FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1969–1976

VOLUME II

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1969–1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976

Volume II

Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume documents the Organization and Management of Foreign Policy of the Nixon administration, 1969–1972. In effect, this volume is a prologue to the rest of the volumes for the first Nixon administration. It

documents how the Nixon administration came to office determined to institute a major reorganization of the foreign policy decision making process, and how it proceeded to undertake that task. The volume also documents the Nixon administration's attempt to reorganize the overall management of intelligence activities, and its attempts to manage the Department of State and the Foreign Service, establish a new bureaucratic structure for foreign economic policy, and fight off a Congressional challenge to the control of foreign policy by the executive branch through war powers legislation.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume II

The focus of this volume is the organization and management of the foreign policy process. This theme runs throughout the volume, but is most clearly evident in the first chapter, "The NSC System." This chapter documents the Nixon administration's foreign policy process as it was conceived by President Nixon, his Special Assistant Henry Kissinger, and other key advisers. The chapter shows how the foreign policy decision making process was supposed to work in theory, and then documents how the system worked in reality. A primary concern of Nixon and Kissinger was that the President retain control over the foreign policy process through his National Security Council (NSC) Staff, and that the White House oversee the implementation of presidential decisions. The NSC system of generating National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), discussion of options papers in response to a NSSM in NSC interagency policy groups (primarily the Senor Review Group), and then Presidential Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), was designed to concentrate decision making in the President's hands. It was a reaction to a belief by Nixon and his key advisers that the decision making process of the Johnson administration had been chaotic and too informal, and that the system for following up on bureaucratic implementation of Presidential decisions was too weak. As the documents indicate, the Nixon administration believed that it was fighting an ongoing battle to retain Presidential and White House control of the foreign policy decision making process against the bureaucratic forces of the Departments of State and Defense. The creation of later NSC interagency groups, such as the Vietnam Special Studies Group and the Defense Program Review Committee, were attempts by the Nixon White House to assume control of strategic planning in Vietnam and the policy considerations of the Defense Budget from the Department of Defense. The first chapter of this volume documents how this struggle for control caused friction between the White House and the Departments of State and Defense, as well as a certain amount of personal rivalry and tension between Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

The second chapter of the volume focuses on the related issue of reorganization and revitalization of the Intelligence Community. This reform was driven by President Nixon's and the White House Staff's view that they were not getting the right intelligence and that the United States was spending too much on intelligence for the product it was receiving. In addition, Nixon and the White House were concerned that covert operations, which they believed had a tendency to go on indefinitely, were not properly supportive of larger U.S. foreign policy objectives. Finally, the second chapter documents a formal reorganization of the intelligence function at the Department of Defense, where it was widely held that the intelligence function was too diffuse and not properly coordinated. The documents selected cover both the attitudes of Nixon and the White House, the formal reorganization process primarily through the White House's perspective, and many internal Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency documents relating to intelligence reorganization.

The third chapter deals with the administration and management of the Department of State by the Department's principal officers and by President Nixon and the White House. The documents indicate that the President was determined to appoint his own people to key positions in the Department and ambassadorships, but he also wished to push forward younger Foreign Service officers to ambassadorial posts. Because of balance of payment problems, Nixon was also determined to cut overseas personnel, which would naturally affect Department of State overseas operations. The President also wished to upgrade the Department's Latin American Bureau, but needed Congressional approval. This chapter deals with the question of the loyalty of the Foreign Service officers to the President, the role—or, more accurately, the lack of a role—for professional women in the Department of State and foreign affairs bureaucracy, and the question of Foreign Service spouses (then called wives, since the Foreign Service consisted overwhelmingly of men). Like the documents on intelligence, this chapter combines informal documents about attitudes and personalities with more formal bureaucratic documentation on the administration of the Department and the Foreign Service. The penultimate chapter on foreign economic policy focuses on three main themes: the dispute about whether the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations should be in the White House or the Department of Commerce; the conflict between the Departments of State and Commerce over control of U.S. foreign economic policy and the commercial function; and the establishment of the Council on International Economic Policy in the White House. A final, brief chapter, documents the challenge posed to President Nixon's control over foreign policy by Congress's pending war powers legislation, an issue that would take on far greater significance in the second Nixon-Ford administration, 1973–1976.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original document.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Historical Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Historical Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to formally notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2001 and was completed in 2005, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 2 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 28 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate and comprehensive—given limitations of space—account of the Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.

This volume was researched, selected, and annotated by David C. Humphrey under the supervision of the former General Editor, David Patterson. General Editor Edward C. Keefer supervised the final production of the volume. Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Kristin L. Ahlberg, Carl Ashley, and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Max Franke prepared the index.

Marc J. Susser
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. foreign policy agencies and Departments—the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of the Treasury, the Nixon Presidential Materials at College Park Maryland, the Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford Presidential Libraries—have compiled fully with this law and provided complete access to their relevant records. In addition, Henry Kissinger and Eliot Richardson have approved access to their private papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford sub series.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume II

The sources for this volume are different from most other *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Nixon-Ford sub-series because of its primary focus on organization and management of the foreign policy and intelligence process. In addition, this volume draws from a more diffuse base of sources, many of which are not normally used in other volumes in the sub-series. For that reason, readers should pay special attention to the source and other footnotes in the volume which provided a wealth of citations that will lead the reader to key files. In this note on sources the emphasis is on the most important files.

For a thorough understanding of the organization of foreign policy as conceived and then implemented during the early years of the first Nixon administration, the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, is the best starting point. Within this large collection of Nixon presidential materials are two key collections: the NSC Files and the NSC Institutional (H-Files). As its name implies, the NSC Institutional Files contain considerable information on the organization and working of the National Security Council and its sub-groups under the Nixon administration. Most important in this collection are the National Security Decision Memorandum

(NSDM) Policy Paper Files. President Nixon used the NSDM process to define and describe his actual foreign policy process as well as to help make policy decisions. Specific decision memoranda outlined NSC procedures: NSDM 1 established the NSC Decision and Study Memorandum (NSSM) series, NSDM 2 reorganized the NSC System, NSDM 7 directed, coordinated and supervised interdepartmental activities overseas, NSDM 8 set up a system for crisis management, NSDM 19 established the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), NSDM 25 created the Defense Policy Review Committee (DPRC), and NSDM 85 changed the Review Group to the Senior Review Group. Thus the NSDM sub-files of the Institutional Files are a key collection.

Also of value in the NSC Institutional (H-Files) are the Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon administration, especially the NSC System, which are located in the later boxes of the file. Included in these records is the Institutional General File (IGF) which has information on general organization matters. In the records prepared for initial WSAG, DPRC, Vietnam Special Studies Group, and the Verification Panel meetings, there is documentation on how and why these groups were established and what their role was to be in the NSC system. Initial WSAG and NSC meeting minutes provide insight into how these groups were expected to function.

The second key source at the Nixon Presidential Material is the extensive National Security Files. Within these files, the Agency Files are an important collection, including individual sub-files on the main national security and foreign policy agencies: the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, DPRC and Defense Budget, DPRC General, Department of Commerce, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Also in the NSC Files are the equally valuable Subject Files, including such specific subjects as Congressional [relations], Kissinger—Irwin and Kissinger—Richardson meetings, Intelligence Reorganization, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), NSDMs, Presidential Directive on Reduction of Personnel Overseas, and the Office of the Special Trade Representative. Also of special value in the NSC Files are the Names Files, particularly those of Andrew Marshall. There is also an NSC System File in the NSC Files which is a valuable collection. Also part of the NSC Files are the Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Administrative and Staff Files, the Agency, and Congressional Files. In the Kissinger Office Files, Agency Files, a key sub file is State-White House relations.

A third major collection of value for this volume at the Nixon Presidential Materials is the White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive. The White House Special Files within the Central Files have Staff Member and Office Files, which are of value, especially those of

John Ehrlichman. Also of value are the Nixon Presidential Tape recordings. A number of transcripts are printed in this volume.

The Halperin Papers at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library have documentation on his tenure as a staff member of the National Security Council and especially relate to the issue of wiretapping his telephone. At the Gerald Ford Library, the files of National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Files, have Administrative Files that cover 1969–1977 as well as Subject Files that have documentation on the first Nixon administration, 1969–1972.

The Kissinger Papers at the Library of Congress are a useful source. While they are not available for public research, copies of the most useful collection, Transcripts of the Kissinger Telephone Conversations, are available at the Nixon Presidential Materials. Also at the Library of Congress are the Eliot Richardson Papers which have good documentation on organization and management issues during his tenure as Deputy Secretary of State.

