

# **Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board**



*Report on the Review of the  
2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*

November 6, 2006

## **DISCLAIMER**

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**United States Department of State**

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

*www.state.gov*

November 17, 2006


MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY ROBERT JOSEPH

SUBJECT: Report of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) on the Review of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

The ACNAB's report on our Review of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD that I am forwarding with this letter responds to your request of March 14, 2006, for the Board to undertake such a review. The report was drafted by a Task Force chaired by VADM Robert Monroe, USN (Ret.). It was reviewed by all ACNAB members and approved at our plenary meeting on November 6.

The report includes six specific recommendations for changes to the Strategy and thirteen recommendations to enhance its implementation. I would like to draw your attention to three major recommendations from the report. First, while the Strategy itself is a strong document, implementation has lacked centralized coordination and oversight. We recommend that such oversight be established and the U.S. Government efforts be better coordinated. Second, although deterrence is a key component of the Strategy, there does not appear to be a cohesive effort to use deterrence as a tool to counter proliferation. We offer recommendations on how to enhance deterrence to address today's threats. Finally, the report recommends the initiation of efforts to create targeted strategies against proliferants, as called for in the Strategy. We believe that the implementation of these recommendations would enhance the Strategy significantly.

I encourage you to consider all of the report's recommendations carefully. The Task Force members and I stand ready to brief you and ~~other~~ members of the Administration on the findings, as requested.



**Fred Thompson**  
**Chairman, Arms Control and**  
**Nonproliferation Advisory Board**

# **ACNAB REVIEW OF THE 2002 NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)**

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# Report on the Review of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD

**TASKING.** The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) has been asked to assess implementation of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and to recommend changes which could strengthen both strategy and implementation. The four elements of our Terms of Reference (TOR), and the ACNAB's response to each, are set forth below. The first two cover assessment; the last two set forth recommendations. Strategy recommendations are "S" series; implementation recommendations are "A" [action] series.

Important Note: At issue here is U.S. National Strategy, thus much of our assessment relates to organizations and agencies other than the Department of State, and many of our recommendations are the responsibility of these other organizations (NSC, DOD, DOE, DHS, the intelligence community, etc.) Failure of these others to implement recommendations which apply to them could well disable the National Strategy, therefore the Department of State should exert all possible influence to have all agencies act upon these recommendations.

**REPORT OVERVIEW.** The 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD is a comprehensive and timely policy document. It lays out—in concise, unclassified form—U.S. counterproliferation and nonproliferation goals, as well as some principal tools for achieving these goals. This ACNAB report recommends six changes to improve this strategy.

Implementation of the National Strategy, however, has been uneven. There have been individual successes—some quite notable—but many areas show weaknesses in implementation. Most critical has been lack of centralized oversight and follow-up. Additionally, specific responsibilities within many agencies are unspecified, unclear, or not enforced; timelines and milestones for achievement have not been established; metrics for performance are not specified; and line-item budgets have rarely been created. Most of the recommendations in this ACNAB report are focused on improving implementation of the strategy.

There is a real need to improve implementation. The United States is facing a global threat in a rapidly changing world. Some adversaries are showing increased ability to coordinate their activities. Some are attempting to force us into proxy battles. Regional terrorist forces have blended into civilian populations. Immigration into European nations and many other factors (preoccupation with domestic politics and economics, resurgent protectionism, etc.) has reduced the resolve of some of our allies to defend our common interests. The United States can combat these trends only if we implement a coordinated strategy ourselves.

Although some past gains have been achieved in counterproliferation and nonproliferation, the United States faces two enormous challenges—North Korea and Iran—our handling of which should dwarf all prior proliferation-prevention activities. If either state goes into continuing production of nuclear weapons, the world will cross—irreversibly—a major threshold of danger. Both nations could well sell such weapons to other rogues or provide them to terrorist organizations for use.

While proliferation by North Korea and/or Iran could encourage similar moves anywhere in the world, the likelihood is that North Korea's might be followed by that in Japan, South Korea, or

Taiwan. Similarly, proliferation in Iran could stimulate it in such Middle Eastern states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Algeria. With this impetus, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Germany, Ukraine, and others may believe their security will be enhanced by possessing nuclear weapons. The world is headed for a near-term danger level never before seen; and if the United States is unsuccessful in halting these two rogue states, America's half-century of efforts against proliferation will have failed.

**TOR TASK #1: ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY, INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS ON ENDING PROLIFERATION TRADE BY ROGUE STATES, INDIVIDUALS, AND GROUPS IN PREVENTING TERRORIST ACQUISITION AND USE OF WMD.**

**Counterproliferation.** At present the National Strategy addresses three counterproliferation elements: Interdiction, Deterrence, and Defense and Mitigation. A fourth element—"Offensive Operations"—should be inserted following the first two. It is quite different from the listed three, and very important. It would encompass such actions as strikes on WMD production facilities, storage, or launch sites; seizing WMD material tracked by interdiction activities; securing or eliminating WMD in unstable states which become hostile through internal takeover; covert operations, etc. The Department of Defense's "National Military Strategy to Combat WMD" (a derivative document) lists eight Mission Areas, the first two of which address offense.

