Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Reduce the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the United States, Our Allies, and Our Friends

I. Public Benefit

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and their delivery systems can threaten our territory and citizens, our armed forces, our national interests, and our Allies and friends overseas. The Department helps combat this threat by working with other countries to fight WMD and missile proliferation, to defend against WMD attack, and to deny them to terrorist groups and rogue states. The Department's efforts improve the safety and security of the United States and its friends and Allies by lowering the risk of conflict; minimizing the destruction caused by an attack or conflict; denying access to such indiscriminate weapons and the expertise necessary to develop them; and preventing potentially devastating WMD-related accidents.

The Department is committed to reducing the WMD and missile threat through agreements to reduce current nuclear weapons stockpiles; cooperative efforts to develop missile defenses as appropriate; strengthening nonproliferation treaties and commitments and their implementation; effective action to remedy noncompliance; and active measures to improve and enforce export controls. The Department is leading the U.S. to shape international strategies to eliminate threats remaining from the Cold War's WMD legacy, enhance controls on biological agents and toxins, especially in the area of national controls; and, most recently, redirect Iraq's former WMD scientists and help Libya eliminate its WMD programs. To ensure the United States Government's WMD strategies are both robust and effective, the Department seeks to integrate verification into arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament negotiations, treaties, agreements, and commitments. The Department also works to ensure that compliance is rigorous and enforced. WMD and missile proliferation, especially in troubled regions, exacerbates regional instability and its associated negative political, economic and social consequences, including the risk of terrorists' acquisition of WMD and delivery systems. The Department is on the leading edge in responding to these and other WMD challenges that might arise.

II. Resource Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request	Change from FY 2005	
				Amount	%
Staff [1]	514	514	514	0	0.0%
Funds [2]	$388,852	$413,198	$424,086	$10,888	2.6%

[1] Department of State direct-funded positions.
[2] Funds include both Department of State Appropriations Act Resources and Foreign Operations Resources, where applicable.

III. Strategic Goal Context

Shown below are the performance goals, initiatives/programs, and the resources, bureaus and partners that contribute to accomplishment of the "Weapons of Mass Destruction" strategic goal. Acronyms are defined in the glossary at the back of this publication.

Strategic Goal	Performance Goal (Short Title)	Initiative/ Program	Major Resources	Lead Bureau(s)	Partners
Weapons of Mass Destruction	Unilateral and Bilateral Measures	Redirect WMD Expertise, Material and Equipment	D&CP, NADR, Science Center, Bio-Chem Redirect, Iraq Redirection Program, CIO	NP	AC, IO, VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD; Adherents to the NPT; IAEA; Relevant non-governmental organizations; U.S. nuclear industry, OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Export Controls	D&CP, NADR, Export licensing	NP	AC, IO, VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD, UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Strategic Relationships	D&CP	AC, VC	NP, DoD, IC, NSC, NATO
		Use Sanctions and Other Measures to Deter Proliferation	D&CP, Sanctions	NP	VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD; Relevant non-governmental organizations; OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund	NADR, D&CP, CIO	NP	AC, IO, VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD, UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise	D&CP, NADR, Science Center, Bio-Chem Redirect, Iraq Redirection Program, CIO	NP	AC, IO, VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD, UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations, OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
	Multilateral Agreements and Nuclear Cooperation	Strengthen Global Norms	D&CP, NADR, CIO, Voluntary Contributions, CPPNM	NP	AC, IO, VC, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD; Adherents to the NPT; IAEA; UN; U.S. nuclear industry; OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Multilateral Arms Control Agreements	D&CP, CIO	AC, VC	IO, Regional Bureaus, other federal agencies including DoD, DOE, DOC, IC, NSC, WHO, Adherents to the NPT, IAEA, UN.
		Strengthen Export Conditions	D&CP, CIO	NP	DoD, DOE, DOC, HHS, IC, NSC

Strategic Goal	Performance Goal (Short Title)	Initiative/ Program	Major Resources	Lead Bureau(s)	Partners
Weapons of Mass Destruction	Verification and Compliance	Verification	D&CP, CIO	VC	AC, IO, NP, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including the IC, DOE, NRC, DoD; Commerce; Adherents to the NPT; IAEA; UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; U.S. nuclear industry. OVP, NSC, Treasury and the EPA.
		Compliance Assessment and Reporting	D&CP, CIO	VC	AC, IO, NP, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including the IC, DOE, NRC, DoD, Commerce; Adherents to the NPT; IAEA; UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; U.S. nuclear industry. OVP, NSC, Treasury
		Compliance Enforcement and Diplomacy	D&CP, CIO	VC	AC, IO, NP, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including the IC, DOE, NRC, DoD, Commerce; Adherents to the NPT; IAEA; UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; U.S. nuclear industry. OVP, NSC, Treasury
		Effectiveness of International Organizations to Contribute to Verification and Compliance	D&CP, CIO	VC	AC, IO, NP, Regional Bureaus; Other Federal agencies, including DOE, NRC, DoD; Adherents to the NPT, CWC; IAEA; UN; Relevant non-governmental organizations; U.S. nuclear industry. OVP, NSC
		All Source Intelligence Collection and Technology R&D	D&CP	VC	INR, IC, DoD, DOE, DHS, OSTP, TSWG, DTRA, National Labs, NSC
		Reliable Communications And Timely Upgrades	D&CP	VC, AC	DoD, DOE, DOC, NSC, IC

IV. Performance Summary

For each Initiative/Program that supports accomplishment of this strategic goal, the most critical FY 2006 performance indicators and targets are shown below.

Annual Performance Goal #1
UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL MEASURES, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF WMD AND REDUCE STOCKPILES.

I/P #1: Redirect WMD Expertise, Material and Equipment

Access, engage and redirect high-risk former weapons institutes. Monitor progress toward implementing Fissile Materials Projects.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: Progress Toward Implementing Fissile Material Projects

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Implement U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition (PuD) and multilateral financing agreements. 2. Proceed with PuD monitoring and inspections and with G-7 and Russian contributions exceeding U.S. support for the program. 3. Continue Implementing Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA); obtain additional international participation commitments. 4. Implement transparency arrangements for Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) . 5. 90% of Global Partnership (GP) target pledged, actual spending commitments of 50% of target. 6. Track and coordinate increasingly effective responses to and follow up on nuclear and radiological smuggling incidents; press governments to prosecute smugglers. Begin bringing to bear existing U.S. assistance programs to states identified as having a nuclear smuggling problem. Engage like-minded governments and the IAEA to combat illicit trafficking.
	FY 2005	1. Begin implementing PuD multilateral framework and international financing plan. 2. Conclude agreements with IAEA on M&I regime. 3. Continue implementing PPRA; obtain international participation commitments. 4. Complete Mayak FMSF transparency protocol. 5. Obtain pledges of ninety-five percent of Global Partnership target, and fourty percent of actual U.S. spending commitments. 6. Track and coordinate responses to and follow up on nuclear and radiological smuggling incidents; encourage governments to prosecute smugglers. Begin diplomatic program to reach out to states identified as having a nuclear smuggling problem. Engage like-minded governments and the IAEA to combat illicit trafficking.

RESULTS	2004	1. PuD multilateral negotiations and bilateral consultations continued while additional efforts were made to resolve outstanding liability issues. 2. PPRA implementation fully underway, several prospective international participants identified. 3. Mayak transparency negotiations continued. 4. For GP: Total pledges remain about 85%, U.S. spending commitment of at least 10%, other country data not adequate to assess at this point. 5. Tracked and coordinated responses to, and followed up on known nuclear and radiological smuggling incidents. 6. Ad hoc coordination with U.S. nuclear and radiological security assistance programs.
	2003	1. Russia decided to use the same design for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility as in the U.S.; negotiations of a multilateral framework to support Russian plutonium disposition started and continued. 2. PPRA Amendment and replacement implementing agreement signed; access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing projects to construct/refurbish fossil fuel plants to replace production reactors signed; initial contracts signed and implementation underway. PPRA monitoring of shutdown reactors and weapon-grade plutonium in storage continue smoothly. 3. Negotiations continued on transparency protocol for Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF).
	2002	1. Progress made on Russian plutonium stockpile implementation and transparency issues. 2. Preparations for negotiations of U.S.-Russian plutonium-disposition multilateral framework are on track. 3. PPRA Amendment and fossil fuel implementing agreement concluded, awaiting Russian government approval to sign.
	2001	Plutonium disposition (PuD) suspended; Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) amendment negotiations suspended.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator enables us to measure the most important elements of nuclear and radioactive material disposal and prevent misuse.
	Data Source	Reports from foreign Interlocutors, on-site observers who provide information as to the status of the projects.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #2: Redirection of Former WMD Scientists/Engineers to Civilian Activities Through Development of Self-Sustaining Civilian Alternative Employment