The Lot Files and the Central Files of the Department of State at the National Archives are a key source for this volume. Within the Lot Files are a series of S/S (Executive Secretariat) files that deal with NSC matters. The most important is S/S–I Files, Lot 80 D 212, containing NSDM studies and responses, although S/S–I Under Secretaries Files, Lot 83 D 277, S/S–NSDM Files, Lot 83 D 305, S/S General NSC Matters Files, Lot 73 D 288, and S/S-Presidential Reading and Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 64 D 164 also have useful material. The Office Files of William P. Rogers, E–5439 (formerly Lot 73 D 443), have some useful information as do the U. Alexis Johnson Files, Lot 96 D 695. An important series of Lot Files relate to the Work of Deputy Under Secretary for Management, William Macomber, who was a key figure in reorganization and management of the Department of State. Of the seven Macomber files listed in the list below, the most important is Lot 74 D 394, the Management Reform Task Force's Records of Macomber's Office, including documentation on women in the Foreign Service and the role of Foreign Service spouses.

As for the Central Files of the Department of State, the most useful is ORG 1, general organization of the Department, but ORG 1 COM–STATE has documents on control of foreign economic policy. The list below cites other subject-numeric files used in the volume. An intelligence collection of value, still under the custody of the Department of State, is the INR/IL Historical Files.

The Records of the Central Intelligence Agency were key to this volume, especially for the chapter on Intelligence and the White House. The best files are the Files of the Executive Registry, Job 80–R01284A and Job 80–B1086A. Other useful CIA files are listed below. The Nixon Intelligence Records, including records of the 303/40 Committee, at the

National Security Council when research was undertaken, were also of value.

As for Defense Department Files, two collections stand out among the rest in the list below: OSD Files, FRC 330–76–0197 and OSD Files, FRC 330–77–0094, decimal files of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary for 1971 and 1972 respectively. These files contain substantial material on reorganization of intelligence organizations at the Department of Defense.

Two final collections worthy of special mention are the Haldeman Diary, Multimedia Edition, a key source for appointments and personalities, and RG 460, Records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Forces, relating to the Plumbers Task Force and Wire Tap Investigations.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Subject–Numeric Indexed Central Files

DEF 1 US, national security
DEF 1–1 US, national security contingency planning
DEF 18, arms control and disarmament
E 1, economic affairs: general policy, plans, programs
ORG 1, organization: general policy, plans, coordination
ORG 2, general reports
ORG 8, agency reorganization plans
ORG 10, management improvement
ORG 1 COM–STATE, organization: general policy, plans, coordination, Departments of Commerce and State
PER, general personnel policy
PER 1, personnel: general policy, plans, coordination
PER 4–1, personnel: reduction-in-force
POL 1 US, political affairs and relations: general policy
POL 2, general reports and statistics
POL US–USSR, U.S.-Soviet Union relations
POL 27 INDIA–PAK, India-Pakistan war
POL 27 LAOS, military operations in Laos

Lot Files

Office Files of William P. Rogers, Entry 5439 (formerly S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443)

Official and personal files of Secretary of State Rogers, including correspondence, speeches, statements, and chronological and alphabetical files, 1969–1973

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394

Working papers, background papers, correspondence, and other material, 1970–1973

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Macomber Files: Lot 73 D 421

Subject and correspondence files, 1970–1973

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, New Management Methods and PARA Files: Lot 74 D 436

Management subject files, 1970–1971

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Interagency Committee Files: Lot 76 D 185

Administrative files for interagency committees, 1969–1975

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210

ORG 10 (management improvement) and other subject files, 1968–1971

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235

Management subject files, 1964–1973

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, General Correspondence Files: Lot 78 D 295

Administrative correspondence and policy and procedural files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–1975

Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229

Chronological and subject files of Richard F. Pedersen, 1956–1973

Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363

Subject and Country Files of the Policy Planning Council and the Planning and Coordination Staff, 1967–1973

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 73 D 288

Memoranda and other material concerning National Security Council committees, issues, and administration, 1970–1972; also Cabinet memoranda, 1970–1972

S/S Memos Files: Lots 72 D 371, 72 D 372, and 72 D 373

Memoranda from the Executive Secretary and other Department officials concerning administrative issues and some substantive matters, 1964–1976

S/S–I (Executive Secretariat) Files, President's Evening Reading and Kissinger-Irwin Meetings: Lot 74 D 164

Department of State reports for the President's evening reading and memoranda concerning Under Secretary John Irwin's weekly lunches with Henry Kissinger, 1970–1972

S/S–I NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212

National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, 1969–1976

S/S–I Files: Lot 82 D 126

Files concerning Senior Review Group meetings and other NSC matters, 1969–1977

S/S–I Files: Lot 83 D 113

PARA review material, 1971–1972; miscellaneous NSC material, 1971–1975; Presidential Review Memoranda and Presidential Directives, 1977–1980

S/S–I Under Secretaries Files: Lot 83 D 277

Under Secretaries Committee Notes (NSC–U/N), 1969–1977

S/S–I NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305

National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), 1969–1977

U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695

U. Alexis Johnson's files as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1969–1973, together with some personal material and files reflecting his career as Ambassador to Thailand, 1958–1961, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1961–1964 and 1965–1966, Ambassador to Japan, 1966–1969, and Ambassador at Large, 1973–1977

Nixon Presidential Materials

National Security Council Files

Agency Files
Country File, Laos
Haig Chronological File
Haig Special File
Kissinger Office Files
Name Files
NSC Nixon Files
President's Daily Briefing
President/HAK Memcons
Saunders Subject Files
Staff Files—Lake Chron
Staff Files—Staff Memos
Subject Files
Vietnam Country Files

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)

National Security Council Meetings and Minutes
Review Group/Senior Review Group Meetings and Minutes
Washington Special Action Group Meetings and Minutes
Verification Panel Meetings and Minutes
Defense Program Review Committee Meetings and Minutes

Study Memoranda

Policy Papers: National Security Study Memoranda

Policy Papers: National Security Decision Memoranda

Miscellaneous General Institutional Files: NSC System, NSC Administrative Files

White House Central Files

Staff Member and Office Files: Houthaker Files, President's Daily Diary, Subject Files

White House Special Files

Staff Member and Office Files: Butterfield Files, Ehrlichman Files, Flanigan Files, Haldeman Files, President's Office Files, President's Personal Files, Young Files

White House Tapes

Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

Halperin Papers

Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Files, 1969–1977

RG 460, Records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force

Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation Files

Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia

DCI Files: Job 80B01285A

Files of Directors of Central Intelligence John McCone and Richard Helms

DDI Files: Jobs 79R01012A, 79T01159A, 80R01621R

Files of the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Intelligence Directorate

DDO Files: Jobs 79480A, 7901440A, 8000037

Files of the Deputy Director for Plans and the Directorate for Plans

Executive Registry: Jobs 80B01086A, 80M00165A, 80M01048A 80R01284A, 80R01580R, 86B00269R

Files of the Director of Central Intelligence's Office

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Henry Kissinger Papers

Chronological File

Files on the Department of State

Files on the National Security Council

Telephone Records

Elliot Richardson Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 56, Records of the Department of the Treasury

FRC 74 A 7

Secretary's Memos/Correspondence, 1966–1970

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

FRC 330–74–0045

Chron Files of the Secretary of Defense, 1969–1973

FRC 330–74–0132

Subject Files of the Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1969-1971

FRC 330–74–0142

Files from the immediate office of Secretary of Defense Laird, 1969–1972

FRC 330–75–0089

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1969

FRC 330–75–0104

Files of the Military Assistant, 1966–1971

FRC 330–76–0028

OSD Office Chron Files, 1958–1973

FRC 330–76–0067

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1970

FRC 330–76–0076

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1970

FRC 330–76–0197

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1971

FRC 330–76–0207

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1971

FRC 330–77–0094

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1972

FRC 330–77–0095

Decimal Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1972

Personal Papers of William P. Rogers

Appointment Books

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Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, Anti-Ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AG, Attorney General
AID, Agency for International Development
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASD (A), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
ASD (I), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
ASD (SA), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
ASW, antisubmarine warfare

BALPA, Balance of Payments Reduction Program
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BRDP, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CCC, Contingency Coordinating Committee
CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CDIP, Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CIP, Consolidated Intelligence Program
CL, classified
Comite, committee
COMSEC, communications security
CPM, Country Programming Memorandum
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CS, Clandestine Services
CSS, Central Security Service

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCID, Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
D/DCI/IC, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
D/DCI/NIPE, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation
DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO/IMS, Deputy Director for Operations/Information Management Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
DD/P, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
DDR&E, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense
DD/S&T, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

DE, destroyer escort
Del, delegate
DG, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency
DIS, Defense Investigative Service
Dissem, dissemination
D/NRO, Director, National Reconnaissance Office
DOD, Department of Defense
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; John Ehrlichman
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
ELR, Elliot L. Richardson
EOB, Executive Office Building
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution

F.R., *Federal Register*
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FSR, Foreign Service Reserve officer
FSS, Foreign Service Staff officer
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GS, General Schedule
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

IG, Interdepartmental Group
IG/EUR, Interdepartmental Group for Europe
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/IL, Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IRBM, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
J/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs
JRC, Joint Reconnaissance Center

K, Kissinger

L, Legal Adviser of the Department of State
LIG, Legislative Interdepartmental Group

M, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MASF, Military Assistance Sales Fund
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Mbr, member
ME, Middle East
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIRV, Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
Misoff, Mission Officer
MR, Memorandum for the Record
Mtg, meeting

NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO, Non-Commissioned Officer
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIPE, National Intelligence Programs Evaluation
NIRB, National Intelligence Resources Board
NK, North Korea
NMCC, National Military Command Center
NODIS, no distribution
Noforn, not releasable to foreign nationals
NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO, National Reconnaissance Office
NRP, National Reconnaissance Program
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSC/OCB, National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSF, National Science Foundation
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NVA/VC, North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong

O, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONE, Office of National Estimates
OPRED, Overseas Personnel Reductions
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI, Office of Scientific Intelligence
OST, Office of Science and Technology

P, President
Para, paragraph
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PHOTINT, photo intelligence
P.L., Public Law
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PMG, Politico-Military Group
Polad, Political Adviser
PPBS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
Pres, President
PSAC, President's Science Advisory Committee

R&D, research and development
RDT&E, research, development, test, and evaluation
RG, Record Group, or Review Group
RMN, Richard M. Nixon
RN, Richard Nixon

S, Office of the Secretary of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCA, Service Cryptologic Agency
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOP, standard operating procedure
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
SRG, Senior Review Group
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STR, Special Trade Representative
SVN, South Vietnam

TDCS, series indicator used for CIA clandestine service reports received by telegram or teletype
TO&E, table of organization and equipment
TS, Top Secret

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
USC, Under Secretaries Committee
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USIS, United States Information Service
U/SM, Under Secretaries Memorandum
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VC/NVA, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
VP, Verification Panel
VSSG, Vietnam Special Studies Group

WHCA, White House Communications Agency
WPR, William P. Rogers
WSAG, Washington Special Action Group

Persons

Abshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 1970

Anderson, Admiral George W., Jr., USN, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from May 1970

Ash, Roy L., Chairman of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, 1969–1971

Behr, Colonel Robert M., USAF, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Scientific Affairs) from 1969 to 1971

Bergsten, C. Fred, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (International Economic Affairs) from January 1969 to June 1971

Bross, John A., Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation until January 25, 1971

Burke, Gerard P., Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from September 1970

Burns, John H., Director General of the Foreign Service from August 1969 until June 1971

Cargo, William I., Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State from August 1969

Chapin, Frank M., Member and Senior CIA Officer on the National Security Council Staff from 1969 to 1971

Cline, Ray S., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 1969

Colby, William E., Executive Director-Comptroller, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1972

Connally, John B., Secretary of the Treasury from February 1971 until June 1972

Cooke, David O., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration from June until November 1971; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration

Coyne, J. Patrick, Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board until September 1970

Cushman, Jr., Lieutenant General Robert E., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until December 1971

Davis, Jeanne, Director of the National Security Council Secretariat, 1969–1970; thereafter National Security Council Staff Secretary

Dean, John W., III, Counsel to the President from July 1970

DeLoach, Cartha D., Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, until 1970

Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President from January to November 1969; thereafter Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

Elliot, Theodore L., Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1969

Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant to the President from January 1969 until March 1969; Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from March 1969 until June 1971

Fazio, V. James, Member of the National Security Council Staff and Assistant Director of the White House Situation Room from 1970

Flanigan, Peter M., Consultant to the President on Administration and Staffing from January to April 1969; Assistant to the President; Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy from February 1972

Froehlke, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration from January 1969 to June 1971; thereafter Secretary of the Army

Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gayler, Vice Admiral Noel A. M., USN, Director, National Security Agency from August 1969 until 1971

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister

Haig, Jr., Brigadier General Alexander M., USA, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until June 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Haldeman, H. R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from January 1969

Hall, Albert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from November 1971

Hall, William O., Director General of the Foreign Service from July 1971

Halperin, Morton H., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January to September 1969

Hannah, John A., Administrator of the Agency for International Development from April 1969

Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President from January 1969 until November 1969; Counselor to the President from November 1969 until December 1970

Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant and Staff Director, Under Secretaries Committee, Department of State from February 1969; thereafter Deputy Director for Coordination, Planning and Coordination Staff, from August 1969 until July 1972

Hillenbrand, Martin J. A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 1969 to April 1972; Ambassador to Germany from June 1972

Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Hoover, J. Edgar, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation until May 1972

Hormats, Robert, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff, International Economic Affairs, from 1969

Houdek, Robert, Staff member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 to July 1971

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; thereafter redesignated as Deputy Secretary of State

Jessup, Peter, Secretary of the 303 Committee and its successor the 40 Committee until 1972

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969

Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Under Secretary of State until January 20, 1969

Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 1969 until February 1971; Ambassador at Large from February 1971; Permanent Representative on the NATO Council from March 1972

Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., Member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970; thereafter Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council Staff

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969

Klein, Herbert G., Director of Communications for the Executive Branch from January 1969

Kleindienst, Richard G., Attorney General from June 1972

Laird, Melvin, R., Secretary of Defense from January 1969

Lake, W. Anthony, Staff member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, from 1969 until April 1970

Latimer, Thomas K., Member of the National Security Council Staff from 1970 until 1972

Lehman, John F., Jr., Member of the Planning Group, National Security Council Staff from 1969; National Security Council Staff Member responsible for Congressional Liaison, 1971–1972

Lincoln, George A., Director of the Office of Emergency Planning from 1969

Lord, Winston, Member of the National Security Council Planning Staff and Group from January 1969 until 1970; Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (United Nations Affairs) from September 1969 until 1970; Staff member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1970

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Assistant for Programs and then Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until September 1970

Macomber, William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1969; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from October 1969 until July 1971; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management

Marshall, Andrew W., Consultant to the National Security Council from 1970; Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council Staff, from November 1971

Mayo, Robert P., Director of the Bureau of the Budget from January 1969 until July 1970; Counselor to the President during July 1970

McCracken, Paul W., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from January 1969 until November 1971

McManis, David Y., Member of the National Security Council Staff and Director of the White House Situation Room from 1969

Meyer, Cord, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Mills, Wilbur, Democratic Representative from Arkansas; Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee

Mitchell, John, Attorney General from January 1969 until February 1972

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Moot, Robert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Morris, Roger, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Africa) from January 1969 until April 1970; Member of the National Security Council Planning Group from September 1969 until April 1970

Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from March 1969

Odeen, Philip A., Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff, from November 1971

Olmsted, Mary S., President of the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies from July to November 1970; President of the Women's Action Organization from November 1970 to 1972; Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service, 1971; Deputy Director for Personnel Management Services, Office of the Director General, 1971–1972; thereafter Deputy Director of Personnel Policy, Classification, and Evaluation, Office of the Director General

Osgood, Robert E., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969; Director of the National Security Council's Planning Group, 1969–1970

Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1969 until December 1971

Peck, Edward L., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from January 1971

Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor for the Department of State from January 1969

Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy from February 1971 until February 1972; thereafter Secretary of Commerce

Proctor, Edward W., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until May 1971; thereafter Deputy Director for Intelligence

Pursley, Lt. Gen. Robert E., USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until 1972

Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State from January 1969 until June 1970; thereafter Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Rimestad, Idar, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration until October 1969

Rodman, Peter W., Member of the Planning Group, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1970; thereafter Staff member of the Office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 1969

Ruser, Claus W., Deputy Staff Director, Under Secretaries Committee, Department of State, from February 1969 and then Member of the Planning and Coordination Staff; Deputy Director for Policy Analysis and Resources, Policy and Coordination Staff, from 1971

Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to Germany from July 1969 to February 1972; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense

Samuels, Nathaniel, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 1969 until May 1972

Saunders, Harold H., Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Near East and South Asia) from January 1969

Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, from January 1969 until June 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, from July 1970 until August 1971; thereafter Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., Director of the United States Information Agency from February 1969

Shultz, George, Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, from July 1970 until May 1972; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President

Smith, Abbot E., Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 16, 1971

Smith, Gerard C., Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from February 1969

Smith, K. Wayne, Director of the National Security Council's Program Analysis Staff from 1970 to November 1971

Smith, R. Jack, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until May 1971

Smyser, W. Richard, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from January 1970 until 1971

Sneider, Richard L., Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from January 1969 until September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan from September 1969 until July 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1972

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Europe) from January 1969

Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from August to September 1969; thereafter Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce from January 1969 until January 1972; thereafter Chairman of the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President

Stevenson, John R., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from July 1969

Sullivan, William C., Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation until July 1970; Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, from July 1970 until 1971

Sullivan, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from April 1969

Taylor, General Maxwell, USA, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Board until April 1970

Timmons, William, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations from January 1969 to February 1970; thereafter Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations

Trezise, Philip H., Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, until July 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from July 1969 until November 1971

Tucker, Gardiner L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from January 1970

Tweedy, Bronson, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation from January 1971 to March 1972; thereafter Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community

Vaky, Viron P., Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Latin America) from January 1969 until October 1970

Veliotes, Nicholas A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State

Walters, Lieutenant General Vernon A., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 1972

Watts, William, National Security Council Staff Secretary from 1969 until April 1970

Weinberger, Casper W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from July 1970 until May 1972; thereafter Director

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1970

White, Lawrence K., Executive Director-Comptroller, Central Intelligence Agency, until January 10, 1972

Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary from January 1969

Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

The NSC System

1. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon[1]

December 27, 1968.

