

NP, WH SF, 043,  
President's Office File,  
Memoranda for the President,  
Beginning July 9, 1972

DECLASSIFIED  
PA/HO, Department of State  
E.O. 12958, as amended  
June 9, 2005

File

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1972

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Meeting with John B. Connally

DATE AND TIME: Friday, July 14, 1972 9:00 a.m.

PLACE: The President's Office  
The Western White House

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary Connally  
Henry A. Kissinger

The President welcomed Secretary Connally warmly and congratulated him on the success of his round-the-world trip. [Secretary Connally's trip, from June 6 to July 11, took him to six Latin American countries, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Iran.] The President told Secretary Connally, "You did a great job," and asked for a summary of the trip's highlights.

[Omitted here is Connally's report on the stops he made in Latin America and Southeast Asia.]

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Turning to South Asia, Secretary Connally thought that Bangladesh "must be the worst place in the world." But it needed our support and could be a bridge to India. The President observed that the Japanese also could and must do more in the area of economic assistance. Secretary Connally went on to describe Mujib as articulate, smart, a consummate actor and demagogue. There was a question whether Bangladesh could exist. It needed the skilled Bengalis from West Pakistan; otherwise it had no civil servants. But the U.S. can't undertake a continuing level of support.

In India, the Secretary had had very frank talks. Mrs. Gandhi assured him that India had no special animus against the U.S. and that much of what India was saying was only repeating what India had always said.

Pakistan's President Bhutto had changed his views on the U.S. He was very grateful for everything the U.S. had done for Pakistan. Secretary Connally found the quality of Pakistani leadership very high. Our <sup>their</sup> problem was one of public relations. Bhutto denied Pakistani mistreatment of Bengalis. War crimes trials, Bhutto had said, would force Pakistan into war. Pakistan would not sit still at the mercy of the Indians. Bhutto was a smart politician and a smart leader.

Afghanistan the Secretary had found a pitiful country. It had no leadership. As a country it was incapable of acting. The Secretary remarked that

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Afghanistan had lost a lot of planes just trying to fly them on maneuvers during the India-Pakistan war. Ambassador Neumann was an impressive fellow; he deserved a better post.

[Omitted here is Connally's report on his stop in Iran and a discussion of oil policy.]

Secretary Connally summed up several strong feelings he had as a result of his trip. For one thing, we were permitting too many countries to malign us, India particularly. He cited the Indian attacks on us on Vietnam. We had to stop this criticism of the U.S. Secondly, it was the Secretary's impression that most of these countries had more competence than they had ever possessed in the past. Third, it was his conviction that the next battleground in world affairs would be economics. We had to use our economic strength as a weapon. For example, we had to stop the Philippines' bitching or we would lose our bases. We should threaten removing the bases and abolishing the sugar quota and the Laurel-Langley tariff.

The Secretary had observed in the course of summing up that we had dropped in popularity in India. As for Latin America, watch Echeverria, he said.

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We can't be all things to all people, Secretary Connally said. We had to be selective as to the friends we sought. We couldn't do everything for everybody. The Latin Americans wanted a U.S. Latin American policy. We have one, but they didn't know what it means. In South Asia and East Asia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia were the key countries. As a general principle we had to articulate a firm U.S. point of view. We had to have a clear view of our interest and pursue it vigorously instead of letting others take the initiative all the time. We had to develop a capacity for this type of activity.

The President expressed his appreciation for this report and advice. The trouble was that all our ambassadors were worried about was how they were getting along with their hosts. The State guys had the right manners but they minced around and had no clear concept of defending the natural interest. The President also commented that it was a grievous mistake not to sell F-4's to the Latin American countries that sought them.

The meeting ended and Secretary Connally then went outside to speak with the press.

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