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Sustain engagement of critical WMD/missile experts/institutes and continue efforts to gain access to remaining previously inaccessible high-priority BW/CW institutes in Russia/Eurasia. Engage at least four new WMD institutes in new members states. 2. Industrial partner funding of science center projects increased to level between 15-20% of total Science Center project funding. 3. Graduate 2-3 institutes or groups of scientists from NP/Science Center funding, and graduate one institute or group of scientists from BW/CW engagement program. 4. Begin two new Bio-Industry Initiative (BII) conversion and commercialization projects at priority BW production facilities. Fund two new BII projects on accelerated drug and vaccine research. 5. Continue and, as security situation allows, expand redirection effort in Iraq, with initial emphasis on providing opportunities for greatly increased interaction (through conferences, workshops, specific training courses) between Iraqi scientists/engineers and their western peers and colleagues. Work with Iraqis to identify long-term projects to employ Iraqi WMD personnel. 6. Sustain engagement and redirection of WMD and missile scientists/engineers in civilian activities that enhance Libya's scientific and economic development. Emphasize project sustainability and transition to market economy.
	FY 2005	1. Gain access to at least two new previously inaccessible BW and/or CW institutes in Russia/Eurasia via the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and at least four new high-priority former WMD institute in member countries Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. 2. Increase level of U.S. private industry funding of joint science center projects to 15% of total project funding. 3. Graduate 2-3 institutes or groups of scientists from NP/Science Center Program assistance. Identify candidates among them for graduation in FY 2006. 4. Begin two new BII conversion and commercialization projects at priority BW production facilities. Fund two new BII projects on accelerated drug and vaccine research. 5. Initiate effort in Iraq to engage, redirect, retrain and/or re-employ former WMD scientists and engineers. Establish initial group of transition and training activities; develop database of available scientists/engineers; coordinate activities with other reconstructions efforts. 6. Initiate program in Libya to engage and redirect former WMD and missile scientists/engineers in civilian activities that will enhance Libya's scientific and economic development. Develop and implement "quick-win" cooperative projects in support of Libyan-identified priorities.

RESULTS	2004	1. Engagement focus was on approximately 165 institutes of proliferation concern of the 430 involved as lead or supporting institutes in U.S. funded research and on several hundred Iraqi and Libyan scientists and technicians. Financial and other relevant data was collected to declare over two dozen institutes "graduated" i.e. no longer considered priority for funding research proposals, particularly proposals that were not solicited or collaboratively designed by our program personnel (including science center staff). 2. Gained first-ever access to the last closed bio-chem facility in Kazakhstan (Pavlodar Chemical Plant). Established Kirov Environmental Monitoring Lab – first mechanism focused on engaging former BW scientists from the top priority Kirov-200 site, which remains closed. 3. Identified two new priority bio institutes in Tajikistan; first ISTC visit planned for April 2004. 4. BII program developed business, marketing and core competency assessments on 12 biological research institutes. Three new pharmaceutical industry partners engaged in BII commercialization projects and business development strategies with Russian institutes. Increased access and transparency with seven biologic production facilities.
	2003	1. U.S. private sector industry partners total over sixty. 2. Five new projects funded at three newly engaged BW and CW institutes. 3. Three new U.S. industry partners recruited thus far, with partial year results for U.S. non-NP Partner funding at 14% of total project funding. 4. The BioIndustry Initiative has funded long-term commercialization and sustainability programs at large-scale biologic production facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan; has developed Russian Bioconsortium of former BW research and production facilities; has developed relationships with DOW Chemical and Eli Lilly.
	2002	1. Engaged cumulative total of 50,000 scientists, of whom about 26,000 were former WMD scientists. 2. Eight new U.S. industry partners recruited. 3. Three new technological applications brought to market, including Neurok TechSoft (linear differential equation solver), a laser-based fluorocarbon detector, and new computer animation technology.
	2001	Up to 40,000 scientists and several new high-interest institutes now engaged.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator is well suited to enable us to measure the most important elements of our Science Center and BW/Redirection program.
	Data Source	Reports provided by Science Centers.

I/P #2: Export Controls
(PART Program)

Assist governments to raise their laws and regulations to international standards, improve licensing, border control and investigative capabilities.

Output Indicator

Indicator #3: Number of Countries That Have Developed and Instituted Valid Export Control Systems Meeting International Standards

TARGETS	FY 2006	Cumulatively, seven countries have developed and instituted export control system and practices that meet international standards.
	FY 2005	Two more (5 cumulative) selected countries' export control systems meet international standards.
RESULTS	2004	1. The program set ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures. It proposed to more than double the number of countries receiving U.S. assistance that meet international standards for export controls between fiscal year 2004 and 2006 and to reduce the average delivery time for goods and services by 2 months each year within the same timeframe. 2. EXBS program countries strengthened export control systems and some, including Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania, significantly strengthened implementation. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic graduated from the program. 3. The program also received independent evaluations of the export control systems of the target countries, in order to better help EXBS assess progress and target its training and enforcement activities. Through the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, India committed to improve its export controls. Pakistan adopted an export control law and vowed to bring its controls and regulations in line with international standards.
	2003	1. Based on assessments and other indications of program progress and achievement, three countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) were slated to be graduated from the program. 2. India implemented some amendments to its export control laws and regulations. India prosecuted the owner of an Indian company engaged in WMD-related transfers to Iraq. 3. Pakistan began technical export control cooperation with the U.S., planned to continue it in FY 2004. Began work on new export control law.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This measure is directly tied to our goal. It is a tangible indication of progress and success for the EXBS program. Its reliability is further validated by the independent, objective assessments provided by UGA CITS.
	Data Source	University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security (CITS).

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #4: Average Dollars Expended for Contract Training Elements Under the International Support Service Contract (ISSC)

TARGETS	FY 2006	Average dollar cost per contract training course decreases by nine percent from base year.
	FY 2005	Average dollar cost per contract training course decrease by seven percent from base year.
RESULTS	2004	Dollars per training course decrease by five percent from base year. At the time of this publication, course costs for FY 2004 are being analyzed, and a new baseline for FY 2004 will be established by third quarter, FY 2005.
	2003	Baseline: EXBS expended $11,195,832 for training events conducted in FY 2003. Average course cost for this period is $105,621.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Training courses are the single common denominator available for measuring efficiency of assistance provided to all partner nations.
	Data Source	The data is maintained and tracked locally in an NP/ECC database.

I/P #3: Strategic Relationships

Seek the support of allies and friends for the new strategic relationship with Russia and the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, and their cooperation in countering new WMD threats and in missile defense development and deployment aimed at dissuading rogue states from acquiring WMD and ballistic missiles and deterring their use.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #5: Status of Cooperation With Allies/Friends on Missile Defense

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Allies and friends begin work with U.S. on cooperative arrangements for deployment of U.S. and/or joint mobile missile defense systems to defend the U.S. and/or Allies/friends. 2. NATO completes population defense feasibility study announced at November 2002 Prague Summit, and begins implementing its findings and recommendations. 3. NATO proceeds with the adoption and integration of a joint missile defense operational command and control concept. 4. Preparation for live exercises involving NATO and Russian troops in a crisis response scenario in which ballistic missile threats are expected.
	FY 2005	1. More allies/friends work with U.S. on missile defense-related projects, or some allies/friends undertake their own missile defense-related projects without the U.S. 2. Agreement on establishment within NATO of operational elements for joint command and control of national missile defense systems fielded in support of the NATO Response Force. 3. Establishment of a plan for future integration of the interoperability capabilities being developed under NATO and NATO-Russia projects, including definition of a set of future exercises to demonstrate these capabilities.
RESULTS	2004	1. On August 5, 2004, the U.S and Canada agreed to permit NORAD to support the Missile Defense Mission. Both discussed Canadian participation in the U.S. missile defense program and the possibility of negotiating a Framework Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation. 2. Denmark agreed in May to upgrade the early warning radar at Thule, Greenland. 3. Australia announced that it would participate in the U.S. missile defense program and signed a MOU on cooperation with the U.S. in July 2004. 4. Japan announced intention to acquire PAC-3 and Aegis missile defense systems from the U.S. 5. Taiwan sought funding to acquire the PAC-3. 6. The Department discussed India's interest in missile defense in the context of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and the U.S.-India dialogue on strategic stability. 7. The NATO study on protection of population and territory was initiated, and an agreed NATO Staff Requirement for Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMD) was established. With regard to NATO-Russian cooperation, Phase I of the TMD interoperability study was undertaken successfully, and included an effective NATO-Russia TMD exercise at Colorado Springs involving participation by ten states, including Russia, and provided information toward establishing an initial operating concept for NATO-Russia interoperability in Crisis Response Operations involving ballistic missile threats. Agreement was reached to fund Phase II of study.
	2003	1. The UK agreed to support the upgrade of the early warning radar at Fylingdales; discussions with Denmark on upgrading the early warning radar in Greenland are progressing well. The U.S. and UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding missile defense cooperation in June 2003. 2. The U.S. worked with Germany and Italy on the Medium Extended Air Defense System. 3. The U.S. and Canada established a regular consultation mechanism and are exploring potential areas of joint cooperation. 4. At the November 2003 Summit, the U.S. obtained NATO agreement to study the feasibility of missile defenses to protect population and territory; the U.S. continues to work with NATO. 5. The U.S. worked closely on missile defense with Japan, whose government has significantly increased its budget request for missile defense-related work. 6. U.S. and Australia discussed Canberra's interest in missile defense/cooperation opportunities. 7. U.S. and India discussed how India could conduct a missile defense requirements analysis.
	2002	Intensive consultations held with allies concerning the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty. Allies and friends welcomed the Treaty. Efforts continued to gain their active support and participation in U.S. missile defense plans and programs.
	2001	Baseline: Based on President's May 1, 2001 speech at National Defense University, consultations began with allies on new U.S.-Russia strategic framework.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	U.S. missile defense deployment plans depend in part on Allied cooperation. Also, the U.S. seeks a cooperative approach with Allies and friends to address the increased ballistic missile threat, including through missile defense.
	Data Source	USG/Allies/friends announcements and actual contracts.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #6: Levels of Offensive Warheads; Transparency in Reductions and Missile Defense Plans; Level of Treaty Implementation; and Operation of JDEC

