

391. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Starr) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Brown) for East Asian and Pacific Affairs¹

Washington, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep—Important Question

In our Chirep guidance to USUN (State 139831)² we did not indicate whether the USG considers that a proposal to deprive the ROC of representation in the UN would constitute an important question under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 18 of the Charter. The ROC may press for an explicit mention in any IQ resolution of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and in any case they may seek USG support for the position that action to expel the ROC would come under paragraph 2 rather than paragraph 3 of Article 18. The question of the USG position on Article 18 may also be posed by other delegations in New York as we get into the Chirep issue.

Our Chirep guidance to USUN states only that:

“We believe it is best that the IQ Resolution not explicitly be tied to Article 18(2) (expulsion or suspension of rights of members), since this Article necessarily involves Article 5 or 6 (of the UN Charter). On the other hand, it is unnecessary to tie the IQ explicitly to Article 18(3) (Assembly action to create a new category of important questions in addition to those cited in 18(2)). In order to preserve maximum tactical maneuverability, it is best to leave it open to delegations to decide for themselves whether they are supporting the resolution as an affirmation of Article 18(2), or as a decision to add a new category as per Article 18(3).

“. . . There should be no great problem in getting ROC sanction for this IQ, though they may press for explicit mention of Article 6 and/or Article 18(2), and it is easy enough to explain its meaning to press and public.”

Relying simply on Article 18, without indicating whether we believe paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 is involved, may create a false impression that our IQ position is based on paragraph 2. A speech by Ambassador Phillips on the Chirep issue in last year's UNGA debate (Tab A)³ contained references to the Charter provisions on expulsion of a member and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Exdis, 1971. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Robert I. Starr.

² Document 388.

³ Attached but not printed. Phillips' speech is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1970, pp. 733–735.

led to a critical article in the *New York Times* by Harvard Professor Jerome Cohen (Tab B).⁴ Cohen read the Phillips speech as contending that a simple majority decision of the UNGA to seat the PRC and expel the ROC would constitute a Charter violation.

Cohen argued that such an interpretation, if accepted, would deprive the UN of flexibility for achieving a political solution. He also noted that, should the Assembly reject that interpretation and decide to settle the representation question by simple majority vote, the USG position would brand such action as illegitimate.

We had considered sending a clarifying letter to the *Times*, in order to avoid the buildup of expectations that the USG would consider as illegal adoption of last year's Albanian resolution by less than a two-thirds majority vote and without a Security Council recommendation. However, it was agreed that further journalistic speculation would be more harmful than beneficial, and a letter was sent instead to Professor Cohen making it clear that the USG did not intend the implications suggested by Cohen in his article. In the letter we made it clear that the reference in the Phillips speech to Articles 6 and 18(2) of the Charter did *not* involve an assertion that these provisions would apply as a matter of law. Rather, the references were intended mainly for purposes of analogy—to buttress our position that the UNGA *should* consider the Chirep issue an important question, and *not* to argue that it *necessarily must do* so under the Charter. (That letter has been reproduced in the April, 1971 issue of the *American Journal of International Law*) (Tab C).⁵

I believe we would find it extremely difficult to make a persuasive legal case for the proposition that expulsion of the ROC would involve Articles 6 and 18(2) of the Charter, particularly in view of our position that seating the PRC involves representation, and not membership. Moreover, there are sound reasons of policy for avoiding a situation in which the USG would have to brand as illegal UNGA action to deprive the ROC of representation by less than a two-thirds vote and without a Security Council recommendation. Such a position would deny us necessary flexibility in dealing with the essentially political issues involved.

Accordingly, if pressed and if we believe it necessary to take a more forthcoming position, we should concede that the UNGA has discretion to decide whether or not depriving the ROC of representation should be considered an important question. In other words, paragraph 3 and not paragraph 2 of Article 18 would be viewed as controlling.

⁴ Attached but not printed; "China: A New U.S. Move," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1970, p. 47.

⁵ Attached but not printed; *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 1971), pp. 396–397.

392. Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep

The attached cable from George Bush recommends that the U.S. draft resolution on Chirep include at least a preambular paragraph that the Security Council Seat should go to Peking.² Bush thinks we need this to get the Australians and New Zealanders on board, and that we should line up the Japanese and then rapidly inform the GRC.

Putting this reference in the resolution could be interpreted in Taipei as going beyond what we have told them we intended on the Security Council Seat. This is that we are, in the words of Secretary Rogers' statement, "prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of members of the United Nations."

If it should be USUN and State's judgment that including this reference to the Security Council in our resolution is essential to the success of our efforts, we should at least tell the GRC this and give them a chance to react before we talk with the Australians, New Zealanders, and Japanese. Otherwise, they may accuse us of breaking faith (and they may do that anyway if they believe we have given them a commitment).

Another point is involved here: the question of whether Peking does or does not consider that we will sponsor a Chirep resolution supporting the continued seating of the GRC, as opposed to only supporting such a resolution. Winston Lord has sent you the pages from the transcript of the Peking talks on this subject and believes that you did *not* commit yourself to Chou. If you believe that we should not act as a sponsor (or in this case, co-sponsor) we will need to move rapidly to stop the process, which is clearly well advanced.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Materials. Secret. Sent for action. An attached memorandum from Winston Lord to Kissinger, also dated August 6, includes a handwritten note from Holdridge reading: "HAK—I called Eliot to be sure nothing got out. He told me Rogers told Bush to knock it off. We're not ready for this kind of thing *yet*."

² Telegram 2125 from USUN, August 6. (Ibid.)

*Recommendations:*³

1. That you call Rogers or Johnson concerning inclusion of Security Council in our resolution.
2. That you review Peking transcript on Vietnam to ensure you see no problem with our sponsoring resolution rather than just supporting.

³ Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked or initialed.

393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, August 7, 1971, 0202Z.

144386. Subject: Chirep.

1. UK Chargé Millard called at his own request on Deputy Asst. Secretary Herz today to ask about results of US consultations with other countries on Chirep. Herz said it is still too early to make judgments on basis of NY meetings, but first reactions from capitals are quite encouraging. Several countries which either now have relations with Peking or are in process of establishing them have told us they see no obstacle to voting for our formula and against Albanian Resolution. Herz named Turkey as example. Even one co-sponsor of Albanian Res, which Herz declined to name, apparently was prepared to go along with US formula. Herz said we recognize that we still have uphill battle, but from our consultations so far it appeared that UK's bearishness about US formula was exception rather than rule. Many countries which had supported Albanian Res in past had done so because it was only way they could register their desire to see PRC in UN. Now they have an alternative.

2. Millard noted that UK has consistently said it would not support a two-China solution because (a) it has reason to believe that PRC will not enter UN on that basis; (b) UK has supported Albanian Res for ten years and for sake of consistency proposes to adhere to that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Robert T. Burns and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.

position; and (c) UK has legal problems with our formula due to apparent conflict with Articles 4 and 18(1) of Charter.

3. In reply, Herz said with respect to legal problems that we had studied them very carefully, and did not consider them insurmountable. This was really a political issue. UN Charter does not make distinction between UN members and states. Byelorussia and Ukraine are not states but are nonetheless members of UN. Millard observed that their membership had been settled by special arrangement. Herz said that that was exactly his point; for political reasons special arrangements could be made which were in no way in violation of UN Charter.

4. In response to Millard's reiterated question of whether our proposal was not clearly in conflict with Articles 4 and 18(1), Feldman replied we believed there was no conflict. Article 4 (admission of new members) did not apply since we were not proposing admission of new member. China is already member of UN and question is, "How shall China be represented?" We saw no legal obstacle to the General Assembly deciding that, for the present at least, China shall be represented by a delegation from PRC and a delegation from ROC. If "legal rationale" were necessary, this could be found in successor state theory. More specifically, in connection with Article 18(1) (each member of General Assembly shall have one vote), Feldman pointed out Charter nowhere defines either "state" or "member" and two terms cannot be considered synonymous. India, for example, became member of UN when still a part of British Empire and before it had attributes of sovereignty which would permit it to be described as "state" in international law. Other original members of UN (e.g., Philippines, Syria, Lebanon) were in similar situation. Best examples of members which were not states remain Ukraine and Byelorussia. Despite their presence in UN, no one speaks of UN having imposed a "three Russias" solution. UN Charter in 1945 was sufficiently flexible to take fully into account the de facto realities of that time and, in our view, retains same flexibility today. Moreover, though all these legal points are interesting, it is important not to lose sight of fact Chirep has been and remains a political problem, requiring a political and statesmanlike solution.

5. Millard asked what prospects were for Taipei's acceptance of dual representation formula. Herz noted that ROC had publicly stated that it would struggle to the end in UN. He thought we had reasons to hope that Taipei would see that its own interests would be served by our proposals.

In closing, Herz said we hoped UK would stay in close touch with us. NY was best place to consult, particularly on tactics. Even if UK could not support our effort, we hoped they would be able to avoid actions that could damage our prospects.

6. We note that British Embassy notetaker was rather sporadic in making notes on above conversation. In particular, he took no notes at all on points made by Feldman (paras 4 and 5 above), and we are unsure whether these points will be made to FCO. Believe it would be useful if Embassy could make similar points to FCO, drawing on this message and State 139829.²

Rogers

² See footnote 3, Document 387. Discussions with British officials about the U.S. legal position on the China representation question were reported in telegram 7378 from London, August 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

394. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 11, 1971, 0100Z.

2193. Subj: Chirep—Advantages of Separate Agenda Item.

1. Mission of definite opinion that we should seek to inscribe separate agenda item on Chirep with neutral formulation “the representation of China in the UN”.

2. Issue has already surfaced in wording of first preambular para in our draft DR res and at Aug 3 meeting of potential cosponsors. If we do not seek inscription of a separate agenda item we will be faced with equally difficult task of seeking to change wording of Albanian item.

3. New agenda item helps dramatize that we, as result of new US policy announced Aug 2, in an entirely new ballgame. We are not just trying to block adoption of traditional AR under “restoration of rights” rubric—we are making major and serious attempt to solve difficult problem by providing for representation of PRC and ROC in UN thereby recognizing existing realities without prejudicing either’s claims.

4. Japanese are attracted to idea of separate agenda item and have suggested one possibility might be to seek priority in General Committee for our neutrally worded item together with draft reses

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

circulated in connection with it. Japanese mission tells us they have recommended to Tokyo that Japan cosponsor separate agenda item.²

Bush

² Telegram 150415, August 13, authorized USUN to request the inscription of a new agenda item, "The Representation of China in the United Nations." Bush was advised not to seek additional co-sponsors in view of Secretary Rogers' August 2 announcement. Potential co-sponsors were to be advised in advance, and the new item was to be inscribed before August 21. (Ibid.)

395. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 11, 1971, 0242Z.

2229. Subj: Chirep: Aug 11 Mtg.

1. Summary. At mtg of inner core group of potential cosponsors Aug 11, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Belgium all volunteered (some on personal basis) that it is necessary to include language awarding SC seat to PRC in order to convince others of sincerity of our effort and to achieve maximum vote. Philippines suggested utility of separate agenda item with title which appears in US DR res draft. All agreed seek authorization cosponsor separate item prior to deadline for submission of supplementary items (30 days before GA opening Sept 21). New Zealand made point that, while decision to cosponsor and circulation of our draft reses could take place after that deadline, it would help if members of group also had prior authorization cosponsor reses. Next potential cosponsors mtg tentatively set for Aug 17. End summary.

2. At Bush invitation, reps of six Missions met Aug 11 discuss Chirep. Represented at mtg were Australia (Ashwin), Belgium (Longestaey), Japan (Ogiso), New Zealand (Scott), Philippines (Reyes), and Thailand (Klos Visessurakarn). Phillips, Bennett, PolCouns, Legal Adviser and MisOffs also present.

3. Bush opened mtg by stressing US determination, confirmed by conversations past few days with President, Secretary and Kissinger,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Bangkok, Brussels, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

to succeed in new Chirep policy, specifically to offer PRC seat and to insure continued representation of ROC. Assured reps that administration giving full backing to deadly serious and priority USUN effort to have UNGA accept both procedural and substantive reses, whether incorporating precise US texts of amended through consultations. Bush emphasized that rumors and press reports to contrary are without basis.

4. Bush reported that we in process of meeting with some 80 other Missions, starting with 22-nation mtg Aug 3. Said generally we feel response had been quite good but many govts still considering positions. Although not full agreement, consensus of those we have contacted appears be that we have close but reasonable chance to succeed. Virtually none have rejected US approach out of hand and reactions here reflected overlapping majority desires to see PRC seated and ROC stay seated.

5. Bush said purpose his calling mtg was to move process one step forward, to invite criticism of US drafts. While he did not want put any rep on spot, he hoped for frank discussion. Based on contacts to date, US somewhat more optimistic now than when operation began. Asked for reports on what others have found and comments on US approach and on substance.

6. Scott said New Zealand also taking issue seriously and welcomed opportunity for consultations. Generally, NZ position well known since PM and FonMin have made statements. Scott said he could say clearly that his govt had same objectives as others in room: to devise a formula for retaining ROC seat while being prepared to vote for PRC. Since all sharing these goals were starting late and AR sponsors started early, we faced with problem that requires all to focus on best way to cope. Not simple problem. Any formula we propose must take account of "erosion of support for ROC and increase in support for PRC."

7. Scott said he felt sponsors should pay special attention to "floating vote," those who are concerned about ROC expulsion but have no strong commitment. On other hand, trend in UN is that there will be strong majority, but perhaps not two-thirds, for bringing Peking in. Any res, Scott said, must cover certain points. Major point is, which govt should occupy SC seat. It can of course be argued that UNGA does not need to comment on this. But GA members want to know our view and our intention in regard to SC seat. New Zealand feels there should be no doubt as to which China reps proponents of reses feel should occupy SC seat. NZ aware this not spelled out in draft reses. Frankly, NZ feels that to have best chance of success—and issue is tricky and will require work in any event—situation requires specific mention of SC seat.

8. How can this be done? Scott asked. Even though language specifying SC seat not in draft res, sponsors could make clear in

introducing reses their attitude on SC seat. This would invite amendment to res, which would result in language regarding SC in final text. However, this such serious question that most govts by time of any amendment would have been fully briefed and comparatively locked in to fixed and unhelpful position based on lack of SC language in res. Relying on change in res text at that time, therefore, is not best. NZ believes that if language is to be changed to include SC seat it should be done at beginning of process.

9. Bush asked if Missions are far enough along in their consultations with other reps to say that presence or absence of language on SC would have effect on votes. Are contacts saying, for example, that they would support a res with SC language and would not support without. If such an accommodation is necessary, US is flexible. On basis our consultations thus far, we not yet at point of being able say presence or absence of SC seat language would, for example, make ten vote difference.

10. Scott said he not in position to discuss numbers of votes, but he pointed out that AR does specifically mention SC seat and we will need to counter this in our res.

11. Longerstae (Belgium) earlier had highlighted problem created by summer absence from Brussels, resulting in no firm GOB decision this issue. He now said, however, that US draft reses very close to lines of what Belgium has been supporting. But main difference is that mentioned by Scott. Belgians believe language on SC seat should be included. Belgians think it would have influence. There have been doubts about seriousness of US purpose. Inclusion of language would help resolve these doubts.

12. Longerstae noted that our efforts are now proceeding in a new pro-PRC environment, not as favorable a climate as existed year ago. He expressed conviction there is built-in majority for dual representation. Problem is to bring it into open and that many will abstain even though they among a majority. Reason is that they influenced by new environment. Longerstae said he believes legal basis for draft reses is weak. We should admit to ourselves that this a very "soft spot." He concluded by apologizing foregoing must be considered only as personal view.

13. Ashwin (Australia) said he would like make two points. First, Australia "agrees entirely with Belgian and NZ positions." Reality is that SC seat should go to Peking. This should be reflected in res to attract more votes. Second, Australia has always accepted ICJ position that question of representation should be decided by GA rather than subsidiary organs of UN, including SC. PolCouns explained implications of 1950 ICJ ruling.

14. Reyes (Philippines) recalled his comments at Aug 3 mtg (when he pointed out that AR specifically mentions SC seat but he felt SC, re-

ardless of GA should insist on SC competence to decide—USUN 2099).² Reyes recalled he had asked for clarification of US position on SC seat. Reason was not that Philippines eager see PRC become perm member but Philippines looking to 26th GA, foreseeing that IQ might get priority but that vote on representation res would be influenced by precisely what alternative offered to AR language. US-sponsored alternative draft should be as acceptable and attractive as possible.

15. Reyes said he had not yet received response from FonMin on this question, although he had explained difficulty in denying SC seat to Peking. Reyes said he wanted identify himself with remarks of previous speakers. Question of SC, Reyes said, “must be dealt with in drafts in some form.”

16. Reyes introduced question of inscribing separate item or modifying AR item language so as not to prejudice reception of our draft. Term “restoration” could be to our procedural disadvantage. Reyes said he and Scott had discussed this problem before today’s mtg. Issue could be dealt with in General Comite or in some other fashion.

17. Phillips suggested this could be handled in manner similar to our handling of Korea item. Newlin, after draft text of China item distributed (text septel), noted that it could be inscribed as separate item or could be combined with AR.

18. Longerstaey suggested better have own item but predicted items would finally be combined.

19. Bush asked if any others wished comment. Ogiso, who had been silent at Aug 3 mtg and had said nothing yet this mtg, asked if Secretary Rogers’ remark to press that US prepared follow majority view on SC seat necessarily referred to majority expression by GA. Or could it mean majority expressions in informal prior consultations. Bush responded that Secretary merely indicating US flexibility and willingness to follow majority lead. Representation for both Chinese govts principal issue and Secretary simply intended convey impression of flexibility on SC issue. If this will of GA members and is what they feel is required, then US would agree. US not going to walk out if majority felt that way.

20. Ogiso asked: does this therefore mean that Secretary’s statement does not prevent US from accepting SC seat allocation to PRC? Bush confirmed this meaning, adding that, while all in room are sympathetic to ROC, question was simply one of votes. Bush said he had clear impression from discussion that reps present feel that representation res would be better with SC seat included. If this what it will take, US is flexible. Mtg very helpful in clarifying this point.

² Not printed.

21. Scott commented that SC seat ref in res text would “greatly improve credibility of our seriousness.” With such language, we couldn’t be criticized for going insufficient distance to meet Peking. Scott agreed with Longerstaeay that inclusion of language would neutralize rumors that US approach is gimmick.

22. Longerstaeay returned to legal question. Suppose, he asked, res does not dispose of SC seat. Is ROC veto possible? Legal Adviser (Reis) explained that atmosphere in GA would be reflected in SC. Thus veto might be attempted but it probably would not be sustained. Reis said he would like make another point on legalities. Perhaps US approach does not touch all legal points but even AR expulsion of ROC is of doubtful legality.

23. Ashwin said that everybody he had discussed US approach with had raised legal questions, particularly centered on legality of providing second China seat without proper admission procedures. Because of this legal question, Ashwin said, many were opposed to our approach. Reis, mentioning Byelorussia and Ukraine, pointed out that UN incorporated anomalies when founded. Mentioned India status. Noted Charter nowhere defines member or state. Reis added: is it not worthwhile ask if Charter not flexible enough to accommodate this proposal.

24. Ogiso asked to turn to different issue. For Japan, he said, study of SC question is very important. On this question, Ogiso said “Personally, I am in full agreement with what Scott said about need to mention SC seat.” Furthermore, he added, inclusion of SC clause might have impact on voting on procedure and on possibility of obtaining priority. To avoid dels concluding IQ res simply same device for same purpose as in prior years, we must demonstrate relationship between IQ and representation res, making clear their bearing on SC question.

25. Ogiso said he had been asked certain questions by dels he had contacted. If our approach succeeds this year, what happens next? If ROC is finally expelled next year then others doubt they should support this year. These reps doubt that next year US will make same effort as this year. If US willing make effort only this year, then they doubt should support. Ogiso said that speaking personally he felt that if US formula gets majority this year it could provide basis for compromise between two Chinese sides. What bearing does this have on US policy?

26. Bush replied that we do not know what exact bearing Kissinger and Nixon visits will have on this question. There is no way of substantiating a link. But who can foretell Peking flexibility particularly when we see how Taiwan’s position has developed over short period?

27. Klos (Thailand) said his govt favors some specific ref to SC, and said he agreed with Scott.

28. Bush excused self, explaining he must leave to make call on another Mission to seek support for Chirep policy. Phillips (returning to question raised by Reyes) suggested mtg discuss agenda item, noting that he understood that only item itself and not necessarily explanatory memo need be submitted by 30-day deadline.

29. Belgian Deputy PermRep Van Ussel, who accompanied Longerstaey to mtg, interrupted to refer to rep res pream para referring to UN as "center for harmonizing actions of nations." Would implications for universality be harmful? Newlin and Reis explained rationale for para, pointing out that it provides useful talking point and that we felt we could find way to explain it to GVN, ROK and FRG. Scott felt this para helpful toward enlisting neutrals support.

30. Scott, returning to subject of agenda item, asked if we felt we should submit separate item before deadline for supplementary items and if his understanding correct that did not need table res at that time. Phillips confirmed both. Scott asked how closely list of co-sponsors of item should reflect list of co-sponsors of res. Phillips and Reis replied that there no requirement of which we aware and that precedents exist for more co-sponsors for inscription than for res itself. Normally, list expected be same, in that case, Scott concluded, it important at time of submitting item to have as wide agreement as possible on text of res.

31. Phillips said we had been assuming mtg next week to include those likely to co-sponsor. Suggested mtg Aug 17. Reps agreed that potential co-sponsors would need two–three days for instruction prior to mtg, thus requiring preliminary efforts with these delts starting this week. Agreed tentatively schedule potential co-sponsors mtg 11:00 am Aug 17.

32. Ogiso asked when we would circulate draft explanatory memo, urging that we do so Aug 13 at latest. We agreed complete ASAP.

33. Scott asked if he understood correctly that US would give consideration between now and Aug 17 to question of amending rep res to include SC seat. Phillips confirmed that we would give serious attention.

34. Longerstaey volunteered that he believed reps attending mtg had been unanimous that SC seat should be mentioned in res. He asked if we could provide figure on reaction of other delts to absence of SC clause in draft res. We said roughly 15–20 others had raised question, many stressing importance of addressing SC issue in res.

Bush

396. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 13, 1971, 0200Z.

2267. Subj: Chirep—Credentials Committee.

1. Stavropoulos reported to MisOff 13 Aug that Sov Mission has told him they expect SYG will propose constituting Credentials Committee for 26th GA on basis 4–4–1. Noting his conversation with another MisOff 12 July, Stavropoulos said he believes increased number of countries recognizing PRC, which is basis for CC composition, now requires 4–4–1.

2. Stavropoulos said that tactical question is more important than increase UN numbers of countries treating in one way or another with Peking. SYG is obliged to propose composition of CC at very beginning of session and before commencement general debate. If he proposes 5–3–1, there is certain to be prolonged and heated challenge to his proposal in volatile context where reps will not be tightly instructed and with unpredictable results. On other hand, Stavropoulos believes that there would be no serious or unmanageable challenge if the SYG proposed 4–4–1.

3. *Comment:* We cannot any longer maintain that 5–3–1 is justified by the facts. These are that as of 13 Aug, 58 UN members recognize PRC (of whom 50 have diplomatic relations with PRC), while 60 UN members recognize GRC (of whom 59 have diplomatic relations with GRC), and 4 recognize neither PRC nor GRC.

4. Stavropoulos is correct in saying that in view of these facts, and possible furthering of bilateral trend toward Peking before 26th GA, even if we succeeded in persuading SYG to recommend a 5–3–1 CC, this would almost certainly be challenged from the floor. It would be extremely dangerous for this matter to be put to the vote unless we had gone to capitals on this issue and had sought to build a majority to overrule such a challenge. This would involve not only adding a further issue to continuing efforts to seek support for IQ and DR in Washington, here and in capitals, but the weakness of the case and consequent lack of appeal would very likely harm our search for IQ and DR support.

5. There is of course no guarantee that an SYG proposal for a 4–4–1 CC would not also provoke challenge. But we are confident such a challenge would be defeated—first, because the hard facts of the mat-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Pretoria.

ter show a near parity of recognition and diplomatic relations as between Peking and Taipei, and second, because the membership would recognize that our agreeing that the SYG should come forward with 4-4-1 represented considerable movement and a willingness to accept facts.

6. On the other hand, a 5-3-1 CC, if we could get it, would insure to the greatest possible extent that Chinese representation would not be resolved in the context of credentials. If any way could be found to sustain an SYG 5-3-1 proposal without adversely affecting our basic goals, we would opt for it. Since there is none, we recommend informing Stavropoulos that although we would prefer 5-3-1 CC, we would be prepared to consider 4-4-1 and would expect that, in return, the SYG and all reasonable dels would wish to support such a recommendation as against any possible challenge. Finally, we would want to make the point that we expect the 4-4-1 will be selected in such a way as to produce a majority in the CC for South Africa's credentials. Request reply.²

Bush

² The Department replied that an effort should still be made to seek continuation of the "traditional" 5-3-1 formula on the Credentials Committee, seeking, if necessary, support from the Secretary-General. (Telegram 151262 to USUN, August 18; *ibid.*)

397. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, August 18, 1971, 2059Z.

152449. Subject: Chirep. Refs: A. USUN 2297;² B. State 150259.³

1. For Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Bathurst, Blantyre, Bogota, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Gaborone, Kigali, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Panama City, Port au Prince, Quito, San Jose, San Domingo, Suva, The Hague, Tokyo, Tunis, Wellington:

A. Meeting of friendly delegations in New York Aug 17 (their capitals listed in para above) was helpful in advancing our initiatives but did not result in commitments regarding co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions. The time has come therefore to make approaches at addressee posts, to follow up on the discussion in New York, obtain pledges of co-sponsorship, or where this is not possible elicit suggestions re what we can do to make such co-sponsorship possible. We realize in particular that two points in the representation resolution seem to give most trouble:

B. One point is preference of some countries that representation resolution refer to "Taiwan" rather than ROC. We believe you have adequate material in para 7 Ref B to explain why substitution of Taiwan for ROC, far from making the res more saleable, would actually increase PRC and other opposition to it. Where govt is troubled that use of term ROC in resolutions somehow might be taken to imply acceptance of ROC claim to represent all of China, you could make these points: (1) Use of term in no way entails acceptance of such claims, and co-sponsorship would in no way prevent host govt from making its views on this point clear in public; (2) normal UN practice is to use names by which countries refer to themselves; (3) if Chirep problem

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Herz; cleared by George N. Monsma, John D. Rendahl, James H. Boughton, Peter C. Walker, C. Robert Moore, Winthrop G. Brown, Pedersen, and Eliot; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Beirut, Blantyre, Bogota, Brasilia, Bridgetown, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Dakar, Djakarta, Dublin, Fort Lamy, Gaborone, The Hague, Kampala, Kigali, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Lagos, La Paz, Libreville, Lima, Lome, Lusaka, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Montevideo, Nairobi, Nicosia, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Panama, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rabat, Reykjavik, San Jose, Santo Domingo, Singapore, Suva, Tehran, Tokyo, Tunis, Vienna, Vientiane, and Wellington. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Rio de Janeiro, Dakar, and Bathurst.

² Telegram 2297 from USUN, August 18, reported on the August 17 meeting. (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 3, Document 387.

is to be settled at all in a realistic way, resolutions must steer clear of seeming to endorse either set of conflicting claims.

C. The other point has to do with the fact that our draft resolution does not include language recommending that Security Council seat be given to PRC. If this is what gives host government trouble you should refer to Secretary's statement Aug 2 that we will abide by views of the majority on SC seat and assure them that you will immediately report their views to us. FYI. This is of course the most delicate aspect and most difficult for ROC to accept. We have not yet decided how or when to handle it, but clearly our most important objective is to retain UN membership for the ROC. End FYI. If host government is not prepared to co-sponsor res as it now stands, you should ask them if they would be prepared to co-sponsor if it were amended to include recommendation on Security Council. In any case, info on degree to which this matter will affect vote of host government will be valuable to us in deciding next steps.

2. Addressees other than those listed in para 1 we regard as unlikely to be co-sponsors although we hope to have their support for our resolutions. Accordingly, those addressees should explore host government attitude to our resolutions and when indicated also try to elicit information on extent to which Security Council issue in DR resolution would affect their ability to lend support (or might lead them to abstain rather than oppose).

3. All addressee posts should report again even where this info has previously been reported, so that we will have most up-to-date picture enabling us to decide on next moves.

4. Some addressee posts have reported special factors (e.g., absence of key govt figures) which have made host govt unable to express firm views at this time. At such posts, in Ambassador's discretion, his own assessment of host govt attitudes would be helpful pending opportunity to approach host govt.

5. If question of timing of submission of resolutions to UN is raised, you should say that matter is open, but that we think it advisable to table resolutions well before beginning of General Debate at UNGA. Hence we are anxious to ascertain very soon the potential list of co-sponsors, and what needs to be done to make it as broad and representative as possible.

6. FYI. We recognize that we may not in every case be able to get support for both the IQ and representation resolutions and may have to settle for support for only one of them. However, at this stage we should avoid any indication that we would settle for support of the one resolution alone. End FYI.

Rogers

398. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 20, 1971, 0009Z.

2333. Subj: Chirep Meeting With Central Americans. Ref: USUN 2280.²

1. Summary: In meeting with Central Americans on Chirep, Bush drew attention to new position on DR which ROC now conveying to close friends. Urged governments to consider joint ROC–US conviction that support for DR is best means of preserving ROC representation. Agreed continue close consultation in NY and capitals. Recommend addressees make further approaches. End Summary.

2. Bush held follow-up meeting Aug 19 with five Central American dels: Molina (Costa Rica), Castenada-Cornejo (El Salvador), Asensio (Guatemala), Sevilla-Sacasa and Roman (Nicaragua), Rios (Panama). Phillips and MisOffs also present. (No Honduras rep now in NY and we still have not seen here.)

3. Bush remarks designed principally to move these governments toward support and co-sponsorship of DR. For this purpose, he emphasized that to preserve ROC's seat DR policy must be successful and that ROC itself wants it to succeed. Protection of ROC's seat requires support for widely acceptable DR concept embodied in US reses. Bush paid tribute to loyalty toward ROC that made some of best friends of US and ROC reluctant to support DR. He and MisOffs brought dels up-to-date on our understanding of ROC's private attitude. Referring specifically to recent ROC instructions—clarified at Chiefs of Missions conferences held in past 10 days—that ROC missions should encourage friends to support DR (reftel), we urged dels to discuss with ROC Amb Liu and to stimulate governments to seek clarification directly from ROC.

4. Group seemed receptive to presentation. Discussion indicated most not aware of current ROC position. Discussion of ROC attitude and other aspects of problem also tended verify our previous impression that FonMinistries not communicating sufficiently with these UN dels on Chirep.

5. Sevilla-Sacasa (although he typically postured as senior of group) revealed sparse understanding of rationale for new reses, and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to San Jose, San Salvador, Guatemala City, Managua, Panama, Taipei, Tegucigalpa, and Tokyo.

² Dated August 16. (Ibid.)

we sought to clarify (with unknown success) such questions as why we were not using old IQ formula and why we want avoid issue of admission of new state. Sevilla-Sacasa summarized problem as centering on attitudes of GA membership, of PRC and of ROC. Sevilla-Sacasa asked Bush how many Asians would co-sponsor US reses. Bush said we anticipated EA governments support and co-sponsorship. We working intimately with them trying to adjust to their needs. However, EA governments need time to consider; therefore, for example, we requested item inscription alone. Bush reported that several EA's have spoken of need for DR language on SC seat; he described US attitude in terms of Secretary's statement regarding a majority view.

6. Castenada-Cornejo (El Salvador) said he and other ROC friends concerned that their support for DR concept would give impression of policy inconsistency. Furthermore, vote might imply political recognition of PRC; this might damage relations with ROC, perhaps even leading to break in relations. Issue is also domestic political concern. We replied, in addition to substance of para 3, that our approach would avoid UN seeking decide rival claims and that member's UN vote need not mean change in bilateral policy.

7. Rios (Panama), pointing out he had no instructions, said Chirep question so sensitive that he believed it would be more fruitful for US to discuss in capitals. FonMinistry has informed him GOP studying issue. We agreed discussions in capitals important and described extensive US activity in field. We assured Rios we would continue approaches in Panama but added that we would hope also to work closely in NY as well. Underlined value of close coordination among US, ROC and others both here and abroad.

