

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO, Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 9, 2005

DEF

PAK-US

NND 969057

By 57/VSV Date 4/20/98



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LR DEF 15 PAK-US

~~TOP SECRET~~ 084

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 02213 110416Z

17
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

035624

R 100725Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3445

~~TOP SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 2213

EXDIS
SUBJECT GOP SUGGESTION FOR MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH U.S.,
INCLUDING AVAILABILITY OF MILITARY FACILITIES IN PAKISTAN

1. SUMMARY: GOP DEFSEC, SAYING HE WAS SPEAKING WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE AND AT REQUEST OF PRES BHUTTO, SAID GOP SOUGHT CLOSER MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH U.S. SAID GOP WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE LAND AND PORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR US USE. I WAS ENTIRELY NON-COMMITAL, PROMISING MERELY TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION.

ACTION REQUESTED: INSTRUCTION AS TO ANY RESPONSE TO BE MADE TO DEFSEC'S PRESENTATION. END SUMMARY

2. I CALLED ON DEFSEC GHIAS UDDIN AHMED MARCH 10 AT LATTER'S REQUEST. GHIAS SAID HE WISHED DISCUSS WITH ME, WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PRES BHUTTO AND INDEED AT HIS REQUEST, QUESTION OF MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND US. HE HAD WISHED TO TALK WITH ME EARLIER IN WEEK, BUT SINCE I HAD BEEN OUT OF TOWN HE HAD MENTIONED SUBJECT TO ACTING DCM (ISLAMABAD 2113). NOW HE WISHED TO TAKE MATTER UP OFFICIALLY.

3. GHIAS IMMEDIATELY SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY QTE FACILITIES UNQUOTE COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US BY PAKISTAN IF US WISHED. HE SAID THIS WOULD INCLUDE FACILITIES ON LAND OR AT PORTS. WITH REGARD LATTER, HE MENTIONED LOCATIONS ALONG ARABIAN SEACOAST INCLUDING (FROM WEST TO EAST) JIWANI, GWADAR, SONMIANI BAY, KARACHI AND AREA SOUTH AND EAST OF KARACHI. HE THOUGHT US MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING PORT SUCH AS AT GWADAR WHICH WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

3-10-72
2213

2

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NND 969057
By 571VSV Date 4/20/98



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 02213 110416Z

OF THAT REGION OF PAKISTAN.

4. HE SAID GOP WAS NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF HAVING LARGE NUMBERS OF AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PAKISTAN, BUT WE MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE ACCESS TO FACILITIES AS NEEDED. BEYOND THAT, PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITY FOR STRATEGIC MILITARY PLANNING WAS LIMITED AND GOP WOULD WELCOME COLLABORATION OF AMERICAN PLANNERS.

5. REASON FOR THIS APPROACH, GHIAS SAID, WAS THAT PAKISTAN NOW FACED ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION AFTER RECENT WAR WHEN IT HAD SUFFERED DEFEAT BY INDIA WITH SOVIET COLLABORATION. GOP WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER INTENTIONS OF BOTH SOVIETS AND INDIANS. PAKISTAN NEEDED TO BOLSTER UP ITS DEFENSES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SOME CREDIBLE DETERRENT. GHIAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PAKISTAN WAS NOW ONLY A SMALL FRACTION COMPARED TO INDIA IN SIZE AND STRENGTH. HE WENT ON THAT PAKISTAN COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE ATTACKING INDIA BUT IT NEEDED SOME ASSURANCE ABOUT ITS DEFENSE. IN THIS REGARD HE THOUGHT PAKISTAN WOULD BE LOOKING TO CLOSER DEFENSE COLLABORATION WITH IRAN AND TURKEY, AND SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

6. GHIAS REFERRED TO CLOSE SOVIET COLLABORATION WITH INDIANS BOTH AT PORT OF VISAKHAPATNAM AND ON ANDAMAN ISLANDS, WHICH HE INTERPRETED AS PROVIDING IMPORTANT NAVAL FACILITIES FOR USSR. HE SAID HE THOUGHT USG WAS INTERESTED IN EXPANSION OF SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN AREA.

7. IN LATTER PART OF THIS PRESENTATION GHIAS MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NEED SOME EQUIPMENT FOR

DEFENSE PURPOSES. HE OFFERED NO SPECIFICS BUT WENT ON TO REFER TO RECENT TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY ROGERS BEFORE SFRC, DURING WHICH SECRETARY WAS REPORTED IN LOCAL PRESS AS SAYING THAT USG HAD NO PLANS TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO PAKISTAN. GHIAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE IN U.S.