SUBJECT

Memorandum on a New NSC System

The attached memo (Tab A) outlines my ideas for organizing the NSC and my own staff. It is based on extensive conversations with a number of people—particularly General Goodpaster, who agrees with my recommendations.[2]

I apologize for its length, but the decisions you make on the issues raised here will have an important effect on how we function in the field of foreign affairs in the years ahead. I thought, therefore, that

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive FG 6–6. No classification marking. A handwritten annotation on page one of the memorandum reads: "12–27–68 (Taken by HAK to Florida for 12/30 meeting with RMN), approved by RMN 12/30/68." In *White House Years,* pp. 41–47, Kissinger recounted the formulation of this memorandum, the subsequent debate over its merits, and Nixon's hesitation at implementing it. Kissinger stated that Nixon approved the memorandum on December 27, before meeting with Rogers, Laird, and Kissinger to discuss it on December 28 at Key Biscayne. (Ibid., p. 44) Roger Morris, an NSC staff member from 1967 to 1970, discussed how the memorandum took shape in *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 77–90. Morris credited Morton Halperin with drafting the plan proposed in the memorandum. The Department of State drafted revisions in the memorandum which, in addition to Document 4, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1; and in the National Archives, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, NSC.

[2] Four memoranda on national security organization prepared by Goodpaster and forwarded to Kissinger on December 15 are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, Gen Goodpaster.

it would be best for you to have as full a description as possible of what General Goodpaster and I have in mind.

We would like a chance to discuss the memo with you after you have gone over it.

At Tab B are outline summaries, plus action recommendations, covering each of the subsections of the basic paper.[3]

Tab A

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon

SUBJECT

Proposal for a New National Security Council System

This memorandum:

—examines current procedures for making national security decisions, and contrasts them with those of the Eisenhower Administration;
—recommends new NSC procedures to insure orderly decision making;
—makes proposals regarding my own staff;
—lists the major issues which will require early consideration by the National Security Council, and suggests the focus and timing for papers on these.

Current Practice

The Johnson Administration's key decision-making body is the so-called "Tuesday Lunch" of the President and his principal advisers.[4] The lunch group meets without a formal agenda and without any formal followup. Decisions are conveyed orally to the Departments, with frequent uncertainty about precisely what was decided.

A National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) is sometimes issued by the President or his Special Assistant informing the bureaucracy of a Presidential decision, but the NSAM almost never provides

[3] Attached but not printed. Nixon indicated his approval of each of the action recommendations, but he crossed out the listing of the DCI as member of the NSC Review Group and wrote "no" next to it. In *White House Years*, p. 44, Kissinger stated that Nixon's only change was to remove the DCI from the National Security Council. The original action recommendations with Nixon's markings and initials in blue ink are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1.

[4] Attendance has varied, but recently the membership has included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

any rationale for the decision. While the National Security Council meets from time to time, its principal function is an educational one, i.e., general review of a major issue. In recent years the NSC has not been used as a decision-making instrument.

The major strength of the existing system is its flexibility and the speed with which decisions can be made. The absence of formal staffing for the Tuesday lunch, for example, permits a free and frank discussion unencumbered by a large group of second-level staff, but the discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and often unfamiliar with the nuances of the issue before them. Because the principals meet without the benefit of staff or previous staff study, there is no guarantee that all the relevant alternatives are considered, or that all the interested parties within the government have a chance to state their views. Since there is no systematic follow-up, it is often unclear exactly what has been decided or why. Nor is there any formal method for assuring that decisions are adequately implemented.[5]

Eisenhower Procedures

The NSC met frequently during the Eisenhower Administration. Participants had the benefit of fully staffed papers, and a systematic effort was made to give all interested parties a hearing.

A Planning Board (chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, and with representatives from the agencies represented on the NSC) met frequently to review all papers going to the NSC. The Special Assistant for NSC Affairs prepared the agenda for the NSC meeting, summed up the positions taken by the participants, and presented a decision document to the President for approval after the meeting. Implementation of NSC based decisions was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board.

If there is any criticism to make of this system it is that its very formality tended to demand too much of the principals' time, while giving insufficient priority to issues of primary Presidential concern.

The present task is to combine the best features of the two systems; to develop a structure, using the NSC, which will provide the President and his top advisers with:

—all the realistic alternatives;
—the costs and benefits of each;
—the views and recommendations of all interested agencies.

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[5] In a conversation with three journalists on July 29, 1971, Kissinger commented that the Johnson administration "had a different style from ours. They were a raucous group: fighting, lively, quite a contrast to the order in our Administration. Their Tuesday lunches were chaos." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAK Memcons, Memcon—Henry Kissinger, Henry Grunwald, Hugh Sidney, and Jerry Schecter, Jul. 29, 1971)

The procedures outlined below will, I believe, permit us to reach these goals, while avoiding the dangers of compromise and indecision which can result from an excessively formal system.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

A. *The National Security Council.* The National Security Council should be the principal forum for issues requiring interagency coordination, especially where Presidential decisions of a middle and long-range nature are involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Secretary of State—should be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared—normally by the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only principals should attend (with the possible exception of the Under Secretary of State).

The NSC should consider middle and long-range policy issues as well as current crises and immediate operational problems. By providing a forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the NSC can insure that senior officials consider the long-range implications of policy choices.

NSC agenda papers should present a wide range of alternative policy options that are politically and administratively feasible, and should avoid the all-too-frequent practice of setting up extreme alternatives as straw men to the one course of action being urged.

The NSC should not be considered the sole forum for Presidential discussion in the National Security field. The President will reserve the option of constituting subcommittees for the expeditious handling of operational matters (with membership especially adapted to the particular issue).

B. *National Security Council Review Group.* An NSC Review Group would examine papers prior to their consideration by the NSC, unless the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President deem it unnecessary. Its role would be to frame the issues to be decided by the NSC, not to achieve a compromise or consensus which hides alternatives. The Group will also assign action to Regional or Ad Hoc groups, as appropriate.

Membership in the Group would vary depending on the issue, but would include:

—the Assistant to the President (Chairman);
—the senior State Department and Defense Department official below the Secretary actively concerned with NSC matters;

—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his representative;
—the Director of the CIA or his representative;
—the Directors (or their representatives) of other agencies such as AID, USIA or ACDA when appropriate.

The Review Group would examine papers prepared for the NSC to be sure that: (1) they are worthy of NSC attention; (2) all the relevant alternatives are included; (3) the facts are accurately presented.

Issues that do not require Cabinet level discussion or Presidential decision will be referred by the NSC Review Committee to the NSC Under Secretary's Committee.

C. *NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary's Committee.* This Committee would be composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of Central Intelligence (and other agencies where appropriate). It would deal with matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group, including matters on which the IRG's have not been able to agree but which do not involve issues requiring Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.

D. *Inter-Agency Regional Groups.* The currently existing inter-agency regional groups (IRG's), chaired by the relevant Assistant Secretary of State, should be reconstituted as sub-organs of the NSC. Membership should generally include the agencies represented on the Review Group, depending on the subject being considered. The IRG's should perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; (2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives, their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation of potential crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well as actions planned during the crisis.

Note: The elaborated NSC machinery makes the continued functioning of the existing Senior Inter-Departmental Group unnecessary.

E. *Ad Hoc Working Groups.* Where the problem is not geographic—or is too important to be dealt with from a regional perspective—ad hoc working groups should be used to develop policy alternatives for consideration by the NSC. The make-up of the working group would depend on the subject being studied. In cases where implementation of policy is complicated or controversial, and inter-agency cooperation is required, ad hoc groups might be charged with coordinating operations in support of policy.

F. *Outside Consultants.* The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should establish a roster of consultants who are experts on major issues. When appropriate, these consultants should participate in groups preparing papers for NSC consideration.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE

A. *NSC Memoranda.* Two memoranda series should be established to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) should be abolished and replaced by:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs).* NSDMs would be used to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the result of NSC meetings) when the President wants the agencies concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and the reasons for his decisions.

—*National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs).* This series would be used to direct that studies be undertaken of particular problems (normally for NSC consideration).

Existing NSAMs should be examined prior to January 20 and divided into three categories: (1) those which are out of date and should be rescinded; (2) those which should continue in force; (3) those which should be re-examined to determine whether they should be continued. NSAMs in the second category would be primarily annual decision documents which the President would review as a matter of course during his first year. Those in the third category should continue in effect pending completion of the review. A NSDM should be issued on January 21 indicating the status of all existing NSAMs.

B. *Annual Review of the International Situation.* The National Security Council Staff, together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the President an annual review of the international situation similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended discussion of the President's view of the international situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message. The Review would:

—provide a regular framework for defining U.S. security interests and programs to meet those interests;

—give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level attention to fundamental issues within an overall framework.