8. *Comment:* Recommend addressees make clear to Fon Ministries high value we place on type of consultations reported this message. At same time it would be helpful if addressees could find means of getting across point that it in mutual interest for hosts to keep UN reps as fully informed as possible.

Bush

399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 26, 1971, 0234Z.

2408. Sub: Chirep—Credentials Committee. Refs: USUN 2267² and 2320 (latter NOTAL)³ State 151262.⁴

1. USUN Legal Adviser called on Stavropoulos to explain our difficulties with his proposal for 4–4–1 Credentials Committee. Noted that traditional 5–3–1 formula originated in East-West issues across-the-board, not merely in context of numbers of member states recognizing Taipei or Peking, and that moving to 4–4–1 would produce so volatile a situation within GA and specialized agencies that credentials issues involving, for example, Cambodia, Germany, Korea and Vietnam might no longer be handled on technical-procedural-apolitical basis, as called for by GA rules, but would be subject to every current of national unpopularity and personal “initiative”. While we understood concern that first day of 26th GA not be marred by violent challenge to a Stavropoulos/Hambro 5–3–1 recommendation, we thought Albanian proponents were more likely to complain than go so far as formally to challenge 5–3–1, in large part because they couldn’t be sure of winning at outset of GA and would not wish to jeopardize entirety of Chirep on possible defeat on this issue. Also noted possibility UN membership at large would go along with 5–3–1 recommendation in view of widespread feeling Chirep should be subject of everyone’s views, not merely those of (unrepresentative) 9-member Credentials Committee.

2. Stavropoulos said he appreciated even if he did not share fully our viewpoint. Difficulty would be with acting Pres Hambro, not him. Stavropoulos thought we would have very considerable difficulty convincing Hambro of rectitude of 5–3–1 and suggested we undertake this task without delay.

3. Stavropoulos asked what we are telling other Missions with regard to optimum timing Chirep debate. MisOff replied only the extremes seem clear; we do not think that Foreign Ministers would appreciate delaying the general debate in order that Chirep be taken up, and resolved, at very beginning of the Assembly; on other hand, we are not seeking to delay Chirep until Dec. We think Albanians unlikely

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Pretoria.

² Document 396.

³ Dated August 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 396.

to want to push Chirep to a vote before the general debate draws to a close, both because of attendance Foreign Minister problem and because they will need opportunity to gauge measure of support that 1971 GA is likely to accord Albanian Res. Stavropoulos said he is considering advising that Mon 18 Oct—which will mark conclusion of 3-week general debate—would be as appropriate a time for plenary Chirep discussion as any other. MisOff said we would like opportunity to reflect; it was still early to have answers to these questions.

4. Stavropoulos said he assumes that, having looked at probable General Committee composition, we are bearing in mind the likelihood that the GC will recommend combining the 2 Chirep items. He thought it awkward to have an item beginning (A) “Restoration of the lawful rights . . .” and (B) “The representation of China in the UN”, and that, by reasons of practice and tradition, it would be better to have a chapeau followed by (A) and (B). He asked that we consider for this purpose “the question of China”. While others would say there is no “question” but merely a denial of lawful rights, “the question of China” would be neutral and thus serve non-prejudicially.

5. Stavropoulos said a 4-4-1 Credentials Committee could be formed without endangering South African credentials. Might not Pakistan be recommended as one of the “PRC four” and agree to abstain on any [vote?] in the Credentials Committee to decline South African credentials? MisOff reiterated importance we attach to Credentials Committee treating South African credentials no differently than those of anyone else; 4-4-1 seemed a particularly tricky business.

6. Stavropoulos also said USSR Mission is pessimistic and appears to fear PRC will be in UNGA this year. Sov Mission is sending Rybakov (Counselor level) to review with Stavropoulos possible effect on handling and outcome of agenda items of active PRC participation in 26th GA (*sic*).

7. MisOff thanked Stavropoulos and said we would need to reflect on questions raised and might require some time to do so.

8. Request info addressees protect Stavropoulos in any discussion foregoing problems. Relationship could be jeopardized by citation Stavropoulos in capitals.

Bush

400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1608Z.

158910. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling Resolutions. For Amb From Secretary.

1. Our sense of timing on Chirep issue in NY is that it is highly desirable to submit DR Res with reasonably balanced group of sponsors by Labor Day. Japanese co-sponsorship in our view will be essential in obtaining such a list and to prospects for ultimate success.

2. We have also concluded that inclusion of provision on SC seat will ultimately be critical in prospects for favorable vote. As Japanese know, Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines are strongly urging that such provision be included at outset, in fact have said their co-sponsorship hinges on this point.

3. Our impression of ROC position is that it has evolved not only to point of urging its friends to support DR but also to point where ROC will acquiesce in SC seat going to PRC. We gather Japanese are getting similar impression. At same time we remain concerned at possibility inclusion SC seat in our own text when initially tabled could cause Chiang to react adversely or GRC to cease urging favorable vote—with possible loss several conservative votes in GA.

4. Accordingly, I would like you to consult with Sato in way you consider best with view (a) to obtaining Japanese agreement to co-sponsor both IQ and DR, (b) to obtain their views on how SC para should be brought into the Res and (c) to obtain their active lobbying support with others.

5. Presentation, whether orally or with assistance of written note, would be along following lines:

“The Secretary has asked me to counsel with you personally on the next steps we should take in the matter of Chinese representation in the UN. Because of Japan’s importance in this entire endeavor, we are anxious to discuss with you the considerations set forth below in advance of consultations with any other government.

“We believe we have made a good beginning in putting forward our new initiative. Many governments around the world have been receptive to our proposals. We think the time has come when we must

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pedersen, Herz, and Feldman; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Richard A. Ericson, Pedersen, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.

take a further step and formally table by Sept 6 the dual representation resolution in order to consolidate and broaden our support. For the moment we are undecided on the timing of tabling the IQ Resolution. For tactical reasons in obtaining treatment as a procedural motion it may be desirable to delay its submission until close to the vote.

"This raises the question of co-sponsorship. Although well-disposed to our initiative, many countries whom we would very much wish to have as co-sponsors are hanging back in order to see whether the principal countries of the Asian region, and Japan in particular, are willing to commit themselves. We ourselves believe that Japanese co-sponsorship of both the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions is essential to success of the policy on whose broad outlines our two Governments are in agreement. We therefore would hope that Japan could concur in this and join with us in urging others to co-sponsor as well.

"The Security Council aspect is one which must be handled with special care. A number of countries have forcefully stated the view that the Dual Representation resolution is unlikely to succeed unless it includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat. Our analysis is that this is correct and that the most favorable impression would be created if we included such a provision at the outset. For Japan and the United States to sponsor a recommendation to that effect, however, would cause obvious problems for the Government of the Republic of China. Our impression is that the GRC is moving toward acquiescence in the SC seat going to the PRC but still would prefer the issue to be precipitated by countries other than Japan and the US.

"For these reasons, we have come to believe that the best approach might be for the US and Japan to seek co-sponsorship of the present DR resolution from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, one or two Latin American countries, one or two African countries and, if possible, Belgium and Ireland, but with the prior understanding that within a week several of these countries (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Belgium) possibly with others not on our original list, would submit an amendment on the SC seat, which we would incorporate into a revised text before the GA opens. It may be that Australia and New Zealand would not agree to such an approach and that we would then have to revise it. Or you may believe that relations with the GRC do not require us to go through such a process and that we could safely have the SC seat recommendation in the text before we submit it. I would appreciate your views on this point.

"We recognize that a commitment to co-sponsor and to include the SC seat are serious steps which your government must carefully consider. If we are to maintain and build our momentum, however, the

tabling of the dual representation resolution should take place as early as possible. We therefore would like to ask that you agree to join with us and other like-minded states to accomplish this necessary task in the immediate future.”

6. *Comment:* We consider Australia and New Zealand support for such an approach to be essential. If they did not agree we would then probably want to proceed on the basis of including the SC seat from the outset. We would not consider Belgium or Ireland necessary, though they would be desirable.

7. If Sato asks whether we are sure we can win the vote if the US and Japan co-sponsor and the SC is in, you should say no one can be positive at this point because the situation is too fluid. Without Japanese sponsorship and the SC seat recommendation we believe it would be unlikely; with GOJ sponsorship and active support, and continued GRC acquiescence, we believe the prospects are favorable. That is probably all we, or they, could honestly say at this point.

8. As passage of time is beginning to cause us problems we would hope Japanese could give us answer next week.

Rogers

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1804Z.

158911. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling of Resolutions. Ref: Taipei 4290.²

1. We are repeating to you message to Tokyo asking personal *dé-marche* to Sato requesting his cooperation in the two-stage approach on the Dual Representation resolution.³ We are making it clear to the Japanese that we expect stage two to be reached very soon and that, in fact, we are resorting to the two-stage approach largely because of the deli-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Pedersen, Leo J. Moser, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.

² Telegram 4290, August 27, described a meeting between Ambassador McConaughy and Foreign Minister Chow. (Ibid.)

³ Document 400.

cacy of the problem for the ROC and also because of Japanese concerns. At the same time, we are pointing out to Sato that the two-stage approach might have to be abandoned if we could not get Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to agree to co-sponsor on that basis.

2. Reftel states the GRC hopes we can muster a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors for a DR resolution which did not include a recommendation that the PRC hold the Security Council seat. It is precisely the question of putting together a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors which is the crux of our present difficulty. Frankly, the prospects are quite bleak at present.

3. Having approached some 90 countries in New York and in capitals, and with repeated follow-ups where appropriate, only one country (Costa Rica) thus far has agreed to co-sponsor the DR res without the Security Council seat recommendation. While it is possible that the Australians and New Zealanders will agree to the two-stage approach if the Japanese come on board, their past repeated statements to us have been to the effect that they would not co-sponsor unless the SC seat is covered. It is thus possible that the two-stage approach may get into serious difficulties at the very outset, due to Japanese or Australian and New Zealand non-cooperation. We would then have to decide whether it is desirable to table with only a corporal's guard of co-sponsors, instead of a large and well-balanced group, since we must assume in that case that other key countries such as Philippines, Thailand, Belgium, Mexico, Colombia, etc. would also stand aloof.

4. Given the considerable risk factor in the two-stage approach even if we can get it going (as some countries would interpret our action in tabling the resolution without any reference to the SC seat as evidence of "lack of seriousness" on our part, and as an effort that was doomed to failure), and in the light of recent indications that the ROC may be becoming more flexible, we would like to have your assessment of what the ROC reaction would be if we explained subsequently that the two-stage approach is not workable and that it is necessary to success that the Security Council seat be covered in the resolution when it is tabled.

5. Of course we are mindful of your conversation with Foreign Minister Chow reported reftel, and of his statement that the ROC would prefer that the resolution as tabled make no reference to the Security Council seat, though the ROC clearly expects the resolution to be adequately co-sponsored as well. On the other hand, we are impressed by the recent accumulation of indications that the ROC is becoming more flexible on this entire question, perhaps including its tactical aspects as well:

(a) Tokyo's 8434 reporting that according to Vice Foreign Minister Hogen, several ROC Ambassadors have told their Japanese

counterparts that President Chiang has indicated his willingness to stay in the UN even if the Security Council seat is given to the PRC;⁴

(b) USUN 2426 reporting that Ambassador Liu not only appears to accept the necessity of including a recommendation on the Security Council in the DR res, but that he displayed “equanimity at the prospect;”⁵

(c) Blantyre 968 reporting that the instructions issued to ROC Ambassadors overseas state ROC Ambassadors are to ask host governments to vote for the DR resolution “regardless of how amended;”⁶

(d) USUN 2406 reporting that a “special emissary from Taipei” had told a recent meeting of ROC Ambassadors to LA countries that the Security Council seat question had become a “side issue;”⁷

(e) Maseru 494 reporting that the ROC Ambassador to Lesotho told our Chargé that the ROC would not oppose a DR resolution which includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat.⁸

6. Subject to your concurrence, we think it may be useful to acquaint the ROC with the realities of the bleak co-sponsorship situation now facing us, even though we are proceeding to discuss the two-stage approach with the Japanese. We consider (and we assume from his statements that Chow agrees) it is essential to have on board with us from the start the core group of influential Asian countries as well as at least one or two influential co-sponsors from Europe, Africa, and Latin America. We believe the ROC should be made aware that the two-stage approach carries with it a substantial risk, and that this risk could become unacceptable if we are able to launch stage one with only a small group of minor states that have no influence in the international community.

Rogers

⁴ Dated August 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

⁵ Dated August 26. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII)

⁶ Dated August 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

⁷ Dated August 26. (Ibid.)

⁸ Dated August 17. (Ibid.)

402. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, September 1, 1971, 1011Z.

8607. Deliver opening of business Wednesday. For the Secretary. Subj: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship of Resolutions. Ref State 158910.²

Summary: Sato is studying possibility of GOJ co-sponsorship of DR via two-stage approach. His preliminary reaction not unfavorable, but he is concerned by prospect of deferring submission of IQ. He also concerned over altering Chirep scenario which was disclosed to LDP and press two days ago.

1. In context of Secretary's seeking his counsel, substance of para 5 of reftel was carefully conveyed to PriMin Sato morning September 1. Emphasis was placed on our views re essentiality of Japanese co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions and urgent need to submit DR by next Monday.

2. Sato agreed that time is running short. He also agreed on importance of having as broad sponsorship as possible. He emphasized need to be successful. In response I employed essence of para 7, i.e. course which both our countries considering offers best hope, provided GOJ co-sponsors and supports it actively.

3. Sato suggested there some change in proposed handling of both IQ and problem of UNSC seat, wondering about reasons. I noted there only slight change re timing of submission of IQ but even this undecided. More important change was two-stage approach to handling question of UNSC seat, and this change motivated by our trying to be responsive to GOJ considerations as well as our own. I stressed that two-stage approach not been discussed elsewhere and we unable to prophesy that it will be acceptable to those who would be involved such as Australia and New Zealand.

4. Sato indicated two stage approach sounded agreeable, but noted GOJ been having serious domestic political problems re Chirep. GOJ favorably disposed to co-sponsorship of IQ in conjunction with submission of DR. He doubted DR could be achieved without IQ. I made clear USG still solidly supports IQ; only question is tactical one of timing.

5. Sato said that despite domestic pressures against IQ, there no change in GOJ position. He wondered if change in US attitude toward

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.

² Document 400.

timing of IQ was result of domestic pressures on USG (slight implication re our seriousness). I assured him emphatically it is simply question as to tactics at UN. I added that only concern we have is whether resort to two-stage approach might be interpreted as lack of USG seriousness.

6. Re domestic support in Japan, I reminded Sato of *Sankei Shimbun* poll which showed that 74 percent of Japanese would like to see PRC in UN provided Taiwan not ousted. Only 11 percent of Japanese people polled indicated willingness to see Taiwan out of UN. He agreed this represents thinking of Japanese people. They wish see both represented in UN as an “interim measure” without confirming two-China or one China one Taiwan policy. (I had earlier described our official position as “seating” PRC and not ousting GRC.) Sato noted even Chiang insists on principle that China is one, e.g. Chiang opposes Mongolian independence.

7. Sato said he would give Secretary’s views urgent study and asked when I leaving for ECONCOM. I noted that because of importance of this question, I deferring departure until this Friday. Sato indicated he hoped to have reply by that time.

8. *Comment.* When Assistant Secretary Trezise and I called on Fukuda previous afternoon, I tipped off Fukuda re my visit to Sato. He will be key figure from now on in decision-making. He and Nishibori who was present were worried that just previous day PriMin and Fukuda had decided to co-sponsor IQ but defer final decision re complex DR until circa September 10. This position been communicated to LDP Committee and in fact to press (Tokyo 8561).³ They concerned re public reaction to switch, which would place DR and particularly GOJ co-sponsorship ahead of co-sponsorship of IQ. As supplement to approach to Sato we staying in touch with Fukuda via Mori, Hogen and Nishibori with view to securing full FornOff support.

9. *Action.* Would appreciate urgently rationale behind tactics for handling of IQ resolution since this seems to be matter of concern to FornOff particularly.⁴

Meyer

³ Not printed.

⁴ In telegram 160827 to Tokyo, September 1, the Department advised Ambassador Meyer that “we considered having IQ go in as motion rather than separate formal resolution only as a tactical variation which might assist somewhat in the matter of gaining priority in voting over the Albanian Res.” The United States remained fully committed to the Important Question principle and was prepared to table a formal IQ resolution at the same time as the Dual Representation resolution was tabled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

403. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chirep

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Secretary Rogers proposing that we now submit to the United Nations a resolution which specifically recommends that Peking assume the Security Council seat heretofore occupied by Taipei.²

As the Secretary's memo makes clear, we have made a major effort to line up support for a dual representation strategy which did not explicitly involve the Security Council seat, at least initially. That effort has failed. Even such stalwarts as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines have refused to co-sponsor such a resolution. In fact, after approaching 35 potential co-sponsors, we have only two firm commitments, Costa Rica and Guatemala.

It is now abundantly clear that there is not a prayer of maintaining the GRC's membership in the United Nations unless our dual representation resolution provides the Security Council seat to Peking. That is dramatically illustrated by the following best estimate of how the General Assembly will vote on the three resolutions relevant to this issue.

<i>Important Question Resolution</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
If the DR covers the SC, we win:	60	50	17
If the DR does not cover the SC, we lose:	44	61	22

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, 1 June–30 September 1971, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the first page reads: "Approved orally by President, September 7." Much of this memorandum, including the predicted voting totals, is based on a September 3 memorandum from Wright to Kissinger, in which Wright wrote: "Because of our inability to bite the bullet now on the Security Council issue, we are perilously close to frittering away what ought to be a winning hand." (Ibid., Box 285, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. 13)

² Rogers' September 5 memorandum is attached but not printed. Posts were informed of the new policy and strategy for the upcoming UN vote in telegrams 166117 and 166118, September 7, and 166140, September 9. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

Albanian Resolution

If the DR covers the SC, we win:	50	55	22
If it does not, we lose:	63	41	23

Dual Representation Resolution

If it covers the SC, we win:	57	51	19
If it does not, we lose:	43	55	29

I hasten to add that these estimates are fragile, and may be optimistic. But they do indicate two salient facts: We cannot possibly win unless we face up squarely to the Security Council issue. We have a good chance of winning if we do so.

The question, therefore, is not whether the Secretary is right in stating that this course is necessary in order to maintain Taipei's seat. He unquestionably is. The question is whether the possibility—and it is no more than that—of saving Taipei's seat is worth the price.

There are three principal elements to be weighed, the domestic reaction, the international reaction, and the effect upon your trip to Peking.

Domestic. The right will undoubtedly be outraged at our sponsoring a resolution awarding the SC seat to Peking. That, however, needs to be balanced against their reaction if we handle this whole issue in such a way that Taipei is totally expelled from the U.N. Another consideration is the broader central sentiment in the country, which does not care particularly about the Security Council seat, but which does expect that Taipei's U.N. membership will be preserved.

My own instinct is that the right is going to be critical, whatever we do on this issue, and that the only good defense is that we did what we had to do to save Taipei from expulsion.

International. We are thoroughly on the record with foreign governments as determined to save Taipei's membership, and resigned not to stick over the disposal of the SC seat. If we do not behave in a manner consistent with that position, it will be widely believed that we have acted in bad faith, with the deliberate intent all along of sacrificing Taipei's U.N. membership to the demands of Peking. The delays and indecisiveness inherent in our maneuvers thus far will come to be viewed as a deliberate strategy calculated to result in our own defeat. For this we will get little credit from those who want Taipei expelled, and considerable obloquy from those who share our desire to save Taipei's membership in the U.N.

Taipei's reaction to this move on our part is unknowable. They do not want us to do it. Yet they undoubtedly realize that it is necessary. In a narrow judgment call, I agree with Ambassador McConaughy that Taipei will probably acquiesce in our disposing of the Security Council seat in the dual representation resolution. In any event, I am certain of one thing. If in the end, we do not save Taipei's membership, they will blame it on us.

Relations with Peking. It is difficult to foresee how this issue will affect Peking. On the one hand, Peking is subtle enough to see that intransigence on our part has the effect of strengthening the drive to put Peking in, and Taipei out, of the U.N. On the other, Peking's leadership is not likely to be reassured of our reliability or firmness if we "help" them in such a "duplicitous" way.

In any event, it seems clear that Peking is prepared to disagree with us on the U.N. issue without letting that disagreement interfere with the discussion of other issues. Undoubtedly, Peking is now confident that in time it will get what it wants in the U.N., with or without us. She is not, therefore, likely to attach cardinal importance to what we do now on this issue.

The Need for an Urgent Decision. This is one of those matters in which a delay is tantamount to a negative decision. The General Assembly meets in mid-September. All over the world policy decisions are being taken and delegations are about to depart for New York. We are about out of the time to persuade governments to stand with us. Once they make their decision, it may be possible to turn some around. But others will be irretrievably lost. And according to the estimates above, a switch of three votes will beat us on the Dual Representation and Albanian Resolutions, and a switch of five votes will beat us on the Important Question Resolution.

If you approve Secretary Rogers' recommendation I strongly urge that you generate immediately the widest possible consultation with Congressional and political leaders to explain the situation which has led you to take this step. If the situation is presented squarely in its full bleakness: a choice between (1) accepting Peking in the Security Council but keeping Taipei in the U.N., and (2) the expulsion of Taipei from all U.N. bodies with Peking still getting the Security Council seat, I believe there will be considerable understanding, if not approval, of your decision.

On foreign policy grounds, I concur with Secretary Rogers' recommendation. On domestic grounds, I am less certain, but inclined to believe that we could reduce the unfavorable domestic reaction by an energetic program of consultations. Moreover, if the effort to save Taipei's membership succeeds, I think that to some extent it will serve as its own adequate justification.

*Recommendation:*³

1. That you approve Secretary Rogers' recommendation.

³ Neither the approve nor disapprove options under each recommendation is checked or initialed.

2. That you authorize an immediate and intensive round of consultations with domestic conservative leaders, making maximum use of the Vice President, the Attorney General, and Secretary Connally.

404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, September 8, 1971, 0048Z.

164355. Subj: Chirep. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Please seek early appointment with Foreign Minister Chow to deliver following personal message from me:

2. "Since my announcement on August 2 of our Chinese Representation policy, the United States has made exceptionally intensive efforts around the world to explain and seek support for this new policy. In addition, we have made strenuous and repeated efforts to persuade an appropriate group of influential countries to join with us in co-sponsoring the Important Question and Representation resolutions.

3. I believe your Government is aware, through reports from Ambassador Liu in New York and from other diplomatic missions, of the drive we have mounted in this regard, as well as the fact that we have sought by every means to obtain co-sponsorship for a Representation resolution which was silent on the Security Council seat problem, even though it was understood between us that the resolution might have to be amended soon after tabling to take an explicit stand on this matter.

4. In the month since we launched our initiative, and in particular over the past two weeks, we have found our prospects becoming bleaker with each passing day. Despite our best efforts, we have been totally unable to assemble even a minimally acceptable list of co-sponsors for the Representation resolution. This is due primarily to the absence from that resolution of any reference to the Security Council seat. Well over forty friendly nations have pointed to this omission in their discussions with us, and almost all have expressed the view that the Representation resolution will have no chance for success unless it

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Herz and Feldman; cleared by Pedersen, Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma, Kissinger, and Curran; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to USUN, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Brussels.

recommends that the Security Council seat be held by the People's Republic of China. Indeed, some countries have come to regard our willingness to include such a recommendation as a test of our seriousness in pressing ahead with all available means to make our approach prevail in the General Assembly. Many more have reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to associate themselves with a resolution which in their view has no chance of success.

5. In specific terms, this means that as of this date, we have had firm assurances of co-sponsorship of the Dual Representation Resolution from only two countries, Costa Rica and Guatemala, although we understand Upper Volta has also informed your government it will also co-sponsor. While it is probable that we could add to this brief list a few more countries from Africa and Latin America, these would not be countries with influence in the General Assembly. Even the prospective co-sponsors among our closest allies, such as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Belgium, have stated that they are unable to co-sponsor the Representation resolution in its present form. In the case of Japan, the government is unable at this time to come to any decision on co-sponsorship. I believe your own Government has received similar information from Republic of China diplomatic missions in those countries.

6. As you doubtless know, we have greatly stepped up our efforts over the past two weeks in the awareness that time is pressing and that many have commented on our delay in tabling our resolutions. We have made a special effort with Japan, realizing that its position in this matter could be crucial. We have communicated directly with Prime Minister Sato in an effort to see if Japan would co-sponsor now on a temporary basis a Representation resolution which was silent on the Security Council seat, on the understanding that appropriate revision could be made shortly thereafter. The Japanese Government has so far been unable to give us a definite response, and we have indications that the political situation in Tokyo is such that it may be some time before they will be able to make a decision in this matter, and it is unclear what that decision will be. It is clear, however, that further delay would seriously jeopardize the chances for success of our initiative.

7. The overriding objective of the United States has been to make every possible effort to preserve the Republic of China's representation in the United Nations. It was for this reason that we launched our initiative on August 2. I must inform you that we have been forced to the conclusion that our choice now lies between tabling a Representation resolution which recommends that the People's Republic of China hold the Security Council seat or anticipating the overwhelming passage of the Albanian Resolution. Our latest estimates show that unless we take this step now, the Important Question resolution is likely to lose by a

substantial margin. The Albanian Resolution will be adopted by an even larger margin, and the Representation resolution itself will never even come to a vote.

8. Given this situation, given our commitment to attempt by all means at our disposal to protect your Government's representation in the United Nations—a commitment which I publicly reiterated on September 3²—and because any further delay would be fatal to what we and the Republic of China would hope to accomplish, I am sending urgent personal messages to all potential co-sponsors of influence in the General Assembly informing them that we have determined on the basis of our consultations that a majority of UN members wish to see the People's Republic of China seated in the Security Council and that, accordingly, we are soliciting their co-sponsorship for the Representation resolution amended so that the first operative paragraph will end "... and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

9. I am aware, of course, that this action will present many problems to your Government, just as it does to our own. I trust you will understand that we are forced to take this step by the situation we now face and the prospect of defeat if we fail to act decisively and in timely fashion.

10. As you are aware, there are certain intangibles which will have a bearing on our prospects for success in the General Assembly. One of these is the need to prevent any public acrimony between ourselves and the Republic of China. Only if we give the impression to other countries that we have made a cool-headed appraisal of the situation and are reacting to it realistically and with all the resources at our command—and with at least the tacit acquiescence of the Republic of China—can our efforts be crowned with success. In particular, we will need your continued active cooperation behind the scenes with countries who may be inclined to stand aside because of a mistaken belief that this would be agreeable to the Republic of China.

11. We believe that, given this new basis, we can muster the minimum number of co-sponsors needed and that both our resolutions will now have a fair chance for passage. Our current estimate is that if we and our allies, including the Republic of China, will bend every effort to the common task, and if in the end Japan finds it possible to join in co-sponsoring, the chances for success are good. I must emphasize, however, that to accomplish this result we shall have to mount the most

² Reference is to a news conference on September 3 during which Rogers reiterated the U.S. position on Chinese representation in response to a reporter's question; for text see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 27, 1971, pp. 327–328.

intensive campaign yet seen in the General Assembly. I trust that in this we may count upon the unstinting cooperation of the Republic of China, so that we may be victorious in defeating the Albanian Resolution.”

12. FYI. We have carefully considered whether it is in our mutual interest to give the GRC an opportunity for rejoinder or counter-proposal or a request that we delay seeking co-sponsorship on this basis. In view of your reporting and assessments, as well as indications of ROC attitudes from posts around the world, however, we concluded that it is best to inform them that we are acting and to seek their acquiescence through silence rather than in explicit terms. Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that they be convinced of the reasonableness of what we are doing and of the continuing importance of their own active cooperation in lining up a solid majority in favor of our resolutions.

13. Should it be pointed out, as it probably will be, that our action in making provision for the Security Council seat will create internal problems for the GRC, you should reply that we understand this all the more keenly because the decision will occasion difficulties of an internal nature for us as well. Because of the over-riding importance of preserving UN membership for the ROC, however, we are taking the step with reluctance but with urgency since in our considered opinion the situation simply will not brook any further delay. If you deem it useful, you might also point out that the uncertainty of Japan’s position will seriously complicate our efforts. End FYI.

Rogers

405. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, September 8, 1971, 1031Z.

4498. For Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Chirep: Delivery of Secretary’s Message to ROC FonMin. Ref: State 164355.²

Summary: Ambassador on September 8 delivered Secretary’s message to FonMin Chow Shu-kai, notifying ROC that US has decided it is necessary to amend its draft DR resolution to recommend seating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, Tokyo, USUN, and Wellington.

² Document 404.

PRC in Security Council. FonMin, who was deeply unhappy to learn of this decision, minimized his comment, saying he would be back in touch after consultation with President Chiang and other senior officials. Although we expect prompt sharp rejoinder, we cannot estimate how severe it will be.

1. Very shortly after receipt of reftel I met with FonMin Chow Shukai at 3:00 p.m. today and read him your message, making sure that he understood all the key points and leaving him a copy.

2. Chow asked briefly whether other governments had already been informed, and if we had set date for tabling resolution. I said the other messages seemed to have gone out simultaneously and that even though we did not have a date for tabling, I knew it was a matter of great urgency.

3. Chow refrained from extensive or systematic comment. Instead he reminded me of the very strong views of President Chiang and said he would report immediately to his seniors, specifically mentioning the Vice President and the Vice Premier in addition to the President. Chow did not know how they would react “initially” but left little doubt that it would be very negative and that he, personally, would be in a most uncomfortable position.

4. During our relatively brief conversation the Foreign Minister said he had hoped the US and Japan could desist from taking the lead in introducing the SC seat issue, thus “making our task less painful.” He asked rather rhetorically why the US could not have tabled a simple DR while hinting broadly to others that we would acquiesce in an almost immediate amendment. The direct approach would not only create problems with conservative elements in the ROC but would also reopen suspicions that the US may have struck some bargain with the PRC during Dr. Kissinger’s Peking visit.

5. After noting that I was available at any time the government wished to convey any further views to us, I explained that your message was very clear as to why we felt it mandatory to move without any further delay to save the situation. It was simply too late to contemplate any other successful approach; we had to move now on the SC issue in order to attract the maximum possible number of significant co-sponsors and achieve the requisite majority in the Assembly. If we failed to do so, some key governments, which were in the process of making up their minds during this stage of the pre-GA deliberations, would refrain from co-sponsoring and might commit themselves to support the Albanian Resolution.

6. I also emphatically countered Chow’s comments about a possible US–PRC “bargain” on the SC seat. I said we had made it clear—and had done so publicly—that there had been no substantive agreement reached in Peking. Moreover, I thought it should be fully apparent

that we had not pulled any punches in our massive campaign to protect continuing representation for the ROC in the UN. The decision to include a reference to the SC seat was a most uncomfortable one for us and one that had been forced on us by the hard facts of the parliamentary situation we faced in New York and capitals around the world. Finally, as authorized, I explained that we too were faced with internal difficulties and were taking this step only because we did not think the situation would brook any further delay. I pointed out the difficulties caused by Japan's indecision, but I did not mention Fukuda's comments to Marshall Green.

7. *Comment:* I think it is virtually certain that we will receive a strong reaction either through the Foreign Minister or possibly at a higher level, with some criticism of both the substance and the manner of the move we have been forced to take.³

McConaughy

³ Further details of the meeting are in telegrams 4552 and 4553 from Taipei, both September 10. (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Taipei's Position on UN Resolution Giving Security Council Seat to Peking

Although we expect pro forma, public opposition from the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), we now believe that Taipei will not oppose our resolution on Chinese representation behind-the-scenes. Indeed, if the vote is close, we feel that Taipei may well support our initiatives in its private representations to other governments.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. A covering note dated September 14 indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Marshall Wright with the concurrence of Holdridge. Kissinger forwarded Rogers' memorandum to the President under cover of a brief memorandum. (Ibid.)

² See Documents 404 and 405.

The GRC's response to my personal message to Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, informing him that we had decided to modify our draft resolution to specify that the Security Council seat go to Peking, was about as favorable as we had hoped. On September 10, Foreign Minister Chow handed our Ambassador a formal written response which called the decision "particularly regrettable" and reiterated the traditional position of the GRC: to admit the Chinese Communists to the UN would violate the Charter. The moment such a resolution was tabled, his government would have to issue a public statement objecting to it in the strongest terms. The GRC would continue to object, moreover, as required by the occasion.³

In addition to his somewhat "hard line" written response, however, Foreign Minister Chow made several statements to our Ambassador that show that Taipei's position remains in fact both flexible and pragmatic. He indicated that the GRC did want our dual representation resolution to succeed. He implied that GRC public statements would be most carefully drafted and that, if the margin of support for the resolution should appear dangerously narrow, Taipei might adopt a more positive role in working for it off stage.

