

APPENDICES



FISCAL YEAR 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

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COMPLETED PROGRAM EVALUATIONS FOR 2004

BY STRATEGIC GOAL

The following provides detailed information on major findings, recommendations, and actions the Department has taken or will take as a result of selected Program Evaluations completed in FY 2004.¹

Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY
Title or Topic	Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) (GAO-04-519)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The State Department made important progress in its efforts to control the global proliferation of MANPADS. Thirty-two foreign governments made multilateral commitments to better control MANPADS and prevent their acquisition by terrorists. ◆ The Department’s ability to assess further progress in MANPADS nonproliferation is limited because the multilateral fora have no mechanisms to monitor members’ implementation of commitments. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department should develop a strategy to work within multilateral fora to establish mechanisms for assessing foreign governments’ implementation of their commitments to reduce MANPADS proliferation. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Addressing how participating governments implement the policy undertakings made in December 2003 is a key next step. For this reason, the United States and other Wassenaar states are examining implementation during 2004, and will continue to do so in future years. ◆ The Wassenaar Arrangement is not an international organization, but a policy-coordinating forum, albeit one specifically focused on export controls for munitions and related dual-use technologies. Examination of how participating states are implementing the policies discussed and agreed upon will be conducted in this context. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Sustained high-level attention and speedy and flexible responses to the threats posed by MANPADS achieved between the U.S. and other Wassenaar states. 	

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Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic	Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO-04-403)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Christina B. Rocca, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South Asian Affairs (SA)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Of the \$900 million that the U.S. spent on non-security related assistance in Afghanistan in FY 2002 and 2003, over 75 percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction. ◆ U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the \$3.7 billion the international community disbursed over the 2-year period. ◆ U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. ◆ By providing food and shelter to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S. assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. ◆ The United States lacked a complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S. government's ability to focus available resources and hold itself accountable for measurable results. U.S. officials responsible lacked complete financial data, which hindered their ability to oversee the assistance. ◆ Lack of staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding further impeded U.S. efforts. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ State should produce an annual consolidated budget report and semiannual reports on obligations and expenditures. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department takes issue with the report's assertion that the United States lacks a complete and integrated assistance strategy. On December 15, 2003, the Department submitted to Congress its report on the "FY 2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related Activities in Afghanistan." ◆ The Department's Report explains that: "In concert with Afghan leaders and international partners, the United States is pursuing a three fold, integrated strategy in Afghanistan, focusing on security, reconstruction and governance. Pursued in parallel, these three elements are mutually reinforcing and promise to create a virtuous cycle as (1) improved security creates conditions for accelerated reconstruction and stronger government; (2) reconstruction boosts stability and confidence in the government by delivering benefits to citizens; and (3) as the growth of constitutional, democratic and effective government discredits those who would return Afghanistan to the anarchy and violence of the past." 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ This three-fold strategy has long underpinned U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and is bearing fruit, as attested by progress already noted. 	

Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic	PEACEKEEPING: Multinational Force and Observers Maintaining Accountability, But State Department Oversight Could Be Improved (GAO-04-883)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Modified several of its financial practices to make them consistent with leading practices in financial management. ◆ Despite budget remaining flat for the last 9 years (at \$51 Million), Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) contributors may face budgetary challenges due to equipment upgrades. ◆ State has not provided employees who possess the expertise to carry out many of its financial oversight responsibilities, along with concerns over leadership capability of some staff for the chief civilian observer posts. ◆ State oversight of MFO and agreement between the U.S. and the MFO on cost-sharing arrangements is essential to ensure the cost of U.S. troop participation is equitably shared. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Resolve the recurring concern of finding qualified candidates for the chief civilian observer unit. ◆ Ensure that staff with accounting expertise is available to carry out NEA's financial oversight responsibilities for MFO. ◆ Direct the MFO management advisory board to monitor and document NEA's compliance with its guidelines for overseeing the MFO. ◆ Work with Army officials to reconcile difference between Army's and State's views about the current MFO cost-sharing arrangements. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ NEA has transferred personnel management function to NEA/EX. ◆ State OIG auditors reviewed recent MFO budgets and financial statements and found nothing that would require further examination. OIG will conduct similar reviews annually. ◆ The State MFO Oversight Advisory Board is monitoring NEA's compliance with its guidelines for monitoring the MFO. ◆ State is awaiting the U.S. Army's development of a new cost allocation model in preparation for a meeting to resolve differences on Army and MFO financial responsibilities 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ There will be greater cost sharing and financial oversight of MFO. 	

Strategic Goal 3		HOMELAND SECURITY
Title or Topic	Review of the Department of State Procedures Related to the Issuance of Visas to the September 11, 2001, Terrorists (ISP-CA-04-17)	
Evaluator	Office of Inspector General (OIG)	
Department Contact	Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ OIG concluded that the consular officers who issued visas to the terrorist hijackers acted in accordance with policies that prevailed at their missions at the time the visas were issued, with published policies, practices and procedures established by the Department, and required by visa law in effect at the time. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ No major recommendations 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Since 9/11, many changes have been made in visa law, policy, practices, and procedures. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Visa processes are strengthened as an anti-terrorist tool. 	
Title or Topic	Review of Export Controls for Foreign Persons Employed at Companies and Universities (AUD/PR-04-24, April 2004)	
Evaluator	Office of Inspector General (OIG)	
Department Contact	Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs (PM)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Coordination between Political-Military Affairs and Consular Affairs and Nonproliferation bureaus, and with external agencies as DoD and DHS is adequate, but was often indirect. ◆ The number of work-related visas issued in the post-9/11 environment has decreased, and refusals have increased. ◆ Political-Military Affairs has not fully implemented planned improvements in export control processes, and could improve its outreach and compliance programs that relate to foreign person employees. ◆ The Compliance Office of Political-Military Affairs has no specific programs or procedures solely used for tracking foreign persons and for ensuring they do not have unauthorized access to sensitive military instruments, technical data, or defense services. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Political-Military Affairs should implement revisions to information management systems to ensure that all foreign persons employed in the U.S. defense trade can be accurately identified. ◆ Political-Military Affairs should coordinate outreach initiatives with the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, and strive to increase the number of jointly sponsored training sessions for the U.S. export control community. ◆ Political-Military Affairs should develop export control policies and procedures for an Office of Compliance audit program. ◆ Political-Military Affairs should coordinate with DHS planned changes to export control documentation that will match license expiration dates with visa expiration dates. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Political-Military Affairs has implemented changes to the D-Trade electronic licensing system's DSP-5 export license application, in addition to continuing enhancements that allow for the capture of information related to foreign national employment on technical assistance agreement export license applications. ◆ Political-Military Affairs has continued to look for outreach opportunities and to work on educating the export community about defense trade controls as they relate to foreign national employment in the U.S. ◆ Political-Military Affairs has hired two contractors with the initial responsibility of developing internal policies and protocols. ◆ Political-Military Affairs will add a proviso to validate the export license to the DHS period of authorized stay in the U.S., for participation by a foreign person employee in International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)-controlled activity. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department's ability to track foreign nationals employed in the U.S. defense trade will be aided by an improved information management system and coordination with the export community. 	

Strategic Goal 3		HOMELAND SECURITY (continued)
Title or Topic	Visa Operations at U.S. Posts in Canada (GAO-04-708)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Consular officers and managers at U.S. posts in Canada said that, “despite rising workloads and more labor-intensive processing requirements,” they are placing an emphasis on security in visa operations. ◆ While most officers felt that they had enough time to screen applicants carefully for possible security risks, some of the newer officers at posts expressed concern about their ability to remain vigilant if the workload increased. This problem was most severe in Toronto, where workload was high and the consulate’s poor space configuration cramped operations. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Informational report, no formal recommendations. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ State took action to address issues in Toronto, including the authorization of funds to hire new consular staff and funds for State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to conduct a review of the physical infrastructure. The Bureau of Consular Affairs sent a Consular Management Assistance Team to Toronto in May 2004 to assess the consular section and make recommendations on how to improve the operation. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Posts have the staff and support needed to manage workload and maintain an emphasis on security in visa operations. 	
Title or Topic	Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars (GAO-04-371)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Based on a random sample of Visas Mantis cases for science students and scholars from April to June 2003, it took an average of sixty-seven days for the security check to be processed and for State to notify the post. ◆ The manner in which Visas Mantis information was disseminated at headquarters made it difficult to resolve some of the cases expeditiously. ◆ The wait time at posts GAO visited was generally two to three weeks, but could be longer depending on the time of year. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Develop and implement a plan to improve the security check process known as Visas Mantis. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ State has invested about \$1 million to upgrade the technology for sending Visas Mantis requests. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Significant reduction in the amount of time it takes to clear a Visas Mantis case. 	

Strategic Goal 4		WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Title or Topic	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities Need Reassessment (GAO-04-521)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The seven major programs funded through State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs appropriations account are authorized by law and engage in activities that are in accord with their authority. ◆ The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) engages in activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations about the scope of the program's mission. ◆ Past appropriations committee reports and testimony by the Secretary of State indicated that the NDF is designed to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation events of immediate concern to the United States. However, at least half of the NDF's \$35 million budget request for FY 2004 and 57 percent of the \$34.5 million request for FY 2005 were designated for longer-term activities preplanned through the annual budget process, including expansion of an export control system called Tracker. Furthermore, the Tracker system has been developed and deployed independently of another Department of State program, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (EXBS), which supports the development of export control capabilities in foreign countries. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ State and Commerce evaluate the extent of integration of export control activities of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and EXBS. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department concurs with GAO's finding that the Tracker program should be better integrated into the export control assessments and country program plans of the EXBS program. The Department is in the process of transferring the Tracker system from NDF to the EXBS program. It is expected to be in place during FY 2005. The EXBS program office will determine in consultation with the host country, posts and other offices in the Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation, including the NDF office, the timing of all future Tracker deployments to countries currently participating - or likely to participate - in the EXBS program. In addition, all EXBS program advisors resident in countries where Tracker already has been deployed have been instructed to report regularly on the system's usage and forward any host government recommendations and requests related to the system. This is an oversight and monitoring function the EXBS program advisors also perform for other U.S. Government nonproliferation assistance efforts. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ These programs will continue to provide flexible, cost-effective tools to address rapidly evolving challenges from WMD proliferation and international terrorism, and the widespread dangers posed to innocent civilians by abandoned landmines. Several programs are expanding their scope to take advantage of new opportunities in areas of concern to the Global War on Terror and the President's nonproliferation initiatives. ◆ Conformed with the major GAO recommendation concerning export control integration. 	

Strategic Goal 5		INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUGS
Title or Topic	Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved (GAO-04-918)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft has increased as those aircraft have increased yearly flying hours from 5,450 hours in FY 2001 to 11,300 hours in FY 2003. ◆ Since January 2003, State has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents' proximity to spray targets. ◆ Since FY 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding doubled from about \$49 million in FY 2001 to \$100 million for FY 2003. ◆ From 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. ◆ State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. ◆ State does not plan for the long-term costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new aircraft. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Develop a strategic planning and budgeting process that accounts for all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ State is taking some initial steps to enhance long-term budgeting and planning. In the FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) process, INL worked to address these needs by requesting funding for a Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP). The CFSP would include a depot level maintenance program, an equipment modernization and replacement program, a robust helicopter upgrade/conversion program, and the acquisition of key aircraft. With these actions, the Department believes it has made substantial strides in this area. INL is also improving long range planning, financial transparency, and fiscal accountability. ◆ Actions already underway include significant action to reconcile prior year funds, establish processes to ensure current funds remain reconciled, recurring program reviews by the Assistant Secretary before program plan and funding final approval, and maximizing the use of de-obligated prior year funds to address budget shortfalls. ◆ The report states that the State Department does not have a strategic plan for the aviation program. In fact, the initial INL Air Wing Strategic Plan was completed in April 2004. The process included several days of participation by all aviation Functional Area Managers, Senior Aviation Advisors, and Resource Management Strategic Planning personnel. ◆ Examples of the INL Aviation Program's Strategic Planning process include the Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP) and Reorganization Plans, which were incorporated into the INL FY 2006 BPP and FY 2006 Budget Request. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ More comprehensive long-term planning and budgeting processes will result in improved budgets for the Office of Aviation with more specific ties to program requirements, including aircraft replacement. 	

Strategic Goal 8		ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY
Title or Topic	U.S. Non-Military Assistance To Colombia Is Beginning To Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable (GAO-04-726)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Although U.S. non-military assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation changes, and may not be sustainable. ◆ Programs designed to promote economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. ◆ The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles, such as limited funding and security constraints. ◆ Despite the progress made by the three non-military assistance programs, Colombia and the U.S. continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. ◆ The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for non-military assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining non-military assistance efforts. ◆ U.S. assistance to vulnerable groups has provided support to many displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need. The USG has not maximized the mutual benefits of its non-military assistance programs and has not established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. ◆ The Department and USAID have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Improve systematic coordination among the three non-military assistance programs in Colombia. A plan should include a timeline for achieving stated objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved. ◆ Improved coordination between State and USAID. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Solutions to improving systematic coordination between State and USAID are being explored at the working level both in Washington, D.C. and in the field. The Humanitarian Action Plan - a joint coordination product of the UN system and the government of Colombia - is an excellent example of cooperation and coordination. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ PRM and USAID will benefit from their efforts to develop a more formal mechanism to address the transition gap between short-term assistance and long-term development. 	

Strategic Goal 9		SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Title or Topic	Global Health: U.S. AIDS Coordinator Addressing Some Key Challenges to Expanding Treatment, but Others Remain (GAO-04-784)	
Evaluator	Government Accountability Office (GAO)	
Department Contact	Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ U.S. Government field staff identified the following as the most significant challenges to implementing and expanding Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment in resource-poor settings: (1) coordination difficulties among both U.S. and non-U.S. entities; (2) U.S. government policy constraints; (3) shortages of qualified host country health workers; (4) host government constraints; and (5) weak infrastructure, including data collection and reporting systems and drug supply systems. ◆ Although the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator has begun to address these challenges, additional effort, longer-term solutions, and the support of others involved in providing ARV treatment are required. ◆ The Office has taken steps to improve U.S. coordination and acknowledged the need to collaborate with others, but it is too soon to tell whether these efforts will be effective. ◆ To address policy constraints, U.S. agencies are working to enhance contracting capacity in the field and resolve differences on procurement, foreign taxation of U.S. assistance, and auditing of non-U.S. grantees. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Global AIDS Coordinator should monitor agencies' efforts to coordinate with host governments and other stakeholders. ◆ Work with the USAID Administrator and the HHS Secretary to resolve contracting capacity constraints and any negative effects from agency differences on procurement, foreign taxation of U.S. assistance, and auditing of non-U.S. grantees. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Program efforts and activities have progressed far beyond what the report describes, and work is underway to address the majority of challenges and issues raised. ◆ The Office has taken steps to improve U.S. coordination and acknowledged the need to collaborate with others. ◆ To address policy constraints, U.S. agencies are working to enhance contracting capacity in the field and resolve differences on procurement, foreign taxation of U.S. assistance, and auditing of non-U.S. grantees. ◆ The Office has taken steps to encourage host countries' commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, but it is not addressing systemic challenges outside its authority, such as poor delineation of roles among government bodies. ◆ The Office is taking steps to improve data collection and reporting and better manage drug supplies. ◆ The Office is developing a longer-term training and capacity-building strategy that includes strengthening training systems and local training institutions, and improving human resource policies and planning at the national level. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The U.S. Government is making overwhelming progress under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to bring hope and care to millions around the world, but much remains to be done. In leading the world's response, the Department believes the USG can restore lives, preserve families, and help nations progress forward. 	

Strategic Goal 10		HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
Title or Topic	Report to Congress in Response to Section 594 (c) of Public Law 108-199 (Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act), Fiscal Year 2004: U.S. Government Efforts to Protect Women and Children Affected by Humanitarian Emergencies	
Evaluator	PRM, G/IWI, USAID, HHS	
Department Contact	Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The USG is a leader in protecting and assisting women and children affected by humanitarian emergencies through a broad range of activities. However, funding cycles during a humanitarian emergency are often short-term, influenced by the "relief culture," political imperatives, and budgetary processes. ◆ Departments of State, HHS, and USAID have pivotal roles in devising policy and providing assistance. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Increase U.S. Government agencies' flexibility and independence to make longer-term programmatic commitments to improving protection mechanisms. ◆ Suggest United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) establish a Protection Coordinator in areas where there are significant protection problems. ◆ UNHCR should prioritize the implementation of the High Commissioner's five commitments to refugee women. ◆ Devote more attention, expertise, and funding to evaluating the impact of protection interventions to assess their efficacy. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ PRM and USAID advocate strongly for UNOCHA to designate a Protection Coordinator in areas where there are significant protection problems. ◆ PRM is providing funding to the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children to assist and ensure UNHCR's implementation of the High Commissioner's five commitments to refugee women. ◆ PRM and USAID are engaged in a series of discussions on humanitarian protection – both internally and with partner organizations. ◆ PRM provided \$3 million in FY 2004 to UNHCR for the creation of 27 new protection-related positions in field locations. PRM also supports the development of technical expertise and training on protection issues, including exploitation. PRM has developed an efficiency measure on protection for OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ International coordination on protection issues will improve. ◆ UNHCR will fully implement the High Commissioner's five commitments to refugee women. ◆ Protection strategies will become more effective; agencies will improve measurements of the impact of protection efforts; and humanitarian staff will have increased capacity/expertise to respond to protection issues. 	