8. I LISTENED QUIETLY THROUGHOUT GHIAS' PRESENTATION, WHICH LEFT ME WITH IMPRESSION THAT GOP WAS, MORE OR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NIND 969057

By *ST/VSV* Date *4/29/98*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED
~~PA/HO, Department of State~~
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 9, 2005

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 02213 110416Z

LESS, ASKING US TO WRITE ITS OWN TICKET IF WE AGREE-
ABLE TO STRENGTHENING OUR DEFENSE TIES WITH PAKISTAN. WHEN
HE HAD CONCLUDED, I SAID I APPRECIATED IMPORTANCE
OF HIS PROPOSAL, WHICH HAD BEEN MENTIONED TO
US AS POSSIBILITY ON VARIOUS LEVELS IN RECENT MONTHS
BUT NEVER BEFORE WITH EXPRESS CONCURRENCE OF PRES
OF PAKISTAN. I WAS NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT IN ANY
MATERIAL WAY ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS GHIAS HAD MENTIONED,
I WENT ON, BUT I WOULD PROMPTLY REPORT OUR CONVERSATION.
I WOULD INFORM HIM OF ANY REACTION RECEIVED FROM WASH-
INGTON.

9. I THEN ASKED HOW GOP MIGHT VIEW CONNECTION BETWEEN
PROPOSALS GHIAS HAD JUST MADE AND ON-GOING POLITICAL
ACTIVITY IN AFTERMATH OF RECENT INDO-PAK WAR. AGREE-
ING WITH GHIAS' OBSERVATION THAT PAKISTAN COULD NOT
BE MILITARY MATCH FOR INDIA, I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME
THAT REAL HOPE OF DURABLE PEACE IN SUBCONTINENT LAY IN
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO BOTH INDIA AND
PAKISTAN THAT WOULD PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO GIVE UP ANY
REVANCHIST CLAIMS. GHIAS SAID HE WOULD AGREE TO
THAT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE KASHMIR PROBLEM BE SUBMITTED
TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BY IMPARTIAL AZ ENTITY. HE
THOUGHT PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN WOULD AGREE TO ARBITRATION FINDING,
WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE INCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF TURNING PRE-
SENT CEASEFIRE LINE INTO INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AS INDIA
APPARENTLY HAS IN MIND. HE ACKNOWLEDGED MY COMMENT THAT
GOI HAS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT IT CONSIDERED KASHMIR
AS ISSUE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN ONLY. HE ADDED THAT
IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ANY GOVERNMENT
IN PAKISTAN TO GIVE UP, ON ITS OWN, EXISTING PAK CLAIMS
ON INDIAN KASHMIR.

10. NOTING THAT PRES BHUTTO WILL BE IN MOSCOW NEXT
WEEK AND HOPES TO MEET PRIMIN GANDHI NOT LONG THEREAFTER,
I ASKED HOW PAK PROPOSAL FOR CLOSER MILITARY COLLABORA-
TION WITH US MIGHT AFFECT, IN GHIAS' MIND, POSSIBILITY
OF SUCCESSFUL TALKS WITH SOVIETS AND INDIANS. GHIAS
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANY AIRING OF PROPOSALS HE HAD MADE
TO ME WOULD DAMAGE CLIMATE FOR FORTHCOMING POLITICAL
TALKS, AND REMARKED THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD REMAIN BE-
TWEEN US. HE THEN SAID THAT PEKING, HOWEVER, WOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NIND 969057
By 571 VSV Date 4/20/76



Department of State

TELEGRAM

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO, Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 9, 2005

PAGE 04 ISLAMA 02213 110416Z

NOT MIND CLOSER MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN PAKIS.
TAN AND US.

11. AS CONVERSATION CONCLUDED, I PROMISED ONCE AGAIN
TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION FAITHFULLY.

12. ACTION REQUESTED: I HAVE BEEN TOTALLY NON-
COMMITTAL WHENEVER SUGGESTIONS SUCH AS DEFSEC MADE
OFFICIALLY TODAY HAVE BEEN DROPPED IN MY PRESENCE, AND
ALL PERSONNEL OF THIS MISSION HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
BE SIMILARLY NONCOMMITTAL. I MENTIONED TO DEFSEC
THAT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF OUR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA
WERE NOW UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON AND SAID I COULD
NOT PREDICT WHEN I COULD GIVE HIM ANY REACTION. I
WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON ANY COMMENT I MAY MAKE
IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS WHICH DEFSEC PUT FORWARD.
SOBER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. FRY.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~