Over the last few months, Taipei has come a very long way toward developing a more pragmatic foreign policy—much farther than many would have predicted. We must be careful not to overreact when the GRC feels it must publicly reassert its basic and long held principles. To do so would be to risk inhibiting future GRC flexibility.

It will be most important for us in the weeks ahead to make it as easy as possible for the GRC to work with us behind the scenes for the passage of our dual representation resolution. Any public announcements that we make on this subject should be viewed in terms of the difficulties they might create for Taipei. To the extent possible, we should coordinate the exact wording of our statements with the GRC—or at least give Taipei adequate advance notification.

William P. Rogers

³ Chow's written reaction was transmitted in telegram 4552 from Taipei, September 10; see footnote 3, Document 405.

407. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, September 16, 1971.

171047. 1. ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai called on the Secretary Sept 16 accompanied by ROC Perm Rep Liu, Amb Shen and other officials.² Conversation turned largely on need for ROC support in certain capitals and how it could be provided. Secretary put it plainly to Chow that with active (if behind-the-scenes) ROC support we can win, but without it we will lose.

2. Upshot of conversation was that ROC will lend support for both resolutions both in New York and in capitals although for reasons of internal politics this will be done in a very Chinese manner. Chow showed great concern that "instructions would be on the historic record, we can't put it black on white."

3. What ROC is saying so far is that "every country must make decision on the basis of its own national policy and ROC will understand if decision is taken in light of that country's own appreciation of interests of ROC and relations with US." We remonstrated that this is too sybilline and Chow said he understands the problem and will personally work actively in New York. He specifically acknowledged importance of obtaining co-sponsorships for our resolutions as well as voting support.

4. From foregoing it appears that for time being instructions to ROC Ambassadors will not yet be to urge host governments in so many words to support our (amended) DR resolution. However, they should allow ROC Ambassadors to answer affirmatively if host government asks if ROC agrees with US assessment that their support is necessary to prevent expulsion of the ROC; and if question is put to them whether ROC has any objection to host country support or co-sponsorship of the resolutions, ROC Ambassador should be able to reply in negative.

5. While this is not yet good enough, we also have assurance from Foreign Minister Chow in New York, where he will be from now on,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Herz, cleared by Moser and Pedersen, and approved by Herz. Sent to 34 posts in Central America, South America, and Africa, as well as to Taipei, Tokyo, and USUN.

² The meeting lasted from 11:35 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. and included Rogers, Pedersen, De Palma, Brown, Herz, and Moser. (Ibid., Private Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) A 12-page memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Exdis, 1971. Rogers reported the results of this meeting to Nixon in his evening report for September 16. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 36, President's Daily Briefing)

that he will be available personally to ambassadors of friendly countries who wish to take counsel with him. Accordingly, if host country remains in any doubt about ROC position after checking with ROC Ambassadors, it should be encouraged to make approach directly to ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai through UN delegation.

6. In the same conversation we also discussed the importance of not only defeating the Albanian resolution but also passing the Dual Representation resolution if, as may happen, the AR is put to a vote first and fails to get the necessary two-thirds majority. In such case some friends of ROC could lose enthusiasm for the DR resolution in the mistaken belief that danger of ROC had already been averted.

7. We went over this with Chow in some detail and found he completely understands that defeat of both AR and DR under such circumstances would be very bad indeed for the ROC; for if the DR fails there is bound to be a new move to unseat the ROC, possibly through credentials challenge, and there is little doubt there would then be large majority for such action. We thus have complete meeting of minds with ROC on importance that friends of the ROC understand that not only is passage of the IQ and defeat of the AR necessary to safeguard the ROC seat in the UN, but also passage of the Dual Representation resolution as well.

8. We realize that not all host governments are hesitant to vote for our resolutions out of misplaced concern for friendship with the ROC; some are ideologically opposed to any resolution that will bring the PRC into the UN, even if failure to vote results in expulsion of the ROC. However, we believe ROC Ambassadors can be useful in all of addressees.

9. You are specifically authorized to tell host government that we have had recent high-level review of UN voting situation with the ROC and they are in complete agreement with us that support for our two resolutions is necessary to prevent their expulsion from the UN. At this point in the process, their view is most likely to be expressed in terms of “understanding” if host govt decides to support or co-sponsor DR resolution with Security Council included.

10. If local ROC rep waffles on this or if host govt does not get the purport of what he is saying, you should encourage host government to seek confirmation through its UN Mission directly from ROC Foreign Minister Chow who has just arrived in New York and is making himself available for such questioning.

Irwin

408. Editorial Note

During a press conference on September 16, 1971, President Nixon received a question about a statement by Dr. Walter Judd, Chairman of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Judd had asserted that the expulsion of the Republic of China would not be legal under the UN Charter without a vote by the Security Council. The President replied that there were "different legal opinions" about the expulsion procedure.

"We, however, have reached the conclusion that the position we presently take, which has been stated by the Secretary of State and by Ambassador Bush, is the legally sustainable one.

"To put, also, our policy in clear perspective, we favor the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations and that will mean, of course, obtaining a Security Council seat.

"We will vote against the expulsion of the Republic of China, and we will work as effectively as we can to accomplish that goal." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971*, pages 950–951)

409. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 17, 1971, 0345Z.

2712. Chirep: Cosponsors Meeting, Sept 16.

1. Summary. Reps of thirty-five Missions attended Chirep cosponsors' meeting at USUN Sept 16. Bush reviewed Chirep activities since cosponsors' meeting Aug 17, explaining US decision to accept others' recommendation that dual representation resolution must be revised

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Abidjan, Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Bangkok, Bangui, Bathurst, Bogota, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Canberra, Cotonou, Dakar, Dublin, Fort Lamy, The Hague, Gabarone, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Kampala, Kigali, Libreville, Lima, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Mbabane, Mexico City, Monrovia, Montevideo, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rome, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Suva, Tegucigalpa, Tokyo, Tunis, and Wellington.

to enable resolutions to succeed. Distributed revised text of DR.² Described ROC flexible reaction prior to DR revision and said we continuing to consult closely. Solicited statements of cosponsorship for IQ and DR. At same time, Bush made clear that we understood number of other governments needed more time to consider, that therefore we would consider that list not closed and that we fully anticipated additions to cosponsors' list prior to tabling early next week. Following said they would cosponsor IQ: Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Philippines and Swaziland. Following said they would cosponsor DR: Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Philippines and Swaziland. Colombia commitment conditional. Phils spoke especially strongly on behalf of reses. Australia and New Zealand, in similar statements, said they prepared in principle to cosponsor pending identification of others on list. Following asked questions or made other comments without discussing their willingness cosponsor: Belgium, Netherlands, Fiji, Thailand and Ghana. Japanese did not speak. Philippines reiterated request for revision of third operative paragraph of DR. We accepted revision. End Summary.

2. Following Missions represented at Chirep cosponsors meeting at USUN Sept 16: AR: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay; EUR: Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain; NEA: Turkey; EA: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand; AF: Botswana, Car, Chad, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Swaziland, Uganda, Fiji. Phillips, Bennett, Schaufele, PolCouns and MisOffs also present.

3. Bush opened meeting by reviewing events since last meeting Aug 17. He cited continuous consultations in New York and capitals, strong recommendations that representation resolution must be explicit regarding Security Council seat, our agreement to revision as only way to ensure maximum support for reses and preservation of ROC seat. Bush also reviewed ROC flexibility since Secretary's Aug 2 statement. Noted that ROC viewed situation realistically and understands, from closest consultations with US and others, why revision necessary. Mentioned ROC restraint since notified last week that we obliged to revise text.

4. Bush said we have delayed tabling resolutions to permit other govts ample time to consider them. Recognized need to table and an-

² Telegram 166117, September 10, which invited governments to this meeting, transmitted a message from the Secretary that informed the governments of a revision to the draft Dual Representation Resolution that recommended that the People's Republic of China be seated as one of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. The Secretary invited governments to join with the United States in co-sponsoring the revised resolution. (Ibid.)

anticipated doing so "by early next week". Said we already privately had word from number of govts that they would cosponsor both resolutions. Said we hoped reps would record at meeting their govts' willingness to cosponsor. Invited specific commitments or any other explanations of govts present positions. Said we aware some govts need more time to consider and we would expect, in addition to those speaking at meeting, that others would join us over next few days.

5. Bush distributed new text of representation resolution with first operative paragraph revised to read "hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

6. PolCouns (Newlin) provided summary of our attitude toward tactical questions. Anticipated that AR and US items would be merged under neutral heading; priority for IQ; question of priority for DR would be handled in light of existing situation. Would work to pass IQ, defeat AR and pass DR.

7. Anand (Thailand) asked about AR cosponsors tactical plans. Reply included statement that we had heard nothing about intentions in Credentials Committee and that we would seek to insure best composition with neutral chairman. Belgium, Netherlands and Fiji also asked questions about tactics. Ghana and Liberian reps asked about support from govts not represented at meeting.

8. Australia (McIntyre) first to respond to Bush's invitation to speak on cosponsorship, said GOA had taken no final or formal position on cosponsorship. Wants to cosponsor both, especially since the DR includes SC seat. GOA explaining position to many govts, soliciting their support and cosponsorship. GOA not inhibited in this direction. McIntyre said he believed IQ definitely winnable. Later in mtg, in response to Thai request for clarification of GOA position (as well as positions of New Zealand and Philippines), McIntyre repeated foregoing, adding that GOA only waiting to see what the final list of cosponsors looks like; meanwhile doing its best to encourage others to support. (Merrillees later verified to MisOff that he had made round of calls to other missions.)

9. New Zealand (Scott) in somewhat more positive statement than McIntyre, said New Zealand waiting to see number of other cosponsors, then New Zealand will be able to cosponsor. Revision enhances chances of successes. In later response to Anand's question, Scott rephrased to say that New Zealand prepared to cosponsor but final position will be taken in light of responses of other govts.

10. Philippines (Reyes), who made strongest supporting statement of meeting, said that change in DR was not easy decision for US to take. Phils had been among first to remark on weakness of original draft's ambiguity on SC seat. Basis of whole USG approach had been

to face up to reality. Phils aware of extreme difficulty Dual Rep policy faced in GA because of lack of precedents giving two seats to one state. Phil Govt feels should maintain seat of ROC and bring in PRC. Reyes said he authorized to state GOP would cosponsor both resolutions. (In his later response to Anand, Reyes added only that after USG accepted GOP recommendation it logical and fair that Phils cosponsor.)

11. Reyes then added that GOP believed DR operative para three may not cover all UN bodies. He suggested we insert ref to “all UN bodies”. Bush agreed to change op para three to read “recommends that all UN bodies and the specialized agencies take into account, etc”.

12. Colombia (Espinosa) said GOC supported admission of PRC while preserving ROC position. Two draft resolutions are carefully composed and well balanced statements for these purposes and GOC is prepared cosponsor. It can wholeheartedly support revised DR because it now clarifies SC seat question. GOC appreciates USG agreeing to revision. Associating self with GOA and New Zealand statements, said GOC would favor inscription of drafts with sufficient cosponsors to indicate strength. Asked that his delegation be kept currently informed of progress of draft reses. (In later conversation with MisOff, Espinosa said he surprised by failure Australia to make commitment to cosponsor in view of earlier private statement by McIntyre to effect GOA cosponsoring both reses. Espinosa added Australian and New Zealand cosponsorship would seem essential to any credible cosponsors list. Colombia would be happy to be included in such list.)

13. Chad (Ouangmotching) said in view of modification of DR, Chad would cosponsor that res. Position on IQ would be decided later. (Chad Del not informed of Fort Lamy 1681³ prior to meeting.)

14. Bush informed meeting that Honduras had authorized USUN to announce its cosponsorship of both reses.

15. Costa Rica (Molina) said Govt of Costa Rica would cosponsor both because wanted to preserve ROC seat while seating PRC in both GA and SC.

16. Haiti (Coradin) said he had received instructions just prior to meeting enabling him to state that GOH would support both reses provided they do not affect the interests of ROC and ROC’s continued participation in UN. Accordingly, Haiti would cosponsor both reses.

17. Swaziland (Dlamini) said position of his govt was that he is free to cosponsor both resolutions.

18. Bush said that he would not tell waiting press names of participants in meeting or identify cosponsors but would attempt make clear that we see significant forward movement in meeting. Reyes ex-

³ Not printed.

pressed appreciation for Bush's desire not to embarrass participants by giving press name lists. He added hope that delegations interested in fate of DR would come to decision ASAP. Failure to decide complicates public relations aspects of Chirep effort. Very fact that we unable to finalize and table reses or to indicate a definite date for tabling gives negative impression. At this stage, Reyes said, other side has psychological advantage because AR cosponsors known and resolution already tabled. Reyes said he appreciated difficulties with which other delts confronted but reiterated urgency of issue.⁴

Bush

⁴ Further reports on the September 16 meeting were sent to certain Latin American posts in telegram 172102 and to certain African posts in telegram 172118. (Both September 17; *ibid.*) The Department also urged the Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to make special efforts to persuade those countries to support the IQ and DR resolutions. (Telegram 172103 to Canberra and Wellington, September 17, and telegram 172259 to Tokyo, September 18; both National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

410. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 21, 1971, 0100Z.

2773. Subj: Chirep: UK Position.

1. Bush at SC luncheon Sept 20 again made strong pitch UK support US initiative on Chirep to maximum possible extent. Although we recognized UK had not supported us on substance in the past, it had been helpful on procedure. We very much needed UK support for such procedural aspects as inscription of US item, grouping it with AR under neutral formulation, priority for IQ. Colin Crowe said he still had no instructions on Chirep.

2. Just after lunch Crowe called to say UK position was as fols:

(A) UK would vote against IQ and DR.

(B) UK would have to vote for priority for AR (UKUN interprets this as voting against priority for IQ).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Taipei.

(C) UK would have to oppose inscription of US item if it came to the vote. (Crowe gave as his personal estimate that AR co-sponsors might not oppose inscription of US item.)

3. Bush said he “was ashen with dismay.” He said he would report foregoing to Dept immediately and he knew reaction would be one of surprise in view of UK undertaking that it would do nothing to make US task more difficult.

4. In subsequent telcon, Weir (UK) asked when in General Comite we would make motion to have items grouped under neutral title. We said we had not decided whether to do this at outset of consideration of Albanian item or to wait until Albanian item and US item inscribed and then propose grouping. Weir said his instructions did not yet cover this point.²

Bush

² Later in the day, the Department telegraphed Ambassador Annenberg and urged him to meet with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home at the earliest opportunity to seek to persuade him to vote for inscription of the U.S. item during the General Committee meeting. (Telegram 173141 to London, September 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) Douglas-Home agreed to review the British position and decided that, if the General Committee discussion was purely procedural, Ambassador Crowe could vote for inscription. Should the discussion turn substantive (dual representation), Crowe should vote against inscription. (Telegrams 8746, September 21, and 8777 from London, September 22; both *ibid.*) Annenberg’s analysis of Douglas-Home’s reasoning is in telegram 8792 from London, September 22. (*Ibid.*)

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, September 22, 1971, 1040Z.

9356. Subj: Chirep: PriMin Sato Announces Decision to Cosponsor.

Summary: At dramatic press conference arranged only minutes beforehand, PriMin Sato announced that GOJ would cosponsor reverse IQ and complex dual rep resolutions.² End Summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Canberra, Wellington, and USUN.

² Other posts were informed of Prime Minister Sato’s announcement in circular telegram 174849, September 22. (*Ibid.*)

1. In response to questions at impromptu news conference covered on national television at 11:30 a.m. Sept 22 PriMin explained his decision on cosponsorship as follows:

2. More and more countries are recognizing “People’s Republic of China”, and it can be foreseen that even more will do so in future. At present, 60 UN members recognize PRC and 57 UN members recognize GRC. Thus situation has changed completely, and we must have policy suited to changed realities. Therefore at this juncture we wish to invite PRC to UN and provide it seat as permanent member of Security Council. Simultaneously, based on our support of UN Charter, we believe expulsion of GRC is important matter which should require two-thirds majority. As opinions within party and government have been divided and as Japan, in contrast to US, is Asian neighbor of China, it has been necessary to act with great care and I have had difficulty reaching decision. I believe our policy must (1) suit Japan’s national interest, (2) be consistent with our one China policy—there is not one mainland China and one Taiwan but only one China—(3) avoid aggravating international tensions and (4) be in step with changing realities. It seems that appropriate policy is to support and to cosponsor complex DR and reverse IQ resolutions. In accordance with premise that China is one, this policy is transitional measure. As it recognizes present realities and does not attempt to change them, it will not aggravate international tension.

3. Question has been discussed freely within party and government; all have had opportunity to express their views. Majority opinion seems to be that Peking should be welcomed into UN, offered permanent seat on Security Council and that GRC’s position in UN should be preserved. Once that major decision made, I hope it will be understood that issue of cosponsorship is secondary, tactical question. Cosponsorship is consistent with our policy of support for these resolutions.

4. Today’s announcement is not just step forward, but actually great leap forward in our China policy. While recognizing existence of PRC, we have until now avoided referring to it directly and have sought to deal with it through a policy of separating economics and politics. That is now completely changed. This is positive step, and despite opposition, I as PriMin and party leader have made decision. However, it should not be thought that this will solve our bilateral problems, or that it is equivalent to recognizing or establishing relations with PRC. Some even more positive act will be required for that. We must work to build friendly relations with China, reflect upon our past history, recognize that deep misunderstandings exist and strive to build mutual understanding.

5. Should this approach at UN fail, question of political responsibility is complex one because outcome is determined by majority will in international forum. Thus it is not just the responsibility of a single Prime Minister or a particular Cabinet.

6. In front page commentary, all evening newspapers stressed fact that PriMin's decision on cosponsorship was made despite strong opposition even within LDP and Cabinet. *Asahi*, *Sankei* and *Tokyo Shim-bun* stressed that there is strong possibility that Sato Cabinet would be forced to resign if resolutions should fail at UN, particularly since vote in UN will take place during Diet session.

6. [sic] *Comment*. In deciding to cosponsor both resolutions, despite strong opposition within the LDP, Sato has made courageous decision calculated to demonstrate that he is strong leader who has grasped helm of his party and government. Sato acted in dramatic fashion by calling impromptu nationally-televised press conference solely for purpose of announcing major policy decision. Although he appeared somewhat fatigued, his manner was confident and resolute throughout.

7. Form and content of announcement designed to appeal directly through television to wider public audience in order win understanding for and defuse criticism of his decision. As the substance of the decision pleased pro-Taiwan elements, logic of his argument was shaped to appeal to opponents of resolution and cosponsorship. He portrayed decision as a major positive change in GOJ's approach to China, and as consistent with international trend towards bringing China into UN. He repeatedly used formal title "People's Republic of China" and emphasized that decision was fully consistent with GOJ's "longstanding" one China policy. He admitted Japan must self-reflect about its pre-war relations with China. For other listeners, he reiterated standard phrases about Japan's national interests and relaxation of international tensions. He avoided references to maintenance of international faith toward Taiwan and reality of two regimes in China—comments which would have given opponents handle for criticizing his logic.

8. Nowhere in statement did Sato refer to fact that US had pressed Japan to cosponsor or imply that this controversial decision was anything other than his own response to international imperatives and Japan's own national interest.

9. Deputy Political Editor of *Mainichi* told EmbOff immediately following announcement that consensus among news corps was that Sato by acting decisively and out of obvious personal conviction had applied a temporary brake to his declining power within LDP and to his crumbling prestige elsewhere in Japanese establishment. LDP US Problems Research Committee Chairman Naokichi Kitazawa echoed this appraisal shortly before his departure on mission to US, commenting that while there was still strong disagreement within LDP, Sato had gained full measure of respect for his decision.

10. There are rumors that Sato has come to tacit agreement with LDP factional leaders who oppose his Chirep policy to effect that he will step down if UN strategy fails. However, until then, as quid pro

quo, hounds will diminish their baying. This scenario given some credibility by statement by Masayoshi Ohira, one of leading candidates for Sato's job, that he "not surprised" by PriMin's decision and that he would "make no fuss" over issue of political responsibility.

Sneider

412. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 28, 1971, 2138Z.

2936. Subj: Chirep: Tactical Situation. Ref: State 175888.²

1. Now that GA plenary has voted to inscribe our Chirep item,³ our efforts here will be targeted, as indicated reftel, on support for four questions:

- A. Priority for Important Question resolution
- B. Adoption of IQ
- C. Defeat of Albanian Resolution
- D. Adoption of Dual Representation resolution.

2. Most governments have indicated positions on one or more of these questions, in some cases at highest level. However, in view of PRC's continuing skillful application of pressures and of intense Chirep activity in New York, we anticipate that alignment on all four issues will remain fluid until end. We thus cannot absolutely rely on constancy of some who have given us categorical assurances of support; nor should we take for granted opposition on all four issues by some, given application of pressures from ourselves and other co-sponsors, with which we are still at least able to discuss Chirep.

3. For purposes of handling problem here, we have broken down target list into categories below. We are using these categories as a basis for coordinated efforts by missions of Japan, New Zealand, Australia and USUN, supplemented by the ROC Mission.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² Telegram 175888, September 24, gave an estimate of the votes on the IQ and DR resolutions in the General Committee. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 2814 from USUN, September 23, informed the Department that the General Committee voted to inscribe the item on September 22 by a vote of 11-9-4. (Ibid.)

A. Co-sponsors of either resolution plus those whose full support seems certain (although listing in this category does not mean that we should take them altogether for granted): Australia, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, United States, Uruguay, plus Brazil, Ivory Coast, Khmer Republic, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Senegal, Upper Volta.

B. Conservatives whose support for all issues but Dual Representation seems assured (ROC démarches still required): Congo (K), Malagasy, Panama, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia. In addition, IQ co-sponsors El Salvador and Guatemala need shoring up on DR.

C. Support on all four questions seems unlikely although in some cases (see para 3-D below) we should continue to press for such support; in any event, we should continue seeking support for priority for IQ: Austria, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, UK.

D. Countries which may be leaning either way but which we should continue (in concert with allies) to press for support on all four questions: Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Car, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela.

Bush

413. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts¹

Washington, October 1, 1971, 0055Z.

180508. Subj: Chirep: Status Report and Action Program. For Chief of Mission or Principal Officer.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman and Herz; cleared by Fessenden, Moore, Davies, Brown, and Crimmins; and approved by Herz. Also sent to the POLADs for CINCPAC, CINCSO, CINCSTRIKE, CINCEUR, CINCLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, HICOMRY, USNMR SHAPE, COMAC, and HICOMTERPACUS.

1. This message is to bring you up to date on Chirep situation and to help in focussing our further efforts. We wish to stress the very high priority given our Chirep initiative at highest levels of USG as well as our desire that Chief of Mission give this matter their continuing personal attention, even where host govt decision seems firm. The votes may be close, and continuing efforts will be required world-wide to win the battle.

2. Message is in three parts: Part I is brief description of current status of our initiative and what we see as likely scenario over the next few weeks; Part II provides breakdown of how we believe countries are lining up and what actions are required; Part III recapitulates in brief the principal talking points given in previous circulars on Chirep.

3. Part I—Current Situation and Scenario

A. Both the Albanian and US items are now included on UNGA agenda. Our resolutions (IQ and DR) are tabled under both our own and the Albanian agenda items. Texts were transmitted to posts by State 175244.² The Albanian agenda item will come up for discussion first, but the debate will be wide-ranging and will cover all three resolutions.

B. We expect the Chirep debate to begin shortly after conclusion of the current General Debate period, probably on October 18 or 19. We expect debate to be fairly lengthy, expect the Albanian side will probably attempt a number of parliamentary maneuvers, and believe actual voting will take place in late October or early November.

C. Aside from whatever procedural maneuvering our opponents may attempt, there will be four major votes: (1) a motion for “priority”, which we will make, to have the Important Question resolution voted on before the Albanian Resolution is voted on; (2) the vote on the IQ itself; (3) the vote on the Albanian Resolution; (4) the vote on our DR resolution. If we lose on the first vote (priority for the IQ) we will probably lose on everything thereafter. If we lose on the IQ itself, the AR would pass by a simple majority.

4. Part II—The Line-up

A. Following information on positions being taken by countries is believed current as of the date of transmission, and is analyzed under three headings: how we believe countries are lining up on the matter of having the Important Question resolution voted on ahead of the Albanian Resolution (shorthand term: priority for IQ); how they stand on the IQ itself; how they stand on DR.

B. *Action to be taken by all posts:*

(1) If posts believe their country is incorrectly listed below, this should be reported to Dept with info to USUN, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington and Canberra.

² Not printed.

(2) In the “Believed Favorable” and “Decided For” categories we list countries that have told us they will vote with us and those countries we believe will almost certainly vote with us even though they have not yet said so. Experience shows that shifts and slippages can still occur in this category, even where govt has assured us of favorable votes. We are not encouraging you to reopen the dialogue (although an occasional expression of gratification that they and we are together on this issue may be helpful). Nevertheless, posts should be alive to note any changes in attitude and take whatever action seems appropriate to reinforce host government’s original resolve. In any case, should you notice any slackening or nervousness or tendency to back away from previous expressions of support, this should be immediately reported. Since votes may be close, we need to keep tabs meticulously on the likely voting behavior of all UN members.

(3) Where countries are indicated as “Believed Unfavorable” or “Decided Against”, and where this is not patently unreasonable, posts should work by all available means to persuade host govt to abstain rather than vote against our resolutions, and abstain rather than vote for the Albanian Resolution.

(4) Where countries are indicated as leaning in favor, leaning against or uncommitted, posts must make every effort to obtain vote in favor of having the IQ voted on before the Albanian Resolution; vote in favor of the IQ itself; vote against the Albanian Resolution, and vote in favor of DR. This also applies to countries in the “abstain” category.

(5) Dept welcomes post suggestions as to best tactics in dealing with individual countries, including recommendations for a personal message from the Secretary.

[Omitted here are Sections C and D with lists of countries and their probable votes on the IQ and DR resolutions.]

5. Part III—The Arguments Recapitulated

A. Principal arguments in favor of our resolutions:

a. Dual representation is the only fair solution to the Chirep problem. The AR would deprive 14 million people of representation in the UN.

b. It is reasonable and realistic: Both the PRC and ROC exist. The UN should take cognizance of realities. This does not imply approval or endorsement of any legal position.

c. There is no need for the UN to rule on PRC and ROC claims and counter-claims, nor need UN action affect the position which any member takes in its bilateral relations with either entity. In terms of assisting movement toward a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, the best contribution the UN can make is to serve as a mechanism which Taiwan and the Mainland can use to settle their problems peace-

fully. The extreme act of depriving the Republic of China of representation and driving it outside the UN would do the opposite.

d. If the ROC should be deprived of representation, this would be a dangerous precedent. Moreover, it would be something that the UN would probably be unable to undo (because once PRC is in Security Council, it would veto application of ROC as new member).

e. For neutrals: The Albanian Resolution is fundamentally unneutral because it would settle issue brutally in favor of the stronger side. Our resolution does not propose to adjudicate in favor of the weaker; it would simply recognize existing situation and leave question to be worked out in future.

f. For supporters of universality: Passage of the Albanian Resolution would be a retrograde step from point of view of those who espouse ideal of universal UN membership.

g. We are making a determined effort to win. We are very serious in our resolve. This is a matter of importance to the United States.

6. Principal Counter-arguments to Objections

a. "There can be only one China, and DR implies two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan)". Not so. DR not only makes no statement about two Chinas, leaving question entirely open, it explicitly states that the solution proposed is without prejudice to a settlement of the conflicting claims of parties involved. Japan, for instance, in announcing co-sponsorship for our resolutions, made ringing affirmation of its position that China is one and must not be divided.

b. "ROC should remain, but under name of Formosa". It is conceivable that some day status of ROC may change, but we believe UN should be careful not to take a position on this. If it did, friends of PRC and ROC (both of whom are for "one China") would combine to defeat any such resolution. In addition, a resolution which described the ROC as "The government of Formosa" would be more distasteful to Peking than our present resolution.

c. "You are creating a new member, and new members must be admitted under Article 4 procedure." Not so, our DR resolution decides how China should be represented, it does not involve new membership. Admittedly, dual representation is unusual, but it is not unprecedented. USSR has triple representation.

d. "PRC will never come in under DR." How can anyone be so sure? It would be surprising if PRC did not proclaim at present that it will have nothing to do with UN if DR passes since to do otherwise would lose votes for the AR; but after DR resolution passes the PRC will be confronted with a new situation. PRC has shown that it can be flexible when that suits its interests. (In countries where this might be helpful, you could call attention to speculative stories from Hong Kong that Chou En-lai might come to UN "to take seat and wage fight from inside UN for

expulsion of the ROC." It is also possible that PRC might take the Security Council seat only for time being. There are many other possibilities.)

e. "We are afraid that if we vote against them, that will make the PRC angry." We wonder why friendly countries who are prepared to worry over the state of their relations with the PRC should not be at least as concerned about their relations with us.

7. Embassies should not hesitate to ask for instructions if anything in our position is not clear to them or if they hear arguments that are difficult to answer.

Irwin

414. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1971, 0200Z.

3059. Subj: Chirep—Co-Sponsors' Meeting October 1, 1971.

1. Summary: Chirep co-sponsors met briefly at USUN October 1. All co-sponsors represented except Colombia, Dominican Republic, The Gambia, Guatemala, Lesotho and Liberia. Bush provided Chirep status report; explained how both IQ and DR submitted September 29;² encouraged continued energetic proselytizing for our resolutions; stressing confidence that hard work would bring success; reviewed tactical prospects (including Zambian plan to apply two-thirds requirement to our DR); urged close liaison among co-sponsors: and solicited others' recommendations. Australia (McIntyre), New Zealand (Scott), Thailand (Anand) and Japan (Ogiso) all commented. End Summary.

2. Bush chaired forty-five-minute co-sponsors' meeting at USUN October 1. Following representatives attended: Australia, Chad, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Fiji, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand and Uruguay. Phillips, Bennett, Schaufele and MisOffs also present.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Bathurst, Bogota, Canberra, Fort Lamy, Guatemala, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Monrovia, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, and Suva.

² The Important Question draft resolution was submitted as UN doc. A/L.632 & add. 1.2. The Dual Representation draft resolution was submitted as UN doc. A/L.633 & add. 1.2. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, pp. 127–128, 136)

3. Bush opened by saying we assess Chirep effort to be in reasonably good shape. He recalled last week's 65-47 margin for inscription, recognizing that not all inscription supporters will support us in Chirep vote. Result of co-sponsors' work in New York and capitals beginning to show. Voting appears close now, but we convinced have excellent chance of winning. Zambia general debate proposal to apply two-thirds requirement to our DR implies AR co-sponsors concerned that our IQ will pass. Important we not slacken efforts. Secretary giving priority to Chirep in extensive New York bilaterals.

4. Bush described September 29 tabling of IQ and DR reses under Albanian item 93 and our item 96. Said we expected simultaneous discussion in plenary. Regarding Zambia general debate proposal, suggested we take line it absurd to apply two-thirds majority for continued representation of UN member; we have not sought apply two-thirds provisions to seating PRC and we puzzled by Albanian co-sponsors' wish to do so. Bush endorsed earlier Australian suggestion that in UN corridors we refer to IQ as "non-expulsion resolution" to strengthen psychological position. Bush concluded by specifying need to seek votes for (A) priority for IQ, (B) adoption of IQ, (C) defeat of AR and (D) adoption of DR.

5. McIntyre concurred in Bush's remarks, particularly that policy is "winnable." He noted that we should be prepared face various tactical problems. Scott suggested we be clear in lobbying whether we discussing priority for IQ and/or DR. Bush confirmed we not now planning seek priority for DR. Regarding timing of vote poll counts, Newlin said AR co-sponsors still want Chirep debate to begin as soon as possible after general debate which closes Oct 13. Tuesday, Oct 14, earliest possible beginning date. In subsequent discussion, including remarks by Ogiso and Anand, group seemed to agree that US preference for Oct 19 beginning is acceptable. Bush noted that (despite erroneous *New York Times* report that 100 speakers inscribed for Chirep debate) Legal Counsel Stavropulos had said there would be twelve sittings on Chirep, but we have no hard information on length of debate. Nevertheless, we preparing texts of our Chirep statements and others might also wish begin do so.