Strategic Goal 11		PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Title or Topic	Changing Minds, Winning Peace	
Evaluator	U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (Reporting to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives)	
Department Contact	Patricia Harrison, Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ U.S. Public Diplomacy requires a new strategic direction and should be better coordinated. ◆ The current state of U.S. Public Diplomacy funding is absurdly and dangerously inadequate, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. ◆ The most effective public diplomacy programs are those that are mutually beneficial to the United States and to the Arab and Muslim countries. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ A new culture of measurement must be established within all public diplomacy functions. ◆ Additional professional staff for public diplomacy dedicated to issues of the Arab and Muslim world is urgently needed. ◆ Programs in support of English language training, a critical instrument of outreach, education, and job opportunity, must be expanded. ◆ A rapid expansion of the scope of the American Corners program for local institutions should be undertaken, especially given the decreased access to American facilities. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department has created the inter-bureau Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council to guide the evaluation and measurement of all public diplomacy activities. ◆ The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources now coordinate PD activities and infrastructure. ◆ A survey of PD officers and staff worldwide was conducted to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and use of PD activities. ◆ The Bureau of International Information Programs has established a system to regularize the sharing of information through an existing central clearinghouse and database. ◆ Regular meetings of a Policy Coordinating Committee on outreach to the Arab and Muslim World. ◆ The Department has developed a micro-scholarship program to provide English language training to over 1000 students per year. ◆ The American Corners program continues to expand in key countries. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Improved measurement of the actual impact of U.S. public diplomacy. Department and inter-agency coordination, strategic planning and PD-wide evaluation efforts better inform program decision-making and performance targets. ◆ A stronger U.S. public diplomacy message, more effectively and efficiently disseminated. ◆ Intake of valuable information about issues affecting the Arab and Muslim world, increasing the Department's understanding of its audience. ◆ Increased spread of English language proficiency in the Arab and Muslim world, providing foreign nationals with better access to information and commerce. ◆ Today's American Corners can restore the public presence, trust, and understanding similar U.S. public diplomacy facilities encouraged during the Cold War, and which was lost over the past decade. 	

Strategic Goal 11	
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (continued)	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	<p>Report of Inspection on the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) (ISP-I-04-31) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Alexander C. Feldman, Coordinator, Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)</p>
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Among the report's 43 formal and nine informal recommendations are the first independent evaluative focus on the Interagency Strategic Communication Fusion Team, American Corners and the Washington File. ◆ Interagency Fusion Team members collaboratively reach across agency boundaries to offer or to seek support for their respective strategic communication plans and activities. The team operates at the action officer level. ◆ The Washington File brings together in one daily document transcripts of the highest-level U.S. foreign policy statements and other source material. For many years the File was sent by cable to embassies around the world; it is now web-based, transmitted electronically. Today the Washington File, published in English, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, Persian, French, and Spanish, is considered the medium of record overseas for official public statements about U.S. policies and information on U.S. society and institutions. ◆ American Corners are promising public diplomacy outposts that contain Internet access, a small reference collection and meeting space. Originating with the public diplomacy staff in Russia, the American Corners are sponsored by a host country's municipal or national government and located in publicly accessible buildings. They provide a programming platform to reach foreign publics, especially the young, and offer places for holding program events. There are now 150 American Corners abroad, an increase of almost 100% over last year, with 128 more in various stages of development.
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ "The Fusion Team is a large interagency group (more than 100 members) that meets weekly to share information about public diplomacy projects conducted by various agencies. OIG observed that these meetings are useful fora for presentation of information about the latest public diplomacy initiatives," but needs greater participation by geographic and functional bureaus in the Department. ◆ IIP should clearly delineate goals of the Washington File, enhance search engine capabilities, update the website to provide users with more manageable hyperlinks and a more interesting and user-friendly look. IIP should reevaluate the current structure of the Washington File and develop a plan for improving editorial review, oversight and quality control. ◆ IIP should develop and implement guidelines covering the assistance it provides to embassies in setting up and maintaining American Corners.
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Fusion Team participation from within the State Department is not yet widespread, even as participation from other agencies continues to increase. Interagency membership in the Fusion Team is now over 300, more than triple the size described by the OIG. ◆ In April 2004, IIP implemented Convera, one of the best search engines on the market. There has been a significant drop in the number of complaints about searches on the Washington File after July 2004. IIP has also implemented new procedures to improve quality control processes for Washington File and USINFO website content. Starting this fall, all offices are required to submit material for web publication to a newly re-organized Central Processing Office that is responsible for the editorial review of all articles. The bureau continues to pursue state-of-the-art standards in the midst of technological change and to assure appropriate career development. ◆ The newly created Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council is working with IIP and the Department's geographic bureaus to develop definitions and suggested standards that bureaus may use to develop their evaluation protocols for American Corners. IIP has established a system to regularize the sharing of information through an existing central clearinghouse and database.
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Fusion Team members continue to report that the team meetings are among their best sources for interagency information and their most effective venue either for offering or seeking support across agencies boundaries. Examples of such support: 1) Interagency support for a DoD documentary film about U.S. military support to Muslim populations; 2) Support for an IIP publication about DoD global humanitarian assistance; 3) Information USAID offered to other agencies to inform international publics about reconstruction in Iraq; and 4) Multi-lingual publications offered by IIP to inform international publics about the U.S. election process. ◆ The ultimate goal for the Washington File is improved capability to reach our intended international users with messages that will generate greater understanding of the U.S. and its policies, diminish the current level of antipathy and lead international publics to take action more consistent with U.S. interests. ◆ American Corners can restore the public presence and the trust and understanding that they brought and which was lost over the past decade. They can go a long way toward providing an antidote to international hostility towards the U.S.

Strategic Goal 11 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS <i>(continued)</i>	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Report of Inspection: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) (ISP-1-04-07A) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Since September 11, ECA has consciously sought and found ways its programs can contribute to short-term policy priorities and long-term foreign policy goals. ◆ Exchange programs run by the Department are an efficient and effective method for U.S. Public Diplomacy. ◆ ECA's best practices include an effective evaluations process and interagency working group.
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Establish a mechanism for regular senior-level consultation with all agencies involved in student and visitor exchanges to coordinate policy and operational issues. ◆ Review the University Partnership Program to ensure that it meets critical needs in targeted areas. ◆ Revise binational agreements that do not require foreign government contributions with a goal to gain host government participation. ◆ Consult with the Office of Procurement to identify requirements for competitive award of Bureau grants and revise procedures accordingly.
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Coordination established with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security. ◆ Conducted evaluation of the Educational Partnerships Program and will review the results and coordinate with the regional bureaus to identify specific needs that the program can help to satisfy in underserved world regions. ECA will review the program in cooperation with the Fulbright Scholar and specialist programs. ◆ Review underway of several binational agreements, and renegotiation of some new agreements. ◆ New guidelines established for competitive award of Bureau grants.
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Augmented coordination and ability to move visitors more smoothly through the system. ◆ More targeted programming and support for academic exchanges in areas where it is difficult to create and implement exchange efforts. ◆ More leveraging of resources for exchange programs to increase the number of foreign visitors to the United States and the number of Americans traveling abroad. ◆ Expansion of competition opportunities for ECA grant awards.

Strategic Goal 11		PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Public Diplomacy Global Survey Public Diplomacy Survey Team Ted Kniker, Chief for Evaluation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Public diplomacy and public affairs programs, products and services are well regarded by missions worldwide. All activities received ratings of better than average or above both for effectiveness and efficiency. ◆ Posts are using a wider range of public diplomacy tools than in 2000. ◆ Programs that provide for direct people-to-people contact were rated very highly – especially the International Visitor Leadership Program, Fulbright, and youth programs. ◆ Products that quickly get our embassies the kind of broad and authoritative information they need for policy advocacy are vital. Examples are the Washington File, our IIP and PA websites and Electronic Journals. ◆ New initiatives that help the Department reach broader and younger audiences, such as American Corners, sports and cultural programs received strong ratings. ◆ The current mix of PD activities is generally effective at reaching traditional audiences, but needs improvement to reach youth, ethnic and religious minorities, and non-elites. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ A client-based application should be used to deliver the surveys to respondents, rather than a web-based survey, hosted on an external server. Web surveys are ill equipped to handle the complexity and magnitude of the PD survey. These problems are compounded by the firewalls in the OpenNet system. ◆ Responses should be collected by country, rather than by individual. One official and comprehensive response should be requested from each Mission, rather than asking individuals who manage only a portion of the PD portfolio to respond. ◆ Question wording should be refined, especially about non-use of programs. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Review of different survey mechanisms and formulation of a plan for future surveys. ◆ The Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council will be putting into place ideas on how to better inform the field of the wide range of public diplomacy tools available. ◆ Development of a schedule for program evaluation based upon the findings. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Better and more frequent feedback from post on PD activities and tools. ◆ Clearer picture of how PD programs are used and rated for effectiveness and efficiency by missions abroad. ◆ Increased use of a wider range of PD activities and tools by missions abroad. ◆ Better information about the impact of key public diplomacy initiatives 	

Strategic Goal 11 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS <i>(continued)</i>	
Title or Topic	Partnerships for Learning Youth Exchange and Study Program Responses to Pre-Return Online Survey
Evaluator	InterMedia
Department Contact	Ted Kniker, Chief for Evaluation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Approximately 90% were satisfied with their host families, with program orientation, and program activities. ◆ 10% were dissatisfied with their religious life in the U.S. ◆ Students developed and increased their confidence in significant leadership skills. ◆ Participants increased their view of the importance of freedom of speech, freedom of access to information, and right to employment. ◆ 91% said they understood Americans “a lot” better as a result of the exchange. 85% perceived Americans as friendly and open. ◆ Students developed and increased their confidence in significant leadership skills.
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Encourage host organizations to pass information in a more timely and detailed manner to students. ◆ Provide students with additional resources for addressing their religious concerns and better educate the host families and schools about what the students’ religious needs might be and identifying resources to fulfill those needs. ◆ Continue to enhance and refine the leadership components of the program.
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Program office instructed host organizations to work on the communication flow. ◆ An official and concrete role has been created for an Imam to counsel students and assist in the training of host families and institutions about the religious needs of students. ◆ Leadership will remain an integral component of the program. ◆ Mechanisms for mid-course correction and initial impact analysis.
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Students will be better prepared on arrival to the United States and will have better communication with the sponsor organizations. ◆ Increased student satisfaction with their program in the United States. ◆ Increased follow-on impact by the participants in their home countries.

Strategic Goal 12		MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Phase I of Department of State's Approach to Establishing a New Messaging System (IT-A-04-05) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Bruce Morrison, Chief Information Officer, Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ OIG found that the approach for developing the State's Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART) was based on adequate analysis of the mission and business processes that the system is intended to support. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ None, but OIG plans to review SMART again after subsequent phases are complete. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The SMART Phase 1A Beta Solution is proceeding as planned. A pilot of the project is scheduled for initiation in March 2005, with worldwide deployment scheduled to commence after a successful pilot in late August 2005. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ When implemented, SMART will replace the Department's legacy messaging systems with a single system that provides modern messaging, archiving, and information sharing at the desktop. 	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Review of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' New Embassy Construction (NEC) Program Planning and Design (AUD/PPS-04-07) Office of Inspector General Charles E. Williams, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ OBO headquarters management has initiated several improvements to the NEC program to address more timely and cost-effective embassy construction. Although no NEC projects have been completed under the new planning and design processes, OBO predicts the process improvements will significantly reduce the time from contract award to construction completions. ◆ OBO's new fixed-price contract process can reduce the risk to the Department of escalating costs and shift the financial risk to the contractor. ◆ Some statutorily mandated security risk assessments and security certifications required by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) before commencing embassy construction were not being performed in a timely manner. ◆ Documentation from the construction contractors was late or inaccurate, and communication between OBO and the Center for Security Evaluation (CSE), a group that represents security and intelligence interests, was lacking. ◆ Although no construction delays have occurred to date, they are possible if certification is not performed in a timely manner. ◆ Communication between OBO and Department bureaus, tenant agencies and their headquarters, and other agencies concerned with projected overseas staffing needed improvement. 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should determine the information needed for security certification of NEC projects and ensure that the information is included in Requests for Proposals. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ All FY 2003 and later Design/Build Services contracts now include a comprehensive list of design development and construction drawings required for security certification. The OIG recommendation was closed as a result. ◆ OBO has begun to host annual meetings to discuss the staffing projection process with responsible representatives from tenant agencies and regional, functional, and management bureaus. ◆ OBO, CSE, and DS officials jointly addressed security certification process issues concerning the timeliness and accuracy of CSE and contractor submissions. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ That the design (and construction) of new embassy construction projects will meet full security requirements and will be able to be so certified by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 	

Strategic Goal 12		MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic	Review of Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades (AUD/PPA-04-37)	
Evaluator	Office of Inspector General (OIG)	
Department Contact	Charles E. Williams, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)	
Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department's processes for identifying and approving projects needing security upgrades and for planning, funding, and procuring contracts were well conceived. ◆ Processes for communicating with posts needing upgrades, monitoring the contracts, and ensuring that the architectural drawings are accurate were areas for improvement that the Department was beginning to address. ◆ Construction projects were more efficient with on-site management authority from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO). 	
Major Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The Department should improve its communication between OBO and posts, as requested by senior officials at reviewed embassies. ◆ There should be a plan outlining the impact on the embassy's ability to conduct business and maintain security during construction. ◆ Consider creating regional project directors, rather than consulting contractors, to provide onsite management and that OBO examine the design review process to ensure that recommended changes suggested by OBO during the drawing review process are incorporated before forwarding the drawings to the construction contractors. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Provide an impact statement that is a notification to the post about construction activities that may impact personnel or operation. ◆ Designate regional OBO project directors. The first regional office is located in Rome, and additional project directors will be selected where required. ◆ Improve communication with post personnel by sending them minutes from planning meetings and pre-bid meetings; this will be particularly helpful for posts that have had reassignment of key management personnel. ◆ Improve the process for changes to drawings that are agreed to at design reviews. ◆ Perform evaluations of architectural and engineering firms. 	
Expected Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Actions being taken will improve communications with overseas posts and the efficiency in completing physical security upgrade projects. 	

OMB PART SUMMARIES FOR FY 2004 AND FY 2005 BUDGET YEARS

BY STRATEGIC GOAL

The results from the PART reviews conducted by OMB are detailed as follows by strategic goal. Only the FY 2004 and FY 2005 PARTs are addressed as the “Major Findings/Recommendations” and “Major Actions Taken or That Will Be Taken” for the FY 2006 PARTs were not yet final at the time of publication.

Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Peacekeeping Operations - OSCE Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Not Reassessed 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ PM, EUR, and USOSCE should develop measurable criteria for the assessment of peacekeeping efforts in OSCE states. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ USOSCE Mission Performance Plan established detailed performance indicators for resolution of conflicts in OSCE states and refined efficiency indicators for peacekeeping missions. (Action Completed) 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Conclusion and implementation of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict between Moldova and its breakaway constituent region of Transnistria. ◆ A settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. ◆ OSCE Secretariat implementation of a comprehensive regulatory framework on the basis of its program for Integrated Resource Management. ◆ Adoption of decisions and implementation of measures to strengthen the OSCE budgeting process. ◆ Implementation of a comprehensive system to ensure accountability for U.S. extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE. ◆ ODIHR/OSCE assessment of participating State compliance with international standards in the conduct of elections. ◆ Level of implementation of an OSCE Action Plan on Activities to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Per Unit Cost of USG-Funded OSCE election observation. ◆ Conclusion and implementation of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict between Moldova and its breakaway constituent region of Transnistria. ◆ A settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. ◆ OSCE Secretariat implementation of a common regulatory framework on the basis of its program for Integrated Resource Management. ◆ Implementation of a comprehensive system to ensure accountability for U.S. extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE. ◆ ODIHR/OSCE assessment of participating State compliance with international standards in the conduct of elections. 	

Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY (continued)
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Security Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Constance Berry Newman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs (AF)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Program and program partners not achieving all annual performance goals. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Provided proposed measures to OMB for review. Provided performance data for use in Department's Performance and Accountability Report. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of U.S. trained African units (or trained by U.S.-trained trainers) deployed to support humanitarian response operations. The flagship U.S. peace support training/equipping program is ACOTA. Battalions are usually the unit of measure, although smaller units also deploy. ◆ African militaries contribute to the democratic evolution in their societies by: 1) Thwarting coups and conforming to democratic principles; 2) Avoiding human rights violations; 3) Decreasing defense burden on national budget; 4) Decreasing HIV/AIDS prevalence; 5) Article 98 agreements signed. ◆ ECOWAS provides more oversight of regional peace support and humanitarian response requirements as evidenced by increased defense and security staff size and capabilities and expanded scope of conflict mitigation activities. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Cost to Train and Equip One Battalion of U.S.-trained or U.S. Trainer-trained African Peacekeeping Troops. ◆ Increase in number of African military officers, non-commissioned officers and civilian, exposed to U.S. operational techniques and democratic mores through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is the most important tool in the security assistance inventory. 	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Military Assistance to New NATO and NATO Aspirant Nations Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2003: Not Reassessed ◆ CY 2004: Not Reassessed 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ No regularly scheduled evaluation of program effectiveness exists by independent parties. ◆ DoS and DoD differ on priorities and do not produce coinciding budget schedules. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The European Command Inspector General conducts annual inspections independent of the unified command. ◆ DoD goals are discussed in interagency meetings to balance DoD requirements with Department goals. This produces a single, agreed upon recommendation. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The proportion of allied nations that spend at least 2% of GDP on military budget. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ As new NATO military reforms continue, percentage of aspirants making progress achieving NATO-defined and measured, country-specific Membership Action Plans. ◆ Percentage of countries that contribute military capabilities (e.g., equipment, units, and forces) or infrastructure (e.g., airfields) for contingencies when requested by the U.S. 	

