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EXDPS

Deliver opening of Business Dec. 19.  
SUBJECT: Secretary's Conversation with Bhutto

1. Following is uncleared Memcon, FYI, and subject to revision upon review.
2. Pak Deputy PM-designate, Z. A. Bhutto, called on Secretary December 18 prior to call on President. Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador Raza. Sisco and Laingen sat in. Bhutto expressed deep appreciation that US had stood by Pakistan in defense QUOTE basic principles international law and civilized society UNQUOTE, indicated strong concern over Soviet policies in achieving QUOTE reversal of Cuba

(10)

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at Pakistan's cost UNQUOTE, and pledged determination seek reconciliation with India. Essential, however, that Indian forces leave East Pakistan ~~xxx~~ promptly; said he thought it still possible preserve Pak unity on basis very loose confederation. In any event effort must be made and he was returning to Pakistan forthwith not to rock boat but to do what he could in context transfer of political power which now vital and urgent. Secretary stressed strong USG support for Pakistan, understanding for severe problems ahead, and intention continue be as helpful as possible. Assured Bhutto we would consult closely before any action re Bangla Desh but noted likelihood we would need and wish to support international humanitarian relief that area.

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3. Secretary gave Bhutto warm welcome, emphasizing our understanding that this was sad time in history Pakistan and that we very pleased to get Bhutto's views directly regarding future and what we can do together to be helpful. Noted we have tried to do what we could to help in current crisis and that and sympathetic on basis certain basic President particularly was understanding ~~was looking~~ principles and was looking forward to meeting Bhutto later in day.

4. Bhutto said he wanted to make clear at outset that although sometimes referred to as "Yankee-baiting Former Foreign Minister," he was determined to open new chapter in history Pakistan-US relations. Pakistan deeply grateful to USG for standing by basic principles of international law and civilized society as these had emerged after World War II. US ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ actions and statements in current crisis were important in demonstrating that World War II had not been fought in vain.

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5. Bhutto said he wished to make two ~~statements~~ fundamental points: First, that the whole picture of international law had been disrupted by Soviet behavior in the South Asian crisis and, second, that he, Bhutto, was prepared for reconciliation with India. On first point, Bhutto noted that Soviets had reportedly gone even to point of providing Soviet personnel on Indian warships and that they had otherwise equipped Indian vessels and aircraft with latest missiles and technology.

He ~~was~~ did not know if this true or not but what was true Paks had fought India before but never the Soviet Union. Latter was that "Soviets had defeated us." / ~~they~~ had now reversed their defeat in Cuba at Pakistan's cost. Their objective was to show China that not they but rather the Soviets were the leaders of the Third World.

6. Second fundamental ~~point~~ point was that he and Pakistani people were prepared for reconciliation with India. India now has glorious opportunity either to seek reconciliation with Pakistan or become enemy of Pakistan

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for all time on scale like Carthage and Rome. If India missed present opportunity, there would be hatred for all time, utter chaos and terrible massacre. He shuddered to ~~xxxxxx~~ think what this could mean for Muslims in Bengal. Moreover, this hatred would spread to whole subcontinent. India must act with ~~magnanimity~~ <sup>magnanimity</sup>. Honorable adjustments between two countries could be made but these could not be made in vacuum and would require time.

7. To that end, Bhutto said he was being called home by Yahya and understood special plane was meeting him tomorrow in Rome. He was anxious to get back "to see how land lies." He would tell President that either there would ~~not~~ <sup>now</sup> be immediate transfer of political power so that he could grapple with enormous problems facing Pakistan or he would go back to his "small ranch in Sind." He was not going back to ~~xxx~~ rock the boat or to challenge authority. He had done that before in Ayub period but

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country was in too much of mess now/do this. (In some contradiction to this line, he made point elsewhere during conversation he hoped people of Pakistan would not have to fight another war to achieve political transfer of power in West Pakistan.)

8. Bhutto said that much of tragedy since March could have been had not ~~be/avoided-as~~/there/~~had~~ been inordinate delay in transfer of power. Military action on 25 March was inevitable but what happened thereafter was not justified and could have been avoided by transfer of power. If government could not carry the people with it, then everyone in government would be ~~xxx~~ pygmies and Pakistan would go from one difficulty to another.

9. However, Indians and others must understand that he, Bhutto, would need a month or more to prepare public opinion for what has taken place. He understood there were already reports of demonstrations and other trouble in West Pakistan over cease-fire agreement. India must—

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act in humility; if it had demands on Pakistan, it should make them through diplomatic channels. Unhappily Indians lack vision, and he could not be confident of Indian response.