Offensive targeting of the WMD threat may need to be broadened to include specific individuals who have an enabling role (military, scientific, industrial, or political), whether or not they are affiliated with the proliferator. This targeting should also include every element of the WMD process: research and development, testing, acquisition, production, assembly, storage, transfer, deployment, launch, etc.

The integrated employment of interdiction, credible deterrence, offensive operations, and defense and mitigation produces a counterproliferation effect the whole of which is greater than the sum of its parts.

**Recommendation S1.** Expand the Counterproliferation section of the National Strategy (pages 2-3) by adding an "Offensive Operations" subsection (strikes, seizures, elimination of WMD, etc.) as the third major element (of four).

Counterproliferation is made more important—and more difficult—by the world's rapid evolution into a new era. Past distinctions are becoming blurred. Terrorist organizations are becoming political parties, and vice versa. Failed and failing states abound. Nationwide votes elect terrorist organizations into governance. Individual states are fractured by civil wars over religious differences; while religious ties closely bind sects in several different states. Virulent Islamic fundamentalism, with its exploitation of suicide, is on the rise; in some cases including a desire for world domination.

These growing realities, and the asymmetrical threats that accompany them, deserve more recognition in the National Strategy. An extreme hypothetical example might be the case of a stolen Russian nuclear weapon, fitted to a North-Korean developed cruise missile by rogue

Pakistani engineers, deployed on a Hezbollah-crewed leased merchant ship, and launched against a U.S. population center. Threats of this type may be more likely than the straightforward ones implied in the Strategy.

**Recommendation S2.** Review all elements of the National Strategy, from intelligence collection to attribution (forensics), for changes necessitated by the world's accelerating evolution into today's more dissociated, diffused international environment.

Interdiction. The one specific sub-tasking in our TOR is in Task #1. It asks the ACNAB specifically to assess "progress on ending proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals, and groups in preventing terrorist acquisition and use of WMD." Since this centers on interdiction, the ACNAB addresses it here. The National Strategy calls for effective interdiction capabilities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations. This is an extraordinarily difficult task because of the technical limitations of detection, because it depends in large degree on international cooperation, and because dual-use technologies are increasingly widespread as a result of economic growth and globalization.

Clearly this has been one of our highest national priorities of the last several years. In response to the threats and the need, the federal government has been reorganized and focused. A few specific accomplishments: issuance of our National Strategy to Combat WMD itself; sweeping overhaul of the intelligence community; creation of the Department of Homeland Security with its major interdiction responsibilities; establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center and National Counter Proliferation Center; the Department of Defense's issuance of the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, its creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), its assignment of responsibility for combating WMD to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and establishment of that command's new Center for Combating WMD.

The paramount need to foster a global network of partners has also been a top national priority, and it has resulted in significant advances. Most notable is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in 2003, which now counts over 80 partner nations and is still expanding. It has helped to interdict more than 30 WMD-related shipments, including that of centrifuge parts which played an important role in Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs. Other major advances have been: the 2002 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the 2004 United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540; the 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention; and most recently the new "Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," launched by Presidents Bush and Putin on July 15 at the St. Petersburg G8 meeting. On a more focused scale, numerous bilateral and multilateral interdiction programs have been put in place and are growing at key international border crossings.

In response to the TOR, the ACNAB's assessment must be mixed. Major successes have been achieved in a remarkably short time: Iraq's reversal from a WMD threat and sponsor of terrorism to a potentially democratic nation; Libya's opting to abandon their WMD ambitions; exposure and extensive disruption of A.Q. Khan's global black market nuclear weapons proliferation network. On the other hand, the United States' (and the world's) decade of failure in halting North Korea's and Iran's nuclear weapons production ambitions and the imminence of

their success, and the mushrooming growth of terrorist organizations with WMD aims and global reach, illustrate vividly that the threat is far from under control.

Deterrence. In coping with actual proliferation activities, deterrence is the indispensable ingredient, and the United States needs to enhance our declaratory policy and our deterrent posture. The most significant omission in the National Strategy is under-appreciation of the immense power of deterrence; and the greatest weakness in the Strategy's implementation is our seeming reluctance to use deterrence effectively in response to today's and tomorrow's WMD challenges. Historically, negotiations on difficult issues must be linked to the threat of force to be effective; and this approach offers the best chance of achieving a successful outcome without military action. Deterrence is based upon fear. We deter someone from taking an action against us (whether that action is use of nuclear weapons or production of nuclear weapons) by instilling fear of the consequences. The essential element of deterrence is credibility. Our adversary must believe that if he persists with his actions the consequences for him will be unacceptable. To achieve this, U.S. declaratory statements (written and verbal), must be clear, specific, and consistent; and these statements must be reinforced by a wide range of visible actions demonstrating our readiness and capability to follow through. Our adversary must be convinced the United States has both the will and the capability to carry out our threats.

