

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 969003
By *AK* Date 7/1/02

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

POL Iran-USSR

087985

XR POL 19 FAA
XR POL 33 Persian Gulf

87985

XR Def Iran E

6 JUN 70 19 37z



INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW

STATE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

REF: Tehran 2333

POL Iran-USSR
XR POL 33 Persian Gulf *XR ORG TU*
XR Def Iran E

1. We concur fully in reassurances you gave Acting Foreign Minister Khalatbari as well as expression of our belief that there no conceivable advantage to British conniving with Iraq to Iran's disadvantage. We consider London's 4351 excellent statement on latter point and general UK attitude toward Gulf and you authorized draw on it as seems appropriate. In reconfirming assurances you have already given Iranians you may also wish to draw attention to fact that it was only two months ago that you reconfirmed in writing and on a instruction USG continued adherence to the validity of the US-Iranian bilateral of March 5, 1959. You may also cite our move into Cambodia as clear evidence our resolve and ability to act when we]

5

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/IRN:JCMiklos:psw

DRAFTING DATE

6/5/70

TEL. EXT.

23014

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Joseph Sisco

CLEARANCES:

EUR - Mr. Swank
EUR/BMI - Mr. Cheslaw

NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA/ARP - Mr. Murphy
NEA/ARN - Mr. Baas
S/S - Mr. Brown

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 21, 2006

Classification

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 21, 2006

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 969003
By AK Date 7/1/02

~~SECRET / EVIDENCE / NOT FORN~~
Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

ES OF AME

TO

DISTRIBUTION	ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN	PAGE 2	7
--------------	--------------------------	--------	---

believe our interests affected. This step was taken in the full realization that it would not meet with full public approval. We believe that the conclusion the other side will draw from this is clear notwithstanding the heightened public debate it has generated in the United States.

2. While it is possible Soviets sought remind hosts of more favorable aspects of 1921 Soviet/Iran Treaty which replaced onerous and distasteful ~~XX~~ Czarist conventions, it is far more likely that Soviets have developed some suspicion that US intends to move in behind British after UK withdraws from Gulf in 1971. Pursuing this line of thought Soviets may have speculated US may ask Iran for military base facilities. Reminding Iranians of 1921 Treaty would, of course, put Iran on notice as to what Soviet reaction likely to be. This ~~XXXX~~ would be consistent with earlier Soviet behavior when it trotted out 1921 Treaty in attempt to force Iran to sign nonaggression pact in

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
-------------	---------------	-----------	--------------

CLEARANCES:

~~SECRET / EVIDENCE / NOT FORN~~
Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 969000
By JK Date 7/1/02



~~SECRET (EYES ONLY)~~
Classification
Department of State
TELEGRAM

PAGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN

PAGE 3

early 1960's. Soviets also mentioned it when it was in process of obtaining Iranian assurances that no American missiles would be stationed on Iranian soil.

3. Finally, it is probably also a Soviet reminder ~~KKK~~ that the Soviets can be difficult if the occasion requires.

4. While we agree with Iran that there is no room for complacency, we nonetheless do not believe that Soviet power and influence in the Middle East or the Gulf should be overdrawn. Soviet relations with Syria and Iraq, for example, are not uniformly harmonious or entirely to Soviet liking. Both countries have demonstrated decidedly independent attitudes when the Soviets appear to become too overbearing. Further, indigenous Communist political parties have had anything but unqualified success. Indeed there are recent reports of anti-communist activities by governments of both countries with arrests being made of a number of Communist Party members. We believe, therefore, that Soviet efforts to become arbiters of Gulf and

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 969003
By AK Date 7/1/02



DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
June 21, 2006

~~SECRET, EMBLED, NOFORN~~

Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

URGENT TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN

PAGE 4 7

entire Middle East face formidable obstacles not only from strong moderate countries such as Iran but also from indigenous forces in countries where it has already established a substantial presence.

5. Hope you agree point to be made is that we are resolved to stand by our commitments, to support our friends, and we have great confidence in Iran's own ability withstand Soviet blandishments or thinly veiled threats.

END

GP-3

SECRET

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
-------------	---------------	-----------	--------------

CLEARANCES:

~~SECRET, EMBLED, NOFORN~~

Classification