

## China, 1970

### 57. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 2, 1970.

#### SUBJECT

Gestures to General Chiang

You requested that an action memorandum be prepared on the upgrading of the GRC air defense system as a gesture to General Chiang. Dave Packard has written you explaining that this proposal, first made by State, needs to be further studied by DOD before any commitment is made to the GRC (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

#### *The Proposed Gestures*

On December 11, State proposed that we make two gestures to the GRC as assurances of U.S. support (Tab B).<sup>3</sup>

—A new PL-480 agreement in support of the GRC's program (Vanguard) of technical assistance to other developing countries.<sup>4</sup>

—A promise to contribute substantially (\$31–\$36 million) to the upgrading of the GRC's air defense capability through provision of a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. Lynn initialed the memorandum but not Grant. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw and initialed it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab A is a December 31 memorandum from Packard to Kissinger, in which Packard wrote: "While there is general agreement that a high priority requirement exists for the proposals made by Ambassador Johnson and that they would substantially contribute to the GRC air defense system, the estimate of cost and funding provided to you appears to be optimistic." This conclusion was taken verbatim from a December 17 memorandum from Nutter to the Secretaries of the Army, Resor, and the Air Force, Seamans. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA General Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, China, Rep. of, 1969, 333–388.3)

<sup>3</sup> Attached at Tab B is a December 11 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Kissinger. Another copy is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, AID (US) 8 CHINAT.

<sup>4</sup> Public Law 480, The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, (later commonly known as the "Food for Peace Act") was designed to "increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes." (PL-480, 68 Stat. 454, as amended) The Vanguard program was the ROC's foreign agricultural assistance program, primarily for African nations.

F-104 squadron, an additional Nike–Hercules battalion, an additional Hawk battalion, and upgrading of the GRC Aircraft Control and Warning System.

On the first gesture, PL-480 for Program Vanguard, you have signed off on the proposal.<sup>5</sup> On the second, action has been delayed for DOD to develop a specific course of action based on State's general proposal.

The reasons given by Dave Packard for reconsideration of State's proposal to improve the GRC's air defense system are:

—The possibility of providing the proposed air defense systems cannot be determined now. State's judgement about the availability and cost of the air defense equipment "appears to be optimistic."

—The U.S. has recently promised to provide the GRC with both an additional squadron of F-104 interceptors and 5 destroyers. Dave Packard states that these systems will augment the GRC's air defense capability.

For these reasons, Dave Packard feels that the air defense proposal needs further study, which DOD has now undertaken and will be completed "in early January."

In preparation for his visit to the GRC, Vice President Agnew was briefed to make no specific commitment to the GRC beyond mentioning the F-104 squadron already promised and the U.S. desire to help the GRC improve its air defense capabilities.<sup>6</sup> If more specific guidance has not been sent to the Vice President, he will not have committed the U.S. to provision of more air defense capability than Dave Packard feels DOD can offer at this time.

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<sup>5</sup> On December 22, 1969, Rogers recommended to Nixon that he ask Agnew, who was then traveling in East Asia, to inform the ROC Government of the continuation of PL-480 support for the Vanguard Program "subject to working out appropriate terms and conditions this spring." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, China, Vol. III) In a December 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge and Bergsten noted: "We see no need to bring this matter to the President." They recommended informing the Vice President of the Vanguard Program's renewal. Kissinger initialed his approval on December 27. (Ibid.) The Vice President was informed in telegram 213872 to Manila, December 31. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/AGNEW)

<sup>6</sup> In a December 17, 1969, memorandum to Agnew, Kissinger wrote: "Although we do not wish to take a public position against F-4s, State and Defense have long considered F-4s too expensive, and submarines irrelevant to Taiwan's defense requirements. We are, however, discussing the continuing provision of more modern weapons (including F-104s) to the GRC." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 450, President's Trip Files, VP Trip East Asia Jan 70)

*Summary*

Dave Packard finds that the air defense system proposed by State as a gesture to General Chiang needs further study. Vice President Agnew's position prepared for his meeting with Chiang was consistent with this DOD reservation.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Even prior to the Packard memorandum, Agnew's party had been informed that "DOD is currently working on plan that would hopefully enable GRC to obtain better aircraft than they now have with more manageable costs." (Telegram from Haig to Robert Houdek aboard Air Force II, December 27; *ibid.*) Memoranda of conversation from the Vice President's trip are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387, Vice President's Trips, December 1969–January 1970, CF–421.

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**58. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 10, 1970.

INFORMATION ITEMS

[Omitted here are two paragraphs on the situation in Laos.]

—*Vice President on F-4s*: During his meeting in Taipei, the Vice President was twice approached obliquely concerning the GRC's desire for F-4s. Without mentioning F-4s specifically, he responded by:

- recognizing the high priority of GRC air defense requirements,
- indicating the US disposition to assist in up-grading GRC air defense, and
- stressing the difficult political problems surrounding the pending Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill.

He urged the GRC to take account of our problems, and reminded them that "the recipient country was not in a position to make a decision as to precisely what type of matériel the US would provide."

Subsequently, Ambassador McConaughy has discussed the F-4 question with Chiang Ching-kuo. He mentioned our current planning

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 16, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. There is no indication that the President saw it.

on improved GRC air defense capabilities, and he elaborated on the technical reasons which make us doubt that the F-4 is suitable. He made a strong case of our desire for GRC consultation and cooperation in coping with a trying issue which was undoubtedly having consequences harmful to the GRC.

Chiang Ching-kuo said flatly that the request still stands. At the Ambassador's insistence, he agreed that his response would not be considered definitive until he had checked it with President Chiang, but neither he nor Ambassador McConaughy believe that President Chiang is likely to change his mind. (Tab B)<sup>2</sup>

—*Continuing Trend Away From Militancy in Communist China*: A recent article in the theoretical journal *Red Flag* underscores the determination of the Chinese leadership to rebuild the Communist Party through the rehabilitation of members who were under suspicion during the Cultural Revolution. The Party's primacy over other political organizations was strongly asserted, and Cultural Revolutionaries were bluntly warned that having won "merit" or office in the Cultural Revolution did not in itself entitle them to Party membership.

Whatever this may mean as to the power relationships at the top—and this is thoroughly unclear—the new article is a strengthening of the pragmatic and cautious line of the past nine months. It is another sign that the radicals who came forward in the Cultural Revolution are being further frozen out of the reconstituted power elite. Almost certainly, this both reflects and will further reduce the radicals' waning influence in Peking.

[Omitted here are items on the Soviet Union and other topics.]

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<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab B but not printed is telegram 127 from Taipei, January 8, reporting on a January 3 meeting between Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and Agnew; and telegram 149 from Taipei, January 9, reporting on a meeting between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo.

59. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Warsaw Talks

You are aware of the success of the meeting with the Chinese Chargé on January 8.<sup>2</sup> Both sides carefully avoided polemics, and the Chinese accepted the administrative arrangements for future meetings with alacrity. The next meeting (and the first formal discussion of substance in two years) will occur in the Chinese Embassy on January 20. We will revert to the use of Chinese and English, which minimizes the possibility of translation error. Secretary Rogers has a proposed guidance telegram, which should be coming over very shortly.<sup>3</sup>

The Chinese tone of reasonableness is underlined by the ease which they accepted the principle of meeting alternately in the two Embassies. (Chinese usually like others to come to them, a remnant of the old imperial attitude.) Meeting inside the Embassies has the advantage, as they well know, of making it much harder for the Poles and the Russians to eavesdrop.

Three different elements of the Chinese attitude came out very clearly:

—They now *want* publicity. The Chargé arrived flamboyantly in his limousine. It was he who proposed the announcement of the meeting.

—They want to *sound reasonable*. The Chargé referred to the “five principles of peaceful co-existence,” a Chinese theme of the 50’s which was anathema during the Cultural Revolution.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, it was returned from the President on January 14. An attached covering memorandum indicates that Holdridge forwarded it to Kissinger at the latter’s request on January 9.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 53 for background on restarting the Warsaw talks. On January 7, 1970, the Chinese telephoned to suggest that Chargé Lei Yang and others come to the U.S. Embassy the next day. (Telegram 31 from Warsaw, January 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) At this meeting Lei Yang, accompanied by two aides, asked for a formal meeting on January 20. (Telegram 52 from Warsaw, January 8; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Document 61.

—They want to maintain their *ideological “purity”* despite these talks. The Chinese press has continued to tell the Chinese public of the “iniquities” of your Administration.

The immediate Chinese purpose is to show the *appearance* of the ability to deal with us—primarily for Soviet consumption. They are probably unready to talk much substance. This phase is necessary, however.

Having convinced themselves of the desirability of appearing to be able to make deals with us, they may find it easier to justify seeking the *substance* of understandings. Already, they are showing some interest in trade with us, and considerable curiosity as to your new policy lines.

The more pragmatic style of diplomacy which the Chinese are showing around the world can pose some immediate problems for us (e.g. the Chinese representation issue in the UN), but it is a danger which we must run if they are to move into a more responsible and normal member of the world society.

There is a continuing trend within Communist China away from militancy, and a weakening of the radicals. (Recent evidence on this point is being separately briefed.)<sup>4</sup> There is a good chance that the leadership may hold to its present pragmatic course, and that we shall have a chance to explore our relations with it at some leisure.

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 58 and 64.

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**60. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Kabul, January 13, 1970, 1542Z.

112. 1. In view of encouragement which President, you and Secretary Rogers gave to me November 24 in Washington to look into pos-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Top Secret. Haig forwarded the cable to Kissinger under a January 15 covering memorandum entitled “Items to Discuss with the President During Telephone Call Tonight.” This item was check-marked; however, the same item appeared on the “Items” memorandum for January 23. (Ibid.) A note attached to another copy reads: “No further dis. per AMH.” (Ibid., Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 1/5/70 to 4/30/70)

sibilities of some Sino-US contacts in Kabul, I have taken a first tentative step.<sup>2</sup>

2. On December 22 before resumption Warsaw talks announced I had conversation with Yugoslav Ambassador (Vojo Sobajic) in which I carefully reviewed key points our current policy toward China and indicated as my personal view that Kabul might not be bad place for informal or formal contacts. I said that I would leave to his judgment whether and in what manner he might make use of these views should occasion arise in his periodic contacts with Chinese Ambassador in Kabul.

3. At his request I called on Yugoslav Ambassador January 14 who had meeting with Chinese Ambassador (Hsieh Pang-chih) and his interpreter January 11. Following Yugoslav Ambassador's comments on US policy as reflected in my talk with him, Chinese Ambassador said that as far as formal talks between US and PRC were concerned it is immaterial to PRC where they are located. Talks first took place Switzerland, moved to Warsaw, but might well lead elsewhere. In order for these talks to produce any positive results, however, Chinese insist and will insist to the very end on two conditions: (1) Retreat of all US forces from Taiwan ("our territory of Taiwan") and (2) Withdrawal of US 7th Fleet from Straits of Taiwan. (No other condition was mentioned.)

4. Yugoslav Ambassador raised question of Viet Nam, to which Chinese Ambassador replied that Viet Nam should not be raised in context US-Chinese relations. Chinese position re Viet Nam was well known, namely that US forces ought withdraw as soon as possible. But, he repeated that "this has no bearing on US-Chinese relations and should not be raised in Warsaw either".<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Rogers, Kissinger, and Neumann met with Nixon from 2:54 to 3:03 p.m. on November 24, 1969. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> During a January 15 telephone call, beginning at 6:10 p.m., Nixon and Kissinger discussed Neumann's meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador and Sino-American relations. The transcript of the telephone conversation reads: "K[issinger]: The Ambassador in Kabul had an interesting contact with the Chinese Ambassador through the Yugoslav Ambassador. He suggested that talks begin in Warsaw and then talk could begin about talking elsewhere. One interesting thing he said—Vietnam has no bearing on Chinese-U.S. relations. President: Whole new attitude on that. K: Have to withdraw from Taiwan. In Vietnam have to withdraw eventually. That was in your Nov. 3 speech. President: We would have no trouble getting out of Taiwan. K: We would have to withdraw our 7th fleet from the Straits but would not have to hand Taiwan over [to] them. President: Very interesting point. K: Everyone was opposed to those drones over Southern China but they haven't hurt anything. Chinese push is withdraw from VN as soon as possible and should not raise in Warsaw. Has no bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations. Very interesting. President: Yes." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

5. Responding to question of Yugoslav Ambassador regarding Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese Ambassador moved into heavy attack on USSR and said border talks had broken down and in fact were non-starter from outset. Failure was attributed to refusal Soviets agree move forces back from border to avoid friction. He added that it would be better if no direct contact existed between Chinese and Soviet troops in this sensitive area and in view Soviet refusal “incidents were again possible”.

6. Yugoslav Ambassador said that in entire conversation only direct and personal attacks by Chinese Ambassador were against Soviets. He made no comment about me personally or our Mission. Only comment re US was stereotype characterization of general US moves, including VP Agnew tour, as “designed to deceive the people”.

7. I expressed our appreciation to Yugoslav Ambassador, both of us agreeing that his contacts be held very closely and in order to be perfectly clear reiterated my earlier statement that among available options two track discussions, formal at one place, information at another, might possibly also be considered.

8. I should add one note of caution concerning report of Chinese and Yugoslav Ambassadors’ talk. Chinese interpreter speaks English in which Yugoslav is not fully proficient. We speak in French so possibly some nuances might be lost.

9. I am of course informing Secretary Rogers of these conversations by same channel and look forward to any guidance which the President, you, or the Secretary may wish to offer, especially now that Warsaw talks have resumed.<sup>4</sup>

10. The visit of VP Agnew went exceedingly well and Afghan officials were delighted with the visit and the conversations. I hope you will come and see us one of these days.

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<sup>4</sup> This potential avenue of communication with the Chinese did not develop further. No response from Kissinger was found. Neumann relayed his report to the Department of State in telegram 111. Green passed the report to Rogers through Eliot on January 16. Rogers followed the advice of Green, as detailed in his covering memorandum, and approved telegram 10412 to Kabul, January 22, which read in part: “In view of the current resumption of Warsaw contacts, we are not at this point actively planning shift in venue of talks but it is helpful to have indication from Chinese Ambassador in Kabul that Chinese are not bound to Warsaw site.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 CHICOM–AFG)

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**61. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1970.

## SUBJECT

Guidance for Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting, January 20, 1970

I attach for your approval guidance we have prepared for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the 135th Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw, January 20, 1970.<sup>2</sup> The message contains the text of Ambassador Stoessel's opening presentation as well as general guidance for responses to issues we believe the Chinese are likely to raise. The emphasis is on a new beginning in Sino-U.S. relations and this Administration's new approach to Asian policy.

Among the points not previously raised with the Chinese are:

1. *Guam Doctrine*. Although this has been amply spelled out in public statements, we think it important to convey it privately to the Chinese along with its implications for improvement in our bilateral relations.

2. *U.S. assumption that the People's Republic of China does not intend to undertake overt aggression against other Asian states*. We think this useful to dispel earlier characterizations of China as a potential aggressor and threat to its Asian neighbors.

3. *Our intention to reduce U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia and hence in the neighborhood of China's southern border*. This is intended to make clear to the Chinese that we do not seek a permanent military

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson (EA/ACA) on January 13, and cleared by Swank, Green, and U. Alexis Johnson. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Cable cleared and sent WH—Mr. Kissinger cleared. Changes made in cable per Green/Kissinger telcon 1/17/70. (RLBrown to FHess)" According to a January 17, 11:40 a.m. telephone conversation between Green and Kissinger, Kissinger's major problem with the draft instruction—and the President endorsed Kissinger's view—was with the "tone." Kissinger told Green, "It seems we are trying a little too hard to prove our good intentions." Green replied, "You mean we are defensive?" Kissinger agreed, "that is a better word—we are protesting too hard. I think we will be more impressive to them if we give the feeling of moderation produced by strength." Kissinger then went on to suggest a number of specific language changes. Kissinger also told Green that he had checked "this idea of eventually reducing our presence on Taiwan with the President, and he thought that was fine." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Sent as telegram 8061 to Warsaw, January 17. The telegram was drafted by Anderson on January 14; cleared by Kreisberg, Brown, Green, Swank, Farley (ACDA), Johnson, and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers.

presence on the Asian mainland and that China can best ease her own security worries over U.S. “encirclement” through cooperating in a reduction in tension in the area around her southern border.

4. *Offer to discuss both our goals in the area and their limits.* Although, in a sense, the Warsaw talks have centered around mutual discussion and accusation concerning each other’s goals in Asia, we have never proposed that we undertake a genuine dialogue on this subject, particularly concerning the limits of our objectives.

5. *Offer to discuss the whole range of trade questions including the settlement of outstanding obligations.* It is unlikely the Chinese will want to enter into concrete trade discussions at this meeting. Nevertheless, we know that they are curious about our unilateral actions and may be interested in any expression of U.S. willingness to open this entire issue to discussion.

6. *Three new formulations on Taiwan:*

(a) The U.S. does not seek to impose its views concerning Taiwan on either side and does not intend to interfere in whatever settlement may be reached.

(b) A strengthened commitment not to support a GRC offensive action against the mainland.

(c) Expression of hope that we can reduce U.S. military presence on Taiwan as peace and stability in Asia grows.

The issue of Taiwan is the key to any improvement of relations with the PRC and the Chinese will be most interested in our statements on this subject. These three formulations are as far as we should be prepared to go at this time, but they are most important as a signal that we genuinely seek an improvement of relations.

7. *Offer to enter bilateral discussions on disarmament.* This offer has the double advantage of enabling us to refute Chinese charges of U.S.-Soviet “collusion” on nuclear disarmament matters while indicating that we believe the Chinese to be a major power and an essential element in the disarmament picture.

8. *Offer to send a special representative to Peking or have a Chinese representative come to Washington to discuss any of the subjects mentioned in the statement.* Should the Chinese wish to signal their willingness to improve relations, they could accept this offer without compromising any of their principles. Acceptance of such an offer at present is unlikely, but they will find it interesting as evidence of U.S. interest in further development of relations.

## 62. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Warsaw, January 20, 1970, 1645Z.

143. Subj: Sino-US Talks: 135th Meeting. Ref: (A) State 8061;<sup>2</sup> (B) Warsaw 141.<sup>3</sup>

1. In relatively brief (one hour) meeting, I opened with text provided ref (A). Chinese statement which followed started with assertion that basis of ChiCom foreign policy was peaceful coexistence on basis of five principles. From this Lei Yang moved to note that these principles were not consistent with interference by one country in internal affairs of another or forcible occupation by one country of territory of another. He observed that my statement to him on January 8 had spoken of widening communication and political dialogue with PRC but had omitted any mention of Taiwan.<sup>4</sup> He then devoted bulk of his remaining opening statement to Taiwan issue.

2. He emphasized Taiwan was crux of long-standing Sino-US disputes. Reviewing history of issue beginning with Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, US interposition of 7th Fleet in Taiwan Strait at beginning of Korean War, and US-GRC Treaty following conclusion of Korean War, he said US had attempted to legalize forcible occupation of Taiwan, to plan to bring about "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan" situation, and to separate Taiwan from China. He said US had carried out war threats and provocations against Mainland from Taiwan and has provided military aircraft to the GRC in the name of our treaty responsibilities. All this was intervention and aggression against the PRC.

3. He emphasized that the PRC would certainly liberate Taiwan and would never allow another country to occupy China's territory.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 2 p.m. Kissinger forwarded the cable to the President on January 21 in his daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 16, President's Daily Briefs) The Embassy sent the full record of the meeting to the Department of State on January 24 in Airgram A-25 from Warsaw. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-13, Document 3. Stoessel, Kreisberg (Advisor), Donald M. Anderson (Interpreter), Thomas W. Simons (Scribe), Lei Yang (Chargé d'Affaires), Li Ch-ching (Advisor), Ch'ien Yung-nien (Interpreter), and Yeh Wei-lan (Scribe) attended both the January 20 and February 20 meetings.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 141 from Warsaw, January 20, relayed the contents of Stoessel's public statement following the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 59.

Any expectation that Peking's position on this would change was fruitless. He emphasized that it had been the fault of the US that no progress had been made in the Sino-US talks thus far because the US continued to talk about subsidiary issues, rather than the key issue of Taiwan. It was up to the US, he said, to consider how to deal with this basic issue if it wished to improve relations with the PRC.

4. China, Lei said, was consistently in favor of the use of negotiations and peaceful means to resolve disputes between the US and the PRC and were prepared on this basis to explore and consider how to resolve the basic problems existing between the two countries. PRC was willing to consider and discuss any thoughts and proposals consistent with the principles of peaceful coexistence which the US wished to put forward.

5. Concluding, Lei said that such proposals could be put forward either through the Ambassadorial-level talks or through higher-level discussions or any other channel which both sides might agree upon.<sup>5</sup>

6. The general flavor of Lei's remarks was non-polemical. His restatement of the PRC's Taiwan position did not explicitly call for any specific action by the US. He did not refer to any specific incidents, to the 7th Fleet (except in the context of his recitation of the history of the Taiwan issue), to "US-Soviet collusion", to Viet-Nam, or to any other multilateral or ideological issues. Likewise, Lei did not comment on US trade or travel moves. His sole focus was on Taiwan as a bilateral, political, non-ideological issue between us, and upon Peking's willingness to resolve disputes with the US through peaceful negotiations.

