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CIVILIAN RESPONSE

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization



Haiti Stabilization Initiative

Making headway in Cité Soleil (page 4)

March/April 2009, Issue No. 8

Photo: Melanne Civic

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In the fall of 2008, S/CRS sent a team to DRC to explore how we could provide additional assistance to U.S. Government efforts to promote security, stability and reconstruction in eastern DRC. (*page 4*)

***Civilian Response* Staff**: Editor in Chief: Beth Poisson; Public Affairs: Melanie Anderton & Todd Calongne; Graphic Design: Jeannine Ajello; I.T. Coordination: James Stansell

Looking ahead to the May/June issue of *Civilian Response*...

Elections in Afghanistan

In mid-March, at Amb. Richard Holbrooke's request, S/CRS stood up an interagency team to coordinate U.S. Government support for Afghanistan's August 20 elections. The team, led by Amb. (Ret.) Tim Carney, consists of State, USAID, and DoD Afghanistan hands who will work in concert with the UN, NGOs, and international partners. The team will deploy in May 2009.

Operation Austere Challenge

The Civilian Response Corps deployed as part of Austere Challenge, a civilian military exercise that will end in mid-May 2009. The Corps is participating in this exercise with U.S European Command in order to ensure close civil-militay coordination in future crisis response operations.

Training Launch

The Foreign Service Institute and S/CRS are launching two new courses geared toward U.S. Government actors: PD573: Introduction to Interagency Reconstruction & Stabilization Operations (online) and RS500: Foundations of Interagency R&S Operations. Find more information in the Training section of www.crs.state.gov.

Haiti Stabilization Initiative

Two Years Later: Cité Soleil's Door is Open

Proving the concept and building credibility.

By Merrie Archer

About the Author: Merrie Archer is a Senior Planning Officer in S/CRS.

Two years after its inauguration, the $20 million Haiti Stabilization Initiative's (HSI) integrated approach to civilian-led stabilization and reconstruction has brought real, palpable change to Cité Soleil. The initiative has done what it said it would do: create enough momentum of both security and development in Cité Soleil to enable this vital hub to stabilize enough for real development to begin.

"... [T]he Secretary General referred to Cité Soleil. It was a no-man's land. Now there is a new sense of security and freedom in its streets."

- Secretary of State Clinton
Haiti Donors Conference
April 14, 2009

Progress, as in the rest of Haiti, is fragile, uneven and by no means assured. The Haiti Stabilization Initiative, however, has opened the door to Cité Soleil, building momentum that, with continued support from the Government of Haiti, the private sector and the donor community will ensure that the positive developments continue. HSI marks two-years with the bulk of its projects completed or near completion, funding obligated and essentially spent, with one remaining major component scheduled for completion in early September. HSI is now focused on its team's efforts to identify synergistic opportunities and leverage projects with other donors and the private sector.



Looking Back: S/CRS first described its involvement with the Haiti Stabilization Initiative in the January 2008 edition of **Civilian Response**.

HSI is a pilot project designed to test and demonstrate a whole-of-government, civilian-led approach to stabilization, and led by a cross-cutting team of USG experts. HSI was designed by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in concert with elements of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, with broad input from the U.S. Mission to Haiti. Support comes from Section 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act which transfers funds to civilian agencies for stabilization and reconstruction. Oversight is provided by S/CRS. HSI was designed with a specific implementation unit for ensuring flexibility and speed in implementation.

The project focuses on Cité Soleil, a volatile enclave of 300,000, located in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and completely lost to Haitian government control until the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) reclaimed it through military operations at the beginning of 2007.

HSI focuses on building community, opportunity and security, and is made up of quick-impact activities in job-creating infrastructure, strengthened judicial procedures and community policing. These build on existing USAID and Embassy programs. Initial activities were operational within weeks of the official launch of HSI in April 2007, providing credibility with Cité Soleil residents and the Haitian Government.

Why HSI Works

MINUSTAH efforts to retake control of Cité Soleil were critical to long term success and a necessary precursor to the U.S. Government program, especially in light of the absence of any viable Haitian National Police presence. Military action alone, however, would not have been enough. Building on S/CRS' core principles guiding conflict transformation, HSI sought to fill the gap between the establishment of security and the inevitable wait for a government of Haiti donor-supported presence to establish itself. Facilitating the return of the police to the area for the first time in over a decade through construction of police stations, training and the introduction of community policing has been vital to this momentum.