The credibility of our deterrent threats will depend heavily on whether we, and our allies, will consider our actions acceptable after we have implemented them. Our adversaries are totally aware of our sensitivities, and they're counting on them. Our deterrent threats will simply not be credible unless they quite clear about damage-limiting measures for civilians. All of our planning for possible use of military force must place great emphasis on reducing collateral damage, and this places an advance burden on us for development of tailored weapons systems and tactics.

At the highest level of deterrence, U.S. declaratory policy must continually make it absolutely clear that any use of WMD against our nation will be met by devastating retaliation using, as necessary, all our capabilities. Our response will not necessarily be comparable to the attack.

At a slightly lower level of deterrence is the case of nuclear weapon production programs in North Korea and Iran. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes pose a threat like no other. Targeted on some modern states, these weapons might cause destruction of civil society. The United States has been negotiating, without appreciable effect, with both nations for over a decade to get them to abandon these programs, and time is getting short. We should consider openly stating that—to enforce nonproliferation—the United States reserves the right to use military force to prevent irresponsible or belligerent states from producing, deploying, transferring, or using nuclear weapons. To be credible, this statement would have to become national policy, supported by all leaders (some of whom have even publicly taken U.S. military force off the table on this issue). Additionally, the United States should engage in a wide and continuing range of credibility-reinforcing measures (visible military procurement, training, exercises, etc.), to emphasize that we have both the will and the capability. Because these North Korean and Iranian threats are indeed nuclear, and because these weapons are predominantly in hardened underground facilities, the United States should

ensure that our nuclear forces add a clearly credible deterrent to that of our conventional forces.<sup>1</sup> In making the above statement, we should make it clear that this is not new policy; it is an existing right we and other states reserve, the right of a sovereign nation to deal with a threat to international security and peace. We should execute a prepared public diplomacy strategy to mitigate backlash.

**Recommendation S3.** Add the great power of deterrence to U.S. diplomatic efforts with North Korea and Iran. In the Deterrence section of the National Strategy (page 3), change the wording to: “The United States reserves the right to use military force to prevent irresponsible or belligerent states or organizations from producing, deploying, transferring, or using WMD.”

**Recommendation A1.** Engage the entire Administration, and key Congressional leaders, in a continuing effort to understand the nation’s strategy to combat WMD and agree to the paramount importance of having our leaders speak with one voice on vital strategic issues.

**Recommendation A2.** The Department of Defense (DoD) should develop plans to carry out a wide spectrum of reinforcing measures to lend credibility to deterrent threats made to convince adversaries that their continuation of a particular course of action will be met by U.S. military force. Examples are accelerated R&D and procurement of improved weapons specialized for this mission, publicized testing of weapons, visible and focused counterproliferation exercises, announced deployments, increased readiness, elevated alert levels, etc. These activities, also, should be covered by our prepared public diplomacy plans.

This is an absolutely vital issue. Deterrence offers an approach that might carry the day for us without use of force, and the United States should bring it to bear. Notably, our first instance of success of using deterrence to halt determined proliferation in such a state would have immense global nonproliferation benefits through assurance and dissuasion, as well as deterrence!

The power of deterrence is not limited to the above specific examples. As new WMD technologies are developed in the future, it is likely that an effective form of deterrence can be developed to meet the threat. Credible deterrence gives the President a wider spectrum of options for attempting to meet these varied challenges.

Defense and Mitigation. Deserving of mention is the impressive implementation of missile defense programs since promulgation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD in 2002. This not only enhances defense, but it also enables the United States and our allies to use stronger deterrent measures against adversaries with WMD.

Following-up on the National Strategy, a National Policy for Biodefense was issued in 2004, assigning responsibilities to agencies, setting up oversight, prioritizing objectives, mitigating effects of an attack, etc. Consideration should be given to issuing similar policy documents for dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons threats (e.g., detecting an adversary’s assets; destroying these assets prior to use; rapidly attributing the source of a WMD attack; conducting post-conflict operations to destroy residual WMD). A noteworthy example of the above need in

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<sup>1</sup> One member does not agree with any suggestion that we need to develop new types of nuclear weapons to meet this challenge.

the nuclear area is the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack, which is only now beginning to be readdressed as a result of the Congressionally mandated 2004 “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.”

**Recommendation A3.** Consider issuing National Policy documents for Nuclear Defense and Chemical Defense, following the pattern of the 2004 National Policy for Biodefense.

**Recommendation A4.** With a high priority, address in a formal way the urgent national need to respond to the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack. Key military equipment should be hardened; and vital national infrastructure assets (electric power, communications, transportation, financial networks, medical facilities, etc.) should be made survivable or reconstitutable.

**Nonproliferation.** Most of today’s “global nonproliferation regime” (the UN, the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, many large blocs of states, countless NGOs, etc.) focuses on total nuclear disarmament, rather than nonproliferation. However, disarmament was never equated to nonproliferation when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was being formulated, and it should not be now, notwithstanding the hope (then and now) that sometime in the future nuclear weapons could be abolished.