7. I replied only briefly to Lei Yang's remarks, reiterating in accordance with Department's guidance that the US position relating to Taiwan was clear, that it was without prejudice to any peaceful settlement which might be arrived at between Peking and Taipei, and observed that it was my feeling that there was much similarity between the positions he and I had set forth so far as our desire to resolve any disputes in the area, including Taiwan, by peaceful means. I then asked whether he could elaborate on the meaning of "other channels" as a means of continuing our discussions.

8. Lei on his part repeated that Peking's position on Taiwan was clear, the US-GRC treaty was not recognized by the people of China,

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<sup>5</sup> The full record of the meeting (see footnote 1 above) shows that, following the instructions from the Department of State, Stoessel offered that "If as these talks progress it would seem to be useful and your Government would so desire, my Government would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative of your Government in Washington for more thorough exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree."

and that Taiwan was not a state but a part of China. Lei specifically noted that he would refer to Peking our proposal on sending a representative to Peking or having a Chinese representative visit Washington. He declined to elaborate on the meaning of meetings at "higher level" or through "other channels," and suggested PRC would consider US specific proposal on this subject or could work out proposal at ambassadorial meeting. He then suggested that rather than setting a specific date for the next meeting, liaison officers of our two Embassies be in touch soon.

9. Our over-all impression of the meeting was that the Chinese wished it to be considered as a serious opening negotiating session in which direct bilateral issues could be set forth and general ideological issues set aside. The atmosphere was straightforward and businesslike with the Chinese moving the actual meeting from a large formal hall (where newsmen were allowed to take photographs) to a small, informal conference room. (We assume this was for security reasons as well as for greater ease of dialogue and strongly recommend that no public mention be made of fact talks did not actually take place where newsmen were admitted.) It is somewhat ambiguous at this point who will take the initiative in proposing the next meeting. I suspect the Chinese intentionally left it so.

10. In briefing friendly governments on meeting, I recommend that Chinese statement be characterized as generally dealing with problem of Taiwan, restating essence of ChiCom position on historical character of this dispute. General non-polemical, non-ideological character of ChiCom presentation might also be noted. Recommend, however, that ChiCom proposal on higher-level meetings and willingness discuss peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes with US might be held to ourselves for present. Chinese we believe have gone to considerable efforts to maintain security of present meeting and any leak of relatively relaxed Chinese comments or optimistic characterization of atmosphere of meeting could embarrass our future contacts with Chinese and force defensive hardening of their posture.

**Stoessel**

63. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Warsaw Talks

I described and commented briefly on the Warsaw talks in this morning's intelligence briefing.<sup>2</sup> Given the importance of the topic, I would like to expand somewhat on that report.

The meeting was brief (one hour). Stoessel opened; the Chinese replied, devoting almost his entire time to the Taiwan issue. From that, he moved directly to say that China "favored the use of negotiation and peaceful means to resolve disputes between the US and the PRC, and were prepared on this basis to explore and consider how to resolve the basic problems existing between the two countries." The Taiwan issue, he said, was not an ideological one. He offered to discuss any US proposals "consistent with the principles of peaceful coexistence." He suggested that we proceed either with ambassadorial level talks, higher-level discussions or any other mutually agreeable channel. He specifically mentioned that he would pass to Peking our proposal to send a representative to Peking or accept a Chinese representative in Washington. Beyond that, he would not elaborate. Rather than setting a date for the next meeting, he suggested that our Embassies' liaison officers "be in touch soon."

Ambassador Stoessel observes that:

- Lei's remarks were not polemical.
- He restated the PRC's Taiwan position without explicitly calling for specific US actions.
- He avoided reference to the 7th Fleet, "US-Soviet collusion," Vietnam, or any ideological issues.

Stoessel regards the Chinese presentation as a serious opening of negotiating sessions to discuss direct bilateral issues and avoid ideology.

Stoessel recommends that in briefing friendly governments we not go beyond characterizing the Chinese statement as "generally dealing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on January 26. A covering memorandum, attached but not printed, indicates that Holdridge drafted it at Kissinger's request.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 62.

with the problem of Taiwan, restating the essence of the Chinese Communist position on the historical character of this dispute. The general non-polemical, non-ideological character of the Chinese Communist presentation might also be noted."

*Comments:* The Chinese Chargé's language is unquestionably the most forthcoming of any we have heard in the history of the Warsaw talks, except for one brief period in 1955. They want to keep on talking. Whether they want to arrive at an understanding even at the expense of compromising on Taiwan is much less certain. They certainly have not given anything away. It should be remembered that they are focusing on Taiwan, an area in which *they* want something from *us*. They are of course aware of the potential for disrupting US/GRC relations to their own advantage if they can get us to seem to make concessions concerning Taiwan.

Having said all this, it was still a most interesting and inviting presentation. Once in 1955 they seemed to hover on the point of willingness to declare that the "Bandung principles" ruled out the use of force in the Taiwan Strait; also in 1955, they suggested carrying on the talks at a higher level. They have now returned close to that style of diplomacy, and the question will arise: what use do we wish to make of the change?

We clearly have considerable thinking to do as to what we want from them, and what we would give in return. This question has been addressed before, in theoretical terms. One quickly discovers, of course, that they are not actually *doing* much that we want them to stop doing.

—we would like them to desist from material support to insurgencies in Southeast Asia, but by their lights we are providing far more support to our friends in Southeast Asia than they are to theirs.

—we have one collision point—the Chinese road in Laos—which could wreck our movement toward a *détente*.

There are some things which we would like them to *start doing*, but these involve our hopes for a fundamental reordering of their priorities and outlook, and are far beyond the scope of non-ideological, bilateral negotiation, i.e.:

—we would like for them to participate responsibly in supranational endeavors, such as disarmament, and to take a less hostile view of non-Communist governments.

Consequently, the areas in which we can hope to accomplish anything tend to be *transitional issues*, in which our purpose is not to arrive at important practical agreements, but rather to continue to shape a climate in which they will evolve in a desirable direction, e.g.:

—a *détente* in the Taiwan Strait, without sacrificing the GRC.

—a mutual phasedown of the hostility with which we regard each other's actions in Asia.

—an improvement in communication, such as arrangements for travel in both directions, for trade, for the better exchange of books and written materials, for Chinese participation in international groups, for telegraphic clearing agreements, etc.

These are issues about which we have talked before, but encountered no Chinese response. They have insisted on settling the Taiwan issue first; they still insist on it, but they may be more flexible as to what constitutes an interim settlement. We shall probably have to accommodate them and talk about Taiwan, but we will need to move most carefully to avoid giving them a windfall by upsetting the present stability on Taiwan.

Beyond that, trade may be the most fruitful area for probing, since the Chinese may develop an interest in the American market.

As to more immediate issues, I agree with Stoessel's concerns that we not say too much to our friends, and have asked that any proposed briefing on the talks be cleared here. We may need to be somewhat franker with the GRC about the Taiwan issue in this and subsequent meetings, however, to avoid allowing the Communists to whipsaw us by leaking distorted accounts to the GRC.

Stoessel is probably right that the Chinese are being deliberately unclear as to who should ask for the next meeting. They may hope to induce us to make the bid, for the psychological advantage of putting us in the position of supplicant.

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**64. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**

Washington, January 26, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

65. **Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

US Treatment of Peng Ming-min

*The Situation:*

You are aware that Peng Ming-min has escaped from Taiwan. The Department of State thinks he is probably in Sweden, and that he will soon approach us for a visa to take up one of the university positions offered to him in the United States. His family is still in Taiwan.

Peng was evidently a student of yours, and several individuals and organizations solicited your help last spring to press the GRC to allow him to come to the United States. At your guidance, we answered one of these letters (to an acquaintance of yours) with the briefest of acknowledgments, and filed the rest unanswered.<sup>2</sup>

Our Embassy in Taipei thinks that Peng will become the leader of the Taiwan independence movement, and that he may revitalize that movement. There is, however, no evidence that he will be able to raise the movement from the almost complete impotence which has heretofore characterized it. (Thomas Liao, the erstwhile leader, lived for years in Japan, but made his peace with the GRC some time ago and returned docilely to Taiwan—thereby, incidentally, removing a very sore point in GRC/Japanese relations.)

Ambassador Chow has requested an appointment with Marshall Green on Thursday morning. State has told our Embassies in Taipei and Stockholm that we will inform Chow that we plan to issue a visa if it is requested. (Tab A)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an unsigned copy.

<sup>2</sup> An associate of Peng in Japan, Yoichi Yokoboki, wrote a letter to Kissinger dated May 1, 1969. A reply signed by Grant on May 9 reads in full: "Dr. Kissinger has asked me to reply to your letter of May 1. As I am sure you appreciate, the pressures on his time make it simply impossible for him to write directly. Thank you for calling our attention to Professor Peng's problem." (Ibid., Vol. II) Another letter regarding Peng from Yoichi Yokobori was dated May 24. In it, Yoichi had requested help in obtaining an exit visa for Peng. Kissinger's handwritten comment on a note forwarding this letter to him reads: "No answer, 6/4/69."

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 12608 to Taipei and Stockholm, January 28, not printed.

*The Issues:*

This is a very hot potato. Peng has many friends in university circles here, and any move to qualify or prevent his entry will probably elicit quite an outcry that we are attempting to muzzle opinion in the United States to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek. (This will not help Chiang among liberals here—but it is questionable whether his stock with them could sink any lower.)

On the other hand, President Chiang will take it as a personal affront if we decide to issue a visa. He will see it in the context of the removal of the permanent Strait patrol, the Warsaw meetings, and our statements and actions concerning relations with Communist China. He will probably become highly suspicious of a US plot to sell him out and work toward a “one China, one Taiwan” solution based on the Taiwanese.

At State, the working-level people argue: “What can Chiang do?” The answer is that he is dependent upon us and cannot do much. This is not to say, however, that we should look with equanimity on a decision which will deepen US/GRC suspicions and which will probably make it more difficult to cooperate, for instance, in strategy on Chinese representation in the United Nations. An accumulation of suspicions could conceivably lead Chiang to take ill-considered action.

Insofar as they take note of this matter, the Chinese Communists would probably regard a visa for Peng as a “one-China, one-Taiwan” maneuver, and dislike it as such.<sup>4</sup>

*The Visa Regulations:*

The ideal solution would be to grant Peng asylum, on condition that he not engage in political activities intended to overthrow the GRC. Unfortunately, our visa laws do not make provision for asylum. We are on thin legal grounds in attempting to exact a pledge from Peng as a condition for entry (though at our urging, State did get U Nu to sign such a pledge voluntarily in a somewhat similar situation last year—which he largely ignored.) We have little legal recourse if Peng violates such a pledge.

*Proposed Action:*

I think that this one should go to you or the President.<sup>5</sup> Marshall Green has agreed *not* to take a definitive position Thursday when Am-

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<sup>4</sup> The PRC's adverse public reaction to Peng's activities is summarized in “U.S.–Japanese Reactionaries Step Up ‘Taiwan Independence Movement’ Plot,” *Beijing Review*, March 6, 1970, pp. 21–22.

<sup>5</sup> There is no record of this matter being brought to the attention of the President.

bassador Chow calls. (After all, we are not formally notified that Chow will raise the subject, and we have not yet received the visa application.) Marshall will recite the disadvantages of refusing a visa, by way of educating the Chinese and preparing them for the worst, but at the same time he can refrain from stating a position, on the grounds that no visa has been received and no policy yet decided.<sup>6</sup>

State will staff out the alternatives legally open to it, and will present these with their recommendations to the White House, after they have heard from our Embassy in Taipei as to likely reactions there.

Meanwhile, Stockholm is being forewarned to submit any visa application from Peng for clearance to Washington.

*The Best Possible Resolution:*

Without prejudging the results of further inquiry, Marshall thinks that the best course will be to allow Peng in, but only if he will sign a pledge not to engage in political activity intended to bring about the overthrow of the GRC. (We would be unwise to ask him to refrain from *criticizing* the GRC.) Given the fact that his family is in Taiwan, and that he probably wants very much to come to the United States, he will probably sign such a document. The pledge could then be shown to the GRC to demonstrate our responsiveness to their concerns, and it would probably have a certain effect in dissuading Peng from engaging in flamboyant activity against the GRC, such as attempting to revive the nearly defunct Taiwan nationalist underground newspaper.

If he should refuse a conditional visa, we would have another and tougher problem, but we could at least have a defensible explanation for delay in issuing a visa.

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<sup>6</sup> Green followed this course in his conversation with Chow on January 29, as reported in telegram 14335 to Taipei and Stockholm, January 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

**66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Henry Cabot Lodge's Discussion with Mr. J. J. Derksen, Netherlands' Minister Accredited to Communist China

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum prepared by Cabot Lodge describing his discussion with Mr. J. J. Derksen, the Netherlands' Chargé accredited to Communist China, who visited him in Boston on January 30.<sup>2</sup> The discussion which Lodge had with Mr. Derksen was highly significant and is described in detail in his memorandum to me. Inter alia, Derksen made the following points to Lodge:

—Offered to act as a channel between the U.S. and Peking Governments.

—Promised to preserve absolute secrecy and if we decide to use him to send nothing in writing to his own government. He would only report orally to the Prime Minister's Office when he is in the Hague, after first consulting with us on what he should say. Derksen would not tell anything to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

—Confirmed that Chou En-lai is in complete command in Peking and controls and directs through five Vice Foreign Ministers with whom Derksen has easy access.

—During a January 13 departure call on the Acting Director of the Chinese Communists' Office of Western European Affairs, Derksen was told about the resumption of the Warsaw talks and was assured that if the U.S. wants better relations then "everything becomes easy." He also was impressed with the importance of Taiwan to Peking in its visualization of improving relations with the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 430, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Derksen, J.J.—Backchannel (Lodge Initiative) 1970–1972. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Eyes Only. The date on the memorandum is handwritten. Derksen's given name was Jacobus Jerome.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached. A February 3 memorandum from Lodge to Kissinger is *ibid.*, Box 823, Name Files, Henry Cabot Lodge, Vol. I through 20 Apr. 70. This 5-page document describes Derksen's background and his offer to assist the United States in negotiating with both the PRC and North Vietnam. According to Lodge, "I believe he came [to Boston] at his own expense and that his trip may well not have been known to the Dutch Government." Also attached is a January 23 message from Lodge informing Kissinger of Derksen's January 30 visit.

—Derksen has concluded that Chou En-lai wants better relations with the U.S. and prefers the Americans to the Russians.

—Derksen believes that it would be extremely useful to assign him the job of getting talks started between Chou En-lai and a senior representative designated by you. Derksen believes that these talks should be thoroughly prepared ahead of time and could lead to some real improvement in relations. He also believes that meetings between Chou En-lai and your representative could be arranged at some location outside of China.

Derksen's proposals offer some distinct advantages:

1. It would give a sense of security to the Chinese Communists with respect to the Soviets which is not provided in the Warsaw forum.

2. I suspect that the pro-Soviet factions in State go to the limits of the possible and at times even beyond in informing Dobrynin of the contents of our discussions in Warsaw, thereby affording the Soviets an opportunity to sabotage these talks by intimidating the Chinese Communists in their dealings with them.

For these reasons, I recommend that we send the memorandum at Tab B to the Chinese Communists through Mr. Derksen.<sup>3</sup> If Chou En-lai is definitely interested, as Mr. Derksen believes, we could establish a dialogue which might lead to direct secret talks at a mutually agreed upon location outside of Communist China between him or other senior officials. In the proposed communication, I have offered either Mr. Derksen or Major General Vernon Walters, our Defense Attaché in Paris, as channels.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the attached message to the Chinese Communist Government which would be delivered to Mr. Derksen in the

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<sup>3</sup> The attachment reads in full:

"The U.S. Government wishes to continue the exchanges we have begun again through the Ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw. However, the location of these talks makes it difficult to maintain complete secrecy due to the amount of public interest which they have generated, the level at which they are conducted, and the numbers of officials involved. If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks not known by other countries, the President is ready to establish an alternate channel for matters of the most extreme sensitivity. We are prepared to activate such alternate channels through either Mr. Derksen, the bearer of this communication, or through Major General Vernon C. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché accredited to the French Government in Paris. General Walters can be contacted in Paris at his residence, telephone number 637-4374, or at his office in the Embassy, telephone number ANJ 7460. He is in direct contact with the White House. Knowledge of such talks would be kept to a very small circle of the President's closest advisors."

strictest confidence (probably by Cabot Lodge) prior to Derksen's departure from the Hague.<sup>4</sup> Knowledge of the message would be restricted to yourself, Cabot Lodge, Mr. Derksen and me.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The original message, initialed by the President, is attached. According to a February 11 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, Kissinger was to pass along the message in a meeting with Derksen and Lodge that day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for the First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

<sup>5</sup> The President initialed his approval. This effort to make contact with the Chinese failed. In an overview of communications with the Chinese, Lord wrote that in April 1971 "There followed a series of messages to Haig for HAK passed through the Dutch Embassy here which are even more incomprehensible once translated than they were in code. Derksen keeps saying he is getting ready to pass [the] message and Haig keeps acknowledging Derksen's notes." (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, April 17; *ibid.*) In December 1970 Kissinger informed the Dutch that he had no objections to their recalling Derksen from Beijing "where he has been a disappointment to his government." The Dutch Ambassador to the United States, Van Lynden, asked Kissinger in July 1971 if Derksen had "helped to establish contact which led to Kissinger's trip to Peking." In a July 17 message relayed through Haig to Van Lynden, Kissinger declared that Derksen "had no role in matters leading to the trip to Peking, that no messages were ever received through him, and that we have not used his services for some time." Copies of these messages are *ibid.*, Box 430, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Derksen, J.J.—Backchannel (Lodge Initiative) 1970–1972.

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## 67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### SUBJECT

Sino-US Negotiations in Warsaw

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum forwarding State's proposed guidance for the February 20 Sino-US meeting in Warsaw and a memorandum on US strategy (Tabs A, B and C).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached February 10 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger contained a lengthy analysis of the recent Warsaw meeting by Holdridge and indicated that he was the drafter of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. These documents were drafted by Kreisberg, cleared by Swank, then forwarded by Green to Rogers on February 6. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The documents were prepared in part to respond to

The guidance instructs Ambassador Stoessel to:

- State that we are prepared to discuss with the Chinese a joint declaration incorporating the position that we would not interfere in any peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question reached between the PRC and the GRC and affirming our adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;

- Indicate our intention to reduce those military facilities which we have on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminish;

- State our intention of dropping our remaining travel restrictions applicable to Mainland China (these restrictions come up for renewal on March 15);

- Offer specifically to discuss and settle blocked accounts and arrangements for an expansion of trade relations;

- Authorize our Ambassador on rebuttal, if the subject arises, to refer to a possible amnesty for Richard Fecteau, an American whose prison sentence expires in two years.

The strategy memorandum assumes that the Chinese as well as ourselves will want to reduce the chances of a Sino-US conflict, and would be interested in bilateral talks on issues such as trade if the stumbling block of Taiwan can be overcome. For this purpose, the memorandum says that Peking will want some acknowledgment that we regard the Taiwan question as an internal Chinese matter, that we do not support “two Chinas,” and that we will reduce our military presence on Taiwan; for our part we will want assurances that Taiwan will not come under attack and that we can maintain our commitments to the GRC. The recommended initial negotiating position on Taiwan is therefore to blur the issue of Taiwan’s status by reiterating the position (taken at the last meeting) that the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland should be settled by those directly involved.

You should have no problem with the general direction of the immediate strategy and guidance (including the removal of the remaining travel restrictions). You may wish, however, to consider Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that we pull slightly back from our proposal in January to send representatives to Peking or receive Chinese representatives here.<sup>3</sup> (The new guidance would have Ambassador Stoessel refer the question without showing interest.) Shortly after the talks began in 1955 the Chinese proposed raising the level, to which we responded by insisting that there had to be progress at the Ambassadorial level before we could agree. Our negative reaction to Peking’s bid was probably one

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Kissinger’s February 3 memorandum to Rogers, in which Kissinger wrote: “The President has requested that a game plan be developed for the evolution of the Warsaw talks.” Kissinger continued, “The plan should spell out our objectives in the talks, and should address itself to the tactics which the Department of State plans to use.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 61.

reason why the talks slipped into sterility, and we might now want to avoid going over the same ground again. If the talks should move to Peking or Washington and go to a higher level, Peking might in fact consider it had more to lose by not discussing bilateral issues than would otherwise be the case. I suggest that if you agree on these reservations, I pass them along to State.

*Recommendation*

That you authorize me to inform State that you have reservations concerning its recommendations on responding to a Chinese proposal on talks in Peking or Washington and that it adopt a more positive approach to such a proposal.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Nixon initialed his approval. Instructions to Stoessel in Warsaw were sent in telegram 24493, February 18, and telegram 25648, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) Stoessel was also informed of the White House’s stance in a February 19 letter from Hillenbrand, which reads in part: “The White House believes that it would be preferable to take a more positive approach to a favorable Chinese response on the question of higher level meeting.” Hillenbrand suggested, “Evidently, the view is that holding out too stringently for progress at the Ambassadorial level before agreeing to have representatives meet in Peking or Washington might invite a repetition of the deadlock which developed in earlier stages of the talks.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Files of Walter J. Stoessel, China Talks (Warsaw))

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**68. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Warsaw, February 20, 1970, 1645Z.