HSI's goal was to quickly stabilize the bitter and violent Cité Soleil gang-led environment so that regular U.S. Government programs, other donors and the Haitian government could begin to work normally. *[continued on page 7]*

Conflict in Eastern Congo:
U.S. Tools for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Promoting security, stability and reconstruction.

By Lyla Andrews Bashan & Jason Lewis-Berry

About the Authors: Lyla Andrews Bashan is a Conflict Prevention Officer in S/CRS. Jason Lewis-Berry is a Planning Officer.

View from the sky as our plane prepares for landing (Photo: Lyla Bashan)

As our United Nations flight from Kinshasa landed in Goma, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), we were greeted by Mount Nyiragongo, the volcano that hovers over the town. The most recent eruption, in 2002, left almost 50 people dead and 120,000 homeless. The remnants of this eruption can be seen in the many walls around town built with the same jagged volcanic rock that continues to blanket much of the ground. One is quickly reminded that this devastation is the least of Congolese worries: on the wall of the small United Nations airport is a color-coded sign titled, "Threat Assessment Level Goma." The day we landed was a good day – the arrow is only pointing at the red level 4 rather than the maximum black level 5. We later learn that one of the front lines of the conflict between the Government of the DRC and the main rebel group at the time, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), is in the foothills of the volcano, just 12 miles north of Goma.

Natural resources, ethnicity, and lack of state authority all work together to make this conflict highly complex, with no easy solutions.

Many parts of eastern DRC remain unstable, especially in the province of North Kivu. The conflict, once a full-blown war involving seven national armies, has spanned 15 years and resulted in over 5 million deaths. This most recent stage of the conflict in the east involves the DRC Government, the CNDP, and another armed group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (more commonly known by its French acronym "FDLR"). The CNDP's purported goal is to protect the Tutsi people and other ethnic minorities, while the FDLR is led by a small number of génocidaires, the ethnic Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Natural resources, ethnicity, and lack of state authority all work together to make this conflict highly complex, with no easy solutions.

Sadly, the violence and instability in the DRC is not an aberration in today's world. Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day. The U.S. Government has learned from past experiences that we need to be able to prevent conflict and, if necessary, help stabilize and reconstruct countries emerging from conflict. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004 to strengthen the U.S. Government response to conflict. As it has done in more than 20 countries, S/CRS has applied several of its stabilization and reconstruction tools to the situation in eastern DRC as part of the U.S. effort to improve stability in this conflict-stricken region.

One such effort is an $11.9 million program focused on border policing, civilian and military judicial reform, and local governance. The Office of the Coordinator's conflict prevention programs are funded through section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year to the Department of State for programs that support security, reconstruction or stabilization around the world.

Following this precept, in June 2008, S/CRS and USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation facilitated a three-day interagency conflict assessment in Washington that helped identify the main drivers and mitigators of conflict in the DRC. This assessment tool, known as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, is designed to guide a shared interagency analysis of conflict dynamics and identify potential entry points for U.S. Government efforts. More than thirty interagency partners participated in this assessment and the findings fed into the DRC's Country Assistance Strategy, a five-year U.S. Government foreign assistance strategy.

In the fall of 2008, S/CRS sent a team to DRC to explore how we could provide additional assistance to U.S. Government efforts to promote security, stability and reconstruction in eastern DRC. This scoping team was comprised of the DRC analyst from the State Department's Humanitarian Information Unit and three S/CRS staff: a Conflict Prevention Officer, a Planning Officer, and a Diplomatic Security Agent detailed to the Civilian Response Corps. Corps members, drawn from the interagency community and coordinated by S/CRS, are U.S. Government employees with conflict expertise who are available to reinforce reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Washington and our Embassies abroad.

In the fall of 2008, S/CRS sent a team to DRC to explore how we could provide additional assistance to U.S. Government efforts to promote security, stability and reconstruction in eastern DRC.

The first member of our scoping team arrived in country shortly after a rebel offensive in October 2008. S/CRS took the opportunity to reexamine the situation and support the embassy during this crisis. Once the situation had stabilized somewhat, the rest of the team followed, spending a few days undertaking consultations in the capital, Kinshasa.