Nuclear weapons remain the most formidable weapons ever developed, and will most assuredly remain so for the foreseeable future. We are now seeing what many have long expected—that advances in knowledge and technology, as well as the spread of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes as called for in the NPT, have permitted many more states the option of developing nuclear weapons. While treaties, diplomatic pressures, threats of sanctions, and economic incentives have been, and will continue to be, major nonproliferation actions, the need for a credible nuclear deterrent will not diminish as long as rogue states continue to defy international norms. Recent U.S.-Japanese talks, in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, illustrate vividly that the United States’ extended nuclear umbrella is critical to nonproliferation for a number of important states.

**Recommendation A5.** In the nation’s widespread and multifaceted nonproliferation activities, the United States should be forthcoming about emphasizing the beneficial role nuclear weapons have played in protecting the United States (and much of the world) from nuclear attack.<sup>2</sup> If the world community does not or cannot roll back nuclear weapons programs in radical or unpredictable regimes, our nuclear capabilities will be vital in deterring use against us.

**Diplomacy.** Public diplomacy is not specifically addressed in the National Strategy, but it should be added as an important tool of U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy. Public opinion plays a key role in helping governments and international organizations (e.g., UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) “do the right thing” with regard to nonproliferation. There is a real need for public diplomacy, particularly in non-Western and less-developed countries.

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<sup>2</sup> One member does not agree with this recommendation, believing that U.S. policy should be to devalue nuclear weapons.

Despite recent advances in public diplomacy by the Department of State (DOS), there is ample evidence that the United States is losing the battle for minds. Al-Jazeera, for example, broadcasts stridently anti-American messages through satellites to Arabs worldwide. The United States has no effective counter aimed at Al-Jazeera's audience.

The U.S. public diplomacy task is made more difficult by the fact that our adversaries have learned how to take advantage of the globalization of communications. For example, Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently visited other Muslim nations to drum up international support for Iran's position that its nuclear program is peaceful and that the United States is unwarranted in its opposition to the program. He achieved a fair measure of success. The United States needs to significantly expand—and be more creative with—our public diplomacy efforts.

**Recommendation S4.** Add public diplomacy to the National Strategy (pages 3-4) as an element of active nonproliferation diplomacy.

**Recommendation A6.** Increase priority and funding for public diplomacy. Focus U.S. activities on North Korea, Iran, neighboring states, Muslim nations, potential future proliferators, etc. Employ internet, TV, radio, and print media vigorously to raise local awareness of the benefits to them of America's strong nonproliferation program.

Threat Reduction Cooperation. Threat reduction programs were well conceived at the outset, and much has been achieved by them; but targets of opportunity at present are diminishing. In the years ahead, however, it is probable that new worldwide opportunities—principally fast-breaking ones—will arise in which threat reduction programs will be highly useful in countering proliferation.

**Recommendation A7.** Conduct an Executive Branch review of all threat reduction programs to: (1) improve their ability to respond without delay to future opportunities such as possible North Korean or Iranian decisions to abandon their nuclear ambitions (making use of lessons learned in Libya); (2) examine all past U.S. policies governing DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs, and DOS's program for redirection of scientists, to identify cases where changes in our U.S. "ground rules" would significantly reduce WMD threats; (3) terminate programs which have proven difficult to negotiate or have low probabilities of success; and (4) rebalance the funding levels among these three departments based upon past results and future plans.

Controls on Nuclear Materials. In the past, one of our protections against proliferation has been the many years required for states to acquire or produce nuclear materials, and the lead-time (or warning) this gave us. Today the United States is losing this safety factor because of the widespread use of nuclear power, the greater number of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, the increasing number of states with nuclear weapons and materials, and the increasing proliferation trade among rogue states, terrorist organizations, and others.

Simultaneously, satellite television and the internet have put pressure on developing nations' leaders to catch up with the "haves," rapidly. This requires a significant expansion of their energy supplies, which may be possible only through broader use of nuclear power. It is

imperative that these have-not countries have access to proliferation-resistant nuclear power plant designs and reactor fuel.

Because of this, the National Strategy states that the United States will work to develop recycling and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant. This commitment is so important to our WMD objectives of preventing proliferation that its priority and funding should surely be raised.

One new concept to achieve this is the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), a collaborative effort among nuclear-energy-supplier states to select and demonstrate technologies that will close the fuel cycle by recycling and consumption of long-lived radioactive waste, while promoting nonproliferation. A key objective of the project is for these suppliers to lease fuel to countries desiring to use nuclear energy, recovering the spent fuel for reprocessing.

**Recommendation S5.** Include the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in the National Strategy, under Controls on Nuclear Materials (pages 4-5).

The technology-development portion of GNEP is moving forward, but the political efforts required to make fuel-leasing and control a reality have scarcely begun. And, as past nuclear power issues have so clearly demonstrated, the political issues become highly emotional and are fraught with problems and delay. The United States should take the lead in developing a plan to provide nuclear-energy assistance, including fuel supplies and fuel return. As with the technological portion of GNEP, the preferred approach is for the United States to work outside the UN with the five nuclear suppliers, while keeping the IAEA informed.