376. Subj: Sino-US Talks: February 20 Meeting. Ref: A. State 24453 [24493]; B. State 25648.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A full record of the meeting is in Airgram A–84 from Warsaw, February 20. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 4. The Chinese suggested the February 20 date during a February 2 visit to the Embassy in Warsaw. (Telegram 215 from Warsaw, February 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 67.

1. In his twenty-minute opening statement, Lei Yang focused on only two subjects: primacy of Taiwan issue and Chinese interest in higher level meeting. He started by welcoming US comments at January 20 meeting on US wish to improve Sino-US relations, relax tensions, and resolve differences and said PRC had always stood for conducting relations between states with different social systems on basis of principles of peaceful coexistence and for the peaceful settlement through negotiations of Sino-US differences. He said that the Chinese in 1955 had said the Chinese people wishes friendly relations with the American people and did not want war with the US. PRC was willing enter into negotiations now to discuss relaxation of tensions in Far East and especially in the Taiwan area.

2. Lei expressed satisfaction that at January 20 meeting US did not evade Taiwan issue and dealt with question of agreement on Five Principles and Taiwan in detail. At same time, he said, US had raised other questions in way which confused the primary Taiwan issue with secondary matters. Taiwan and the directly related matter of Five Principles must be settled first. Only when this done could fundamental improvement in Sino-US relations be achieved and other matters discussed. He then noted, without elaboration, that the PRC was aware that the settlement of the Taiwan issue required that an effort be made to create appropriate conditions for its resolution.

3. Recalling that ambassadorial talks had been suspended for two years, Lei noted they were now resumed and said PRC shared US hope they represented new beginning. He said in this context that the Chinese continued to note inconsistency in US position: (a) US wanted to improve relations with PRC but continued relations with "Chiang clique" which had been overthrown by Chinese people; (b) US was willing discuss Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence but said it would continue honor commitment to "Chiang clique;" (c) US considered PRC had right (*sic*) settle Taiwan question as an internal affair but continued follow policy aimed at "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" which Chinese people could never accept.

4. Lei said that all this showed that more thorough exploration of this question was indeed necessary. There were, however, "certain difficulties" in undertaking this exploration through the ambassadorial talks. Lei noted that both sides appeared to have foreseen this situation when they separately suggested at the January 20 meeting that higher level talks were possible. If the US wished to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy to Peking for further exploration of the fundamental principles of relations between the US and PRC, the Chinese would be prepared to receive him. Lei again emphasized that fundamental principle revolved around Taiwan. Once this question was settled, resolution of other issues would not be difficult. For example, the practice in the past of allowing "US criminals

in China" to exchange letters and packages, and receive visits by family members could be continued in future.

5. After I made prepared statement provided ref (a) (as amended by ref (b)), Lei responded that he had nothing to add on Taiwan question, would report US position to Peking, and was not prepared to make further comment on trade, prisoners, or other issues.

6. I then observed that while we would welcome continuation of past Chinese practice on letters, packages, and visits for prisoners on mainland, this did not represent any forward movement. I noted Fecteau and Dunn cases (ref A). I then asked for further clarification of PRC proposal on higher-level meeting, specifically asking whether Chinese envisaged this as substitute for Ambassadorial meetings, whether arrangements for such a possible meeting would be made through Ambassadorial discussions here, and whether Chinese were thinking in terms of publicized meeting or one held in secret.

7. Lei said he would report my comments on prisoners to Peking as well as questions on higher-level meeting. He said he was not prepared at present time to say any more.

8. As experiment, I asked Lei if he would like to join me in my office for informal tea and sandwiches. He declined at this time on grounds of appointment elsewhere but said Embassy liaison personnel might discuss arrangements for similar informal encounter at some future time.

9. *Comment:* Chinese statement was even blander and less polemical than at January 20 meeting. No accusations were made of US military involvement on Taiwan, drone incident was avoided, and past history of Sino-US relations was not rehearsed again (I consequently omitted portion of first para of Dept guidance (ref a) dealing with past history). At same time, Chinese gave little away and avoided any hints or signal on bilateral issues we have raised. Lei Yang's comment, almost a "throw away," that Peking recognized need to create conditions for resolution of Taiwan question extremely interesting if, as I suspect, it was intended as hint that the Chinese may be prepared to consider more compromise solution on Taiwan or to make some gesture of substantive move on other issues. At same time, in focusing explicitly on three key aspects of Taiwan issue (para 3 (a)–(c) above), Lei gave no hint of any concession or shift in Chinese posture.

10. As I gather Department anticipated, Chinese appear anxious have higher-level meeting and are setting their target high in aiming at "ministerial" or "Presidential envoy" level. I did not press Lei as to what precisely were "certain difficulties" which made such a meeting more appropriate for discussion of Sino-US relations than lower-level talks. Sensitivity in Peking of talks with US gives Chinese representative little if any leeway in give and take at our ambassadorial meetings. Meeting in Peking would make possible continuing internal

“factional” discussions on Chinese side, provide the Chinese with invaluable counterpoint to their simultaneous negotiations with the Soviets, and have obvious effects on the GRC. I suspect it is less a question of “certain difficulties” for Peking than of “considerable advantages.”

11. At the same time I suspect the Chinese are going to be very reluctant to back away from such a high-level meeting and that we may be hard pressed to persuade them to return here in Warsaw to substantive discussion of hint of future flexibility they provided in today’s meeting. Chinese are obviously prepared to meet again here to discuss the higher-level meeting itself but I suspect not much else. Question will be whether they want it enough to be willing to put something down “on account” beforehand.

**Stoessel**

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**69. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese at Warsaw Talks Suggest US Send High-Level Representative to Peking

At today’s session of the Warsaw talks<sup>2</sup> the Chinese said that if we wished to send a representative of “ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy to Peking for the further exploration of fundamental principles of relations” between the US and China, they would be prepared to receive him. They made it plain that the “fundamental principle” with which they were concerned was the Taiwan question, and that once this question was settled other issues could be resolved. They also made it plain that the resolution of the Taiwan issue could not be in the context of a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” procedure.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Poland, Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Haig signed for Kissinger. The “I” is apparently Haig. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on February 26.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 68.

The Chinese have now picked up that element in our negotiating position which would be the most dramatic development in terms of the effects on the outside world. The Soviets could be expected to be taken aback by the appearance of a US envoy in Peking; the GRC undoubtedly would react adversely; and opinion in other countries which have fears and suspicions of Communist China might question our motives and the direction of our policy. The Chinese probably had all of these effects in mind in responding to our proposal. At the same time, however, the Chinese will also face problems in terms of the effects on their own public opinion if a US "imperialist" shows up in Peking after years of propaganda against us; moreover, they must be prepared to consider making some adjustment in their own stand against the US and the US role in Taiwan to avoid a dramatic collapse of this high-level contact. Such a collapse might encourage the Soviets to believe that Chinese explorations of the US option had failed and that the Chinese now had to face the Soviets on their own.

I consider that the advantages lie on the side of a positive response to the Chinese. While we should exercise great care in selecting our representative and laying out the line he should take with the Chinese, his presence in Peking could be very helpful in moving our relationship with the Chinese in the direction which you set in your foreign policy review. This step is fully in consonance with the policy toward Communist China laid down in the foreign policy review, and can be explained as such to all comers, including the GRC. From our standpoint, we may wish to prolong the presence of our representative in Peking and thereby gain, if nothing else, some degree of representation there.

We need not move immediately in naming a representative, since Ambassador Stoessel raised a number of questions concerning the Chinese thoughts as to the arrangements and, in any case, the ball is in our court in proposing the time of the next meeting. However, we should not delay over long so as to avoid creating a negative impression, and I will very shortly have recommendations for you concerning nominees for the job of representative, the level of the position, and the guidance he will be given. I will consult with State on this. There may need to be one or two meetings before arrangements can be fully worked out.

As an interesting side-light on the Warsaw meeting, the Chinese referred to remarks they had made in 1955 on wishing friendly relations with the American people and not desiring war with us. You will recall that our negative reaction to their call for higher-level meetings in 1955 was one of the factors which led to the sterile nature of the talks. We now appear to be back in the 1955 atmosphere, and indeed the Chinese at this meeting avoided polemics and references to any

other issue such as our military position on Taiwan which could have impaired the atmospherics of the session.

I have discussed the broad outlines of the foregoing with Dr. Kissinger and he agrees that we will probably have to respond positively to the Chinese initiative. He will be prepared to cover this with you in greater detail on Sunday.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, the President and Kissinger met from noon until 3:15 p.m. on February 22 at Camp David. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of their conversation has been found.

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## 70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 23, 1970.

### SUBJECT

Message from President Yahya on China

Ambassador Hilaly came to me yesterday with the contents of a letter he had received from President Yahya containing his assessment of the current state of Communist China's thinking about U.S.-Chinese relations.<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador said President Yahya's letter contained no explanation of what further contacts with the Chinese, if any, this assessment might be based on.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. The handwritten date on this copy, February 27, 1970, is apparently incorrect, as Kissinger noted in his memoirs that he met with Hilaly on February 22 (see footnote 2 below). Another copy of this memorandum, without Nixon's handwritten comments but dated February 23, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Cookies II, [Chronology of Exchanges with the PRC, February 1969–April 1971]. "Cookies II" was a collection of materials documenting contact with the PRC up to the time of Kissinger's trip in July 1971. This copy also bears the notation "Handcarried to Gen. Haig. No cover memo."

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: "On February 22, we received a communication from Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly that his President, Yahya Khan, believed our initiatives had encouraged the Chinese." (*White House Years*, p. 689)

If this is a message from the Chinese—and I assume it is—its significance seems to be:

1. that they are telling us they no longer see the Vietnam war as a problem between us and
2. that they are no longer concerned about the U.S. and USSR seeking a condominium in Asia.

Specifically, President Yahya's statement as read by Ambassador Hilaly ran as follows:

"The initiatives taken by the U.S. have encouraged the Chinese. It also seems to be their assessment now that there is no U.S.-Soviet collusion on matters of concern to China. They would, however, be very sensitive if the U.S. were to show its belief that their willingness to conduct a meaningful dialogue with the U.S. is a sign of Chinese weakness or of fear of U.S.-Soviet collaboration against China. For the U.S. to proceed from such a basis might jeopardize future negotiations."<sup>3</sup>

"In any case, the Chinese response to U.S. initiatives is likely to be in very measured and cautious steps. But China does seem inclined toward a meaningful dialogue concerning all issues which divide the two countries.

"It should be anticipated that negotiations will be hard and difficult. A lot will be said for the purpose of the record but given trust, the problems between the two could be solved by peaceful negotiations.

"The possibility of expansion of the Vietnam war is seen as having lessened. A war between China and the U.S. is seen now as a very remote possibility."

I told Ambassador Hilaly that we would appreciate it if President Yahya would explain two things to the Chinese:

1. We do not control the press. Any attempt by us to control press speculation on this subject would create even more speculation. The White House will scrupulously avoid any reflections along the lines of those described in President Yahya's communication.

2. When matters are in formal diplomatic channels, it is not so easy for us to maintain total discretion because too many people see what is happening. We would therefore be prepared to open a direct White House channel to Peking which would not be known outside the White House and on which we could guarantee total security.<sup>4</sup>

At the conclusion of our conversation I told Ambassador Hilaly that the communication from President Yahya was consistent with what had happened in the Warsaw Talks so far. I also asked him to tell President Yahya that you very much appreciate his role in this matter.

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: "Very important to have in mind."

<sup>4</sup> Nixon bracketed these numbered paragraphs and wrote in the margin: "good."

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**71. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 7, 1970.

## SUBJECT

Personal Letter to You from President Chiang Kai-shek Protesting Warsaw Talks<sup>2</sup>

At Tab A is a personal letter to you from President Chiang Kai-shek expressing his "shock" at the position which Ambassador Stoessel allegedly took with the Chinese Communist representative at the February 20 Warsaw meeting and in effect protesting the course which the talks are taking.<sup>3</sup> The specific issue which concerns President Chiang is the possibility that we might consider "accepting the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence first publicized by the Chinese Communists at the Bandung Conference 15 years ago and discuss with them how to settle the so-called Taiwan problem." He states that this would be infringing upon the sovereign rights of the Republic of China.

In making these points President Chiang reviews the record of US involvement with the Chinese Communists during World War II and subsequently; submits that their objectives in Asia have not changed (he takes the Vietnam war, the fall of the Plain of Jars and Muong Soui and the Chinese road building activity in Laos, and infiltration of the Philippines and Thailand by Communist elements as cases in point) and warns you to be on your guard. He declares that he supports the Nixon Doctrine, but adds that this should mean strengthening the free nations against aggression, and by inference, not giving in to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger on March 5. According to a handwritten notation on the first page, the memorandum was "OBE'd."

<sup>2</sup> In the letter attached at Tab A, Chiang wrote that he did not object to the talks per se, but added, "I hope you will carefully consider the consequences and take timely measures to prevent any distortion of your well-meaning policy during its implementation."

<sup>3</sup> Guidance for informing the ROC Government of the Warsaw talks is in telegram 27045 to Taipei, February 24, and telegram 28259 to Taipei, February 26. These telgrams, approved by Green and Brown respectively, stated that the first briefings were to be held for ROC Embassy personnel in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

the Chinese Communists. He concludes by saying that his letter backs up a Ministry of Foreign Affairs *démarche* on the same subject.<sup>4</sup>

President Chiang's letter is not unexpected. It illustrates the deep concern which he and others like him in Taiwan undoubtedly feel with respect to the possible implications of the Warsaw talks. I believe that we will need to be very careful in replying to President Chiang so that our continued commitment to the Republic of China is re-emphasized to him and that due deference is given to his sensitivities. While we of course do not hold to his analysis of developments in East Asia and rejection of the changes which have taken place during the last generation, we must accept that his views are characteristic of many in that part of the world.

A draft reply to President Chiang's letter will be ready for you next week.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> On March 2 (Taipei time), Foreign Minister Wei presented a note to McConaughy which reads in part: "During the said meeting [February 20 meeting in Warsaw], the so-called 'Taiwan problem' was brought up for discussion. As this is a matter which directly involves the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China, the Chinese Government cannot possibly tolerate its discussion and it must therefore register its most vehement objection." (Telegram 916 from Taipei, March 2; *ibid.*, POL CHINAT-US) Ambassador Chow presented a note to Green on March 2. (Telegram 30838 to Taipei, March 3; *ibid.*) In his March 3 daily briefing memorandum to the President, Kissinger discussed a "stiff note concerning the Warsaw talks." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 19, President's Daily Briefs)

<sup>5</sup> Document 74.

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## 72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 10, 1970.

### SUBJECT

A Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kreisberg on March 4, approved by Green, and forwarded with a covering letter and attachments to Holdridge on March 5. Holdridge then forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on March 11.

At the February 20, 1970 meeting in Warsaw with the Chinese, they offered to receive a US representative in Peking. This was in response to our offer at the January 20 meeting to consider such a "higher-level" meeting after our talks progressed in Warsaw and was consistent with their independent suggestion at the January meeting that our talks might be conducted at a higher level or elsewhere than in Warsaw.

In the Strategy Memorandum enclosed with my February 7, 1970 memorandum to you on the Sino-US talks,<sup>2</sup> I suggested that since Peking might wish a higher-level meeting only in order to serve its own purposes vis-à-vis the Soviets, to damage our relations with the GRC and others, and to weaken support for the GRC in the UN, we should agree to such a meeting only after there were signs in the Ambassadorial-level talks that a higher-level meeting would be productive. I enclose two additional memoranda: on the general advantages and disadvantages of a higher-level meeting, and on tactical considerations in handling the question of our response to the Chinese at the next Warsaw meeting.<sup>3</sup>

A higher-level meeting with the Chinese, either in Peking or here, would be a major international event, receiving the widest public attention and with widespread and substantial international and domestic political effects. It is one of the few things that the Chinese want from us just now. I do not think that we yet have a sufficiently clear idea of what to expect from the Chinese at such a meeting to justify our playing our major card by immediate acceptance of their proposal. At the same time, if there is any chance that such a meeting might help unfreeze our relationships with Peking, we do not want to lose the opportunity which might be offered.

I believe, therefore, that at the next meeting, which I suggest we propose for March 19, we should reaffirm that we are prepared to consider a higher-level meeting but emphasize that in order to ensure a proper basis for such a meeting, the possible areas of mutual understanding, or at least those areas where both sides are clearly going to have to "agree to disagree," should be further developed at the Ambassadorial level.

In doing this we would review the positions we set forth relating to Taiwan at the last two meetings and the positions set forth by the Chinese. We would indicate our view that a plausible basis for discussion could be found in our mutual acceptance of the following

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to an attachment to the memorandum accompanying the instructions to Ambassador Stoessel prior to the February 20 Warsaw meeting. See footnote 2, Document 67.

<sup>3</sup> Both attached but not printed.

principles: (1) Disputes relating to Taiwan should be resolved peacefully between those parties on the mainland and on Taiwan which are directly concerned; (2) The US will not interfere in such a settlement; (3) As tensions relating to the area diminish, the US military presence in the Taiwan area will be gradually reduced; (4) The US and the PRC will resolve disputes which arise between them through peaceful negotiations; (5) It is desirable from the standpoint of both sides to expand mutual contacts and trade; and (6) The principles of peaceful coexistence are consistent with the foregoing positions. We would then attempt to see whether the Chinese would be prepared to take these elements as the basis for further discussions and, if not, at what critical points our differences will focus.

At the same time, we can see whether the Chinese may be willing: (a) to make some gesture of “good will” in terms of action on prisoners, travel, or some analogous issue in order to set the stage for a higher-level meeting; or (b) to indicate that they will make such a gesture at the time of such a meeting.

The Chinese may well refuse to discuss substantive matters in terms going beyond those they have already used at the last two meetings and insist that a higher-level meeting is the only place to advance our conversations. It may take several meetings before it becomes clear whether this Chinese position is subject to change. If they remain adamant, we would then have to decide whether to continue to insist on prior progress in Warsaw, or to agree to go to Peking, or invite the Chinese to come here. Our initial approach, however, will have given us an opportunity to test Chinese intentions further, to see how strongly they want a higher-level meeting, and to find out whether they may be prepared to pay some price for it.

Since we anticipate that the Chinese now are preparing only to hear our response to their February 20 proposal, in order to elicit some reaction from them at the next meeting I believe it is necessary to provide them with advance warning of the general approach we plan to take. This, at least, will ensure that their response at that time will have been made in the foreknowledge of our own attitude and will give us a faster read-back on Chinese attitudes.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Holdridge drafted a memorandum from Kissinger to the President, suggesting a policy designed to “meet some of State’s reservations, but which would respond positively to the Chinese on sending a representative to Peking.” Kissinger did not sign the draft memorandum but did note on the first page: “Why do we have to raise Taiwan issue? Holdridge, see me.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV) Kissinger, Green, William Sullivan, Holdridge, Smyser also met on March 17 in the White House Situation Room. Green reiterated his concerns over sending a high-level representative to China and wanted to make higher-level contacts “conditional to progress at Warsaw.” (Memorandum of conversation per-

I am, therefore, also enclosing for your approval a letter from Ambassador Stoessel to the Chinese Chargé, proposing March 19 for the next meeting and indicating our wish to discuss further in Warsaw the basis for mutually acceptable discussions at a higher level.<sup>5</sup>

**William P. Rogers<sup>6</sup>**

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pared by Holdridge and Smyser, March 17; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, 1969–1970) Green followed up on March 17 with a 3-page letter to Kissinger stating that “Ambassador Brown agrees with me that we should first attempt to obtain some clearer idea what the prospects would be for substantive progress at a higher-level meeting before definitely committing ourselves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70)

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. A notation on the memorandum indicates that it is a “true copy” from the Secretary of State’s office. The signed original is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV.

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**73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese Communists

The President has carefully reviewed your memorandum to him of March 10, 1970<sup>2</sup> on the considerations which you proposed relative to a higher-level meeting with the Chinese Communists in Peking. He agrees with you that it would be desirable to establish the existence of common ground between our respective positions before going from the Ambassadorial level to a higher level in our talks with the Chinese. At the same time, however, he believes that it is important for us to preserve the positive approach to the question of raising the level of the talks, and to avoid suggesting to the Chinese that we are drawing back from the proposal for the meeting at a higher level which we ourselves offered at the January 20 Ambassadorial-level meeting in Warsaw.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Document 72.

Accordingly, the President has directed that Ambassador Stoessel, at the next meeting in Warsaw, present our position on seeking common ground in positive terms so that our intention to proceed at the higher level is fully affirmed.<sup>3</sup> In addition, to underscore the positive nature of our approach, the President directs that at the next Warsaw meeting we propose opening discussions on the modalities which would apply for a higher-level meeting in Peking, e.g. diplomatic immunities, secure communications, etc.