The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set forth the President's view of these events and our future goals. The statement would include some of the material which over the past eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual Posture Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should normally be issued in January.

III. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

The NSC Staff of the Assistant to the President would be divided into three categories: (1) Assistants for Programs; (2) Operations Staff;

(3) Planning Staff. The role of the Staff would be to provide a Presidential perspective in programs, planning and operations. The Staff's job would be to see that the agencies do the initial work, using existing inter-agency mechanisms. Only in exceptional circumstances would the NSC Staff prepare its own papers. The functions of each part of the NSC Staff are described below.

A. *Assistants for Programs* would be responsible for the preparation of studies on the long-range implications of major policy issues (e.g., Vietnam, Middle East settlements, and alternative NATO strategies). They would work with the appropriate Departments to provide the President and the NSC with the relevant information and policy options. After it has been decided that a problem will require one or a series of Presidential decisions, responsibility would be assigned to one of the Assistants for Programs. They would develop a strategy for getting the necessary staff work done, and for bringing the issue to the National Security Council in a timely and orderly fashion.

The Assistants for Programs would be charged with developing a five-year perspective by helping the agencies to: (1) define middle-range goals; (2) propose specific measures to achieve these goals. The responsible Assistant would work with the group considering the issue to insure that all relevant options were kept open. They would also need to work closely with the NSC Operations Staff and Planning Staff if the link between planning and operations is to be maintained.

B. *The Operations Staff* would consist of approximately five Senior Members and a small number of Staff Assistants. Each Senior Staff Member would be responsible for certain geographic regions and/or functional activities. They would follow the day-to-day business of the Departments, and would be responsible for bringing to the attention of the Assistant to the President those matters which are of Presidential concern.

C. *The Planning Staff* would prepare the NSC agenda papers, synthesizing agency papers and necessary back-up and follow-up papers. It would undertake specific studies only when inter-agency studies were unsatisfactory or undesirable. Consultants would be drawn upon to work with the Planning Staff in developing options beyond those developed in the Departments. The Planning Staff would also provide back-up expertise for the Assistants for Programs.

Members of the Planning Staff would also be available to serve as members of inter-agency study groups. Some of the members of the Staff should be experts with particular skills; others should be generalists.

The existence of this Staff and its access to consultants would enable the Assistant to the President and the President to receive preliminary studies on complicated and controversial subjects without

arousing concern within the Departments before the President had decided what options he wanted to explore seriously.

D. *The Military Assistant* would help the Assistant to the President in the development of Staff papers on the full range of military issues, and would be available to provide him with judgments on military questions. He would also assist in monitoring and assembling intelligence materials.

IV. MAJOR POLICY ISSUES

This section lists issues which will require early attention by the NSC, and suggests procedures to be used in developing alternatives.

A. *High Priority Major Policy Issues.* (These are the subjects which will require early, high-level attention and for which alternative policy papers should be available for prompt consideration by the NSC.)

1. *Vietnam.* The NSC Staff should prepare a paper (prior to January 20) listing alternative strategies, both in Vietnam and at Paris. The alternatives should include diplomatic moves and military actions which are mutually supporting. The paper should be sent to the relevant Departments for their examination within two weeks after January 20 to insure that all the relevant alternatives are listed and that the factual assertions are correct.

2. *Middle East.* An ad hoc working group should be asked to develop a paper examining alternative approaches to the Arab-Israeli problem. It should complete its report within one month.

3. *Europe.* European policy will require early consideration for several reasons:

—A number of West European heads of government are almost certain to request early meetings with the President (basic policy should not be made by preparing talking papers for such meetings);

—Negotiations with the Germans on an arrangement to offset the balance of payments costs of our troops in Germany are currently underway. A decision will have to be made at an early date on whether the talks should be continued, and, if so, on what position we should take (these decisions should be taken in the context of an overall policy toward NATO);

—The French have been dropping hints of an interest in improving relations (our reaction to these probes should also be in the context of an overall European policy).

A paper examining these and other problems of European policy should be prepared by the NSC Staff, or by an Ad Hoc Working Group.

4. *International Monetary Policy.* An Ad Hoc Working Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Policy, and including the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, a representative of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the responsible Assistant for Programs, should be asked to

report to the NSC within two months on the basic issues and alternatives of international monetary reform. The Group should also be charged with overseeing on-going operational matters relating to international monetary affairs.

5. *Strategic Forces.* As discussed with Secretary-designate Laird, the NSC Staff will prepare—prior to January 20—a paper outlining issues and alternative policies regarding strategic forces. The paper should be sent to the relevant agencies for comment prior to review by the NSC.

6. *Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Security Policy.* A high-level interagency group should examine the entire range of U.S. security policy. (Since this issue relates intimately to our worldwide posture, it is too crucial to be handled entirely as a Defense Department matter.) The examination should consider U.S. interests, threats to those interests, and alternative security policies. The Working Group should be staffed by the NSC staff, augmented by personnel from relevant agencies. The Group should report to the NSC within six months following the inauguration.

7. *Contingency Planning.* An Ad Hoc Working Group should be established after January 20 to review existing inter-agency plans and procedures for contingency planning on possible major trouble spots (Berlin and the Middle East are especially crucial). The Group should pay particular attention to the political impact of proposed military moves, and the orchestration of political and military measures.

8. *Japan.* A number of issues in U.S.-Japanese relations will arise during the next twelve months, and the Japanese Prime Minister is likely to request a meeting in the fall. Therefore, an Ad Hoc Working Group should be set up to examine the full range of U.S.-Japanese relations (including the issue of the reversion of Okinawa, the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. bases in Japan, and U.S.-Japanese economic relations).

9. *AID Review.* What is needed at this time is not a major research effort,[6] but rather a concise, hard-headed consideration of issues (particularly the relationship between economic and political development) and options. The task could be assigned to a small nongovernmental group, or to an interagency Ad Hoc Working Group.

V. PROGRAM BUDGETING

Today, decisions on U.S. economic assistance, military assistance, and U.S. troop levels in a given country are made separately—often in

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[6] A Presidential Commission, chaired by James Perkins, has just completed a report based on a year's study. [Footnote in source text. Regarding this report, see *Foreign Relations,* 1964–1968, volume IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities, Documents 79 and 145.]

ignorance of what other agencies are doing in the country, and without regard to their impact on our political and diplomatic posture. This makes it impossible to relate budget choices to policy issues.

A series of program budgeting studies should be prepared on major countries where important policy differences exist and we have programs involving large resource transfers. These studies will permit the NSC to examine at one time our overall policy objectives and our budget choices as they relate to key countries or regions.

A small, permanent inter-agency staff, manned by personnel seconded from the relevant agencies but under the NSC, should be created to do these studies. The staff should have overall responsibility for their preparation and should provide technical advice on each. The studies should be performed by Ad Hoc Groups made up of program budgeting experts from the permanent staff and country specialists from the relevant agencies. The results of the studies should provide a basis for policy judgments, as well as for possible reallocation of funds within the proposed FY-70 Budget and/or requests for supplemental funds.

(A country program budget study on Korea is currently being produced by an inter-agency committee. The NSC should consider this study at an early date as a pilot project. Program budgeting studies might be requested, in addition, for Taiwan, Thailand, Greece, Brazil and Ethiopia. This will get at least one study underway in each geographic region. Other countries can be added to the list at a later date.)

Henry A. Kissinger

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2. Editorial Note

In his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power,* pages 513–514, U. Alexis Johnson, who stepped down as Ambassador to Japan in mid-January 1969 to become Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Nixon, recalled meeting Henry Kissinger at the Hotel Pierre in New York City on the evening of January 5, 1969. Although the meeting lasted only about 15 minutes, "that was long enough for me to see that some rough roads lay ahead. Henry outlined his thoughts for wiping out the SIG–IRG interdepartmental system General Taylor and I had developed in 1966 that gave State broad responsibility for directing the interdepartmental work of the government in foreign affairs. Henry intended to establish a system centered on the National Security Council staff with himself as head. I had only two minutes to ex-

postulate with Henry. As I was going down the elevator to get a cab to the airport, I tried to brief Rogers and Richardson on the important bureaucratic theology involved in the SIG–IRG as far as State was concerned—an area with which, of course, they were entirely unfamiliar. I brooded about this on my flight back, and as soon as I arrived in Tokyo I sent a long back channel message to Richardson trying to explicate the issues involved and urging that he and the Secretary mount the ramparts before January 20 against the Kissinger/NSC takeover of State's interdepartmental functions." Johnson's back channel message to Richardson has not been found. The establishment of the SIG–IRG system in 1966 and its operation through the close of 1968 are documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations. For Johnson's role in establishing the system, see Document 48.

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3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon[1]

January 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

The State Department has now begun to object to the NSC procedures which you approved in Florida. (Bill Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key Biscayne, but now—in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates—wants to reserve judgment. Mel Laird agrees with the memo I showed you—with one minor caveat.)