6. Scott suggested consider advisability of using universality argument to support Chirep resolutions; suggested we begin to prepare speakers' lists; urged co-sponsors avoid discussion with others of vote counts, advocating we stick to line simply that we will know vote count after vote is taken; pointed out that general debate statements of Soviets, Czechs and others said minimum about Chirep, indicating worry about internal PRC developments and desire to avoid unnecessary commitment.

7. Meeting closed with tentative agreement to reconvene October 8, at 9:30 A.M.

Bush

415. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 6, 1971, 0243Z.

3198. Subj: Chirep—Plenary Debate To Begin 18 Oct.

1. UN Legal Counsel Stavropoulos told us this afternoon that Albanian group has decided it wishes plenary to begin debate on Albanian Chirep item 18 Oct. (*Comment:* This is a good development; we had been concerned that Albanian cosponsors would try to insist on beginning A.M. 14 Oct following conclusion of general debate on 13 Oct.) Stavropoulos said USSR agrees. Stavropoulos will thus advise President Malik to announce for 18 Oct.

2. On length of debate, Stavropoulos reiterated difficulty of predicting how many sittings should be required but will repeat his earlier advice to Malik that 12 sittings should suffice. Assuming a tightest possible schedule of two sittings per day, Stavropoulos thus foresees earliest possible dates for voting on Chirep reses as 25 or 26 Oct.

3. Stavropoulos said that Soviets stated they have no objection to plenary taking up US Chirep item immediately following Albanian item. Albanian group had made no comment on US item. Stavropoulos thought Malik might not wish to propose that “plenary take up your item after the Albanian item.” He said that if Malik did not make a proposal of this character, “someone might do so from the floor”. (*Comment:* We purposely refrained from responding to this last point.)

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, October 8, 1971, 1357Z.

185067. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 180508.²

1. Request you raise Chirep issue in way you consider most appropriate with Permreps (i.e. individually or at Permreps' lunch), and emphasize overriding importance US ascribes to favorable vote on US resolutions in UNGA. In these discussions, you should draw as appropriate on arguments outlined in reftel. As reftel indicates there will be four key votes at end of Chirep debate: (a) priority for the IQ; (b) the IQ itself; (c) the Albanian Resolution; and (d) our Dual Representation resolution.

2. FYI—We are reasonably certain of support on all four votes only from Belgium and from Luxembourg. In addition, we are hopeful Greece and possibly Turkey will eventually decide to vote with us on priority, on IQ and on DR. Several members, notably Norway, Denmark, UK, France and Canada, believe themselves committed to support the Albanian Resolution and oppose IQ. In their case we are working mainly on obtaining support for priority for IQ although there is small chance that pressure in some cases will induce abstentions on IQ as well. Portugal may be persuaded to support the IQ, particularly if it is thinking of voting in favor of Albanian Resolution this year as we suspect (in their special case we might accept this as a trade-off). Dutch position still uncertain but we believe that they are leaning toward abstention. We should work on Dutch for affirmative vote on priority and on the IQ itself. We are hoping to persuade Iceland to vote in favor of priority for the IQ and for the IQ itself. We are attempting to persuade Italy to vote with us on all resolutions. End FYI.

3. We of course have been raising issues on continuing basis in all NATO capitals at highest levels and will continue to do so until vote. While some Permreps may consider Chirep issue peripheral to NATO affairs, expulsion of ROC could have destabilizing effect on security situation in Pacific. One purpose of your efforts will be to demonstrate extent of our concern, as shown by our effort to press our position in every available forum. Some NATO countries have impression we not making maximum possible effort. This impression is entirely incorrect

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Samuel B. Bartlett; cleared by Feldman, Fessenden, and Floyd; and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN and to all NATO capitals.

² Document 413.

as demonstrated by number and level of our démarches.³ Thus raising subject in NATO context will be yet another indication of US concern and should relay back to NATO capitals fact that we seeking all possible help from Allies and are determined to obtain favorable vote.

Johnson

³ Telegram 182445 to all posts, October 5, reviewed tactical considerations and sent detailed instructions for démarches to host governments, including advice to excerpt the portion of Secretary Rogers' October 4 speech before the General Assembly on the Chinese representation issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) For text of Secretary Rogers' speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1971, pp. 437–444.

417. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Status Report on the Chinese Representation Issue

As votes stand at the moment, we are neck-and-neck with the opponents of our approach to Chinese Representation in the United Nations. Although it is impossible to predict the final outcome because of the number of uncommitted or wavering votes, I would say that our prospects for success are just a little less than even. I have little doubt that we will win priority consideration for the Important Question Resolution. As for the vote on that resolution itself our present estimate is that we can count on about 52 votes in its favor, while our opponents have about 56 votes against. Whether the Important Question Resolution passes or not will be decided by how the remaining member nations vote, and my present judgment is that we have a better chance than our opponents of picking up some of those undecided votes if we make an urgent, high-level effort.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman and cleared by Herz, Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, and Pedersen. An attached memorandum of transmittal from De Palma and Green to Rogers is also dated October 12.

On the Albanian Resolution itself, our opponents can count on some 62 sure votes in its favor and could get as many as 70. If we manage to pass the Important Question Resolution, I am confident that we can muster a blocking third. We can be sure of 37 votes against the Albanian Resolution and may be able to increase that number by an additional 6 to 8 votes from among the undecided. Everything thus depends on picking up the necessary number for the Important Question, thus requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption of the Albanian Resolution.

The vote count on the Dual Representation Resolution is also close. We can count on some 45 votes in favor; our opponents can count on 47 firm votes against. However, if we manage to pass the Important Question Resolution and thus prevent passage of the Albanian Resolution, we should be able to obtain sufficient votes from those presently uncommitted (and possibly even from a few who will have voted against us earlier), to give us a small margin for victory. Clearly, everything hinges upon whether we can muster the extra votes needed to pass the Important Question Resolution.

My conversations with Foreign Ministers in New York and reports from our posts around the world indicate that countries are reluctant to commit themselves to support our initiative primarily for the following reasons:

(a) Interest in improving their own relations with Peking, especially now that we ourselves are moving toward normalization, and fear of being left behind. Peking is playing on the worries of such countries that failure to support entry on its terms will affect their relations.

(b) A belief that it is more important to see Peking seated in the UN than to prevent Taiwan's expulsion, and a conviction that Peking will not come in as long as Taiwan remains. All this is wrapped up in a great amount of legal argumentation, ranging from the specious to the sophisticated. Our task is to cut through the legalistic underbrush and down to the essentials.

Since launching our initiative on August 2, we have made a maximum effort around the world to build support and to counter the opposing arguments. I have urged that our ambassadors give this top priority, and as a result there have been repeated *démarches* in all countries where we have a diplomatic mission and the issue is not foreclosed. The Department has mobilized all its available resources. I myself have sent personal letters to 51 Foreign Ministers, and in New York held discussions so far with 68 Foreign Ministers or Chief Delegates. Ambassador Bush has been equally unstinting in his own efforts.

I would cite just two examples where despite our best efforts the situation looks unfavorable or is still in the balance, but where we should not take no for an answer.

1. *Mexico.* From the beginning, Foreign Minister Rabasa has been hostile to our resolutions and favorable to the Albanian Resolution. It is doubtful that our arguments reached President Echeverria. For a while it looked as if Echeverria were inclined to give us support, but apparently Rabasa convinced him otherwise. When Echeverria addressed the UN General Assembly he came out strongly against “dividing” China, which was widely interpreted as foreshadowing votes against our Important Question and Dual Representation Resolutions. I had a discussion with President Echeverria in New York, and found that Rabasa was doing most of the talking for him on this subject. Apparently Rabasa expects to produce a Mexican abstention as a concession to us, but we need an affirmative vote.

2. *Austria.* In the past six weeks alone, our Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister, the Chancellor and the Chef de Cabinet, and has written to the Chancellor. Other Embassy personnel called on senior people in the Austrian Foreign Ministry three times. In Washington we had three discussions with the Austrian ambassador and two informal talks with the Foreign Minister. Finally, I had an intensive session with the Foreign Minister in New York. All he would say was that his government would give further study to our Important Question Resolution. At the same time, the Foreign Minister said that Austria is prepared to vote in favor of the Albanian Resolution.

The debate on Chinese Representation is scheduled to begin October 18, and the first votes are likely to be taken about a week later. It is my judgment that we must bring about ten more nations to our side on the Important Question Resolution to assure its adoption. If we cannot do this, we must expect to see the Important Question defeated, in which case the Albanian Resolution will pass and the Republic of China will be expelled from the United Nations.

In an effort to maximize our chances, I will shortly recommend a few carefully timed Presidential messages for your signature, to be despatched to selected countries whose votes could make the difference between success and failure.

William P. Rogers

418. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 14, 1971, 0246Z.

3479. Subj: Chirep—Cosponsors Inner Group Meeting October 13.

1. Bush chaired half-hour meeting October 13 with core group of Chirep cosponsors: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines and Thailand, plus ROC. This was first time that Chinese (represented by Ambassadors Liu and Hsueh, plus directors Che and Chien) attended meeting with cosponsors this year. Principal purpose of meeting was to stimulate increased sense of (and actual) participation in Chirep efforts, particularly on part of Thai and Philippines. They have not been engaging in same intensive consultations and exchanges of information with US as case with Japan and ROC and to lesser extent Australia and New Zealand.

2. Meeting chaired by Bush characterized by general exchanges regarding psychological atmosphere on Chirep, summary discussion of grey-area countries requiring special work, need to clarify procedural matter with less sophisticated cosponsors, significance of Congressional activity, etc. At close of this session, Bush invited delegates desiring more detailed discussion with USUN working level to remain. We pleased to find that both Anand (Thailand) and Yango (Philippines) chose to remain, along with Ambassador Liu and other delegations' staffs, for detailed consideration, inter alia, of how each might assist in most effective coordinated approaches to score of uncertain delegations here.

3. Of some interest to Canberra and Wellington might be byplay, during discussion of need to persuade more friendlies to speak during Chirep debate, between New Zealand and Australian staffs, with former twitting latter for failure to inscribe. Australians obviously embarrassed. Later in day, Australia did inscribe to speak (septel). Thailand has not yet inscribed.

4. Regular weekly cosponsors' meeting scheduled for October 15.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

419. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 14, 1971, 2341Z.

Secto 192/3549. Following is Noform, FYI only, uncleared and subject to revision on review.

Memorandum of conversation: FM Chow (Republic of China) October 14, 1971; 12:30 PM 35A Waldorf. Chirep.

1. Participants: Republic of China—FM Chow, Ambassador Liu, Dr. Chien; US—The Secretary, Mr. Pedersen, Mr. DePalma, Mr. Murphy (reporting officer).

2. Summary: FonMin Chow requested public statement by President Nixon on Chirep and suggested that if IQ fails and AR is adopted we should consider taking expulsion case to Security Council where veto applies. The Secretary observed that US veto on this might be overturned, and Chow agreed but said at least it would look like we tried. Chow also requested Presidential letter to Botswana. The Secretary said we still expect to win on the IQ. End Summary.

3. FonMin Chow expressed appreciation for the Secretary's hard work on behalf of the ROC, but said our enemies are spreading rumors that the White House is working at cross purposes, and this greatly disturbs those who are still undecided. He requested that the Secretary discuss with President Nixon a statement of Presidential support for our efforts on Chirep. The Secretary said the President had already made a strong statement to Moro and asked which countries were most affected. Chow said some Latin American and African countries, particularly Panama and Mexico, who say the lack of a White House statement on Chirep shows the US is not sincere. The Secretary said something will be done about this, and Chow pointed out that he felt a *public* statement from the President was required.

4. Chow said our two Missions have been working closely together, and we should maintain confident attitude. At same time he asked if the US had a fall-back position in case our present program fails. The Secretary said he did not think there was one, and asked if Chow had one. Chow stated that of course the ROC cannot even mention such a thing for the other side would spread damaging rumors, and that they could not show any sign of weakness, but that they were thinking, if they lose on the IQ and the AR is adopted then the US is

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 302, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the telegram indicates it was sent to Kissinger.

released from its commitment to get the PRC in the SC and keep the ROC in, he felt the matter would then revert to the issue of expulsion. He wondered if we would cite Article 6 of the UN Charter on expulsion of a member and fight the battle in the SC, where the US could veto. The Secretary asked if this was based on grounds that the AR refers to expulsion and the Charter requires a 2/3 vote, and Chow agreed, saying that Article 6 also applies. Mr. DePalma pointed out that the AR refers to expulsion of a representative rather than a member and that, in any event, the question was where we could find the votes.

5. The Secretary asked about the procedure on credentials, and wondered why this procedure was not being used by the other side. He observed that they had by-passed the traditional method of testing credentials. Mr. Pedersen remarked that we had never wanted to argue on those grounds because the Credentials Committee goes by majority vote. He commented that the Soviets take the position that representation matters should not go to the Credentials Committee, which can only check the signatures of FonMins on credentials, and added that we have essentially gone along with that position. Mr. Pedersen remarked that the PRC has never attempted to present any credentials and FonMin Chow observed that this time they would do so.

6. The Secretary commented that the difficulty with the fall-back position dealing with credentials in the GA is that the final vote on representation would be settled by a majority rather than 2/3. Mr. Pedersen observed that FonMin Chow was considering this a case of expulsion requiring action by the SC, rather than one of representation. Chow said this year the AR resolution is vaguely worded, and is in violation of Article 18 of the Charter. Mr. Pedersen remarked that if we cannot get enough votes to win on the IQ, we cannot sustain that this is a representation issue either, as some of our votes will desert us in a credentials fight. Chow said if there were not enough votes, then we should consider a veto in the SC. The Secretary said we had talked about this, before. A US veto could be appealed as being on a procedural item, and would probably be overturned. FonMin Chow said it would be important for ROC public opinion that the US will do all it can, even to a veto, and at least if we then lose they will know the US really tried its best. The Secretary said he would think about this, but observed that it could be very difficult for the US to use a veto under the circumstances, and added that we still expected to win on the IQ.

7. Asked about Botswana, Chow said he received their FonMin in Taipei and everything was fine, but he has now changed his position. The Secretary said the Botswana Ambassador at the UN probably changed the mind of the FonMin, and observed that this pattern occurs often at the UN. Ambassador Liu said some African states are under the influence of the more truculent Africans like Zambia and are

influenced by rumors creating doubt that the White House fully supports present US efforts on Chirep. FonMin Chow suggested that a letter to the President of Botswana from President Nixon would help. The Secretary commented that the FonMin now said Botswana would abstain on the IQ, but the Ambassador was not in sympathy with this. Asked about Bhutan, Chow said it was influenced by India, and the Secretary remarked that it might abstain on the IQ. Ambassador Liu said the UK and others are saying the IQ is an attempt to delay PRC entry into the UN, and this convinces many other nations to vote against it. Chow also asked if the AR could be amended, if we fail on the IQ and the Secretary replied that that was a possibility. Mr. Pedersen said we still think we will win on the IQ, and the Secretary pointed out that Indonesia will be for us. Mr. Pedersen added that two individuals on the other side have said they now believe their side will lose on the IQ. It was agreed that we would give future consideration to possible fall-back positions if our present program fails and that this would be done in strict confidence so as not to cast any doubt on our expectation of winning.

Rogers

420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 16, 1971, 0054Z.

3608. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning.

1. Japanese, Australians, ROC and New Zealand have all approached us on desirability of contingency planning against possibility we fail to carry IQ by a few votes.² All are aware of extreme sensitivity of any such planning since any leaks on the subject would undermine our ongoing efforts to round up votes for priority, for IQ, for DR and for negative votes on AR. At same time, Ministers wish to be assured that every possible effort will be made to retain seat for ROC. Above Missions believe that such planning best done in New

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.

² Telegram 3574 from USUN, October 15, reported on an October 14 meeting between Hsueh and a Mission officer on a fallback position if the IQ resolution failed. (Ibid.)

York and that it should be in general terms to avoid firm positions which might not fit precise contingency that arises.

2. Following are our preliminary views on fallback positions on which we would like Dept's reactions as soon as possible. Once our general lines are set, we would plan to discuss in first instance with Japan, Australia and New Zealand. After three of us are agreed we could then bring in ROC.

3. Amendments to AR. Australians are under some pressure from Canberra to urge consideration of substantive amendments to AR along lines previously discussed with us (USUN 2507).³ Neither we nor Australian Mission are attracted to this approach. If we do not have the votes to obtain priority and adoption of IQ, we would, in effect, turn it into the DR.

4. Votes by division on AR. Weakest point in AR is expulsion language: "And to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related with it." If, prior to the first vote (vote on priority), it is reasonably certain that we will not be able to carry IQ, we should ask an African who is not a cosponsor (Tunisia, Ghana) to request a separate vote on the expulsion language. Such a request would be opposed but we would stand a chance of winning a motion for a separate vote and a somewhat lesser chance of defeating the expulsion phrase. If expulsion is deleted, we should abstain on a truncated AR. We should not seek separate votes on other objectionable words in the AR such as "the only legitimate representatives of China in the UN." We would not have even a slim chance of deleting these words and an unsuccessful attempt would critically damage the interpretation that we would seek to apply to a truncated AR.

5. Interpretation by President. If it appears likely that we will have to resort to a vote by division on the AR, we should inform GA President Malik of our intention and urge him, in event we are successful, to rule on basis of logic that a truncated AR means ROC seat is retained since GA had rejected a proposal for expulsion. Malik likely refuse to make such controversial ruling, in this event we would have to seek some other way to have our interpretation accepted by GA. We would also have to have assurances from ROC that it would not walk out if a truncated AR were to be adopted.

6. Decision to press DR to vote. If expulsion is deleted from the AR and we sustain a reasonably satisfactory interpretation, we should

³ These amendments, transmitted in telegram 2507, September 21, would soften the wording of the Albanian Resolution (AR) by changing the phrase "restoration of the lawful rights" of the People's Republic of China to "representation." (Ibid.)

not press the DR to the vote if it appears that it might be defeated. If we are confident that the DR will carry even after adoption of a truncated AR, we should press it to the vote.

7. Attempt to apply IQ to DR. In spite of Zambia's statement, we understand AR cosponsors are divided on whether to try to apply the IQ to the DR. At present, we believe we have a reasonably good chance of defeating such a motion if submitted. However, if it appears that a large number of countries who vote for our IQ, and who do not wish to have to vote on DR in its present form, will vote for IQDR as part of a balancing act, we should consider revising our DR to drop op paras two and three.

8. Miscellany. As long as it appears that we have a good chance of winning the IQ, we should discourage any delegation from seeking a vote by division on the AR. (Of course some delegation over which we have no influence could make this motion at any time prior to the voting.) Finally, as long as we are reasonably certain of winning the IQ, we should discourage any movement in direction of a moratorium or postponement.

Bush

421. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 19, 1971, 0150Z.

3658. Subj: Chirep: First Day Roundup.

1. First day of Chirep debate got off to reasonably good start from our point of view but produced major surprise when Baroody (Saudi Arabia) submitted amendments to AR and announced he hoped to submit amendments to DR as well.

2. AR cosponsors decided to forego rumored procedural challenges. At outset, GA Pres Malik announced opening of debate on Item 93 and noted three resolutions (AR, IQ and DR) had been submitted. During statements by Albania and Algeria, which immediately followed Malik remarks, neither of them sought to challenge consideration of IQ and DR under Item 93.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.

3. When in course of his statement Ambassador Bush formally moved priority for IQ, this also was not challenged.²

4. It was interesting that during Albanian speech Soviet seat was occupied by a Counselor. During Ambassador Bush's statement, ranking Soviet Rep, Ambassador Mironova, showed up.

5. In addition to usual congratulations of cosponsors on Ambassador Bush's speech, several middle grade Soviets volunteered that it had been "excellent." A senior French diplomat described it as "wonderful."

6. In late afternoon, Baroody, without consultation with us, went to rostrum to propose a series of amendments to AR. (For text see sep-tel.) The most important of these (to op para three) would have the GA decide on a "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy and would justify latter on basis of self-determination. Baroody said neither AR nor DR were perfect and said he "hoped" to have some amendments to DR later on.

7. In response to press queries re amendments we have been saying that we were not consulted and that we were as surprised as everyone else, and that amendments are obviously important and will require careful study. On background we are noting that Saudi Arabia amendments take a "one-China, one-Taiwan" position which our DR is careful not to do.

8. We are confident that the AR cosponsors as well as the ROC will reject Baroody's amendments and that he will come under pressure not to press his amendments to the vote. As for his intentions re the DR, he told us after the session that he was "still thinking."

9. *Comment:* We assume Baroody thinking of submitting amendments to DR which will also refer to self-determination. Ambassador Bush will see Baroody October 19 and will try to ascertain his intentions. If opportunity presents itself, we intend to discourage him from presenting formal amendments to DR. Assuming Baroody's amendments are not pressed to vote, scenario is set as we wished: vote on priority, IQ, AR, and finally DR.

10. We heard 12 speakers plus Baroody October 18. As of now, additional 56 inscribed and list will close October 20. GA President and Stavropoulos anticipate general debate will occupy remainder of this week. Monday, October 25, they presently anticipate will be taken up by explanations of vote before the vote. Tuesday, October 26, could largely be occupied with procedural maneuvers and vote could come

² Bush's statement at the start of the debate is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 15, 1971, pp. 548-552. Reporting on the General Assembly debates on October 20 and 21 is in telegrams 3729 and 3759 from USUN, October 21 and 22, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday, October 27. This is preliminary timetable and it could slip as more speakers are added.

Bush

**422. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

UN Chirep Situation

This issue is still very much in doubt. There will be four crucial votes:

(1) Our so-called "priority motion" (to get our Important Question voted before the Albanian Resolution): We expect to win this one. State's current forecast is 63 yes, 54 no, and 13 abstentions.

(2) The Important Question Resolution itself: We're still slightly behind. State's latest headcount shows 58 yes, 55 no, and 18 abstentions. This is the vote upon which all else will depend.

(3) The Albanian Resolution: The opposition will certainly get a big majority. But if we can pass the I.Q., they will be well short of the required two thirds. State's forecast is 71 yes, 45 no, and 14 abstentions.

(4) The Dual Representation Resolution: State's current headcount is 55 yes, 56 no, and 19 abstentions. If the I.Q. passes, however, thus blocking the Albanian Resolution, we expect to pick up the votes of some who will then see Dual Representation as the only effective way to admit the PRC.

So, our whole effort turns on passing the Important Question Resolution. We are still working on the following countries, some of whom we are trying to switch from an abstention to a yes vote, and some from a no vote to an abstention.

Special Category

Ireland—Abstaining and we want a yes. The Foreign Minister is against us, and the President is angry because of the air route dispute.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN October–November 1971, Vol. VIII, Part 4. Secret. Sent for information. This memorandum is stamped: "The President has seen." A covering memorandum from Wright to Haig is dated October 20.

We have sent a Presidential interest message, got Speaker McCormack and Majority Whip O'Neill to send a cable, and asked the Vatican to help. Still the Irish vote is uncertain. A message indicating a willingness to be flexible on the upcoming air route negotiations might give President Lynch what he needs to switch the Irish vote. Peter Flanigan has agreed that this minimum commitment is acceptable.²

Israel—Incredible as it seems, the Israelis have adamantly and ostentatiously refused to commit themselves. That fact, plus the open opposition of such close friends as the UK and Canada, continue to hurt us badly, for it leads many to suspect that we are not really serious after all. We could, assumedly, get Israeli supporters on the Hill to make a useful intervention, but Joe Sisco has vetoed that idea.³

Latin American States

Argentina—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a message attesting to your personal interest. We are also trying to get Brazilian President Medici to intervene with President Lanusse.

Ecuador—Abstaining and we want a yes vote.

Mexico—Abstaining and we want a yes. We have sent a Presidential interest message to Echeverria, with the results not yet clear.

Peru—Peru is voting no and we would like an abstention.

Trinidad—They are abstaining and we want a yes vote.

NATO Allies

Italy—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. Graham Martin is putting the big heat on. Your conversation with Moro helped. If we can get Italy in time, we can use it to help turn others such as Argentina, Turkey, and the Netherlands.⁴

Netherlands—They are abstaining and we want a yes. We have sent a Presidential interest message but the result is not yet clear.

Portugal—Now an abstention, we want a yes. Their problem, of course, is Macao on the Chinese mainland.

Turkey—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message.

Norway, Denmark, Iceland—All voting no, and we want abstentions. The Nordic countries—NATO and otherwise—are voting as a bloc, and are voting against us. We have pushed Norway, Denmark, and Iceland hard, but so far to no avail. The Nordics are voting against us even on priority for the I.Q., which seems excessive by any standards. They are

² Nixon's handwritten comment in the margin reads: "Flanigan, give them routes."

³ Nixon wrote "OK" in the margin.

⁴ Nixon wrote "Italy + US should not be against" in the margin.

supporting Max Jakobson of Finland to succeed Secretary General U Thant, and Jakobson has been rock hard on the Chirep issue. (His candidacy is reputed to have Peking's support.) The Nordics have agreed to let Finland determine their vote on priority. It would be playing the game hard, but it seems to me that the time has come discreetly to let the Nordics and Jakobson know that the solid Nordic opposition to us is not going to help Jakobson's candidacy. Such a move might get their support on priority and get one or two Nordic votes for the I.Q., while they save their virginity with Peking by all voting for the Albanian Resolution. George Bush will know best whether this approach is worth trying.

Africa

Botswana—Abstaining and we want a yes. Botswana is a country for which we have done much recently and we applied great pressure to get their vote. President Seretse Khama has, however, turned us down flatly.⁵

Burundi—Voting no and we want an abstention. The Foreign Minister seems to be over-ruling the President on the Chirep issue and it is a country for which we do nothing and therefore have little leverage except good will.

Cameroon—Voting no and we want an abstention. No apparent leverage here, and the chances for a switch seem bleak.

Ghana—Abstaining and we want a yes. We have a good chance here. President Busia is coming to the United States in several weeks and badly wants to call on you. A message giving him the meeting and expressing your personal interest in this issue would probably turn the trick. We have been trying to get approval of an office call for the last week.⁶

Kenya—Voting no and we want a yes vote or an abstention.

Morocco—Abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message to King Hassan.

Togo—Abstaining but still considering a yes vote.

Uganda—Voting no and we want an abstention. We lost ground in Uganda when we refused President Amin's request for an office call on you. The circumstances are not promising for a Presidential message or for a switch in the Uganda position.

Miscellaneous

Austria—Now abstaining and we want a yes vote. We have sent a Presidential interest message.

⁵ Nixon wrote "No more aid" in the margin.

⁶ Nixon wrote "No, unless a vote" in the margin.

Laos—Now abstaining. Presidential message should do it, however.⁷

Malta—You are receiving the new Maltese Ambassador Thursday. If you could press him for support on the I.Q. vote, it might work.⁸

[1 paragraph (1½ lines of source text) not declassified]

⁷ Nixon wrote "Cold Turkey" in the margin.

⁸ Nixon wrote "Done" in the margin.

423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, October 20, 1971, 2348Z.

192811. Subj: Chirep.

Please ask to see FonMin with view to seeking UK support in Chirep debate on at least one procedural issue. We are not seeking to re-open UK position on the several resolutions that will be put to the vote in the next few days. But we do believe UK need not oppose us on procedural aspects of the issue.

UK help would be beneficial to us, while not incompatible with the UK position on the resolutions themselves, in assuring that GA takes decision on the Important Question resolution before it proceeds to vote on the Albanian resolution. We will make a formal motion to this effect and expect that it will be put to the vote.

Priority for the Important Question resolution, while having psychological significance, is essentially a matter of proper parliamentary procedure. It is only reasonable that the General Assembly should decide whether the Albanian Resolution can or cannot be adopted by a simple majority before proceeding to the vote on the Albanian Resolution itself. That is how the issue has invariably been decided in the past, and issue would have to be decided before effect of vote on Albanian Res could be announced in any case. USG therefore hopes that when our motion is made, British delegation will be able to vote with us on this limited point. We would hope UK could so vote even if it felt it necessary to make clear that that vote was without prejudice to UK position on the resolutions themselves.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Feldman and Pedersen; cleared by Herz, Scott George, and Curran; and approved by Pedersen. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Tokyo.

Secty appreciative of the fact that Sir Alec has endeavored not to make our task in the UN on this issue more difficult (although knowledge of extreme firmness of UK and Canadian positions has been our most difficult obstacle in getting votes). But much as a British vote against inscription of our item would have created what would seem to be unnecessary difficulties for us, so would a vote against priority. Such a vote would signal British opposition to our position even down to procedural details.

Sentiment in the United States—both among the public and in Congress—about the preservation of the Republic of China’s seat has been growing. We have not artificially stimulated this sentiment; it is real, as UK Embassy undoubtedly has reported. We hope UK could take this factor into account in its decision also, for such sentiment could result in a considerable diminution of our ability to improve the UN and other international institutions.²

Rogers

² On October 22 the Department informed the Embassy in London that Secretary Rogers had met with Lord Cromer on October 21, and Cromer assured him that the United Kingdom was not “lobbying” against the U.S. position. (Telegram 194614 to London, October 22; *ibid.*)

424. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 21, 1971, 0239Z.

3715. Subj: Chirep—Fallbacks.

1. After repeated and insistent requests by Australia, NZ and Japan, we agreed to informal meeting at staff-level afternoon October 20 to hear preliminary views of others on fallbacks. Participants were: for Australia, Cumes (Canberra) and Merrillees (Mission); for Japan, Amau (Tokyo) and Kawakami (Mission); for NZ, Harland (Wellington) and Small (Mission); for US, Newlin (briefly), Reis and Thayer.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.

2. Australian, Japanese and NZ positions ranged over the lot, e.g., Cumes said that in event of failure of priority or IQ, Canberra is thinking of first moving for a separate vote on beginning of AR operative para to seat PRC, and thereafter for a second separate vote on expulsion end of that para. When questioned, he said Australia wants separate vote on PRC-seating so as to be able to demonstrate genuine character of GOA desire for PRC entry into UN. Stressing we without instructions we replied our initial reaction to Australian suggestion was it was risky in the extreme; PRC-seating part would probably receive large majority, bedlam would follow, many who would in a more tranquil atmosphere like to show their opposition to expulsion provision of AR would be intimidated, and adoption of expulsion provisions would be likely result. Japanese and NZ likewise had strong reservations. At other extreme, Harland said Wellington believes there no chance of deleting expulsion provision in event priority of IQ were to fail; they see no point in moving for separate vote on expulsion. Australia said, sharply, that in view of tremendous Chirep efforts, they could not understand NZ unwillingness to try for separate vote. Japan took similar view.

3. We were able to bring inconclusive discussion to an end by noting that only situation thus far discussed was possible amendment of AR or vote by division. We would need at an appropriate time to turn our thoughts to other questions such as what to do in event priority and IQ succeed but we estimate DR unable to win. We also briefly drew attention to Saudi Arabian amendments in such a way as to indicate personal view that they might offer some possibilities that should not be dismissed out of hand.²

4. Cumes also noted GOA had suggested possibility of extensive detailed amendments to AR.

5. *Comment:* Above thoughts of Canberra underline need for us to consult, on basis Dept's views, with GOA, NZ, and Japan on contingencies at early date.

Bush

² Telegram 193137, October 21, advised Bush that if the IQ succeeded and the AR failed and there were not enough votes to pass the DR, USUN could seek a delay to allow time for canvassing for more votes. Alternatively, the DR could be modified by deletion of its second and possibly third paragraphs. If the IQ failed, USUN could endorse Baroody's amendment to the AR or seek to delete that part dealing with expulsion. ROC proposals to rely on Articles 6 (expulsion of a member required recommendation by the Security Council) or 18(2) (expulsion of a member was an important question and required a 2/3 majority) were considered unworkable. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM)

**425. Memorandum for the President's Files by the President's
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹**

Washington, October 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Secretary William Rogers, Ambassador George Bush,
and Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Friday, October 22, 1971 at 2:15 p.m.
The Oval Office²

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary William Rogers
Ambassador George Bush
Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig

The President opened the meeting by informing the group that he wished to review the status of the vote line-up prior to United Nations consideration of the UN Chinese representation issue.³ Secretary Rogers commented that he was very concerned about the timing of Dr. Kissinger's return from Peking. He felt that should Dr. Kissinger arrive on Sunday or just before the UN vote on Monday, it could have a most deleterious impact on the outcome of the vote. Ambassador Bush endorsed Secretary Rogers' view, noting at the same time that Dr.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memcons, President's File, October–November 1971. Secret; Sensitive.

² The meeting ended at 3 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) A recording of the meeting is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, October 22, 2:05–3:00 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 599–17.