Finally, the President has directed that in our next Warsaw presentation we pick up the reference made by the Chinese Chargé at the last meeting to his country's willingness to sit down with the U.S. to discuss the question of relaxing tensions in the Far East, and indicate that we would be interested in hearing the Chinese views on this matter.

In view of the time factor raised by the visit of GRC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to Washington on April 21–23, the next Ambassadorial-level meeting should be set for the week of March 23–27, or as soon thereafter as possible depending on the Chinese response to the date which we propose.<sup>4</sup>

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>3</sup> In a March 13 telephone conversation with Kissinger, Nixon stated: "I was thinking about the Chinese thing. Did they offer to conduct talks in Warsaw? I want talks in Peking. I do not agree with idea that it is just a question of timing. I suggest they tell them in essence we agree. Who is in charge of that? Tell them that the President has decided that and that we do it. I want to be sure they don't screw it up." Kissinger replied, "We have to clear every speech they make." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

<sup>4</sup> Instructions for subsequent Warsaw talks were held up until May 17 due to uncertainty over the date of the next meeting. See Document 80. Various iterations of instructions to Warsaw during February–June 1970 are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US, and *ibid.*, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology.

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**74. Letter From President Nixon to the President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of March 1 was most welcome.<sup>2</sup> I greatly appreciated your frankness and your sincere concern for the success of my efforts to bring a lasting peace to East Asia.

From the conversations which we had together before I became President and from the previous correspondence which we have exchanged, I know of your deep distrust of Communist China's motives. In my own evaluation of Communist China, I do not ignore the legacy of the past, nor do I ignore the threat which the Chinese Communist regime may pose in the future. In my report to the Congress of February 18, 1970 on United States Foreign Policy, I stated that in dealing with the Communist countries we would not underestimate the depth of ideological disagreement or the disparity between their interests and ours.<sup>3</sup> You may recall, too, that in my press conference of January 30 I cited the potential danger to the United States posed by the growth of Communist China's nuclear weapons capability.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, Mr. President, I believe that I would be remiss in my duty to the American people if I did not attempt to discover whether a basis may not exist for reducing the risk of a conflict between the United States and Communist China, and whether certain of the issues which lie between us may not be settled by negotiation. The alternative of maintaining a hostile relationship indefinitely while weapons of mass destruction increase in numbers and power is a terrible one, and demands that every reasonable effort be made to promote understandings which will contribute to peace and stability in Asia.

In undertaking this effort, I of course have in mind not only the essential interests of the American people, but of our allies as well.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Sent in telegram 45340 to Taipei, March 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US) In an April 11 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger indicated that he sent the response to the ROC while Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70-6/30/70) The response was drafted in EA, then forwarded by Green to Rogers for approval on March 16. Kissinger modified this response after receiving it under a covering memorandum from Eliot on March 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 71.

<sup>3</sup> The report was published as a separate document but is also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116-190. Pages 181-182 address Sino-American relations.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

In your letter you have expressed concern for certain aspects of our talks with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw. Secretary Rogers has received from your Ambassador in Washington a detailed statement of your Government's views on these matters and is replying to them.<sup>5</sup>

I wish, however, to assure you personally and in the strongest terms of my determination that there shall be no change in the firmness of our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and of my earnest desire that these talks will not affect the friendship and close cooperation which has existed between our Governments for so many years. I deeply value our long personal relationship as candid friends and am confident that this will serve us well in the future.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in extending our best wishes and warmest regards to you and Madame Chiang. We trust that Madame Chiang's health has improved.

Sincerely,

**Richard Nixon**<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> These notes were in response to ROC messages from early March. See footnote 4, Document 71. Rogers' note to the ROC Ambassador was sent to Taipei in telegram 45069, March 27, to be delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) McConaughy delivered the letter to Chiang on March 28. (Telegram 1404 from Taipei, March 28; *ibid.*) On March 27 an identical message was given to Ambassador Chow in Washington. (Telegram 45437 to Taipei, March 27; *ibid.*)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Nixon signed the original.

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**75. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Relations

You have expressed concern over a news report of April 4<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union may have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Feb. 1969–Sept. 1971, Box CL 278. Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

accomplished a mutual pull-back of their troops from each side of the disputed border, and you have asked me to comment on the implications of this report with respect to Sino-Soviet relations, the effects on Hanoi and the possible effects on our current strategy with respect to Communist China.

### *Sino-Soviet Relations*

Several sources have confirmed that there has been an agreement to pull back some forces from disputed border areas. The withdrawals have been only a few kilometers and not all along the border. It is also confirmed that the Soviets will send a new Ambassador to Peking, and the Chinese will name their Ambassador later.

Both sides seem to have made some concessions. The Soviets originally proposed last year to exchange Ambassadors as part of a general improvement in relations, which they linked to a general settlement of the border. The Chinese initially refused to accept this approach and insisted as a precondition that the Soviets withdraw from disputed areas.

It may be that each saw some advantage in demonstrating that the talks in Peking were not hopelessly bogged down or about to break off.

The appearance of a slight improvement in relations with Peking would be tactically helpful to the Soviets as they continue their negotiations with Brandt, at a time when the SALT talks resume, and as negotiations continue over the Middle East and they are involving themselves more in the defense of the UAR. Some easing of their Eastern border problems would be designed to confound many in the West who have counted heavily on this problem as either a limiting factor on Soviet freedom of action or as inducing the Soviets to make concessions for the sake of détente with the West.

The Chinese themselves would probably welcome a respite to enable them to devote more of their attention to recovering from the Cultural Revolution. But neither side will be prepared to give up any fundamental positions, and the mutual antipathies will continue. We know from sensitive intelligence sources that the Soviets are extremely suspicious of the Chinese policies and intentions, and the Chinese have made it very evident that they have no use for the "new Tsars", as they now call the Soviets. The Chinese, too, will realize that a pull back of Soviet troops from the border areas still leaves very substantial Soviet forces near enough to China to strike on short notice. The Chinese remain on guard, and in point of fact are still continuing their anti-Soviet propaganda.

### *Effects on Hanoi*

Hanoi, which we know from intelligence reports was greatly worried by the Sino-Soviet confrontation, will be relieved by these latest

developments.<sup>3</sup> Their fears that the Sino-Soviet conflict would lead to a loss of Soviet overland supplies may be eased somewhat. And Hanoi may be less concerned over possible opportunities to exploit the Sino-Soviet competition. Hanoi might therefore judge that its strategy of “protracted struggle” can be continued without undue interruption, and the pressures on it to negotiate may diminish as a result.

This does not mean, though, that Hanoi will be operating without constraints. For example, one of the major limiting factors on its ability to sustain the war is military manpower, and neither the Soviets nor the Chinese are in a position to fill Hanoi’s needs. (The Chinese could, of course, return their logistic support units to North Vietnam, but this would help only peripherally. And, too, Hanoi presumably will need to pay for at least some of the aid which it is receiving from the USSR and China. Basically Hanoi’s decision on whether or not to follow a “protracted struggle” strategy will depend more on the situation in the South, as well as on Hanoi’s manpower losses, than on a guarantee of Soviet aid through China.

*Effects on US Strategy Toward China*

I doubt that these latest developments portend any fundamental relief in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus no significant change in our strategy toward Communist China is likely to be required. The Chinese will probably still wish to continue to develop the contact with us as a counterweight to the Soviets. There also seems to be some interest on their part in opening up trade with us. They may, however, believe that there is less urgency in moving ahead with higher level talks in Peking,<sup>4</sup> and we may find that the fairly rapid pace which developed in our contacts with the Chinese at Warsaw since December 1969 will slow down. In this respect, we are still awaiting a reply from Peking on the date of the next Warsaw meeting. They responded to our bid for talks on April 1–3 by proposing April 15, and we have counter-proposed April 30 or any date thereafter.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: “the most significant by product.”

<sup>4</sup> Nixon circled the words “with higher level talks in Peking” and wrote: “Let us see that State does not drag its feet on this.”

<sup>5</sup> See Document 80.

76. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 21, 1970.

## SUBJECT

United States Relations with the Republic of China

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The President

Ambassador Walter P. McCaughy

Donald M. Anderson, Department of State

*Republic of China*

Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

Shen Chien-hung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

The President greeted the Vice Premier and noted that this was the first meeting that they had had since the Vice Premier was in Washington for the funeral of President Eisenhower. The Vice Premier expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to discuss mutual problems between the United States and the Republic of China. He presented a letter to the President from President Chiang Kai-shek and said that President Chiang had asked him to convey his thoughts on several matters of mutual interest.<sup>2</sup> He then presented President Chiang's views, using prepared notes. This presentation is summarized under the next five headings.

*International Situation and the Nixon Doctrine*

The Vice Premier stated that President Chiang feels the present international situation is in a state of change and that the way in which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 7:05 to 8:05 p.m. prior to a White House State Dinner. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The memorandum of conversation was drafted by Anderson, who also served as an interpreter for the Warsaw talks. Kissinger approved it on May 14. The Vice Premier was in the United States April 18–28, and in Washington April 20–24. Chiang Ching-kuo's schedule is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. II Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo of China, April 21–23, 1970. He met with Rogers, Green, McCaughy, and other Department of State officials on April 21. Records of these meetings are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. According to an April 16 memorandum from Rogers to the President, Chiang was scheduled to meet on April 22 with Laird, McCracken, and Schlesinger, Acting Director of BOB. A memorandum of conversation of Chiang's meeting with McCracken and Schlesinger is *ibid.*, POL 7 CHINAT. For his meeting with Laird, see Document 78.

<sup>2</sup> The 1-page April 17 letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Nixon is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, President Chiang Kai-shek.

we handle the complicated situation at present will be very important in determining the shape of future developments. President Chiang, the Vice Premier said, is well aware of the President's domestic difficulties and the problems he faces with U.S. public opinion, and he sympathizes with the President's heavy burden. President Chiang fully supports the President's new Asia policy and the Nixon Doctrine. The important question concerning the new Asia policy is one of implementation. This will be particularly important in shaping the Asian peoples' reaction to it and will largely determine its success. The Republic of China is prepared to cooperate closely with the United States in the implementation of this policy, and as part of this cooperation, the Vice Premier assured the President that the Republic of China will not use armed force against the mainland, even on a small scale, but instead will use political means to attain its goals.

#### *Security of Taiwan*

The Vice Premier noted that, with the problems of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, there is relatively little attention currently being given to Taiwan. This, he said, is largely because the situation on Taiwan is stable. Nevertheless, Taiwan remains the center of the problems in Asia, and the security of Taiwan is closely connected with the security of the United States. The Vice Premier noted that, while in other countries, the Chinese Communists rely primarily on political infiltration, providing arms and assistance to dissident elements, in the case of Taiwan the Chinese Communists will use military force, most likely a surprise attack. The Republic of China recently acquired a publication limited to Chinese Communist cadres which spelled out Chinese Communist strategic thinking. It clearly indicated that they are planning an attack similar to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the main difference being that it will be followed up with a landing of troops. The Vice Premier stated that the United States and the Republic of China should make a joint effort to determine effective means of coping with this threat. A second very important factor, he said, was the impact of U.S. foreign policy on the situation and the effect that it would have on the morale of governments in the Far East.

#### *Mainland Situation*

Turning to the situation on the mainland, the Vice Premier noted that the Chinese Communists face difficult problems. They are confronted with the problem of Sino-Soviet relations, divisive forces internally and a crisis in their economy. Their main concern at present, then, is how to surmount these difficulties. A standard Communist tactic when they are cornered is to make use of others, so they have agreed to resume the talks with the United States in Warsaw. They have adopted this tactic for a number of reasons. It helps them in their conflict with Moscow; it is a psychological warfare device to alienate the United States and the Republic of China; and it is useful in lowering

the prestige of the United States in Asia. The Vice Premier noted that if the Chinese Communists are given an inch they will ask for a foot. As an example, he noted that the Republic of China had recently acquired intelligence in Hong Kong indicating that the Chinese Communists may propose a change in venue for the Warsaw talks, perhaps even seeking to move them to Peking.<sup>3</sup> Finally, the Vice Premier noted that President Chiang is concerned that the Warsaw talks might arouse the Soviet Union to take action against China.

### *Sino-Soviet Relations*

The Vice Premier discussed Sino-Soviet relations, saying that President Chiang is convinced there can be no rapprochement between the two. He does not feel, however, that the Soviets are planning the use of regular military forces against the Chinese Communists. The Vice Premier noted that Kuznetsov's protracted stay in Peking has two implications: 1) as a symbol of Soviet presence and a potential rallying point for pro-Soviet elements in the Chinese Communist hierarchy; and 2) as a means of collecting intelligence and information as part of Moscow's efforts to bring about a pro-Soviet regime in China. President Chiang believes that Moscow is currently thinking of new means to control any future leadership of Communist China. The methods they used with Mao were a failure.

The United States should be thinking about the adverse implications of a Soviet controlled mainland. President Chiang believes that the Mao regime will eventually collapse either as a result of an internal split or due to pressure from the Soviet Union. This will create a new situation, and if the Soviets regain their dominant position, this will be a major problem for the United States in the 1970's. If the seven hundred million Chinese people are friendly toward the United States there will be peace in Asia. If they are Soviet dominated there will be problems. It is uncertain under what circumstances or how soon the Republic of China will be able to return to the mainland. However, President Chiang, as a friend and ally of the United States, feels that it is of utmost importance that there be a candid exchange of views on what can be done to improve the chances of success. The seven hundred million Chinese people will be friends of the United States only when they have a peace-loving government.

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<sup>3</sup> In a May 1 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge suggested that Chiang "is trying to tip us off that the GRC has intelligence contacts with the Chinese Communists. This is probably intended to remind us that we should not take the GRC for granted. From the Communists' standpoint, this intelligence by-play is a useful reminder that the Communists' immediate tactical objective in the present talks is probably to see if they can slip a blade in between us and the GRC. (The broader purpose of course is probably related to the Sino-Soviet relationship.)" (Ibid., Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. II Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970)

*Collective Security in Asia*

The Vice Premier raised the subject of collective security in Asia, noting that the Republic of China, South Viet-Nam, South Korea and Thailand are like-minded countries and all face a Communist threat. He said that he felt it was important that these governments should coordinate their efforts and that the United States had a major role to play. President Chiang, however, feels that the time is not right for a formal arrangement between these states and that it would be preferable to take other practical measures currently to improve the security of the area.

*U.S. Policy and the Warsaw Talks*

The President responded that he was glad to have the views of President Chiang and the Vice Premier. Concerning the Nixon Doctrine, the President said that its purpose is not the withdrawal of the United States from Asia. The U.S. will continue to play a role there. A second aspect of the Nixon Doctrine, and one which is sometimes too little emphasized, is that the United States wants to help others help themselves. He recognized that the application of the Doctrine might call for more, not less, military assistance to our allies, although the attitude of the Congress might make it difficult to do all that we would like to do. The Republic of China is an outstanding example of success in Asia, the President said, with a self-sustaining economy and a strong military. The other aspect of U.S. policy is that we will stand firmly by our allies, particularly the Republic of China. Under no circumstances will we abandon this commitment. The President described the Warsaw talks as only exploratory in nature and said they in no way compromise our loyalty to the Republic of China. The Warsaw talks, he said, do not encompass our relations with the Republic of China. What will come out of these talks, if anything, we do not know, but the President assured the Vice Premier that it is not U.S. policy to let down its friends. He said that we will continue to oppose admission of Communist China to the United Nations.<sup>4</sup>

The President expressed his appreciation for President Chiang's understanding of the domestic problems involved in such questions as military assistance. We have difficulties in getting sufficient funds from Congress for some purposes, he said, but we will continue to the extent we can to meet those requests which are in our mutual interest.

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<sup>4</sup> In his May 1 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge wrote: "This is a natural formula to use in a meeting such as this, but it is somewhat different from the usual position that we will continue to oppose the eviction of the GRC." (Ibid.) A Chinese record of this conversation, as well as of Chiang's meeting with Kissinger on April 22, is in James C. H. Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally* (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 47–52. Shen served as a translator on Chiang's visit and became Ambassador to the United States in May 1971.

Turning to the question of the Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan, the President noted that we have faced this problem before, as in 1958 especially, and that our position has not changed. We will continue to stand by our commitments. The President expressed his appreciation for President Chiang's assurances of support for United States policies and for his far-sighted views on the vital importance of the seven hundred million Chinese people to the future of Asia. He agreed that for the Chinese people to be dominated by the Soviet Union would be undesirable and that our forthcoming policies will have a profound effect in the area over the next twenty-five years and longer. What we want to do, the President said, is use our influence to shape those developments.

The President concluded by noting that the Vice Premier would be discussing many of these problems in detail with Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and that the most important thing required from him as President was a reaffirmation of our friendship and support. He noted that he has been a friend of the Republic of China for the past twenty-three years, ever since he first entered Congress, and that he had visited the Republic of China on six occasions. The strength and vitality on Taiwan is a credit to the Chinese people. Finally, the President noted that although this is a difficult period in Southeast Asia, we are keenly aware of the importance of a strong, free Republic of China.

#### *Military Assistance*

The Vice Premier replied that the Chinese people look on the President as a staunch friend and that other free Asian peoples feel the same. He noted that on his departure from Taiwan he had been asked if he would seek more modern weapons. He did not intend to ask for more weapons, he said, but he did want to stress the importance of mutual security and the necessity for joint efforts in this regard. The Vice Premier noted that he did have one new thought on this subject that he would like to mention. It is time, he said, for a serious study of the efficacy of the present defense system on Taiwan. He said he hoped that a joint high level study of this problem could be arranged at an early date. After mentioning the recent force reductions in the army on Taiwan, both the President and the Vice Premier agreed that it is quality and not the size of the army that is important.

#### *Concluding Remarks*

In response to the President's question concerning the possibility of a Sino-Soviet détente, the Vice Premier reiterated his belief that it is impossible. Neither side is willing to make concessions, he said. The Soviet leadership could not survive an abandonment of their position, and for Mao to yield to the Soviets would be disastrous for him. There are anti-Mao elements in China, but all find it necessary to oppose the

Soviet Union to some degree. Finally, the Vice Premier noted that Mao is finding it difficult to maintain his control, particularly of the military. He referred to a current slogan on the mainland opposing “mountain-topism” which, he said clearly refers to the old problem of warlordism. The problem of control will become more serious when Mao dies, he said, because Communism is alien to the people of China.

The President and the Vice Premier were joined at about 7:35 by Dr. Kissinger, and at about 7:50 by the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The President’s assurances to the Vice Premier as to the steadfastness of U.S. policy toward the Republic of China were reiterated after the arrival of these officials.

At 8:00 the meeting was adjourned to go down to dinner.

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## 77. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 22, 1970.

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger  
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member  
William Codus, Office of Protocol, Department of State  
Chiang Ching-kuo, Vice Premier, Republic of China  
James Shen, Vice Foreign Minister, Republic of China  
Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

### SUBJECT

GRC Vice Premier’s Conversation with Dr. Kissinger

The Vice Premier said he was glad to be received by Dr. Kissinger at a time when he, Dr. Kissinger, was so busy. Dr. Kissinger said he had been looking forward to seeing the Vice Premier. An NSC meeting on Cambodia was being held, so he had been obliged to cancel all of his afternoon appointments. Nevertheless, he didn’t want to miss the opportunity to see the Vice Premier briefly. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that he knew Ambassador Chow very well, and regarded him as a very effective representative.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. I Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21–23, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum drafted by Holdridge, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation on June 2. It was to have “in-house distribution only.”

The Vice Premier declared that he wanted to express his sincere appreciation for what Dr. Kissinger was doing in providing an important link between our two countries. He had been very pleased to be able to meet with US leaders from the President on down, and found his discussions with them most rewarding. Dr. Kissinger commented that the President had been most impressed by his meeting with the Vice Premier and had said that there was no substitute for face-to-face contacts of this nature. The Vice Premier agreed that there was no better way to get ideas across than to have views exchanged. He liked to think that the relations between our two countries were not of an ordinary sort, since they had been in existence for a long time. It was in this light that he approached the opportunity to have a few days here and engage in face-to-face discussions.

Dr. Kissinger declared that we believe very strongly in standing by our friends. Sometimes we engaged in tactical moves which looked confusing, but we knew how to separate strategy and tactics. A newsman had said to him the other day that he had finally worked out the President's approach—the President was always four moves ahead of the game. His reply had been that the newsman was half right, and that the first thing to figure out was what game the President was playing.

The Vice Premier said that his President had known the President for more than twenty years, and liked to think that he understood him and knew what he thought. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had worked with the President since he had assumed office, had seen him make big decisions, and had always seen him make the big choice. He had always supported his friends, and had never yielded to the Communists on any issue. Speaking frankly, we would go through lots of maneuvering before we acted because there was no sense in tipping our hand. In this respect, the North Vietnamese offensive on Laos hadn't stopped because we were using kind words. Dr. Kissinger added that the President is not good for the nerves of some of his subordinates in the bureaucracy, who are of a more cautious frame of mind.

The Vice Premier said he would like to know the consensus in the Administration on Cambodia—is this part of the whole Communist strategy (which would include Laos), or an issue by itself? Dr. Kissinger said, first, that our Administration policy with respect to the bureaucracy was to "let 100 flowers bloom" but that our friends should watch what we do and not what they in the bureaucracy say. Continuing, he explained that we looked at Cambodia as part of the entire Indo-China problem and of the total Communist movement there. He added that if they thought they could move in Cambodia for nothing, they would know better soon.