10. Bhutto said he must ask USG kindly not to act in haste in recognition of so-called Bangla Desh. He was convinced that sentiment still overwhelmingly pro-Pakistan in both wings. This clearly demonstrated by fact India had to use military forces to achieve its ends in East Pakistan. Recognition could wait; there were certain preconditions normal to such action in any event in international law which must be met, and Pakistan would hope USG would keep in close touch with Pakistan before acting.

11. Secretary took note of Bhutto's hope India would act with magnanimity but noted that despite capacity of Indians often to appear magnanimous publicly and on the record, they could be very sanctimonious and self-righteous

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and act quite differently privately. Bhutto concurred and said it most important for this reason that USG not lose current political initiative. US should make clear to India that it had treaty relationship with Pakistan and that "it was not going to fold up its carpets and leave." India should also understand from US that latter giving serious consideration to massive economic assistance and considering military assistance in order to restore strategic balance South Asia. Indians must understand from US that it has major global interests that have been adversely affected by recent Soviet action South Asia and that it would take these into account in seeking long-term permanent settlement. Indians should also hear from US that they could not do one thing in East Pakistan and something else in Kashmir. Indians had used force in East Pakistan but what of Kashmir?

12. These were things that USG should now be telling

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in fact  
 XXX India. Whether USG could provide military and economic  
 aid now was not <sup>so</sup> important. (He aware of public opinion  
 trends in US.) USG and GOP could talk about such things  
 later; important thing was that India should have clear  
 understanding that we considering such action. Secretary  
 commented that India should also understand that accom-  
 plishing <sup>secession</sup> ~~succession~~ of a neighboring state by force  
 was dangerous principle with widespread consequences.  
 Bhutto agreed, saying this was dangerous Pandora's box.

13. Secretary observed that he hoped that Bhutto  
 understood that USG would ~~likely~~ be under strong  
 pressure public opinion to continue involve itself  
 actively in humanitarian <sup>relief</sup> actions in Bangla Desh. Bhutto  
 said he understood this but hoped it would be done in  
 way that would not imply recognition and would not complicate  
 GOP's negotiating stance on future of East Pakistan.

14. In response questions by Secretary and Sisco re  
 future evolution East-West Pakistan relations, Bhutto

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said Pakistan ready and willing negotiate new arrangement.

It was important, however, that this be done by people of Pakistan and that there must be withdrawal Indian forces. Mujib was important element but public opinion must first be prepared for his reinvovment in picture and he ~~would~~ <sup>did</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>believe</sup> in any event ~~believe~~ Mujib would remain influential political figure beyond three months' time. Mujib was good speaker but "very blank in the head." He could have had all he wanted in March. Only history would be able to ~~say~~ say, however, who the real culprit was in March; i.e., "Mujib, Yahya, or me." In response questions, Bhutto declined name <sup>others</sup> in AL leadership who might assume leading role. Said there were others but they were not men of vision. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Unfortunately, East Pakistan had suffered politically during 13 years of military regime and only Suhrawardy had ever ~~achieved~~ achieved prominence. Bhutto observed that Soviets undoubtedly now actively pushing their own kind of people to the fore. *Pls.*

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16. Bhutto said Mrs. ~~Chim~~ Gandhi now faced dangerous situation. She had laid basis for "Bangla Deshes all over Subcontinent." (At separate point, referred to "bug of secession" that could spread very fast in West Pakistan if previous balance between East and West not present.) Said Mrs. Gandhi would rue the day she had "gone to bed with Soviet bear." Soviets had no humanitarian instincts at all.

17. In concluding exchange, Bhutto emphasized again his intention ~~to~~ seek as close a relationship as possible with US. Stressed however that he was "slave of geography" and therefore convinced Pakistan must have balance in its foreign policy. He convinced, for example, that experiences of recent past had demonstrated that this balance important for US as well. If there had not been that balance, with China playing important role, USG would have faced "terrible liability" in terms need ~~to~~ provide military equipment for Pakistan. Secretary concluded by saying that we fully appreciative of very tough job facing Pakistani leadership;

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USG would be watching and helping as much as it could and in every way possible in ways that would not complicate Pakistan's difficulties or suggest that we second-guessing their decisions in any way. We would, of course, be under strong compulsion act in humanitarian relief Bangla Desh but again he wanted Bhutto to know we would do this only in ways that would not complicate Pakistan's problems.

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END

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