³ Nixon and Kissinger wanted the Department of State to take the lead on the UN fight and had told Bush to "fight hard" to keep the ROC in the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, September 30, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) Nixon asked Rogers to handle the UN issue: "I think getting me involved puts in too direct a deal, particularly when we're working out the Peking, too direct in the case that we'll try to play it as if we're playing it against Peking, which is really not the case." (*Ibid.*, October 17, 6:13–6:26 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 11–105) On another occasion Nixon said that he wanted to avoid personal involvement in the UN issue and to enable Rogers to gain support from conservatives for the Secretary's role in attempting to keep the ROC in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, October 14, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18)

Kissinger's trip had cast an ambivalent cloud on the UN vote.⁴ In some cases it appeared to suggest a U.S. cynicism with respect to our concern about Taiwan's continued membership. On the other hand, it also confirmed among the eastern bloc and the Communist supporting nations that China as well might not have the strong view that expulsion of Taiwan was essential.

General Haig stated that he did not believe Dr. Kissinger's return would have a deleterious impact on the UN vote and that in sum the impact of Dr. Kissinger's visit was neutralized on both sides of the voting ledger.

President Nixon then said that in any event it would be well if General Haig informed Dr. Kissinger immediately that he should delay his return to Washington so as to arrive after the UN vote had been taken. The President suggested that Dr. Kissinger lay over in Hawaii or in Alaska for the purpose of rest so that his arrival could be effected quietly following the vote. General Haig retorted that this kind of a layover would appear contrived to the press and might give credence to rumors that the trip was connected in some way to the U.S. attitude on the UN vote. Secretary Rogers strongly disagreed with General Haig and stated that Dr. Kissinger's arrival before the vote would definitely influence the attitude of many fence-sitting nations. The President

⁴ The timing of the UN vote on Chinese representation and Kissinger's second trip to the PRC became a source of concern as it became apparent that the vote would be held in late October rather than in November, earlier than U.S. officials had anticipated. In numerous conversations, Nixon and Kissinger wondered whether the trip would reduce the chances for the ROC remaining in the United Nations. On September 30 Kissinger concluded that "I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think objectively it effects the votes of anybody." Nixon responded: "I know, no, I know that. People will use things for excuses." They also debated attempting to change the date of Kissinger's trip to China, but felt that going to the PRC immediately after the defeat in the United Nations would be even more difficult. Ultimately, Kissinger felt that there was little chance of winning the UN vote: "I mean I thought as long as we were going to lose we were better off losing on the old stand. But, I think we're farther behind than they [Department of State officials] think. You have to consider that these diplomats when they talk to us, they'll try to make it sound as good as possible. Why annoy us 4 weeks before the vote?" (Ibid., September 30, 2:25-2:50 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582-3) On October 12 Jeanne Davis sent the following language to Eliot for distribution to all posts: "You may be asked by host governments about ChiRep implications of Kissinger trip to Peking at end of this month. If so, you should stress that sole purpose of trip is to make arrangements for Presidential visit and that there is no connection between Kissinger trip and ChiRep issue. The U.S. is firmly supporting the continued membership of the ROC in the UN." (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, China Trip, October 1971) Nixon was only slightly more optimistic on future of the ROC in the United Nations, stating on one occasion: "My idea is that the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, shouldn't be this year, it's not good for the Chinese." (Ibid., White House Tapes, October 14, 3:05-5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289-18)

directed that General Haig instruct Dr. Kissinger to lay over in either Hawaii or Alaska so as to return following the vote.⁵

The group then proceeded to review the status of those countries whose vote would be unfavorable on the Chirep issue or whose vote at that time was uncertain. Secretary Rogers urged the President to make direct communications with certain heads of state either telephonically or by written message. The President agreed that he would make certain telephone calls. Included among these would be a call to the President of Mexico, a special message to the President of Argentina, a call to the President of Italy, and a call to the King of Morocco.

The question was then debated as to whether or not the President should intervene personally in the case of the Irish. The President decided that this would not be an effective move and noted that the current Irish attitude was closely linked to the airlines problem. If the Irish were to vote against us in the United Nations, despite our urging up to now, it could not but have a serious impact on our attitude on airline rights negotiations. He wanted this thought clearly conveyed to the Irish and at the same time he wanted it clearly conveyed that were their vote to be favorable we would take this into consideration in deciding the airlines issue.

The President stated that he was appalled that certain African countries who had received our support consistently were apparently going to vote against us in the United Nations. He instructed Secretary of State Rogers to move promptly with respect to those countries with whom the United States had "clout."

Following the discussion of the status of the United Nations vote, Secretary Rogers observed that the vote was very tightly balanced and that at that point in time the United States might win or lose by one vote. He was somewhat optimistic that the U.S. would win by one vote. The President commented that he was somewhat less optimistic but in any event it would be important to use that day's meeting to further emphasize the President's personal interest in the outcome of the vote. For this reason he suggested that Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush accompany him into the Rose Garden where they might be photographed by the press to insure that all understood there was a high-level meeting to discuss the outcome of the United Nations vote on the Chinese representation issue.

⁵ The October 20–26 messages exchanged between Kissinger in Peking and the White House are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

426. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 22, 1971, 0440Z.

3760. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning. Ref: State 193137.²

1. We anticipate priority will win by a slender margin but the IQ is likely to lose. We understand that the 21 Oct staff-level count of the Dept is 57–57–16. Ours is less optimistic since we do not think we can count on such countries as Barbados and Senegal whose affirmative votes are included in Dept's estimate of 57 in favor. Therefore, we anticipate actual result will be closer to 55–58–17.³

2. We agree that the two possibilities in event of defeat of the IQ are (A) seeking adoption of Baroody amendments to AR or (B) seeking to delete AR expulsion clause. As to (A), ROC Vice-Minister Yang told us 20 Oct he believes ROC could live with AR as amended by Baroody proposals. Nevertheless, we think that we could not pick up a majority in favor of Baroody amendments in atmosphere of just-defeated IQ. We do not know of any AR supporters who, in likely time frame, could be prevailed on to support these amendments, and doubt we would pick up enough additional support for deletion to compensate for erosion of a number of our IQ supporters that would be inevitable in view of their lack of instructions to support the amendments. Defeat of Baroody amendments thus seem likely assuming he decides to press them to a vote.

3. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for adopting this course of action's first fallback position. For one thing, it would be a Saudi text that had been rejected by the GA, not a US proposal. Second, we would have shown our determination to pursue every alternative reasonably open to us to oppose the ROC's expulsion. Finally, if Baroody amendments are maintained, we do not have to move to have them voted; they must be put to the vote (unlike a motion for division).

4. As you note, there is no certainty of Baroody's maintaining his amendments, but we think if we get behind them he might do so. He is, of course, not reliable, and has spoken recently of a "completely new resolution" whose contents and effective purpose remain unknown.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.

² See footnote 2, Document 424.

³ Circular telegram 194327, October 22, requested from the posts "clear information" on how the host governments would vote on the IQ. The telegram noted that all replies should be received by the morning of October 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

5. As to (B), an effort to defeat the expulsion clause of the AR, we come to a parallel conclusion that we could not, in the wake of IQ defeat, put together a majority to support our motion for a separate vote on the expulsion clause. Even if, by some regrouping of votes that does not now seem possible, we were to win both a motion for a separate vote and the deletion of the expulsion clause, we would be faced in the GA with exceedingly difficult problem of interpretation. We would insist that by deleting the expulsion clause the GA had expressed its will to continue ROC representation. Others would argue to the contrary; the President would refuse to rule and would put the question to the vote; the GA would probably vote that the deletion of the expulsion clause had no effect on the AR and the ROC would be obliged to leave. At best the outcome might be ambiguous.

6. We conclude that alternative of a motion for separate vote is a second line of defense. Although as noted above, we are not optimistic we could win a vote on division, we lose nothing by making the attempt.

7. We were attracted to the possibility of seeking a delay at one or another stage to permit renewed efforts in capitals. But a proposal for suspension involving even a few hours would likely be shouted down and voted down in the PRC-“victory” atmosphere that would immediately follow defeat of the IQ.

8. As to situation in event IQ is adopted: believe we and the Dept concur that we cannot get a simple majority for the DR. If IQ is adopted, we agree we could raise a point of order and read out the text of a revised DR whose principal changes would involve deletion of the 2nd and 3rd operative paras. (We would want to consider, as well, shortening the preamble.) We would at same time seek suspension of the plenary to gain some time. But we are uncertain of advantages of this course. As of now, chances of success appear dim and should we win we are left with same problem of interpretation outlined in para 5 above. At best, we would face interminable series of wrangles throughout entire UN system as to practical effect.

9. Re option (C), last para your tel, we concur your judgment such course would only compound defeat.

Bush

427. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 23, 1971, 1745Z.

195059. Subject: Chirep: October 22 Call by GRC Ambassador Shen on Secretary.

Following is Noform, FYI only, unclassified and subject to revision on review.

1. Memorandum of Conversation: Chinese: Amb. James Shen; Political Counselor Henry Chen. US: The Secretary; Counselor Pedersen, Acting Asst Secy Herz, IO; Mr. Moser, EA.

2. Summary: Shen, on instructions, asked Secretary for review of possible fallback positions if IQ should fail, presented no comment upon hearing current US thinking. Shen asked if President Nixon would be making any public statement on Chirep and also took opportunity to express concern that return of Dr. Kissinger might coincide with vote on Chirep. End Summary.

3. The Secretary and Ambassador Shen began by reviewing recent efforts to line up votes at New York. It was agreed that further efforts would be made with Togo, Ecuador and Peru. Ambassador Shen asked for a report on how the voting projections stood at present. The Secretary stated that it stood at a tie on the important question, with several of the undecided countries "leaning against" us. We are, however, working very hard at the highest levels to win over the uncommitted. He discussed efforts to assure that countries generally friendly with the US but not voting with it on this issue would not work against our interests, for instance by predicting that we will lose.

4. Ambassador Shen asked about contingency plans if the IQ should fail. Mr. Herz said there were a number of possibilities. First, there was the Baroody amendment. The US saw no harm in his advancing his amendment under such circumstances. Its chance of success, however, appears small in its present form. Secondly, there is the possibility of a separate vote on the expulsion language of the AR. The chance of success in that case would be less than even. The Secretary emphasized the unpredictability of the vote of many delegations under new circumstances. Some supporters of the AR might well abstain on the expulsion part of that resolution if offered separately. Hopefully, we would have at least one overnight period during which we could

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leo J. Moser; cleared by Pedersen, Herz, Curran, and Peter B. Johnson; and approved by Pedersen. Repeated to Taipei and Tokyo.

emphasize once again what expulsion would mean to the future of the UN. There followed discussion of the rules of debate and how “explanations of vote” might be used to delay a vote.

5. Ambassador Shen asked if there were any other contingency positions that the US had under consideration. Mr. Pedersen replied that in a contingency in which we were successful with the IQ and had defeated the AR, but did not expect majority support for the DR, we might consider removing the second—and perhaps also the third—operative section from our DR.

6. Ambassador Shen asked if this would be done in order to improve the chance that the remainder of the resolution would pass. Mr. Pedersen replied affirmatively and added that it could also give us needed time. Mr. Herz emphasized that in this contingency we would have created a legislative history for a position that the General Assembly had rejected expulsion of the ROC but nevertheless had brought in the PRC.

7. Ambassador Shen asked if President Nixon likely to say anything publicly on the Chirep issue. The Secretary remarked that he would be seeing the President later in the day and that it might be possible for Mr. Ziegler to issue a White House statement of some type. Ambassador Shen then mentioned that he had heard that Dr. Kissinger would be returning Monday, the very day Chirep would be voted on. He expressed concern about the effect of Dr. Kissinger’s answers to questions about his trip. The Secretary confirmed that Dr. Kissinger would be returning late Monday evening and observed that this might be after the vote. He expressed his understanding of the problem that Ambassador Shen had mentioned, and said that he would follow up on it. Mr. Pedersen remarked that should Dr. Kissinger reaffirm upon returning that the subject of Chirep had not come up in Peking at all, this might in fact help our position on the vote. Ambassador Shen recognized this possibility. The Secretary said he thought it would be better if no statement were made before the vote.

8. The Secretary volunteered that if it would help, he would either return to New York or make further press statements on Chirep. At this point he was not sure, however, whether either would be to our real advantage. The meeting ended with Ambassador Shen expressing the gratitude of his country for all the efforts being made by the US to retain ROC membership in the UN.

9. *Comment:* As can be seen from the above, Ambassador Shen received all comments sympathetically but made no substantive comment on any of the contingencies presented. As Mr. Moser accompanied the Ambassador to his car, the conversation made it apparent that neither Ambassador Shen nor his Political Counselor had been closely following the procedural situation in New York. The concept of trun-

cating the DR seemed entirely new to them. They appeared, however, open-minded and not unduly pessimistic.

10. We are not yet discussing such contingencies with other Dels.

Rogers

428. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 24, 1971, 0004Z.

3816. Subj: Chirep: Meeting of Inner Core of Co-Sponsors Oct. 23, 1971.

1. Summary: Informal mtg with Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese co-sponsors was held at USUN morning of Oct 24.² US side represented by Phillips, De Palma, Newlin, and MisOfs. Phillips reported US belief our position was strong and we should continue concentrate all our efforts on attaining victory for IQ. During discussion initiated by Australians of possible contingencies it became apparent Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly also Japanese had received preliminary guidance as to fall-back positions should IQ fail. Australian Cabinet, meeting this weekend, may decide to abstain on AR in event IQ fails and probably would favor Baroody amendments (BA) should they be put to vote. New Zealand also favorably inclined toward BA but would like certain changes in wording. Japanese also favor BA with reservation GOJ believes there only one China. Advisability of voting on AR in parts was also discussed. If IQ fails, Japanese felt we might seek to defeat last part of AR as final effort to save ROC seat although chance of success not bright. End Summary.

2. Phillips opened mtg with report that White House and State Dept felt at highest levels our position was strong and we should press on with IQ. At this point USG was not prepared to consider fall-back positions. We would, of course, listen and report views of our friends.

3. One important objective, Phillips noted, was to have maximum number of speakers inscribe to explain vote on Mon, Oct 25. In view

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² The weekly meeting of all the co-sponsors was held October 22. (Telegram 3794 from USUN, October 23; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII)

of lobbying actions yet to be completed and undesirability of vote Mon evening, US felt it highly desirable for GA to commence voting no earlier than Tues, Oct 26.

4. PolCouns Newlin reported AR co-sponsors were split over timing of vote. Albanians believed vote should come only after full, fair debate and, for example, did not oppose mtg of First Comite scheduled for Mon morning at expense of morning plenary session. Activists such as Yugoslavs and Pakistanis within Albanian camp, on other hand, seemed anxious to have vote ASAP.

5. Phillips pointed out it also important to work for interval between defeat of AR and vote on DR to allow for consultations and full assessment of situation. Legal Adviser Reis will confer with Under-SYG Stavropoulos regarding feasibility of having explanation of vote between AR's defeat and vote on DR, although from strictly legal view this proposal to interrupt voting may be difficult to sustain. We could also consider moving for temporary adjournment or suspension of GA.

6. Remainder of mtg for most part involved discussion of tactics and contingencies in case IQ should fail. Discussion was led primarily by Australians and New Zealanders, both of whom clearly had received at least preliminary guidance from their govts regarding possible fall-back positions.

7. McIntyre (Australia) welcomed encouraging view of Washington but expressed concern about possibility—even if not at present anticipated—of uncoordinated situation should things go wrong in what surely will be close vote on IQ. Australia has and will continue to explore with Canberra various contingencies should IQ fail. Australian Del has not yet received substantive instructions but has begun to receive “broad guidance.”

8. McIntyre said he could not overlook possibility that his Ministers, meeting this weekend, might decide to abstain on AR were IQ to lose.

9. McIntyre asked how US might vote on AR assuming defeat of IQ. De Palma responded Dept had not sent guidance in view of decisions taken yesterday in Washington.

10. Newlin, speaking personally and hypothetically, supposed it likely US would oppose AR in whole or in parts given traditional Albanian interpretation of AR, which is shared by Under-SYG Stavropoulos, that first part as well as second calls for ROC expulsion. Further, should we be faced, against our present expectation, with IQ's defeat, it probably would be difficult to win vote for considering AR in parts. In any case, with prospect of passage of IQ we obviously should not oppose splitting AR. Japanese and New Zealanders agreed.

11. Scott (New Zealand) indicated he had received preliminary instructions regarding Baroody amendments. Wellington favors altering

BA by deleting phrase “de jure” and substituting “territory” for “country.” Scott suggested we should consider approach to Baroody prior to voting on IQ regarding these changes. Otherwise interval between defeat of IQ and voting on AR probably would not allow for sufficient consultations with him. On balance, Scott felt his govt would support BA but would prefer changes mentioned.

12. McIntyre thought his del also would vote for BA if IQ fails. Nakagawa (Japan) said his del probably would do same, with reservations stemming from GOJ’s view that there only one China.

13. McIntyre, who spoke with Baroody Oct 22, reported Baroody probably would withdraw his amendments and save them for next year in event IQ passes. If not, he likely would press them to vote. Newlin added that Baroody seemed determined to offer self-determination amendment to DR before voting begins.

14. Nakagawa did not say he had received Tokyo’s thinking of fall-back positions, but commented that in his view BA could not win if IQ failed. So perhaps we should consider asking for vote on AR by parts, with vote on second (explicit expulsion) part coming first. Such vote would be difficult to win but would represent last ditch effort to preserve ROC seat. McIntyre agreed this might be worthwhile tactic.

15. Nakagawa raised possibility Albanian side might ask GA President to rule, before voting on IQ began, whether IQ applied to whole of AR or only to second part. Scott felt certain Malik would refer questions of interpretation of AR to GA for vote no matter what Under-SYG Stavropoulos recommended. We therefore might wish to ask for ruling as to meaning of first part of AR ourselves to ensure question is phrased in best possible way. Newlin commented best procedure would be to see how situation unfolds and at appropriate time determine whether our interests best served by clarifying meaning of AR or by leaving matter vague.

16. Newlin also noted possibility that Albanian side might challenge legality of DR under UN Charter. We will be prepared for this but hope it will not happen.

17. *Comment:* Mtg was characterized by frank, informal exchange of views with complete understanding by attending co-sponsors of US determination to bring about victory of IQ and defeat of AR.

Bush

429. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 0639Z.

3845. Chirep: Plenary October 25.

1. Summary. Unexpected defeat of IQ by vote of 55–59–15 Oct 25 caused by massive last minute Arab defections. Shifts which occurred in previous or expected positions were: Belgium (yes to abstain); Cyprus (yes to abstain); Ireland (abstain to no); Mexico (anticipated abstention to yes); Oman (yes to absent [*abstain*]); Morocco (yes to abstain); Qatar (yes to abstain); Tunisia (yes to abstain); Trinidad and Tobago (anticipated abstention to no). End Summary.

2. Loss of IQ by four votes evening Oct 25 came as surprise when compared with conservative voting estimate of 60–57–13 early same morning. First sign of what later became long list of defections occurred before session began when we learned Belgian Cabinet had decided to shift from “yes” to “abstain.” Next sign of trouble came when Trinidad and Tobago (whom we originally had expected to abstain) decided to vote “no.”

3. During the meeting Lebanon tipped us off that Cyprus was going soft. Pedersen approached Kyprianou and, remarking on narrowness of vote, expressed gratification Cyprus was with us. Kyprianou indicated he would not support IQ. Pedersen said he was astonished, given two assurances of support by Makarios. Pedersen said US took this issue very seriously and GOC would damage its relations with US much more than it would improve them with PRC. Kyprianou said, as FonMin, he had to shoulder his responsibilities. Foregoing was shortly reinforced by Bush directly to FonMin who said we counting heavily on earlier assurances and that last minute defection would not be understood.

4. We then learned that, contrary to earlier expectations, Morocco would abstain rather than vote yes. (Although this was as unpleasant a surprise as the rest, at least Morocco moved half way toward our position since previously Morocco has voted against the IQ.)

5. At the opening of meeting we took last minute readings in cases of Tunisia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. In all cases we were given assurances that they would vote yes. In the event, only Bahrain honored its word. Driss (Tunisia) after submitting three draft reses that he had no intention of pressing to vote, and after voting for Baroody’s unsuccessful motion to postpone vote to Oct 26, announced that Tunisia would abstain on IQ.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential.

6. Bush early in the meeting also talked to Khampan Panya and urged Laos to reconsider its decision to abstain but latter made clear he bound by firm instructions.

7. Since we knew that new Gulf Arab states were under tremendous pressure from Arabs (and possibly UK too) to be absent, we together with Japanese, Chinese, Jordan and Lebanon kept a close watch on them. Oman nevertheless left the Assembly hall. When reached at his hotel he alleged he had received telegram from his ruler instructing him to be absent. Qatar, in explaining his abstention, told MisOff that he too had received telegram permitting him to be absent but that he preferred to abstain.

8. Under circumstances, Luxembourg deserves credit for not following in the path of Belgium and Bahrain deserves credit for not bolting along with Oman and Qatar.

9. Major favorable development was yes vote of Mexico. On instructions, Pedersen called FonMin Rabasa to express Secretary's appreciation for what had been a difficult decision that had been taken in the interest of good US-Mexican relations. Mexico's decision all the more appreciated under the circumstances. Rabasa was touched and most appreciative.

10. Vote on IQ by Latin Americans generally was gratifying, including favorable votes, in addition to Mexico, from Argentina and Venezuela, who had earlier given us concern. Total vote in favor 18, against 5. There were no abstentions. The negative votes of Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru were anticipated, T&T's final decision to oppose was made known shortly before vote by PermRep Seignoret to Japanese. Gratifyingly, Barbados followed instructions despite evident pressure from both Caribbean and Africans.

11. After defeat of IQ we made last-ditch effort to get separate vote on expulsion language of AR but were defeated by 51-61-16. Under these circumstances, bandwagon psychology set in and AR adopted by 76-35-17.

12. *Comment:* Given what proved to be extreme fragility of some of our support, we doubt that a postponement until October 26 would have led to a substantially different outcome. The Soviets sat this one out. Albania did not not display any great leadership. The result was the pressures and the lobbying of the radical Arabs, Pakistan, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Zambia, the Scandinavians as a bloc, and, despite assurances to the contrary, probable behind the scenes work by the UK and France.²

Bush

² Despite the defeat in the General Assembly, the Department sent, in circular telegram 196436, October 27, a message from Secretary Rogers to the Presidents or Foreign Ministers of the co-sponsoring nations thanking them for the "support and assistance you provided to our common cause during the debate and vote in the UN General Assembly on the issue of Chinese representation." (Ibid.)

430. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 0800Z.

3848. UN General Assembly—Albanian Chirep Res Adopted.

Albanian Res (AR, L. 630) adopted 76–35–17 late Oct. 25 and GA Pres Malik (Indonesia) announced PRC would be notified accordingly. Just before vote Chinese FonMin stated “in view of frenzy and irrational behavior in hall del of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly.” During continuous eight-hour meeting, Important Question (IQ) res (L. 632) defeated 55–59–15 after motion for priority approved 61–53–15. Bush’s request for separate vote on expulsion clause rejected 51–61–16. Saudi Arabia’s motion to defer voting overnight also rejected 53–56–19. Saudi Arabia withdrew its third amendment (L. 637) after first two defeated 2 (Saudi Arabia, Mauritius)—60–66 and 2–62–64. Pres stated explanations of votes after vote be made A.M. Oct. 26.

At outset, Driss (Tunisia) submitted three new reses to be voted if necessary which would: 1) invite PRC occupy China’s seat (L. 639); 2) invite ROC, pending solution affecting status quo of Formosa, continue to occupy UN seat under name of Formosa (L. 640); and 3) inscribe current item in 27th GA agenda and invite SYG report on inquiries with view to seeking solution to Chirep problem (L. 641). Baroody (Saudi Arabia) introduced new res (L. 638) which would have admitted PRC and retained ROC, i.e., people of Taiwan, in UN until those people declared wishes by referendum or plebiscite. He declared this was one of most momentous occasions in UN’s history, and stressed sense of fairness, justice and compromise required. Arita Quinoez (Honduras) supported IQ and DR and stated both Chinas should have rights and duties as member states. Malile (Albania) denounced US anti-Chinese activities.

Liu (China) pointed out Mao Tse-tung already dictating terms to UN and asked if GA could in honor and conscience, accept these impossible terms. He expressed gratitude to reps who upheld his gov’t representation, and concluded: “In your decision lies fate of Chinese people, peace and security of Asia and whole world, and fate of UN itself.” Bush summed up “strongly held view of US,” and urged UN to take “constructive road—not discredited and utterly sinister road that leads to rule of strong over weak.” Explanations of vote before

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Unclassified; Priority.

vote made by Mongolia, Japan, El Salvador, Malaysia, Singapore, Austria, Peru, Madagascar, Rwanda, Dahomey, Senegal, Argentina, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Pakistan, Ghana, Congo (K), and Algeria.

During five-and-half hours after conclusion of general debate, in addition to explanations of vote, Baroody requested priority for his res and moved to defer voting. Before his motion rejected, it was supported by Japan, Philippines and Liberia and opposed by AR co-sponsors. Pakistan formally opposed US motion for priority. Senegal stated it would ask for separate vote on expulsion portion of Albanian res. Bush's request for priority for IQ was supported by NZ, Japan and Australia.

After votes on priority for IQ and for IQ res, Bush moved to delete expulsion clause, and was opposed by Iraq and Tanzania on grounds voting had begun. Bush interjected it had not started; motion clearly in order; and he asked for chair's ruling. Pres Malik then stated: "Voting is continued. Amendment is not receivable." Baroody charged Pres could not prevent voting by division, and said Senegal already requested division. Syria endorsed Pres's ruling and Liberia challenged it. Tunisia withdrew its three reses. Bush requested separate vote on expulsion clause under Rule 91, and Sierra Leone asked for clarification on what such vote would mean. Tanzania appealed to Senegal not insist on separate vote on last clause, and Senegal withdrew proposal claiming some persons insisted on changing its meaning.

After US motion for division rejected, Chinese FonMin said it was flagrant violation. "In view of frenzy and irrational behavior in this hall, del of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly." His govt would continue struggle with like-minded countries, and he was confident cause for which they had been fighting for more than quarter of century would prevail.

Albanian res was then adopted. Albanian rep made victory statement, which Pres attempted interrupt on grounds explanations of vote would be heard at next meeting. GA then adjourned at 11:22 P.M. until 11:00 A.M. Oct. 26.

[Omitted here are lists of countries and their votes on the Albanian resolution, priority for the IQ resolution, the IQ resolution, and the motion for division on the AR.]

Bush

431. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 26, 1971, 2358Z.

3870. Subj: Bush–SYG Meeting Oct 26.

1. Bush requested meeting with U Thant Oct 26 in light of Chirep vote previous evening. At outset Bush said he would try to keep separate his deep personal disappointment that US position did not prevail for main purpose of his call. Bush said as we went into meeting he felt we would win. U Thant said his own estimate as meeting began give US the edge.

2. Main purpose of call was because Bush sensed SYG's discomfort over emotional and carnival atmosphere in GA after key votes and when ROC withdrew. Bush said he wanted SYG to know that he and USUN would conduct selves so as not to complicate the problems of UN. This did not mean that there would not be real difficulties with Congress and Chirep defeat came at awkward time when efforts underway to solve deficit crisis. However, Bush pledged himself personally to do what he could to see that US continues to support UN. We would try to be constructive and would strive to counteract inevitable reaction.

3. SYG was obviously moved and expressed his appreciation. He very much hoped there would be no financial reprisals by Congress. He gave Bush an advance copy of his press statement (septel) in which he regretted departure of ROC. SYG indicated he understood sharpness of US disappointment over vote but said that in long run he believed UN would be strengthened.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.

432. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, October 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Timing of the UN Chirep Vote

You asked for an analysis of the timing of the UN vote, why it came so much earlier than our initial estimates, and why our people at the UN did not delay the matter until the end of October or early November. The following seem to be the salient facts:

1. Neither we nor anyone else had control over when the Chirep debate began. It was the first item on the agenda, and thus became the order of business immediately upon the end of the general debate (the initial round of general statements by delegation heads).

2. The initial estimate was for a vote probably on October 28 but possibly running several days later. That was based upon an estimate of how many people would want to speak to the issue and at what length.

3. As soon as the debate got underway, it became clear that not as many countries were choosing to speak, and that the speeches tended to be extremely short, compared with those made in previous years. At that point it seemed clear that the vote would take place during the last week of October, possibly during the middle of the week.

4. Our delegation at the UN was aware of the necessity of putting off the vote, at least until Henry was out of Peking. They did, therefore, take steps to extend the debate by encouraging countries to speak that might otherwise not have done so, and by getting additional pages inserted in speech drafts.

5. By the end of last week, however, it was clear that the general sentiment of the Assembly, and the strategy of the opposition, were both driving toward a quick disposal of the issue. Over the weekend, Secretary Rogers passed the word to put the vote off at least until Tuesday morning.

6. That brings us to Monday, and you know of the tactical considerations which led to the vote Monday evening. According to Sam DePalma, the other side knew they had the votes on Monday and were

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum bears a handwritten note by Kissinger reading: "Key para on 2nd page. HK." The last paragraph of the memorandum is marked.

determined to push for a vote before anything could happen to change the situation. State, on the other hand, saw no advantage to further delays (the impending Belgian announcement etc.) and, in any event, given the general atmosphere, could not press too hard for further delay without making it obvious that we did not have the horses, thus causing a further erosion of our support.

In connection with Henry's apparent wish that the vote be delayed for at least several days after his return, I do not know what he may privately have conveyed to Secretary Rogers or George Bush. At lesser levels, however, people knew that the vote should be delayed until Henry was out of Peking but were not aware that importance was attached to any further delay.

433. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chirep, ROC–US Bilateral Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Chow Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
James Shen, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Frederick F. Chien, Director, North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Secretary
Richard Pedersen, Counselor
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, EA
Samuel DePalma, Assistant Secretary, IO
Leo Moser, Director, Republic of China Affairs

Summary: Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, enroute back to Taipei after his departure from New York, paid a call on the Secretary in which he expressed his gratitude for US support on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, indicated a generally flexible position in respect to future contests to maintain ROC representation in specialized agencies, and requested continued US bilateral support in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Moser, cleared by Assistant Secretaries Green and DePalma and Pedersen, and approved November 8 in S.

terms of 1) military equipment and 2) actions to help maintain the economic viability of the Republic of China. End summary.

The conversation began with the Secretary expressing his regret that he had to meet the Foreign Minister under these conditions. The US had struggled mightily in its efforts to maintain ROC representation in the UN. The Secretary reviewed successful last minute efforts to line up the votes of such countries as Mexico. He mentioned the difficulties presented by the change of position on the part of Senegal, Cyprus, Belgium and others. (The Senegal change was particularly difficult because it involved also the loss of the Togo vote.) The Secretary stressed that the President had been deeply involved in the effort to assure continued ROC representation in the United Nations.

Minister Chow expressed the gratitude of his country for the support of the US Government and mentioned in particular Ambassadors Bush and Phillips in New York. He feared no decent country would want to be associated with the United Nations and it might go "down the drain." He mentioned the fact that the General Assembly had broken into laughter when the votes of Israel and Portugal were recorded. The opportunistic position of those governments he decried as "disgraceful." He expressed his gratitude to Japan and said he was happy to see the Sato government had weathered the criticism.

The Secretary observed that the vote had gone reasonably well in Latin America. US efforts had turned both Argentina and Mexico toward our position. Only Trinidad and Tobago was a last minute disappointment. Belgium's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China came, he remarked, at a bad time—particularly since we had so little support in Europe generally. Minister Chow mentioned that in the future the bilateral relations of the Republic of China with good friends like the United States and Japan would be more important than the multilateral side of things. He mentioned that the US Government had assured his government of the continuation of the Treaty commitment and of close economic ties. He expressed his hope that the Secretary or the President would once again be able to make a public statement along these lines.

The Secretary of State mentioned that the issue had been covered in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on October 27. He provided Minister Chow with the appropriate pages from that testimony, saying that the GRC could use his statements if it felt they would be appropriate.

For the future, Minister Chow said, the two important things were to guarantee a viable economy and assure external security. External security would require military equipment. The ROC armed forces were in need of modernization. He specifically mentioned the need for tanks, for two or three submarines for training purposes and for more

modern aircraft. Minister Chow mentioned that the delivery of such equipment might take place over the years but that a US commitment at this time would be of great value in terms of morale on Taiwan. On the economic side, Minister Chow expressed his hope that the US would continue to encourage trade and investment on Taiwan.