The Vice Premier said that the Chinese hoped that the new government in Phnom Penh could hold out, but were apprehensive that

the North Vietnamese would not stop where they were and would try to put Sihanouk back in power. Dr. Kissinger agreed that they would try, and remarked that we couldn't be too optimistic. The Cambodian army did not have<sup>2</sup> the same quality as the Laotian army, and had not yet distinguished itself in combat. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had once said that the only people who could fight in Asia were the Chinese or the people under Chinese cultural influence. The Cambodians were definitely not the latter. We couldn't guarantee the outcome but would do what we could. The Communists would not have a free ride. They had had more problems with us than with our predecessors. We didn't talk so much and would not ignore events in Cambodia, which we did not consider a separate war. He hoped that the Cambodians could hold out for a few more weeks. He asked what the Vice Premier thought.

The Vice Premier agreed that Cambodia was not an isolated case but part of the whole Indo-China question. The Chinese felt the same with respect to Laos. Their intelligence indicated that the Chinese Communists were intensifying a training program for Cambodian and Lao cadres in Kunming, which is right on the border. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Chinese Communists had also given strong support to Sihanouk. The Vice Premier went on to say that he doubted they would use their own forces in the situation.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Vice Premier for his estimate of the quality of the Chinese Communist army. In response, the Vice Premier said that there had not been much change in the combat quality of the ground forces, but there had been noteworthy improvements in the capability of the air force and the navy. Army morale accounted for 50% of the Communist capability under fire in the past, but he knew for a fact that this morale was now not what it had been. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the fact that they were stronger in the air and on the sea. He surmised that the emphasis in the training being given Cambodians and Lao in Kunming was on guerrilla warfare.

The Vice President then asked Dr. Kissinger for his estimate of the significance of Chou En-lai's visit to Pyongyang. Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn't have a clear opinion on this. The Chinese Communists were trying to mend relations with many neighbors, and to prevent excessive Soviet influence, but he felt that the Vice Premier's views would be more interesting than his own.

The Vice Premier said that there was one theory to the effect that North Korea had come to resent the tight control which the Soviets had exercised in restraining North Korean adventures against South Korea

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger corrected this sentence, changing "did not have" to "had."

which might involve the Soviets themselves. This resentment had reached such proportions as to make it desirable for North Korea to break away a bit and to establish closer relations with Peking instead. Dr. Kissinger observed that the North Koreans would be in tough shape if they attacked—they could not count on making a move against the US again and getting away with it.

The Vice Premier wondered if the Chinese Communists' purpose was to keep the US busy on more than one front at a time by keeping up the pressures on Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger thought that this might be true. There was something odd, he said, about a situation where the greatest country in the world had to worry about what a whole lot of fifth rate countries were doing to us. It would be unwise, though, for the Communists to hit us again. This President had a great advantage over his predecessors in that there were 13 million votes on the right which he had not yet tapped, and it would be dangerous to push us too hard. We engaged in a lot of tactics because we didn't believe in taking part in needless domestic battles which might involve our political capital, but we would spend this capital when necessary. This President didn't get where he is today by yielding. There were many members of the bureaucracy who didn't realize this point.

The Vice Premier said that he appreciated the fact that Dr. Kissinger was very busy, and would not take up any more of his time. He simply wanted to make one last remark—people often tended to apply normal standards in assessing Mao Tse-tung and Mao's thoughts and actions. This was a mistake. Mao was not a normal man, and his reflexes didn't operate in ways in which they might be expected to operate. Dr. Kissinger agreed that it would be a mistake to analyze other countries on the basis of our standards.

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## 78. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

I-21969/70

Washington, April 22, 1970, 1-2:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

SECDEF Working Luncheon for Vice Premier of Republic of China

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, China, Rep. of, 1970, 333 January. Secret. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Nutter on April 29 and Laird's office on May 25. The meeting was held in Laird's dining room at the Pentagon.

PARTICIPANTS

*Republic of China Side*

Vice Premier—Chiang Ching-kuo  
ROC Ambassador to U.S.—Chow Shu-kai  
Secretary General of Executive Yuan—Tsiang Yen-shih  
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs—Shen Chien-hung  
Special Assistant to Vice Premier—MGEN Wen Ha-hsiung  
Advisor to Executive Yuan—Captain Chung Hu-ping

*United States Side*

Secretary of Defense—Melvin R. Laird  
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard  
Secretary of the Air Force—Robert C. Seamans  
American Ambassador to ROC—Walter P. McConaughy  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (SA)—Gardiner L. Tucker  
Deputy ASD (ISA/MA&S)—LGEN Robert H. Warren  
Deputy ASD (ISA/EAPA)—Dennis J. Doolin  
Military Assistant—BGEN Robert E. Pursley

1. *Military Assistance*

The Secretary opened by observing that this was a working lunch and requested that General Warren provide a general review of our aid program to the ROC. Among items mentioned by General Warren were replacement aircraft for the F-86s, the Nike-Hercules Battalion, long-supply and excess items, as well as the hope for more matériel to the ROC as our SEA involvement draws down. The Secretary then mentioned the air defense radar stating that he hoped that it had been upgraded. Secretary Seamans informed the Secretary that he had briefly discussed this matter with the Vice Premier immediately before lunch.

2. *International Fighter*

The Secretary then briefed the Vice Premier with regard to the proposed international fighter. The Deputy Secretary followed, elaborating on lower O&M costs for the aircraft. Mr. Packard noted that the proposal is out to contractors at the present time and hopes to have it firmed up within 4 to 6 weeks.

3. *Vice Premier's Views*

The Vice Premier then thanked the Secretary for his hospitality as well as the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual concern. He continued by stating that the defense of Taiwan is in the mutual security interest of both our countries and hoped that matters related to military assistance could be studied jointly. The Vice Premier elaborated on this matter at some length. He stated that he had discussed the matter of fundamental improvement and modernization of ROC armed forces with President Nixon, noting that he meant improvement and modernization with regard to organization, structure, weapons, and equipment. He stated that this review should be joint, exhaustive,

and lengthy, and that, if the Secretary concurs, he will bring the matter up with President Chiang. He noted on more than one occasion (although it was not translated each time) that his hope was for a ROC armed force—Army, Navy, and Air Force—with increased fire power but with less personnel. He then requested that consideration be given to providing surplus weapons from SVN *apart from MAP*. He referred to President Chiang Kai-shek's mentioning to Secretary Rogers that the ROC needs air and sea supremacy, and, in a low-key renewed his request for F-4 aircraft *and* submarines in this context. (*Note: This is the first time that the ROC has raised the submarine issue in a context other than anti-submarine warfare training.*) The Vice Premier then reiterated again that his government desired overall, not piecemeal, improvement and modernization of its armed forces. The Secretary responded that this was a worthwhile suggestion that should be outlined in some detail and staffed-out with the Ambassador and our working group in Taiwan.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4. *Plan Rochester*

The Vice Premier then turned to the question of Plan Rochester (the joint U.S./ROC defense plan), noting that the plan was revised last year jointly by the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and the ROC's Ministry of National Defense. He stated that, although agreement had been reached at that level concerning the plan, the U.S. Government has not yet signed and expressed his hope that an early date could be set for the formal signing. The Secretary replied in a noncommittal manner.

#### 5. *Secretary's Views*

Secretary Laird then stated the desire of the U.S. to promote increased close cooperation between our two governments, noting that under the Nixon Doctrine, we are well aware of the need to improve Nationalist China's naval and air defenses. He stated that, within the limits imposed by the Congress, we would try to provide as much military assistance as we can. He stated that we will have additional surplus matériel available in the 1971-72 time frame, and expressed his hope that we will be able to retain our flexibility concerning the allocation of this surplus. He then noted the President's reaffirmation of our Security Treaty commitments to the ROC and stated that the ROC can look forward to continued cooperation from the DOD as the Secretary is "prepared to go the extra step for the Republic of China."

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<sup>2</sup> Prior to the meeting, Nutter informed Laird that Chiang Ching-kuo would probably raise force reorganization in tandem with the need for F-4 aircraft and submarines for the ROC. (Memorandum from Nutter to Laird, April 22; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0067, China (Nats), 1970)

6. *Toast & Conclusion*

The Secretary then proposed a toast to the continued deep friendship between our two peoples as well as to the continued good health of our distinguished visitor. The toast was reciprocated by the Prime Minister, who expressed appreciation for all past assistance and our continued close relations. The luncheon concluded with an amiable discussion.

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79. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Communication with the Communist Chinese

As I mentioned to you at the time on the phone, Professor Ernst Winters, a naturalized American working with UNESCO in Paris, and an old acquaintance, called me on May 3 to relay the reaction of personnel in the Communist Chinese Embassy in Paris to your decision on the Cambodian sanctuaries.<sup>2</sup> This reaction was obtained on April 30, i.e., *before* your speech.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Chinese were aware of only South Vietnamese ground operations in Cambodia, not our own.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for First China Trip by HAK, July 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for information. An unsigned May 3 version of this memorandum is *ibid.*, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, May 1970.

<sup>2</sup> On May 3 Kissinger informed the President of his conversation with Winters. Kissinger told Nixon that "they [the Chinese] wanted to know if it [the Cambodian invasion] is a highly tactical move or intense campaign. They wanted to know who they should talk to here. What I think we should do is tell them that they can talk to us here and that if they want to they should call General Walters. It has two advantages. One, we can surface it if we want to and two, we can establish a channel which the Dutchman has never brought off. This man said he has never seen them in such a state of agitation. He said they called him in which is unheard of." The President replied: "That is very interesting and should be explored to the hilt." (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, May 3, 1:50 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) The transcript of Winters' telephone conversation with Kissinger, May 3, 1:40 p.m., is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia," April 30, 1970, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 405–410.

On hearing the gist of his information, I asked Professor Winters to come to my office right away. We met at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon for about fifteen minutes.

I asked Professor Winters what had transpired in Paris. He said that on Thursday, April 30, at 11:30 a.m. (i.e., *before* your speech) one of his contact people with the Chinese, a Frenchman who arranges exchanges between Chinese and French students, called to say that the Chinese wanted to see Professor Winters. He went to the Embassy for a two-hour lunch.

He met with several young low-echelon personnel, such as the chauffeur and a switchboard operator, who are imbued with the cultural revolution and in a sense run the Embassy. The Ambassador and a young man from the Foreign Service were also there but, as usual, were not very articulate. The Chinese immediately asked Professor Winters what he thought of the President's decisions on Cambodia.

Professor Winters replied that he supposed that the United States thought that its natural interest was at stake and was acting accordingly. The Chinese immediately began to harangue him with invective, a marked departure from their previous polite dealings, and lumped him together with all other Americans. They claimed that the U.S. wished to conquer China, that we were considering preventive war, that we were in collusion with the Soviets in a pincer movement on China, and that our Vietnam withdrawals were a ruse.

Professor Winters was struck by the enormous, un-Chinese intensity of their reaction. Clearly, a nerve had been touched. He took the Chinese reaction in stride and asked how the United States was to know how the Chinese felt without any contact. The Chinese did not allow American visitors and the Warsaw meetings were not really productive.

The Chinese asked Professor Winters who in America they could talk to and trust, the significant groups. In his only intervention, the Foreign Service officer said, "Don't say the student movement." Professor Winters replied that the President and his Cabinet were the policy makers and the ones to talk to.

He left the Chinese Embassy very depressed, with a feeling of hopelessness after seven years of cultivating the Chinese. Since he was going to New York that afternoon anyway for a meeting, he thought it would be useful to go to Washington and give me his information in case it fit into our overall strategic mosaic.

I asked Professor Winters whether they would see him, and he replied that they never refused to do so. They did not know that he had been in New York or that he knew me.

I then asked Professor Winters to see the Chinese the next day on May 4 and to tell them that he had seen me, and had put their

questions to me. I asked Professor Winters to pass a message to the Chinese along the lines of the attachment at Tab A.<sup>4</sup> I told him to contact General Walters as soon as he had seen the Chinese and give him any message from them.

Professor Winters added that he had observed during the past few weeks that the Soviets in UNESCO circles were moving away from the U.S. and that there was a growing Soviet-U.S. tension.

Our meeting closed with Professor Winters assuring me that he would act on this the next day and my observing that if the Chinese refused to receive him, this would be an interesting development also.

We have not heard back from Winters or Walters on this subject.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The attached message reads in its entirety: "The United States has no aggressive intentions concerning Communist China. On the contrary, we would like to establish regular relations with her, recognizing our differences in ideology. We have no interest in establishing military bases in Vietnam, and we believe that a peace that takes into account everyone's interests in that area can be achieved. Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly. The Chinese can reply by getting in touch with Major General Vernon Walters, Senior U.S. Military Attaché, American Embassy, Paris. No one but the President is aware of this message and the Chinese reply should be through General Walters and nobody else."

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger did not hear again from Winters until late September. Lord relayed Winters' message to Kissinger, stating: "Assuming you would consider this the least promising of the various Chinese tracks, I have drafted a friendly, nonsubstantive acknowledgment for your signature." (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, October 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK's Trip to the PRC, July 1971) Winters visited the White House in mid-December but did not see Kissinger. Winters reported that his Chinese contacts in Paris requested the names of "influential" or "establishment" Americans who could be invited to China. Kissinger's reply, January 6, 1971, was noncommittal. (Memorandum from Jon Howe to Kissinger, December 16, 1970; *ibid.*)

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## 80. Editorial Note

Scheduling problems, conflict over the war in Vietnam, as well as growing interest in other avenues of communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China brought the Warsaw talks to an end in 1970. After internal discussion of the timing and goals of Sino-American talks (see Documents 72 and 73), the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, requested that the next Warsaw meeting be held between March 23 and 27. The Department of State asked for more time to prepare and suggested April 1–3 as the next meeting date. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot reported on March 28 that the PRC had not responded to the suggestion of the April 1–3 dates. He added: “The first Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry statement on Laos in a year was issued on March 26 and appeared to convey sharply increased Chinese concern over the developing situation, particularly the involvement of Thai troops and U.S. bombing.” Eliot suggested that the meetings be delayed until after the April 18–28 visit of ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to the United States. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; *ibid.*) Chiang Ching-kuo made his irritation over the Warsaw talks known to U.S. officials, even hinting that he might cancel his visit. (Telegrams 1590 and 1591 from Taipei, April 9; *ibid.*, POL 7 CHINAT)

On March 31 PRC diplomats in Warsaw suggested meeting on April 15, a date closer to Chiang’s scheduled U.S. visit. (Telegram 726 from Warsaw; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) The United States responded on April 1 by proposing an April 30 or later date. The Chinese accepted May 20 for the next meeting. Eliot noted the “apparent ‘hardening’ of Peking’s propaganda stance on a range of international issues since the beginning of April—possibly following a Politburo meeting.” (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; April 28; *ibid.*)

Within the Department of State, there existed varying degrees of eagerness to arrange a meeting with the Chinese. For example, Paul Kreisberg of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs sent a 3-page memorandum through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winthrop Brown, to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, on April 22, outlining options for the next Warsaw meeting. Kreisberg suggested that the United States “indicate that we wish to continue our dialogue, that we do not believe that developments in Southeast Asia should affect the Warsaw meetings.” He included a draft telegram to Warsaw in order to have this message relayed to the Chinese. Brown and Green cleared the draft. Secretary of State William Rogers wrote on the cable: “Disapprove. Why should we seem to be so anxious.” (*Ibid.*)

On May 18 the Chinese cancelled the May 20 meeting but did offer to meet on June 20 to discuss future talks. In a May 18 memorandum to Rogers, subsequently re-written as a May 19 memorandum from Rogers to President Nixon, Green pointed out that this cancellation was different from the situation in 1969. (See Document 6) He noted the relatively moderate terms used to criticize U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and commented that the cancellation “serves to meet the needs of its relations with Moscow and Hanoi by pointedly avoiding talking with the U.S. at this stage.” (*Ibid.*) [*text not declassified*] The PRC’s public stance is printed as “137th Meeting of Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks Postponed,” *Beijing Review*, May 29, 1970, pages 38–39.

On June 18 the United States accepted the PRC offer to meet on June 20. (Telegram 95760 to Warsaw; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) On June 20, however, a PRC diplomat in Warsaw made the following announcement to U.S. diplomats visiting the Chinese Embassy: “I am instructed to notify you of the following. In view of the current situation, of which both sides are well aware, the Chinese Government deems it unsuitable to discuss and decide upon a date for the next meeting of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks at present. As to when it will be suitable for the meeting to be held in the future, it can be discussed by the liaison personnel of the two sides at an appropriate time. Our side will release news about this.” (Telegram 1687 from Warsaw, June 20; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70) No further Ambassadorial talks were held in Warsaw.

John H. Holdridge of the NSC staff prepared a June 7, 1971, summary memorandum and forwarded an 8-page report to Kissinger detailing the history of PRC negotiating tactics at the Warsaw talks. Holdridge concluded, “nothing of real substance was accomplished between 1955 and 1970.” (*Ibid.*, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, Peoples’ Republic of China, Vol. I)

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### 81. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 23, 1970.

#### SUBJECT

Mao Tse-tung Statement on U.S. Action in Cambodia

Mao on May 20 issued a statement concerning U.S. actions in Cambodia (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> These statements appear occasionally, and usually concern the U.S. The last one concerned the negro struggle in America, in 1968.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A May 20 covering memorandum indicates that Holdridge prepared the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the 2-page translation of a May 20 New China News Agency report.

The statement is full of sounding phrases such as "U.S. Imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its death-bed struggle." In substance, however, it is remarkably bland. It offers only "warm support" to the three peoples of Indo-China, without even the usual phrases about China being a "rear area" for the struggle. It hammers home the thesis that a small nation can defeat a large one, which must seem cold comfort in Hanoi. It makes no threats, offers no commitments, is not personally abusive toward you, and avoids positions on contentious bilateral issues.

Tactically, Mao's statement serves several purposes:

- It makes propaganda capital of your action in Cambodia.
- It adds Mao's personal prestige to Chinese support for Sihanouk.
- It embarrasses the Soviets by noting pointedly that twenty (other) countries have recognized Sihanouk.

One may wonder why Mao put his prestige on the line for such a rapid undertaking. No answer to this question is completely satisfactory, but it would seem that the Mao mystique is somehow involved. I think (though some analysts would disagree) that Mao really does write these. He is an old man, and obsessed with his place in history. In this, and in earlier such pronouncements, he is highlighting what he sees as salient developments in the death throes of the American system—and he wants history to see that he correctly diagnosed the process. He predicts in the article that the "American people" will eventually rise against "fascist rule." He probably does see the Cambodian exercise as a paroxysm of a dying imperialism, as he sees the negro struggle as a sign of internal decay.

In addition, Mao may have had a particular tactical issue in mind. The top Hanoi leadership is presently engaged in deliberations over policy, and by identifying his personal prestige with maintenance of a "protracted people's war," Mao may calculate that he can help to check any inclinations among the Hanoi leaders to seek a political settlement. A related matter would, of course, be that Mao senses such an inclination actually exists. A hint of this is contained in Mao's assertion that: "Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and persevering in a protracted people's war, the three Indo-Chinese peoples will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory." This sounds like an argument directed against elements who might wish to take another course.

CIA and State analysts have come to similar preliminary readings of the Mao statement, without touching on the surmise sketched out as to Mao's personal vision or on the implications regarding a political settlement. A CIA analysis is at Tab B.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated 1-page CIA analysis of Mao's statement.

## 82. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

SNIE 13–9–70

Washington, May 28, 1970.

[Omitted here are the cover page and a 1-page map of Indochina.]

### SUBJECT

SNIE 13–9–70: Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments in Indochina

### NOTE

Cambodia's involvement has given a new shape to the struggle in Indochina. This paper considers how China<sup>2</sup> might view future hypothetical developments, particularly in the military field, which might compel it<sup>3</sup> to consider a significant change in its<sup>4</sup> strategy, and estimates what its<sup>5</sup> reactions might be if such developments do take place. Insofar as these involve military or other moves by the US and its allies, they are to be regarded as actions which the Communists might possibly anticipate, not as courses of action being entertained by the Allied side.

### THE ESTIMATE

#### *I. Peking's View of The Struggle in Indochina*

1. Peking has viewed events in Southeast Asia during the course of the war in Vietnam mainly in the light of its aspirations for political dominance in the area. Its perspective is long term, involves no fixed time schedule, and is an aspect of its pretensions to lead a world-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem; Limdis. According to a note on the cover page, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for representatives from the FBI and AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this SNIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678. In a March 25 memorandum to Helms, Kissinger wrote: "In order to obtain a sound basis for U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and China over the next five years, we need to obtain an analysis of Chinese attitudes and behavior toward Southeast Asian insurgencies." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA—Vol. II 1 Jan 70–30 June 70) This report covered much of the same ground as the June 11 SNIE 13–10–70, Chinese Reactions to Certain Courses of Action in Indochina, which noted that "In particular, this paper assesses the likelihood of the Chinese using 'volunteers' in response to successful guerilla operations to interdict communist lines of communication in this area." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files)

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten correction removed the words "and North Vietnam."

