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Authority **NND 969 DDD**
By **CB** Date **04/09/02**

DEF 12-5 IRAN

SECRET
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124200

Department of State
TELEGRAM

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REF: Tehran 3144 ^{DEF 12-5 IRAN}

124629

- Very much appreciate your comments and concerns about difficult issues which would arise should we turn down certain Iranian requests purchase additional military aircraft which Shah believes essential for his security. Unquestionably a decision of this nature would be made only at highest USG levels.
- We feel it important, however, that we and GOI not overlook caveats set forth in our 1968 undertaking to Shah. We take seriously and believe GOI does as well our annual military-economic review which, among other things, calls for examination of impact of Iran's military expenditures on other pressing economic development and social needs.

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN:JCM:mos:psw:atm	DRAFTING DATE 7/31/70	TEL. EXT. 23014	APPROVED BY: The Acting Secretary
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CLEARANCES:

PM - Mr. Chapman <i>cut</i>	NEA - Mr. Van Hollen <i>cut</i>
DOD/ISA/NESA - Mr. J. Reed	NEA - Mr. Cisco <i>cut</i>
S/S - Mr. Levitsky	

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Fact that Iran might acquire heretofore unanticipated resources through some special arrangement with Occidental Oil Co. does not in our view lessen the need for both ^{US} ~~US~~ and the GOI to assess carefully the broad policy implications as well as ^{narrower} ~~the narrow~~ financial and manpower effects of major new purchases. Such assessments are not intended and should not be ~~so~~ interpreted as a sign of our lack of confidence in the Shah or a signal that some basic USG policy/^{change} is in the offing. Rather they ~~they~~ are intended to insure, however, that rational, conscious decisions are made only after all relevant factors have been taken into account.

3. In this connection we understand from McDonnell-Douglas ~~representative~~ here that the Shah has requested the McDonnell-^{its} Douglas representative in Tehran to change ~~Iran's~~ ^{XXXXX} letter of intent to the firm to indicate that Iran intends to purchase 73 rpt 73 F-4's. If this is correct it would indicate an expenditure of approximately ^{\$300 million, not including spares and} ~~\$400 million. While we have~~ support equipment. ~~XXXXXX~~ While we have

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no reason to believe that the GOI is not well aware of the condition that any such purchase contract is dependent on final USG approval, we believe it desirable to explicitly draw this fact to its attention at whatever level you deem most appropriate and effective. In doing so you should make it ~~xxxx~~ clear that a purchase of this ~~xxx~~ magnitude will require most careful consideration and will take some time. You may draw ~~in~~ on the views expressed in para 2 if there appears a need to elaborate on this point.

GP-3

END

JOHNSON

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