**Recommendation A8.** The GNEP initiative has such potential to contribute to the solution of worldwide energy and nonproliferation problems that it should have the priority and funding to advance at the fastest possible pace, the United States working directly with nuclear fuel suppliers.

### **Integrating the Pillars.**

Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants. A major weakness in implementation of the National Strategy is in the area of “targeted strategies.” The Strategy calls for targeted strategies against proliferators whose leaders are determined to possess WMD. (These targeted strategies are much broader than traditional military contingency planning.) The United States has not yet developed effective strategies, yet they are absolutely essential for several reasons:

First, a targeted strategy starts by addressing the end-game. That is, if all diplomatic efforts fail to stop and roll back proliferation in the country concerned, exactly what is the United States willing to do? Specifically, are we willing to undertake military action? This question—essentially one of going to war—requires the most detailed, searching examination by the President and top national leadership, at the very highest security level. Centrally, it involves the long-range issue of whether future U.S. national security will be better served by having the target country in continuing production of nuclear weapons, or by having ended this proliferation threat and advanced the cause of nonproliferation everywhere, but incurred the adverse effects of

the military action we initiated. Most importantly, this decision needs to be addressed several years before it would be acted upon, and updated continuously thereafter.

Second, these targeted strategies (with this early start) are essential because the tentative decision on the end-game will guide every aspect of diplomacy and negotiating strategy with the country involved from today forward. Although the proliferation issue is the driver, every other aspect of our U.S. “country strategy” for that nation must be integrated into the targeted strategy.

Third, if military action is likely, targeted strategies are needed to guide the years of focused intelligence collection, planning, military procurement, organization, training, and exercising that are required. These might be highly classified; or quite open, used as reinforcing measures of a deterrent strategy.

Fourth, the targeted strategy, with its (originally tentative) end-game decision, will influence every aspect of our political and diplomatic interaction with allies, friends, neutrals, and adversaries for the next several years.

Fifth, only a targeted strategy, with its multi-year time span, can allow us to plan, well in advance, the key dates for each successive political and diplomatic action, including, if necessary, military strikes.

All targeted strategies should be based on the assumption that the United States and all relevant international bodies will continue to employ every possible diplomatic effort to halt the proliferation danger, that inducements, sanctions, and other coercive methods will be exercised as most appropriate, and that military force will be considered only as a last resort.

Because the United States has developed no targeted strategies, we currently tend to be reactive rather than proactive. With each potential proliferator we tend to make day-to-day decisions, based on current interactions with the country involved and the current state of world affairs; and we have no clear plan, one, two, three, years ahead, as to our strategic intentions. If this continues, we may arrive at strategic decision points unable to act because of inadequate preparations.

**Recommendation A9.** As an urgent, top-priority action to improve implementation of the National Strategy, develop comprehensive national political and military “Targeted Strategies” for North Korea and Iran.

A great benefit of targeted strategies is that they force high-level consideration of the options in time to allow the extensive planning and risk-reduction actions required if diplomacy fails. If desired, options can be carried forward for future decision. For example, a targeted strategy might identify four options. One, the easiest (and probably the worst), might be to allow the proliferator to develop and produce nuclear weapons. A second option might be to attempt regime change (or “regime adjustment”)—either overtly or covertly. A third option might be early preemptive conventional military strikes, to damage or destroy the proliferator’s key nuclear facilities without warning. A fourth option might be to bring a tough new deterrent line to the negotiations, informing the proliferator that we will not permit them to produce nuclear weapons, that if all negotiations fail we will destroy their nuclear facilities by military action. We would then reinforce this by intense, continuing visible preparations. The hope here is that

the clear threat of force, backed up by intense enabling measures, will eventually gain credibility; causing the proliferator to roll back its nuclear program, accept our alternative positive offers, and carry out its own regime adjustment from within.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of what targeted strategy is settled upon, it should be implemented by all agencies as a true national strategy. In today's complex world, exercising strategies serves to refine them, develop understanding of the roles of others, build confidence and relationships, and speed responses to adversaries' actions.

## **TOR TASK #2: ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL STRATEGY.**

Lack of interagency coordination has been one of the major weaknesses in implementing the National Strategy. This document itself, over its six pages, uses the phrases: "we must pursue...", "we will ensure...", "we must take...", "we will not permit...", "we must accord...", "we must enhance...", and similar phrases about 75 times. Each promises future action. In the great majority of cases the commitment requires joint action by numerous agencies.

After extensive inquiries, the ACNAB has not found any evidence of an overall listing of commitments that must be met, or of any national-level effort to follow-up on these directed actions. Nor have we found any department or agency which was aware of the actions required of their organization by the National Strategy, or which had a plan to fulfill these requirements. Thus there clearly is an oversight and follow-up problem.

Who's in charge? This needs to be determined for the National Strategy itself, for each agency with regard to that agency's responsibilities, and for each specific commitment. Then, to some degree, a plan is needed for fulfilling each commitment. Timelines and milestones should be established, linked to line-item budgets. Measures of effectiveness are needed to determine when the commitment has been met. And there's a continuing need for the follow-up function, because prodding is often required.