We spent the next week in Goma consulting with U.S. and United Nations staff, international donors, and NGOs. In addition to our many consultations – over 30 in 2 weeks – we visited several camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The fighting that began in August 2008 has resulted in an estimated 250,000 IDPs, many of whom have been displaced several times. These are in addition to the nearly one million pre-existing IDPs. Visiting the camps allowed us to see first hand the condition of the victims of the conflict. This moving experience helped breathe life into all we were learning from our consultations with officials and donors.

The United States, along with the broader international community, has worked hard to create a level of stability in the DRC. Although the situation in North Kivu remains tense, other parts of the east have significantly improved in recent years. In coordination with the Embassy, USAID and other offices within the State Department, our scoping trip developed several potential avenues for enhancing stability in eastern DRC. As the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization continues to collaborate with our interagency colleagues and the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, we hope to see good ideas become a reality on the ground and contribute to a positive outcome for eastern DRC.

Clockwise from left: (1) Landing at Goma airport; (2) Threat assessment level barometer at the airport; (3) Weaving through traffic in downtown Goma (Photos: Lyla Bashan)

A Whole of Government Approach to Stability

Civil-military cooperation underpins Smart Power.

By Matthew Cordova

About the Author: Matthew Cordova is Deputy Director of Planning for civil-military affairs.

Secretaries Clinton and Gates have spoken frequently and eloquently about the need to strengthen civilian instruments of national power to leverage the full potential of the U.S. Government (USG). Current U.S. national security challenges include violent extremist organizations, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the global financial crisis, and weak and failing states. These challenges are highly dynamic and complex because of the number of actors involved and the speed at which the environment changes. Whole-of-government capabilities are necessary to manage national security issues that are by nature complex, dynamic and of international concern. There is no single agency or country solution and no single strategy that will endure over time to solve these challenges.

The U.S. civil-military approach to stability operations demonstrates the development of a dimension of Smart Power, a term coined by Harvard University's Joseph Nye as the ability to combine hard (military) and soft power (civilian-led development assistance) into a winning strategy." Stability operations are diverse in nature and require flexible responses. The United States has been involved in 17 stability operations since the fall of the Berlin Wall -- ranging from present-day efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to prior efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti among others.

"…we've got to get our arms around what you could think of as traditional foreign aid -- health, education, economic empowerment and the like -- plus what is now becoming increasingly important -- that's reconstruction, stability, conflict resolution, peacekeeping challenges that we face."

– Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, January 2009 confirmation hearing

"The problem is that the civil side of our government -- the Foreign Service and foreign-policy side, including our aid for international development -- [has] been systematically starved of resources for a quarter of a century or more…"

- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, December 2008 interview with Charlie Rose

Now approaching its fifth year, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is maturing into an operational component of U.S. Smart Power. S/CRS is charged with building and managing a civilian-military capability to plan, manage and conduct U.S. stabilization operations on behalf of the Secretary of State. Civilian-military coordination is a central feature of the whole-of-government capability S/CRS is building with domestic, foreign affairs and national security agencies of the federal government. This is consistent with the President's highest priority – keeping the American people safe – and based on the premise that homeland security goes hand in hand with national security.

S/CRS has led a range of interagency activities to coordinate civilian and military efforts to plan, train and operate together for overseas stability operations. Since 2005, the USG has developed an interagency planning and coordination framework for interagency stability operations – the Interagency Management System (IMS). The IMS has been robustly exercised at U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command, and components of the framework have been employed in real-world situations, such as the fall 2008 crisis in Georgia. At the end of April, we will work with U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe on our most sophisticated exercise to date – Austere Challenge 2009, which will exercise planning mechanisms and the Civilian Response Corps with U.S. European Command. *[continued on page 12]*