General Goodpaster and I will be discussing State's objections with you, but I thought you might want a brief summary of the arguments for a State-centered system (Tab A) and the counter-arguments which led Andy and me to recommend the system which you approved (Tab B).

A delay in establishing the new NSC structure will mean a concomitant delay in getting down to business on the many serious foreign policy issues you will have to face in the opening months of your

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Secret.

administration. It would not be helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement—particularly since it would be over an issue you had already decided at Key Biscayne.

Tab A

The Case for a State-Centered System

The Foreign Service arguments are as follows:

—The existing SIG/IRG mechanism makes the State Department the executive agent of the President for the conduct of foreign policy. This would be destroyed by instituting an NSC system such as you approved.

—The interdepartmental machinery should be staffed by the State Department. The leadership in defining the issues, formulating them, and bringing them to the attention of the President should be taken by the State Department. The committees do not vote; the State Department decides, with other departments having the right to take disagreements to the NSC.

—There is an organization in being (the Department of State) staffed with experienced personnel, with geographical and functional structures established to cover the various areas and issues which arise in the conduct of foreign relations.

—If the Secretary is to pull together foreign policy positions, he must have authority not only over the State Department, but over other Departments as well. He, through the Under Secretary, and the other Departments through their Under Secretaries, must review papers on their way to the NSC to see that all options are adequately examined. The NSC should act primarily as an appeal board when Departments disagree.

—To the extent that there are limits to State's ability to provide a Presidential perspective, NSC staff members can participate in SIG/IRG mechanisms without prejudice to the State Department's power of decision.

—Our Ambassadors are expected to coordinate policy and operations abroad. (Indeed, there is no realistic way to create another system overseas.) Since the Ambassadors usually report directly to the State Department, it is essential that the Department be similarly organized.

—The Foreign Service does not serve the State Department, but the United States and is, in a real sense, the President's staff—avoiding the parochialism often seen elsewhere. To the degree that State is parochial, this can be overcome as Department officers are forced to work with other Departments in the SIG and IRGs.

Tab B

Counter-Arguments

I. The State Department is unable to take the lead in managing interagency affairs because:

—The staff is inadequate to the task of planning or of management.

—The Foreign Service, by training and background, is not capable of the planning you want. Their forte is in compromising differences, and avoiding a confrontation of conflicting points of view.

—Evidence of this is the Department's consistent failure to utilize its own Policy Planning Council adequately. Studies have been unrelated to real problems, have had no effect on policy, and have obfuscated rather than clarified alternatives.

—An attempt by State to dominate the other agencies would, over time, make it the direct focus of Congressional attack, thus weakening its position on the Hill.

—Senior officers within the Department must, to some degree, become the advocates of their subordinates. As they do so, they represent parochial interests.

—The parochial interests of State and the Foreign Service are not removed by simply describing themselves as the President's men.

—When the State Department has attempted to manage operations—as in Vietnam—it has not worked and has had to be changed.

II. Protecting the President's interests.

—The only way the President can ensure that all options are examined, and all the arguments fairly presented, is to have his own people—responsive to him, accustomed to his style, and with a Presidential rather than departmental perspective—oversee the preparation of papers.

—If the President wants to control policy, he must control the policy making machinery.

III. The present system permits an adequate role for the State Department.

—Issues may be raised in the interdepartmental groups, under the chairmanship of the relevant Assistant Secretary.

—State is represented on the NSC Review Group.

—Issues may be sent from the Review Group to the Under Secretary's committee (chaired by the Under Secretary of State) when they do not involve Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.

—The proposed system gives State a larger role than it had under John Foster Dulles. It can make of the system what it wants.

Attachment[2]

January 6, 1969.

NSAM 341

Following are highlights of NSAM 341:[3]

—Reaffirms the Secretary of State's "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." (Military forces operating in the field are specifically excluded from such activities.)

—Creates the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), chaired by the Under Secretary of State, "to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels . . ."[4]

—Creates Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG) for each geographical region of the Department of State, under the chairmanship of the relevant Assistant Secretary of State.[5]

—The SIG and the IRGs are given "full powers of decision on all matters within their purview, unless a member who does not concur requests the referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority."

From the point of view of the Department of State, the most important aspect of NSAM 341 is its reaffirmation of the Secretary of State's position as primus inter pares on matters relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. The SIG/IRG system is looked upon as an important tool in carrying out this responsibility, but the delegation of responsibility itself is the essential ingredient of NSAM 341.

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[2] No classification marking.

[3] For text of NSAM No. 341, see *Foreign Relations,* 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

[4] Membership: Under Secretary of State, Executive Chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense; Administrator of the Agency for International Development; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of the US Information Agency; and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Other agencies may be invited by the Chairman.) [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]

[5] Membership: the regional Assistant Secretary of State, Executive Chairman; and a designated representative from Defense, AID, CIA, JCS, USIA and the White House or NSC staff. (Other agencies may be invited by the Chairman.) [Footnote in the source text.]

4. Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State-Designate (Richardson)[1]

Undated.

The suggested changes incorporated in the attached revisions of the Proposal for a New National Security Council System[2] are predicated upon the following considerations:

1. That the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC perform an indispensable function on behalf of the President of the United States in assuring that those national security policy issues which require his attention and decision are identified and brought up for action;

2. That the Secretary of State is the primary adviser to the President on foreign affairs and is responsible to him for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas;

3. That there is no inherent incompatibility between the function of the Special Assistant and the NSC in policy development and control and the Secretary of State's responsibilities in the field of foreign policy;

4. That the arrangements described in the attached Proposal, which will in due course become embodied in a new restatement of NSC-State Department relationships, must be viewed against the background of a long history of efforts to define these relationships effectively; and

5. That the necessarily wide dissemination of any such restatement must therefore be considered in the context of its impact on institutional attitudes and morale as well as public comment and interpretation.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. No classification marking. The paper is not typed on letterhead and includes no information about authorship other than the following handwritten note at the top of the first page by Kissinger: "Richardson—memo." The first page of the paper, which ends with paragraph 5, was typed in black ink and double-spaced, while the attachment was typed in blue ink and single-spaced. The 4 pages of the attachment are numbered 3 through 6; pages 1 and 2 in the same format have not been found but they presumably consisted of the opening sections of Kissinger's December 27 memorandum (attachment to Document 1) up to the last paragraph of "Eisenhower Procedures." For Nixon's reaction to Richardson's paper see Document 8.

[2] Document 1.

Attachment[3]

Undated.

The procedures outlined below will, I believe, permit us to reach these goals, while avoiding the dangers of compromise and indecision which can result from an excessively formal system.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

A. *The National Security Council.* The National Security Council should be the principal forum for national security policy issues requiring inter-agency coordination where Presidential decisions are involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Secretary of State—should be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared—normally by the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only principals should attend (with the possible exception of the Under Secretary of State).

The NSC should consider middle and long-range policy issues as well as aspects of current crises and immediate operational problems involving the national security. By providing a forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the NSC can insure that senior officials consider the long-range implications of policy choices.

NSC agenda papers should present a wide range of alternative policy options that are politically and administratively feasible, and should avoid the all-too-frequent practice of setting up extreme alternatives as straw men to the one course of action being urged.

The NSC should not be considered the sole forum for Presidential discussion in the National Security field. The President will reserve the option of constituting subcommittees for the expeditious handling of operational matters (with membership especially adapted to the particular issue).

B. *Department of State.* The Secretary of State should be the principal adviser to the President in the conduct of foreign policy. The Department of State has principal responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.

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[3] Secret; Eyes only.

C. *National Security Council Agenda.* The Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President should, in advance of NSC meetings, discuss subjects proposed for NSC discussion to be sure that they are appropriate for NSC consideration and, if so, that they are so framed as to sharpen the issues to be decided, not to achieve a compromise or consensus which hides alternatives. In the case of an issue not regarded by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President as requiring Presidential decision, they could indicate the agency or forum appropriate for its consideration.

Papers prepared for the NSC would be reviewed by NSC staff to be sure that: (1) they are worthy of NSC attention; (2) all the relevant alternatives are included; (3) the facts are accurately presented. They should also be made available in advance of NSC meetings to agencies represented on the NSC.

D. *Under Secretary's Committee.* The Committee would be composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (and other agencies where appropriate). It would deal with matters on which the Interagency Regional Groups (see below) have not been able to agree but which do not require Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion as well as with matters referred to it by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President.

E. *Inter-Agency Regional Groups.* The currently existing interagency regional groups (IRG's), chaired by the relevant Assistant Secretary of State, should perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on issues which appear capable of settlement at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; (2) preparation at the direction of the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives, their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation, also as so directed, of potential crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well as actions planned during the crisis.

F. *Ad Hoc Working Groups.* Where the problem is not geographic—or is too important to be dealt with from a regional perspective—ad hoc working groups should, consistently with paragraphs B and C above, be used to develop policy alternatives for consideration by the NSC. The make-up of the working group would depend on the subject being studied.