Minister Chow stated that his Government was attempting to maintain commercial relations with those governments that have recently established relations with Communist China. In Belgium it hoped to set up a group called perhaps “the Chinese Cultural Center” to provide consular, cultural and commercial contacts in the area. The ROC was also interested in maintaining offices in Geneva and Vienna. It was contemplating launching a “counteroffensive” in Scandinavia, in an attempt to develop commercial relations and an informal presence in that area. From Saudi Arabia a roving ROC Ambassador would cover the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia would be a good anchor for ROC interests in the Near East since the King was a good friend. Brazil could be a similar base for South America, Guatemala for Central America. Ambassador Shen expressed the hope that the US would be able to help the ROC maintain its informal commercial relations with Canada and Italy.

The Secretary stated that he felt the USG could be helpful on the economic side. He mentioned the visit of Governor Reagan to Taiwan as a recent evidence of interest in expanded commercial contacts between California and the Republic of China. The USG could probably encourage US investment in Taiwan to some extent by its future actions. On the military side, the Secretary said, there could be problems. It would not be in the interest of either the ROC or the US to make it appear that there was some sort of military crisis in the area that had to be met by new military equipment. The Secretary expressed his opinion that the Treaty commitment of the US was our major presence in the area. It would be most unfortunate, he said, to give any signal that might be misinterpreted as concern over the security of the area.

Minister Chow stated that he did not wish to make an issue of military aid but stated that he hoped that US assurances in terms of the defense commitment could be translated into something tangible. The Secretary responded that there was a problem of psychological impact, since an action designed to increase stability by supplying more equipment could lead to the opposite effect of undermining the military stability of the area. The most immediate need was to guarantee the economic stability of the ROC. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister for his views on the specialized agencies.

Chow stated that generalization was difficult. Each agency must be studied separately in terms of its history, membership, and voting procedures. He noted that there is weighted voting in the Fund and

the Bank and that the communist nations had not generally joined some agencies. The UPU, ILO and some other agencies are much older than than UN, Chow noted, and these older agencies are not a part of the UN system in the same way as organizations like ECAFE—in which, for example, he foresaw no chance of retaining ROC membership.

Chow stated his Government would have to declare publicly that it intended to fight to the end to retain its seat in all specialized agencies. He added, however, that he did not intend in fact to expose his Government to unnecessary loss of prestige by entering into hopeless contests.

The Secretary stated that it was obvious that further study would be necessary before we could decide what could be done in the various specialized agencies. Meanwhile, we would remain in consultation with the ROC. Mr. DePalma said that the USG would in the interim do its best to insure that each specialized agency followed its own constitutional procedure and did not act precipitously in the area of Chinese representation.

The Secretary remarked that Mr. Meany had said that if the ROC were expelled from the ILO, he would not wish to stay in that organization. The Secretary asked Mr. DePalma how the situation looked in the ILO, and Mr. DePalma replied that it was most difficult to say at the present time.

Ambassador Shen remarked that in the IMF the US had some 25 percent of the shares. Presumably the Chinese Communists would not want to enter such an organization, anyway. Mr. Pedersen said that in most of the “main line” UN specialized agencies it would be very hard to win, since most rely on a simple majority.

Chow recalled that USSR had formerly criticized the UN, saying that the US always had “an automatic majority.” Now Chow feared, “the other side” may think they have an automatic majority. This could turn the UN and other related agencies into irresponsible “circuses,” no longer capable of fulfilling their proper role.

The conversation ended with Minister Chow stating that he hoped the USG would be able to continue to repeat its assurances in respect to its relations with the ROC. “Of all good things,” he said, “you can’t have too many.”

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

196136. Subject: Chirep.

1. You are instructed to call as soon as possible upon President Chiang, or in the case of his unavailability on Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, to deliver the following oral message. Leave an aide-mémoire consisting of the text which you have delivered orally.

2. "I have been instructed to express to you the sincere and deep regret of the Government of the United States as regards the recent action of the United Nations depriving the Republic of China of representation in the General Assembly. We believe that action to have been a serious mistake, neither just nor realistic.

3. The Government of the Republic of China has contributed positively to the UN since its inception and the Government of the US had looked forward to your continued advice and counsel as a member of that organization. Defeat of the Important Question resolution came as a surprise to the Government of the United States, since our voting estimate early on the morning of October 25 indicated that we would win that vote by a narrow margin.

4. The representatives of the Government of the United States who have had the honor to work closely with their colleagues of the Government of the Republic of China during the last few months on this difficult question, have been uniformly impressed with both the adherence to principle and tactical flexibility reflected in your Government's decisions. Our representatives have worked closely around the world in this joint endeavor, and the spirit of close cooperation we have gained will not be lost.

5. In the view of the United States Government, nothing that has happened in the UN will in any way affect the ties between our two countries. The Republic of China has a dynamic and growing economy, our two countries have close bilateral relations in a wide variety of fields and we expect those relations to continue to prosper. As has been stated before, the defense commitment of the US to the ROC is in no way affected by recent developments.

6. My Government will continue to be in contact with your Government to discuss the implications of the decision of October 25th. You may be assured that the Government of the United States remains

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Moser; cleared by Brown, Green, and Haig; and approved by Rogers.

deeply interested in the status of the Republic of China as an honored and valued member of the international community.”²

7. At the conclusion of your oral presentation (but not to be included in the aide-mémoire) you should state the following: “I have been instructed to inform you that these views have the full support of the President of the United States.”

8. You may wish also to take the opportunity of this representation to mention the Secretary’s personal appreciation for the great effort of Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai in our common cause at the United Nations.

Rogers

² The message was delivered by McConaughy in a short meeting with Chiang on October 29. (Telegram 5403 from Taipei, October 29; *ibid.*) The ROC requested that the “general character” of the U.S. message be made public. (Telegram 5405 from Taipei, October 29; *ibid.*) The Department of State agreed. (Telegram 198797 to Taipei, October 30; *ibid.*)

435. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in UN-Related and Specialized Agencies

In the wake of the passage of the Albanian Resolution in the UN General Assembly, we need to formulate the US position with regard to the participation of the Republic of China (ROC) in UN-related and specialized agencies. The timing, the manner in which the issue will arise and the likely outcome will vary from agency to agency.²

We have already begun to face the question of Chinese representation in the specialized agencies. There are no scheduled plenary meetings of these agencies before the end of the year, but the UNESCO

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret. An attached memorandum of transmittal from Marshall Wright to Kissinger is dated November 2.

² An Annex entitled “Chirep in the Specialized Agencies,” which provides a summary estimate of the situation in the agencies, is attached but not printed.

Executive Board is considering the question of Chinese representation on October 28. There are two proposals before the UNESCO Executive Board. One is an Algerian motion requiring the Director General to address all communications regarding the execution of the UNESCO program to the PRC rather than the ROC. The other is a Mexican proposal calling for the convening of a special session of the UNESCO General Conference to deal with this matter. We are opposing the first and seeking to delay the second on the grounds that there is no evidence of any PRC intention to participate in UNESCO. The executive organs of ICAO and the ILO will meet in early November and the IAEA Board of Governors in December.

As in the case of UNESCO, executive bodies of other specialized agencies meeting before the next sessions of their plenary bodies will probably be urged to take some interim action which would have the effect of excluding the ROC from participation. Even technical commissions or the secretariats of these agencies might undertake actions in this direction.

Although there is no indication as yet of any PRC intention to participate in these bodies, it has made known its view that the ROC should be expelled from all specialized agencies. The People's Republic of China and its supporters will certainly press the position that the General Assembly action means that the Republic of China should not participate in the activities of most, if not all, of the UN-related and specialized agencies. As the vote on the Albanian Resolution signified, there will be strong support for this position generally. The UN Secretariat is also strongly disposed to accommodate the early entry of the PRC and the early departure of the ROC from UN-related bodies. We have requested USUN to inform the Secretary-General that we are opposed to any irregular actions by executive or subsidiary organs of these agencies seeking to prejudge decisions which should be taken by the membership as a whole.

The Republic of China has indicated that it regards its announced withdrawal from the UN to apply also to subsidiary UN organs (the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council and its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and UNICEF). The Foreign Minister has stated that the ROC does not regard its decision as applying to those specialized agencies of which it is a member: International Labor Organization (ILO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunication Union (ITU),

World Meteorology Organization (WMO), Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) or to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He also said that the ROC has decided in principle to fight to preserve its membership in each of the specialized agencies. We will want to obtain a more specific reading of the way in which the ROC envisages handling this issue in each agency. The position we propose to take may importantly influence the ROC approach.

In the past to protect the ROC's seat we have consistently taken the position that specialized agencies should be guided by the UNGA Resolution 396 of December 14, 1950 which recommends that specialized agencies take into account the decision of the UNGA with regard to the representation of a member state. In supporting the ouster of the ROC from UN-related organs and specialized agencies, the Secretary General and other members are certain to cite this resolution and our previous position, the language of the Albanian resolution which passed (to expel the ROC from "all the organizations related to" the United Nations) as well as the language of our dual representation resolution which was not put to the vote ("recommends that all United Nations bodies and the specialized agencies take into account the provisions of this resolution in deciding the question of Chinese representation").

In terms of the situations we will face, UN-related organs and specialized agencies can be divided into four categories:

(a) Agencies and bodies with such integral ties with the UN that the ROC considers itself to have withdrawn from them. These include the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, ECAFE and UNICEF.

(b) Agencies in which the question of Chinese representation will, for all practical purposes, have been virtually decided by the adoption of the Albanian resolution. These are agencies in which a substantial majority of the members voted for the Albanian resolution in the UNGA, most of whom will take a position in the agencies consistent with that vote. While there would in some cases be valid legal grounds for contesting the ouster of the ROC, since the supporters of the Albanian resolution insisted that the question was one of representation and not expulsion of a member, the voting strength to uphold this position would not be present in case of a challenge. These agencies include UNESCO, ICAO, IMCO, ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU and WMO. A preliminary study of the probable voting position of the members of these agencies indicates we would lose a fight to maintain ROC representation.

(c) There are also the financial institutions, the IMF, the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, and IFC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). They have different provisions in their respective articles of agreement, which are under close study. In general, these economic institutions, of which the IMF and the World Bank Group have

acknowledged themselves to be specialized agencies of the UN, have not always followed the guidance of UNGA resolutions. The possibility of ROC exclusion is, therefore, considered not to be so acute in these apolitical institutions in which we and other responsible nations enjoy a preponderant influence.

(d) A case can be made for continued ROC participation in certain agencies by reason of their purely technical nature (ICAO, IAEA, UPU, ITU, WMO and IMCO) or because they engage in standard-setting or risk-limiting activities requiring the broadest membership to be effective (WHO and some others of the above). But, in the end, the decision is likely to be taken on political grounds and will be determined largely by the desire of a majority to assure PRC participation, if necessary on its own terms.

(e) Lastly, there is the question of ROC participation in UN-related conferences and conventions. The normal position of the UNGA has been to apply the "Vienna formula" in issuing invitations. The Vienna formula provides for the invitation of states members of the United Nations, specialized agencies, the IAEA and parties to the International Court of Justice. Were the ROC able to continue to participate in the IMF or another specialized agency, there would be grounds for its inclusion under the Vienna formula. However, this position might be challenged on the grounds that, following the adoption of the Albanian resolution, the ROC is not a state recognized as such by the UN and the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly would probably support that interpretation. Our only recourse might be to ask for a ruling by the International Court of Justice, but that too would require approval by a majority.

This brief survey of the technical and voting considerations suggests that the realistic possibilities for the ROC retaining a position in UN-related organs and the specialized agencies are confined largely to the financial organizations and possibly some special arrangements could be reached in IAEA. Apart from these factors, our policy and posture toward the ROC and the PRC will, of course, bear on the positions we decide to take. We assume that:

(a) We attach high priority to the normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China and accordingly would not wish to work intensively to impede its participation in the UN-related agencies and international conferences, particularly those where participation has significant political connotations. The PRC itself has given indications that it will want the ROC out of all UN-related activities if it is to participate in the UN and international conferences.

(b) We wish to do what is feasible to avoid the rapid isolation of the ROC in the international community. This interest would be served if the ROC could participate in one or more of the UN-related or specialized agencies and thereby qualify for participation in the UN De-

velopment Fund and for inclusion in the Vienna formula and could therefore attend various international conferences and adhere to various conventions.

There will be a clear contradiction between these two objectives in most instances. We will, therefore, wish to examine each situation on a case-by-case basis before making a final determination. Moreover, the prospects of gaining sufficient support to maintain ROC representation in most of these agencies is dim and we shall have to consider how much more US prestige should be engaged in such an effort.

Pending further study of the matter, we can in the governing bodies where the question arises take the position that constitutional procedures must be observed and, without entering into the substance of the matter, vote against proposals based on irregular procedures or on attempts to prejudice decisions by organs competent to take them. We can also seek to deter action by the secretariats of the specialized agencies simply to decide to send correspondence and invitations to the PRC rather than the ROC without prior reference of the question to their plenary bodies or other organs competent to decide the matter.

We could also at this time speak to the ROC along the following general lines:

(1) We wish to ascertain what the ROC position is with regard to its continued membership and participation in the various UN-related bodies and the specialized agencies.

(2) We believe that the PRC may make its participation in the General Assembly contingent upon the expulsion of the ROC from all UN-related agencies. However, we do not have any clear indication regarding PRC intention to participate in the work of specific agencies.

(3) We believe that the international financial institutions, the IMF and the other affiliated agencies, form quite a separate case in that they are apolitical and we and other responsible nations enjoy a preponderant influence in them. They offer the least likely possibility of ROC expulsion.

(4) We would want to study very carefully the statutory and voting situation in UN-related organs and specialized agencies before formulating our position on a case-by-case basis. Frankly, the prospects for sustaining ROC participation do not appear bright in many of them.

(5) We will, in any event, favor strict observance of appropriate statutory procedures in deciding the question of participation in the various agencies and will not support proposals aimed at by-passing competent organs or prejudging their decisions.

Ted Curran³

³ Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

436. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**¹

New York, October 30, 1971, 0050Z.

3956. Subj: Chirep in Specialized Agencies. Ref: USUN 3909.²

1. ROC Vice Minister Yang (please protect) expressed to Amb Phillips Oct 29 his strongly held personal view that with adoption of AR, ROC membership in all specialized agencies should be considered as terminated.

2. While recognizing right of each agency to be judge of its own membership qualifications, Yang thought it would be a serious mistake for ROC to fight to retain its membership in agencies. To do so, he said, would be to expose ROC to another round of bruising contests doomed to end in failure and thus contribute to a further erosion of ROC's diplomatic position. Rather than fighting for a lost cause, Yang said ROC must now devote its energies to strengthening its bilateral relations with as many countries as possible.

3. Yang said FonMin Chow's initial reaction following General Assembly vote had been a determination to fight to retain ROC's seats in specialized agencies. Yang believes he has now convinced FonMin of fallacy of this policy and he hopes USG will refrain from giving ROC any encouragement to mount a campaign to retain its membership in specialized agencies. Yang observed that AR called for expulsion of "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek," rather than ROC. He speculated what situation might be if in future a new govt came to power which explicitly claimed jurisdiction over only Taiwan. Under these different circumstances he said Taiwan might find greater receptivity to membership in some of specialized agencies, particularly those which act on principle of universality and which include in their membership states not members of United Nations.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Noform; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei.

² In telegram 3909, October 28, ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai expressed his government's intention to try to keep its seat in the specialized agencies. (Ibid.)

437. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, November 2, 1971, 0952Z.

5457. Subj: Chirep: Atmospherics of Ambassador's Meeting With President Chiang. Ref: Taipei 5403.²

Summary: When Ambassador delivered oral message to President Chiang following UNGA expulsion action, President's attitude was one of interest and appreciation for US support, but he was not in a communicative mood. All of Ambassador's efforts to draw him into substantive conversation were unsuccessful. President asked pointedly whether message was from President or State Dept. Ambassador replied message was from US Government and explained exclusive authority and responsibility of President for conduct of foreign relations under US Constitution. President Chiang's unusually close-mouthed posture is believed to stem from his need for more time to adjust to the setback of Oct. 25 before he takes a position.

1. In my October 29 meeting with President Chiang to deliver USG oral message of reassurance and sympathy following UNGA expulsion action, President seemed normally vigorous and showed complete self-control. He was courteous, considerate, and mildly responsive to my sentiments of felicitation on the eve of the 84th anniversary of his birth. However, he was not inclined at all to enter into substantive conversation. My efforts to elicit something of his thinking on the new situation created for the GRC, or at least to get his reaction to the sad events of October 25, were unavailing.

2. I prefaced my delivery of oral message with some general comments which were a blend of expressions of regret and sympathy on the one hand, and an effort to focus on ways to minimize the adverse consequences and make the best of a difficult situation on the other. I mentioned particularly the problem of maintaining GRC membership in the specialized agencies of concrete value to the GRC, capitalizing on the fact that the specialized agencies are not bound by the action of the General Assembly. I indicated that our legal and international organization specialists were already studying this problem in close concert with GRC representatives in New York and Washington and I speculated in a preliminary way on the relative utility to the GRC of membership in several of the specialized bodies. Ordinarily this type

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.

² See footnote 2, Document 434.

of approach would be sufficient to launch an animated discussion with the President, but he remained noncommittal though attentive. I then directly invited him to give us the benefit of his thinking on the best means of coping with the difficult new international relations situation we face as a result of the exclusion action of the UNGA. I recalled how illuminating and how valuable to us his insights and analyses, based on his wisdom and vast experience, had proven on numerous occasions. Again the President showed a disinclination to be drawn out by indicating that he would prefer to hear the US views.

3. I then delivered the oral message reading slowly, and with added emphasis on some key passages. I paused after every sentence or so for translation by Ambassador Ying, who was serving as substitute interpreter in the absence of Fred Chien. Ying did a rather poor job, even though he had before him a carbon copy of the document from which I was reading. He hesitated, stumbled, corrected himself, and seemed almost in a state of confusion at one point. The President's military aide came to his rescue on the spur of the moment, showing a good comprehension of the locutions which were giving Ying difficulty. President Chiang followed the presentation closely and asked for clarification of several phrases which appeared to be obscure in Ying's off-the-cuff translation. When I finished delivery of the oral message, I passed the confirmatory aide-mémoire to Acting FonMin Tchen.

4. The President briefly expressed his thanks for the message. Noting my added remarks at the end of the oral message characterizing the views expressed as having the full support of the President of the United States, President Chiang asked bluntly if the message was from the President or from the State Department. I replied, possibly with a trace of warmth, that the message was from the Government of the United States. I added that the President under our Constitution has full authority and responsibility for the formulation of the foreign policy and the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. The Department of State serves as the agent of the President in implementing the foreign policy which he establishes.

5. In a further attempt to draw President Chiang into a discussion which would give me some insight into his thinking or at least his mood, I referred to the important meeting of FonMin Chow Shu-kai with Secretary Rogers which would begin in Washington within a few hours. The President merely said he hoped Minister Chow would not fail to express the gratitude of the GRC for all the hard work of Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Bush, and their colleagues in defense of GRC membership in the UN.

6. As I prepared to depart I expressed the strong resolve of the USG to do all it could to shore up the international position of the GRC in this time of adversity and in conjunction with GRC representatives

to seek the best possible means of offsetting the damage done by the UNGA action. President said we must all work harder than ever in order to negate the bad effects of the UN action.

7. *Comment.* The President did not strike me as a man having nothing of a substantive nature in mind. Rather he seemed to be refraining for a reason from significant comment at this juncture. I estimate, that while he is not in a state of actual shock, he wants more time to evaluate his drastically altered situation and to determine the best posture for him to adopt in the wake of the traumatic events of the week. He is aware that any views or reactions voiced by him will be carefully studied by US representatives, and he probably feels it would be premature for him to go on record at a time when his mental and emotional reaction has not completely jelled. I do not believe we should read any broad implications into his rather uncommunicative attitude on this occasion.

McConaughy

438. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 2, 1971, 2319Z.

3991. Subj: USUN Relations With Chinese Delegation.

1. Although it is not yet certain, it appears that Chinese delegation might arrive at the end of this or beginning of next week. As host country, we will have a certain amount of routine administrative work to perform in facilitating entry, providing privileges and immunities, documentation, and assisting with other numerous problems associated with opening of a permanent mission. It is not clear whether Chinese will wish to deal directly with us on these matters or whether they will ask third parties (e.g., Pakistan, Albania) to assist them.

2. From outset we will be faced with problem of the proper attitude US del should adopt toward PRC reps. We assume we will wish to avoid the extremes of effusiveness or aloofness. In the SC and in main committees there will be specific items on which it would be unusual for us not to engage in matter-of-fact consultations on the same

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Canberra, and Wellington.

basis as we do with other delegations with which we do not have diplomatic relations (e.g., Egypt, Syria).

3. We expect that those who fought for the AR will wish to have PRC's entry taken note of in some fashion. Stavropoulos tells us Romanians have already asked if special plenary meeting could be called for purpose of welcoming PRC del. Secretariat has replied in the negative but has indicated that on day PRC del arrives, plenary could be called in connection with a current item such as WDC which would provide opportunity for welcoming speeches.

4. As for welcoming statements, we will wish to consider forum and particular circumstances. In SC and plenary where majority of other delegations are making welcoming remarks, we assume we should make brief statement recalling that US has supported representation of PRC in UN and we hope its presence will strengthen the organization in realizing the Charter's goals.

5. As Dept aware, USUN does not ordinarily send Mission officers to airport upon arrival of new UN delegations. Given special circumstances surrounding PRC arrival and fact reps will not be issued visas, believe Dept might wish consider having USUN officer present when Chinese arrive.²

Bush

² In telegram 4058 from USUN, November 5, the Mission confirmed instructions from Assistant Secretary De Palma that the arrival of the PRC delegation would be handled under "general ground rules governing the arrival of new UN delegations." Under no circumstance would the Mission have Ambassadorial representation at the airport. (Ibid.)

**439. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, November 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Travel Restrictions on PRC Mission

Peking's announcement that it intends shortly to send a delegation to the General Assembly raises the question of what kind of travel restrictions will be applicable for the PRC Mission.

There are at present three types of travel restrictions applied to Communist missions in New York:

(1) The Soviet Mission must notify USUN at least 48 hours in advance of proposed travel beyond a 25-mile zone around New York (unless we specifically disapprove, the Soviet traveller proceeds on his trip);

(2) Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania need not give advance notification though they and the USSR must apply for permission to visit specified closed counties (appreciably greater in number in the case of the USSR);

(3) Albania, Mongolia and Cuba must receive prior permission for each trip and follow more cumbersome procedures to travel anywhere beyond the 25-mile zone. While implementation in fact varies, travel theoretically is supposed to take place only in connection with UN business.

The third alternative would be logically consistent with the policy we have followed toward Communist UN members with whom we do not have diplomatic relations and is the nearest equivalent to the type of restrictions applied by Peking on the travel of foreign diplomats in China. A later decision to ease controls would be easier to handle than if such controls had to be tightened. Countries governed by this alternative have done much less travelling in the United States, a fact which has eased the security problem.

Choosing either of the first two alternatives might be useful as a gesture to Peking in connection with the President's visit as well as a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. An attached transmittal memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger is also dated November 8. At the end of that memorandum, Kissinger initialed his approval of a recommendation authorizing USUN to notify the Chinese Mission that it would be subject to the same travel restrictions as the Soviet Mission.

gesture of reciprocity for the manner your own visits to Peking were handled. Application of the first type of restriction also would be in line with our general effort to treat Peking on the same basis as Moscow. Application of more restrictive procedures might be taken by Peking as an excessively cool U.S. welcome to the international community. However, the limits on travel involved in these alternatives stem from reciprocity for treatment of U.S. diplomats, a factor not yet existent in the case of the PRC.

Allowing the PRC representatives travel privileges no less favorable than those granted the USSR would give the PRC greater access to Chinese communities and to extremist organizations in the United States. We believe, however, that the PRC will be circumspect, at least initially, in its dealings with such groups. In any case, our ability to control PRC travel and handle problems of personal security, would be almost the same under the first as under the third alternative since under both we can disapprove trips and ascertain the itinerary of PRC travellers.

It is our recommendation that we follow the policy applied to the Soviet Mission, permitting the PRC representatives to travel beyond the 25-mile zone upon 48-hour advance notice to USUN and giving them the same list we give the Soviet Mission of counties situated throughout the United States to which travel is barred. In practice special permission is often given for travel to these areas.

Mr. Mardian of the Department of Justice, in his capacity as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (established under the NSC with representatives from Justice, Defense and State) has sent a letter on behalf of the Committee to the Secretary of State containing a recommendation identical to the one in this memorandum.

We believe that we should inform the PRC representatives of these restrictions as soon as possible after their arrival in New York. Therefore, unless we hear otherwise from you before then, we will instruct USUN to send a note upon their arrival informing them of the applicable rules with respect to travel in the United States.²

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

² Authorization was transmitted to USUN in telegram 205625, November 11. (Ibid.) Delivery of the note was reported in telegram 4228 from USUN, November 13. (Ibid.)

440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 10, 1971, 0100Z.

204697. Subject: USUN Relations with Chinese Delegation. Ref: A. USUN 3991;² B. USUN 4023.³

1. In your contacts with PRC delegation you should observe following guidelines:

a. Working contacts, including arranging administrative details connected with opening PRC Mission: You should not take the lead in trying to establish bilateral contact on administrative problems, but should be responsive if the PRC reps initiate, or indicate a desire, for such contact. You should promptly report any such contacts, and any administrative difficulties which the Chinese may experience in opening their mission. On working contacts required or desired in connection with substantive or procedural matters before the UN, you should refer to the Department for instructions.

b. Social contacts: Your general attitude toward the PRC reps should be friendly but restrained, and you should leave to them the initiative in setting the tone for more intimate contacts. USUN personnel may attend parties given by friendly states honoring the PRC reps. You should promptly report any contacts with the PRC delegation and the atmosphere in which they were conducted. For the time being, you should request Department advice on case-by-case basis should invitations be received from PRC delegation.

2. In making above decisions, we have in mind unique nature of US-PRC relationship, including President's planned visit to Peking and US-PRC bilateral efforts to improve relations.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Confidential. Text received from the White House; cleared by Armitage, Jenkins, Eliot, Under Secretary Johnson, and Winthrop G. Brown; and approved by Assistant Secretary De Palma. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Canberra, and Wellington.

² Document 438.

³ Dated November 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM)

**441. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, November 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in UN-related and Specialized Agencies

After a close examination of the problem of Chinese representation in the specialized agencies and the IAEA, I have reached some conclusions regarding agencies in which we should endeavor to maintain Republic of China (ROC) membership, those in which it is desirable to avoid a losing confrontation and those in which further study within the U.S. Government and further consultation with other governments is necessary. The Department is consulting with ROC representatives with a view to coordinating our positions. We will not seek to foreclose the possibility of participation of the People's Republic of China in agencies of which the ROC remains a member.

Our examination of the membership, likely voting positions and constitutional factors in each of the specialized agencies has led me to conclude that:

(1) It will not be possible, under present circumstances, to preserve ROC representation in the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Despite legal or technical grounds that we might cite in justification of continued ROC representation in these organizations, an overwhelming majority of the members will not consider them sufficiently important to override their interest in voting as they did in the UNGA. (The UNESCO Executive Board has already taken a decision to regard the PRC as the sole representative of China in UNESCO; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has invited the PRC to apply for membership, but the ROC is not a member.)

(2) With careful planning and some effort, it is likely that ROC membership can be preserved in the IMF and the World Bank group, at least so long as the PRC does not express an interest in participating. It may be possible to preserve ROC representation in the International Civil Aviation Organization as well, at least for the time being, but an indication of the PRC's readiness to assume the rights and ob-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted November 5 by Long; concurred in by Armitage, Stevenson, Brown, Pedersen, and Rein. An attached transmittal memorandum from Assistant Secretary De Palma to Rogers is dated November 9.

ligations of China under the ICAO Convention would probably lead to the exclusion of the ROC.

(3) Complexities in the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) require further examination before we can make a final decision on the approach we should take in these agencies. Our preliminary view is that we could not prevent the exclusion of the ROC from the ILO or the ITU. The situation in IAEA is particularly complicated because of the organization's mandate to safeguard peaceful nuclear activities in member and non-member countries.

We are consulting with the ROC regarding these conclusions and informing them that we are examining the means to preserve their representation in the agencies in which we have concluded it is possible to do so (the IMF, World Bank group and ICAO). We are at the same time informing them that we wish to avoid a confrontation in IMCO, UPU, WHO and WMO, in which there appears to be no feasible way to preserve their position, and that we are continuing to examine the more complex situations in the IAEA, ILO and ITU.

We are also consulting with other appropriate governments and groups, especially Treasury with respect to the financial institutions, to coordinate strategy to be followed in the agencies in which we have decided to work actively to preserve ROC representation and to obtain more precise assessments in regard to the agencies on which we have not reached a decision.

In the interest of maintaining institutional integrity and in order to avoid ill-considered actions, we are continuing to urge, in all agencies, that the issue be dealt with in strict compliance with the agencies' statutes and rules of procedure.

We intend to inform the ROC that we will probably share with the international community the view that PRC participation in the work of certain conferences, e.g., nuclear arms limitation, population, drug control and environment, will be desirable and will be insisted upon by a majority of UN members. We may wish to encourage the ROC not to contest the issue of representation in such fields.²

William P. Rogers

² A meeting between Assistant Secretary De Palma and Foreign Office Director of UN Affairs Che Yin-shou on November 10 on Chinese representation in UN agencies was described in telegram 206298 to Canberra, Taipei, Tokyo, and USUN. (Ibid.)

442. Editorial Note

On October 26, 1971, Secretary-General Thant had notified the heads of UN agencies of the passage of Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that declared the representatives of the People's Republic of China to be "the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations," and reminded them of a 1950 resolution recommending that the General Assembly's decisions concerning representation "should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies." Agency heads were to inform him of any actions taken concerning Chinese representation.

The Executive Board of UNESCO was the first to vote to recognize the PRC as representing China in the UN on October 29. The ILO Governing Board followed on November 16. GATT revoked the Republic of China's observer status on the same date. The ICAO Council followed on November 19. The FAO Council voted on November 25 to invite the PRC to join, and the Board of Governors of the IAEA voted to seat the PRC on December 9.

The Director-General of the WHO put Chinese representation on the provisional agenda for the 1972 World Health Assembly on November 11, 1971. Its Executive Board recommended representing the PRC on January 26, 1972, and the World Health Assembly voted to do so on May 10, 1972. The WMO invited member states to vote on Chinese representation on November 26, 1971, and a majority voted for the PRC by February 24, 1972. The PRC gained representation in the UPU on April 13, in the IMCO on May 23, and in the ITU on May 28. The IBRD and the IMF took no actions concerning Chinese representation during 1971 or 1972. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, pages 133–135, and *ibid.*, 1972, pages 765, 778, 795, 801, 804, 808, and 812)

443. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Ch'iao Kuan-hua Addresses the UN: "China Belongs to the Third World"

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, head of the PRC UN Delegation, has reaffirmed the basic political orientation of the Peking Government in his first address to the world organization.² The major theme of the statement is that China is not, and will not become, a "superpower"; that the PRC belongs to the "third world." Peking thus stresses its intent to rally support for its cause from the small and medium-sized countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ch'iao's address reiterates the main themes and issues of Chinese foreign policy of the past few years:

—It is only because of "gross interference in China's internal affairs" by the U.S. that the PRC has—until this year—been excluded from its rightful place in the UN.

—The strong majority of UN support for the Albanian Resolution is a defeat for the U.S., in collusion with "the Sato Government of Japan," in its effort to create "two Chinas." The PRC thus is targeting on Sato, while hoping a political figure in Japan will emerge who is more favorable to their position on Taiwan (or that Sato will modify his position to outflank his opposition).

—Regarding Taiwan, "it was only because of the outbreak of the Korean War" that the U.S. went back on its word (as expressed in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations) that the island should be restored to mainland control. "On behalf of the Government of the PRC, I hereby reiterate that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and the U.S. armed invasion and occupation of China's Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits cannot in the least alter the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan, that all the armed forces of the United States definitely should be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and that we are firmly opposed to any design to separate Taiwan from the motherland. The

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for information.

² A translation of Chiao Kuan-hua's November 15 address was sent in telegram 4245 from USUN, November 16. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA)

Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and no force on earth can stop us from doing so.”