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten correction changed "them" to "it."

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten correction changed "their" to "its."

<sup>5</sup> A handwritten correction changed "their" to "its."

wide revolutionary movement. More immediately, Peking sees the war in Indochina as a continuation of a lengthy liberation struggle; first against the French, and now against the US. Peking's advice to the Communists in Indochina has been repetitious and consistent. They are to persist in self-reliant and protracted struggle until they can destroy the enemy or his will to fight. That this may involve occasional defeats and considerable losses is a foregone conclusion. Only by a prolonged and costly struggle can they hope to achieve eventual victory, and they must carry on this struggle themselves, without reliance on outside forces.

2. On one hand, the Chinese view the fighting as a test of Mao's theory of "people's war." They believe a victory would enhance China's political prestige in Asia and would support their claims for ideological pre-eminence over the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Peking has had to consider the possibility that an adverse turn in the war might lead to a security threat on China's southern border and therefore a possible direct confrontation with the US. In practice, this has meant militant advocacy of "people's war" for others, but careful maneuvering to ensure that China stays safely out of the line of fire.

3. In defining its role in this struggle, Peking has been both cautious and prudent. Thus far the policy has been to rule out any direct use of Chinese troops in the ground fighting and to reduce the risks of even an accidental confrontation with the US. There is evidence that the Peking leadership reaffirmed these basic ground rules after a long and bitter debate during 1965. This conflict, which pitted Minister of Defense Lin Piao against his Chief of Staff, was concerned with the assessment of, and possible responses to, the large-scale US intervention in Vietnam then under way. Lin Piao ended the debate with an authoritative endorsement of Mao's theories on "people's war," emphasizing defense in depth rather than moving across China's borders to meet the threat.

4. This decision not to intervene overtly in the Vietnam War was consistent with Peking's policy, at least since the Korean War, of not risking major hostilities with either the US or the USSR. There is as yet no indication that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has changed this basic stance. Indeed, it may have had a sobering effect. When hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 threatened to escalate into a nuclear conflict, the Chinese moved to calm the situation. We judge that China's troubled internal situation and its unresolved problems with the USSR incline its leaders to continue making the same cautious calculations of risk that have marked their conduct of recent years. This means that China's aims in Southeast Asia should be pursued by subversion, revolutionary activity, and diplomacy rather than by the open use of its own military forces.

5. *Recent Developments.* Recent events in Indochina are not likely to change this basic approach. As long as the US/GVN move into Cambodia does not critically affect Hanoi's ability to continue the war, Peking is likely to minimize the threat posed by the current Allied actions. Moreover, Peking probably sees immediate benefits from the political reaction aroused in the US against the Cambodian involvement. And if the US should not withdraw from Cambodia, Peking would assess the situation as one in which the US was getting more and more bogged down in an expanding war that would guarantee growing opposition both at home and abroad. In this sense, at least, it would make little difference to Peking whether the US kept to its schedule and withdrew or whether it continued its involvement in Cambodia.<sup>6</sup>

6. In Peking's view, the US is fighting a losing war in which Hanoi has only to be patient and persevere in order to outlast the US. In order to preserve that patience, China will continue to supply North Vietnam with economic and military aid. More important, Peking is probably now better prepared to furnish steady and dependable political support than it was during the Cultural Revolution. Relations with Hanoi have improved considerably since last fall, and recent events in Cambodia have brought Peking and Hanoi closer together. The remarkable turnout in Peking for Le Duan's recent visit, in which both Mao and Lin made one of their increasingly rare appearances, is evidence of Chinese concern to strengthen ties with Hanoi at Moscow's expense. Peking's careful campaign to exploit Sihanouk, recently emphasized in a major pronouncement by Mao himself, is also intended to diminish Soviet influence in Indochina.

7. In short, Peking has moved promptly to exploit the Cambodian developments for its own ends. The Chinese leadership has seized the opportunities presented to reduce Soviet influence on Hanoi and to increase its own capability to influence Hanoi without, for the present at least, exposing itself to greater risks or markedly higher costs.

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<sup>6</sup> In a June 18 memorandum to Helms, Kissinger asked several questions about the SNIE. He wrote: "In paragraph 5, it is argued that Peking is unlikely to change its basic approach, since it would find advantage in both a U.S. withdrawal and in the U.S.'s becoming bogged down in an expanding war. This seems to leave out the possibility that our policies could succeed and that Vietnamization would result in a GVN increasingly able to take care of itself. Is this so totally out of the question as to be left out of Peking's calculation entirely?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA—Vol. II 1 Jan 70–30 June 70) Abbot Smith, Director, National Estimates, CIA, responded to Kissinger's questions on June 24, noting: "The discussion in paragraph 5 was not intended to exclude possible concern on Peking's part that allied actions in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos might, in time, result in a GVN increasingly able to take care of itself (or a Hanoi less willing and able to sustain a protracted struggle). We did not feel, however, that this concern would be overriding in the near term; indeed, Peking's sponsorship of the 'Indochina Peoples Conference' seemed to attest to Chinese Communist confidence that Hanoi was prepared to carry on with the struggle on a somewhat broader front." (Ibid.)

8. At the same time, Peking may have some concern that an intensified and enlarged scale of hostilities could weaken Hanoi's will and capacity to continue. Against this possibility Peking is probably prepared to render increased aid to Hanoi, increase the level of threat in its propaganda, perhaps stimulate insurgency and tensions elsewhere in Asia, or attempt to unsettle the US by moving troops about in southern China. Judging by its past actions, however, Peking is likely to calculate carefully the risks of these moves and to prefer gestures and actions that will worry but not provoke the US.

9. *The Soviet Factor.* Peking's reactions in Indochina are conditioned by the terms of its bitter rivalry with the USSR. At critical points during the course of the war, the Chinese have sought to project an image of militant devotion to "people's war," partly at least to outflank politically the Soviets; the latter are constrained in Southeast Asia by geography and by some concern to avoid complicating relations with the US or offending potentially friendly non-Communist Asian regimes. Peking calculates in these situations that Moscow's position is certain to be relatively "soft," providing ample room for Chinese posturing without a requirement for risky commitments. Nonetheless, this stance carries the risk that the Soviets might be able to expose the gap between Chinese rhetoric and performance.

10. Moreover, so long as large and hostile Soviet forces threaten China's northern and western borders, there is added reason for avoiding direct military involvements in Southeast Asia. In sum, the Soviet factor reinforces other considerations which make Peking want to avoid precipitate and risky action even though it continues to discourage compromise settlement of the war.<sup>7</sup>

[Omitted here are paragraphs 11-26, under the heading: II. Peking's Reactions to Possible Future Developments, which were divided into the following sub-headings: Continued Allied Military Activity in Cambodia, Allied Support of the Lon Nol Government, Thai Military Commitment to Cambodia, Renewed Bombing of North Vietnam, Ground Troops in Southern Laos, and Ground Troops in Northern Laos.]

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<sup>7</sup> An unsigned and undated memorandum to the President contained Kissinger's summary of this SNIE. (Ibid., Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV)

### 83. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 13–3–70

Washington, June 11, 1970.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

#### COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

##### *The Problem*

To assess the strength, capabilities, and disposition of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces with particular reference to the impact of domestic political developments and Sino-Soviet tensions.

##### *Conclusions*

A. Twenty years have now been expended in Communist China's effort to strengthen and modernize its armed forces. Peking's persistent willingness to allocate a large share of its resources to military purposes has yielded some creditable results. At the same time, however, the effort has been beset by difficulties caused by disruptive economic and political policies and by the ambivalence between Maoist military doctrine and the requirements for building a modern, professional military force.

B. The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interfered with military training and degraded the combat capabilities and readiness of the Chinese Armed Forces. But the extent of this degradation and the degree of its persistence up to the present time is in dispute. CIA and INR believe that the level of training is still well short of normal in the army because of continued heavy involvement in non-military activities and that progress in extricating the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from these tasks will be slow. DIA and NSA, on the other hand, believe that training in the army approached normal levels in 1968 and that any residual degradation in combat readiness and effectiveness is slight. A discussion of the evidence on these points at issue is contained in paragraphs 12 to 17.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13–3–70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on June 11 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678.

C. The deteriorating course of Sino-Soviet relations, which first deprived China of extensive military assistance and then in recent years led to an ominous buildup of military forces and pressure against China, has added another dimension to China's defense problem. Although Peking's reaction has so far been cautious and limited in scope, the Soviet buildup is almost certainly having a major impact on Chinese military planning.

D. Despite its problems, the PLA has the capability for putting up a formidable defense of the mainland. Its principal strength lies in the size of the ground forces (about two and one-half million) and their fighting potential as an infantry force. Although China's military stance is basically defensive, its forces could overwhelm its neighbors in Southeast Asia or Korea if not opposed by a modern outside power; and, as it is demonstrating in Indochina, Peking can provide important assistance to insurgent groups across its southern borders.

E. In conventional combat against a modern opponent, however, each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Army units are believed to be seriously deficient in motorized transport and heavy armament; the air defense system probably lacks an adequate communications and data processing capability and could not withstand a large-scale, sophisticated air attack; and China's navy, while growing, is still little more than a coastal defense force.

F. As estimated, current and projected production programs will not, for many years, provide sufficient quantities of the various types of weapons and equipment needed to remedy matériel deficiencies and to raise the PLA to modern combat standards. But the Chinese are persevering—and almost certainly will continue to do so under any foreseeable leadership—with a fairly broad range of modernization programs along the following lines:

1. *Ground Forces.* Although the army is deficient in firepower and mobility and seems to have made less progress in modernization than might have been expected, the firepower of Chinese combat units is increasing. Already well supplied with small arms, ground units are receiving more tanks and artillery.

2. *Air Forces.* All elements of China's air defense apparently have been improved. Command and control capabilities have probably increased, more and better radars have been deployed at an increasing rate, and Mig-19 production probably has recovered from the Cultural Revolution. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly and we are increasingly uncertain about Chinese plans for producing the Mig-21. There is some evidence that an aircraft of native design based on the Mig-19 has been produced in China.

3. *Naval Forces.* With few exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs appear to have recovered fully during 1969 from the Cultural

Revolution, and current expansion of shipyards indicates that new programs could be planned. Greater emphasis is being placed on production of larger, longer range ships capable of extended patrols. Construction of R-class submarines now averages about two units a year, and China has begun to build destroyers. Old destroyers are being converted to carry cruise missiles.

[Omitted here is the 24-page Discussion section of the NIE, which includes the following chapters: I. The People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution, II. The People's Liberation Army Today, and III. Outlook; and an Annex: Status of Forces and Trends.]

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**84. Message to Be Delivered by Major General Vernon A. Walters to the Government of the People's Republic of China<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

The United States Government wishes to continue the exchanges that are taking place through the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. However, it is difficult to maintain complete secrecy in these talks due to their formal nature, the large number of officials involved and the great public interest that they have generated.

If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks that are strictly confidential and not known by other countries, the President is ready to establish an alternative channel directly to him for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Eyes Only. A typed note attached to the message reads: "June 16, 1970. Typed version—exactly like this—but without signature—was hand carried by Jim Fazio to General Walters this date w/cover memo which is also in this file." A copy of the message in the file is signed by the President. Attached but not printed is a June 15 memorandum from Haig to Walters, which reads in full: "Pursuant to your discussions with my friend [apparently Kissinger], attached is the text you should use in your discussions in Paris. As I understand it, you will not hand over this text to the other side but will follow it literally in your discussions. Jim Fazio, who is carrying this memorandum and its enclosure, will also provide you with an additional supply of one time pads." Fazio, assistant director of the White House Situation Room, delivered this message and Haig's memorandum to Walters in Paris on June 17. His account of meeting Walters was included in two memoranda from Fazio to Haig, both June 22. (Ibid., Box 1327, Unfiled Material, 1971, 5 of 12) "One-time pads" are sheets of random numbers used for encryption purposes. An account of Sino-American contact in Paris is in Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978). Walters' account of the timing of these initiatives varies from the documentation printed here.

matters of the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology.

We are prepared to activate such a channel through the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché accredited to the French Government in Paris. We are also ready to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S.-Chinese relations.

Knowledge of these talks would be confined to the President, his personal advisors, and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.

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**85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Chinese Communist Attempt Against U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft

You have seen the report that the Chinese Communists sent out two MIG 19s with protective cover, in an apparently premeditated effort to intercept and presumably to shoot down a C-130 which was flying [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] collection mission some 100 miles off the China coast on July 2. The MIGs could not locate the C-130, which aborted its mission and returned safely.

These intelligence missions are routine. They sometimes elicit defensive Chinese patrols, but not since 1965 have the Chinese shown evidence of hostile intent.

There are certain aspects of this situation which are puzzling and even disturbing. First, the aircraft was operating well off the China mainland, and was following a flight pattern which has been repeated many times. Customarily the Chinese could be expected to react only when the path carries the aircraft close to the mainland, and they have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Umbra. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

allowed the many previous flights along the same general line to go unchallenged. Second, the attempt against the aircraft comes at a time when the Chinese have been cautiously opening communications with us, in a process which has not been entirely disrupted by Cambodia. It is true that the Chinese have displayed particular military sensitivity about the Shantung region, and may have wanted to raise the cost and decrease the effectiveness of our intelligence collection activities in this region by driving us farther offshore and perhaps resorting to fighter cover. There may be also some new military developments in or around Shantung regarding which they are particularly sensitive.

However, this may not in itself be sufficient explanation for an effort to shoot down an American aircraft far at sea. Had they succeeded, they would have finished off the slight movement toward a Sino-U.S. thaw. In doing so, they would have nullified the "U.S. option" which they have been developing since their confrontation with the U.S.S.R. began.

The tone of Chinese treatment of us—particularly their diplomatic language—has not changed so markedly as to suggest a major reversal of Chinese policy. Witness the courteous and low-keyed manner in which they deferred future Warsaw meetings.

Perhaps the most plausible hypothesis is that somebody in the power structure *did* want to wreck Sino-U.S. relations. Discounting the usual stridency of their propaganda language, the Chinese for some two years have been cautiously and tentatively feeling us out to see what we might be willing to do to improve relations. This policy is usually associated with Chou En-lai and the moderate grouping which has dominated internal policy in the same period. In the past couple of weeks, there has been evidence of an upsurge of the zealots, and signs that they are fighting their relative exclusion from the reconstituted Party. The Air Force during the Cultural Revolution was the most radical of the armed services. The attempted shootdown may have been related to a policy/power struggle and been intended to stop the moderate drift of foreign policy. The perpetrators may also have hoped that by provoking us into reactions or angry statements they could discredit any proponents of limited accommodation with the U.S.

From the Chinese standpoint, a shootdown would have had two useful byproducts, which may have been used by the proponents to persuade the Standing Committee (i.e. Mao) that the effort should be undertaken:

—It would have raised estimates in the U.S. as to the danger of deeper Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia, and increased pressures for U.S. withdrawal.

—It would have shown solidarity with North Korea, which the Chinese have been courting.

From our standpoint, whatever the truth as to the above hypothesis, the prudent course would seem to be to examine our intelligence operations and make sure that aircraft are not unnecessarily exposed, or their missions unusually provocative. If my guess is correct, we have the additional incentive to avoid playing into the radicals' hands.

We should be sure that adequate cover is given to missions which are thought necessary. The loss of a MIG 19 would not particularly serve the radicals' purpose. We cannot simply abandon the entire C-130 collection operation under these circumstances, without proving to the Chinese that a hard line works best with us.

I have asked that proposals for forthcoming intelligence missions against China be framed with the increased danger in mind.

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## 86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird<sup>1</sup>

Taipei, July 17, 1970, 0945Z.

3080. Subj: GRC Force Reorganization and Modernization. Ref: A) Taipei 2589;<sup>2</sup> B) State 99216;<sup>3</sup> C) Taipei 2925;<sup>4</sup> D) Taipei 2939.<sup>5</sup>

1. We believe Ambassador's and General Taylor's conversations with CCK (refs c, d) have provided about as much clarification as we can expect re CCK and GRC thinking on proposed review. We recognize that we and GRC may still have some differences in relative

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority. Copies were sent to CINCPAC, COMUSTDC, CHMAAG Taiwan, and 327th Air Division, part of the 13th Air Force.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2589 from Taipei, June 12, McConaughy reported on a May 21 meeting between General Taylor of MAAG and Chiang Ching-kuo to discuss force reorganization. The Ambassador emphasized that "We will of course give consideration to objectives outlined in telegram 19013 to Taipei (see footnote 4, Document 1) as modified by subsequent exchanges between Washington and Country Team." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 CHINAT-US)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 99216 to Taipei, June 23, contained a series of questions about the force reorganization plan. (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2925 from Taipei, July 7, the Embassy reported on McConaughy's July 3 meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo to discuss the questions raised by telegram 99216 to Taipei. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 2939 from Taipei, July 8, the Embassy reported on a July 7 meeting among General Taylor, McConaughy, and Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang discussed the weapons he felt should accompany the reorganization effort: F-4 fighter aircraft, 3 submarines, and M-14 and M-16 rifles. (Ibid.)

importance assigned to certain objectives. In particular, GRC almost certainly hopes the review will improve its prospects for future US assistance. This is only natural, but we should be able to prevent this from becoming major problem by US input during review as well as constant reminders that study implies no USG commitment on either general level of future assistance or on specific items. Moreover, in some respects this is not basically inconsistent with US belief expressed last spring that more carefully considered ROC procurement proposals reflecting sound rationale and systematic evaluation of requirements and their costs (including O&M) probably would enhance receptivity in Washington. This and other potential problems also eased by CCK's full acceptance of idea that study itself, and its end products, will be GRC's and not joint.

2. We also believe that GRC has genuine interest in developing more rational approach to defense planning, and this review can provide further stimulus. For example, growing MND interest and activity in area of systems analysis should gain momentum from this exercise as will trend toward more careful consideration of O&M costs. Sharper focus on relationship of threat to priority requirements and an integrated look at service priorities also a plus. We realize there are limitations on the pace and extent to which these and other US objectives can be achieved, but we are confident that progress in this direction can be made.

3. In any event, GRC may move ahead with some form of review even if we back away. (In fact, Chinese have already begun some preparatory work and informally have been requesting MAAG advice.) There is risk that if they proceed unilaterally, objectives we seek to achieve may suffer.

4. With foregoing in mind, we propose that we develop informal working relationship with MND at two levels—one involving the Chinese service elements, and another higher level arrangement involving representatives of Chinese GCHQ. We would expect the latter group to discuss general approach along lines of ref a and ref c, with some fleshing out of this guidance for the benefit of the Chinese personnel actually doing the work and as guidance for the US officers principally responsible for providing consultation. US personnel will be instructed to: propose basic questions which will stimulate GRC to formulate concepts and plans, as suggested ref b; to respond to requests for advice; and to critique GRC oral presentations and drafts.

5. Defense assistance "nucleus" within the Country Team will be kept fully apprised of developments and "nucleus" will meet as required to provide whatever guidance appears necessary based on its own deliberations and on instructions from Washington. "Nucleus" will keep Washington advised of progress of study.

6. Country Team would appreciate indication as to when systems analysts requested ref a might be expected to arrive.<sup>6</sup>

7. As noted above, Chinese have already undertaken some preparatory work and have informally requested advice of MAAG officers. It will be awkward to continue holding them off and we would appreciate a reply to foregoing ASAP.

8. TDC, MAAG and 327th concur.

9. Re request (ref b) for copy of MemCon covering earlier CHMAAG conversation with CCK and copy of ROC statements to CINCPAC regarding modernization requirements of individual services, we are forwarding material Monday by pouch.<sup>7</sup>

10. *For EA/ROC*: Please bring this message to the attention of Ambassador McConaughy.

**Armstrong**

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 2589, McConaughy also suggested that the two systems analysts assigned to MAAG participate in the ROC force reorganization effort.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

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**87. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1970.

SUBJECT

Communist Chinese Foreign Policy and Strains Within the Leadership

You may find the attached brief research study of interest (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> It pulls together recent evidence of renewed jockeying for power. It

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The memorandum was date-stamped "August 11 1970."

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab A but not printed is "Communist China: Maneuvering Among the Top Leadership," Research Study REAS-19 prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 23.

describes the evident slippage in power of the old guard leadership and the “administrators”, many of whom had been associated with Chou En-lai. It documents the reappearance of the more radical “cultural revolutionaries.” The study notes that there are continuing signs of the subtle, opportunistic type of foreign policy which we usually associate with Chou, and which has been resurgent for the past two years. It warns, however, that there may be erratic or contradictory behavior, some of it attributable to tensions within a delicately balanced leadership coalition.