PARTNER PROFILE: The Department of Justice

By Joseph M. Jones

About the Author: Joseph Jones is Special Rule of Law Adviser to Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Mr. Jones is on detail from the Department of Justice where he serves as the Senior Rule of Law Adviser, Criminal Division.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is a strong supporter of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), both of S/CRS's critical role in Reconstruction and Stabilization programs and of the formation of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). DOJ engages in extensive operational activities overseas. We have Federal Prosecutors and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, located at embassies throughout the world. Additionally, for over 20 years, two DOJ components have been devoted exclusively to planning, staffing and implementing Rule of Law related development projects overseas. These programs are the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement and corrections, and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT), which seeks to improve the skills of foreign prosecutors, investigators, and judges, and promotes the rule of law and regard for human rights. ICITAP and OPDAT's programs are managed, both in Washington and in the field, by federal employees with senior career criminal justice and international Rule of Law development experience. ICITAP and OPDAT's reach-back capability is strong with 5000 attorneys (both criminal and civil,) 20,000+ members of DOJ's law enforcement components, and many other experts in diverse areas of Rule of Law. ICITAP and OPDAT have had major Rule of Law development roles in every post-conflict theater, from the 1990s implementation of the Central American peace accords through today's development of police, corrections, prosecutorial, judicial, anti-corruption and legislative systems in Iraq.

DOJ has made substantial progress in hiring its initial cadre of Civilian Response Corps Active component members (10 Actives hired as of 4-8-09), drawing upon professionals who have extensive experience as field managers for DOJ Rule of Law development programs. Training of DOJ CRC Active and Standby members (60+ identified) is already in progress. DOJ looks forward to full partnering with our interagency colleagues in all future S/CRS and U.S. whole-of-government Rule of Law development programs.

Haiti *[continued from page 3]* The key to HSI's success in facilitating the relatively rapid transformation of this distressed community has been its unflagging focus on multi-sectoral integration in a specific geographic zone. No activities were undertaken in isolation or without linkages to as many other relevant elements as possible. HSI was mandated to use its projects as leverage for buy-in from other programs and actors, or as a catalyst to generate other activities. There is nothing unique about the type or scope of the projects themselves; the difference lies in the original conception of the initiative as a whole and in dedicating staff specifically focused on its implementation.

Speed also played an important role, differentiating HSI from most programs that take two years from budgeting to first expenditures. Conceptualized as the "pointy end of the carrot," HSI bypassed business as usual – leaving many in the private sector and in NGOs amazed at its positive and concrete response to their ideas. This gave the program enormous credibility in a community inured to broken promises by the donors and the government of Haiti. HSI proved to be different, and leveraged that difference into a new attitude on the part of nascent or reborn community grassroots organizations. As much as this was a stabilization program or a development program, it was an anti-gang program.

Conflict Transformation

Cité Soleil today is a changed environment. It is less a hair trigger population ready to react on command or in reaction to any number of catalytic events -- man-made or natural -- and more of a community increasingly trying to work together. This represents a depoliticizing of conflict and a more pragmatic focus on grassroots self-interest. The stage has been set for regular aid, training, health, education, and microenterprise programs to begin operating, and they are. Elements of Haiti's private sector are coming around to the idea that there is value in promoting and supporting training and education opportunities and are beginning to consider reinvesting in the larger neighborhood. We can say that in two years, despite difficulties both internal and external, HSI did what it said it would do, in one of the most difficult places in the Western Hemisphere.

Civilian Stabilization Initiative: New Funding in FY2009 Omnibus

By Terry Heide

About the Author: Terry Heide is Legislative Liaison for S/CRS.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) recently received funding under the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 2009 (Div. H, P.L. 111-8). Also known as the FY2009 Omnibus, P.L. 111-8 appropriated a total of $75 million for CSI into two accounts: One at State Department ($45 million) and one at USAID ($30 million) to continue the stand-up of the Civilian Response Corps.

The standup of the Civilian Response Corps is a joint effort and an interagency effort.

These funds are in addition to the $65 million received under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252) enacted in July 2008. Supplemental funds were appropriated to both State ($30 million in supplemental funding and $10 million in bridge funding) and USAID ($25 million in supplemental funding). Supplemental funds are only available for obligation until 30 September 2009 while the funds received under the Omnibus are available until expended.

As was the case under the FY2008 Supplemental, only the Active and Standby components were funded in the Omnibus, not the Reserve component. The Omnibus and the accompanying Explanatory Statement also contain a few other provisions.