Strategic Goal 1		REGIONAL STABILITY <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Security Assistance for the Western Hemisphere Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Long-term goals need more definition, with specific targets and timeframes. ◆ Annual resource needs and budget requests of State and Defense Departments could be presented in a more complete and transparent manner. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Resubmitted goals and specific targets. ◆ Established a more formal arrangement for coordinating security assistance. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ This indicator measures: 1) Terrorists deactivated (captured, killed, or induced to desert), 2) Terrorist attacks, and 3) Police deployments to rural areas. ◆ Percentage of FMF and IMET recipients who participate in more than two combined/multilateral exercises, peacekeeping operations, or coalition operations. ◆ Decrease in the use of non-commercial maritime conveyances for moving cocaine to the U.S. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of FMF support to Colombia to the number of personnel in the Colombian armed forces. ◆ Number of offensive operations conducted by Colombian units that are the focus of FMF support (FUDRA, Mobile Brigades, Special Operations Command, units participating Plan Patriota). ◆ Number of times that WHA, FMF, and IMET recipient countries participate in joint/multilateral exercises, peacekeeping operations, and coalition operations. Number of countries participating in Enduring Friendship. ◆ Amount of cocaine seized in the transit zone. 	

Strategic Goal 2		COUNTERTERRORISM
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Anti-Terrorism Assistance Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2003: Effective ◆ CY 2004: Not Reassessed 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Seek to improve long-term outcome measure to capture qualitative improvements to host country capabilities. ◆ Demonstrate progress on newly developed efficiency measure and incorporate refined measure into the FY 2006 budget. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Working with OMB, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has improved long-term outcome measures to better capture improvements in host country capabilities. ◆ A revised efficiency measure has been developed and submitted with the PART input for this year's reassessment, and has been approved by OMB. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of participant countries that achieve a capability to effectively deter, detect and counter terrorist organizations and threats and sustain those capabilities. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Percentage of United Nations (UN) member states implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that requires all states to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism. ◆ Number of planned anti-terrorism courses and number of course evaluations to ensure that skills taught continue to be retained and used after training is completed. ◆ Perform consistent and timely reviews of groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations pursuant to US law. 	

Strategic Goal 2		COUNTERTERRORISM (continued)
Title or Topic	Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)	
Evaluator	Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)	
Department Contact	J. Cofer Black, Ambassador, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Complete program management staff improvements. ◆ Develop targets for long-term goal of system installations. ◆ Seek to improve long-term outcome measure to capture qualitative improvements to host country capabilities. ◆ Demonstrate progress on newly developed efficiency measure and incorporate refined measure into the FY 2006 budget. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Targets have been initially established for long-term goal of providing the TIP watchlisting system to every country on the joint-agency developed "tier list." ◆ Improved long-term outcome measures to capture improvements in host country capabilities which have been approved by OMB. ◆ A revised efficiency measure has been submitted with the PART input, and has been approved by OMB. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Percentage of the highest priority countries capable of screening for terrorists through implementation of the TIP. ◆ Percentage of travelers screened by participating nation governments with the TIP's watchlisting system across all sites at which the system is installed. Target is 100% by the year 2009. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of TIP PISCES phased installations completed per yearly appropriation. ◆ Annual increase in the number of highest priority foreign ports of entry equipped to conduct terrorist watchlisting in cooperation with the United States. ◆ Percentage of foreign government usage of the TIP's watchlisting system across all sites where the system is installed. 	

Strategic Goal 3		HOMELAND SECURITY
Title or Topic	Visa and Consular Services Program (Border Security)	
Evaluator	Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)	
Department Contact	Maura A. Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The managers of this program and the program itself have made great progress over the past two years. The reassessment found that the program is not effectively tracking its own progress due to overly broad performance goals and measures, and Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies are not always including the State Department in early stages of deliberation over new policies which would enhance coordination and collaboration over long-term goals. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CA has revised its long-term and annual goals and more clearly defined the linkages between the two. CA is working closely with DHS and the FBI, in particular, on mutual goals. This has resulted in a significantly improved score for the recent reassessment in calendar year 2004. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Development of a Biometrics Collection Program for U.S. Visas. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of days between receipt of routine passport application by Passport Services and issuance of a passport. ◆ Training of consular personnel on consular modernized systems. ◆ Number of Consular Management Assessment Team assessments. 	

Strategic Goal 4		WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Title or Topic	Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF)	
Evaluator	Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)	
Department Contact	Susan Burk, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Nonproliferation (NP)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Add long-term measures. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ NDF will now track all measures. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Four additional countries to deploy the Tracker Software by FY 2007. ◆ Five more active projects to destroy dangerous materials (not including nuclear safeguards) by FY 2007. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Deploy tracker software in additional countries. ◆ Efficiently implement all long-term projects to eliminate, destroy, remove or secure all proliferation and strategic threats. 	

Strategic Goal 7,8		DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS / ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY
Title or Topic	Coordination of Support for East European Democracy (SEED) and Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA)	
Evaluator	Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)	
Department Contact	A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Unclear linkage between BPP/MPP process & Coordinator's office budget allocation process. ◆ SEED and FSA annual reports do not contain sectoral performance measures. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The MPP/BPP, Annual Reports and Country phase out process have been synchronized to guide budget allocation decisions. ◆ Posts included sectoral performance measures in their 2003 Annual Report submissions. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ensure the coordination of the transitions to democratic institutions and free market economic systems in SEED and FSA countries is irreversible. ◆ Democracy assistance phased out as transitions become irreversible in each country. ◆ Economic assistance phased out as transitions become irreversible in each country. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Review country assistance phase-out timeframes annually as part of the Annual Report and MPP review processes to reconfirm that established phase-out timeframes are still accurate. ◆ Countries monitored annually for achievement of MPP targets and action taken as necessary, i.e. effectiveness. ◆ Ensures that performance data reported in Annual Reports and MPPs are of sufficient quality and relevance to make phase out decisions. ◆ Ensure efficient use of assistance. 	

Strategic Goal 8		ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ This year's performance plan is a significant improvement over the previous year's. The plan contains measurable targets for UNDP programs. It is also demonstrated that Federal managers are accountable to advance U.S. interests through participation in the UNDP Executive Board. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The OMB approved efficiency indicator is included in the FY 2005 Department Performance Plan. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Percentage of countries where annual targets were fully achieved out of the total number of countries (92) where UNDP provided support for democratic governance goal. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ "Operational Support Costs" as a Percentage of Total Costs. ◆ Percentage of countries where annual targets were fully achieved out of a total of number (58) of countries where UNDP provides support to public administration reform and anti-corruption. ◆ Percentage of countries where annual targets were fully achieved out of the total number (36) of countries where UNDP provides support to conflict prevention and peace building. ◆ Achievement of annual milestones toward private sector development. 	

Strategic Goal 10		HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Refugee Admissions to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Adequate ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Review the relationship of refugee reception and placement between the Refugee Admissions program at the Department and the Office of Refugee Resettlement at HHS. ◆ Continue ongoing efforts to improve strategic planning to ensure that goals are measurable and mission-related. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Because of the Homeland Security Act, attention has been focused on other aspects of the HHS program in FY 2003 and early FY 2004. OMB action to complete. ◆ Measurable goals included in FY 2005 PART and will also be included in the FY 2005 Budget. (Action Completed) 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of refugees admitted to the U.S. as a percentage of the regional ceilings established by Presidential Determination. ◆ Partner agencies ensure that all employable adults are employed by the 90th day in the U.S. and provide all basic necessities to arriving refugees. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Total average cost per refugee arrival in the U.S. ◆ Number of individual and group refugee referrals to the U.S. from UNHCR. ◆ Percentage of refugees moved to U.S. within 6 months of DHS approval. ◆ Percentage of agency affiliates in the Reception and Placement program found to be in compliance with established basic standards of care, which ensure that refugees' basic necessities (housing, employment, health, child education) are met upon arrival and during an initial period in the U.S. 	

Strategic Goal 10		HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (continued)
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Humanitarian Migrants to Israel Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Adequate ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Establish better long-term goals, as well as more annual goals, with the United Israel Appeal in the 2003 grant agreement. Establish efficiency measure. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Long-term and annual goals agreed with United Israel Appeal (UIA) in 2003 and grant agreement finalized for 2004. Efficiency measure established and approved by OMB. (Action Completed) 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The percentage of Ethiopian humanitarian migrant households that leave absorption centers within a period of 24 months, where Ethiopian humanitarian migrants represent the most vulnerable sub-group under the program. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Reduction in time migrants from the former Soviet Union stay at absorption centers, thereby reducing cost. ◆ Availability and quality of mandatory services to eligible humanitarian migrants. Mandatory services are defined as care and processing en route, transport to Israel, relocation allowance, and transitional housing. ◆ Humanitarian migrants are provided with effective Hebrew language training. ◆ Humanitarian migrants to Israel are provided with effective vocational training. ◆ Service providers to humanitarian migrants develop measurable objectives to ensure effective and efficient use of grant funds. 	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Humanitarian Demining Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Review the relationship between annual and long-term goals and develop revised goals as necessary for the FY 2006 budget. ◆ Demonstrate progress on newly developed efficiency measures and incorporate into the PART for the FY 2006 budget. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Revised existing annual performance measures and developed an additional performance measure. (Action Completed) 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of countries receiving U.S. humanitarian mine action assistance that eliminated the most pressing humanitarian impacts and are now able to sustain future operations with indigenous capacity with little to no external funding. <p>Annual Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Countries Reaching Sustainment or End State/Cumulative Budget Authority. ◆ Percentage of countries targeted for end state in 2009 that are meeting all capacity-building targets as defined in their respective country plans. ◆ Percentage of countries supported by PM/WRA's program meeting their target for casualty reduction figures as defined in their country plans. ◆ Percentage of countries supported by PM/WRA's program meeting their target for square meters of land cleared as defined by their country plans. 	

Strategic Goal 10		HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE <i>(continued)</i>
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Department should use "Framework of Cooperation" to set policy priorities and common objectives. ◆ Department should work with UNHCR to establish an integrated financial system. Establish efficiency measure. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Framework was signed on February 12, 2004. Consultations between Department and UNHCR occur regularly to review progress; last consultation occurred in July 2004. ◆ System will be launched in phases, beginning with Finance and Supply Chain (FSC) in 2004, followed by Human Resources and Payroll in 2005. FSC was launched on January 30, 2004. Efficiency measure established and approved by OMB. 	
PART Performance Measures	Annual Measures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ UNHCR Inventory Control: Value of non-expendable items procured/total value recorded of non-expendable property procured. ◆ Number of UNHCR protection posts worldwide. ◆ Number of countries with significant refugee populations for which UNHCR provides a comprehensive refugee needs assessment to donors. ◆ The percentage of negative findings in an audit report for one year that are fully addressed by March of the year following issuance of the audit report. 	

Strategic Goal 11 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Educational Exchanges in Near East Asia and South Asia Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Patricia S. Harrison, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Results Not Demonstrated ◆ CY 2003: Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Clearly define targets and timeframes. ◆ Create regional long-term goals. ◆ Set long-term goals relative to baseline. ◆ ECA is taking on additional management and administrative responsibility in 2005. This includes expansion of ECA coordination and management of policy, planning and development of standardized performance and evaluation tools and methods for all Public Diplomacy programs.
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Department provided proposed measures and goals and process to OMB for review. Measures have been approved by OMB and resulted in a dramatic increase for the recent reassessment in CY 2004. ◆ Regional goals established through coordination with regional bureaus and approved by OMB. ◆ Long-term and annual goals are set to established baselines, targets and timeframes now included in performance indicators. ◆ ECA has consulted with public diplomacy bureaus on PART, Evaluation and Strategic Planning. ECA has conducted public briefings on PART and Evaluation, and is coordinating evaluation of several programs.
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The percent of SA participants who remain in contact or collaborate with host country people met on their program one year or longer after the exchange. ◆ The percent of NEA participants who will remain in contact or collaborate with host country people met on their program one year or longer after the exchange. ◆ The percentage of participants who report gains in thematic knowledge skills or abilities immediately following their program. ◆ The cumulative number of critical institutions in NEA and SA that demonstrate a goal-directed relationship with the United States or which demonstrate sustainable impact in a way that parallels U.S. interests within 5 years of ECA engagement. ◆ The percentage of NEA and SA participants who initiate, implement or change their organization or community within five years of their experience based on knowledge gained from their exchange program. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of Total Administrative Cost to Program Cost. ◆ The number of annual participants from NEA and SA. ◆ The percentage of NEA and SA participants who increase or change their understanding of the host country immediately following their program experience. ◆ Increase the amount of private sector, foreign, and other USG funds generated for NEA and SA program use on an annual basis to reach 25 million for NEA and 10 million for SA by 2008.

Strategic Goal 12		MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Capital Security Construction Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Charles E. Williams, Director, Office of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2002: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2003: Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Effects of management changes in OBO were not fully known at the time of the FY 2004 PART review. ◆ Develop new goals that closely link performance to budget. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Effects on management changes were well documented in the FY 2005 PART process, resulting in a strong score for this PART program. (Action Completed) ◆ Goals/performance measures were developed/linked to OBO budget. (Action Completed) 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of capital security construction projects completed (within construction timeframes) following construction contract awards as scheduled in the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP). <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ratio of construction management costs to LROBP construction project costs over \$25M. ◆ Number of building sites acquired for capital security construction projects in accordance with the LROBP. ◆ Number of new capital security construction projects awarded. ◆ Percent of capital security construction projects completed within the schedule authorized in the construction contracts. ◆ Percent of capital security construction projects completed within the approved construction budget. 	
Title or Topic Evaluator Department Contact	Worldwide Security Upgrades Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)	
Scores and Ratings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ CY 2003: Moderately Effective ◆ CY 2004: Effective 	
Major Findings/ Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Work closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to develop effective annual goals and targets. ◆ Work to develop performance measures for major programs to support annual performance goals and ensure long-term effectiveness. 	
Major Actions Taken or That Will be Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Work closely with DS to develop effective annual goals and targets. ◆ Baseline performance measures now developed for major programs to support annual performance goals and ensure long-term effectiveness. 	
PART Performance Measures	<p>Long Term Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The percentage of security countermeasures projects completed. ◆ Improve, integrate, and sustain worldwide investigative capabilities. <p>Annual Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Number of staff/time needed to complete background investigation cases. ◆ Number of posts provided with Chemical/Biological countermeasures equipment and training. ◆ Real-time monitoring of diplomatic missions, especially those with Lock and Leave status. ◆ Full implementation of the Access Control Systems at DOS facilities. ◆ The number of technical security upgrades completed. ◆ All Chiefs of Mission will have an appropriate armored vehicle at their disposal; all ICASS and other armored vehicles eligible for replacement are armored at no cost to post. ◆ Number of passport and visa fraud cases investigated. Criminal investigations are promptly and effectively investigated. 	

SUMMARY OF RESULTS RATED “BELOW TARGET”

The results of the following targets were rated “below target.” As some of the data provided below is in summary form, the full text can be found in the Strategic Goal chapters. A similar analysis of results rated “significantly below target” can be found in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of this report.

STRATEGIC GOAL 1: REGIONAL STABILITY

Initiative/Program #3: Conflict Management and Resolution

Indicator #1: Number of African Armed Conflicts Resolved and Peace Support Missions Concluded

Target	Two peace support missions withdrawn (Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea).
Result	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sierra Leone: UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) numbers are greatly reduced in light of strides forward in the process of post-conflict rebuilding and reconciliation. 2. Ethiopia-Eritrea: The two sides have avoided a return to conflict, but various diplomatic efforts to break down barriers between Ethiopia and Eritrea have had limited to no impact on reconciliation. The two sides have expanded their Military Coordination Commission meetings down to the regional level.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sierra Leone: Insecurity in the countryside remains, but is reduced, and heightened stability among its neighbors bodes well. 2. Ethiopia-Eritrea: Despite the Boundary Commission’s decision in 2002, the demarcation work had not yet begun. Senior levels of both sides have been unwilling to reconcile.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone’s institutions continue to stabilize and reform. The Sierra Leone Police and Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces are continuing efforts at reform and restructuring with a view toward withdrawing UNAMSIL by the end of 2005. 2. Ethiopia-Eritrea: In September 2004, the UN Security Council agreed to extend the work of the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and urged both parties to abide by the Algiers Agreement. Diplomatic efforts on reconciliation continue.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL monitoring activities and bilateral support of security sector reform, led by the UK, increase prospects for eventual peace. UNAMSIL is poised to drawdown to approximately 3,250 by February 2005. UNAMSIL withdrawal is postponed pending events, but may occur at the end of 2005. 2. Ethiopia-Eritrea: A state of cold peace ensues with the prospect for a return to war impeding economic and political progress on both sides. UNMEE presence to be maintained having provided a positive impact in the ceasefire with no major infractions occurring over the past three years.

STRATEGIC GOAL 1: REGIONAL STABILITY (continued)

Initiative/Program #4: Indo-Pak Relations/Kashmir

Indicator #2: Status of Relations Between Pakistan and India, including Kashmir

Target	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No resumption of infiltration. 2. Terrorist groups in Pakistan are disbanded.
Result	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Infiltration continues. 2. No observable progress on disbanding terrorist groups.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Government of India asserted continuing infiltration attempts. 2. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) has banned these groups, but they have resurfaced and operate under different names.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The USG will increase pressure on the GOP to remain diligent about banning terror groups and curbing infiltration and work with the GOP to help meet these targets.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Infiltration in Kashmir is an area of concern in ongoing peace negotiations, as well as in Indo-Pak relations writ large. Infiltration continues, slowing overall progress in peace talks.