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Continued discussions on offensive reductions and resolution of any implementation or strategic stability issues that develop through additional transparency measures or other action. 2. Widening and intensification of missile defense-related transparency and predictability efforts (including reciprocal visits and demonstrations, data exchanges, and joint consultations); joint missile defense development programs with greater industry-to-industry engagement. 3. U.S.-Russian cooperation expands in other strategic areas, including within the context of the NATO-Russia Council, and in regional areas where both the U.S. and Russia have enduring security interests. 4. The Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) is open and fully established, where U.S. and Russian military operators monitor, side-by-side, launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.
	FY 2005	1. Reductions under the Moscow Treaty proceed; implementation issues that arise are resolved. 2. Transparency exchanges concerning strategic and non-strategic arms implemented smoothly. 3. Implementation of voluntary and reciprocal transparency and predictability efforts vis-à-vis missile defense plans and programs. 4. Continued implementation of U.S.-Russian missile defense-related cooperation projects. 5. U.S. and Russia begin full operation at the JDEC to exchange and monitor ballistic missile early warning data.
RESULTS	2004	1. The Moscow Treaty Bilateral Implementation Commission met for the first time in April 2004. Moscow Treaty reductions by both Parties were underway. 2. The CGSS Working Group on Offensive Transparency continued to meet; the U.S. proposed practical transparency related to non-strategic nuclear warheads and strategic activities. The CGSS Working Group on missile defense continued to meet; the U.S. continued to provide transparency and predictability into U.S. missile defense-related plans and programs, and has offered to implement further transparency measures on a voluntary and reciprocal basis. 3. U.S. and Russian experts discussed potential concrete missile defense-related cooperation projects; although the U.S. canceled the bilateral RAMOS project, the U.S. remains interested in bilateral missile defense cooperation. In July 2004, the U.S. provided a revised text of a bilateral Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement, taking into account Russian positions delivered in March. The Russian government considered signing such an agreement a necessary precondition for government-to-government and industry-to-industry cooperation in the military field, especially missile defense. 4. Implementation of the JDEC was delayed mainly due to an impasse on taxation and liability issues that transcends this agreement. 5. Dialogue continued with other Parties to resolve START implementation issues; a longstanding issue concerning the B-1 bomber was resolved when the JCIC met March 24-April 7, 2004.
	2003	1. Moscow Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Discussions on procedures for and scheduling of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission began. The Department opened regular consultations on arms control with the Russian MFA at the Assistant Secretary level. 2. CGSS Working Groups on offensive strategic affairs and missile defense have met twice and three times, respectively. The U.S. and Russia began exchanging information on their plans for reductions under the Moscow Treaty. In February 2003, NATO and Russia agreed on a work plan that includes some nuclear CSBMs. 3. Discussions on START. 4. Implementation continued on a more positive basis than in previous years; meeting of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) took place in June and August 2003.
	2002	U.S. and Russia established a New Strategic Framework, including commitment to deep reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed in Moscow in May 2002, calling for reductions to 1,700-2,200 warheads for each side by December 31, 2012. U.S. withdrew from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, thus removing the principal legal obstacle to deployment of missile defenses. The CGSS was established to expand transparency, including on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW). NATO and Russia discussed potential confidence-building measures and transparency measures for NSNW. Talks continued with Russia on enhancing transparency and predictability with regard to missile defense plans and programs, as well as cooperation in missile defense-related projects. All parties completed the final START I reductions by the required deadline of December 5, 2001.
	2001	Baseline: Following President's May 1, 2001, speech at the National Defense University, consultations began with Russia on the New Strategic Framework.

DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The New Strategic Framework is a key element in the transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship from confrontation to cooperation. The Department is seeking Russian cooperation in managing our strategic relationship and in addressing the new challenges of the 21st century. Key elements of the New Strategic Framework are cooperation in implementing the Moscow Treaty and cooperation in missile defense, and will indicate whether the New Strategic Framework is being fulfilled.
	Data Source	Progress in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship will be recorded in bilateral U.S.-Russian and NATO statements and/or agreements. Milestones in the development of missile defense cooperation will be recorded in publicly available statements by the governments, agreements, and/or contracts. Assessment of progress in negotiations/consultations will be based on embassy and delegation reporting.

I/P #4: Use Sanctions and Other Measures to Deter Proliferation

Use sanctions and other measures to assure accountability by sellers and buyers of WMD and related technologies.

Input Indicator

Indicator #7: Extent to Which Iran, Syria, DPRK and Other Countries of Concern Are Denied WMD/Missiles and Related Technology, Materials, Equipment and Expertise From Other Countries

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. IAEA takes effective steps to redress Iranian safeguards concerns, rigorous inspections continue. Iran adopts and implements an Additional Protocol. No countries cooperating with Iran's nuclear program. Russia ceases cooperation on Bushehr reactor. Wide international consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities until trust rebuilt. 2. Iraq completely and verifiably disarms. 3. China fully implements and effectively enforces its 1997 nuclear and 2000 missile commitments. China effectively enforces its WMD/missile-related export controls. 4. DPRK agrees to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and takes steps toward this end. 5. DPRK missile-related exports decrease. 6. 10% increase in interdictions of specific shipments involving programs of concern. 7. International community taking steps to ensure against Libyan and Syrian WMD proliferation.
	FY 2005	1. IAEA takes effective steps to redress Iranian safeguards concerns, rigorous inspections continue. Iran adopts and implements an Additional Protocol. No countries cooperating with Iran's nuclear program. Russia ceases cooperation on Bushehr reactor. Wide international consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities until trust rebuilt. 2. Iraq completely and verifiably disarms. 3. China fully implements and effectively enforces its 1997 nuclear and 2000 missile commitments. China effectively enforces its WMD/missile-related export controls. 4. DPRK agrees to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and takes steps toward this end. 5. DPRK missile-related exports decrease. 6. 10% increase in interdictions of specific shipments involving programs of concern. 7. International community taking steps to ensure against Libyan and Syrian WMD proliferation.

RESULTS	2004	1. DPRK: Little progress, but in advance of the second round of Six Party talks held in February 2004, DPRK reiterated a proposal to halt its nuclear weapons program (plutonium) in exchange for assistance and acknowledged this as one step toward the dismantlement. During the February round of talks, parties made progress on regularizing process to resolve this dispute, including agreement to establish working groups to address and attempt to resolve detailed issues between plenary sessions. 2. DPRK continued to export significant ballistic missile related equipment, components, materials and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. 3. China: Although Beijing has taken steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations, some Chinese entities continue to engage in transfer activities, particularly with Pakistan and Iran. 4. Continued IAEA investigation and reporting of Iran's nuclear program; international pressure against Iran increased, and Russia, EU and others continue slowdown of trade and cooperation with Iran. 5. Verification and dismantlement of Libya's nuclear/chemical weapons program continued and provided additional information about the A.Q.Khan proliferation network.
	2003	1. Iran: Unexpected growth in Iranian nuclear program revealed; U.S. made the case to the international community that Iran's nuclear fuel cycle is designed to support a nuclear weapons program. Iran was pressured through an IAEA board resolution; the U.S. also secured an EU slowdown on Iran trade and cooperation talks pending resolution of the Iranian nuclear issues. Iran's noncompliance caused Russia and other potential nuclear suppliers to reconsider cooperation with Iran's program. Shipments of missile-related items to Iran were stopped, plus contracts with Iranian entities involved in Iran's missile programs were cancelled. USG has denied visas to individuals whose proposed access to WMD/missile technology was assessed to pose an acceptable risk of diversion to WMD/missile programs. 2. Iraq: The Iraqi regime was toppled and disarmed. 3. North Korea: Very little progress, but North Korea met with the U.S. in Beijing in late April 2003 and Six Party talks initiated in August 2003. Shipments of CW precursor elements bound for DPRK were interdicted. 4. WMD and related materials and technology were denied to Syria.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The inability of target countries to possess WMD is a direct measure of how well U.S nonproliferation programs are working.
	Data Source	Diplomatic cables and intelligence reports.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #8: Extent to Which States With Entities or Individuals Identified as Part of the A.Q. Khan Network Take Action to Eliminate the Network Permanently and Ensure That Similar Proliferation Can Be Detected and Prevented in the Future

TARGETS	FY 2006	States continue to improve export control laws, full export control training takes place, continue sustained law enforcement action as appropriate and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol.
	FY 2005	States improve export control laws, agree to accept new export control training, begin sustained law enforcement action and sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.
RESULTS	2004	Diplomatic effort to shut down A.Q. Khan network began. Began effort to educate governments about the network and take initial steps to improve export control laws and initial law enforcement action. Pakistan committed to working with the U.S., aided international efforts to shut down the Network, and vowed never again to be a source of proliferation in the future. Investigations conducted in many countries.
	2003-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator enables the Department to measure the level of proliferation in target countries.
	Data Source	Diplomatic cables and intelligence reports.