- Requires that State and USAID develop and submit a coordinated joint financial plan to the Congress within 60 days of encactment, or by 11 May 2009, of all funds received in FY2008 and FY2009.
- Requires that State and USAID submit to Congress an integrated implementation strategy for all funds made available in FY2008 and FY2009, again within 60 days of enactment, or 11 May 2009.
- Provides that up to $23 million of the funds made available to State in both FY2008 and FY2009 can be used to support the administrative expenses of the S/CRS.
- Provides that up to $6 million of the funds made available to USAID in the FY09 Omnibus can be used to support the "Office of Surge Administration" at USAID. (Note that this office was misnamed in the Act. It is actually called the Office of Civilian Response, or OCR.)
- States that the President may exercise existing transfer authority provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and as provided in the Omnibus, but only to support and actively deployed Civilian Response Corps and not for regular operations, and only after consulting with and notifying the Appropriations Committees. It also states that the President should use this transfer authority judiciously.
- Requires that State, in consultation with USAID, submit a report to the Appropriations Committees that clarifies the relationship between the CSI and (1) existing disaster response capabilities of the U.S. Government, and (2) the Department of Defense disaster response capabilities, assets, and authorities.

Unlike the FY08 supplemental which made a distinction between the funds for State and the funds for USAID, the Omnibus sees the funding going towards development of an overall CSI program that just happens to be appropriated into two CSI accounts. This memorializes the relationship between State and USAID that was begun under the supplemental funding: The stand-up of the Civilian Response Corps is a joint effort and an interagency effort.

P.L. 111-8 appropriated a total of $75 million for CSI into two accounts: One at State Department ($45 million) and one at USAID ($30 million) to continue the stand-up of the Civilian Response Corps.

The funds received under the FY2009 Omnibus will be used to expand the Active component to a total of 250 from the 100 planned under the FY08 Supplemental. The funds will also expand to the Standby component to 600 from the 311 currently on-board. The FY2009 Omnibus, like the supplemental, does not include funding for the Reserve. When fully funded, the Active component will number 250, the Standby will be 2000, and the Reserve component will be 2000.

The FY2009 Omnibus language also continues the nomenclature of the FY2008 Supplemental by referring to the Active, Standby and Reserve components of the Civilian Response Corps. The authorization refers to a Readiness Response Corps, made up of Active and Standby components, and a Civilian Reserve Corps, now known as the Reserve component.

Supporting Bangladesh's Return to Democracy

By: Jon Danilowicz &
Jason Lewis-Berry

Photo: Melissa Bentley

About the Authors: Jon Danilowicz is Political Counselor at U.S. Embassy Dhaka. Jason Lewis-Berry is a Senior Planner in S/CRS.

In response to a request from the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh, James Moriarty, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS) deployed a three-person team to support whole-of-government planning at Embassy Dhaka in January and February 2009. Bangladesh is more stable than some S/CRS destinations, but the Ambassador recognized that the country's return to democracy after two years of a military-backed caretaker government presented a number of new risks and opportunities.

With S/CRS support, Embassy Dhaka was able to develop a plan that integrates all the instruments of national power to achieve policy objectives…

S/CRS facilitated the Embassy's development of an interagency plan that would assist them in seizing new opportunities and addressing new challenges during this period of potential instability. Personnel ranging from section chiefs to junior officers and representing multiple offices within State, USAID, Defense, and Justice participated in facilitated discussions over several weeks. The heavy intellectual lifting was done by the Embassy itself, as Dhaka's planning team generated the substance of the Plan. S/CRS' role was to lead them through an interagency planning process based on best practices for countries at risk of, in, or emerging from instability or conflict.

With S/CRS support, Embassy Dhaka produced a USG Three-Year Strategic Plan for Bangladesh, based on a shared interagency understanding of the environment and including an overarching policy goal, strategic objectives, sub-objectives, metrics, and strategies to prevent and mitigate major risks. The planning process simultaneously produced the content of Dhaka's annual Mission Strategic Plan, which provides strategic context, a collective understanding of priorities, and guidance for the Mission's tactical decisions, operational programming, and performance management. This deployment was an excellent example of how a Mission can tap into S/CRS to both develop new capabilities and to fulfill existing obligations.

Already a well integrated Post, Embassy Dhaka quickly adapted to the whole-of-government planning process. Participants from all sections appreciated the opportunity to analyze and plan together. They found it useful to flesh out how their individual work connected to other parts of the Embassy, and to link their particular portfolio to broader strategic goals.

At Ambassador Moriarty's request, S/CRS briefed Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher on the strategic planning process during his visit to Dhaka, which went well. All sections of the Embassy (to include USAID, Defense, Justice, and others) were pleased with both the planning process and products. It was a rewarding deployment for S/CRS as well, as the office was able to adapt a flexible interagency planning process to meet the specific needs of a Mission at a critical time. With S/CRS support, Embassy Dhaka was able to develop a plan that integrates all the instruments of national power to achieve policy objectives in a country whose stability is important to broader U.S. regional goals.