**Recommendation S6.** Add a brief section on "Implementation" to the unclassified version of the National Strategy. Require the National Security Council (NSC) to oversee and coordinate the strategy's implementation, using an Executive Agent (e.g., DOS, DoD). Staff members from other agencies could be transferred to the Executive Agent on a permanent-change-of-station basis; and technical support could be provided.

**Recommendation A10.** The nineteen recommendations in this report address U.S. National Strategy, thus their implementation in many cases is the responsibility of agencies other than the Department of State. Failure to implement these others could well disable the National Strategy itself, therefore the DOS should exert all possible influence to have all agencies act upon these recommendations.

Many of these commitments or action programs are of vital national importance. For example, under the counterproliferation summary (top of page 2), the National Strategy states: "We will

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<sup>3</sup> One member does not believe military threats could be effective.

ensure that all needed capabilities to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging defense transformation plan.” DoD has been actively pursuing defense transformation for conventional forces since 2001, but as yet there has been no counterpart transformation on the nuclear weapons side. Both our nuclear strategy and our nuclear weapons stockpile need to be transformed from the Cold War’s massive retaliation focus to one appropriate to today’s and tomorrow’s adversaries and threats. There is an urgency here, as full implementation will require decades.

**Recommendation A11.** To provide credibility to our national deterrent force, the United States should commence transformation of our nuclear strategy and stockpile. U.S. nuclear weapons should have the characteristics needed to deter the threats of today.<sup>4</sup>

National Strategy commitments regarding intelligence are also in urgent need of interagency coordination in implementation. All aspects of the U.S. program to combat WMD need better intelligence support. This—possibly more than any other support program—can serve to focus actions across the U.S. Government. Much has been said of our intelligence deficiencies in “The 9/11 Commission Report” and the report of “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Many actions have been, or are in the process of being, implemented as a result, including the creation of the position of the Director of National Intelligence. But one startling revelation in both of these reports is the disconnect between how poorly senior policymakers, nearly unanimously, viewed the quality of intelligence received; and how intelligence providers themselves viewed their product. Senior policymakers need to inform the Director of National Intelligence clearly, and in writing, of their intelligence requirements and their views of intelligence shortcomings. Evaluation of intelligence support should come from policymakers, not intelligence professionals. Intelligence consumers should not accept “too hard” as a reason for not gathering the intelligence vital to successful implementation of the National Strategy.

**Recommendation A12.** The head of each agency directly involved in combating WMD should report at least annually to the Director of National Intelligence the state of intelligence support received in programs important to this National Strategy. The Director of National Intelligence should include these in his annual report.

**Recommendation A13.** Departments of State and Defense, working with other Government agencies, should begin a program of table-top exercises on combating WMD scenarios, to inform policy and diplomacy. Exercises should evaluate effectiveness of deterrence options, plan effective public diplomacy programs, help select targets in event of an adversary’s WMD use, and enable more rapid implementation if needed. These should result in an effective combating WMD strategy that is refined through exercises that take into account all political and military aspects and options.

As regards targeting, a true “intelligence revolution” is required—one which shifts decisively from a half-century’s focus on our enemies’ order of battle to one focused on individuals, activities, and specific objects. Today, intelligence must identify and track appropriate WMD

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<sup>4</sup> One member does not believe that new U.S. nuclear weapons need to be developed to meet this requirement.

targets the same way it supported the Strategic Air Command's Single Integrated Operational Plan mission in the Cold War.

In summary, considerable progress has been made in implementation of the National Strategy, but it is uneven. It needs improvement particularly in the area of interagency coordination. By no means does this mean the National Strategy is ineffective. It is a remarkable guidance document, and many individual agencies, recognizing the need, have implemented substantial portions of it which fall in their areas of responsibility and which are compatible with their own priorities and funding.

### **TOR TASK #3: RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY**

These six changes are listed in report at appropriate points. They are aggregated in Appendix A.

### **TOR TASK #4: RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY**

These thirteen changes are listed in report at appropriate points. They are aggregated in Appendix A.

Final Note. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is composed of three pillars: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. This report does not address consequence management. The decision to leave this topic for future addressal was made and reported during initial ACNAB organization work, for four reasons: consequence management was not included in the TOR's four tasking elements; time was not available for adequate coverage; counterproliferation and nonproliferation are of vital, urgent interest to the Department of State, whereas much of the responsibility for consequence management lies within the Homeland Security Department; and the subject matter of the topic is of a completely different nature from counterproliferation and nonproliferation. This does not imply that the Department of State does not play an important role in consequence management, or does not have important responsibilities therein.

# Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations

## STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation S1.** Expand the Counterproliferation section of the National Strategy (pages 2-3) by adding an “Offensive Operations” subsection (strikes, seizures, elimination of WMD, etc.) as the third major element (of four).

**Recommendation S2.** Review all elements of the National Strategy, from intelligence collection to attribution (forensics), for changes necessitated by the world’s accelerating evolution into today’s more dissociated, diffused international environment.