I/P #5: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) (PART Program)

Prevent future WMD and missile threats to the U.S. and its interests by using the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) to help forestall and eliminate them.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #9: Ratio of Total Administrative Cost to Program Cost

TARGETS	FY 2006	4.7%
	FY 2005	4.8%
RESULTS	2004	5.0% - Unforeseen occurrences (e.g., the application of NDF resources to EXBS and to Iraq and Libya) have made it impossible to achieve realistic results.
	2003	Baseline: 5.0%
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This is a valid project efficiency measure. It accurately reflects efforts to reduce administrative costs.
	Data Source	NDF project/financial databases.

I/P #6: Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE)
(PART Program)

Expand and enhance redirection programs to deter former Soviet and other nuclear, chemical and biological weapons experts from working for proliferators, terrorists or rogue states.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #10: Number of Reconfigured Former Biological Weapons Production Facilities for Peaceful Uses and Number of Engaged Former BW Scientists in Drug and Vaccine Development

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Begin two new Bio-Industry Initiative (BII) conversion and commercialization projects at priority BW production facilities. 2. Fund two new BII projects on accelerated drug and vaccine research.
	FY 2005	Begin two new BII conversion and commercialization projects at priority BW production facilities. Fund two new BII projects on accelerated drug and vaccine research.
RESULTS	2004	BII program developed business, marketing and core competency assessments on 12 biological research institutes. Three new pharmaceutical industry partners engaged in BII commercialization projects and business development strategies with Russian institutes. Increased access and transparency with seven biologic production facilities.
	2003	The BioIndustry Initiative funded long-term commercialization and sustainability programs at large-scale biologic production facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan; developed Russian Bioconsortium of former BW research and production facilities; and developed relationships with DOW Chemical and Eli Lilly.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a consistent measure of our performance, especially in programs the Department controls because the conversion of each BW facility removes it and the associated scientists as proliferation threats.
	Data Source	Reports provided by Science Centers.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #11: Number of Russian and Other Eurasian Proliferation-Relevant Institutes Engaged in U.S.-Funded Civilian Research Projects

TARGETS	FY 2006	Engage at least four new WMD institutes in new members states.
	FY 2005	Gain access to at least two new previously inaccessible BW and/or CW institutes in Russia/Eurasia via the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and at least four new high-priority former WMD institute in member countries Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
RESULTS	2004	1. Gained first-ever access to the last closed bio-chem facility in Kazakhstan (Pavlodar Chemical Plant). Established Kirov Environmental Monitoring Lab – first mechanism focused on engaging former BW scientists from the top priority Kirov-200 site, which remains closed. 2. Identified two new priority bio institutes in Tajikistan; first ISTC visit planned for April 2004.
	2003	Five new projects funded at three newly engaged BW and CW institutes.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a consistent measure of our performance; especially in programs the Department controls the engagement among each institute and the associated scientists removed from proliferation threats.
	Data Source	Reports provided by Science centers.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #12: Cost to Assist a WMD Institute to Reach Financial Self-Sufficiency

TARGETS	FY 2006	$790,000
	FY 2005	$806,000
RESULTS	2004	Baseline: $822,000
	2003-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This measure demonstrates management efficiency by illustration the reduced costs of achieving program goals.
	Data Source	Reports provided by Science Centers and Financial data recorded in NP/PTR database.

Output Indicator

Indicator #13: Number of Institutes and Scientists Graduated Into Commercially Sustainable Ventures

TARGETS	FY 2006	Graduate 2-3 institutes or groups of scientists from NP/Science Center funding, and graduate one institute or group of scientists from BW/CW engagement program.
	FY 2005	Graduate at least 2-3 institutes (more subject to supporting financial data) or groups of scientists from NP/Science Center Program assistance. Identify candidates among them and bio institutes for graduation in FY 2006.
RESULTS	2004	As of September 30, 2004, engagement focus is on approximately 165 former Soviet institutes of proliferation concern of the 430 involved as lead or supporting institutes in U.S. funded research and on several hundred Iraqi and Libyan scientists and technicians. Financial and other relevant data being collected to declare over two dozen institutes "graduated" i.e., no longer considered priority for funding research proposals, particularly proposals that were not solicited or collaboratively designed by our program personnel (including science center staff).
	2003	Five new projects funded at three newly engaged BW and CW institutes.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a consistent measure of our performance, especially in programs the Department controls because the graduation of each institute removes it and the associated scientists from funding dependency.
	Data Source	Reports provided by Science Centers.

Annual Performance Goal #2

STRENGTHENED MULTILATERAL WMD AGREEMENTS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION UNDER APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS

I/P #7: Strengthen Global Norms

Reinforce our Political support for strict NPT compliance.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: A Healthy NPT Regime

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Outcome of 2005 NPT Review Conference leads to national policies and to multilateral cooperation on specific steps to strengthen the Treaty. 2. Ten additional states negotiate, sign and/or implement the Additional Protocol including all NPT parties with nuclear power reactors. Additional Protocol adopted by supplier states as a condition of nuclear supply. 3. Increase in safeguards funding continues without a hitch and IAEA applies resources in an efficient manner. Special Committee of the Board makes recommendations on safeguards verification and on enforcement of safeguards agreements. 4. IAEA reports increase in number of countries that it has assisted in establishing a program to strengthen security of nuclear and other radioactive material. 5. Press on any continuing NPT noncompliance issues.
	FY 2005	1. 2005 NPT Review Conference reinforces value of Treaty, including support for the Additional Protocol, export controls, restraint on ENR, and safeguards. 2. Ten additional states negotiate, sign and/or implement the Additional Protocol, including most NPT parties with major nuclear programs. Process for implementing U.S. Additional Protocol is well under way. 3. Additional safeguards funding that began in IAEA CY 2004 budget and improved approach to implementation continue to strengthen safeguards system. IAEA Board creates Special Committee to advise the Board on measures to strengthen safeguards and enforcement of safeguards agreements. 4. IAEA program to combat nuclear terrorism remains strong and continues to strengthen the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. 5. Progress toward resolving Iranian noncompliance, settle any remaining compliance issues with Libya, and sustain pressure on North Korea to achieve the CVID of its nuclear program.
RESULTS	2004	1. PrepCom III for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concluded satisfactorily. 2. Six more states signed an Additional Protocol bringing the number to 84; twenty-two more states brought the Protocol into force bringing the total to 59. 3. U.S. Senate unanimously approved the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. 4. IAEA exposed Iranian violations of its NPT safeguards obligations. 5. Libya renounced nuclear weapons and agreed to return to compliance with the NPT. 6. Two rounds of Six-Party talks held on DPRK nuclear weapons program.
	2003	1. PrepCom II for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concluded successfully. Cuba and East Timor joined the treaty. The international community urged Iran to comply with the NPT and North Korea to reverse its position on NPT withdrawal. 2. Eleven more states signed an Additional Protocol, bringing the total to seventy-eight, thirty-seven of which have entered into force. 3. Voluntary contributions to the IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program funding doubled in FY 2003. 4. IAEA General Conference agreed to increase regular safeguards budget of the IAEA by $19.4 million over four years.
	2002	1. PrepCom I for the 2005 NPT RevCon concluded smoothly. 2. IAEA took action on integrated safeguards and emphasized financial needs; nine more states signed bringing the total to sixty-seven of which twenty-eight protocols have entered into force. 3. The IAEA Board approved a multi-year, $11.5 million a year program to address the prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear terrorism. 4. President Bush sent U.S. Additional Protocol to Senate for its advice and consent.
	2001	Fifty-two countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will allow us to track the extent to which the global community is prepared to get behind measures to increase the effectiveness of the NPT and IAEA against new threats.
	Data Source	Diplomatic and open source reporting, IAEA documentation, consultations with other governments and the IAEA.

Outcome Indicator		
Indicator #2: Status of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)		
TARGETS	FY 2006	1. U.S. ratifies revised CPPNM. 2. At least 2/3 of States ratify revised CPPNM to bring it into force.
	FY 2005	Amendments are adopted during diplomatic conference and at least 2/3 of States sign revised CPPNM to allow convention to come into force with U.S. ratification.
RESULTS	2004	The U.S has not yet signed the amendments to the CPPNM as the amendments have not yet been adopted by a diplomatic conference and are not yet open for signature. The IAEA circulated a proposal of the Austrian Government to revise the CPPNM in July 2004. A simple majority of CPPNM Parties must request the IAEA Director General to convene a diplomatic conference to consider the Austrian proposal. To achieve the necessary majority of 53 Parties, the United States has been coordinating diplomatic strategy with the Core Group and Austria. As of October 2004, 29 of 53 Parties have requested the conference. The current goal is the convening of a diplomatic conference in early 2005.
	2003	After two meetings, the Drafting Group concluded its work without reaching consensus on a revision proposal, but did identify a set of possible amendments warranting further consideration by States Parties as the basis for a proposal.
	2002	Baseline: The IAEA met to discuss whether the CPPNM should be revised or strengthened. Experts made recommendations. The Experts Group recommended "well defined amendment" to CPPNM for consideration by the Drafting Group. The Drafting Group worked on recommendations for consideration by a revision conference.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The indicator is a reliable measure of progress toward our overall goal as the CPPNM is one of the key components of the international system of nonproliferation treaties, norms and standards.
	Data Source	Data on progress comes from diplomatic cables and first hand accounts of activities. Both are expected to be highly reliable.