The Embassy is using the Plan as a living strategic management tool to monitor progress and adapt to any changes in the environment. In fact, just two days after S/CRS' departure, one branch of the Bangladesh military suffered a bloody mutiny attempt. Ambassador Moriarty and his senior staff indicated that the Mission's ability to understand the crisis and develop a whole-of-government response was significantly aided by the strategic planning process they had just completed.

Deployment Stories:
From Abeche to Zabul

By Charlie Wintermeyer

About the Author: Charlie Wintermeyer served as an Active component Officer in the Civilian Response Corps from 2006 through 2008.

Afghanistan

I deployed to Afghanistan in June 2008 and, after some changes in my assignment, finally wound up serving as the Policy Advisor to the 4/101 brigade. This being an active war zone, my prior experience in such situations really helped to prepare me for this deployment. I served as the State Department representative on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Zabul Province and before that in the military. One of the most memorable parts of this deployment was getting to fly around Afghanistan in a Blackhawk helicopter with the brigade commander. Meeting with provincial governors, chiefs of police, and other Afghan officials at "Border Flag Meetings" was also very interesting. The saddest part was attending memorial services for soldiers killed in action.

I took very few ground trips during this deployment. One was to a Zadran tribal shura, and another to downtown Khost when Ambassador Herbst visited the Khost PRT. We made both trips in MRAPs, Mine Resistant Ambush Protective Vehicles, another new and interesting mode of transportation. As for the accommodations, I was billeted in a 'private' room, but the plywood walls did not go up to the ceiling, so voices and noises carried, as well as light. A fellow deployed CRC member and I spruced up our quarters a bit by getting new mattresses to replace the ones they gave us that sagged so much they were like dugout canoes.

Hauling away our saggy old mattresses

Exploring Pristina in my spare time

Kosovo

Kosovo was a tragic place in 1999, but when I went there in 2008 it was unlike any other deployment in that it was so very nice. Pristina was a modern city, and I 'deployed' to basically an EU organization, the International Civilian Office (ICO), which was as well-equipped as the U.S. Office/Embassy there. The ICO's purpose was to oversee Kosovo's independence, and my job with them was to help set up the field office plan. This was the easiest, most pleasant deployment I had. I worked almost no overtime, and I got to travel around Kosovo to each of the cities where the ICO wanted to establish a field office. We wore suits instead of Embassy polo shirts and cargo pants, and stayed in a nice hotel or nice Embassy TDY (temporary duty assignment) quarters with private, indoor bathrooms.

It was exciting to be there for Kosovo's independence, although the political situation was extremely confused. It was interesting to work in an EU organization. I felt my value added was as a buffer and negotiator between the budget side and the policy side within the ICO. Our final plan managed to reduce the cost substantially without eliminating necessary policy positions at the field offices. Some off-duty highlights included a trip to historical Prizren, visits to the National Museum of Kosovo, and just walking around downtown every weekend.

Sudan

I deployed to North Darfur to support the Darfur Ceasefire Commission. Unfortunately, I didn't get to travel much outside of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. My major excursion was visiting the local IDP camp with a member of Congress who came to see and talk with victims of violence in Darfur. The other Civilian Response Corps members and I stayed in the small compound we had in El Fasher, where we had access to several vehicles. Meals were either taken at the AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) Cafeteria, one or two restaurants downtown, or consisted of MREs, the military's Meals, Ready to Eat. Every three weeks or so, we'd go back to Sudan's capital Khartoum to communicate classified information (and enjoy real restaurants!).

My daily schedule included attending meetings led by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), now the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and working as the U.S. Civilian Representative to the Darfur Ceasefire Commission (CFC). Much of my time was spent working with the U.S. Military Representative, the Norwegian military UN Representative, and the French CFC Vice-Chairman to help the CFC professionalize its staff. The UNAMID Force Commander really appreciated our support, which made the experience all the more rewarding. Unfortunately, the rebel groups involved were more interested in the Military Subsistence Allowance provided for staffing and assisting the CFC than they were in investigating alleged ceasefire violations.