**Recommendation S3.** Add the great power of deterrence to U.S. diplomatic efforts with North Korea and Iran. In the Deterrence section of the National Strategy (page 3), change the wording to: “The United States reserves the right to use military force to prevent irresponsible or belligerent states or organizations from producing, deploying, transferring, or using WMD.”

**Recommendation S4.** Add public diplomacy to the National Strategy (pages 3-4) as an element of active nonproliferation diplomacy.

**Recommendation S5.** Include the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in the National Strategy, under Controls on Nuclear Materials (pages 4-5).

**Recommendation S6.** Add a brief section on “Implementation” to the unclassified version of the National Strategy. Require the NSC to oversee and coordinate the strategy’s implementation, using an Executive Agent (e.g., DOS, DoD). Staff members from other agencies could be transferred to the Executive Agent on a permanent-change-of-station basis; and technical support could be provided.

## IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation A1.** Engage the entire Administration, and key Congressional leaders, in a continuing effort to understand the nation’s strategy to combat WMD and agree to the paramount importance of having our leaders speak with one voice on vital strategic issues.

**Recommendation A2.** DoD should develop plans to carry out a wide spectrum of reinforcing measures to lend credibility to deterrent threats made to convince adversaries that their continuation of a particular course of action will be met by U.S. military force. Examples are accelerated R&D and procurement of improved weapons specialized for this mission, publicized testing of weapons, visible and focused counterproliferation exercises, announced deployments, increased readiness, elevated alert levels, etc. These activities, also, should be covered by our prepared public diplomacy strategy.

**Recommendation A3.** Consider issuing National Policy documents for Nuclear Defense and Chemical Defense, following the pattern of the 2004 National Policy for Biodefense.

**Recommendation A4.** With a high priority, address in a formal way the urgent national need to respond to the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack. Key military equipment should be hardened; and vital national infrastructure assets (electric power, communications, transportation, financial networks, medical facilities, etc.) should be made survivable or reconstitutable.

**Recommendation A5.** In the nation's widespread and multifaceted nonproliferation activities, the United States should be forthcoming about emphasizing the beneficial role nuclear weapons have played in protecting the United States (and much of the world) from nuclear attack.<sup>5</sup> If the world community does not or cannot roll back nuclear weapons programs in radical or unpredictable regimes, our nuclear capabilities will be vital in deterring use against us.

**Recommendation A6.** Increase priority and funding for public diplomacy. Focus U.S. activities on North Korea, Iran, neighboring states, Muslim nations, potential future proliferators, etc. Employ internet, TV, radio, and print media vigorously to raise local awareness of the benefits to them of America's strong nonproliferation program.

**Recommendation A7.** Conduct an Executive Branch review of all threat reduction programs to: (1) improve their ability to respond without delay to future opportunities such as possible North Korean or Iranian decisions to abandon their nuclear ambitions (making use of lessons learned in Libya); (2) examine all past U.S. policies governing DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOE's nonproliferation programs, and DOS's program for redirection of scientists, to identify cases where changes in our U.S. "ground rules" would significantly reduce WMD threats; (3) terminate programs which have proven difficult to negotiate or have low probabilities of success; and (4) rebalance the funding levels among these three departments based on past results and future plans.

**Recommendation A8.** The GNEP initiative has such potential to contribute to the solution of worldwide energy and nonproliferation problems that it should have the priority and funding to advance at the fastest possible pace, the United States working directly with nuclear fuel suppliers.

**Recommendation A9.** As an urgent, top-priority action to improve implementation of the National Strategy, develop comprehensive national political and military "Targeted Strategies" for North Korea and Iran.

**Recommendation A10.** The nineteen recommendations in this report address the U.S. National Strategy, thus their implementation in many cases is the responsibility of agencies other than the Department of State. Failure to implement these others could well disable the National Strategy itself, therefore the DOS should exert all possible influence to have all agencies act upon these recommendations.

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<sup>5</sup> One member does not agree with this recommendation, believing that U.S. policy should be to devalue nuclear weapons.

**Recommendation A11.** To provide credibility to our national deterrent force, the United States should commence transformation of our nuclear strategy and stockpile. U.S. nuclear weapons should have the characteristics needed to deter the threats of today.<sup>6</sup>

**Recommendation A12.** The head of each agency directly involved in combating WMD should report at least annually to the Director of National Intelligence the state of intelligence support received in programs important to this National Strategy. The Director of National Intelligence should include these in his annual report.

**Recommendation A13.** Departments of State and Defense, working with other Government agencies, should begin a program of table-top exercises on combating WMD scenarios, to inform policy and diplomacy. Exercises should evaluate effectiveness of deterrence options, plan effective public diplomacy programs, help select targets in event of an adversary's WMD use, and enable more rapid implementation if needed. These should result in an effective combating WMD strategy that is refined through exercises that take into account all political and military aspects and options.

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<sup>6</sup> One member does not believe that new U.S. nuclear weapons need to be developed to meet this requirement.