I/P #8: Multilateral Arms Control Agreements

Develop and implement targeted strategies for gaining additional adherents to the CWC and BWC.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #3: Viability of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. 169 States Parties. 2. Continuation of destruction of Albanian chemical weapons, with U.S. assistance. 3. OPCW inspection program expands to 235 sites inspected in 61 countries. 4. Second Russian destruction facility completed, and construction continues on the third facility. 5. All Article VII requirements met by 75% of States Parties.
	FY 2005	1. 165 States Parties. 2. Completion of destruction of Libyan CW agent stockpiles, with U.S. assistance as needed. 3. Destruction of Albanian chemical weapons underway, with U.S. assistance. 4. OPCW management and financial reforms show results: inspection program expands to 230 sites inspected in 60 countries. 5. Completion of destruction operations at first Russian facility (Gorniy), second destruction facility near completion (Kambarka), and construction underway on a third facility (Shchuch'ye).
RESULTS	2004	1. A total of 166 Parties to the CWC. 2. After the sudden Libyan announcement in December 2003 to forgo WMD, the AC Bureau led U.S. assistance to Libya to ensure rapid submission of an accurate declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and civilian chemical industry and to begin destruction of CW stockpiles. 3. The Department led international support for Albania to accelerate implementation of the CWC. 4. Active USG and OPCW efforts to promote effective domestic implementation by CWC member states got underway, in accordance with an agreed action plan. 5. As another step in its management reform, the OPCW implemented a tenure policy to promote a steady flow of fresh qualified personnel for inspections and staff functions. 6. The OPCW ended 2004 executing its full program of inspections. But in April 2004, the U.S. decided to defer payment of about one-third of the 2004 U.S. assessment until FY 2005. Delays in making this decision meant that as of September 2, 2004, the U.S. had paid nothing to the OPCW for 2004. Urgent action in September and October led to U.S. payment of about 70 percent of what the U.S. owed, enough to keep the OPCW operational.
	2003	1. A total of 156 States Parties. 2. The first Russian destruction facility started operations in December 2002, and Russia met its revised deadline of destroying 400 agent tons by April 24, 2003. Construction of a second destruction facility has begun. 3. OPCW has significantly recovered from the financial and administrative crisis it faced a year ago. The new Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat has undertaken necessary management and financial reforms. Inspections, a key operation for the OPCW, have increased by over 15%, while the budget increase has been held to less than 10 percent, indicating an increase in efficiency, as well. Inspections have also been retargeted to focus better on potential chemical weapons (CW) threats.
	2002	1. Four States Parties (Nauru, Uganda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Samoa) were added to the CWC, and two other states (Libya and Thailand) voiced intent to join. 2. The U.S. fully implemented CWC industry obligations by meeting all declaration and reporting requirements, hosting eight industry inspections, and successfully resolving issues from five previous inspections. 3. Three of the six Congressional conditions for granting authority for U.S financial assistance for Russian stockpile destruction have been resolved; limited progress was made on the other three conditions; Congress granted the President waiver authority. As a result of intense Department efforts, significant international financial assistance was provided. 4. In the summer of 2002, the U.S. succeeded in bringing about a change in the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and called for voluntary donations to resolve the immediate OPCW financial crisis. The U.S. made a $2 million voluntary contribution, and sought and obtained agreement of the States Parties for a 10% increase in the 2003 OPCW budget.
	2001	1. A total of 144 States Parties. 2. The U.S. fully implemented its industry obligations, including hosting 16 inspections of U.S. industry facilities conducted. 3. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) budget problems continued. 4. Some destruction of Russian chemical weapons began.

DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The OPCW needs to be an efficient and viable organization so that it can carry out all the inspections needed to ensure compliance with the CWC. This will be especially important when the pace of CW destruction picks up beyond FY04. The Department is using one target to measure the number of inspections in the number of countries (as opposed to the number of inspections alone) because our objective is to spread the geographic scope of inspections so that every site of concern is inspected. The number of States Parties provides a measure of the CWC's growing influence and universality, and provides one measure of whether the CWC is an effective instrument for reducing the WMD threat. Russia possesses the world's largest CW stockpile and its destruction is an essential requirement of the CWC. Targets based on the amount of agent destroyed by Russia might be a more direct or understandable measure of progress, but there will not be much increase in the amount of agent destroyed for several years. Therefore, the Department is using targets based on facility construction.
	Data Source	Data on signature/ratification of the CWC is known from the states themselves and the OPCW. Data to measure OPCW performance will derive from OPCW reports. Data on the status of construction of Russian destruction facilities and the amount of agent destroyed is based on OPCW reports. Data on destruction in Libya and Albania and any others country will be known through the OPCW and bilateral consultations.

Output Indicator

Indicator #4: Number of States Parties Who Incorporate U.S. Proposals in Their National Approaches to Controlling the Biological Weapons Threat

TARGETS	FY 2006	U.S. alternative proposals incorporated by 40-45 BWC States Parties in their national approaches to controlling the BW threat.
	FY 2005	35-40 of the 150 total States Parties incorporate U.S. alternative proposals in their national approaches to controlling the BW threat.
RESULTS	2004	At the November 2003 meeting of BWC State Parties, all 78 states participating pledged to implement and enforce appropriate pathogen security and national implementation measures, which was the first subject of the U.S.-proposed multi-year work program. It will take time for all these states to carry out this pledge in terms of specific national legislation or other actions. States Parties also responded positively to U.S. strategy for implementing the U.S.-proposed work program for 2005, which focuses on disease surveillance, suspicious outbreaks, and alleged use. The July 2004 Experts Meeting on this subject was very successful in reviewing the issues and identifying problems and needs; eighty states participated and seventy substantive expert briefings were given.
	2003	1. States Parties agreed at the November 2002 Review Conference to a work program based on U.S. proposals. 2. At the August 2003 experts meeting, at least 25 states reported that national legislation, mirroring U.S. laws to control the BW threat, was already in place. The 80 states participating agreed that such legislation was an important element of their measures to improve biosecurity and evidence of implementation was more fragmentary. However, at least 20 States Parties acknowledged the validity of the U.S. approach and indicated that they had at least begun an awareness-raising program in their countries. 3. At the November 2003 meeting of States Parties, the U.S. got an agreed pledge that all Parties will work to implement and enforce appropriate safeguards in their respective countries.
	2002	USG developed an alternative package of effective measures to strengthen the BWC and began discussions with other BWC States Parties.
	2001	1. The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol. 2. The U.S. rejected the flawed BWC Protocol because it would harm the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and undermine U.S. security.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a direct measure of the success of U.S. diplomacy in persuading other BWC States Parties to follow the U.S. approach for strengthening implementation of the BWC. If all States Parties undertake the desired national actions, it will be much more difficult for terrorists or rogue states to acquire biological weapons.
	Data Source	Public announcements by States Parties; States Parties' reports to other States Parties.

I/P #9: Strengthen Export Conditions

Global nuclear cooperation under the highest nonproliferation and safety standards is promoted.

Output Indicator

Indicator #5: Replacement or Closure of Old/Unsafe Reactors in the Former Soviet States

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Armenia commits to firm closure date of ANPP Unit 2. 2. Bulgaria shuts down Kozloduy Units 3 and 4. 3. Ukrainian K2R4 reactors completed to meet international nuclear safety standards. 4. Russian power sector market reforms support continued development of replacement power for unsafe reactor closure.
	FY 2005	1. Decommissioning begins for Ignalina Unit 1 in Lithuania. 2. Bulgaria prepares to shuts down Kozloduy Units 3 and 4. 3. Armenia negotiates the closure of its plant.
RESULTS	2004	1. Ignalina-1 stopped generating electricity at 8:02 pm on Dec. 31st, fulfilling Lithuania's pledge to the European Union to shutdown the RBMK-1500 by 2005. 2. No progress in Armenian energy situation. 3. Ukraine submitted proposal to EBRD consistent with international safety standards.
	2003	1. Ignalina (Lithuania) initiated closure procedures for Unit 1 and planned for the closure of Unit 2. 2. Russia worked on a comprehensive plan for de-commissioning of some of its reactors. Began a comprehensive plan for addressing nuclear waste issues.
	2002	1. Positive results achieved in Eastern Europe: e.g., Lithuania and Armenia; Bulgaria shut down two of its four high-risk reactors (Kozloduy). 2. Liability agreement reached with Russia allowing U.S. participation in waste cleanup; implementing agreements negotiated.
	2001	1. Several NIS plants closed. 2. G-7 adopted the goal of pressuring Russia to close unsafe reactors.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The indicators provide the best information to measure progress by focusing on the key elements of U.S. policy – nuclear cooperation under international agreements, closing or replacing nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union.
	Data Source	G-8 NSSG contacts and reports from the countries in question.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #6: Status of North Korean Nuclear Weapons Programs

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. North Korea remains a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT with comprehensive IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol implemented. 2. North Korea cooperates with IAEA on safeguards, including beginning an assessment of the program history.
	FY 2005	North Korea rejoins the NPT and refrains from reprocessing plutonium and producing enriched uranium. Multilateral talks lead to DPRK decision to dismantle all nuclear weapons facilities in a verifiable and irreversible manner. North Korea begins a permanent, thorough, and transparent dismantlement that would result in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible end to its nuclear program.
RESULTS	2004	North Korea boycotted a fourth round of Six-Party talks scheduled for September 2004 in Beijing, citing what it called "hostile U.S. policy" and other issues. Diplomatic work continues to secure North Korea's agreement to reconvene the talks. North Korea has vowed to strengthen its nuclear deterrent if the U.S. holds on to its "hostile policy."
	2003-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Compliance with nuclear weapons testing treaties, commitments, and moratoria is a vital element in preventing the supply of missiles and nuclear weapons to countries of concern and terrorist groups.
	Data Source	Diplomatic cables and official reports.