Meeting with Minni Minawi and Civilian Response Corps Standby member, Drew Mann

It was fascinating dealing directly with Minni Minawi, presidential advisor and leader of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (the only rebel group to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement), his staff, and representatives of several other rebel groups. The Embassy supported us well logistically while we were deployed, but we had to work hard to integrate ourselves and the Embassy's local employees with the Embassy Political and Economic Sections. Off-duty highlights included jogging along the Nile in Khartoum (except when I stepped in 'dried' mud and sank to my thigh in the wet mud underneath) and seeing the pyramids in Meroe, a few hours north of Khartoum.

Chad

I deployed to Chad to observe and report on Darfur refugees, Chadian internally displaced persons (IDPs), and rebel movements in the eastern part of the country. My first stop in Chad was the U.S. embassy in the capital city, Ndjamena, but my primary base of operations was the city of Abeche in eastern Chad. Abeche was the field headquarters for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with refugees and IDPs in the area, as well as for many of the rebel groups from neighboring Darfur, Sudan.

I spent my nights in UNHCR guest housing, with a mattress like a dug-out canoe, and Mickey Mouse sheets. The UNHCR cafeteria was the main place to eat, until we found Mama Fafa's, a great local restaurant. From Abeche, we caught flights to 11 of the 12 refugee camps, and many of the IDP camps. We stayed in UNHCR guest housing there and ate with the staff. The conditions were pretty austere, but it was more interesting than staying in Abeche. We had several visits from Congressional Delegations who came to see Darfur refugees in eastern Chad after having their visas to Sudan denied. At the Embassy, I sat in on meetings between the Ambassador and rebel leaders and participated in follow-up conversations with them.

The overall experience was fascinating, but the most moving aspect was the visits to refugee camps. There I saw firsthand how little the refugees had and what horrible ordeals many of them had suffered at the hands of the Janjaweed. It also became apparent how arbitrary the Sudan-Chad border is for the people living there. It cuts right through tribal areas with no regard for the fact that the people identify themselves by their tribe, not by which side of the border they fall on. A key lesson from this deployment was the utility of having a portable communications device in such remote locations. This small device, the size of a medium-sized book, is actually an antenna that provides internet access anywhere in the world. It was vital to successful completion of the mission. I also learned that although clothes dry very fast when hung outside, it's best to allow them to dry indoors because bugs find damp clothes an ideal place to lay their eggs.

Whole-of-Government [continued from page 6]

These efforts to operationalize Smart Power through the Civilian Response Corps and interagency planners reflect the USG's new approach to planning and conducting stability operations: a civilian-led whole-of-government plan, properly resourced civilian capabilities and the U.S. military in a support role. The Department of Defense has been among the strongest champions of this new approach.

The civil-military approach we have developed is not hypothetical; it is being applied to U.S. national security priorities today. In Afghanistan, the new Interagency Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG) within the U.S. Embassy is the lead body for policy implementation and problem solving. Already, ICMAG has facilitated integrated guidance and geographically-based plans for Regional Command-East and is now moving to Regional Command-South. It has supported development of functional sectoral efforts in areas such as health and Focused District Development and is increasingly coordinating with international actors such as the International Security Assistance Force (on metrics), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (on district mapping) and with the UK (Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team). ICMAG is also working on developing an integrated metrics system in-country.

To ensure the changes described above endure, the State Department is leading a significant USG effort to institutionalize these new processes and capabilities in interagency doctrine, training and planning efforts. Along with other Civilian Agencies, the Department of State has contributed to emerging Department of Defense doctrine, concepts and capabilities related to Irregular Warfare, Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency. S/CRS has made significant investments in building habitual relationships with the Geographic Combatant Commands, Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command and professional military schools to ensure that these key military actors are integrated into the civilian-led Smart Power construct for Stability Operations. S/CRS played a significant role in assisting the U.S. Army in its development of an updated stability operations field manual that emphasizes military support to civilian-led efforts.

A key enabler to these efforts is the civilian resources called for by Secretaries Clinton and Gates. Civilian agencies and the Department of Defense are now planning, operating and training together in a more concerted manner. Congress is a crucial partner and has recognized the value of a whole-of-government capability by permanently establishing S/CRS in legislation and authorizing and funding the stand up of an initial Civilian Response Corps. While this capability is maturing, sustaining it will require a concerted civil-military effort to ensure a balance of resources that meets both the immediate and longer term international security needs of the nation.

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