

International Mobile Satellite Organization

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Eleventh Session
24 – 25 May 2005

IMSO/AC/11/3

Origin: Secretariat

Date: 23 May 2005

Agenda item 3

LONG RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING OF SHIPS (LRIT)

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 The eightieth session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) met from 11 to 20 May 2005 and considered, *inter alia*, measures to enhance maritime security. Among the subjects reviewed under this agenda item was the matter of the Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships (LRIT).

1.2 The IMO Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue had decided, at its eighth session (16 to 20 February 2004) that “*it would be necessary to develop and agree: the oversight of LRIT data service providers*”. (COMSAR 8/18 paragraph 13.6.2.4). The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004) had concurred in this view (MSC 78/26 paragraph 7.32.5) and instructed COMSAR to: “... *develop and propose a robust intergovernmental oversight scheme for the approved LRIT service providers through which the adherence of the LRIT data service providers to the conditions imposed on them, at the stage of their approval, could be verified in a transparent manner to the satisfaction of all SOLAS contracting governments.*” (MSC 78/26 paragraph 7.105).

1.3 At its seventy ninth session (1 to 10 December 2004), the Maritime Safety Committee instructed COMSAR to consider the matter further. The COMSAR Sub-Committee therefore, at its ninth session (7 to 11 February 2005), considered matters relating to LRIT and developed “draft performance standards and operation of the International Long-Range Identification and Tracking system for ships (LRIT)” (COMSAR 9/19 Annex 15), which includes a section on “Functions of the LRIT Co-ordinator”.

1.4 Subsequently, the MSC, at its eightieth session:

.1 *agreed that the LRIT Co-ordinator should carry out the oversight of the LRIT Data Centre, the LRIT Tracking Services and relevant elements of the communications systems used, and, as appropriate, of the contracts between participants in the system;*

.2 *agreed that oversight by the LRIT Co-ordinator should include verification that the security requirements established by the*

Organization for the entire LRIT system are adhered to, and that the LRIT Co-ordinator should report to the Organization on its findings;

.3 requested IMSO to advise the Committee whether IMSO would be willing and able to undertake the oversight of the LRIT system on behalf of the Organization; and

.4 invited IMSO, if it was not already doing so, to contribute to the work of the COMSAR Correspondence Group on LRIT.

1.5 Extracts from the reports of the most recent meetings are attached for the information of the Advisory Committee as follows:

- MSC 80/WP.7/Add.1 – Working Group on Maritime Security
- MSC 80/WP.6/Add.3 – Draft Report of the Committee
- COMSAR 9/19 – Report of the Sub-Committee – Annex 15

2 **ACTION REQUIRED**

The Advisory Committee is invited to recommend that the Assembly responds positively to the request of IMO whether IMSO would be willing and able to undertake the oversight of the LRIT system on behalf of the International Maritime Organization (paragraph 1.4.3 above refers).

EXTRACT FROM MSC 80/WP.7/ADD.1

LRIT Co-ordinator

11 The Group recalled that MSC 78, when it agreed that the Organization should not be involved in collecting, storing and disseminating the LRIT information, had instructed the COMSAR Sub-Committee to develop and propose conditions which the Committee may impose on an LRIT Tracking Service(s) when considering its approval. The Committee had also instructed the COMSAR Sub-Committee to develop and propose a robust intergovernmental oversight scheme for the approved LRIT Tracking Service(s) and LRIT Data Centre(s) through which their adherence to the conditions imposed on them, at the stage of their approval, could be verified in a transparent manner to the satisfaction of all SOLAS contracting governments (MSC 78/26, paragraphs 7.103 to 7.105).

12 The Group agreed to recommend to the Committee that the LRIT Co-ordinator should carry out the oversight of the LRIT Data Centre, the LRIT Tracking Services and relevant elements of the communication systems used, and, as appropriate, of the contracts between participants in the system. The oversight should also include verification that the security requirements established by the Organization for the entire LRIT system are adhered to. The LRIT Co-ordinator should report to the Organization on its findings.

13 The observer from IMSO advised the Group that, in the light of the proven experience of IMSO in carrying out oversight of the performance of public services on behalf of the Organization, IMSO would consider undertaking the role of the LRIT Co-ordinator if requested to do so by the Organization. IMSO further advised the Group that it did not see itself owning or operating the LRIT Data Centre as this would create conflicts of interest between the oversight functions and the operational roles. However, IMSO would be willing to assist in the process of establishing the LRIT Data Centre, if the Organization were to request it.