Annual Performance Goal #3
VERIFICATION INTEGRATED THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND COMMITMENTS, AND RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND INSPECTION REGIMES

I/P #10: Verification

Integrate verification into negotiations and implementation of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements and commitments.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: Extent to Which Libya Dismantles Its Nuclear Program, Completes Destruction or Conversion of All Chemical Weapons and Related Facilities, and Adheres to its December 19, 2003, Commitments Relating to Missiles

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Libya's weapons-related nuclear program dismantled in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. 2. Libya continues destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline of April 2007 for 100% destruction of Libya's stockpile (23.6 metric tons). 3. Libya completes conversion of all of its CW Production Facilities to non-WMD use. 4. Arms control/nonproliferation dialogue continues. 5. Libyan adherence to its December 19, 2003 commitment, limiting its missile programs to missile systems below MTCR Category 1 specifications is monitored according to long-term monitoring plan. Trilateral consultation mechanism used to raise and resolve any issues with Libya regarding implementation of its commitments.
	FY 2005	1. Libya continues the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its weapons-related nuclear program, cooperation with the IAEA continues. 2. Continue destruction of Libya's chemical weapons stockpile. 3. Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWPF) construction completed. 4. Convert production facilities to non-WMD use. 5. Libyan adherence to its December 19, 2003 commitment, limiting its missile programs to missile systems below MTCR Category 1 specifications is monitored according to long-term monitoring plan. Trilateral consultation mechanism used to raise and resolve any issues with Libya regarding implementation of its commitments.
RESULTS	2004	1. Progress made toward the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of Libya's weapons-related nuclear program due to cooperation among the IAEA, UK and U.S. 2. Physical inspections within Libya initiated. Complete extent of stockpile/program identified. 3. Libya acceded to the CWC, deposited instruments of ratification, and joined OPCW. 4. Destruction of chemical weapons stockpile initiated. 5. Conversion of production facilities to non-WMD use initiated. 6. Scud C inventory removed from Libya; finalized agreement on Scud B elimination.
	2003	Libya committed to limit itself to missile systems below Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category 1 missile systems.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	National Means and Methods (NMM), intelligence reporting, data exchanges, declarations, inspections, and an established forum for resolving concerns over the long-term will validate Libya's compliance.
	Data Source	OPCW reporting and bilateral consultations.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #2: Status of Verified Elimination of All Elements of North Korea's Nuclear Program and Develop Plan for Verifiable Chemical, Biological, and Missile Compliance Regime

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Begin dismantlement of North Korean nuclear program. 2. Negotiations with North Korea begin for a verifiable ban on North Korean chemical, biological, and missile programs.
	FY 2005	1. Obtain and review any disclosures by North Korea regarding its nuclear program. 2. Begin nuclear-related dismantlement negotiations with North Korea. 3. Interagency plan for verifiable chemical, biological, and missile compliance regime is finalized for negotiations.
RESULTS	2004	1. Developed framework to verifiably dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. 2. Began draft of the regime to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. 3. Full member of the U.S. delegation.
	2003	Developed Department concept paper outlining objectives, strategy, and tactics to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea (agreed). Preliminary exploration with interagency regarding appropriate technical means to sequentially denuclearize North Korea and to verify complete and irreversible dismantlement.
	2002	Preliminary work to develop framework to verifiably dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	U.S. policy is structured around the dismantlement of DPRK nuclear program.
	Data Source	Bi- and multilateral discussions/negotiations.

Input Indicator

Indicator #3: Progress of Establishment of Verification Policy Related to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

TARGETS	FY 2006	Continue diplomatic efforts to explain the U.S. verification position and gain support for the U.S. position on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
	FY 2005	Continue diplomatic efforts to explain the U.S. verification position and gain support for the U.S. FMCT position.

RESULTS	2004	The U.S. reaffirmed its support for a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Verification requirements related to FMCT were studied and the USG concluded that an effectively verifiable FMCT that does not compromise our national security interests is not achievable. Consequently, the U.S. did not seek to include provisions that might create a new international mechanism and the impression that effective verification was possible. For this reason, the U.S. sought to revise the existing negotiating mandate, which called for an "effectively verifiable" treaty. Diplomatic efforts were underway to explain and gain support for the U.S. position.
	2003	Interagency fully engaged in NSC-directed review of potential FMCT, with unconstrained model verification regime developed and its impact on USG reviewed.
	2002	2002 Conference on Disarmament unable to reach agreement on a work program, to include negotiations on an FMCT. NSC directs review of U.S. policy regarding an FMCT.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Transparency provides an additional measure of effective implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
	Data Source	Ongoing discussions and negotiations.

Input Indicator

Indicator #4: Progress of Establishment of Measures to Improve Compliance Judgments Related to Former Soviet Union (FSU) Fissile Material Agreements and Commitments

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Coordination across U.S. programs to meet monitoring and transparency needs for improved ability to assess compliance related to FSU fissile material agreements and commitments. 2. Compliance assessment measures for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF), the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA), and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) established.
	FY 2005	Improve ability to assure compliance with FSU fissile material agreements and commitments, with emphasis on the Russian Federation through resolution of Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) compliance concerns and implementation of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF). Continue developing compliance measures for the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA).
RESULTS	2004	Transparency negotiations continued for FMSF and PPRA. Transparency negotiations also continued for PMDA, but progress limited by the impasse on liability issues.
	2003	Transparency negotiations continued for FMSF and PPRA. Mayak FMSF construction completed and ready for loading. Transparency regime negotiations began in parallel with PMDA framework and financing negotiations. Papers exchanged on monitoring regime and blend stock.
	2002	1. U.S.-Russian construction of Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility underway in 2001 to provide storage for dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Monitoring procedures and arrangements on PPRA not fully developed. In April 2001, important concerns identified. 2. September 2000 U.S.-Russian PMDA bilateral meetings focused on development of transparency measures and U.S. work on measurement/inspection methodologies for plutonium disposition.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Transparency provides an additional measure of effective implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
	Data Source	Ongoing interagency discussions and bilateral U.S.-Russian negotiations.

I/P #11: Compliance Assessment and Reporting

States Parties to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, and commitments must recognize their individual and collective responsibilities to enforce compliance and rigorously implement inspection regimes. Compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, and commitments assessed. The Annual Presidential Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments is the culmination of an ongoing annual effort to assess noncompliance.

Input Indicator

Indicator #5: Status of Implementation of a Global Norm of Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties, Agreements and Commitments

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Assess and report on compliance of other parties to their arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. 2. Participation in rigorous review of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile information, activities, and behavior facilitates robust noncompliance reporting and more complete noncompliance determinations. 3. Conduct compliance dialogue in and related to countries of concern.
	FY 2005	1. Participation in rigorous review of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile information, activities, and behavior facilitates robust noncompliance reporting and more complete noncompliance determinations. 2. Conduct compliance dialogue in and related to countries of concern.
RESULTS	2004	1. Incorporated sensitive intelligence reporting into noncompliance assessments. 2. Participation in rigorous review of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile information, activities, and behavior facilitates robust noncompliance reporting and more complete noncompliance determinations. 3. Conducted two regional trips to brief compliance. 4. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers Report 2001-2003 published.
	2003	1. Briefed Congress on significant progress in compliance assessment rigor and timeliness. 2. Incorporated sensitive intelligence reporting into NCR's noncompliance assessments. 3. Working with Congress to address redundancy by removing the requirement for separate CWC and CFE reports by including the information necessary to satisfy these reports in the Annual Noncompliance Report.
	2002	CY 2001 Annual Noncompliance Report submitted to the NSC on time, but needed revision to meet more fully Congressional requirements.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Noncompliance assessments will be validated by intelligence reporting, National Means and Methods (NMM), data exchanges, international monitoring systems, on-site inspections, research results. Review of these sources is necessary in order to make informed compliance assessments. Compliance reinforces the global norm of adherence to agreements and commitments.
	Data Source	Intelligence reporting, National Means and Methods, data exchanges, international monitoring systems, on-site inspections, research results.

I/P #12: Compliance Enforcement and Diplomacy

Noncompliance must be identified and corrective measures implemented to increase the cost of noncompliance and to persuade other nations to adopt compliant behavior.