# **Appendix B - Terms of Reference**

**UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
WASHINGTON**

March 14, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ARMS CONTROL AND  
NONPROLIFERATION ADVISORY BOARD (ACNAB)

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for ACNAB Review of the 2002 National  
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

The ACNAB is requested to undertake a study to review the implementation of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This strategy, issued in unclassified form in December 2002, outlines a comprehensive approach to combating the proliferation of WMD. The National Strategy is built on three main pillars: proactive counter-proliferation; strengthened non-proliferation; and effective consequence management. Further, the National Strategy lists four crosscutting functions that are essential to combating the proliferation of WMD: 1) improved intelligence collection and analysis; 2) research and development; 3) bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and 4) tailored strategies against hostile states and terrorists. To implement the National Strategy, the Department of State works closely with the National Security Council Staff, the Homeland Security Staff, the Intelligence Community, and the Departments of Treasury, Defense, Justice, Energy, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Homeland Security.

It would be of great assistance if the ACNAB review of the National Strategy to Combat WMD could examine and assess:


- Implementation of the strategy, including an assessment of the progress on ending proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals, and groups and in preventing terrorist acquisition and use of WMD;
- The effectiveness of interagency coordination in implementing the National Strategy;
- Changes in the policies contained in the National Strategy that could strengthen our non- and counter-proliferation efforts; and

- Changes to current programs, and new initiatives that could enhance our non- and counter-proliferation efforts.

This study should be completed in 180 days. Completed work should be submitted to the office of the ACNAB Executive Directorate no later than October 1, 2006.

The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security will sponsor the study. The Director for Strategic Planning and Outreach will support the study. Michael Landweber will serve as the Executive Secretary for the study and Matthew Zartman will represent the ACNAB Executive Directorate.

The study will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Board Committee Act."

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Rb Joseph". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized font.

Robert G. Joseph

# Appendix C - Members and Project Staff

## Board Members

Senator Fred Thompson (Chairman)

Dr. Michael R. Anastasio  
Dr. Kathleen Bailey  
Ms. Alison B. Fortier  
Dr. William Graham  
Mr. Stephen Kappes  
Mr. Mitchel B. Kugler  
Dr. Ronald F. Lehman  
VADM Robert Monroe, USN (ret.)  
Dr. Gordon Oehler

Dr. Keith Payne  
Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff  
Senator Charles Robb  
Dr. Amy Sands  
Dr. James Schlesinger  
Dr. William Schneider  
Dr. William Van Cleave  
Mr. James Woolsey

## Task Force

VADM Robert Monroe, USN (ret.) (Chairman)

Dr. Kathleen Bailey  
Mr. Mitchel Kugler  
Dr. Gordon Oehler  
Dr. James Schlesinger  
Dr. William Schneider

## Project Staff

Dr. George Look  
Executive Director, ACNAB

Mr. Michael Landweber  
Executive Secretary

Mr. Matthew Zartman  
Deputy Executive Director,  
ACNAB

Mr. Brandon Buttrick  
Deputy Director, Office of  
Strategic Planning and Outreach  
(SPO), DOS

Ms. Thelma Jenkins-  
Anthony  
Executive Assistant

Ms. M. Wendy Reid  
SAIC Senior Analyst

## Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Task Force

### May 10, 2006

Ms. Catherine Montie	Associate Director, Combating WMD Enterprise, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Mr. Bruce Pease	Director, Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Central Intelligence Agency

### June 1, 2006

Ambassador Kenneth Brill	Director, National Counterproliferation Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Maj. Gen. Richard Newton (USAF)	Director, Plans and Policy, U.S. Strategic Command
Dr. James Tegnalia	Director, DTRA

### July 12, 2006

Dr. Robert Joseph	Under Secretary of State, Arms Control and International Security
Mr. Frank Record	Acting Assistant Secretary of State, International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (ret.)	President, The Scowcroft Group

### August 4, 2006

Mr. Jack David	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy
Mr. John Rood	NSC Senior Director, Counterproliferation Strategy and ISN Assistant Secretary-nominee

# Other U.S. Government Officials Consulted by Task Force Members

**May – August 2006**

Larry Brown	Senior Policy Advisor, Department of Energy (DOE)
Alex Burkart	Deputy Director, ISN/Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security
Maureen Clapper	DOE
Jeremy Curtin	Principal Deputy Coordinator, Bureau of International Information Programs, DOS
Phillip Dolliff	Deputy Director, ISN/ Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
David Evans	Consultant, ISN/CTR
Michael Foughty	Deputy Director, ISN/Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
James Kelman	Senior Public Diplomacy Advisor, ISN/ Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach
James Marshall	Analyst, Intelligence and Research (INR), DOS
Jonathan Medalia	Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Adam Scheinman	Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Non-proliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE
Tom Schieber	Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Forces Policy, DoD
Andrew Semmel	Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISN
Bruce Sherman	Strategic Planning Manager, Broadcasting Board of Governors
Dan Smith	Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, DOS
David Stein	OSD Forces Policy
Scott Walker	Korea Country Officer, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, DOS
Christian Westermann	Analyst, INR
Amy Woolf	Specialist in National Defense, CRS