G. *Outside Consultants.* The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should establish a roster of consultants who are experts on major issues. When appropriate, these consultants should participate in groups preparing papers for NSC consideration.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE

A. *NSC Memoranda.* Two memoranda series should be established to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) should be abolished and replaced by:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda* (NSDMs). NSDMs would be used to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the result of NSC meetings) when the President wants the agencies concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and the reasons for his decision.

—*National Security Study Memoranda* (NSSMs). This series would be used to direct that studies be undertaken of particular problems (normally for NSC consideration).

Existing NSAMs should be examined prior to January 20 and divided into three categories: (1) those which are out of date and should be rescinded; (2) those which should continue in force; (3) those which should be re-examined to determine whether they should be continued. NSAMs in the second category would be primarily annual decision documents which the President would review as a matter of course during his first year. Those in the third category should continue in effect pending completion of the review. A NSDM should be issued as soon as possible after January 20, following review by the NSC, indicating the status of all existing NSAMs.

B. *Annual Review of the International Situation.* The National Security Council Staff, together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the President an annual review of the international situation similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended discussion of the President's view of the international situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message. The Review would:

—provide a regular framework for defining U.S. security interests and programs to meet those interests;

—give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level attention to fundamental issues within an overall framework.

The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set forth the President's view of these events and our future goals. The statement would include some of the material which over the past eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual Posture Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should normally be issued in January.

5. Memorandum From the Military Assistant-Designate (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)[1]

January 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Processing of Information and Intelligence for the President-Elect

Within the limited time available and the restrictions imposed by a temporary lack of access, I have reviewed the information system currently employed to keep the President and the Special Assistant abreast of the current worldwide situation.[2] Summarized below are the principal impressions gained from this review:

—Information and intelligence are now fed to the Special Assistant and the President on an "as available" basis, depending on the degree of urgency of the information and the time at which it arrives at the White House Situation Room. Under the current system, the President receives his initial daily briefing in writing. At 6:30 a.m. each morning, he receives the printed CIA Daily Brief, the CIA printed update on the situation in North Viet-Nam, the printed Morning Staff Summary and the printed Joint NMCC–DIA Operational Intelligence Brief. There has been *no* formal briefing as such. The President also receives each evening the printed State Evening Summary and, when prepared, the State Department Daily Activities Report. All other informational material is furnished during the day as required and as dictated by its degree of urgency. Normally, information is provided by Mr. McCafferty to the Special Assistant with or without covering memo. The Special Assistant in turn forwards it to the President. The nature of the information provided through this system is varied and is both refined and raw. Material received in the White House Situation Room includes (a) cables from all sources (6–700 per day), (b) hard copies of Departmental messages (12–1500 per day), and (c) an average of 5 NODIS messages and 25 EXDIS messages per day. A variety of other informational data including press reports written with each memoranda and reports are also forwarded. Mr. McCafferty and his staff sort out all source material for the Special Assistant which they

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969. Confidential; Eyes Only.

[2] Haig recounted his hiring and first months as Kissinger's Military Assistant in his memoir, *Inner Circles,* pp. 189–202. Roger Morris, an NSC staff member at the time, discussed the same subjects at greater length in his biography, *Haig: The General's Progress* (New York: Playboy Press, 1982), pp. 97–105 and 112–117.

feel would be of interest to either the President or the Special Assistant. Where additional information is required, Mr. McCafferty's staff initiates the action to obtain this from the reporting agency. When required, covering memoranda are prepared. During crisis situations information is channeled directly to the President with copies to the Special Assistant. Specifically, the White House Situation Room and its staff function to support the Special Assistant and the President. (I have been informed that on occasion data required by substantive NSC staff officers has not been available and some refinements may be called for in this area.)

—The system employed by the President-Elect should be totally responsive to his personal requirements and tailored to his personal schedule. Due to the heavy flow of vital information, I believe the President should receive both written and, at least initially, oral information and briefings. I also believe that where possible, *all* information provided to the President should be channeled through the Assistant to the President except during non-business hours when anything provided to the President should be provided simultaneously to the Assistant to the President. (You may wish to insist that clearance be obtained from you prior to the relay of off duty emergency information to the President. This is a problem which should be discussed with the President's Military Aide and the President.) Because reading is an essential part of his informational flow, I would recommend that we retain a reading package to be made available to the President as he desires at the earliest time each morning. This should be followed later in the morning by a briefing presented by you which would be designed primarily to comment on and interpret the reports which he has received, supplemented by any other informational data which has crystallized over the period. Obviously, this briefing will be both informational and operational in the sense that you should comment on key events over the preceding period but also discuss actions which have or should be triggered by these events. In sum, your briefing will undoubtedly become a business session introduced by a summary of key events. I would anticipate preparing notes for your use at these daily meetings. Also on occasion you may wish to be accompanied by Mr. McCafferty or other experts together with illustrative material when the situation dictates.

—It is apparent that the system devised for the President-Elect should include consideration of the role that the Military Aide will play in the processing of information. Under President Johnson, Military Aides have been isolated from substantive information and emergency notification to a large extent. I do not believe that Mr. Nixon will continue with this system and will expect Colonel Hughes to be generally cognizant of the run of current information. Consequently, I would suggest that the system adopted be coordinated with the Military Aide to insure that his needs will be met at the outset so as to preclude ad

hoc adjustments which might work to our disadvantage. Hopefully, his access to certain written information will suffice.

—I would propose few changes in the White House Situation Room initially and would continue to exercise Mr. McCafferty's current system. Except as noted above, I should be included in the information distribution system prior to the time that it reaches your desk with the assurance that delays will not occur and with the assurance that in my absence, the material will go straight to your desk or in an emergency situation directly to the President. In order to make this system most effective, I should be located in the West Wing, either through the construction of a small office in the main reception room or the occupation of the room which is now occupied by Mr. Schwartz.

—Keeping the President informed will be one of the most pressing responsibilities of the Assistant to the President, and the system established initially will unquestionably be modified with experience and as the President's wishes and modus operandi become clearer. Of major concern in this area is the requirement to prevent being "scooped" by the Departments and members of the Cabinet. Timely information invariably results in substantive reactions and the Assistant to the President must be the primary point of contact with the President. Since, in this sense, information is power, the Departments will undoubtedly attempt to hold back information and intelligence from the Situation Room in an effort to strengthen the hand of their Secretary. Movement in this direction will take the form of legitimate efforts to "restore the authority of the Departments in the interest of required decentralization." These efforts cannot be tolerated and will require firm handling at the outset of this Administration. Related to this phenomena will be efforts to screen out at Departmental level so called "raw" information and intelligence. This can be expected from CIA and the intelligence community at large. It is essential that multisource reports and estimates continue to be furnished to the NSC so that you will be fully aware of divergencies in this critical area and so that you can be the President's broker when conflicting estimates exist.

A.M. Haig, Jr.[3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

6. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense-Designate Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)[1]

January 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Memorandum dated January 3, 1969 concerning a New NSC System[2]

I have read and re-read your proposal many times and have tried to relate it to the discussions we had in Key Biscayne on proposed changes in the National Security Council System.[3] After much study and considerable reflection on the draft proposal, I am forced reluctantly to conclude that as Secretary of Defense-designate, I cannot fully approve the proposal in its present form.

This decision was reached for several major reasons, among which I would list the following:

First, it would institute as presently drafted, a "closed loop" in which all intelligence inputs would be channeled through a single source, the Assistant and his NSC staff. Such an arrangement in effect would or could isolate not only the President from direct access to intelligence community outputs but also the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other top-level members of the President's team.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, Sec. Laird. Secret. A draft of the memorandum that has extensive handwritten notations, most of them additions in Laird's hand that were incorporated in the final version, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's "Organization Papers." Several pages of handwritten notes in an unidentified hand are ibid. One note states: "Two Choices: 1) Send memo to Henry outlining in detail why this is totally unacceptable. 2) No memo—instead go to Bill Rogers & explain situation—I go to Bryce [Harlow] at same time—then you & Bill & Bryce see Pres., suggest he call in Asst & tell him that NSC staff is independent, to be used & responsive to State, Def, & Asst—not solely to Asst. 2) that Asst be responsive to Pres & his Bd of Directors, not a substitute for or a buffer between them & him."

[2] Kissinger sent Laird a copy, with one revision, of his December 27 memorandum to Nixon (Document 1), under cover of a January 3 memorandum in which he indicated that it had been discussed with Rogers and Goodpaster and approved by Nixon. The one revision was in the membership of the Under Secretary's Committee, adding the Assistant to the President and omitting the Director of Central Intelligence. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's "Organization Papers") Another copy of Kissinger's December 27 memorandum with marginal notations in an unidentified hand is ibid.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 1.

I have found in my past dealings with the intelligence community and DOD officials, for example, that it is not a good practice to interpose a third party, no matter how capable and objective, between the man responsible for intelligence information and those who must take responsibility for acting upon it. A method must be provided to correct this deficiency.