Input Indicator

Indicator #6: Extent of Implementation and Enforcement of Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Multilateral Treaties, Agreements, and Commitments

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Other nations of proliferation concern adjust their behavior to come into compliance with their obligations and commitments. 2. Multiple initial and follow-up diplomacy conducted to seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. 3. Apply rigorous standards of verification to the review of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile information, activities, and behavior, thereby facilitating substantive judgments of sanctionable activity to be made by decision-makers. 4. NPT – Compliance remains a central issue among Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) parties and at NPT meetings. 5. CWC – Multiple bilateral and multilateral discussions and site visits with other States Parties regarding Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and noncompliance issues. 6. CFE – Continue to emphasize importance of compliance at Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty consultations. 7. Open Skies – Continue to press importance of compliance at Open Skies consultations. 8. BWC – Increase compliance focus at Sixth Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference; publicly identify States Parties that continue to cause compliance concerns; increase international pressure to comply with BWC commitments. 9. MTCR – Participation in rigorous review of missile and missile proliferation activities and behavior facilitates robust noncompliance reporting, more complete noncompliance determinations, and appropriate and timely enforcement.
	FY 2005	1. Other nations of proliferation concern adjust their behavior to come into compliance with their obligations and commitments. 2. Multiple initial and follow-up diplomacy conducted to seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. 3. NPT – Other nations briefed on and supportive of U.S. noncompliance concerns and proposals strengthen compliance and enforcement of the NPT, or compliance positions that achieve similar objectives. 4. Increased emphasis in diplomatic and public diplomacy dialogue on the need for and consequences of the failure of NPT States Parties' strict adherence to their NPT obligations. 5. Increased efforts to secure support for swift action against those Parties that violate the NPT. 6. Compliance generally accepted as the central issue for the NPT Review Conference. 7. CWC – Noncompliance issues identified with 16 states parties of concern resolved. Bilateral discussions held with 5 highest priority countries of concern and site visits conducted with top two States Parties of concern regarding CWC noncompliance issues, including those related to declarations, ambiguous CW and industrial activities. 8. CFE – Continue to emphasize importance of compliance at Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty consultations. 9. Open Skies – Continue to press importance of compliance at Open Skies consultations. 10. BWC – Continue public diplomacy efforts. Consult with close Allies to strengthen compliance focus of upcoming BWC Review Conference. Three year working program concludes. 11. MTCR - Participation in rigorous review of missile and missile proliferation activities and behavior facilitates robust noncompliance reporting, more complete noncompliance determinations, and appropriate and timely enforcement.

RESULTS	2004	1. NPT – Compliance remained a central issue among Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) parties and at NPT meetings. Compliance was a central issue at the NPT PrepCom. 2. CWC – Multiple site visits conducted within Libya. Site visit to Albania to resolve noncompliance concerns. Numerous demarches delivered to identify and resolve U.S. noncompliance concerns. Bilateral consultations on noncompliance issues conducted with several CWC States parties. 3. CFE – Compliance issues pressed in bilateral and multilateral meetings in Vienna. Ensured that verification equities preserved at NATO consultations on CFE implementation. 4. Open Skies – Efforts to resolve compliance issues during early implementation were successful. 5. BWC - 3-yr working program continued. Public diplomacy highlighted non-compliant States. 6. MTCR – Participated in rigorous review of missile and missile proliferation activities and behavior which facilitated robust noncompliance reporting, more complete noncompliance determinations, and appropriate and timely enforcement. Sanctions applied to foreign entities that transferred MTCR-controlled items.
	2003	1. CWC – Sought clarification and resolution of U.S. compliance concerns related to the CWC through visits conducted under Article IX of the CWC. Bilateral compliance consultations also conducted. 2. BWC – 3-yr program continues, with focus on strengthening national compliance legislation within States Parties, and increasing Bio-security measures to prevent non-compliance. Public diplomacy efforts highlight non-compliant States. 3. MTCR – Participated in rigorous review of missile and missile proliferation activities and behavior to determine appropriate responses to noncompliance.
	2002	1. CWC – Bilateral consultations on noncompliance issues conducted with several CWC States parties, many made progress toward more complete compliance. 2. BWC – 3-yr working program initiated within BWC to enhance compliance efforts throughout BWC signatory States. Public diplomacy continued to highlight non-compliant States.
	2001	1. CWC – Bilateral consultations on noncompliance issues conducted with several CWC States parties, many make progress toward more complete compliance. Two site visits conducted. 2. BWC – Fifth BWC RevCon highlighted compliance concerns with 5 States Parties the U.S. viewed as non-compliant with BWC.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Noncompliance must be identified and corrective measures implemented to increase the cost of noncompliance and to persuade other nations to adopt compliant behavior. Noncompliance assessments will be validated by intelligence reporting, National Means and Methods (NMM), utilizing all source data, data exchanges, international monitoring systems, on-site inspections, and research results. Review of these sources is necessary in order to make informed compliance assessments and to take effective corrective measures.
	Data Source	NPT, CWC, CFE, Open Skies, BWC, and MTCR-related reporting (and BWC annual submission of confidence and security-building data and reports from international health-related organizations). Bilateral consultations with Allies.

Output Indicator

Indicator #7: Extent of Implementation and Enforcement of Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Bilateral Treaties, Agreements, and Commitments

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) – Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) continues to resolve major noncompliance issues. 2. Moscow Treaty – Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) continues to discuss Moscow Treaty's implementation, taking actions where necessary.
	FY 2005	1. START – JCIC continues to resolve major noncompliance issues. 2. Moscow Treaty - BIC continues to discuss Moscow Treaty's implementation, taking actions where necessary.
RESULTS	2004	1. START – JCIC continued to resolve major noncompliance issues. 2. Moscow Treaty – Developed transparency into Moscow Treaty implementation using national intelligence capabilities and knowledge gained from other treaties and agreements.
	2003	START – In August 2003, the Department held consultations with Russia's representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the unclassified version of the Noncompliance Report for the year 2002. In September 2003, VC sent a follow-up letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament, reiterating the earlier explanation from the consultations that the law requiring the President to submit the Noncompliance Report to Congress was changed to require more specificity in the upcoming Report. In response to a subsequent request from the Russian MFA, a copy of the law containing the requirements for submitting the Report to Congress was delivered to the Russian MFA on September 26. Russia has yet to provide official comments in response to the consultations.
	2002	START – START I final reduction achieved.
	2001	START – Compliance issues worked in JCIC.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Strengthen national/global security through continued discussions to resolve noncompliance issues.
	Data Source	Bilateral discussions, National Means and Methods.

I/P #13: Effectiveness of International Organizations to Contribute to Verification and Compliance

Ensure that relevant organizations support rigorous assessment and enforcement of States Parties' compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, and commitments. Foster the realization by such international organizations that the security benefits of these treaties, agreements, and commitments are achieved only through strict and full compliance, robust verification, and enforcement.

Input Indicator

Indicator #8: Extent of Enhancement of Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament-Related International Organizations' Contribution to Verification and Compliance

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – Improve effectiveness to contribute to verification and compliance, particularly to detect undeclared activities and prevent misuse of technical cooperation program assistance. Implement results of Verification Assessment of the IAEA pursuant to U.S. policy. 2. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) - Increase number and compliance-quality of inspections conducted by OPCW. Ensure all OPCW reporting includes strong language on compliance where appropriate. Compliance discussion with targeted States by OPCW increases. OPCW fully funded. 3. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Meetings - Compliance becomes central theme of Sixth Review Conference. Strengthened compliance regulations and procedures become the norm within BWC signatory States. 4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) & Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Arms Control Fora - Increase compliance focus of each organization; all non-compliance events are noted/opposed swiftly and universally, isolating transgressor States.
	FY 2005	1. IAEA – Complete Verification Assessment of the IAEA and provide it for interagency consideration in developing a U.S. policy to improve the IAEA, including its Technical Cooperation Program. 2. Generate international support for the President's Nonproliferation Initiatives. 3. Entry into force of the NPT Additional Protocol made a condition of nuclear supply and participation in the IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) Program. More rigorous review of requests, continuing oversight, and end use certification of TC assistance made a requirement. 4. OPCW – Increase number and compliance-quality of inspections conducted by OPCW. Ensure all OPCW reporting includes strong language on compliance where appropriate. Compliance discussion with targeted States by OPCW increases. OPCW fully funded. 5. BWC – Increase compliance focus of BWC members. States more frequently cite compliance concerns in public statements. Non-compliant behavior identified and condemned by a greater number of signatory States. 6. NATO/OSCE arms control fora - Noncompliance events opposed in coordinated manner by alliance members. Russia brought into compliance with Istanbul Commitments of 1999, enabling Western ratification of Adapted CFE Treaty.
RESULTS	2004	1. OPCW – Initiated requirement for sufficient funding for inspections and ability to conduct challenge inspections as needed. Additional compliance action plan initiated to strengthen compliance under Article VII of the CWC. U.S. addressed Western and Others Group (WEOG) and Director General (DG) of OPCW highlighting the requirement for strong compliance enforcement. 2. BWC – Initiated improvement of UN mechanism to investigate BW usage. Expanded cooperation with World Health Organization and other similar international organizations to improve monitoring of, response to, and bio-safety of BW threats. 3. NATO/OSCE arms control fora - Initiated strong alliance response to Russian non-compliance actions with CFE and Open Skies Treaties. Addressed Armenian CFE non-compliance concerns.
	2003	1. Raised awareness of the importance of compliance within the BWC. 2. Non-compliant CFE and Open Skies actions by Russia were opposed throughout NATO/OSCE.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	National and global security is strengthened by International Organizations supporting the rigorous enforcement of States Parties' compliance with their obligations and commitments.
	Data Source	1. IAEA reporting, intelligence reports, OPCW - OPCW reporting. Bilateral consultations with Allies. 2. BWC - Annual submission of confidence and security-building data. Reporting from BWC mtgs. Reports from international health-related organizations. Bilateral consultations with close Allies.