Initiative/Program #7: Restrict Advanced Conventional Weapons (ACW) Transfers

Indicator #5: Effectiveness of Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Control Lists

Target	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prompt reporting of arms transfers on the Wassenaar Arrangement Information System (WAIS). Reporting of denials of arms transfers, and notification before undercutting a previous dual-use denial. 2. Sharing of "best practices" papers on effective export control practices within the WA.
Result	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arms transfers on the WAIS: Fewer member states were tardy in reporting. Important member states blocked consensus on dual-use denial consultations and required reporting of approvals for items on the Very Sensitive List. 2. Separate control list for items for terrorism: Member states do not agree whether a separate list is needed, or if there are other ways to achieve this.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Certain sovereign governments do not agree with U.S. goals and methods on arms transfers and terrorism.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Continuing bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve comparable goals by other means, adapting USG approach according to circumstances.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. More up-to-date information on WAIS; dual-use denial consultations and Very Sensitive List likely to remain as goals for 2005. 2. This is more a problem of form than substance, since arms potentially used by terrorists are already on other control lists.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Initiative/Program #1: Curb Access

Indicator #1: Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Impeded

Target	North Korea (DPRK) maintains its missile flight-test moratorium and constrains its missile-related exports.
Result	DPRK continued its flight test moratorium, but U.S. efforts to discourage countries from buying North Korean missiles have resulted in only a slight reduction in North Korean missile-related export activity.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	DPRK continued missile-related exports and re-started plutonium production facilities.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Work with like-minded countries to restrain, identify, and disrupt DPRK missile exports. 2. Demarche DPRK suppliers and clients to prevent acquisition of goods or money to buy them. 3. Enforce U.S. export controls to ensure the U.S. doesn't inadvertently supply the DPRK.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	DPRK exports of ballistic missile related equipment and technology continued, although there has been no export of accurate Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. Some inroads made on the illegal trade of illegal weapons/material.

Indicator #2: States Conform to International Nonproliferation Norms of Behavior

Target	East Asia: North Korea (DRPK) remains a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT; no plutonium reprocessing; uranium enrichment program shut down and elimination begun in a verifiable and irreversible manner; re-freeze of plutonium program; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prepared to assess program history; DRPK cooperates with IAEA on safeguards, including beginning assessment of program history.
Result	Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Russia, and China agree with the USG on the need for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of DRPK nuclear programs (both uranium and plutonium based). DRPK has made various claims including that it has reprocessed 8,000 canned spent fuel rods and is enhancing its nuclear deterrent.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	While Six-Party talks are underway to address the threat of DRPK's nuclear weapons programs, there has been little progress except agreement to continue dialogue. ROK, Japan, Russia, and China agree with USG on the need for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantle of DRPK's nuclear programs.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	USG continues efforts to negotiate complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament, including through provision of expertise on specific issues relevant to WMD and missile nonproliferation.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	International involvement via Six-Party talks continues in trying to deter DRPK from pursuing its nuclear program.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

Initiative/Program #1: Curb Access (continued)

Indicator #3: Progress Toward Implementing Fissile Material Projects

Target	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Multilateral framework and international financing plan completed. 2. Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) contains at least several tons of plutonium under bilateral transparency.
Result	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Substantial progress on redefining acceptable approaches for the plutonium disposition (PuD) multilateral framework and financing plan, for resolving the overarching liability issues, and for minimizing program delays pending complete fulfillment of the targets. 2. Mayak FMSF transparency negotiations continued.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PuD multilateral negotiations suspended for five months due to Russian government reorganization; liability issues remain to be resolved at levels within the USG. 2. Negotiations on Mayak transparency protocol suspended by Russians during reorganization of Russian government.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Beginning September 2004, accelerate relevant Plutonium Disposition (PuD) negotiations, based on a revised U.S. approach responding to partners concerns; as primary resource on liability issues, provide strategies and recommendations to high-level USG officials. 2. Continue to press Russians to restart negotiations as soon as possible.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The delay in negotiations for PuD will not affect the security of this material in the short or medium term, but will require re-doubled efforts with partners plus renewed expression of high-level USG support for the program and for resolving liability issues in order to meet subsequent years' targets. 2. The delay in completion of the transparency protocol should not affect the safety and security of fissile material storage at Mayak, but it will impede U.S. ability to ensure that the right material is safely and securely stored until the protocol is completed.

Initiative/Program #3: Cooperation with Russia on New Strategic Framework

Indicator #6: Status of Cooperation with Russia on New Strategic Framework

Target	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The United States and Russia begin implementing new transparency and predictability efforts to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and strategic stability. 2. The United States and Russia begin working on missile defense-related research and development projects.
Result	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Moscow Treaty Bilateral Implementation Commission met for the first time in April 2004; the U.S. and Russia exchanged briefings on the Moscow Treaty reductions underway by both Parties. The U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security Working Group on Offensive Transparency continues to meet. 2. U.S. and Russian experts continued to discuss potential concrete missile defense-related cooperation projects.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The Russian government may not yet have decided its priorities relating to cooperation with the U.S. and has taken positions or made proposals in the mold of traditional arms control, which the U.S. has rejected in favor of informal cooperation based on voluntary efforts.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The U.S. continues discussions with Russia in order to improve understanding and demonstrate commitment, increase confidence, and expand areas of common interest.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The new strategic relationship is not developing as smoothly as the USG had hoped; the U.S. and Russia still have differences of views regarding how to proceed.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

Initiative/Program #4: Strengthen Global Norms

Indicator #1: Status of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Target	PrepCom III for the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) concludes satisfactorily.
Result	Most PrepCom goals were achieved, but one routine procedural issue for the 2005 RevCon was not resolved.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Target not met because PrepCom chair was ineffective and because the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries believed the results of the 2000 NPT RevCon were not given adequate attention in preparing the agenda for the 2005 RevCon.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Wage proactive diplomacy via demarches in capitals, and bilateral consultations in capitals and in Geneva, New York, and Vienna to promote U.S. positions.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The outcome has led to increased pessimism about potential for the 2005 NPT RevCon to achieve broad agreement on key issues.

Indicator #2: Status of the Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM)

Target	The United States signs the CPPNM, which is sent to the Senate for ratification. A sufficient number of states sign the revised CPPNM to allow it to enter into force.
Result	The U.S. has not signed the amendments to CPPNM as they have not yet been adopted by a Diplomatic Conference and are not yet open for signature.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The CPPNM was not signed due to the difficulty of scheduling a diplomatic conference to adopt the amendments.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The United States has been coordinating diplomatic strategy with the Core Group and Austria in order to attain simple majority of CPPNM Parties in order to request the IAEA Director General convene a diplomatic conference for consider of the Austrian proposal. As of 4 October, 29 of 53 Parties have requested the conference. The current goal is the convening of a diplomatic conference in early 2005.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Some progress made towards a consensus on amendments.

Initiative/Program #8: Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification

Indicator #1: Status of Verification of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments

Target	Pursue North Korean (DPRK) agreement to verifiable dismantlement of their nuclear programs, and ensure that verification requirements are implemented. Pursue verifiable ban on North Korean indigenous and export ballistic missile programs.
Result	DPRK has not engaged in substantive discussions of U.S. proposal or their own counterproposal. Without progress in the nuclear arena as a matter of priority, there is no movement on the ballistic missile issue.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	DPRK prefers uncontested declarations to systematic verification. DPRK delay in substantive negotiations forestalls ultimate implementation of verifiable agreements for both the nuclear and the ballistic missile DPRK programs.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Continue to encourage/increase multilateral political and economic talks with the DPRK to negotiate dismantlement of DPRK nuclear program in good faith, recognizing that verification is central to any proposed agreement with the U.S.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Failure to agree upon and implement verifiable nuclear dismantlement could destabilize NPT and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) nonproliferation regimes. Continuing stalemate could call into question utility of either bilateral or multilateral negotiations as a means to resolve crisis, and has inhibited progress on ballistic missile issues.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

Initiative/Program #10: All Source Intelligence Collection and Technology R&D

Indicator #3: Intelligence Collection Resources Promoted to Support Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification Objects

Target	Participate in over thirty USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities, and direct appropriate action related to sensors and other assets in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives.
Result	Involved with over thirty intelligence committees and working groups. Continued providing information to verify arms control and nonproliferation agreements/commitments, however, unable to consistently participate in all working groups.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Manpower shortage.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Pursue hiring of new staff members.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Limited Bureau participation in diverse intelligence committees directly reduced efficiency of verification process by stunting collection and research activities.

STRATEGIC GOAL 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUGS

Initiative/Program #2: Counterdrug Initiative

Indicator #2: Foreign Cultivation of Coca, Opium Poppy, and Marijuana¹

Target	Opium Poppy Cultivation: 119,000 Hectares
Result	Opium Poppy: Initial estimates indicate the cultivation continued to decline in Southeast Asia while increasing in Southwest Asia, primarily Afghanistan.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The Afghan government's continuing difficulties in extending its authority throughout the country has limited its efforts to curb the increasing cultivation of opium poppy. The multi-national counternarcotics effort, which depends on the cooperation of the provincial governments, has not been as effective as the USG had hoped. The slow pace of economic development and limited sources of income in post-conflict Afghanistan have caused many farmers to turn to opium cultivation.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The USG embarked on a program to provide direct support for a counternarcotics program by the Afghan government, as well as to increase alternative development opportunities and launched a public awareness campaign to encourage farmers to give up opium farming.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Most of the illicit heroin trade from Afghanistan either remains in the region or goes to Europe and Russia.

Indicator #3: Potential Production of Cocaine and Heroin in Key Source Countries (in Metric Tons)

Target	Heroin: 220 metric tons (Afghanistan, Burma, Laos)
Result	Heroin: Estimates indicate that heroin production will likely be above 220 metric tons.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Heroin production will likely exceed target goals because of increased cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan, more than offset the continuing decline in South East Asia because Afghan poppy plants have higher yields.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The USG began to provide direct support for an eradication program carried out by the Afghan central government. This program requires building up of an infrastructure, including aircraft and related aircraft training, maintenance, and operating facilities.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Most Afghan heroin and opium either remains in the region or goes to the European market. Most of the illegal heroin entering the U.S. comes from South America and Mexico, which means that the increase in Afghanistan does not necessarily mean an increase in heroin available in the U.S.

¹ Mexico Only

STRATEGIC GOAL 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUGS

Initiative/Program #3: Support Investigation/Prosecution of Major International Criminals

Indicator #2: Parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention

Target	175 parties join the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Result	169 parties join the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	All key source and transit states have ratified, leaving only those countries that either are unimportant in terms of trafficking or have demonstrated that they have no intention of abiding by the Convention (e.g., North Korea).
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Department believes that this performance indicator no longer needs to be tracked since all major countries abide by the Convention.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The 1988 UN Drug Convention has been key in normalizing the U.S.-led international campaign against narcotics trafficking and gaining international acceptance of the view that drug trafficking and trafficking organizations are a threat to all countries. Parties to the convention are legally obligated to take domestic steps and to cooperate with other states to combat drug trafficking.

Initiative/Program #6: Money Laundering Initiative

Indicator #6: Status of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) List of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT)

Target	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) removes all but two countries placed on list prior to 2003.
Result	FATF removes three countries from list; six countries remain.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Several states have been slower than anticipated in improving their banking and financial rules, regulations and anti-money laundering regimes. This is due in part to the shortage of experts providing needed assistance and to political and bureaucratic foot-dragging by some governments.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Department and other members of FATF will continue to put diplomatic and other pressure on governments still on the list to improve their performance, particularly where a lack of political will seems to be an important factor.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Several countries improved their anti-money laundering regimes, but not enough to meet FATF standards. Other countries on the list have made little effort to meet FATF benchmarks and will likely remain on the list for the foreseeable future.

STRATEGIC GOAL 8: ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

Initiative/Program #2: Create Open and Dynamic World Markets

Indicator #1: Status of Negotiations on Open Markets for Services, Trade, and Investment

Target	Conclude two new bilateral investment treaties (BIT).
Result	Close to completion of one BIT with Uruguay.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Difficulty in reaching internal USG agreement on model BIT text has delayed negotiation of BITs.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	With the successful completion of inter-agency discussions (and Congressional consultations) on the model text, new BITs can now be pursued.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Concluded FTAs open markets for U.S. businesses, serve as model agreements for future FTAs, and provide leverage in other negotiations. Successful WTO interim framework agreement lays ground for bringing Doha Round negotiations to conclusion in 2005-2006 and ultimately greater trade liberalization worldwide. With the resolution of inter-agency discussion on the text of the model BIT, negotiations on a BIT with Uruguay was concluded and negotiations of a BIT with Pakistan was launched. Further candidates for BIT negotiations are being explored.

STRATEGIC GOAL 9: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Initiative/Program #1: Global Health

Indicator #8: Countries With Smallpox Vaccine and Drug Stockpiles

Target	Additional ten countries establish vaccine and drug stockpiles; work with WHO to strengthen its smallpox vaccine reserve.
Result	U.S. continues to work with WHO on setting up global smallpox vaccine reserve. Germany and Canada have all made contributions to this reserve in the past year. Additional nations, including Japan and Germany, are expanding the size of their own vaccine and drug stockpiles.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The Department's performance fell short on this initiative due to inadequate data about the creation and composition of stockpiles in other countries. The U.S. is aware of some stockpile programs, and is working with countries to improve overall international emergency response mechanisms for bioterrorism. In addition, the U.S. is working within the Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) to enhance international support for the global smallpox vaccine reserve housed at WHO.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Department will seek more information/data from foreign governments about the creation and composition of their stockpiles.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Creation of WHO global smallpox vaccine reserve has been a critical step in improving international health security. Failing to meet this target will jeopardize U.S. and global health security.

Initiative/Program #4: Science and Technology Cooperation

Indicator #3: Coordination and Management of All U.S. Government S&T Activities Derived from S&T Agreements

Target	Conduct a policy review of S&T activities under the U.S.-China S&T agreement.
Result	Biannual report to Congress on U.S.-China S&T cooperation delayed due to incomplete data from USG agencies.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Failure of several key USG agencies to adequately report their activities has led to significant delays in developing database upon which policy review will be based.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Policy review process will be initiated upon final submission of report to Congress.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Realignment of activities to enhance engagement on priority issues; policy review to be conducted second or third quarter of FY 2005.

STRATEGIC GOAL 10: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Initiative/Program #1: Humanitarian Assistance

Indicator #1: Crude Mortality Rate (CMR)

Target	Refugee crises do not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people per day.
Result	In June 2004, CMR exceeded 2/10,000/day among Sudanese refugees in Chad.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	CMR exceeded the emergency threshold among Sudanese refugees in Chad because of a combination of limited humanitarian access and delayed operational response by humanitarian actors.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	In FY 2004, the Department provided \$47.3 million to humanitarian operations for Sudanese refugees in Chad. The Department advocated strongly to improve field management on behalf of refugees, including through ongoing staff deployments to monitor operations and active engagement in international efforts to improve humanitarian access and response.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Refugees were dying at an unacceptable rate despite efforts to provide humanitarian assistance.



STRATEGIC GOAL 10: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (continued)

Initiative/Program #1: Humanitarian Assistance

Indicator #2: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 Years of Age

Target	In targeted refugee populations, less than 10% of children under age five suffer from global acute malnutrition. Global acute malnutrition is defined as weight-for-height ratios that are less than 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of less than -2), or less than 80% median weight-for-height, or the presence of nutritional edema.
Result	In June 2004, 36-39% of children under age five suffered from global acute malnutrition among Sudanese refugees in Chad.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Among refugees in Chad, factors contributing to the crisis included large inflows with high rates of malnutrition, a poor public health environment, and limited humanitarian access.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	In FY 2004, the Department provided \$47.3 million to humanitarian operations for Sudanese refugees in Chad. The Department advocated strongly to improve field management on behalf of refugees, including ongoing staff deployments to monitor operations and active engagement in international efforts to improve humanitarian access and response.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Sudanese refugee children suffered unacceptably high rates of malnutrition, and were at grave risk of death.

STRATEGIC GOAL 11: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Initiative/Program #1: Reaching Out to Allies and Regional Powers

Indicator #2: Percentage Increase of Unique Users to the Department's International Website and Listservs

Target	Ten percent increase of unique users to Department's international website and listservs over 2003 baseline levels.
Result	15% decrease over baseline for the website, and 1% increase over baseline for listservs.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	At the time the baseline was established, the Department did not have an evaluation unit or a set standard for standard measuring web usage. Also, interest in the Department's international website was anomalous in 2003 due to attention aroused by the Iraq war, making it unusually high for a baseline figure. The 2003 baseline reflects a time before international public opinion turned so dramatically against the United States.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Department is undertaking a review of marketing efforts and is planning to make changes and adopt new approaches to increase outreach.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Use of the Department's international website is one indication of international public interest in the U.S. and what the U.S. is officially saying to the world. The decline the Department experienced in FY 2004 may be an indication of reduced international interest in or antagonism toward the U.S., but that is conjecture in the absence of an objective marketing study and structured verifiable evaluation.

Initiative/Program #3: Communicate More Effectively with Global Publics

Indicator #2: Targeted Publics Receive Intended Message

Target	Evidence shows that the intended message has reached the intended user, which in this case is the targeted public.
Result	Results are unclear since projections were to be determined by media trend analyses and program specific focus group surveys, neither of which were funded.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Funding not provided for media trend analysis.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	An evaluation team is currently recruiting to fill new positions. The Department is seeking means for funding pilot studies.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The Department's inability to evaluate the reach and accuracy of its intended message has obvious consequences for the sound management of its programs and essential feedback on their effectiveness.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE

Initiative/Program #1: Recruit and Hire Talented, Diverse Employees

Indicator #1: Number of Individuals Taking the Foreign Service Written Exam (FSWE)

Target	Maintain or increase FY 2003 level of 20,342.
Result	19,101
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Precise reason unknown. Reasons could include random, limited market of interest combined with a vigorous marketing campaign, unpopular U.S. policies abroad, moderation of the post-9/11 patriotic fervor that elevated the numbers in 2002 and 2003.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Office of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment continues a vigorous recruitment program designed at improving the quality and diversity of Foreign Service applicants, rather than focusing on the quantity of applicants.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The number of takers of the FSWE is not an indicator of success in recruitment and hiring but only of general interest in the exam (which does not necessarily indicate interest in employment in the Foreign Service). The indicator has been modified in current performance plans.