The leader of the Air Force, who has been closely associated with the radicals, is again on the ascendant. This adds one small shred of evidence to my personal hypothesis that the apparent attempt in June to shoot down the American C-130 over the high seas may have been a deliberate effort by the radicals to sabotage Chou’s efforts to maintain a dialogue with the U.S.<sup>3</sup>

To compound the mysteries, the French Parliamentary mission reports that, during its interview with Mao, Chou En-lai appeared to be very much at ease and was in constant conversation with Mao. Lin Piao, supposedly the heir apparent, was unshaven and unkempt; seemed to be in poor health, and said not a word.<sup>4</sup>

The impression which the French Parliamentary mission got from its visit was all sweetness and light, by Chinese standards, but most of its contact was with the administrators rather than the radicals. The conversation with Mao was very general. He disclaimed a big power role for China, objected to “some powers’ ” efforts to interfere in the domestic affairs of others, and complained that the USSR and the U.S. are trying to impose decisions in the nuclear field. Chou En-lai was very complimentary to the French. He reiterated the theme that China would not be pushed around by the big powers but said that China would have normal relations with powers favoring peaceful coexistence. He refused to concede that the U.S. is interested in peace in Vietnam or elsewhere. He bore down heavily on Taiwan, and insisted that

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<sup>3</sup> Grant is presumably referring to the July 2 incident. See Document 85.

<sup>4</sup> French Minister for Planning and Territorial Management, André Bettencourt, led a delegation during a July 7–21 visit to the PRC. Telegram 10048 from Paris, July 28, and telegram 121713 to Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Taipei, Moscow, London, and Bonn, July 29, contain reports of the visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 FR) Another version of the talks between Mao and Bettencourt, obtained “on most confidential basis,” is in telegram 12787 from Paris, September 22. (Ibid., CHICOM–FR)

China would never accept "two Chinas." The PRC could, however, "live with the factual situation." He described German and Japanese militarism as "two new dangers."

Other Chinese echoed the line on Taiwan. None of the Chinese would be drawn into substantive conversation concerning solutions for the Indochina problem.

The French felt that the Chinese are not in an aggressive mood, that they are genuinely worried about Japan, and that they may have played down the Sino-Soviet problem in order to worry the U.S. about possible improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.

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## 88. Assessment Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 2, 1970.

### TAIWAN SITUATION ASSESSMENT

*Summary. The GRC is rapidly approaching the end of an era, and it seems almost certain that the next few years will be marked by sweeping changes in the domestic situation and in Taipei's international position. The groundwork for these changes is already prepared. What is perhaps the most significant GRC achievement—rapid economic development of the island—has set the stage for potential shifts in the internal political balance. Changes in the U.S. political priorities and the gradual resumption of Peking's long march toward regional dominance in East Asia point toward the necessity for acceptance of a new international role by the GRC.*

Society on Taiwan is being rapidly urbanized. The many stresses which result—including a growth of political consciousness among the underdog Taiwanese majority—will be harder to cope with because of the split between the politically dominant Mainlanders and the generally alienated Taiwanese, who outnumber them 8 to 1. Internationally, the GRC faces an increasingly precarious situation with steadily diminishing options as U.S. power is gradually shifted in the Pacific.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 73 D 38, Pol. Assessment-US/GRC. Secret. An attached but not printed covering memorandum from Nelson to Green states that this report was prepared by the CIA.

Eventually, the leaders in Taipei must confront the unpleasant prospect—probably sooner rather than later—of acknowledging the “two Chinas” situation and openly accepting the galling status of a small power existing behind the shield of U.S. and/or regional security guarantees. Against this backdrop of trouble, the GRC leadership must cope with the succession question—probably no later than 1972—and a host of lesser problems.

Despite the uncertainties in the near-term future, I feel quite confident that the GRC will weather its problems successfully during the next several years.<sup>2</sup> The economic growth, which is at the root of many political and social difficulties, also produces a steady rise in the standard of living which serves as a balancing factor in an otherwise unstable situation. This, in conjunction with the *pervasive security apparatus* and the fact that “*Taiwanese independence*” is still basically a state of mind, makes it seem likely that the period just ahead will be comparatively tranquil internally. This judgment would require immediate review if some sudden stroke of fate removed the President’s able son, Chiang Ching-kuo, from the line of succession to *de facto control as Premier*—which I confidently expect within the next twelve months.

This does not mean, however, that either the U.S. Government or [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will have easy times ahead in working with the GRC. I believe the *Chinese are going to become more touchy, more demanding and more inclined to be assertive where there is any question concerning GRC sovereignty.* [2 lines of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is an 11-page analysis of the Taiwan situation.]

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<sup>2</sup> Shoesmith prepared a memorandum for Green on September 11, in which he took issue with the CIA report. Shoesmith posited that “the GRC is not merely facing the ‘end of an era’ but a basic challenge to the political structure which has been maintained on Taiwan since 1949.” He also observed that the passing of Chiang and the declining international position of the ROC created a “potentially explosive” situation that could impair domestic economic growth and, in turn, exacerbate political conflicts between mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Green wrote on the first page of this memorandum: “Many thanks. The two analyses [*names not declassified*] made useful contrasts. MG.” (Ibid.)

## 89. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 14, 1970.

### SUBJECT

Contact with the Chinese

In response to an item on Communist Chinese activity in the September 9 Daily Brief, you asked whether we should not try again through our channel in Paris to contact the Chinese.<sup>2</sup>

As suggested in your note, we do have an offer outstanding to the Chinese. Attached is a copy of a message that we gave General Walters on June 16, but which he has not yet delivered.<sup>3</sup> (You, of course, approved this message but we left it purposely unsigned. Walters would not hand over the text, but rather would read from it literally.) Several weeks ago he found an opportunity to tell his Chinese contact that he had an important message from our government to their government. The man said that he would inform his government that we had a message, but Walters received no response. This past Monday, September 7, Walters again told his contact, at a Pakistani reception, that he had a message. The man again said that he would tell his government.<sup>4</sup>

We have also been trying since the beginning of the year to open a channel through the Dutch,<sup>5</sup> but I believe if we are to have any success it will be through Paris.

I agree that it would be useful to establish contact with the Chinese at this time. However, we have made clear signals, and I think we have no choice but to wait and see if they are willing to respond.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> In his September 9 daily briefing memorandum, Kissinger mentioned the Hong Kong Consulate's reports on a "new mobility in Peking's conduct of foreign relations which may present opportunities for improving relations." Nixon commented in the margin: "K—should you not try again on your Walters contact with the Chicom in Paris? Or do we have an offer outstanding?" (Ibid., Box 26, President's Daily Briefs)

<sup>3</sup> Document 84.

<sup>4</sup> Information on this attempt to contact the Chinese was not found.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 66.

## 90. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Paris, September 27, 1970.

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger  
Mr. Sainteny

[Omitted here is discussion concerning Vietnam and Cambodia.]

### *Communist China*

Mr. Sainteny said that he frequently saw the Communist Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. Dr. Kissinger said that we had tried to have conversations with the Chinese but that they seemed to get nowhere, even though we have no basic problems with the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger asked if Mr. Sainteny could set up a channel with Huang Chen. Our other channels were not satisfactory, and the one in Warsaw was much too much in the public (and the Soviet) view.

Mr. Sainteny said that he would try to arrange something. He was a little concerned because he did not speak Chinese, and whenever he talked with Huang Chen it was through an interpreter. The latter, of course, was an intelligence officer. However, Mr. Sainteny thought he might be able to arrange a channel through an associate who spoke Chinese and who, he thought, could speak to Chen privately. Mr. Sainteny said he would write to Mr. Smyser to let Dr. Kissinger know what happened.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Jean Sainteny's Paris apartment. Sainteny was a French banker and political figure. He served as a source of information and contacts with the Vietnamese. He had served in French Indochina as Commissioner, 1945–1947; Governor of the Colonies, 1946; and Delegate General to North Vietnam, 1954–1958.

<sup>2</sup> A November 7 memorandum from Smyser to Kissinger passed along a translation of a November 3 letter from Sainteny. Smyser observed: "I note that he appears to have taken a long time to obtain rather basic information [on PRC diplomats in France] and that he does not refer to the interpreter problem he cited in our conversation. So I do not really know what to make of it. Maybe Jean first checked with his government. In any case, I stand ready to transmit a reply on my personal stationery." An attached note from Haig ordered Smyser to prepare a letter for Kissinger's signature; see Document 119. Copies of the Smyser memorandum, Sainteny letter, and Haig's note are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971.

**91. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Visa for Taiwan Independence Movement Leader Peng

Attached at Tab A is a recent FBI report on the ChiNat Independence Leader Peng, whose group is allegedly responsible for the attempt on the life of Vice Premier Chiang last April.<sup>2</sup> You will recall the Vice President spoke to you about the need to have State not issue a visa to Peng who plans to come to the U.S. for the purpose of accepting a research position at the University of Michigan.<sup>3</sup>

Attached at Tab B is a copy of our staff work on the Peng visa. U. Alexis Johnson informed you of State's decision on September 3 to approve issuance of a non-immigrant visa, valid for one year.<sup>4</sup> Although realizing that the decision would be painful for the Nationalists, State reasoned that it had no other choice since Peng satisfied all the criteria normally required for a non-immigrant visa application. State also felt that discrimination against Peng would generate congressional and public criticism which would prove harmful to U.S. policy toward the GRC. The visa was issued on September 17, and Peng gave his

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret. Kissinger wrote "OK, HK" and "Peng is former student of mine" on the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In an October 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Hoover declared that Peng was a leader of the independence movement, whose members had attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo in New York on April 24, 1970. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V)

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found. However, an October 6 memorandum from Haig to Kent Crane of the Vice President's staff mentioned that Agnew found it "undesirable" for Peng come to the United States. Haig's memorandum explained the reasoning behind the visa decision and promised that Kissinger would contact the Vice President personally to discuss this matter. (Ibid.) A September 21 letter from Ambassador Chow to Agnew included a personal plea from Chiang to prevent Peng from entering the United States (Ibid.) Documentation on the debate concerning Peng's admission to the United States is also *ibid.*, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29 Peng Ming-min.

<sup>4</sup> On September 3 Acting Secretary of State Richardson approved an August 28 memorandum from Green, which granted a non-immigrant visa to Peng. Johnson forwarded the memorandum to the NSC on September 3. The memoranda from Green and Johnson are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 CHINAT. In a September 5 summary memorandum by Holdridge, Kissinger indicated his approval by writing: "OK, HK." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Department of State—Sept 70–Nov 70, Vol. IX)

personal assurances that he would not engage in organized Taiwan independence activities while in the United States.

*Recommendation*

That you call the Vice President and explain to him that:

—the problems associated with granting Peng a non-immigrant visa were well recognized at the time.

—there were considered to be no valid legal grounds to bar his entry.

—Peng has given assurances that he will not engage in organized Taiwan independence activities.

—on balance, you believe that under the circumstances the best choice was made among unhappy alternatives.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> No record of a conversation between Kissinger and Agnew has been found.

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**92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Taipei, October 22, 1970, 1145Z.

4603. Dept pass White House and Vice President's Office. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Subject: Ambassador's Conversation with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo on US/GRC Relations. Reference: Taipei 4580.<sup>2</sup>

1. I paid my first call following recent home leave on Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo October 21. Personal rapport as strong as ever, and amenities and personal exchanges consumed ten minutes of one-hour meeting.

2. I then told CCK that I would not press for discussion of official matters on this initial occasion. But at some time convenient to him, I wanted to have completely candid discussion of any elements in US/GRC relationship which might be troubling him. Our close friendship did not permit any unrealistic pretenses and I was of course aware of GRC preoccupation with certain recent developments, especially

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSTDC, and CHMAAG.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4580, October 21, the Embassy relayed the contents of McConaughy's discussions with Acting Foreign Minister Shen on October 20. Their talks focused on MAP funds and Peng Ming-min. (Ibid.)

those related to MAP and Peng Ming-min case. I was ready at any time to give him full exposition of US rationale for decisions taken and I wanted to have a full and uninhibited exchange of views with him. The preservation of the traditional close and trustful relationship between our two governments was too important to permit any disagreement to fester beneath the surface.

3. The Vice Premier heartily reciprocated my preference for friendly candor and said he would like to set forth at once the essential GRC position on MAP cut and admission of Peng to US.

4. As to MAP cut, CCK said that although they had noted warning of possible substantial cut conveyed by Vice President Agnew end of August, they had not anticipated that the new level would go below \$15 million. It was inconceivable to GRC that all investment items would be eliminated and fund for operations and maintenance cut out completely, leaving nothing but a sum of less than \$7 million for overhead type expenses. He said his government had not yet recovered from shock and still found US action incredible. He said that there had to be some continuity in any important major program and some reasonable relationship between present levels and levels of immediately preceding years. Changes need to be gradual and there needs to be opportunity for advance planning and adjustment to necessary changes. The total withdrawal of the entire substantive program without notice and contrary to the advance joint planning could not be justified in GRC view. He said confidence in US consistency and dependability had been seriously diluted in all sectors of his government, adding that the US action would also work against the morale of the GRC armed forces. He said that the GRC officials could not see how the US action, particularly as to the manner in which it was carried out, could be reconciled with the requirements of alliance and friendship. He said the consensus in meetings held by various organs of government was that the US action was "outrageous." GRC officials had said that they did not see how any American associated with the matter could avoid a feeling of embarrassment. He said that while the most serious tangible effect was on the GRC armed forces, the budgetary consequences were also worrisome. The GRC budget was already over-strained and it would not be easy to finance the shortfall, particularly since there had been no opportunity for advance budgetary preparation. But he thought that the intangible consequences were even worse than the concrete results. The GRC officials felt that there had to be policy implications in such a drastic unilateral move, and the implications which the GRC was bound to read into the action were disturbing.

5. I explained our MAP action along the same lines I used October 20 with Acting FonMin Shen (reftel). I assured him categorically that there were no anti-GRC policy implications in the move whatever. I noted the limited total of the expected appropriation and the top

priority unexpected emergency requirements for Cambodia and Korea which had to be met. I frankly pointed out that the absence of any apparent immediate aggressive intent against Taiwan by the ChiComs and the impressive economic progress of the GRC were necessarily taken into account in Washington when the painful decisions had to be made as to how the unavoidable cuts would be applied. I told him that while we could make no commitment as to MAP levels for following years, it was a fact that the current cut applies only to FY 1971. I recalled our ongoing efforts in association with GRC representatives to find ways of buffering the shock of the cut through a readjustment of purchases under military credit and otherwise.

6. CCK said he recognized US budgetary difficulties and the emergency situations in Cambodia and Korea. He did not deny that some cuts might have been necessary but he thought that the matter could have been handled in a different way with some consultation, some advance notice, and at least a partial preservation of the O&M program.

7. CCK then turned to Peng Ming-min case. He termed the US action in opening its gates to Peng the most abrasive event in Sino-US relations in the last 20 years.<sup>3</sup> He called the action a direct blow at the political and social stability and security of Taiwan. He recalled that the prestige of President Chiang himself had been engaged in the GRC effort to convince the USG that Peng's admittance to the US would be contrary to essential GRC interests and would be deeply upsetting to GRC. He noted strong appeal which FonMin Wei had made to me on August 28 (Taipei 3737), and urgent representations made by Ambassador Chow in Washington.<sup>4</sup> USG had acted in complete disregard of these most insistent pleas of a friendly government. The results were a widespread assumption that US was sympathetic to TIM movement, a considerable encouragement to TIM sentiment, and a compounding of the problems of GRC at a difficult juncture.

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<sup>3</sup> On September 16, Washington local time, Green informed Ambassador Chow in Washington, and Armstrong informed Shen in Taipei, of the decision to grant a visa to Peng. (Telegram 151025 to Taipei, September 15, and telegram 152198 to Taipei, September 16; both *ibid.*, POL 30 CHINAT) ROC officials immediately protested. The Embassy reported a September 21 conversation with Chou Chung-feng, Director of the National Security Bureau, similar to the talk between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo: "Chou predicted that issuance of a visa to Peng will create misunderstanding and protest on the part of the people of Taiwan." Chou asked that Peng be prevented from coming to the United States or at least be dissuaded from engaging in political activity. The U.S. Government declined to do so. (Memorandum from William E. Nelson to Shoemsmith, September 25; *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29, Peng Ming-min)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 3737, August 29, McConaughy reported on his meeting with Wei. (*Ibid.*, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 CHINAT) Chow met with Green on September 22 and called McConaughy, then in Atlanta on home leave, on September 24 to complain about the military assistance program and Peng's visa. (Telegram 155267 to Taipei, September 21; *ibid.*, and Shoemsmith's memorandum for the file, September 24; *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29, Peng Ming-min)

8. I set forth basis for our reluctant decision in Peng case and precautionary steps we had taken in recognition of GRC concerns, along lines used with Acting FonMin. I stressed great difficulty of denying entry to a visa applicant qualified under the law and regulations when he cannot be termed a subversive by any US definition of the term. I also dwelt emphatically on extensive harm to the GRC reservoir of goodwill in US if academic, congressional and journalistic communities had been alienated by exclusion of Peng.

9. CCK's response was to effect that GRC had documented number of cases where USG had excluded by administration action aliens whom it wanted to exclude. He said flatly that US could easily have kept Peng out of the country if it had wished to do so. He dismissed goodwill argument, saying that GRC was accustomed to unfriendly attitude from substantial sectors of American public and it could, if necessary, withstand some further hostility from American public. He said the holding of a firm internal security line was far more important to his government than the goodwill of the American elements I had mentioned.

10. CCK summed up by saying that the local standing of the US unfortunately had been severely damaged by these actions. Consequences could be serious. The Chinese view was that the basic requirement of governmental as well as personal friendship was a sympathetic understanding of the needs of the friend and a willingness to go to some trouble to accommodate those needs. It was felt that the USG had not met this friendship test in these two cases. He said that these two decisions were history now, but "they had left scars." The two decisions between them had struck at both the external and the internal security of the GRC. He believed that both types of GRC security had some importance for the US.

11. CCK then mentioned Canadian recognition of ChiComs.<sup>5</sup> He called this a highly unfortunate development which aggravated the international problems of GRC. He noted that the GRC is facing reverses from several directions but they refused to be discouraged and setbacks would only cause them to redouble their efforts. He said "we will stand up and fight to the end in any event."

12. I told CCK that it was our established policy and confirmed intention to uphold the international position of the GRC and to carry out all of our commitments. I told him his government was mistaken in reading sweeping policy implications into the two actions we had discussed. We do not support or encourage any TIM effort to overthrow the GRC. I told him I and my colleagues would work unremittingly to set right any misunderstandings and to preserve the

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 2 and footnote 2, Document 93.

traditional close US–GRC relationship. I said that I earnestly hoped that no lesions would be left from the two events we had talked about. If there had to be any scars, I hoped they would be completely healed and hardly noticeable.

13. CCK said that he wanted to work with me on the remedial action which he felt was needed. He said he thought the GRC had always lived up to its commitments. It had tried to be forthright, frank, and accommodating in all its dealings with the US. It had not complained or threatened when the AID program was terminated in 1965, when the initial MAP cuts began in 1968, or when other programs had been cut back. He hoped that the US would be able to take account of the needs and the special circumstances of its Chinese ally.

14. I told CCK that the best assurance of the steadfastness of this administration to its commitments lay in the character, the convictions, and the wisdom of its leaders, President Nixon and Vice President Agnew. The leaders of the GRC knew them both well as sympathetic and understanding friends of the GRC.

15. CCK told me that his government did indeed find much comfort and reassurance in President Nixon's and Vice President Agnew's positions of leadership.

16. At the end of the meeting CCK told me that regardless of circumstances the GRC position of close alignment with the United States and support for the US position will not change.

17. CCK insisted on escorting me from his third-floor office to my car.

18. See septel for brief CCK representations to me about alleged involvement of some private American nationals on Taiwan with members of Taiwan Independence Movement.<sup>6</sup>

**McConaughy**

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 4613 from Taipei, October 23, McConaughy reported that on October 21, "Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said the security authorities here have definite evidence that certain private American citizens are giving encouragement and assistance to members of the Taiwan independence movement." McConaughy said that the Embassy would, at most, consider "passing some sort of cautionary word to the persons involved." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US).

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**93. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1970, 3:20 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

President Richard Nixon

C.K. Yen, Vice President of the Republic of China

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President opened the conversation by saying that the Canadian recognition of Communist China had disturbed some people, and was interpreted by some as a harbinger of what the United States would do.<sup>2</sup> The President said that the U.S. position remained the same and we would continue to oppose the Red Chinese admission. He thought that the Canadian move was strictly political. In response to the President's question, Dr. Kissinger commented that he thought the wheat deal played a significant role in the Canadian decision.

Vice President Yen said that even from the point of view of wheat it was a mistake. The Republic of China trades more with Canada than Red China does, apart from the wheat deal. The President said he wanted to make clear that we would maintain our vote in the U.N. on the traditional pattern. Yen said that perhaps the U.S. could help by getting Cambodia to vote against the Red Chinese admission. Cambodia had told Taiwan that it would consult its friends; they must have meant the United States.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger to look into this and see what could be done.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. A November 10 memorandum by Lord transmitting a copy of this memorandum to Kissinger reads: "You [Kissinger] were the only other person at these meetings and I have boiled down and sanitized your personal notes. Your full records will go into your personal files." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) No other record of this conversation has been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Yen and the President met from 3:21 to 3:59 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

<sup>2</sup> After over a year of negotiations, the Canadian Government and the People's Republic of China announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970. The U.S. response was detailed in telegram 171377 to all diplomatic posts, October 16; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 CHICOM.