I/P #14: All Source Intelligence Collection and Technology R&D

Promote intelligence collection resources and technology R&D to support arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament verification and compliance objectives; intelligence information secured and protected.

Input Indicator

Indicator #9: Extent to Which Robust Verification Activities and Assets Fund (V Fund) Are Successfully Advocated, Endowed, and Expended

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. V Fund money authorized and appropriated as a line item. Requesting $3 million for initial V Fund endowment. 2. V Fund used to preserve critical assets and develop new R&D verification projects. 3. Promote inclusion of Intelligence Community verification assets in the permanent Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) funding lines. 4. Successful advocacy of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) initiatives in support of sensors used to verify compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, and commitments. 5. Strengthen the Department's influence upon and leadership of technology R&D in support of verification and compliance objectives. 6. Utilize open source information to support verification and compliance of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives.
	FY 2005	1. V Fund money authorized and appropriated as a line item. 2. V Fund used to preserve critical assets and develop new R&D verification projects.
RESULTS	2004	The Department identified funds to support critical verification activities and to fund the development of new collection programs to fill gaps and replace existing collection programs important for verification.
	2003	The Department did not seek funding from Congress for the V Fund, but identified projects and funded key intelligence programs, important for verification of agreements and for ascertaining WMD-related activities.
	2002	V Fund is not endowed, but $450K of Department resources were identified for verification activities. This money was allocated to collection programs consistent with V Fund goals.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Funds appropriated and money used to support critical assets and development of replacement sensors important for verifying compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and for tracking global proliferation activities.
	Data Source	Intelligence community and Department of Energy programs.

I/P #15: Reliable Communications And Timely Upgrades

Ensure the rapid transmission of critical information regarding compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, commitments, and regimes.

Output Indicator

Indicator #10: Level of Usage of Information Technology to Enhance Verification and Compliance and Communications Domestically and Overseas

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Video collaboration - Complete PM/EUCOM video initiative installing up to 60 video systems at embassies throughout Europe and Africa to speed decision making, enhance intelligence sharing, and provide an emergency communications and coordination network. 2. Machine Translation - Utilizing state-of-the-art information technology gain more timely access to data in non-English formats in effort to advance verification and compliance assessments relating to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament treaties, agreements and commitments. Implement full pipeline for formatted CWC declarations, expanding capabilities to other formatted texts and languages. 3. Assistance to OPCW/TS - Capitalize on opportunities for implementing automated data exchange with OPCW State Parties utilizing data standards and state-of-the-art information technology. OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) completes initial implementation of secure database using Common Transmission File Structure (CTFS) data model; inviting State Parties to adopt electronic submission of industrial data. TS adopts change control mechanism, including State Parties for defining future enhancements to data exchange tools. OPCW fully automated data exchange mechanism in place, with the majority of State Parties submitting industrial declarations electronically.
	FY 2005	1. Expand video collaboration system to POLADS at military locations. Complete the worldwide POLAD video network to enhance political/military communications and coordination during exercises, real world events and emergencies and to enhance communications with senior POLAD coordinator in Washington. 2. Machine Translation – Initiate evaluation of expanded MT pipeline to incorporate Russian, French, Spanish and Arabic. 3. Assistance to OPCW/TS – Aid TS in completing initial phase of automated data collection mechanism and secure database using CFTS data mode. TS implements prototype of secure Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) and opens for security evaluation by State Parties Audit Team.
RESULTS	2004	1. Video collaboration - Accreditation of video collaboration system to support overseas delegations. 2. Machine Translation – Secured funding and engaged contractor to design and test various configurations of components in effort to support prototype development of pipeline, focusing on Chemical Weapons Industrial Declarations, translated from native Chinese to English. Completed initial hardware and software evaluation of scanning, OCR, and MT engines. Developed domain-specific lexicon of names, site and plant names, relevant data. 3. Assistance to OPCW/TS – OPCW TS sought supplemental funding for development effort to re-design and deploy secure Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) for handling industrial declarations. Re-engaged in dialog with TS to assess status of RDBMS development efforts.
	2003	1. Development of videoconferencing to support communications with overseas delegations. 2. Machine Translation – Provided TS with prototype of Common Transmission File Structure and exchange tool for data collection of industrial data.
	2002-2001	OPCW TS assumed responsibility for development of RDBMS and electronic data exchange mechanism for handling bi-annual data exchanges of industrial data under the CWC.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Continued improvements in communications systems are essential in order for the U.S. to meet its arms control treaty and agreement reporting requirements.
	Data Source	State and SIPRNet video users at worldwide locations. Access to data. OPCW consultations.

Output Indicator		
Indicator #11: Status of New Communications System Replacing Current Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) Systems with FSU		
TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Integrated GGCL system functioning at 99% reliability, facilitating U.S.-START partner communications. 2. Emergency GGCL back-up facility continues fully capable of being brought on-line on short notice.
	FY 2005	1. Timely communications in support of U.S. and foreign compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. 2. Final international testing of replacement system successful; integrated system brought online, maintaining 99% reliability in communications.
RESULTS	2004	1. Coordination of international testing of accepted GGCL replacement architecture design. 2. NRRC, as lead, conducted consultative visit to Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, with IRM and DISA in Autumn 2004.
	2003	GGCL preliminary modernization authorized by START partners in the summer.
	2002	START partners (former Soviet nuclear states) considered completed U.S. proposal for replacement of current Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) system.
	2001	Study of architecture for GGCL replacement system took place.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Continued improvements in communications systems are essential in order for the U.S. to meet its arms control treaty and agreement reporting requirements.
	Data Source	Annual internal statistical verification, consumer feedback, interagency participation.

V. Illustrative Examples of FY 2004 Achievements

Weapons of Mass Destruction	
Libya	In December 2003, Libya made a commitment to eliminate its nuclear/chemical weapons and Missile Technology Control Regime-class missile programs. Libya has since signed and is implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol, and is cooperating with the U.S./UK to remove equipment from its nuclear weapons program. Libya has acceded to the CWC, destroyed CW munitions, eliminated its SCUD-C missile force, and agreed to ultimately eliminate its SCUD-B missiles so that they may no longer have MTCR Category I range/payload capabilities.
The Proliferation Security Initiative	At the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President Bush emphasized that PSI cooperation must not just address shipments of WMD, but should also include efforts to shut down proliferation networks and to bring justice to those involved in facilitating this deadly trade. At the fifth plenary meeting held March 2004 in Lisbon, Portugal, the core partners developed a series of practical steps that establish the basis for supportive States' involvement in the PSI activities. In May, the First Anniversary meeting of the PSI was held in Krakow, Poland with over 60 nations in attendance. To date, over 80 nations have expressed their support for and interest in participating in the PSI. The Operational Experts Working Group, now consisting of 18 nations, continues to advance PSI implementation.
Positive Outcome for 2nd PrepCom Meeting	U.S. efforts to support the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee (2003 NPT PrepCom II) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference contributed to a positive outcome that addressed a full range of substantive issues, including international concern over Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs, the importance of universalization of the Additional Protocol for strengthened IAEA safeguards and the importance of treaty compliance.
Fissile Materials Disposition	A Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) and replacement implementing agreement was signed. In addition, access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing projects to construct/refurbish fossil fuel plants to replace production reactors were signed. PPRA monitoring of shutdown reactors and Russian weapon-grade plutonium in storage continues smoothly.

VI. Resource Detail

Table 1: State Appropriations by Bureau ($ Thousands)

Bureau	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
International Organization Affairs	$92,830	$109,597	$118,946
Nonproliferation	18,879	19,572	20,317
European and Eurasian Affairs	17,557	17,666	17,666
Arms Control	16,929	17,161	17,458
Other Bureaus	33,907	34,962	37,559
Total State Appropriations	**$180,102**	**$198,958**	**$211,946**

Table 2: Foreign Operations by Account ($ Thousands)

Title/Accounts	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
Export-Import Bank			
Overseas Private Investment Corporation			
Trade and Development Agency			
USAID			
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative			
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance	61,800	65,520	62,470
Independent Agencies			
Department of State	146,950	148,720	149,554
Department of Treasury			
Conflict Response Fund			
Millennium Challenge Account			
International Military Education and Training	0	0	46
Foreign Military Financing	0	0	70
Peacekeeping Operations			
International Development Association			
International Financial Institutions			
International Organizations and Programs			
Total Foreign Operations	**$208,750**	**$214,240**	**$212,140**

Grand Total	**$388,852**	**$413,198**	**$424,086**