Indicator #2: Number of Applicants to Foreign Service Specialist Positions

Target	Maintain or increase FY 2003 level of 4,800.
Result	4,117
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Precise reason unknown. Reasons could include random, limited market of interest combined with a vigorous marketing campaign, unpopular U.S. policies abroad, moderation of the post-9/11 patriotic fervor that elevated the numbers in 2002 and 2003.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Office of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment continues a vigorous recruitment program designed at improving the quality and diversity of Foreign Service applicants, rather than focusing on the quantity of applicants.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The number of applicants to Foreign Service Specialist positions is not an indicator of success in recruitment and hiring but only of general interest in such positions. The indicator has been modified in current performance plans.

Indicator #4: Number of Minority Individuals Taking the Foreign Service Written Exam (FSWE)

Target	Maintain or increase FY 2003 level of 6,238.
Result	5,995
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Precise reason unknown. Reasons could include random, limited market of interest combined with a vigorous marketing campaign, unpopular U.S. policies abroad, moderation of the post-9/11 patriotic fervor that elevated the numbers in 2002 and 2003.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Office of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment continues a vigorous recruitment program designed at improving the quality and diversity of Foreign Service applicants, rather than focusing on the quantity of applicants.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The number of Minority Individuals taking the FSWE is not an indicator of success in recruitment and hiring but only of general interest in the exam (which does not necessarily indicate interest in employment in the Foreign Service). The indicator has been modified in current performance plans.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

Initiative/Program #1: Recruit and Hire Talented, Diverse Employees (continued)

Indicator #5: Hiring Levels

Target	Hire 400 above normal intake and for security and consular needs, as required.
Result	Approximately 310 hires over attrition, plus 193 Border Security and 85 diplomatic security employees.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Funding was received for 89 fewer positions than originally anticipated.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Request for additional funding/positions proposed to keep ahead of attrition while addressing new mandates.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Reduced progress toward mission goals.

Initiative/Program #5: Americans Employed by UN System Organizations

Indicator #12: Percentage of UN System Organizations' Workforce Positions (Subject to Geographical Distribution) That Are American Citizens¹

Target	CY 2003 Target: 11.9%
Result	CY 2003 Result: 11.5%
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Performance was slightly below target because employment of American citizens did not increase as fast as total employment in posts subject to geographical distribution in targeted organizations.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Bureau increased staffing dedicated to this initiative, is expanding outreach by contacting more professional associations/groups to identify candidates, and is using an interagency task force to identify candidates from outside the USG and facilitate transfers of USG staff to UN agencies.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	The lack of progress made in CY 2003 may necessitate a downward adjustment in the out-year targets, which build on each other. The number of Americans matters because they bring values, ideals, skills, and experience to the job that can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international organizations.

Initiative/Program #10: Secure Employees

Indicator #3: Replacement of Armored Vehicles (AVs)

Target	177 armored vehicles replaced.
Result	197 vehicles deployed (28 Chief of Mission replacement vehicles and 95 vehicles have been shipped to Iraq). Other armored vehicle replacements include: Office of Procurement-8, ICASS-24, and Marine Security Guards-11.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The Department has consciously curtailed the scheduled replacement of vehicles in order to facilitate the priority needs in higher threat environments (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan) and to respond to the War on Terrorism.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The replacement schedule will resume in FY 2005 once critical threat posts have the necessary equipment to protect American lives.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	As necessitated by the occurrence of unanticipated exigencies, vehicles originally designated for replacement have been placed on hold to accommodate the priority needs in high threat environments. Delivery of vehicles will be delayed given the priority in Iraq.

¹ UN System organizations gather their information on a Calendar Year basis. Given the delay in gathering and reporting the data, each fiscal year's targets correspond to the previous calendar year. The annual targets listed herein are averages among those international organizations that attract a high level of U.S. interest (i.e., for CY 2000-CY 2003, the UN, ILO, ITU, ICAO, FAO, UNHCR, and WHO; IAEA for CY 2003 only).

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

Initiative/Program #10: Secure Employees (continued)

Indicator #4: Installation of Access Control Systems (ACSS)

Target	Access Control Systems installed in 50% of the Department's annexes in the Washington, D.C. area.
Result	The perimeter of the Harry S Truman building has been completed and 10% of facilities in the Washington, D.C. area have access control systems.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The services of the initial contract management group engaged for the Access Control Project were terminated in December 2003 requiring the contract to be re-competed. As a result, the project responsibility has been moved in-house for completion.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The movement of the project to in-house management has allowed Diplomatic Security to gain control over the successful installation for the Washington, D.C. area annexes.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Access Control Systems installation in 50% of the Department's annexes will be delayed until next year.

Initiative/Program #14: New Office Building for U.S. Mission to United Nations

Indicator #4: U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) New Construction

Target	Complete existing office building demolition.
Result	The demolition contract for the Existing Office Building (EOB) was awarded and notice to proceed was issued July 17, 2004. Completion of the demolition effort is scheduled for January 2005.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Although execution of the Interim Office Building (IOB) lease build out of leased space and relocation of the U.S. Mission was accomplished in near record time, the initial location of appropriate lease space was delayed. The final IOB leased space became available much later in the year than originally planned. Subsequently, vacating the EOB and the start of demolition occurred later than originally planned.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	GSA, working with their construction management consultant, is assisting the contractor in ameliorating the situation. The Bureau of Administration's Office of Real Property Management has an on-site representative closely monitoring the situation on a day-to-day basis.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Although the EOB demolition is not scheduled to be completed until January 2005, impact to the start of the NOB construction effort is not anticipated, as the contract award is not scheduled until the end of January 2005. A period of time is necessary following contract award for the contractor to obtain necessary bonding, permits, etc., prior to issuance of notice to proceed.

Initiative/Program #15: Budget and Performance Integration

Indicator #2: Implementation of Central Financial Planning System (CFPS) Modules

Target	Complete the development and deployment of Bureau Resource Management System (BRMS) Version 1 and prototyping of a Financial Performance and Reporting Module.
Result	Version 1 of the Bureau Resource Management System will be completed early in FY 2005. The prototype of the Planning and Performance Reporting Module has been completed.
Reason for Performance Shortfall	Shortfall in BRMS is the result of web software requirements and the external approval process. Shortfall in the Financial Planning and Performance Module was caused by data integration issues that were unforeseen and unknown until the module developers chose their contractor for development. Both modules also feel the affect of reorganization within the contractor's realm that has delayed work.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	Performance will improve as the contractor issues are addressed and reorganization is finalized.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	There is no operational impact due to the slightly delayed BRMS schedule. The new development remains on budget, but slightly behind schedule. The schedule will be made up as the Department proceeds through this calendar year and achieve version 2 development by the second quarter of the next fiscal year.



STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

Initiative/Program #16: Improved Financial Performance

Indicator #4: Improved Financial Performance (President's Management Agenda, OMB Scoring)

Target	Status: Green Progress: Green
Result	Status: Yellow Progress: Green
Reason for Performance Shortfall	The Department continues to work with OMB to achieve the revised "financial data integration" criteria for this PMA initiative. Under this criteria, agencies must demonstrate how their financial system(s) achieve better results through lower costs or improved outcomes, and are implementing a plan to continuously expand the scope of this ability to additional areas of operations.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	The Department has provided OMB an example of financial data integration as well as a proposed "expansion plan." The Department will continue to work with OMB to provide additional examples of financial data integration at State, as well as finalize the expansion plan.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	Enhanced "financial data integration" will not be achieved until FY 2005.

Initiative/Program #17: Worldwide Logistics

Indicator #1: Percentage of Service Contract Dollars That Are Performance Based

Target	20%
Result	16% ¹
Reason for Performance Shortfall	No additional funding was made available for contractor support and expertise in support of this initiative. Therefore all effort in support of this goal was accomplished using existing in-house personnel with no contractor support.
Steps Being Taken to Improve Performance	To promote the use of and expand PBSA, the Department developed a performance-based model contract for guard services. In FY 2005, the Department will participate in the PBSA interagency working group. PBSA contracting goals are included in individual Bureau Performance Plans for FY 2005. This will expand interest in and ownership of meeting the FY 2005 PBSA goals.
Impact of Performance Shortfall	PBSA improves quality of contractor performance, increases customer satisfaction and enables innovation. The Department can maximize the opportunities to increase contractor performance quality, customer satisfaction and innovation through PBSAs.

¹ The statistical information provided in this report is based upon manual evaluation and manipulation of raw data from GSA's Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) which is the Government-wide automated repository for procurement related information.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHANGED INDICATORS AND TARGETS

Justifications are provided for changes made to the Department of State's FY 2004 performance indicators and targets since publication of the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan (DPP). *(No changes were permitted after May 2004.)*

STRATEGIC GOAL 1: REGIONAL STABILITY

I/P #2: Regional Stability in East Asia and the Pacific

Indicator #2: Status of U.S.-South Korean Relations

Target #1

Initial	Complete Joint Study of Phase III Military CBMs and Arms Control Measures.
Revised	Complete Future of Alliance negotiations on reconfiguration of U.S. Forces in Korea.
Justification	Changes to the target were required because of changes in DoD planning for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK); i.e., unanticipated requirements from DoD negated previous plans.

Target #2¹

Initial	Begin Joint Study of Phase IV Military CBMs and Arms Control Measures.
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Deletion of the target was required because of changes in DoD planning for USFK; i.e., unanticipated requirements from DoD negated previous plans.

I/P #4: Indo-Pak Relations/Kashmir

Indicator #2

Initial	Status of Relations Between Pakistan and India on Kashmir
Revised	Status of Relations Between Pakistan and India, including Kashmir
Justification	Title of indicator was modified to reflect recent changes in the Pakistan-India relationship, and the fact that the entire relationship was not based solely on Kashmir. The two countries are moving forward in several areas (including Kashmir) in their recent rapprochement, and movement in other areas may be possible even without movement in Kashmir.

I/P #5: An Enhanced and Expanded Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Indicator #3: Implementation of Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Target #1

Initial	No major problems implementing the Adapted Treaty.
Revised	U.S. and NATO Allies agree that Russia has fulfilled all Istanbul commitments, allowing for U.S. ratification and, after all other CFE States Parties ratify, entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, and then other key states accede.
Justification	Modifying target as necessitated by the impact of realized FY 2003 performance results as reported in FY 2003 PAR. The FY 2003 target was not achieved, and therefore the FY 2003 target now becomes the FY 2004 target.

¹ This Target was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 2: COUNTERTERRORISM

I/P #2: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)

Indicator #2: Number of ATA Courses Provided to Priority States and the Number of Program Reviews that Are Conducted No Later Than 18 Months After the Training

Target #1

Initial	A total of 210 program reviews conducted.
Revised	A total of 16 program reviews conducted.
Justification	There was an initial confusion with the setting of the initial target between what comprised the total number of training courses vis-à-vis what comprised a program review that might involve training provided to a wide number of Priority States. A single Program Review can consist of any number of ATA training courses within the core curriculum that covers a particular antiterrorism training program. Thus, one Program Review can cover a number of ATA courses provided to a number of Priority States. The sixteen Program Reviews conducted included more than two hundred individual ATA training courses provided to Priority States. Thus, the difference between the initial target of 210 versus the actual number of Program Reviews conducted.

STRATEGIC GOAL 3: HOMELAND SECURITY

I/P #1: Visa and Consular Services

Indicator #1: Number of Other Agencies With Access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)

Target #1

Initial	6
Revised	3
Justification	The creation of the Department of Homeland Security merged several agencies with which agreements existed or were planned. As a result, in the FY 2003 PAR, the target for FY 2003 was changed to 2 and it was anticipated that the target for FY 2004 would be 3.

Indicator #2: Percentage of Files Stored Electronically in Accordance with the Requirements of Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (PL 107-173)

Target #1

Initial	Electronic retention of all applications in cases of concern. Transfer of archives to electronic media of all serious refusal files and forty percent of other archival material.
Revised	Electronic retention of all applications in cases of concern. Transfer of archives to electronic media of all serious refusal files from countries of concern. Begin backscanning serious refusal files from other posts.
Justification	Due to the forensic value of paper records, the Department made arrangements to archive paper records, in full compliance with the requirements of PL 107-103. Scanning and electronic storage activities are therefore restricted to records for which electronic sharing and rapid retrieval provides significant value. In the FY 2003 PAR, the target for FY 2003 was changed to reflect this change; therefore, the FY 2004 target needs to be changed.

I/P #4: Initiatives to Improve Cargo Security

Indicator #2: Participation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI)

Target #1

Initial	All major ports that ship to the U.S. will participate in the CSI program.
Revised	Eighty percent of all container traffic to the U.S. covered. Pilot phase deployments at initial CSI ports become permanent.
Justification	Measure of container traffic covered provides better understanding of the breadth and progress of the program.

Indicator #3: Cargo Manifest Requirements

Target #1

Initial	CBP continues implementation and screening. The Department works with overseas operators to create a seamless and safe door-to-door delivery system. Air cargo manifest screening will be in place at all ports of departure overseas. Sea and land freight trial screening programs will be in place at POEs.
Revised	All vessel cargo manifest information is provided to the CBP in electronic format at least 24 hours prior to loading unless exempted. CBP publishes final regulations for electronic submission of data for all modes of transport including rail, sea, and air.
Justification	Better explains the steps and mechanism for cargo manifest requirements.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I/P #1: Curb Access

Indicator #1: Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Impeded

Target #4

Initial	NIS Countries: All but one meet internationally recognized export control standards.
Revised	Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program expands beyond original focus of Newly Independent States (NIS).
Justification	The conversion of the EXBS to a global program has shifted the focus from NIS or (FSU) countries to others, which are of more immediate concern.

I/P #8: Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification

Indicator #1: Status of Verification of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments

Target #1

Initial	Seek Senate ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Seek to enforce Russian compliance with START in support of the Moscow Treaty. Implement and enforce the Moscow Treaty.
Revised	Seek to enforce Russian compliance with START in support of the Moscow Treaty. Implement and enforce the Moscow Treaty.
Justification	Moscow Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003 after U.S. and Russia exchanged instruments of ratification. Moreover, Senate provided its advice and consent in 2002. Listing this as a FY 2004 target is misleading.

I/P #9²: President's Annual Non-Compliance Report

Indicator #2¹

Initial	Submission of Presidential Report on Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed with the new Indicator 2: Status of Implementation of a Global Norm of Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments.

Indicator #6¹

Initial	Report on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) Published
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed with Indicator #2: Status of Implementation of a Global Norm of Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments.

I/P #9: Compliance Diplomacy

Indicator #8¹

Initial	Nuclear Verification Information System (NVIS) Enhances Verification of Compliance With Nuclear Testing Treaties and Moratoria
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Work pertaining to NVIS was subsumed with Indicator #2: Status of Implementation of a Global Norm of Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments. Though NVIS will be a useful tool once fully developed, its current unavailability does not significantly undermine the Bureau's ability to render compliance judgments or engage in compliance diplomacy and therefore should not be used independently as a performance indicator.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

² This I/P was included in the FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

I/P #10: All Source Intelligence Collection and Technology R&D

Indicator #4¹

Initial	Prepared for Rapid Assessment of Allegations of Biological and Chemical Weapons Use
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed with Indicator #3: Intelligence Collection Resources Promoted to Support Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification Objectives.

STRATEGIC GOAL 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUGS

I/P #1: Improve Anti-Trafficking Prosecutorial And Protection Capacities

Indicator #1¹

Initial	Implementation of Counterterrorism Financing Regimes in the 19 Countries Most Involved in al Qaeda Financing
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Merged Indicator with Strategic Goal 1, I/P #7, Indicator #2: Degree to Which Currently-Funded Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Research Projects Are Completed On-Time and Within Budget and Degree to Which the Number of Projects Accepted Is Increased.

I/P #4: International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)

Indicator #3

Initial	Number of Officials Trained at International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) and Through Other Programs
Revised	Number of Officials Trained at International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)
Justification	The Department has changed its training program. In the past, a large part of the training program included "off-the-shelf" courses provided by various USG law enforcement agencies. Over the past two years, the Department/INL has increasingly moved to project training, which is based on the training needs associated with specific projects and programs being implemented in a particular country. Since the training is tailored to specific projects underway, training is more cost effective and more directly meets the needs of the individual country programs.

Target #2

Initial	Other: 11,100
Revised	Deleted
Justification	"Other" training is now embassy-determined and project-driven; it is no longer useful as a performance indicator. Henceforth, the Department will no longer report on "other training" as currently defined.

Indicator #4¹

Initial	Number of Law Enforcement Officials Receiving Counternarcotics Training
Revised	Deleted
Justification	The Department has revamped its core training courses to integrate counternarcotics and law enforcement training aspects, to which counterterrorism training has been added. The result is that the Department has largely eliminated the distinction between counternarcotics and more general law enforcement training except for more specialized training.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 6: AMERICAN CITIZENS

I/P #1: American Citizen Services

Indicator #2: Access to Online Registration System

Target #1

Initial	Online registration system will begin to deliver Consular Information Program documents to citizens when they register.
Revised	U.S. citizens have the ability to use a global Internet-based registration system to inform U.S. embassies and consulates about their planned travel to other countries so that they can be contacted in an emergency.
Justification	In the FY 2003 PAR, the target for FY 2003 was changed to reflect a protracted clearance process that led to a change in direction and a slight delay of the online registration system. The FY 2003 target shown in the FY 2004 Plan became the target for FY 2004, and the FY 2004 target became the FY 2005 target.

Indicator #3: Status of Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption

Target #2

Initial	Accrediting agency/agencies is/are selected and will begin to process all adoption providers that qualify for accreditation. U.S. instruments of accession deposited.
Revised	Answer major public comments in Federal Register, issue revised proposed regulations on the accreditation and approval of adoption service providers, and negotiate Memoranda of Agreement with qualified accrediting entities.
Justification	Due to the large number of public comments, the complex legal and regulatory issues involved, and meetings with stakeholders in the adoption community and on Capitol Hill, the Department will again need to publish rewritten regulations as a proposed rule for comment. Because the regulations are not yet set, various steps in the implementation of the Convention could not proceed according to the previous schedule. Therefore, the target for FY 2004-2006 had to be changed.