—Regarding Indochina, Ch’iao called for “immediate and unconditional” withdrawal of U.S. forces, and supported the 7 point peace plan of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

—Concerning Korea, there was no direct call for withdrawal of U.S. troops; but North Korea’s 8 point program for national reunification was supported, and the demand was pressed that the UN annul its “illegal resolutions” on the Korean question and dissolve UNCURK.

—In the Middle East, Ch’iao expressed support for the Palestinians and other Arab peoples against “Israeli Zionism” and the major powers.

—Support was given to the African states struggling against “white colonialist rule” and racial discrimination.

—Ch’iao expressed support for the “third world” in its desire for economic independence, explicitly backing the Latin American countries seeking to extend the limit of their territorial waters out to 200 miles.

—Regarding disarmament questions, “China will never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries. Under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.”

Comment:

Ch’iao’s speech seems basically a “going on the record” with positions which the PRC has been advocating for the past several years—longer in the cases of Taiwan and Korea. It contained no surprises. The presentation is notable, however, for its lack of an operational focus. Ch’iao does not telegraph very much about specific measures which Peking will resort to in solving issues of concern such as Taiwan and Korea. The PRC intends to differentiate itself from the U.S. and USSR, and challenge us on the outstanding issues; but there is no indication in this speech that Peking has thought through the operational choices necessary to obtain its end.

While taken at face value the anti-U.S. tone of the speech can be read as laying down the gauntlet to us, it may be that Peking has merely stated its general position for the record to satisfy domestic and international audiences. Evidence from diplomatic sources, and from a Chou En-lai press conference of October 28, most strongly supports the view that the PRC delegation will adopt a low-profile posture during the remaining General Assembly session. One cannot preclude the possibility that Peking might now see it in its interest (or find its hand forced) to press aggressively on certain issues which would lead to a public confrontation with the U.S. It seems most likely, however, that

Ch'iao and his associates will wait for an assessment of PRC strength in the General Assembly (particularly among "third world" countries) before adopting a more aggressive political posture next year.³

³ After this first speech by a PRC representative in New York, Kissinger described to Nixon his conflict with Rogers over how the United States should respond. Kissinger stated: "Then I want it low-key. [Rogers] said it was an outrageous speech, and it's partly his ignorance. If you read what they said about Vietnam, it had tough rhetoric, but it didn't ask for a deadline. It didn't ask for the overthrow of Thieu, all it said was American troops have to be withdrawn, but no deadline." Nixon called the PRC statements a "damn smart strategy on their part, instead of coming in and sucking around at the UN." Kissinger continued: "Now what I did is I gave Bush a statement, which repeats some of my rebuttals to Chou without labeling them as such, and a very brief one. It says we're disappointed that they came, instead of being—firing empty cannons of rhetoric. The reason I picked that is that when I complained about these placards [during his October trip to the PRC], Chou said to me, don't worry about it, it's just empty cannons." Kissinger and Nixon agreed that these statements should be made from New York. As Kissinger stated: "Well, moreover if we do it in Washington, they'll reply in Peking. If they do it in New York, they can reply in New York if they want to. Secondly, nothing would please the Russians more than for us to be in a public brawl with the Chinese. Thirdly, people are going to say what the hell is he going there for, if we now get into a huge brawl with them." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, November 16, 12:33–1:59 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 619–28) For Bush's remarks, see Tad Szulc, "US Assails China as 'Intemperate' in Speech at UN," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1971, pp. 1, 10.

444. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 17, 1971, 2336Z.

4314. Subj: PRC Statement in GA.

1. Bouayad (Algeria) approached MisOff November 17 to query why Bush had released statement to press re PRC's statement in plenary November 15.² MisOff replied that this was matter which had been considered very carefully and that statement by PRC could not be left unanswered in view US public opinion. Bouayad said that it fortunate US had not replied in GA to PRC statement since statement was generally mild and merely restatement of PRC policy.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers, Hong Kong, and Taipei.

² Bush's statement to the UN General Assembly is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 20, 1971, pp. 715–716.

2. MisOff acknowledged that this may be case, but that it [not?] possible for US overlook such a statement in view of lively interest by US public opinion in what PRC does and says. Bouayad said he understood US position and remarked that Vice FonMin Ch'iao Kuanhua had seen Algerian Perm Rep Rahal November 12 to go over speech. According Bouayad, speech was far more abusive against US and that Rahal had managed clean up speech to great extent. Only point which had been over-emphasized perhaps was question of Palestinians on which Algerians felt very strongly. He said this information should be closely kept. When asked whether Algerians being front runners for PRC del, Bouayad said no and that they speaking to PRC as equals. Bouayad further pointed out that PRC del is totally unfamiliar with procedures in UN and is still feeling its way around and thus consulting with friendly delegations.

Bush

445. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Participation of Republic of China in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's)

ISSUE

What should the U.S. position be on Chinese participation in the IFI's? Specifically, should the United States press to retain Taiwan in the IMF, World Bank Group and ADB—and if so, how hard—and how should the question of PRC entry be handled in this connection?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Confidential. An attached transmittal memorandum from Marshall Wright to Kissinger, dated November 19, asking Kissinger to approve the Volcker-Samuels positions, bears Kissinger's handwritten note: "I agree but should we trigger the fight? HK." Another, undated, memorandum from Kissinger to Volcker and Samuels, in which he concurred with their recommendations, was not sent.

Because of the importance of the IFI's to development and to international monetary stability, and because of our own interest in Taiwan's economic well-being, we wish to encourage an equitable and internationally acceptable settlement of the Chinese representation issue in those institutions. ROC exclusion from the IFI's would probably jeopardize continued major U.S. support for the institutions. Moreover, entry of the PRC could create important operational and political problems for the IFI's, which would have to be carefully addressed.

Exclusion of the ROC would clearly be inequitable to a functioning economy and to a member in good standing of the institutions. Exclusion would cut the ROC off from IMF support as well as from important development financing from the World Bank Group and the ADB, could also damage the climate for private investment in Taiwan, and could give rise to additional financial demands on the United States to support Taiwan's economic viability. In addition, ROC exit from the IFI's could result in its virtually complete isolation from international organizations.

U.S. tactics in support of the ROC would have to be very carefully formulated, since if the issue were forced to a vote and if countries voted as they did in the UN, Taiwan might well be excluded in spite of the weighted voting system.

Options: Against this background, our broad options are:

1. *Remain silent as long as possible*, on the theories that the issue may simply recede with time, and that any positive action on the part of the United States may trigger a reaction. Although U Thant has called the UN China decision to the attention of the Fund and Bank by telegram, no member has yet indicated a desire to precipitate the issue in these organizations. This option appears inadvisable, however, because the lack of a clearly stated U.S. position could be interpreted by other governments, as well as Taipei, as an absence of U.S. concern.

2. *Make a serious effort to retain the ROC*, but not by a major diplomatic campaign as we mounted in the UN. If the PRC wishes to join, raise questions only of a technical nature concerning fulfillment of the obligations of membership (e.g., avoidance of discriminatory currency practices), applying the same standards we would to the membership application of any other Communist country. This is the favored option.

3. *Make an all-out effort to retain the ROC*, which may involve opposing PRC membership as incompatible with the objectives of the institutions. This alternative is considered inadvisable because defeat of an all-out effort would have far graver consequences for the IFI's themselves as well as for U.S. public and Congressional support for them than any other option.

Recommended Position: As noted, we recommend option 2. The specific tactics which we intend to initiate at once in support of this option are detailed in the Tab.²

Our intention would be to keep the primary focus of our activities on this issue within the framework of the institutions themselves, utilizing our IMF Executive Director as a principal channel of communication.³ As necessary, we would also make selected diplomatic contacts. At the same time, we would be exploring with the ROC various ways to adjust its position in the IFI's to reflect the size of its economy.

Our strategy on this issue in the Asian Development Bank should be similar to that for the IMF and World Bank Group.⁴

Paul A. Volcker
Nathaniel Samuels

² The attachments, none printed, are as follows: Tab: "U.S. Strategy for Continued ROC Membership in the IFI's"; Annex A: "Current Situation"; Annex B: "Foreign Policy Analysis in Support of the U.S. Strategy" (prepared by the Department of State); Annex C: "Background, Analysis and Options" (prepared by the Treasury Department); Annex D: "IMF and IBRD Staff Background Papers."

³ Membership in IMF is a prerequisite to membership in the World Bank Group. It is assumed, therefore, that the IMF will be the principal forum for resolution of this issue. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The principal difference in the factual situation regarding ADB is that, when ADB was established in 1966, the ROC became a member on the basis of the Taiwan economy only. [Footnote in the source text.]

446. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 20, 1971, 0227Z.

4408. PRC UN Del First Week Miscellany.

1. Summary. PRC UN delegation, statements about lack of preparedness and conservative approach to committee participation to contrary, has been active in UN corridors speaking to wide variety of newsmen and mostly third world delegates. In calls on various dele-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 22–2 CHICOM. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

gations in and outside UN, Chinese have listened to advice, asked many questions and kept silent on intentions. PRC apparently relying primarily on UN Secretariat for formal briefings and acquisition of documents. Delegation has shared USUN reluctance to take initiative on contacts, but Bush and Phillips have now met, respectively, Chiao and Huang. End summary.

2. In mild, low-key approach, Chinese have been going about process of learning the UN ropes. PRC delegates have made calls on many AR cosponsors, solicited and listened to advice, and have taken cautious first steps toward inserting selves into UN committee issues. Though many delegations (e.g. Norway, Algeria, Burundi) have taken initiative to put selves in position of intermediaries with USUN and presumably other delegations, Chinese appear to be relying on Secretariat for basic briefings and documents. (See septel for a Secretariat view of Chinese.)

3. In first week of UN participation, Chinese attended only plenary, SPC, First and Third Committees. Despite this limited activity, numerous Chinese delegates met in lounge and corridors with Afro-Asian and Latin American DeLOffs especially Chileans and Cubans. Their ease in moving about and talking with such variety of delegates has drawn on apparent linguistic versatility. Ubiquitous corridor motion justifies friendly delegation officer's remark that Chinese activity and its apparent relaxed manner already exceed that which characterized Soviet Delegation ten years ago. Indeed PRC may quickly approach USUN coverage of both UN committees and corridors.

4. Mild and cautious posture in UN chambers broken on November 19 with sharp exchange in First Committee between Chinese (An Chih-yuan) and Saudi Arabia (Baroody) over Chinese nuclear test. On same day, Chinese made dramatic appearance in Third Committee where they came down hard on side of Pakistan against India.

5. Chinese, while moving with ease around corridors, appear generally to be avoiding contact with American officials, but Chiao exchanged greeting with Bush in corridor prior November 15 plenary welcoming session and Huang shook hands with Phillips November 18. US press corps has confirmed in detail to us impression conveyed by published stories that Chinese very accessible to them. Li Wen-chuan, whose English considerably better than Kao's, appears be acting as Kao's assistant and interpreter in press contacts.

6. UN Protocol Assistant Castrounis informs us that PRC delegation staffing pattern published by *NY Times* November 18 reflects Secretariat's current understanding of delegation pigeon holes. He had been obliged to put this list together, however, on basis of "bits and pieces" elicited on various occasions from Chinese. When Chinese expressed surprise to him at publication of list, Castrounis asked if it contained any

errors. Chinese indicated list contained only one or two small mistakes. Castrounis tells us, however, that he confident only in list's identification of top ten names and he has pressed PRC delegation to let him know ASAP, for example, which of personnel were to be members of permanent mission. PRC has declined to indicate when this question would be sorted out.

7. Castrounis also states that below Huang Hua, only Chen Chu has ambassadorial rank. Chen is specifically designated as deputy for Security Council.

8. Castrounis has confirmed to us that in past week, Kao Liang has not been involved in protocol matters. These now seem to be handled largely by Hsu Hsin-hsi (when English required); Lin Chia-sen (French) and a third staffer, surnamed Liu, who speaks English.

9. Another Secretariat source informs us that Chou Nan will be handling military liaison work with Secretariat. PRC designated him in response to Secretariat request. We previously reported that Chou was functioning as delegation secretary, stressing internal coordination, and we assume that for present he doing both concurrently.

Bush

447. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

The People's Republic of China Enters the UN: Prospects for Her Political Posture, Staff Competence, Voting Patterns, and Issues

The rapid turn around on Chinese representation in the UN raises new prospects for the world organization. This memorandum sketches out Peking's likely political posture for the present UN session, notes

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, NSC Secretariat, Richard Solomon Chrons, 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Concurred in by Wright. Attached is a one-page chart dividing UN members into "Independents," "U.S. Supporters," "Sino-U.S. Cross-Pressured," "PRC Supporters," "Sino-Soviet Cross-Pressured," "Soviet Supporters," "U.S.-Soviet Cross-Pressured," and "Small Arab States."

the competence of her delegation staff, explores the issues that are likely to involve China's relations with the U.S. and USSR, and suggests possible voting patterns that may emerge in the General Assembly given the PRC's presence.

China's Political Posture: Defender of "Oppressed Nations" Against the "Super-Powers"

The tone of PRC public statements regarding her sudden acceptance by the UNGA as the sole legitimate government of China has been a self-righteous sense that her "legitimate rights" have been restored. The vote against the US-sponsored IQ resolution and subsequent support for the Albanian resolution is pictured in mainland media as representing "the defeat of might by justice."

Peking's international propaganda for several years has attempted to portray the PRC as defender of small countries against the bullying of the two super-powers. This line has been given particular emphasis in Chinese statements on her entrance to the UN, apparently in an effort to build a base of support from "third world" countries—and to undercut backing for the U.S. and USSR. "China will never be a super-power bullying other countries," asserted an official PRC statement of October 29. Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei told guests at an official banquet on November 3 that China had long "supported all the oppressed nations and peoples," and that "the one or two super-powers are finding it more and more difficult to engage in truculent acts of manipulating the UN and international affairs." And in an interview with a Japanese newsman made public on November 9, Chou En-lai stressed, "We must particularly and without fail respect the opinions of the small and medium-sized nations." In contrast, PRC propaganda has attempted to characterize official U.S. handling of the GA vote, and the subsequent reaction to the expulsion of the Nationalists, as "dollar blackmail" and crude political abuse.

The rapid sequence of developments in the UN seems to have confronted Peking with new opportunities and problems earlier than anticipated. A report from the Norwegian Ambassador to Peking characterizes the PRC as "completely unprepared to enter the UN this year;" and Chou En-lai has publicly stated that he was "surprised" by the "overwhelming majority" vote for the Albanian resolution.

The most notable political issue raised by Peking in the wake of the General Assembly vote has been an attack on the U.S. and Japan for allegedly promoting "Taiwan independence." Thus while Peking has succeeded in undercutting international support for the Nationalists, the Party leadership now sees that it has landed on the other horn of its dilemma of preventing the island, further severed from institutional and political ties to the mainland via the UN, from moving closer toward de facto independence.

How will Peking use its new UN presence to deal with the Taiwan issue, and other matters of concern to its security and international support? While this question is dealt with in a subsequent section of this memorandum on an issue-by-issue basis, it is our view that at least initially Peking will tread cautiously in a public forum where the ground is untested. Chou En-lai said as much in his interview with the Japanese newsman, stressing that China must “not be indiscreet and haphazard” as she enters the UN.

It seems that Peking initially will prefer to deal with her most sensitive issues through other channels. Most obvious is the new link to the USG. Peking has invested its public prestige heavily behind the coming Presidential visit (as most evident in the publicity given to Mr. Kissinger’s second visit to Peking); and given indications of Chou En-lai’s awareness of opposition to the President’s China policy from the American “right,” it seems likely that the PRC UN delegation will not seek to confront the U.S. on the most contentious matters during this session of the General Assembly. More likely, the PRC will want to explore such issues as Taiwan and Korea at the confidential and authoritative level of the Presidency in order to gain a sense of its options.

PRC Staff Competence in the UN: Starting with the “First Team”

A CCP cadre in Hong Kong has described the PRC delegation to the UN as China’s “first team.” Analysis of the professional experience of the eleven-man delegation reveals a number of characteristics which support such an assertion. Above all, this delegation is a “Chou En-lai” team. The senior members of the delegation have had long personal association with Chou, and four of the group have served in official ambassadorial roles in Chou’s Foreign Ministry.

This is a well-seasoned delegation: the senior members of the group have had personal experience in dealing with Americans going back to the days of the Yen-an “Dixie Mission” of 1944–1945, and the Marshall Mission of 1946. The broad international negotiating experience of the group includes participation in the 1950 UN China debate, the Panmunjom negotiations, the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea, the 1955 Bandung Conference, the 1961–1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, the Sino-Soviet Border negotiations, and the most recent “Kissinger” Sino-American contacts in Peking. All these negotiating situations, it might be emphasized, were directed by Chou En-lai.

A number of minor characteristics of the group include experience with press and propaganda work, and exposure to life in foreign countries including the U.S., USSR, Poland, Egypt, India, Germany, Canada, Ghana, Tanzania, and the Congo.

One member of the group has been identified as a member of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and

one is thought to be an intelligence operative with experience in dealing with "leftist" or revolutionary groups. It is rumored that the one female in the group, Wang Hai-yung, is a niece of Mao Tse-tung.

The fact that Huang Hua, the PRC's Permanent Representative to the UN, is transferring his base of operations from Ottawa to New York suggests that the PRC will actively use its UN presence to strengthen its influence in the world community. It also seems likely that the delegation will use its New York base to increase information gathering activities regarding the U.S., and as an informal diplomatic presence for contact with USG. In some measure, the PRC's UN presence removes any incentive for a reciprocal establishment of diplomatic relations (at whatever level) with the United States.

Peking Seeks to Build a Claque in the "Third World"

In a speech of November 8, CCP Politburo member Chang Ch'unch'iao asserted, "The trend of small and medium-sized countries to unite in opposition to the power politics of the super-powers is making headway with each passing day." Chou En-lai's active diplomacy among "third world" countries in preparation for the Chirep vote, reinforced by the increased level of PRC trade and economic aid programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America this year, indicates a determined effort to build a base of support among "non-aligned" countries which can be expressed, in part, through support for PRC policies in the UN.

Particular voting issues will obviously play a major role in defining country positions in the General Assembly. But it is likely that race and colonial questions will enable Peking to strengthen support from African and some Latin American states. Disarmament questions might give her the basis for gaining support against both the U.S. and USSR. Some economic and arms control and race issues may enable Peking to gain backing at U.S. expense.

UN Issues: Isolating the "Super-Powers"

Apparently earlier than expected the PRC will have to take positions on major international issues given its UN presence during the remaining session of this General Assembly. On the basis of those items now inscribed on the agenda for the 26th session, the following are our estimates of likely PRC positions:

Items 22, 38, 40, the Middle East Crisis, Palestinian Refugees, and Israeli Practices. This is a set of issues where the Chinese at no real expense to themselves, can assert themselves in a way which will place them on the right side of a problem with the Arab states and at the expense of the U.S. The PRC rebuff to the Israelis when they refused to accept their telegram of congratulations on the passage of the Albanian Resolution, and Chou En-lai's recent public criticism of Israel for

having started an “aggressive war,” indicate a willingness to “distinguish clearly between self and enemy” in the Middle East.

Items 23, 55, and 65, Colonial Independence, Portuguese and Southern Rhodesia Territories, and non-Self-Governing Territories. This is another set of issues where the Chinese, in this session of the GA, might very well take a “hard” position in order to gain support from “third world” countries without having to confront her major protagonists. Chou En-lai also signalled as much in this area when, in his interview with the Japanese journalist, he ridiculed Portuguese support for China’s admission to the UN by saying this would never deter her from attacking Portugal on the colonial question.

Other issues under this general rubric which might be used against the U.S. are related to our current negotiations over the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.

Items 27, 29, 32, and 97, Disarmament Issues, Nuclear Testing, and Use of the Seabed. Reporting has indicated that the Chinese are considering supporting the Soviet position on a World Disarmament Conference, but have not made up their mind on this question. While the Chinese might attempt to use disarmament discussions to “expose” the reluctance of the U.S. and USSR to agree to total and complete disarmament—a position Chou En-lai has espoused in the past—their own developing nuclear program puts them in the awkward position of wanting to test their own growing capabilities while damning the “super-powers.” They have long sought to justify their own weapons program as breaking the nuclear monopoly of the U.S. and USSR, but their position may now take new directions as the issues are defined by the world community.

In order to deal with contradictory pressures, the Chinese may seek to break the disarmament issue into more limited problem areas and take conflicting positions, such as seeking to justify their own testing program while supporting moves to make the seabed off limits to weapons placement. They can be expected to support regional disarmament or “weapons-free zone” proposals, such as Ceylon is considering for the Indian Ocean, and may attempt to inhibit their geographical rivals—the Indians and Japanese—from developing nuclear weapons in the context of a regional arms control program.

Items 37, 54, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination. Here is another issue area where at little cost to themselves the Chinese can take a strong moral position in order to win support in Africa. They might even feel justified in attacking the U.S. on the racism issue; but given our expectation that they will be cautious and protect the Presidential visit in the next few months, they are likely to leave this matter to the initiative of third parties.

Issues That Might Be Raised By the PRC:

In addition to the GA's present agenda, there are a number of contentious issues which, at some point, the Chinese may very well wish to raise in the UN. While we do not think they will do so this year for the political considerations already noted, it is at least useful to call these issues to attention:

—*Cambodia*. In their October 29 official statement, the Chinese gave unusual support to Prince Sihanouk for his efforts to have the PRC's "lawful rights" restored in the UN. This unusual degree of backing for an exile with limited opportunity to assist them in the UN prompted speculation that the Chinese might use the precedence of the GRC's expulsion to promote the expulsion of the Khmer Republic and have the Royal Government of National Union take over Cambodia's UN seat. There is, however, no evidence which would support this speculation, and it seems to us that at least in her first year of UN membership the PRC would be unlikely to promote such a contentious issue for an exile government. In future years, however, this situation might change, especially if the Lon Nol government falls.

—*Korea*. The blocking of inscription of the yearly Korean debate on this year's GA agenda has temporarily removed from consideration one of the most contentious issues in Sino-American relations. It is conceivable that the Chinese might seek to have the Korean question reinscribed this year, but considering the coming Presidential visit, and the weak international position of the North Koreans, we think this unlikely. In future years, however, as the Chinese gain a sense of their support in the UN and as international backing for Kim Il-song's government might grow, it seems expectable that the PRC will seek to have the UN Korean Command and UNCURK dissolved, and the resolution of 1950 branding them an aggressor for involving themselves in the Korean conflict, rescinded.

—*Territorial limit of 200 miles*. Peru and Ecuador are among the nations interested in having territorial waters extended out to 200 miles. The Chinese already have given public support to this position in their communiqué of November 2, issued when they established diplomatic relations with Peru, although the PRC itself claims a 12-mile territorial sea. Peking may well support the right of coastal states to determine their own territorial limits, a position which they could exploit at U.S. expense.

—*Taiwan*. In due time the PRC is very likely to raise issues relating to Taiwan—the island's legal status, and U.S. and Japanese treaties with the GRC—in the UN. Given the exceptional contentiousness of these matters, however, we do not anticipate moves in this direction before the Presidential visit, and until the Chinese

have tested sentiment in the international community. This, however, does not mean a moratorium on rhetoric.

The PRC vs. the Nationalists in the UN Specialized Agencies

The question of continued Nationalist Chinese (ROC) representation in UN specialized agencies will be coming up over the period of the next year. General Assembly action has already had the automatic effect of replacing Taipei with Peking in the UN subsidiary organs—the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, along with its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and its UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

Two specialized agencies, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), have already expelled the ROC and seated Peking. Taipei has also been deprived of observer status in GATT. The ROC probably has little or no chance for continued representation in four of the specialized agencies,² given the fact that a majority of their members voted for the Albanian Resolution. Sentiment seems to be running strong among members to bring the PRC into all parts of the UN at an early date, seemingly out of an undifferentiated enthusiasm to see the PRC represented, but possibly also to avoid complicating bilateral negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations or the conduct of the bilateral relationship if already established. Peking has undoubtedly reinforced this immediate post-victory emotion by its strong statement of October 29 calling for Taipei’s expulsion from all UN agencies forthwith—although not making this in any way a precondition for PRC participation in the UN.

The ROC probably has a somewhat better, but not very hopeful, chance in three other specialized agencies—the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Telecommunications Union. In these organizations substantive technical problems and certain procedural considerations give the ROC some opportunity to hold onto a seat, particularly if the agencies were to delay considering the Chirep problem until after the current enthusiasm for immediate PRC entry abates.

The ROC has a better opportunity to stay on in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group (the IBRD), the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation. The Communist states—with the exception of Yugoslavia—have remained aloof from these “capitalist” agencies, and we have no

² The World Meteorological Organization, World Health Organization, Universal Postal Union, and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. [Footnote in the source text.]

indication at this time that Peking will wish to join them. Thus we do not expect the pressure for the GRC's expulsion to be as great in these organizations, although member countries may respond to Peking's indirect pressures for expulsion for their own political reasons. The weighted voting in these agencies, moreover, does give some advantage to the GRC, and the past practice of not always following the General Assembly's lead would make the Chirep vote of less influence here. In addition, the ROC has sizeable outstanding financial obligations in at least two of these agencies.

Despite its public posture of adamant opposition to the Nationalists, the PRC will very possibly be content to passively allow the existing tide of opinion to work its will in most of the specialized agencies in the coming months. The ROC, for its part, has told us privately that, while it will publicly say it intends to make a stiff fight to hang on in every case, it will do so only where it has a reasonable chance of retaining a seat. It believes this approach will conserve its diplomatic capital for a campaign to hold and strengthen those bilateral relationships that it deems of real importance to its international position.

448. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 8, 1972, 0118Z.

065. Subj: ECOSOC—PRC Maiden Speech.

1. Summary: In maiden intervention as ECOSOC member, PRC, during second organizational meeting of 52nd ECOSOC on AM Jan 6, attacked "one or two superpowers" who have in past "monopolized" UN affairs. Characterized PRC as champion of small countries. USSR replied, criticizing PRC del for attempting create schism and bring disharmony to ECOSOC. Also chided PRC for attempting assume role as protector of third world. End Summary.

2. During procedural discussion AM Jan 6 on ECOSOC organizational meeting's agenda, PRC (An Chih-yan) made maiden intervention as ECOSOC member, attacking "one or two superpowers." Reviewing world situation last year and 26th GA, he said, it easy to see

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM. Unclassified. Repeated to Taipei, Moscow, and Hong Kong.

spectacular change in international arena and in UN. Asians, Africans and Latins becoming more united and have intensified their struggle against foreign domination and interference and against power politics and hegemony of superpowers. It is becoming progressively difficult for the “two superpowers” to monopolize UN affairs. An hit out at Indians as semi-superpower² which subjecting another country to subversion and dismemberment and has been condemned by overwhelming number of members of SC and UN and has been discredited and isolated. PRC has supported struggle of smaller countries for equality in UN and opposes the “one or two superpowers” who plunder, bully and oppose smaller countries. PRC supports principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and is in favor of economic cooperation and promoting human progress. An concluded that despite limited role it can play in UN, PRC willing do its best in ECOSOC and is ready to exert best efforts together with other dels.

3. In right of reply, USSR (Makeyev) quoted portion of Gromyko address to 26th GA (portion quoted was para immediately following Brezhnev quote) and said in light of this, PRC’s statement can be regarded only as desire bring about schism and create disharmony in ECOSOC, especially among UN members. Only criterion which can be used to assess states’ contributions in class, he said, and in this regard it important to distinguish between socialists—who follow illuminated policies—and capitalists, who oppose. “Superpowers” concept not popular in UN and cannot be successful. He asked PRC not to adopt position as protector of Third World—“They don’t need protectors or patrons.”

Bush

²The phrase in this sentence that reads: “An hit out at Indians as semi-superpower” originally read: “An hit out at Soviets as a superpower . . .” It was corrected in telegram 146 from USUN, January 14, and corrected by hand on telegram 065. (Ibid.)

449. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 18, 1972, 2216Z.

186. Subj: PRC's Interest in Senior Secretariat Post.

1. During talk with me Jan 14, SYG, among other things, told me he had recently discussed PRC position in Secretariat with Huang Hua.

2. When Huang Hua recently called on Waldheim to discuss Chinese interest in a top Secretariat position, he asked SYG what suggestions he had concerning an appropriate position. SYG proposed the Djermakoye job (Under SYG for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories). Waldheim said that Huang Hua listened politely but then made clear this would be unacceptable. The PRC, Huang Hua said, was interested in a senior political position. First he mentioned the Under SYG for Political and Security Affairs (occupied by Kutakovy). When Waldheim pointed out the impossibility of dislodging the Soviet incumbent, Huang Hua suggested the position of Chef de Cabinet as an alternative.

3. Huang Hua felt that the Indians were too strongly entrenched in the Secretariat and that Narasimhan should be replaced.

4. Waldheim made no commitments but told him that he would take into account the Chinese desire for a top level political position.

Phillips

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 303, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X. Secret; Exdis.

450. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-111

New York, January 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC in 26th GA: The Last Three Weeks

REF

USUN 4797²

1. Summary. The PRC Delegation's official participation in the final three weeks of the 26th UNGA was limited to irregular attendance in the Plenary and several Committees. During this same period, however, the Chinese actively participated in Security Council meetings, particularly those on the Indo-Pak War, which spilled over into the GA. The Delegation has charted an active course for the new year, accepting seats on ECOSOC, the Committee of 24, and ACABQ. On the social side, PRC diplomats continue to move with ease through the cocktail circuit and, although social contacts with American officers are limited, administrative dealings have grown. End summary.

2. In the final three weeks of the UNGA (December 4 to December 22), the PRC Delegation only irregularly attended meetings of the Plenary, Special Political Committee, First, Third and Fifth Committees, and did not participate in the other three Committees. While the vitriolic nature of their Security Council (SC) statements on the Indo-Pakistan War made these the most memorable, the Chinese also spoke on eight other issues in various UN bodies:

a) Indo-Pak War: After the U.S. took the initiative to bring the Indo-Pak War to the SC, the PRC adopted a one hundred percent pro-Pakistan position. Except for their statements in Plenary prior to and after the GA vote, the PRC spoke on the war during this period only in the SC. The issue marked an escalation of the ideological clash with the Soviets in the UN. (See USUN 4861.)³ The Chinese tabled their first (and to date only) UN resolution during the SC debate. They tabled the resolution for tactical reasons and did not press for a vote on their resolution. (Statements on this issue were made in Plenary on Decem-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Secret. Drafted by Sally Werner; cleared by David L. Stottlemeyer, Robert W. Kitchen, Ernest C. Grigg, Harry E. T. Thayer, and Michael H. Newlin; and approved by Newlin. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USNATO, and the SALT delegation.

² Dated December 6, 1971. (Ibid., UN 22-2 GA)

³ Dated December 8, 1971. (Ibid., DEF 18-3)

ber 7; statements were made in the SC on December 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 21.)

b) Admission of the United Arab Emirates to the UN: While the PRC approved the admission of this new state, they noted differences on the question of admission among the Arab States (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had opposed admission). They said they hoped the Arab States would resolve problems among themselves in the interest of Arab solidarity and the struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. (Statements made in the Committee on Admission of New Members and in the SC on December 7 and 8.)

c) Southern Rhodesia: The Chinese accused the UK of conniving with Ian Smith. The UK, they said, wished to end sanctions against the Salisbury regime in order to legalize racist rule. Thus, with the support of the UK and the US, Southern Rhodesia would become another South Africa. The PRC proclaimed its support for the struggle of the Zimbabwe people against colonialism. (Statement made in the SC on December 8.)

d) Middle East: The Israeli Zionists, with US support, launched the "war of aggression", the Chinese said, and the UN, without distinguishing between right and wrong, had merely passed resolutions encouraging aggression in the name of "maintaining peace." The PRC called on all countries to strongly condemn Zionist aggression, US imperialism and reactionary forces in Jordan for the repression of Palestinian people. Israeli Zionists must withdraw from occupied territories, while the legitimate rights of Palestinian and other Arab peoples must be decided by themselves. (Statement made in Plenary on December 8. The PRC abstained on the ME Resolution, which was adopted 79-7-36 (US).)

e) Disarmament (Resolution on Suspension of Nuclear Testing): The PRC delegate briefly stated China's opposition to the resolution: such a resolution was insignificant unless linked to complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and therefore these resolutions would not prevent the use of such weapons. He said China would vote against all drafts. (Statement made in First Committee on December 9. All three test ban resolutions passed. PRC and Albania cast the only negative votes.)

f) Cyprus: Explaining that the PRC felt the Cyprus Question was a left-over from imperialist rule, the Chinese said it should be settled by countries concerned on the basis of equality. (Statement made in SC on December 13. China was present but did not participate in the vote. Resolution adopted 14-0-0.)

g) World Disarmament Conference: With a brief recapitulation of Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua's bloc-busting speech of November 24, Permanent Representative Huang Hua stated his country's

prerequisites for a WDC which were a pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of all forces from nuclear bases outside their territories. Given this understanding of China's position, the PRC would vote in favor. (Statement made in GA on December 16. Resolution adopted unanimously.)

h) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) Elections: At the PRC's only appearance in the Fifth Committee, Counsellor Hsing Sung-yi expressed appreciation for his election to ACABQ. (Statement made on December 16. Hsing received 60 votes.) On the last day of the GA during an organizational meeting, Hsing, on invitation of the Chairman, attended the ACABQ closed meeting with his interpreter but did not participate in the discussion. He did make a brief non-substantive comment in Chinese.

i) Credentials Committee Report: China made a brief statement that it believed the delegations of the Khmer Republic and South Africa were unqualified to represent the peoples of their countries in the UN. (Statement made in GA on December 20.)