14 The Group was advised that arrangements had been made for convening an extraordinary session of the Assembly of IMSO between 14 and 15 November 2005, at the IMO Headquarters, for the purpose of considering and adopting certain amendments to the IMSO Convention. If the Organization were to request IMSO to undertake any oversight functions in relation to LRIT, the matter could be put to the Assembly of IMSO for consideration. The next regular session of the Assembly of IMSO would be held in the autumn of 2006, i.e. after MSC 81 and before MSC 82.

15 A few delegations suggested that, as the related information was very limited, it was difficult at this stage to formulate an appropriate request for IMSO to consider undertaking any oversight functions of the LRIT systems on behalf of the Organization.

16 The overwhelming number of delegations stated that oversight was an essential and integral part of the establishment of the LRIT system and that it was necessary for the Committee to have, at the time of the adoption of the proposed SOLAS regulation, a clear understanding of who would undertake the oversight functions. In addition, it would be necessary to complete the oversight requirements

which the COMSAR Sub-Committee had been instructed to develop. It was also pointed out that just as time was needed to develop the requirements for LRIT within the Organization, those who may be asked to undertake the oversight of the LRIT also needed time to put the necessary arrangements in place. There would be a need for oversight from the date of entry into force of the proposed SOLAS regulation on LRIT. They argued that IMSO was the appropriate body and that it should be asked by the Committee to consider undertaking the oversight functions.

17 The Group agreed to recommend that the Committee should advise IMSO that at this stage it is developing requirements for a global LRIT system which, *inter alia*, entails certain oversight functions and in view of the oversight functions currently undertaken by IMSO on behalf of the Organization, it is anticipated that the MSC 81 would need to consider and address matters related to oversight. At this stage, the Committee would wish to be advised whether IMSO would be willing and able to undertake the oversight of the LRIT system on behalf of the Organization.

18 In addition, the Group agreed to recommend that the Committee should consider inviting IMSO, if it is not already doing so, to contribute to the work of the COMSAR Correspondence Group on LRIT, based on the experience it has acquired from the oversight of GMDSS service providers on behalf of the Organization.

* * *

EXTRACT FROM MSC 80/WP.6/Add.3

LRIT Co-ordinator

5.78 Recalling that the MSC 78 (MSC 78/26, paragraphs 7.103 to 7.105) had also instructed the COMSAR Sub-Committee to develop and propose a robust intergovernmental oversight scheme for the approved LRIT Tracking Service(s) and LRIT Data Centre(s) through which their adherence to the conditions imposed on them, at the stage of their approval, could be verified in a transparent manner to the satisfaction of all SOLAS Contracting Governments, the Committee:

- .1 agreed that the LRIT Co-ordinator should carry out the oversight of the LRIT Data Centre, the LRIT Tracking Services and relevant elements of the communications systems used, and, as appropriate, of the contracts between participants in the system;
- .2 agreed that oversight by the LRIT Co-ordinator should include verification that the security requirements established by the Organization for the entire LRIT system are adhered to, and that the LRIT Co-ordinator should report to the Organization on its findings;
- .3 requested IMSO to advise the Committee whether IMSO would be willing and able to undertake the oversight of the LRIT system on behalf of the Organization; and
- .4 invited IMSO, if it was not already doing so, to contribute to the work of the COMSAR Correspondence Group on LRIT.

* * * *

EXTRACT FROM COMSAR 9/19

ANNEX 15

DRAFT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LONG-RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING SYSTEM FOR SHIPS

2 Functions of the LRIT Co-ordinator

The LRIT Co-ordinator:

2.1 Operates or oversees one or more data centres (LRIT Data Centre) which enables Contracting Governments to obtain LRIT information they are entitled to receive.

2.2 Ensures that Contracting Governments receive only the LRIT information that they are entitled to receive.

2.3 Identifies the format the manner in which LRIT information provided to Contracting Governments.

2.4 Prescribes the manner in which Contracting Governments pay for LRIT information.

2.5 Recommends recognition of new LRIT Tracking Services to the Organization, based on their abilities to carry out the duties of an LRIT Tracking Service.

2.6 Reviews the performance of LRIT Tracking Services, and reports annually to the Organization on the performance of the system, and the fee structure. The Co-ordinator also recommends withdrawal of recognition of any LRIT Tracking Service which is not performing the duties required of an LRIT Tracking Service.

* * *