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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

I-22597/76

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: African Trip - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(S) Your trip to Africa (Kenya 16-17 June; Zaire 17-18 June) comes at a time when Congressional, public, and world interest in Africa is high. Since the evolution of the Angolan crisis last year, African problems have attained a prominence unique in the American experience. Secretary Kissinger's April-May 1976 visit to Africa aroused US thought and interest even further. We have sought to demonstrate our genuine concern for African developments and our determination to play a larger role in their direction and pace. Governor Scranton's forthcoming African trip (he will visit neither Kenya nor Zaire) and the late June Kissinger-Vorster meeting in Germany represent additional steps in this undertaking.

(S) Your visit to Kenya and Zaire should also be seen in this context. It is a logical follow-on to the Kissinger opening, adding a security dimension to the politico-economic foundation for relations laid down by the Secretary of State. You will be the first US Defense Secretary to visit Africa; your presence will give a clear signal of US interest and determination.

(S) This memorandum is intended to define the strategic setting in Africa, set forth overall goals for the trip, and outline basic US security issues with Kenya and Zaire.

A. The Strategic Setting

Africa is again reaching a decisive state in its political evolution. Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola already has produced increased political and military pressures against the white-ruled regimes of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Violent solutions to the political quandaries of the region have become harder for Africans to resist in the

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EXEMPTED TO GPO... SCHEDULE OF
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wake of the successful Soviet intervention in Angola and the breakdown of the Constitutional talks in Rhodesia.

Throughout the continent, concern for the security of fragile sovereignties has been rising. Nowhere is this fear more acute than in East Africa, where Soviet-armed Somalia and Uganda covet territory held by their neighbors, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. Somalia also harbors irredentist ambitions about the French Territory of Afars and Issas, whose excellent port of Djibouti is important to Ethiopia.

Both the Kenyans and the Zairians will want to know (1) whether the US will stand by them and other African moderates as they seek to modernize their military forces to meet increased threats from Soviet supplied and influenced neighbors, and, (2) if the US can still be counted upon to counter Soviet aspirations on the continent.

B. Trip Goals

During his recent trip to Africa, Secretary Kissinger tried to cast our concern over Soviet-Cuban involvement in terms of US global interests and responsibilities, and to show that US policies and actions concerning Southern Africa are part of our comprehensive quest for world peace and security. While you should try to reinforce Dr. Kissinger's efforts in these general areas, I believe your particular goal should be to convince the leaders of Kenya and Zaire--two moderate, friendly countries that are likely to play key roles in future African development--that the US understands their security problems and is willing to support their efforts to meet them. Your presence will be read within Africa as a major signal of US support and should remove a bit of the apprehension felt by Kenyan and Zairian security leaders.

Corollary objectives are to avoid implying any commitments the US might be unable or unwilling to meet or suggesting that either country has carte blanche for its re-equipment program. The latter point is particularly important for Zaire, for President Mobutu has sent us over the last few months a series of arms requirements lists that total some \$400-700 million. With Zaire in financial and economic straits as a result of depressed copper prices and transportation breakdowns and on the verge of payments defaults for previous military purchases in the US, it would be misleading to give Mobutu the impression that a massive US security assistance program is in the cards.

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c. Issues

Both Kenya and Zaire see major, immediate security threats from Somalia/Uganda and Angola, respectively. While their immediacy may be diminished slightly by your visits to Nairobi and Kinshasa, both countries will continue to view their security situations as serious.

For Kenya, the immediate issue is delivery of the F-5E/F aircraft that it has decided to buy from us. The Letter of Offer being prepared will state a delivery date of September 1978; this could be moved forward to March 1978 without impacting on the USAF but at increased cost to the Kenyans and with unfavorable implications for their training and maintenance programs. Talking points on this issue are at TAB D.

For Zaire, the immediate issue is the need to initiate a military modernization program at a time when Zaire is near bankruptcy and has little prospect of short or medium term financial relief. A US military survey team has just returned from Zaire and plans to recommend an impact package (including tanks, long one of Mobutu's chief requests) for immediate sale and delivery. This is a complex and detailed question--major equipment needs, limited US credit availability, and imminent default. Nevertheless, while assuring Mobutu of our support and our desire to help, you should also make it very clear that any new US program will have to be limited and carefully phased to avoid additional short-term demands that would make default a certainty. Detailed talking points are at TAB I:

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