Vice President Yen then said that the reduction of the military aid program was too drastic.<sup>3</sup> He believed that military aid for Taiwan was now in much the same position as economic aid had been previously. It should be phased out over a period of years, but if it is phased out too dramatically it will lead to an erosion of confidence and undermine the eventual capability of the Chinese to take care of their own defense.

The President explained that there was a particular problem caused by the fact that military assistance program funds had to be found for Cambodia and had to be scratched together from a variety of sources. He gave Vice President Yen the personal information that on November 15, or as soon thereafter as possible, he would submit a supplemental to Congress which would attempt to restore a great deal of the military aid.

Dr. Kissinger explained that this had not yet been announced and therefore should be kept secret.

Vice President Yen pointed out that the President had always been very farsighted. For example, when the President had visited Taiwan for the first time in 1953 he had urged that Taiwan spend a great deal of its energy training overseas Chinese; some 30,000 have been trained and have returned to their countries. This was an example of the Nixon Doctrine in action.

Vice President Yen then turned to the Peng case.<sup>4</sup> Dr. Kissinger pointed out that we had no legal basis for denying the visa and that actually Peng was attracting less attention in the country than he would have were he kept outside the country. The President added that the U.S. would take Taiwan's views seriously into account in the future.

Vice President Yen then turned to the textile issue and maintained Hong Kong was getting more favorable treatment on the voluntary textile agreement than Taiwan. He also asked that the Central African Republic get a World Bank loan for a railway the Chinese were building.

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<sup>3</sup> Briefing materials for Nixon—prepared by the Department of State on October 22, then summarized by Kissinger—emphasized that the reduction in the FY 71 MAP funds did not indicate a change in the U.S. commitment to defend the ROC. Rather it resulted from the need to provide funds quickly for Cambodia's military. (Memorandum from Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson to Nixon, and memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) Chiang Kai-shek personally complained to representatives from the Departments of Defense and State about the MAP reduction, stating that "\$13,000,000 was less than one-tenth of one percent of our [the U.S. Federal] budget. However, it was very critical to them." (Reported by Armstrong in telegram 4269 from Taipei, October 1; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 US–CHINAT) Vice Chief of General Staff, General Louie Yen-chun, CAF, met with DOD/ISA officials on October 19 and Packard on October 23, in order to express concerns over military assistance. Both memoranda of conversation, October 30, are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Secret Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, China, Rep. of, 1970, 333 Jan. Additional documentation on MAP funding is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 CHINAT.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 91.

The President concluded the meeting by discussing the domestic situation. He said that the U.S. attitude toward Communist China had not really changed. We were keeping some lines of communication open but we will do so only at the Ambassadorial level and without any illusions.

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#### 94. Editorial Note

Pakistan and Romania continued to serve as important avenues for Sino-American rapprochement (see Document 20). President Richard Nixon met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in Washington on October 26 between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. At this meeting, Nixon reiterated his interest in moving the Sino-American talks out of Warsaw. He acknowledged that U.S. ties to the Nationalist government on Taiwan "was a problem of great difficulty" and observed that the United States sought "independent relations with each [the Soviet Union and China], not directed against the other. The President added that this seems to be President Ceausescu's viewpoint as well." Nixon concluded that he hoped Romania could serve as a "peacemaker" by talking to both parties. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files, Europe, Romania, Vol. III and scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXIX.

Kissinger reiterated these points in his October 27 meeting with Ceausescu, emphasizing that "We are prepared to set up channels to the People's Republic of China which are free from any outside pressures and free from any questions of prestige. If the leaders of the People's Republic of China want to tell us something through you and your Ambassador brings the communication to me, I can assure you that such communication will be confined to the White House." (Memorandum of conversation, October 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK Memcons, HAK/President/Ceausescu [Oct. 27, 1970])

Gheorghe Macovescu, Romania's Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Washington in mid-December 1970. In a December 17 talk with Kissinger, he stated that the Chinese were interested in expanding their involvement in international affairs. Macovescu offered few specifics, stating only that the Chinese were willing to have relations and "make efforts." His information was based on a meeting between Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who stopped in Peking while returning to Romania after Ho

Chi Minh's funeral. (Ibid., Box 704, Country Files, Europe, Romania, Macovescu) In a telephone conversation with Nixon at 6:40 p.m. on December 17, Kissinger related that the Chinese were "interested in normal relations with the West and us but nothing specific." They also discussed the need for secrecy in these efforts: "P [The President] said my view is that I wouldn't tell them [the Soviets] anything. P said if I were the State Department I would just let them guess. P said we have to have our own private contacts on these—we can't count on State. P said anything we do important has to be done privately. K [Kissinger] agreed." (Extracts of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, December 17; *ibid.*) These extracts were prepared by Kissinger's staff.

Even more promising was contact through Pakistan. In an October 25 meeting among Nixon, Kissinger, and Pakistani President Yahya Khan at the White House, Nixon declared that "It is essential that we open negotiations with China. Whatever our relations with the USSR or what announcements are made I want you to know the following: 1) we will make no condominium against China and we want them to know it whatever may be put out; 2) we will be glad to send Murphy or Dewey to Peking and to establish links secretly." (Memorandum of conversation, October 25; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memcons, 1970 Presidential File) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-7, Document 90 for the full text. Two versions of this document exist. The slightly shorter version does not contain any of the specific proposals for sending envoys to China. This edited record of the Nixon–Yahya meeting was forwarded to the Department of State and Ambassador Farland. (National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, November 1970) See Documents 98, 99, and 100 for further information on Sino-American contact through Pakistan.

## 95. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 13-7-70

Washington, November 12, 1970.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE

#### Note

*China's return to active diplomacy raises new questions about the direction of its foreign policy. After four years in which the internal preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed foreign relations, Peking is now moving to repair its international image and to exploit new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how China will play this new role in international politics over the next year or so, this paper will examine Peking's options in terms of those policy factors which are most likely to remain constant and those which are subject to greater variations in response to domestic or external events.*

*It must be acknowledged at the outset that we have remarkably little information on the decision-making processes in Peking. Thus, estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable error. As in the past, sudden twists and turns in Chinese policies will probably continue to surprise us. But in the broader perspective of long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful guidelines on the course that China is likely to follow in adapting to the outside world.*

#### Conclusions

A. With the waning of the radical and frenetic phase of the Cultural Revolution, Peking has substantially recouped its earlier diplomatic position and is moving to compete for influence in new areas. Its successes to date—due in large part to the receptivity of other nations to a more normal relationship with the Chinese—have been impressive, especially in areas of secondary importance to Peking. In areas of prime concern, i.e., the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and Japan, progress has been marginal and Peking's policy less sure.

B. Many domestic and foreign obstacles stand in the way of achieving Peking's basic goals, whether these be China as a great power

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13-7-70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on November 12 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 583-599.

and leader of the world revolution or as a more traditional but highly nationalistic country concerned primarily with Asian interests.

C. On the domestic side, stability and steady growth in basic elements of strength—economic, military, political—are far from assured. Even in the best of circumstances, China's marginal economy will serve to limit its maneuverability in foreign affairs. A great deal of work remains to be done to restore effective government administration, and to rebuild a Communist party. So long as Mao lives, the possibility of disruptive campaigns exist and his death could usher in a period of leadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with internal affairs.

D. Externally, China's aspirations remain blocked directly or indirectly by the realities of the international scene including: the vastly superior power and hostility of the USSR, its most immediate threat as well as rival for ideological leadership in the Communist world; the US presence and US commitments around the periphery of China; and the growth in economic strength and self-confidence of another traditional rival, Japan.

E. Even should the Chinese regime wish to alter its basic foreign policy approach and use its growing military force aggressively in peripheral areas, its options would be limited by the risk of provoking one or another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view, military adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, in Korea, or in the Soviet Far East would be needlessly risky and the potential prize not worth the game. Peking does, however, have room, even in present circumstances, for some maneuver directly between the two great powers as well as around their flanks or under their guard in Southeast Asia, the Near East, Africa, and even in Eastern Europe.

F. At present, the Chinese see the USSR as their major military threat. By accepting negotiations with the Soviets, cooling border tensions, and improving their diplomatic image, the Chinese apparently judge that they have reduced the risk of hostilities with the Soviets. There is little prospect, however, of a genuine rapprochement emerging from the present Sino-Soviet talks. But both sides are apparently concerned that their dispute not end in a military test. Thus, as long as they both continue to exercise the present degree of military caution, there is likely to be some improvement in diplomatic and trade relations but little movement in border talks. As long as Mao lives there is almost no chance of significant compromise on the ideological questions.

G. With the US, Peking has moved from its previous intransigence to a more flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sino-US relationship for Chinese purposes. The Chinese hope to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fears of a Sino-American rapprochement as well as exploit the potential for changes in the balance of forces in East Asia resulting from the drawdown of the US military presence. In pur-

suing its new flexibility, however, Peking does not expect an early major improvement in Sino-US relations and any small improvements are likely to be limited to marginal issues.

H. Japan poses special problems to Peking because it too is an Asian power, is outstripping China in economic growth, and is strongly resistant to Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese, who remember Japanese imperialism in China during World War II, wonder what threat the Japanese may become to their security over the long term and fear Tokyo will one day take on the role of protector of Taiwan. The Chinese answer so far has been to continue with a rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack on Japan's leaders, their policies, and their alleged ambitions in Asia. While this may impress the North Koreans and some people in Southeast Asia, it does little good for China's cause in Japan itself. Nonetheless, and despite the burgeoning growth in Sino-Japanese trade, any basic shift in China's approach to Japan seems unlikely in the present ideological climate in Peking.

I. In Southeast Asia, Peking's earlier fear that the Indochinese war might spill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, the Chinese seem to believe that the US is being forced gradually to withdraw its military presence from the region and that this process will eventually improve the prospects for Chinese influence. Rather than use overt military force to exploit possible developments in this area, Peking's more likely course will be to increase its support to subversive and insurgent activity. The Chinese will seek to maintain their role as revolutionary leaders without exposing themselves to undue cost or risk. In addition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when this suits their needs. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for the long haul.

J. In the longer run, if Mao's successors follow a more steady and pragmatic course, they are likely to have greater success than Mao in expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing power in a more aggressive manner. We think it more likely, however, that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of military force will probably be judged needlessly risky.

K. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Peking toward a policy of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-taking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor the probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solution to China's problems.

[Omitted here is the 12-page Discussion section of NIE 13–7–70, which includes the following chapters: I. Foreign Policy: Some Principles and Priorities, and II. Prospects and Contingencies.]

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**96. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

China and Arms Control

Under Secretary Irwin has sent for your clearance a telegram to USUN and Embassy Bucharest on the above subject (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

Also attached is an explanatory memorandum from ACDA Acting Director Farley (Tab B).<sup>3</sup>

The telegram would authorize, after the Chirep votes, hints to the Romanians in New York and Bucharest that Romania might wish to invite Communist China to participate in the 1971 Pugwash meetings, which will be held next year in Romania.

Farley comments that the Chinese response to the suggestion is likely to be negative but the approach would support our stated intention of seeking improvement in our relations with Peking. Should

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Drafted in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by D. Linebaugh on November 5. Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Undated. Attached but not printed.

the Chinese agree to attend next year's Pugwash meeting, the U.S. would have an opportunity on an unofficial level to explore arms control questions with them.<sup>4</sup>

*Comment*

This seems to me to be the sort of discreet pressing of the Chinese of which we should be doing more. I see no likelihood of any negative repercussions. Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.<sup>5</sup>

*Recommendation*

That you authorize me to clear the attached telegram.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This was not the first time arms control talks with the PRC were discussed. In July 1970 the Department of State and ACDA forwarded to the White House a 34-page report on arms control discussions with the PRC. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, July 8, and undated ACDA report; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files Lot 73 D 288, General Files on NSC Matters, NSC Miscellaneous Memoranda, July 1970) No action was taken. A copy was also forwarded to the Department of Defense. Packard provided the Department's response, writing to Farley on October 24 that "My principal concern is that initiation of arms control discussions with the CPR for the sake of whatever political advantages might possibly be derived from such discussions could seriously damage our relationships with other Asian nations, the neutrals as well as our allies. A renunciation of force agreement, in the absence of any substantive change in the CPR's conduct toward its neighbors, could be interpreted as an indication that the United States is prepared to ignore Communist expansion which falls short of overt attack." He added, "Such [arms control] measures will, I believe, have to be worked out in the context of a general improvement in relations based on substantial change in the attitude and actions of the CPR toward us and toward her Asian neighbors." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0067, China (Reds), 1970)

<sup>5</sup> "Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs" was added in Holdridge's hand.

<sup>6</sup> Kissinger initialed his approval. The issue of arms control and the PRC was revisited in 1971. See Document 109.

97. National Security Study Memorandum 106<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

China Policy

The President has directed the preparation of a study on China Policy to be carried out by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. In addition to the regular members of the Group, the Chairman should invite representatives of other agencies, such as Treasury and Commerce, to participate as appropriate.

The study should include such subjects as:

- Long range (5–10 year) U.S. policy goals as regards China;
- Short range policy goals toward China;
- U.S. policy toward Taiwan including short-range goals of our relations with the GRC;
- Tactics to be pursued in carrying out the foregoing;
- Coordination of policy consideration and tactics with other countries which have a particular interest in China, e.g., Japan, Australia, New Zealand;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-176 and 177, NSSM Files, NSSM 106. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Stans and Kennedy. According to an October 19 memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, the impetus for the study came in part from an October 8 letter from Richard Moorsteen. Kissinger noted on this memorandum: "I agree with Moorsteen. Do it as NSSM of policy review for SRG." (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, November 1970. Moorsteen's letter was attached.) Moorsteen had served on Richardson's staff in 1969 as a Foreign Service Reserve officer. In a November 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge, Colonel Kennedy, Wright, and Sonnenfeldt noted that Kissinger transmitted his request for the draft NSSM through Lord and that the study would be under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) The Department of State was also moving ahead with a re-evaluation of policy toward the PRC. In a November 18 memorandum to Nixon, Rogers announced that he had ordered the Department of State, under the coordination of EA, to initiate a "thorough study and review" of Sino-American relations and Chinese representation in the United Nations. This was undertaken at the suggestion of Brown, in his November 17 memorandum to Rogers. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) Documentation on Chinese representation in the United Nations, including NSSM 107, November 17, is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

- Effect of U.S.-China policy on U.S.-Soviet relations;
- Effect of U.S.-China policy on our interests in Southeast Asia.

This study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by February 15, 1971.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

## 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, December 14, 1970, 0752Z.

9593. Eyes Only From Ambassador for Secretary and White House for Dr. Kissinger. Subj: President Yahya on U.S.-China Relations. Ref: Islamabad 9587.<sup>2</sup>

1. During a wide-ranging conversation with President Yahya on December 12, he made the following observations with reference to his recent trip to Peking:<sup>3</sup>

2. Yahya said that quite early in his conversation with Chou En-lai he specifically made mention of those matters which President Nixon had discussed with him during his visit to Washington.<sup>4</sup> (He did not spell out the subject matter to me.) He said that Chou En-lai listened with unusual attention and interest and upon conclusion of this conversation observed that the comments made by President Yahya were extremely interesting and deserved full consideration. Chou En-lai added that he would convey the gist of the conversation with both Mao and Lin Piao.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Eyes Only. Kissinger relayed the contents of the telegram to the President in his December 15 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, President's Daily Briefs) A notation on another copy of this telegram reads: "HAK: This cat is out of the bag. You may get a call from Secy Rogers asking what the President's discussion was about. JHH. I called Eliot per your request and told him Pres. simply said we [were] interested in finding ways to improve relations. JHH." (Ibid., Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 9587 from Islamabad, December 12, Farland reported on his meeting with Yahya. They discussed bilateral relations and disaster relief for East Pakistan. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK)

<sup>3</sup> Yahya Khan was in Beijing November 11-15, 1970.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 94.

3. Later during the state visit, Chou En-lai again alluded to this particular conversation and advised Yahya that he had pursued the subject with both Mao and Lin Piao; as a result he was prepared to state that while there were considerable difficulties between China and the U.S., particularly on the matter of Taiwan, his government was hopeful that a more amiable attitude could develop between the two countries.

Yahya told me that his personal observations during the course of these conversations indicated there was a much more relaxed disposition this time among the Chinese official hierarchy on the whole concept of China vis-à-vis United States than heretofore evidenced.

**Farland**

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**99. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist Initiative

At Tab B is the text of the exchange which President Yahya had with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and President Yahya's comments on the Chinese reply. Chou En-lai made the point that the Chinese reply represented the coordinated position of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Piao and himself.

At Tab A is a draft Note Verbale which would respond to the ChiCom communication and:

—states U.S. pleasure at Peking's offer proffered at the February 20 Warsaw meeting to receive a U.S. representative to discuss outstanding issues between our two Governments;

—welcomes high level discussions seeking the improvement of relations between our two countries; and

—proposes a meeting of our respective representatives at the earliest possible moment to discuss the modalities of a higher level meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.

**Tab A<sup>2</sup>**

The U.S. representative at the meeting between the two sides in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent policy of the United States Government to seek opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between the two governments. The United States therefore welcomed the remarks of the representative of the People's Republic of China at the Warsaw meeting of February 20, 1970, in expressing the willingness of the Government of the People's Republic of China to receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy.

In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En-lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.

The United States therefore proposes that representatives of the two governments meet together at an early convenient moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in the People's Republic of China.

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<sup>2</sup> Nixon made several minor changes to the draft at Tab A, including substituting "Peoples Republic of China" for "China" in the last sentence. According to a December 16 memorandum of record prepared by Kennedy (*ibid.*), the message was given to Hilyaly on December 16. See Document 100.

**Tab B**

Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at 6:05 pm, December 9:

The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-lai's reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."

Chou En-lai said, in the course of the conversation:

"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."

**100. Record of Discussion Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States (Hilaly)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 16, 1970, 11:30–11:45 a.m.

I was summoned to the White House by Mr. Kissinger this morning at 11 a.m. He told me that in reply to the message sent by Premier Chou En-lai through our President which I conveyed to him on the 9th December, President Nixon would like to send a fresh message to President Yahya for passing it on to the Chinese Prime Minister (he presumed this would be through the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan). He then gave me an unsigned note in an envelope.<sup>2</sup> When I asked him what it contained he said that in response to Chou En-lai's suggestion that a special representative of President Nixon would be welcome in Peking to discuss the question of Taiwan, President Nixon wished to inform Premier Chou En-lai that the U.S. Government was prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date in a location convenient to both sides to discuss what arrangements could or should be made for sending a U.S. delegation to Peking for high level discussions. In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said that the preliminary meeting could take place in Rawalpindi if General Yahya's government would not be embarrassed in any way by it. From the U.S. side the representatives could be, Ambassador Murphy or Mr. Dewey or Ambassador David Bruce. Or it could also be himself. (He could arrange to pay a visit to Vietnam and under that cover, arrange a halt in Pakistan for the purpose of meeting the Chinese representative. It would depend on what kind of official the Chinese would send to Pakistan for this purpose).

Mr. Kissinger added that if a U.S. delegation ultimately went to Peking, the discussions would not be confined to the question of Taiwan but all matters connected with improving relations with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. Hilaly and Kissinger met from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Hilaly drafted the record of conversation. A handwritten notation indicates that Hilaly delivered it to Kissinger at 6:15 on April 27; see footnote 1, Document 118.

<sup>2</sup> The note to Chou En-lai is attached. See Document 99. A memorandum of record by Kennedy confirms that Kissinger gave a copy of this message to Hilaly on December 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Materials Concerning Preparations for the First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

Chinese and reducing tensions would be discussed. Also that it would not be difficult to comply with the Chinese request for withdrawing American forces from Taiwan. There were no American military forces there except advisory and training missions.

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**101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Travel and Trade with Communist China

National Security Decision Memorandum 17 announced the President's decision to modify certain trade controls against Communist China.<sup>2</sup> The President's approval of certain additional modifications was conveyed by my memorandum of December 6, 1969, to the Under Secretary of State.<sup>3</sup>

The President has directed that, using these earlier decisions as a base, the Under Secretaries Committee prepare recommendations for additional steps which can be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and further broaden trade with Communist China. Each recommended step should be accompanied by:

- An analysis of the pros and cons and anticipated results.
- Preferred timing of the step.
- A proposed diplomatic scenario associated with the recommended step.
- A scenario for congressional consultation and press guidance.

The recommendations requested by this memorandum should reflect to the extent possible the short term aspects of the study of China

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Document 14.

<sup>3</sup> Apparent reference to Kissinger's memorandum of December 16, 1969. See footnote 3, Document 49.

policy directed by NSSM 106.<sup>4</sup> That study, however, should continue as earlier directed.

The Under Secretaries Committee Report should be submitted by January 20, 1971. The President has directed that the classification of this study and the report of the Under Secretaries Committee be strictly observed and that the study be limited on strict need-to-know basis.<sup>5</sup>

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>4</sup> Document 97.

<sup>5</sup> On December 29 Hartman sent a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Under Secretary of Commerce, and the Special Trade Representative explaining Kissinger's request. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, Under Secretaries' Memoranda, NSC-U/SM 91)