3. The PRC, initially slow to get involved in full discussions of the Secretary-General succession, did participate in five power consultations that began in the first week of December. The Chinese indicated a strong preference for an LA candidate, insisting that Herrera and Valdez, both of Chile, be included on the list. They did so despite clear indications that these candidates would receive a U.S. veto. In the five power talks, the Chinese argued that while geography should not be the overriding criterion in the selection of a Secretary-General, it should play a role. Having made this point in supporting the Latin Americans, they announced they could support Jakobson. The Chinese allegedly told the Finns and the Norwegians that they would veto Waldheim until the bitter end but did not carry through on this reported promise. Reasons for their final acquiescence in the selection of Waldheim are not known, but it is probable that they included all or a combination of the following: a continued veto would have isolated the PRC as the lone vote preventing selection of a successor; a disinclination to end the UNGA without naming a successor; and possibly an assumption that of the candidates that others would not veto, Waldheim would discharge the duties of Secretary-General in a manner most acceptable to them. The Chinese also reportedly told the Norwegians that it was necessary to have a new Secretary-General who could put the UN's house in order.

4. In the final phase of the UNGA the Chinese committed themselves to participation in a wide range of activities: the Committee of 24 (colonial issues); ECOSOC; the Special Committee on the Financial Situation of the UN; and the Host Country Committee. According to a Japanese Officer, the Chinese made their choices from a recommended

list prepared by the Secretariat. PRC delegates have also attended meetings of the Committee of 77 and its Asian sub-group, although not yet members of either. They have indicated interest in participating in the Law of the Sea Conference, the Seabed Committee and in the UN (Stockholm) Environment Conference (the Canadians have passed to the PRC all background documents on the latter conference).

5. According to some delegates, the PRC attendance and activity in the Committee of 77 may have been a factor in the 77's pressing successfully to increase Part VI of the regular UN budget (which provides funds for the regular program of technical assistance) from 6.9 to 8.7 million. Chinese support for the prevailing LDC attitude was a factor in overcoming the opposition of some of the larger developed countries, including the US, UK and USSR, which for various reasons would have preferred that such increases take the form of voluntary contributions. Some delegates also believe that China's support for the doubling of the membership of ECOSOC from 27 to 54 apparently influenced some of those LDC's which had previously opposed enlargement to change their votes. While clearly the activities of the fiscal, economic and social sides of the UN are of interest to the Chinese, limited knowledge of the workings of these UN organs may force them to move slowly. Their claims on jobs in the Secretariat dealing with these subjects will give a better idea of their intentions.

6. The Chinese continued their energetic and effective corridor activity during the month in connection with both GA and SC issues as well as in their assiduous pursuit of strengthened relations generally. Notably, during the India-Pakistan debate in the Security Council, the Japanese, to their obvious pleasure, found the Chinese delegates wholly accessible and engaged them often in informal discussions regarding the substance of resolutions as well as in more casual exchanges. The Belgians also found the Chinese to be approachable, dealing with them informally in the Council as they naturally would with other delegations. (The USSR and U.S. delegations were virtually alone in keeping their distance from the Chinese during the SC debate.)

7. With the annual increase in the pace of social events as the GA drew to a close, the Chinese correspondingly increased their attendance on the cocktail circuit. Several Chinese delegates met and spoke to American officers at these functions, which ranged from the celebration of Burundi's independence to a Thai National Day. The number of Chinese present at any given function appeared to be directly related to the warmth of the relationship between the PRC and the host government (e.g., wall-to-wall Chinese were present at the celebration of Tanzania's Independence Day). The Chinese seemed to pay particular attention to representatives of African and Latin American countries. At several functions the ubiquitous Kao Liang, PRC First Secretary, was observed singling out delegates to introduce them to Vice

Foreign Minister Ch'iao or Permanent Representative Huang. Although many delegates expressed apprehension over the ramifications for the UN of the Sino-Soviet clashes, the PRC version of personal diplomacy appears effective and to have assisted in establishing the warm relationships necessary for informal lobbying.

8. Although the PRC did not accept a USUN invitation to a reception for the Third Committee, as the UNGA neared completion the Chinese did demonstrate that they were prepared to deal directly with USUN rather than the Secretariat on host country and administrative matters. In addition, the PRC Mission has begun to mail, apparently regularly, English-language statements and selected newspaper editorials from the mainland press to USUN. The envelopes carry mimeographed address stickers and presumably this material is also sent to all UN Missions.

9. In the final three weeks, Chinese delegates were not active in tabling new resolutions or drafting suggestions. They did however, work closely with other missions, asking other delegations to communicate PRC positions on various issues. Pakistan transmitted PRC views on the texts of resolutions on the Indo-Pak War which came before the SC. The PRC passed on its intention to participate in the Seabed Committee meeting via Ceylon, although this interest was also volunteered to a USUN Mission officer when the latter assured a PRC delegate that the U.S. hoped the Chinese would not misconstrue a subsequent U.S. vote to mean opposition to the addition of the PRC to the Seabed Committee (see USUN 5105).⁴ The Chinese negotiated with other delegations the final compromise language of the WDC resolution (see USUN 5144).⁵

10. In all, the Chinese demonstrated considerable flexibility during the final phase of the 26th UNGA in the sense that they were willing either to vote in favor of or abstain on not-totally-acceptable resolutions, making an explanation of vote to record their reservations. Despite the heated atmosphere caused by the polemics during the WDC and the Indo-Pak debates, they quietly participated in the effort to find a generally acceptable WDC resolution. Their votes may reflect the effect of UN give-and-take and/or the results of soundings with the Third World. The Chinese continued to present themselves as insufficiently prepared to participate in this UNGA and there is no reason to doubt that this lack of preparation and familiarity with UN processes did limit their role. Also, if they had been better prepared they probably would have tried to get stronger language in resolutions

⁴ Dated December 17, 1971. (Ibid., POL 33–3)

⁵ Dated December 18, 1971. (Ibid., DEF 18–3)

rather than simply voting yes and explaining that they would have preferred stronger language.

11. During the new year the Chinese will be able to focus on questions that were overshadowed by issues before the 26th UNGA: the role they will play in the fiscal problems of the UN; the substantive Secretariat posts they want and for which they will be lining up qualified PRC nationals and adding to the number of qualified Chinese-language interpreters and translators. Now that the drama, pressure and public spotlight of the 26th UNGA has passed, the Chinese will have more time to attend to these and other questions.

Bush

451. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A-792

New York, May 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC in the UN: Settling In

REF

USUN A-111, January 18, 1972²

Summary and Conclusions

This airgram reviews PRC activity at the UN since the end of the 26th UNGA. During this period the Chinese attended all Security Council meetings but have not fully participated in all of the various committees set up by the GA to which they have access. They have been slow to commit themselves on a number of UN issues such as peacekeeping and Law of the Sea and have adopted the tactic of “not participating” in a vote (as opposed to abstaining) when faced with a decision that pits their own “principles” against bi-lateral or Third World considerations. The one exception is on the demand for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 3 GA. Secret. Drafted May 19 by Sally Werner; cleared by Harry E. T. Thayer, A. Reynolds Smith, Robert B. Rosenstock, James C. Irwin, Richard E. Combs, David L. Stottlmyer, and Albert F. Bender; and approved by Michael H. Newlin. Repeated to London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, USNATO, and Hong Kong.

² Document 450.

complete cessation of UN ties with the ROC, a policy the PRC pursues apparently even at the risk of damaging its image with the Third World. We expect the Chinese to continue cautiously to expand their activities in the UN and to continue to use the tactic of “not participating”. Committee participation, restricted in part because of limited and inexperienced personnel, should widen now that the Chinese have permanent quarters, are able to assess their needs, and to house and support additional personnel. We have seen little active Chinese lobbying for a substantive item, although in two instances they made unsuccessful attempts to block Indian candidacy for seats on UN committees. The Chinese will of course continue to study and prepare for a maximum input into the UN, but we doubt that they will be able to mount a major campaign before 1973 because they need more UN experience in the art of lobbying, more established and wider bi-lateral channels, more experienced personnel in their Mission and better developed relations with the Secretariat. This inability to capitalize fully on UN membership in the present and immediate future, does not preclude the possibility that friends of the PRC will either on their own initiative and/or at Chinese behest work and achieve PRC objectives.

In assessing the performance of the Chinese over the past few months we believe that they have viewed and will continue to view US positions on substantive matters before the UN with skepticism and suspicion. While we expect social relationships between individual officers of the US and PRC Missions will improve and expand, we do not expect working/personal relationships soon to reach the point of easy informality now characterizing the contacts we have with certain key members of the Soviet Mission.³

PRC Participation in UN Committees

The frenetic activity and constant pressure for decisions was lifted from the Chinese with the end of the 26th UNGA on December 22. Since that time the PRC has continued selectively to limit its UN activity in New York. From January to April, twenty-nine General Assembly-created committees met in New York. The Chinese are members of only some of these but had they desired they could have attended as observers or otherwise indicated interest in virtually all of the committees. They chose, however, not to attend even all of those meetings of committees of which they are members. In January, for example, six committees of which the Chinese are members met; they

³ Telegram 38831 to USUN (and repeated to all posts), March 7, transmitted guidelines for use in both working and social contacts with PRC delegations at the United Nations or international conferences. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 22-2 CHICOM)

chose to attend two (ECOSOC and the Committee of 24). In February they attended only the Seabeds meeting. Restricted participation apparently was dictated, at least in part, by limited personnel. The Chinese have attended all meetings of the Security Council and its sub-committees—Sanctions Committee and the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia—and in March an observer attended all the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the UN (Stockholm) Conference on the Human Environment. In April a military contingent arrived from Peking to represent the PRC on the Military Staff Committee, which meets bi-weekly. Hsing Sung-yi, in an expert's capacity, attended the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in May. The PRC has continued to absent itself from the Committee on Relations with the Host Country and the Special Committee on the Financial Situation in the UN, although it is a member of both.

In public and private statements the Chinese continue to profess lack of UN experience and unfamiliarity with many UN issues. They are in fact still behaving as newcomers and show the awkwardness of dealing with an institution that has its own customs and idiom. Even an experienced diplomat like Huang Hua seemed uncertain of himself during the SC consultations on Lebanon and in one meeting indicated an unfamiliarity with procedure. The Chinese have stated that Peking has not decided on a number of questions concerning PRC participation and positions. Following UN day-to-day activity in detail obviously was not a priority in Peking before October 25, 1971. The Chinese continue to consult with various friendly missions, e.g., Romania, Yugoslavia and African and Latin American representatives. We understand from the Indians that the PRC's staunch ally, Albania, has its nose out of joint because they are not being consulted. (However, the Albanians recently were taking the initiative on the PRC's behalf to assure newsmen informally that Peking would not relax its support for Hanoi.)

[Omitted here are sections entitled "Issues," "Cutting ROC Ties With the UN," "Chinese Mission: Administration and Personnel," "PRC and the Secretariat," "Social/Official Contacts Between PRC and USUN Officers," and "Personal Diplomacy."]

Bush

452. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 26, 1972, 0430Z.

2617. Bush–Huang Meeting July 25. Ref: USUN 2551.²

1. Summary. Two-hour informal exchange of views on 27th GA between PRC PermRep Huang and Ambassadors Bush and Bennett covered India/Pakistan, Bangladesh, Middle East, UN financing (inc. 25 percent), peacekeeping, Charter review, SC expansion and other items. Huang reserved PRC position or recalled previous statements on bulk of principal issues and on subsidiary aspects but, of above topics, demonstrated particular curiosity about US attitudes toward Middle East, WDC, and Charter review. Said he had no instructions on PRC position regarding UN membership for Bangladesh and pointedly mentioned unresolved issue of Pakistani POW's. End summary.

2. Ambassador Bush met with PRC Ambassador Huang at Waldorf July 25 for two-hour informal exchange of views on 27th GA. Huang accompanied by Second Secretaries Chao Wei and Kuo Chia-ting. Ambassador Bennett and MisOff Thayer also participated.

3. Bush opened meeting by welcoming the opportunity to meet with Huang informally in fashion he has found useful for exchanging views with other major participants in UN. Bush said he had no intention of attempting to touch on all items on 27th GA agenda but would mention several that he felt might be of interest to Chinese and would welcome Huang commenting on these as he saw fit and perhaps introduce some items of interest to him.

4. US and Chinese Dels. Bush began by describing how US composes its delegation, noting the inclusion of Congressional as well as public members. In brief exchange on this topic, Huang said he had received no word yet on who would be coming from Peking to head delegation which so far composed only of himself, Ambassadors Chen Chu and Wang Jun-sheng.

5. India/Pakistan/Bangladesh. Bush said that we view Simla conference as a constructive first step by Bhutto. We hope that further progress would be made in bilateral forum and do not anticipate India/Pakistan as important issue on 27th GA. However, he continued, we expect that Bangladesh will apply for membership and we will

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Confidential; Noform. Telegram 2619 from USUN, July 26, asked that telegram 2617 be marked Noform. (Ibid.)

² Not printed.

support such an application this fall. Huang said that the Simla meeting seems to be a beginning but Simla "is a far distance from solution" of the problems. Regarding matters to be resolved, he mentioned in particular the issues of Kashmir and prisoners of war, including the question of trials in East Pakistan". Huang concluded by stating that while the Simla conference represented progress, there is still much to do to carry out last year's resolutions on India/Pakistan, including that by the GA. In response to a direct question, Huang said that he had received no instructions on the question of Bangladesh membership.

6. Middle East. Bush said that we anticipate that Arab states probably will want a full Middle East debate this year, as last. We do not yet know what form resolution or the debate will take and thus do not have any fixed position. However, he did not anticipate the US taking a leading role in seeking debate and our posture will principally be to wait and see. Picking up Bush's brief reference to formulation by Jarring of his report to the GA, Huang raised possibility that Jarring's forthcoming visit to New York would lead to contact with both parties to the dispute, to which Bennett replied that we understood that one reason he is returning is to survey ground to see what might be done. Huang said that it is his impression that Egypt had asked through SYG for reactivation of Jarring Mission. Bush reviewed history of 4-power talks since early last year. Regarding question of reactivating 4/5-power talks, Huang said that PRC has general position that it does "not regard Resolution 242 to be fair. That is why we have reservations regarding the previous 4-power talks". Huang said he does not have instructions yet regarding the future. He added that the PRC attitude toward Jarring was of course identical with that toward Resolution 242.

7. Recent ME developments. Huang asked Bush if USG sees any new proposals about to come forward as result of new developments in Middle East (removal of Soviet personnel). Bush said we still analyzing recent events carefully but have come to no fixed conclusions. Bush asked Huang how Chinese assessed significance of these developments. Huang recalled Chou En-lai's 20th anniversary message to Egypt, noting that this message expressed support for Egypt's action. He said that Chinese would have to wait and see as to whether or not there are new initiatives as a result. He asked for US views on this. Bush reiterated that we had come to no conclusions yet and suggested that perhaps he and Huang might pursue this at later stage. Bush mentioned to Huang in passing that USG views recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Yemen as a contribution to reduction of tensions in Middle East; even though not of major significance, it was also an expression of fact that tensions not as great today as they were previously.

8. UN financial questions. Bush provided overview of US concern over UN financing, mentioning our desire to control excesses of

bureaucracy, to support efforts to minimize budgetary increases and to reduce UN inefficiency in general. He also briefly reviewed history of US contributions to UN, including changes in our previous assessments, current share of total contributions to UN and Lodge Commission recommendations. Bush told Huang that he would have difficult assignment at 27th GA of implementing policy that no nation should pay more than 25 percent. Bush described Congressional attitude toward this question and noted that we are seeking Congressional agreement to permit us to negotiate appropriate reduction with UN membership. He explained that new UN members and economic growth of others could help us meet target. Bush acknowledged that this would not receive enthusiastic response from UN, but stressed that this is important issue for USG and we obliged to discuss frankly with others. He pointed out that Lodge Commission also recommended increase in voluntary contributions and noted that US had been particularly responsive to needs in this area.

9. (Finances—continued). Stating that he would be pleased to discuss this further with Huang, Bush asked if Huang had any particular thoughts to convey on question of assessments or contributions. Huang said that he did not follow all financial questions in detail but pointed out that Chinese Delegation had already made known PRC reservations about certain UN financial questions. After mentioning Ambassador Algaard's efforts, Huang said that one question that had been raised was that regarding the "several million dollars left over from the Chiang Kai-shek clique". Huang went on to say to Bush: "As you know, we were deprived of our UN seat since 1949, so we cannot assume the responsibility for payment. The Middle East and Congo operations were the result of resolutions passed before the resolution of rights of PRC in UN. As you know, we have differences of views about this in the UN. We have stated our views regarding this. This is our position regarding contributions to the UN. As to future contributions, we have not settled this question". Bush and Bennett pointed out that the matter of contributions would come up next spring and that assessments were now fixed through 1973. Bush recalled Ambassador Algaard's proposal on the handling of certain contentious funds. We believe, Bush said, that Algaard was on the right track but we understand that the Soviet Union was not sympathetic. Bush added that we understand that SYG was to raise this question in Moscow. After brief reference to working capital fund and other problems, Bush asked if PRC had submitted economic data to provide basis for assessment. Huang said that PRC had been requested to provide data for general purposes "but not in connection with PRC contributions". At later point in conversation and responding to Huang's question as to what Bush saw as most important issues coming before 27th GA, Bush told Huang that

he thought broad range of financial questions must be considered by whole membership and these would be among most significant issues.

10. Peacekeeping. Bush said we hope for progress in working out guidelines for peacekeeping operations but noted that we had long-standing differences of views with Soviets over role of SYG and the Security Council. US and USSR not totally deadlocked over this question but, nevertheless, we foresaw no early breakthrough. Bush solicited Huang's comment on the Committee of 33 and on UN peacekeeping role. Huang indicated some surprise that there had not been more result from the Peacekeeping Committee's work and stated flatly that PRC was not planning to get involved in that committee. Bush confirmed, in response to Huang's query, that Peacekeeping Committee's report would be made to 27th GA.

11. Law of the Sea. Bush mentioned briefly our belief that LOS was highly important effort and that we were optimistic that current preparatory committee meeting in Geneva would make significant progress. He asked Huang's views. Huang replied simply that PRC had "made clear our basic position on LOS in conference in New York". (Huang revealed no interest in this subject.)

12. Role of ICJ. Bush described our interest in greater role for ICJ, mentioning possibility of establishment of committee to study ICJ. He asked if Chinese planned to offer candidate for ICJ and if PRC had any views on activation of the court. Huang replied merely that PRC "has not considered putting forward a candidate", and he would not offer any views, despite mild prodding on Court's role.

13. Participation in UNGA committees. Noting that ICJ question would be considered by Sixth Committee, Bennett asked Huang if PRC, which had not participated in Sixth Comite last year, would be doing so this year. Later in conversation, Bennett also asked about Fourth and Fifth Committees. Huang gave precisely same reply to both questions. "Maybe we will take part in Sixth Comite/Fourth and Fifth Comite at this GA".

14. International Law Commission. Bush briefly raised question of ILC and protection of diplomats, noting that we believe convention would be valuable contribution and that we plan to support it. Huang replied only that PRC "had not taken part in ILC."

15. ECOSOC reform. Bush and Bennett described briefly our interest in ECOSOC reform and solicited Huang's comments. Huang recalled that the Chinese had supported the expansion of ECOSOC, but said his delegation in New York had "no specific views" on various questions regarding institutional reform.

16. World Disarmament Conference. Huang introduced WDC question, noting that PRC's basic views made clear at 26th GA and asking USG attitude. Bush mentioned US-Soviet communique statement

that WDC could play role at appropriate time, adding that we do not think however, that that time had come and we would oppose a premature effort to convene WDC. Huang pressed for clarification on timing and on attitude of US allies. Bush and Bennett noted that we would wish to examine prospect closely to see what could be accomplished and made point that we believe progress on disarmament matters best made by taking small steps one at a time. They said that European allies generally share our view. Huang asked if Bush anticipated Soviets would make particular new proposals on WDC, to which Bush said we had no specific estimate. Huang then went on to say that WDC this year may be “an essential problem” for 27th GA. Problem was left over from 26th GA when PRC position was clearly stated. PRC “favors disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. In carrying out our limited tests, PRC has committed itself not to be first to use nuclear weapons. So, if any real progress is to be made then serious attention has to be paid to nuclear disarmament. Thus, to insure success of WDC, prerequisite must be met and only then can WDC be correctly oriented, so it would not be a club for endless debates. In this connection (Huang concluded) we do not agree with the Soviet approach.”

17. Charter Review. Huang noted that several replies had been sent to SYG on Charter review, but not many; however, many other states had “expressed oral views”. He asked US attitude. Bush told Huang that we questioned advisability of engaging in broad review of Charter since such an exercise would be fraught with difficulties, including unproductive and divisive debate. Bush added that US was not obstructionist regarding possible changes, but we believed case by case method was best approach to Charter revision. We told Huang that we would be responding to SYG having these considerations in mind. Huang said he would appreciate Bush’s clarification of significance for Charter reviewing exercise of (a) proposal to revise term “enemy state”; (b) expansion of SC; (c) a permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent membership; and (d) veto power. In subsequent exchanges, we made clear we did not expect to abandon veto, that we understood some others were interested in questions involving first three points but would await clarification from them. Huang, declining to give any view himself on four points (including veto) said only that PRC would have to study others’ views before taking any position, stressing that PRC “must study whole question of Charter review”.

18. Department repeat as desired.

Bush

453. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 9, 1972, 1700Z.

2774. Subj: Contributions of PRC to UN Regular Budget.

1. MisOfs informed confidentially by UN Deputy Controller (Ziehl) that PRC has agreed to pay all but about \$400,000 of its 1972 assessment of \$7.1 million. Ziehl originally anticipated PRC payment only in neighborhood of \$5.2 million but as a result of extended negotiations Ziehl conducted with PRC Mission has obtained higher figure.

2. Amounts withheld by PRC wld cover its share of items included in UN regular budget which it objects to in principle on political grounds, i.e., UNCURK, UN bonds, Korean cemetery and about \$900 for administrative costs of 3 field offices of UNHCR.

Bush

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10-4. Confidential.

454. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 9, 1972, 2340Z.

3773. Subj: Statement of PRC Rep in UN Fifth Committee.

Summary: PRC Rep made first statement in UN 5th Comite (administrative and budgetary questions) since PRC became member UN. End summary.

1. PRC (Hsing Sung-yi) made first statement in 5th Comite since PRC became member UN. Stated PRC has paid all contributions due regular budget and working capital fund since admission PRC. Notwithstanding PRC developing country, it plans raise contribution level to 7 per cent assessed UN budget within next 5 years in view economic development.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, UN 10. Unclassified. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, and Geneva.

2. PRC cannot be held responsible in any way for arrearages in contributions of “Chiang clique.” Amount due from “Chiang clique” shld not have been reflected in budget as arrearage of PRC. Expects correction to be made by end of year.

3. Financial difficulties of UN are due its sending military forces which interfered in internal affairs of nations during time PRC denied its lawful rights. PRC ready join other member states in exploration ways of overcoming deficit.

4. Noted UN budget includes such expenses as bond issue, Korean cemetery, UNCURK, and UNHCR programs Macao. Illegal expenditures for Korean programs shld have ceased long ago and shld be stopped forthwith. Assistance to so-called Tibetan refugees constitutes meddling in Chinese internal affairs. Hong Kong and Macao are Chinese territory and Chinese there are not refugees. Demanded immediate cessation all UNHCR activities in Macao, India, and Kathmandu and deletion expenditures from budget.

5. Stated UN has 5 official languages and all except Chinese are working languages. Called for placing consideration of approval Chinese as working language on 1973 GA agenda, use of Chinese as working language wld improve efficiency of organization. Called also for greater UNSec efficiency.

Bush

455. Report Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 1973.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO SECURE DUAL REPRESENTATION
FOR CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
(NOVEMBER 1970–OCTOBER 1971)

SUMMARY

On August 2, 1971, Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced that the United States would support a dual representation solution to the Chinese representation problem at the upcoming 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary's announcement marked a departure from a policy which had endured for more than twenty years. For the first time since the Chinese representation question had become an annual fixture in the General Assembly, American officials dropped their opposition to the seating of the People's Republic of China and concentrated upon preserving a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China. In part, the revision of American policy was prompted by the climate of opinion which had developed in the General Assembly in favor of seating the People's Republic of China. In a larger sense, the adoption by the United States of a dual representation policy was part of the Nixon administration's continuing effort to adjust to the reality of mainland China without severing American ties with the Government on Taiwan. On July 15, President Nixon dramatically underscored his desire to achieve a détente with the People's Republic of China by announcing his intention to visit Peking. In making his announcement, the President offered the assurance that the United States did not intend to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China at the expense of old friends. Secretary Rogers' subsequent announcement of a policy favoring membership in the United Nations for both Chinese Governments was in the spirit of the President's assurance.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Top Secret; Nodis. This is Research Project No. 1034, prepared in the Historical Studies Division of the Historian's Office. As noted in the Foreword to the 172-page report (not printed): "This study was undertaken in response to a request from the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The research and writing were done by Louis J. Smith under the immediate direction of Homer L. Calkin, Chief of the Special Studies Branch, Historical Studies Division." The study focuses on Department of State efforts and relied on materials now in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, but does not take into account documentation from the White House or National Security Council.

The change in policy which the Secretary announced on August 2 had been under active consideration in Washington for more than eight months. On November 19, 1970, the National Security Council had requested interdepartmental studies treating China policy in general and the Chinese representation question in particular. The studies had to take into account Premier Chou En-lai's vigorous campaign to break the diplomatic isolation which the People's Republic of China had known during the period of the "Cultural Revolution", a campaign which bore important fruit on November 20, 1970 when a majority of the members of the General Assembly voted for the first time to seat the representatives of the Peking Government in the United Nations (the Republic of China retained its place because of the General Assembly's determination that any change in the representation of China constituted an "Important Question" and required a two-thirds majority to effect). Also, American officials were inclined to encourage the People's Republic of China to play a larger, more normal diplomatic role. Specialists throughout the United States Government agreed that it would be very difficult and unwise to continue to exclude Peking's representatives from the United Nations. At the same time, those participating in the policy review agreed that the United States should continue to support the international position of the Republic of China. A dual representation approach to the problem of China's seat in the United Nations offered an obvious answer. Dual representation was an idea which had enjoyed some support in the General Assembly in years past as an equitable solution which would contribute to a more universal organization. The arguments for and against a change to a dual representation policy were laid out for President Nixon by his advisers at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 25, 1971.²

Similar policy reviews were taking place in other capitals. American officials were most interested in the conclusions being reached in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which had been the closest associates of the United States in the previous strategy of defining Chinese representation as an "Important Question". They were also concerned about Belgium, which was the country most prominently identified with the concept of dual representation, and about Great Britain, which was hinting that it intended to throw its considerable weight behind the "Albanian" resolution to give the Chinese seat to Peking. Conversations on Chinese representation with these countries could not be postponed until the policy review had been completed in Washington. As early as December, 1970, cautious and non-committal discussions had begun. By the middle of March, there was general agreement

² See Document 342.

among the specialists in Washington, Wellington, Canberra, and Tokyo that a dual representation approach offered the best hope of preserving a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China. The Belgian Government indicated that it was anxious to play a part in promoting a dual representation resolution. Only the British, among the allies initially sounded, expressed no sympathy for what they saw as a "two-China" solution.

Before a dual representation policy could be adopted, the Republic of China had to lend at least tacit approval to the idea. Less than two weeks after the vote on the Albanian resolution at the 25th General Assembly, Secretary Rogers began the task of persuading the Taipei Government that a new approach to Chinese representation was necessary. At first, the line taken by officials in Taipei was that, with a redoubled effort, the usual Important Question strategy could be made to prevail again. Gradually, however, indications grew that the Government of the Republic of China recognized the situation and would make a realistic effort to preserve its place in the United Nations. In April, Robert D. Murphy, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, traveled to Taipei as the personal representative of President Nixon to discuss Chinese representation with President Chiang Kai-shek. Ambassador Murphy told Chiang that the United States intended to continue to honor its treaty commitments and to provide military assistance to the Republic of China. Thus reassured, Chiang implied that he could accept a dual representation resolution which did not affect the Republic of China's seat on the Security Council. Murphy assured Chiang that the United States would oppose any effort to deprive the Republic of China of its Security Council seat. Chiang's conversation with Murphy set a standard for the remarkable flexibility which the Republic of China demonstrated throughout the dual representation effort. American officials recognized, however, that the flexibility of the Republic of China was never more than tactical, being based on the calculation that Peking might reject any dual representation resolution and would certainly refuse an offer which did not include the Security Council seat.

The Republic of China's cooperation was essential to the process of developing a dual representation policy. American officials recognized that the commitment to defend the Republic of China's seat in the Security Council might not be possible to sustain, but they were willing to make an effort. A full-scale canvass of opinion among the members of the General Assembly was required to determine the type of dual representation formula which would command the support necessary to succeed. Until July, however, the White House restrained the State Department from discussing the Chinese representation question with more than a handful of close allies. The President's announcement on July 15 of his intention to visit Peking made it evident

that the decision on Chinese representation had to be timed to coordinate with a larger reordering of U.S. policy on China. The President's announcement freed the Department to move forward with the dual representation initiative.

The lobbying effort in support of the dual representation approach began immediately after the Secretary's announcement of policy on August 2. Department specialists were aware that time was short by then. Nonetheless, they had to struggle with the difficult co-sponsorship problem before they could formulate a definite dual representation resolution and lobby in support of an established position. The key to unraveling the co-sponsorship problem lay in the matter of China's Security Council seat. Many of the countries important to the dual representation effort indicated that they would not co-sponsor unless the dual representation resolution contained a recommendation that the People's Republic of China be given the seat in the Security Council. Although the Republic of China remained opposed, United States officials finally decided that they would have to support a "complex" dual representation resolution. On September 10, telegrams announcing the American decision went to potential co-sponsors, and the co-sponsorship problem fell into place. The most encouraging development occurred on the day on which the dual representation resolution was submitted to the United Nations Secretariat, along with a revised Important Question resolution. On that day, September 22, the Government of Japan put aside the serious domestic problems occasioned by the controversy over Chinese representation and agreed to join the list of co-sponsors.

Once the resolutions were formulated, and the co-sponsors established, the State Department could turn its full attention to the business of building support for the dual representation initiative. An intense, world-wide campaign was mounted in conjunction with the other principal co-sponsors, and it was maintained until the votes were taken on October 25. The effort was mounted in the face of daunting odds and narrowly failed.

The sponsors of the Albanian resolution were able to build upon a base which had been established over the years and upon momentum carrying over from the majority support they had enjoyed at the 25th General Assembly. They profited from Peking's continuing campaign to improve its bilateral relations and from the reiterated insistence that the People's Republic of China would never enter the United Nations under the terms of a dual representation resolution. The adamant stance taken by the People's Republic of China did much to offset the appeal which dual representation had for those countries concerned with equity and a universal world organization. A number of conservative countries, on the other hand, had no interest in pursuing

the ideal of universality at the expense of welcoming representatives from Peking into the United Nations. Those supporting dual representation had little time to alter preconceptions and establish the credibility of an untested proposition. Throughout the lobbying campaign, United States officials had to work against the widespread suspicion that President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking had been paved by a secret understanding with regard to Chinese representation. In the circumstances, the remarkable thing about the effort to preserve a place for the Republic of China in the 26th General Assembly was not that it failed, but that it failed so narrowly.

[Omitted here are the body of the paper, pages 6–133, and Annexes I–V.]