STRATEGIC GOAL 7: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

I/P #1: Diplomatic Engagement to Advance Democracy

Indicator #1

Initial	Number of Countries Eligible to Be Invited to a Ministerial Meeting of the Community of Democracies (CD)
Revised	Number of Countries Meeting Democracy Criteria of the Community of Democracies (CD) or Improving Democracy Scores on Key Indices
Justification	Community of Democracies invitations only issued every other year. Freedom House and other reports provide hard data on annual basis and provide more detail for comparison purposes.

Target #2

Initial	New Target
Revised	Net positive change in countries improving their scores in Freedom House's annual "Freedom in the World" Survey.
Justification	Freedom House scores provide information on yearly changes, for countries moving among "free/partly free/not free categories" and changing scores within categories. This sharpens the value of the indicator.

Target #3

Initial	New Target
Revised	Net positive change in the number of countries where citizens have the right to change their government (according to the Department's annual human rights report).
Justification	Community of Democracies scores alone are insufficient for yearly comparison of progress on democracy. Evaluations in the human rights report regarding right to change government are one area where comparisons over time, on a fundamental measure of democracy, are possible and useful.

Continued on next page

STRATEGIC GOAL 7: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (continued)

I/P #2: Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

Indicator #1: Number of UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Resolutions on Democracy Adopted

Target #1

Initial	UNCHR adopts a majority of U.S.-priority country-specific resolutions. UNCHR adopts fifth consecutive democracy resolution and/or new democracy-development resolution. The United States successfully opposes moves to eliminate country-specific resolutions.
Revised	Eighty percent of U.S.-supported resolutions are adopted. UNCHR adopts fifth consecutive democracy resolution and/or new democracy-development resolution. The United States successfully opposes moves to eliminate country-specific resolutions.
Justification	Eighty percent target reflects more defined understanding of what constitutes effectiveness of UNCHR diplomacy (as opposed to "majority of resolutions").

I/P #4: Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Indicator #4: Effective Use of the Human Rights Report (HRR) to Promote U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

Target #1

Initial	Implement HRR-based programs. Country Reports and Asylum Affairs (CRA) officers visit posts to assess programs. Reports by CRA on program implementation. Add Arabic translation of the HRR. More posts in Middle East place translated version on their websites.
Revised	Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) programs are based on priorities identified by HRR. Number of translations and web-posting of translations increase to 33% of non-English-speaking countries worldwide.
Justification	Congressional requirement to report on number of translations of HRR and other reports. Changes in budget/other resources resulted in expansion of Human Rights and Democracy Fund.

I/P #5: Promote International Religious Freedom

Indicator #5

Initial	Level of Engagement with Foreign Governments and NGOs to Promote and Advocate on Behalf of Religious Freedom in Keeping with Foreign Policy Directives such as the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA)
Revised	Level of Engagement with Foreign Governments and NGOs to Promote and Advocate on Behalf of Religious Freedom
Justification	Recognition that the IRFA is not the only instrument for IRF monitoring.

Target #3

Initial	Two additional bilateral religious freedom negotiations; discussions with three allies on promoting religious freedom.
Revised	At least two additional bilateral or regional IRF initiatives are undertaken, laying the groundwork for significant policy changes in those countries or regions (e.g., constitutional protections, better religion laws, improved legal status for religious groups, fewer religious prisoners, more inter-religious dialogue, less religion-based violence).
Justification	These bilateral initiatives in priority countries are key to our office's advocacy work. The revised target gives greater specificity to our goals.

Target #4

Initial	IRF advocacy by senior officials and posts.
Revised	IRF reports recognized for high-quality reporting.
Justification	The IRF Reports are a high-priority focus for our advocacy efforts, and they bear mentioning as a specific goal.

Target #5

Initial	Interfaith dialog expands because of IRF effort in target country for each IRF officer.
Revised	Multilateral bodies give increased attention to IRF-related issues due to U.S. advocacy and intervention.
Justification	The revised target on multilateral diplomacy is a higher priority for our advocacy work than efforts to promote interfaith dialogue. This revised target gives the Department greater focus.

STRATEGIC GOAL 7: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (continued)

I/P #5: Promote International Religious Freedom (continued)

Indicator #6¹

Initial	Intensity of Monitoring, Reporting, and Analysis on Behalf of Religious Freedom by the USG and Multilateral Institutions in Keeping With Foreign Policy Directives Such as the IFRA
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Merged Indicator with Indicator #5: Level of Engagement with Foreign Governments and NGOs to Promote and Advocate on Behalf of Religious Freedom.

STRATEGIC GOAL 8: ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

I/P #1: Development Strategies

Indicator #1: Average Developing Country Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI)

Target #1

Initial	Increase in average GCI.
Revised	Increase in average GCI by three percent, from 4.81 to 4.95.
Justification	Additional data resulting in evolving judgments about the indicator.

Indicator #2¹

Initial	The Millenium Challenge Account (MCA)
Revised	Deleted
Justification	The Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) became an independent Title II agency in mid FY 2004 and is no longer considered a Department-led program. The Department will continue to play a significant support role to encourage sound economic growth strategies and practices in MCC countries, and to provide the MCC with essential economic and political analysis.

Indicator #2

Initial	International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Recommendations Adopted
Revised	International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Development Sector Programs and Projects
Justification	New title more accurately reflects focus on development-related activities.

Target #1

Initial	480
Revised	Implement six programs of the Istanbul Action Plan through ongoing projects, technical assistance, and study group activities. Link Istanbul Action Plan with objectives set forth by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).
Justification	Additional analysis resulted in a better judgment of how to measure the indicator based on ITU activities related to development.

I/P #2: Create Open and Dynamic World Markets

Indicator #3: Number of Countries Allowing Commercial Use of Agricultural Biotechnology and Global Acreage of Biotech Crops Under Cultivation

Target #2

Initial	Three additional countries begin to commercialize ag-biotech.
Revised	Acreage of agricultural biotechnology crops increases by twelve percent.
Justification	Acreage of land under cultivation demonstrates quantitative progress in market acceptance of biotech products.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 9: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

I/P #1: Global Health

Indicator #1: Level of International Collaboration and Partnerships to Support Health, Including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria

Target #1, #2, #3

Initial	Continued viability and success of the Global Fund. As reported by the Global Fund, one-fourth of all Country Coordination Mechanisms include NGO stakeholders as full participants in the design and implementation of proposals. Two more foundations and one more commercial enterprise make contributions to the Global Fund, including those at the country level. The Global Fund has conducted evaluations of grants, and half of the grant recipients make progress toward the indicators outlined in the proposals and the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework.
Revised	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interagency Global HIV/AIDS Five-Year Strategy developed with defined priorities for international collaboration and partnerships. 2. Fully coordinated interagency country five-year strategic plans developed for 15 focus countries. 3. Dialogue established with other donor nations and multilateral institutions to improve coordination with U.S. bilateral programs.
Justification	The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief was authorized by Congress in May 2003 by PL 108-25, the U.S. Leadership Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. It marked a wholesale change in USG assistance to combating HIV/AIDS internationally. Thus, indicators submitted before the launch of the Emergency Plan are no longer fully applicable.

Indicator #2, #3, #4

Initial	New Indicators
Revised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Number of People Receiving HIV/AIDS Treatment in the 15 Focus Countries • The Estimated Number of HIV Infections Prevented in the 15 Focus Countries • The Number of People Receiving HIV/AIDS Care in the 15 Focus Countries
Justification	The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief was authorized by Congress in May 2003 by P.L. 108-25, the U.S. Leadership Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. It marked a wholesale change in USG assistance to combating HIV/AIDS internationally. Given that this is the major program focus of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Department has submitted indicators related to achievement of these goals.

Indicator #5

Initial	Number of UN Population Fund (UNFPA) Field Monitoring Trips Conducted
Revised	Management Reforms at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
Justification	FY 2003 performance results made it necessary to revise this indicator. PRM staff made one monitoring trip to China in FY 2003. In FY 2004, PRM made one monitoring trip to China and three trips to UNFPA Executive Board meetings. Adoption of UNFPA's Technical Advisory Programme in FY 2003 encompassed broader reforms than the previous indicator could capture. The new indicator attempts to track the progress of reforms, more directly related to the I/P:1 Global Health, rather than the number of monitoring trips.

Target #1

Initial	Make monitoring trips to two countries in each region where UNFPA operates.
Revised	UNFPA reforms methods of monitoring and evaluating two programs.
Justification	Change in target correlates to the change in indicator.

STRATEGIC GOAL 9: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (continued)

I/P #1: Global Health (continued)

Indicator #2¹

Initial	Number of Bilateral and Multilateral Meetings in Which the U.S. Plays a Leadership Role in Dealing with Health Issues
Revised	Deleted
Justification	This indicator describes a means to achieve Department goals, rather than an output or outcome. Attendance and participation does not describe achievement of goals.

Indicator #3¹

Initial	Department-Wide Awareness of Global Health Issues and USG Policy
Revised	Deleted
Justification	This indicator has been dropped because it describes a routine action internal to the State Department. While the goal of assuring that health issues are mainstreamed into overall policy remains valid, this is not a good indicator of achievement of that goal.

Indicator #4¹

Initial	Countries or Regions with Stabilized or Reduced Rates of New HIV Infections
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Rates of new HIV infections for all countries are not collected annually. In addition, reduced or stabilized rates of new HIV infections cannot be directly attributed to the Emergency Plan, but rather reflects a worldwide collaborative effort that includes national governments of affected countries, other donors and multilateral organizations, and local groups.

Indicator #6: Status of World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR)

Target #1

Initial	Submit draft of revised International Health Regulations to WHO Governing bodies and adopt it at the World Health Assembly.
Revised	Technical review of the revised IHR continues at global, regional, and sub-regional level; regulatory draft IHR revision is submitted to member states for review.
Justification	The new narrative reflects what was done in 2004: technical review and member state reviews. The drafted revised IHR will be submitted to the World Health Assembly in Spring 2005 as was originally intended.

Indicator #5¹

Initial	Maternal Mortality Rate
Revised	Deleted
Justification	No results were reported in the FY 2003 PAR because it was determined that this indicator is not an appropriate measure of the Department's international population activities. The Department does not fund programs directly affecting maternal mortality. USAID does support programs directly affecting maternal mortality and tracks related indicators. Performance planning and reporting on U.S. international population policy will be further coordinated through the joint State-USAID Strategic Plan.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 10: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

I/P #1: Humanitarian Assistance

Indicator #2: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 Years of Age

Target #1

Initial	In humanitarian crises, children under weight-for-height ratios that are greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to -2), or greater than 80 percent median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema.
Revised	In targeted refugee populations, less than 10% of children under age five suffer from global acute malnutrition. Global acute malnutrition is defined as weight-for-height ratios that are less than 2 standard deviations below the mean (Zscore of less than -2), or less than 80% median weight-for-height, or the presence of nutritional edema.
Justification	Targets for this indicator have been revised to more accurately measure child nutritional status.

Target #2

Initial	Improve and expand data collection and reporting.
Revised	Deleted
Justification	Target was deleted because it included no specific measure and was not a useful indicator of progress.

I/P #3: World Food Program Donor Base

Indicator #4: Percentage of Non-U.S. Donors to the World Food Program (WFP)

Target #1

Initial	Increase the number of donors to WFP by five, and increase non-U.S. contributions by 5 percent over CY 2003.
Revised	Number of donors to WFP increased by five, and non-U.S. contributions increased to 50% of total.
Justification	Revision necessitated by WFP's involvement in Iraq.

Indicator #8¹

Initial	Status of Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN)
Revised	Deleted
Justification	This indicator and associated targets are no longer considered appropriate for a Department-level plan.

I/P #4: Humanitarian Demining

Indicator #6: Square Meters of Land Cleared in U.S. Program Countries

Target #1

Initial	250,000,000m ²
Revised	74,000,000m ²
Justification	In the early planning process, a global figure was used rather than limiting to only those projects to which the USG contributes.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 11: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I/P #1: Reaching Out to Allies and Regional Powers

Indicator #1: The Level of Media Placement in Foreign Markets in Broadcast and Print

Target #1

Initial	Evidence shows that information has reached intended user.
Revised	Evidence shows that information has reached intended user, and there is a 5% increase based on the FY 2003 Performance Results (Baseline).
Justification	Refinement of Target.

I/P #3: Communicate More Effectively with Global Publics

Indicator #1

Initial	Percentage of Program Participants Who Demonstrate an Affinity for Democratic Values Three or More Years After Their Program Experience
Revised	Percentage of Exchange Program Participants Who Espouse Democratic Principles Three or More Years After Their Program Experience
Justification	The new wording is a more clear and accurate reflection of the goal. The measurement is based on an aggregated set of responses to questions regarding understanding and value of democratic principles.

Indicator #2¹

Initial	Level of International Public Understanding of U.S. Policies
Revised	Deleted
Justification	This indicator overlaps with the new Indicator #2: Targeted Publics Receive Intended Message – thus all data will be reported via this indicator.

I/P #4: Outreach to Expanded U.S. Audience

Indicator #1: Number of Interviews and Contacts With U.S. Media

Target #1

Initial	16,000 contacts/year
Revised	Evidence shows that information has reached intended user with a 5% increase based on the FY 2003 Performance Results (Baseline).
Justification	Refinement of Target.

Indicator #2: Increase in the Number of Outreach Activities to Targeted U.S. Audiences

Target #1

Initial	Evidence shows that information provided has reached intended user.
Revised	Evidence shows that information reached intended user with 3% increase based on the FY2003 Performance Results (Baseline).
Justification	Refinement of Target.

¹ This Indicator was included in the FY 2004 Department Performance Plan and has not been included in the FY 2004 PAR.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE

I/P #5: Americans Employed by UN System Organizations

Indicator #12

Initial	New Indicator
Revised	Percentage of UN System Organizations' Workforce Positions (Subject to Geographical Distribution) That Are American Citizens ¹
Justification	The Department decided that this is an important indicator and should be reported in the PAR although it was not included in the FY 2004 DPP.

I/P #7: Ready Access to International Affairs Applications and Information

Indicator #1: Status of Commercial Networking Facilities Available for Unclassified and Classified Processing Completed

Target #1

Initial	OpenNet Plus project completed. More than 43,000 users have desktop Internet access.
Revised	OpenNet Plus Internet pilot project completed including OSIS connectivity.
Justification	OSIS connectivity gives OpenNet Plus users the additional benefit of access to the unclassified Intel community exchange network.

Target #3

Initial	New Target
Revised	PDNet users converted to OpenNet.
Justification	Complies with Under Secretary for Management's mandate to work towards a single State Department unclassified network.

Indicator #2: Progress Toward Replacing Classified and Unclassified Desktop Computers More Than Four Years Old

Target #1

Initial	Complete Classified program, thus providing classified connectivity to all domestic and overseas locations. Continue consolidated program to refresh and maintain classified and unclassified computers.
Revised	Continue consolidated program to refresh and maintain classified and unclassified computers.
Justification	Refinement of Target.

1 UN System organizations gather their information on a Calendar Year basis. Given the delay in gathering and reporting the data, each fiscal year's targets correspond to the previous calendar year. The annual targets listed herein are averages among those international organizations that attract a high level of U.S. interest (i.e., for CY 2000-CY 2003, the UN, ILO, ITU, ICAO, FAO, UNHCR, and WHO; IAEA for CY 2003 only).

The annual targets and results shown are averages among those international organizations where the U.S. is most inequitably employed or which attract a high level of interest. For CY 2001 and CY 2002, these organizations were as follows: UN, ILO, ITU, ICAO, FAO, UNHCR, and WHO.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

I/P #9: Modern, Worldwide, Integrated Messaging (SMART)

Indicator #5: Progress Toward Elimination of the Current Cable System and Processes

Target #1

Initial	System piloted.
Revised	Completed design demonstration.
Justification	Refinement of Targets.

Target #2

Initial	Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
Revised	Develop and test Beta solution.
Justification	Refinement of Targets.

Target #3

Initial	Deployment begins.
Revised	Install secure processing facility.
Justification	Refinement of Targets.

I/P #10: Secure Employees

Indicator #2: Deployment of Chemical/Biological Countermeasure Masks to Posts Abroad

Target #1

Initial	240 posts.
Revised	149 of 240 posts have employee countermeasure masks.
Justification	Revisions necessitated by the occurrence of unanticipated exigencies and by the impact of realized FY 2003 performance results. Specifically, the distribution of escape masks to overseas posts began on schedule in FY 2003, but was then delayed to provide the Middle East region with unanticipated support related to the Iraqi conflict. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security ensured that the immediate region surrounding the war zone was properly trained and fully prepared in case of CW or BW attacks. This caused a delay in the completion date of the project.

Indicator #3: Replacement of Armored Vehicles (AVs)

Target #1

Initial	225 armored vehicles replaced.
Revised	177 armored vehicles replaced.
Justification	Revisions necessitated by the occurrence of unanticipated exigencies and by the impact of realized FY 2003 performance results. Specifically, the replacement schedule of armored vehicles, which originally had a massive FY 2004/2005 bulge, has been flattened and peak procurement years scaled back due to the current model vehicles having extended lifecycle. The savings from these models offsets the increased cost per base unit.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

I/P #11: Protect Critical Infrastructure

Indicator #6: Remediation of Identified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Vulnerabilities

Target #1

Initial	Olney FEMA Federal Support Center reaches Full Operational Capability (FOC), with all BIMC circuits installed.
Revised	Olney Alternate Communications site reaches Full Operational Capability (FOC), with all BIMC circuits installed.
Justification	The name of the facility has been changed.

Target #2

Initial	All Tier 2 and 3 vulnerabilities progress to green and half of Tier 4 vulnerabilities progress to yellow.
Revised	All Tier 2 and 3 vulnerabilities progress to green.
Justification	The tiers have been consolidated to create only three tiers.

I/P #12: Capital Security Construction

Indicator #1: Number of New Sites Acquired for Capital Security Construction Projects

Target #1

Initial	10
Revised	Acquire seven sites for New Embassy Compound (NEC) projects.
Justification	The Damascus NEC, the Karachi NEC, and the Asmara NEC construction projects were moved to a later year in the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan. The host nations did not support nor cooperate in acquiring NEC sites in Damascus and Asmara. In Karachi, no suitable NEC site could be located in FY 2004.

I/P #13: Foggy Bottom Renovation/Consolidation

Indicator #3: Renovation of the Harry S Truman Building (HST)

Target #2

Initial	Start construction on U.S. Diplomacy Center.
Revised	Complete Pre-Concept Design for U.S. Diplomacy Center.
Justification	Construction cannot start until private funding is received to continue design and construction.

I/P #14: New Office Building for U.S. Mission to United Nations

Indicator #4: U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) New Construction

Target #4

Initial	Begin NOB construction.
Revised	Complete New Office Building (NOB) design.
Justification	Locating and leasing an Interim Office Building required greater time than originally anticipated. The first building was unexpectedly purchased by a third party and negotiations for the second selected space stalled due to divergent interests by the owner.

STRATEGIC GOAL 12: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE (continued)

I/P #15: Integrate Budget and Performance

Indicator #2: Implementation of Central Financial Planning System (CFPS) Modules

Target #1

Initial	Complete the development and deployment of Bureau and Field Budget Plan Module, and Financial Performance and Reporting Module completed.
Revised	Complete the development and deployment of Bureau Resource Management System (Version 1) and prototyping of a Planning and Performance Reporting Module.
Justification	Bureau and Field Budget Plan module changed name to "Bureau Resource Management System." Financial Performance and Reporting Module target unchanged, but more specifically defined.

I/P #17: Worldwide Logistics

Indicator #1

Initial	Percentage of Service Contracts Using Quality Sourcing Specifications
Revised	Percentage of Service Contract Dollars That Are Performance Based
Justification	Clarity of wording.

Indicator #2: Logistics in the Areas of Acquisition, Distribution, Transportation, Travel and Diplomatic Pouch and Mail

Target #1

Initial	Fill seventy-five percent of orders perfectly.
Revised	Achieve seventy-five percent "perfect order fulfillment."
Justification	Clarity of wording.

I/P #18: Overseas Schools Accreditation

Indicator #3: Overseas Schools Accreditation

Target #1

Initial	A total of 155 accredited schools.
Revised	A total of 170 accredited schools.
Justification	The change in the number of accredited schools reflects the positive effect of grants and direct assistance. The number of schools was revised upward to be consistent with the 2004 target as published in the FY 2005 DPP.

I/P #20: Allowances

Indicator #5: E-Allowances System for Reporting from Posts to Washington

Target #1

Initial	Development/Initial deployment.
Revised	Phase I development/initial deployment.
Justification	Clarity of wording.

DIRECTORY OF KEY OFFICIALS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT

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Richard L. Armitage – Deputy Secretary of State

John C. Danforth – United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations

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John R. Bolton - *Under Secretary*

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- Bureau of Political-Military Affairs – *Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.*
- Bureau of Nonproliferation – *Susan F. Burk, Acting*
- Bureau of Verification and Compliance – *Paula A. DeSutter*

Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs

Alan P. Larson - *Under Secretary*

- Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs – *E. Anthony Wayne*

Global Affairs

Paula J. Dobriansky - *Under Secretary*

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- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement – *Robert B. Charles*
- Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs – *John F. Turner*
- Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration – *Arthur E. Dewey*

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- Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs – *A. Elizabeth Jones*
- Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs – *William J. Burns*
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- Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs – *Roger F. Noriega*
- Bureau of International Organizational Affairs – *Kim R. Holmes*

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Patricia S. Harrison - *Acting Under Secretary*

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- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs – *Patricia De Stacy Harrison*
- Bureau of International Information Programs – *Alexander C. Feldman*

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- Executive Secretariat – *Karl W. Hofmann*
- Office of Policy Planning – *Mitchell B. Reiss*
- Chief Financial Officer – *Christopher B. Burnham*
- Legal Adviser – *William H. Taft, IV*
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- Office of Civil Rights – *Barbara S. Pope*
- Bureau of Legislative Affairs – *Paul V. Kelly*
- Bureau of Intelligence and Research – *Thomas Fingar*
- Office of Protocol – *Donald B. Ensenat*
- Coordinator for Counterterrorism – *J. Cofer Black*
- Office of War Crimes Issues – *Pierre R. Prosper*
- Counselor – *Vacant*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE LOCATIONS

AMERICAN EMBASSIES

Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire	Cotonou, Benin	Maputo, Mozambique
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates	Dakar, Senegal	Maseru, Lesotho
Abuja, Nigeria	Damascus, Syria	Mbabane, Swaziland
Accra, Ghana	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	Mexico City, Mexico
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Dhaka, Bangladesh	Minsk, Belarus
Algiers, Algeria	Dili, East Timor	Monrovia, Liberia
Almaty, Kazakhstan	Djibouti, Djibouti	Montevideo, Uruguay
Amman, Jordan	Doha, Qatar	Moscow, Russia
Ankara, Turkey	Dublin, Ireland	Muscat, Oman
Antananarivo, Madagascar	Dushanbe, Tajikistan	N'Djamena, Chad
Apia, Samoa	Freetown, Sierra Leone	Nairobi, Kenya
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan	Gaborone, Botswana	Nassau, The Bahamas
Asmara, Eritrea	Georgetown, Guyana	New Delhi, India
Asuncion, Paraguay	Guatemala City, Guatemala	Niamey, Niger
Athens, Greece	Hanoi, Vietnam	Nicosia, Cyprus
Baghdad, Iraq	Harare, Zimbabwe	Nouakchott, Mauritania
Baku, Azerbaijan	Helsinki, Finland	Oslo, Norway
Bamako, Mali	Islamabad, Pakistan	Ottawa, Canada
Bandar Seri Begawan, Bunei	Jakarta, Indonesia	Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
Bangkok, Thailand	Kabul, Afghanistan	Panama City, Panama
Bangui, Central African Republic	Kampala, Uganda	Paramaribo, Suriname
Banjul, The Gambia	Kathmandu, Nepal	Paris, France
Beijing, China	Khartoum, Sudan	Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Beirut, Lebanon	Kiev, Ukraine	Port Louis, Mauritius
Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro	Kigali, Rwanda	Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
Belize City, Belize	Kingston, Jamaica	Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany	Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo	Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago
Bern, Switzerland	Kolonia, Micronesia	Prague, Czech Republic
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan	Koror, Palau	Praia, Cape Verde
Bogota, Colombia	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia	Pretoria, South Africa
Brasilia, Brazil	Kuwait, Kuwait	Quito, Ecuador
Bratislava, Slovak Republic	La Paz, Bolivia	Rabat, Morocco
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo	Libreville, Gabon	Rangoon, Burma
Bridgetown, Barbados	Lilongwe, Malawi	Reykjavik, Iceland
Brussels, Belgium	Lima, Peru	Riga, Latvia
Bucharest, Romania	Lisbon, Portugal	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Budapest, Hungary	Ljubljana, Slovenia	Rome, Italy
Buenos Aires, Argentina	Lome, Togo	San Jose, Costa Rica
Bujumbura, Burundi	London, United Kingdom	San Salvador, El Salvador
Cairo, Egypt	Luanda, Angola	Sanaa, Yemen
Canberra, Australia	Lusaka, Zambia	Santiago, Chile
Caracas, Venezuela	Luxembourg, Luxembourg	Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Chisinau, Moldova	Madrid, Spain	Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Colombo, Sri Lanka	Majuro, Marshall Islands	Seoul, Korea
Conakry, Guinea	Malabo, Equatorial Guinea	Singapore, Singapore
Copenhagen, Denmark	Managua, Nicaragua	Skopje, Macedonia
	Manama, Bahrain	Sofia, Bulgaria
	Manila, Philippines	St. George's, Grenada



Stockholm, Sweden
 Suva, Fiji
 Tallinn, Estonia
 Tashkent, Uzbekistan
 Tbilisi, Georgia
 Tegucigalpa, Honduras
 Tel Aviv, Israel
 The Hague, Netherlands
 Tirana, Albania
 Tokyo, Japan
 Tunis, Tunisia
 Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
 Valletta, Malta
 Vatican, The Holy See
 Vienna, Austria
 Vientiane, Laos
 Vilnius, Lithuania
 Warsaw, Poland
 Wellington, New Zealand
 Windhoek, Namibia
 Yaounde, Cameroon
 Yerevan, Armenia
 Zagreb, Croatia

CONSULATES GENERAL

Amsterdam, Netherlands
 Auckland, New Zealand
 Barcelona, Spain
 Belfast, United Kingdom
 Calgary, Canada
 Cape Town, South Africa
 Casablanca, Morocco
 Chengdu, China
 Chiang Mai, Thailand
 Ciudad Juarez, Mexico
 Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles
 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
 Dubai, United Arab Emirates
 Durban, South Africa
 Düsseldorf, Federal Republic of Germany
 Edinburgh, United Kingdom
 Florence, Italy
 Frankfurt Am Main, Federal Republic of Germany
 Guadalajara, Mexico
 Guangzhou, China
 Guayaquil, Ecuador
 Halifax, Canada
 Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany
 Hamilton, Bermuda
 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Hong Kong, China
 Istanbul, Turkey
 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
 Jerusalem
 Johannesburg, South Africa
 Karachi, Pakistan
 Krakow, Poland
 Lagos, Nigeria
 Leipzig, Federal Republic of Germany
 Marseille, France
 Melbourne, Australia
 Milan, Italy
 Monterrey, Mexico
 Montreal, Canada
 Mumbai, India
 Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
 Naha, Japan
 Naples, Italy
 Osaka-Kobe, Japan
 Perth, Australia
 Quebec, Canada
 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
 São Paulo, Brazil
 Sapporo, Japan
 Shanghai, China
 Shenyang, China
 St. Petersburg, Russia
 Strasbourg, France
 Surabaya, Indonesia
 Sydney, Australia
 Thessaloniki, Greece
 Tijuana, Mexico
 Toronto, Canada
 Vancouver, Canada
 Vladivostok, Russia
 Yekaterinburg, Russia

CONSULATES

Adana, Turkey
 Alexandria, Egypt
 Bordeaux, France
 Calcutta, India
 Chennai, India
 Fukuoka, Japan
 Hermosillo, Mexico
 Izmir, Turkey
 Lahore, Pakistan
 Lille, France
 Lyon, France
 Matamoros, Mexico
 Merida, Mexico

Nagoya, Japan
 Nogales-Sonora, Mexico
 Nuevo Laredo, Mexico
 Peshawar, Pakistan
 Podgorica, Serbia and Montenegro
 Ponta Delgada, Portugal
 Recife, Brazil
 Rennes, France
 Toulouse, France
 Winnipeg, Canada

BRANCH OFFICES

Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina
 Cluj-Napoca, Romania
 Douala, Cameroon
 Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina

U.S. INTEREST SECTION

Havana, Cuba (USINT)

U.S. OFFICE

Pristina, Kosovo

U.S. MISSIONS

U.S. Mission to the United Nations,
New York, New York
 U.S. Mission to the Organization of American
 States, *Washington, D.C.*
 U.S. Mission to the European Union,
Brussels, Belgium
 U.S. Mission to the International Civil Aviation
 Organization, *Montreal, Canada*
 U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization, *Brussels, Belgium*
 U.S. Mission to the United Nations Agencies for
 Food and Agriculture, *Rome, Italy*
 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic
 Cooperation and Development,
Paris, France
 U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in
 Vienna, *Vienna, Austria*
 U.S. Mission to the United Nations Environmental
 Programme, and the UN Human
 Settlements Programme, *Nairobi, Kenya*
 U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United
 Nations and Other International
 Organizations, *Geneva, Switzerland*
 U.S. Delegation to the Organization for Security
 and Cooperation in Europe, *Vienna, Austria*
 U.S. Observer Mission to the United Nations
 Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
 Organization, *Paris, France*



CONSULAR AGENCIES

Acapulco, Mexico
 Antigua & Barbuda, Antigua
 Bali, Indonesia
 Barranquilla, Colombia
 Bata, Equatorial Guinea
 Belem, Brazil
 Bremen, Germany
 Cabo San Lucas, Mexico
 Cancun, Mexico
 Cayman Islands, Jamaica
 Cebu, Philippines
 Ciudad Acuna, Mexico
 Cochabamba, Bolivia
 Cozumel, Mexico
 Cuzco, Peru
 Fortaleza, Brazil
 Fort-de-France, Martinique
 Funchal, Portugal
 Galapagos, Ecuador
 Geneva, Switzerland
 Genoa, Italy
 Haifa, Israel
 Honiara, Solomon Islands
 Ixtapa, Mexico
 La Coruña, Spain
 Las Palmas, Spain
 Malaga, Spain
 Manaus, Brazil
 Maracaibo, Venezuela
 Mazatlan, Mexico
 Montego Bay, Jamaica
 Nice, France
 Oaxaca, Mexico
 Palermo, Italy
 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
 Papeete, Tahiti
 Piedras Negras, Mexico
 Porto Alegre, Brazil
 Poznan, Poland
 Puerta Plata, Dominican Republic
 Puerto Ayora, Galapagos
 Puerto Vallarta, Mexico
 Reynosa, Mexico
 Salvador de Bahia, Brazil
 Salzburg, Austria
 San Luis Potosi, Mexico
 San Miguel de Allende, Mexico
 Santa Cruz, Bolivia
 Seville, Spain
 Trieste, Italy

Valencia, Spain
 Victoria, Seychelles
 Zurich, Switzerland

U.S. SPECIAL OFFICE

Astana, Kazakhstan

U.S. LIAISON OFFICE

Tripoli, Libya

PASSPORT AND VISA CENTERS

National Passport Center
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
 National Visa Center
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
 Kentucky Consular Center
Williamsburg, Kentucky
 National Passport Center
Charleston, South Carolina
 Boston Passport Agency
Boston, Massachusetts
 Chicago Passport Agency
Chicago, Illinois
 Honolulu Passport Agency
Honolulu, Hawaii
 Houston Passport Agency
Houston, Texas
 Los Angeles Passport Agency
Los Angeles, California
 Miami Passport Agency
Miami, Florida
 New York Passport Agency
New York, New York
 New Orleans Passport Agency
New Orleans, Louisiana
 Norwalk Passport Agency
Norwalk, Connecticut
 Philadelphia Passport Agency
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
 San Francisco Passport Agency
San Francisco, California
 Seattle Passport Agency
Seattle, Washington
 Special Issuance Agency
Washington, District of Columbia
 Washington Passport Agency
Washington, District of Columbia

FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTERS

Bangkok, Thailand
 Charleston, South Carolina

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY OFFICES

Boston Field Office
Boston, Massachusetts

Chicago Field Office
Chicago, Illinois

Houston Field Office
Houston, Texas

Los Angeles Field Office
Los Angeles, California

Miami Field Office
Miami, Florida

New York Field Office
Ft. Lee, New Jersey

San Francisco Field Office
San Francisco, California

Washington Field Office
Dunn Loring, Virginia

Atlanta Resident Office
Atlanta, Georgia

Dallas Resident Office
Dallas, Texas

Denver Resident Office
Denver, Colorado

Greensboro Resident Office
Greensboro, North Carolina

Honolulu Resident Office
Honolulu, Hawaii

New Orleans Resident Office
New Orleans, Louisiana

Philadelphia Resident Office
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Phoenix Resident Office
Phoenix, Arizona

San Diego Resident Office
San Diego, California

San Juan Resident Office
San Juan, Puerto Rico


Seattle Resident Office
Seattle, Washington

St. Louis Resident Office
St. Louis, Missouri

AMERICAN INSTITUTE TAIWAN

Unofficial commercial and other relations with the people of Taiwan are conducted through an official instrumentality, the American Institute of Taiwan, which has offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung.





MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATIONS

Annual Budget Requests

www.state.gov/m/rm/c6112.htm

The Department's Performance Budget submission comprises several volumes. The *Summary and Highlights* provides information about the International Affairs category, or Function 150, of the federal budget and includes funding requests for the programs and activities of several cabinet-level departments and independent agencies as well as numerous international organizations. The *Budget in Brief* provides specific information about the Department of State budget, and the *Congressional Budget Justification* volumes provide detailed information regarding all accounts. The *Performance Summary* is an integral component of the budget and was previously known as the Performance Plan.

Battling International Bribery

www.state.gov/e/eb/rfs/rpts/bib/

Annual report by the Department of State on enforcement and monitoring of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Congressional Testimony

www.state.gov/s/h/tst/

Collection of transcripts from testimony by Department Officials appearing before the Congress.

Consular Notification and Access

<http://travel.state.gov/law/notify.html>

Instructions for Federal, state, and other local law enforcement and other officials regarding foreign nationals in the United States and the rights of consular officials to assist them.

Country Background Notes

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

These handy guides provide information on a country's leaders, politics, economy, and relations with the U.S. Background Notes appear on the Department's website before they are sent to press for GPO subscribers.

Country Commercial Guides

[www.export.gov/marketresearch.html#MarketResearch\(Non-Agricultural\)](http://www.export.gov/marketresearch.html#MarketResearch(Non-Agricultural))

Country Commercial Guides (CCGs) are prepared annually by U.S. embassies with the assistance of several U.S. Government agencies. These reports present a comprehensive look at countries' commercial environments, using economic, political and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, a multi-agency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm

Annual report submitted to the Congress by the Department of State regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights practices.

Diplomatic List

www.state.gov/s/cpr/rfs/dpl/

This publication contains the names of the members of the diplomatic staffs of all missions and their spouses. Members of the diplomatic staff are the members of the staff of the mission having diplomatic rank. These persons enjoy full immunity under provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Foreign Consular Offices in the U.S.

www.state.gov/s/cpr/rfs/fco

This publication contains a complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, and recognized consular officers.

Foreign Relations of the United Stateswww.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/

This historical record of American foreign policy is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian. First published in 1861, Foreign Relations of the United States preserves a key part of American history in more than 350 individual volumes. Each volume documents the major foreign policy decisions and diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government and contains declassified records from the White House, the Department of State, and other foreign affairs agencies.

International Narcotics Control Strategy Reportwww.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/

Annual report submitted to the Congress by the Department of State, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act, which describes the efforts of countries, including those that received U.S. assistance, in the fight against drugs, and Presidential narcotics certification determinations on drug producing and transit countries.

International Religious Freedom Reportwww.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt/

The Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom describes the status of religious freedom in each country, government policies violating religious belief and practices of groups, religious denominations and individuals, and U.S. policies to promote religious freedom around the world. It is submitted in compliance with P.L. 105-292 (105th Congress) and is cited as the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts<http://foia.state.gov/MMS/KOH/keyoffcity.asp>

This directory lists key officers and their telephone and fax numbers from the Departments of State and Commerce and other U.S. agencies at Foreign Service posts that assist American business representatives around the world. It is only available on the Internet.

Patterns of Global Terrorismwww.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/

Annual report submitted to the Congress containing detailed assessments of countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list of countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism).

State Magazinewww.state.gov/m/dghr/statemag/

Published monthly by the Department to facilitate communication between management and employees at home and abroad and to acquaint employees with developments that may affect operations or personnel.

The U.S. Department of State: A Guide to Doing Businesswww.state.gov/m/a/sdbu/pubs/c6145.htm

Lists useful information concerning the Department's procurement opportunities, points of contact, subcontracting opportunities, etc. This can be obtained in hard copy from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

To Walk The Earth In Safetywww.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2004/

Provides annual information on specific programs and accomplishments of the Department's efforts to eradicate persistent landmines--both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle--as well as unexploded ordnance wherever they threaten civilian populations or deny them access to their land, homes, markets, schools, churches, and hospitals.

Trafficking in Persons Reportwww.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/

A comprehensive annual report on human trafficking around the world and what governments are doing to end it. The Trafficking in Persons Report serves as the primary diplomatic tool through which the U.S. Government encourages partnership and increased determination in the fight against forced labor and sexual exploitation.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

2ID	2nd Infantry Division, US Army	C&A	Certification and Accreditation
A	Bureau of Administration	CA	Bureau of Consular Affairs
A/LM	Bureau of Administration/Office of Logistics Management	CAFTA	Central America Free Trade Agreement
AACR	African Armed Conflicts Resolved	CBFP	Congo Basin Forest Partnership
AAMVA	American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators	CBM	Confidence-Building Measure
AC	Bureau of Arms Control	CBMs	Continental Ballistic Missiles
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	CBP	Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
ACI	Andean Counterdrug Initiative	CBT	Computer Based Training
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance	CCD	Consular Consolidated Database
ACSI	American Customer Satisfaction Index	CCP	Classified Connectivity Program
ACSS	Access Control Systems	CD	Community of Democracies
ACW	Advanced Conventional Weapons	CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
ADB	Asian Development Bank	CD-ROM	Compact Disk - Read Only Memory
ADP	Automated Data Processing	CEA	Council of Economic Advisors
AE	Accrediting entities	CEAR	Certificate of Excellence in Accountability Reporting
AETN	American Embassy Television Network	CE-DAT	Complex Emergencies Database
AF	Bureau of African Affairs	CEO	Chief Executive Officer
AGA	Association of Government Accountants	CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
ANC	Antenatal Care	CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
AP	Associated Press	CFO	Chief Financial Officer
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation	CFP	Common Fisheries Policy
API	Advanced Passenger Information	CFPS	Central Financial Planning System
APIS	Advance Passenger Information System	CFSC	Charleston Financial Service Center
ARV	Antiretroviral	CFSP	Critical Flight Safety Program
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	CGSS	Consultative Group on Strategic Security
ASP	Adoption Service Providers	CHR	Commission on Human Rights
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ATA	Air Transport Agreement	CIF	Capital Investment Fund
AU	African Union	CIO	Chief Information Officer
AVs	Armored Vehicles	CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors	CIS	Consular Information Sheets
BCC	Border Crossing Card	CITEL	Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
BFC	Budget Functional Classification	CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
BFSC	Bangkok Financial Service Center	CJCS	Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
BIC	Bilateral Implementation Commission	CLASS	Consular Lookout and Support System
BII	Bio-industry Initiative	CLJ	Constitutional Loya Jirga
BIMC	Beltsville Information Management Center	CM	Case Management
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty	CMR	Crude Mortality Rate
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative	CNC	Crime and Narcotics Center
BOG	Board of Governors	CPA	Certified Public Accountant
BPP	Bureau Performance Plan	CPIC	Capital Planning and Investment Control
BPR	Business Processing Re-engineering	CPMT	Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
BRMS	Bureau Resource Management System	CPPNM	Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
BSC	Balanced Scorecard	CRA	Country Reports and Asylum Affairs
BW	Biological Weapons	CRDF	U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention	CRED	Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters



CS	Civil Service	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
CS&H	Child Survival & Health Programs Fund	EFM	Eligible Family Member
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures	EFT	Electronic Funds Transfer
CSCS	Capital Security Cost Sharing	E-GOALS	Online Performance Measurement System
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development	E-gov	Electronic Government
CSE	Center for Security Evaluation	eGovPMO	eGov Program Management Office
CSG	Counterterrorism Security Group	EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
CSI	Container Security Initiative	e-mail	Electronic Mail
CSRS	Civil Service Retirement System	ENM	Enterprise Network Management Office
CT	Counterterrorism	ENR	Engineering News – Record
CTC	Counterterrorism Committee	EOB	Existing Office Building
CTCC	Counterproliferation Technology Coordinating Commission	EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
CW	Chemical Weapons	e-QIP	Electronic Questionnaire for Investigation Processing
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention	ERMA	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
CY	Calendar Year	ESC&M	Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance
D&CP	Diplomatic and Consular Programs	ESDP	European Security and Defense Program
D.C.	District of Columbia	ESF	Economic Support Fund
DA	Development Assistance	EUR	Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission	EUR/NIS	Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs/Newly Independent States
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency	EXBS	Export Control and Related Border Security
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services	EXIM	Export Import Bank
DHS	Department of Homeland Security	Ex-Im	Export Import
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency	FAIR	Federal Activities Inventory Reform
DOC	Department of Commerce	FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
DoD	Department of Defense	FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
DOE	Department of Energy	FAS	Foreign Agricultural Service
DOI	Department of Interior	FASAB	Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
DOJ	Department of Justice	FAST	Free and Secure Trade Program
DOL	Department of Labor	FATF	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
DOS	Department of State	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
DOT	Department of Transportation	FCS	Foreign Commercial Service
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	FECA	Federal Employees Compensation Act
DRI	Diplomatic Readiness Initiative	FEGLIP	Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor	FEHBP	Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
DSM	Domestic Staffing Model	FERS	Federal Employees Retirement System
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency	FEST	Foreign Emergency Support Team
e.g.	exempli gratia (Latin), meaning "for example; for instance"	FFMIA	Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
E.O.	Executive Order	FHA	Federal Health Architecture
EAP	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs	FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act
EB	Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs	FM	Financial Management
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	FMF	Foreign Military Financing
EC	European Community	FMFIA	Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
ECA	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs	FMSF	Fissile Material Storage Facility
ECA	Economic Complementation Agreement	FOC	Full Operational Capability
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe	FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
ECOMIL	Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia	FOTA	Future of the Alliance
		FPDS-NG	Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation
		FR	Facial Recognition



FREEDOMS	Freedom of Information Document Management System	HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States	HR	Human Resources
FS	Foreign Service	HR	Human Rights
FSA	Freedom Support Act	HRDF	Human Rights and Democracy Fund
FSAT	Financial Systems Assessment Teams	HRR	Human Rights Report
FSC	Financial Services Consolidation	HSC	Homeland Security Council
FSC	Financial Service Center	HST	Harry S Truman Building
FSC	Finance and Supply Chain	i.e.	id est (Latin), meaning "that is; in other words"
FSI	Foreign Service Institute	I/P	Initiative/Program
FSN	Foreign Service National	IAE	Integrated Acquisition Environment
FSNSLTF	Foreign Service National Separation Liability Trust Fund	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
FSPS	Foreign Service Pension System	IBWC	International Boundary Water Commission
FSRA	Foreign Service Retirement Actuarial	IC	International Community
FSRDF	Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund	ICAO	The International Civil Aviation Organization
FSU	Former Soviet Union	ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
FSWE	Foreign Service Written Exam	ICCAT	International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
FTA	Free Trade Agreement	ICES	International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
FTAA	Free Trade Agreement of the Americas	ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent	ICOC	International Code of Conduct
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
FUDRA	Army Quick Deployment Force	ICRI	International Coral Reef Initiative
FWCB	Federal Worker's Compensation Benefits	IDENT	Automated Biometric Identification System
FY	Fiscal Year	IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
G/TIP	Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons	IEA	Information Exchange Agreement
GAAP	Generally Accepted Accounting Principles	IEMS	Integrated Enterprise Management System
GAI	General Assistance Initiative	IFI	International Financial Institution
GAO	The Government Accountability Office	IFRA	The French Institute for Research in Africa
GCI	Growth Competitiveness Index	IG	Inspector General
GDIN	Global Disaster Information Network	IGC	Intergovernmental Consultations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	IHR	International Health Regulations
GEF	Global Environmental Facility	IIP	Bureau of International Information Programs
GFMS	Global Financial Management System	ILEAs	International Law Enforcement Academies
GGCL	Government-to-Government Communications Link	ILMS	Integrated Logistics Management System
GHSAG	Global Health Security Action Group	ILO	International Labor Organization
GIF	Generation IV International Forum	IMET	International Military Education and Training
GITM	Global Information Technology Modernization	IMF	International Monetary Fund
GLID	Global ID	INA	Integrated Notification Application
GM	Grants Management	INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
GMRA	Government Management Reform Act	INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
GOP	Government of Pakistan	INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
GPO	U.S. Government Printing Office	INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act	INTERPOL	International Crime Police Organization
GSA	General Services Administration	IO	Bureau of International Organizations
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism	IO&P	International Organizations and Programs
HACU	Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities	IOB	Interim Office Building
HBCU	Historically Black Colleges and Universities	IOC	Initial Operating Capability
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services	IOC	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus	IOM	International Organization for Migration
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	IPIA	Improper Payments Information Act

IPOA	International Plan of Action	MPP	Mission Performance Plan
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights	MRA	Migration and Refugee Assistance
IRF	International Religious Freedom	MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
IRFA	International Religious Freedom Act	MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Documents
IRM	Bureau of Information Resource Management	MRV	Machine Readable Visa
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer	MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
ISTC	International Science and Technology Center	MWO	Muslim World Outreach
IT	Information Technology	N/A	Not Applicable
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulation	NADR	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
ITU	International Telecommunication Union	NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
IWC	International Whaling Commission	NAPHISIS	National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems
JCG	Joint Consultative Group	NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
JCIC	Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission	NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
JFMIP	Joint Financial Management Improvement Program	NCCT	Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
JFMS	Joint Financial Management System	NCMEC	National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
JMC	Joint Military Commission	NDF	Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
KCC	Kentucky Consular Center	NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
L/M	Leadership/Management	NEC	New Embassy Compound
LACP	League of American Communications Professionals	NEC	New Embassy Construction
LAN	Local Area Network	NED	National Endowment for Democracy
LDCs	Less Developed Countries	NePAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
LDPs	Language Designated Positions	NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
listservs	List Servers	NICS	Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations
LLP	Limited Legal Partnerships	NIIE	Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment
LROBP	Long-Range Overseas Building Plan	NIS	Newly Independent States
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	NIV	Non-Immigrant Visa
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
M/MED	Office of Medical Services	NOB	New Office Building
M/P	Office of Management Policy	NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense
M/R	Office of Rightsizing	NORINCO	China North Industries Corporation
M/WHL	Office of White House Liaison	NP	Bureau of Nonproliferation
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defense Systems	NPAC	Nonproliferation and Arms Control
MAP	Membership Action Plan	NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account	NRC	NATO-Russian Council
MCAS	Management Cost Accounting Standards	NRF	NATO Response Force
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation	NSA	National Security Agency
MCSC	Management Control Steering Committee	NSC	National Security Council
MD&A	Management's Discussion and Analysis	NSF	National Science Foundation
MENA	Middle East/North Africa	NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative	NSSG	Nuclear Safety and Security Group
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	NSSP	Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers	NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda
MIDSA	Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa	NVIS	Nuclear Verification Information System
MIF	Multinational Interim Force	OAS	Organization of American States
MNEPR	Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia Federation	OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement	ODIHR	Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
MOMS	Model for Overseas Management Support	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
MONUC	UN Mission in the Congo	OES	Bureau of Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding		
MOX	Mixed Oxide		

OGC	Office of Government Commerce	PTR	Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference	PuD	Plutonium Disposition
OIG	Office of Inspector General	QID	Questioned Identification Document
OMB	Office of Management and Budget	RAMOS	Russian American Observation Satellite
ON+	OpenNet Plus	RCM	Regional Conference on Migration
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy	RevCon	Review Conference
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	RFMS	Regional Financial Management System
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation	RM	Bureau of Resource Management
OPM	Office of Personnel Management	ROI	Return on Investment
OSAC	Overseas Security Advisory Council	ROK	Republic of Korea
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	RSO	Regional Security Officer
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense	S&T	Science and Technology
OSIS	Open Source Information System	S/COS	Chief of Staff
OSTP	Office of Science and Technology Policy	S/CPR	Chief of Protocol
OVP	Office of the Vice President	S/CRS	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
P&F	Program and Financing	S/CT	Coordinator for Counterterrorism
P.L.	Public Law	S/ES	Office of the Secretary/Executive Secretariat
PA	Bureau of Public Affairs	S/GAC	Global AIDS Coordinator
PAR	Performance and Accountability Report	S/OCR	Office of Civil Rights
PART	Program Assessment Rating Tool	S/P	Policy Planning Staff
PBSA	Performance-Based Service Acquisition	S/WCI	Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
PD	Public Diplomacy	SA	Bureau of South Asian Affairs
PDA's	Personal Digital Assistants	SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
PDNet	Public Diplomacy Net	SACM	South American Conference on Migration
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief	SACU	Southern African Customs Union
PESP	Partnership to Eliminate Sweatshops Program	SADC	South African Development Community
PPF	Partnership-for-Peace	SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
PICES	North Pacific Marine Science Organization	SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System	SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure	SBA	Small Business Administration
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations	SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
PLUS	Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Studies	SECI	Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative
PM	Bureau of Political/Military Affairs	SEED	Support for East European Democracy
PM/WRA	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs/Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement	SEED	Supporting Entrepreneurs for Environment and Development
PMA	President's Management Agenda	SENTRI	Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection
PMS	Payments Management System	SES	Senior Executive Service
PNR	Passenger Name Record	SFFAS	Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones	SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
POEs	Points of Entry	SGL	Standard General Ledger
POF	Perfect Order Fulfillment	SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
PPA	Prompt Payment Act	SMART	State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset
PPRA	Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement	SNAP	Spouse Networking Assistance Program
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee	SOA	Summit of the Americas
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration	SPAW	Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife
PSC	Personal Service Contractor	SPS	Senior Policy Seminars
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative	SSA	Social Security Administration
PSMC	Peace Support Missions Concluded	SSN	Social Security Number
PSO	Peace Support Operation	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
PSO	Post Security Officer	STCU	Science and Technology Center in Ukraine



SYSADMINs	Systems Administrators	USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
TAP	Technical Advisory Programme	USCS	United States Customs Service
TBD	To Be Determined	USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
TC	Technical Cooperation	USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
TCNs	Third Country Nationals	USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
TDA	U.S. Trade and Development Agency	USG	United States Government
TDY	Temporary Duty	USIA	United States Information Agency
TED	Turtle Excluder Device	USINFO	United States Information
TFCA	Tropical Forest Conservation Agreement	USMS	United States Marshal Service
TIP	Terrorist Interdiction Program	USOSCE	United States Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
TIP	Trafficking in Persons	USPS	United States Postal Service
TMC	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense	USPTO	United States Patent and Trademark Office
TMD	Theater Missile Defense	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime	USTR	U.S. Trade Representative
TOPOFF	National Level of Top Officials	USUN	U.S. Mission to the United Nations
TSC	Terrorist Screening Center	UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
TSCTI	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative	VACIS	Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
TSP	Thrift Savings Plan	VC	Bureau of Verification and Compliance
TSUs	Technical Security Upgrades	V-Fund	Verification Assets Fund
TSWG	Technical Support Working Group	VIG	Vaccinia Immune Globulin
TTIC	Terrorist Threat Information Center	VMT	Verification and Monitoring Team
U.S.C.	U.S. Code	VP	Voluntary Principle
U/S	Under Secretary	VPNs	Virtual Private Networks
UAE	United Arab Emirates	WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
UIA	United Israel Appeal	WAIS	Wassenaar Arrangement Information System
UK	United Kingdom	WARCP	West Africa Regional Conference Process
UN	United Nations	WCF	Working Capital Fund
UNAIDS	United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	WFP	World Food Program
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	WHA	Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
UNCHR	UN Commission on Human Rights	WHO	World Health Organization
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNDP	United Nations Development Programs	WMEAT	World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations	WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
UNFSA	UN Fish Stocks Agreement	WTO	World Trade Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	WW2BW	White Water to Blue Water
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund	YES	Youth Exchange and Study
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea		
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia		
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission		
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance		
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East		
UNSC	UN Security Council		
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution		
USAID	United States Agency for International Development		
USCG	United States Coast Guard		

PHOTO CREDITS

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The Diplomatic Reception Rooms, Department of State
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