Second, it would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they will be performed as well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC meetings. There should be some consultation provided for with the principals in establishing the priorities of these studies. It would also give the Assistant both the power and the responsibility for implementing NSC policy as well as the right of determination of issues arising from the implementation of those policies without requiring consultation or even notification of NSC principals. This could very well result in principals going around the NSC and directly to the President as a regular practice. This would negate what I believe the President-elect is trying to accomplish.[4] The principals who make up the National Security Council, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should be able to place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President.

Third, it is my desire, as I know it is yours, to strengthen and revitalize the National Security Council as a major Presidential tool in determining National Security policy. But in my view, this cannot be accomplished by aggregating to the NSC and through it to the Assistant to the President the major tools that have always been intended to be utilized equally by all of the President's top-level board of advisers in the National Security field.

These three points constitute several of the major reasons why I find it necessary to raise these serious questions about the proposed New NSC System, as outlined in your draft of January 3rd. In our conversation today and in my conversation yesterday with General Goodpaster it was made clear that the above comments were in line with your understanding of how the NSC would operate. I do feel, however, that the memo creating the new system should formally spell out these important points.

Needless to say, I look forward to a period of sustained mutual cooperation between the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the principal advisers to the President in this vital area. I am sure that in further consultations among all of the principal

[4] Written in hand in the margin beside the previous three sentences is "How?"

advisers, we will arrive at a mutually satisfactory New NSC System. This, I think, is most important.[5]

Melvin R. Laird

[5] Kissinger discussed Laird's memorandum in *White House Years,* pp. 44–45, commenting that while Laird threw up a smoke screen of major objections, as was his style, "it turned out that he sought no more than the participation of the CIA Director at NSC meetings and the right to propose the initiation of studies. These requests were easily accommodated."

7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon[1]

January 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Additional Provisions Concerning the Conduct of National Security Affairs

1. Through further discussions on organization and procedures for National Security Affairs, Secretary-designate Rogers and I have worked out the proposed provisions which follow. I believe they are consistent with your determination to restore and revitalize the NSC structure, and with the overall plan of organization and method of operating you wish to employ. I recommend that you approve them.

2. In general, the arrangements seek to provide a means by which Presidential leadership and broad perspective will be applied in the guiding, shaping, and policy direction of security affairs, while a maximum of operating responsibility for operational activities—responsive to policy and conforming to its guidelines—will be exercised at departmental and interdepartmental levels.

3. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy adviser. He is responsible, in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy, for foreign policy decisions not requiring specific Presidential supervision, to the full extent permitted by

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 2, Memo for President-Elect. Secret. The memorandum is marked in hand at the top: "Never sent."

law, of interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas. (Military forces operating in the field are specifically excluded from such activities.)

4. The determination whether to treat a security matter as a "policy" question or an "operational" question should be made by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State in consultation, insofar as interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas are concerned.

5. The Secretary of State should have authority and responsibility to refer operational questions involving interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas, not settled through discussion and decision in the IRGs, for timely consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee.

6. The NSC Review Group will function as a planning board in the final preparation of policy papers to be considered by the NSC. The Group will receive papers directly from the IRGs, from Departments, from ad hoc groups, or, on occasion, from other sources.

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8. Memorandum From President-Elect Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)[1]

January 13, 1969.

I have considered the paper furnished by Elliott Richardson,[2] as well as the documents you have provided me at Key Biscayne and here[3] to implement my plan for national security organization and operations.

I do not accept the changes proposed in the paper of Elliott Richardson, other than those reflected in the implementating documents you have submitted, which I have today approved and initialed.[4]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Confidential.

[2] Document 4.

[3] See Document 1.

[4] Attached but not printed are NSDMs 1, 2, 3, and 4, all dated January 11 and initialed by Nixon. All four were issued on January 20 (Documents 10, 11, 12, and 13). NSDM 1 was issued with identical wording while NSDMs 2–4 were issued with revisions. The revisions made in NSDMs 2 and 3 are noted on the attached NSDMs.

Please inform all concerned that I adhere to my plan as previously provided and as set forth in the implementing documents; that this is my firm and definite decision and that I want all necessary preparatory action taken immediately to put this organization and system into effect on January 20.

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9. Memorandum From Colonel Robert E. Pursley to Secretary of Defense Designate Laird[1]

January 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposal for a New National Security Council System

I delivered a set of the papers on the New National Security Council System[2] to General Wheeler this morning, Monday, January 20. I indicated discussions on the papers could be held as early as Tuesday morning, January 21. If I may, I should like to offer a few observations. My notes are keyed to the outline of Mr. Kissinger's memorandum.[3]

Current Practice. The procedures which have been followed during the past three years (as long as I have been with the Secretary of Defense) are accurately described. I would emphasize, though, the drawbacks inherent in not being able to prepare adequately for the top-level discussions. Sometimes the Secretary of Defense was provided 3–4 hours before the Tuesday Luncheon meeting with a list of topics proposed for discussion. While that interval allowed some time for staff work and consultations inside the Department, it almost invariably allowed *too little time* for thorough staff work and frequently allowed *no time* for the Secretary to review papers or to consult his staff prior to leaving for the meeting. The impact of such procedures on the quality of discussions is obvious.

The lack of systematic follow-up to the Tuesday Luncheon meetings is also accurately described in Mr. Kissinger's paper. The hazards in this regard went beyond just keeping the various Departments and staffs informed on any single action or issue. All too frequently, actions

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's "Organization Papers." Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] Not further identified.

[3] Document 1.

on one issue carried potential impacts on other issues. The absence of formal decision documents made it easy (or convenient) to forget earlier actions approval. Conflicting guidance or policies could—and, in my judgment, did—result.

Eisenhower Procedures. The Kissinger memorandum appropriately suggests the present task is to institute procedures which will provide the President and his top advisers with:

—*all* the realistic alternatives (emphasis supplied).
—the costs and benefits of each.
—the views and recommendations of *all* interested agencies (emphasis supplied).

These goals are sound. However, as you suggest in your memorandum,[4] the procedures Mr. Kissinger outlines, allowing his planning staff to *prepare* and *synthesize* NSC papers, seem to contradict—or potentially conflict with—the stated goals. A more "open" system allowing for inputs and review by the Cabinet staffs concerned with national security issues is desirable.

National Security Structure. The *proposed agenda* for the NSC meetings should be subject to the review of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense could, and should, incorporate the inputs from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter point may seem obvious and trivial, but it is important. It has been customary in the past for the Joint Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to have direct lines of communication on some important matters. It is preferable, in my judgment, to establish at the outset that Mr. Kissinger's channels—and his staff's channels to any and all DoD components—will be through the Secretary of Defense.

It is not clear to me why it would be necessary to have both (1) the *National Security Council Review Group* and (2) the *NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary's Committee.* To preclude a "closed loop," as you call it, under the direction of the Assistant to the President—a system which could find the White House staff directing, or working at cross-purposes with the Cabinet level staffs (State and Defense)—it might be advisable to *combine* the National Security Council Review Group and the Ad Hoc Under Secretary's Committee into one Committee (the membership appears to be about the same, anyway). This one committee could operate under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, much as the "Non Group" has operated in the Johnson Administration.

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[4] Document 6.

Membership on this committee could usefully include the top member of the White House, State Department, and Defense Department Public Affairs staffs. In the more formal system proposed for dealing with national security affairs, more papers will be prepared, more people will be informed (and rightly so)—but the chances of "leaks" will increase exponentially. It will be important, I believe, to have a position prepared for public presentation to forestall the potentially adverse impact of such leaks. Even aside from the "leaks" problem, there is much to be gained from having a well-developed, coordinated, and forthright public affairs posture. The alternative is the possible reinstitution of credibility gap charges. Including the key public affairs officials at the working level below the NSC could make a positive contribution in effecting policy decisions, as well as serving as insurance against the deleterious effects of wrong or slanted information.

National Security Procedure. The proposed institution of (1) *National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)* and (2) *National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs)* is sound. I would suggest the *addition* of a variation in each case, however. To insure continuity in the decision process and to avoid conflicting policy decisions, I believe a periodic Summary of NSDMs would be useful. The summaries, or inventory, could be done by functional areas. Also, I believe a periodic Status Memorandum of NSSMs, something akin to a "tickler file," would be useful. The latter would call attention to areas in which action was lagging or in which the opportunity for new direction might be advisable.

National Security Council Staff. The organizational planning for the NSC staff infers uncertainty about (1) whether the main idea will be to use the existing State and Defense staffs to prepare studies and follow the day-to-day actions required to implement policies or (2) whether the White House staff will attempt to duplicate the Cabinet level staff work. There appears to be a tendency to the latter. I would see substantial room for confusion, suspicion, and disorder with a system of coordinate staffs along such lines. I believe the preferred system is one of a small White House staff which leaves the State and Defense staffs the detailed and substantive work.

Major Policy Issues. In addition to the Major Policy issues listed for early attention by the NSC, the following might deserve consideration:

—*Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union*—or even talks ranging beyond the strategic arms area.

—*Non-Proliferation Treaty*—whether we press for immediate U.S. ratification and what pressures, if any, we use on reluctant allies and friends to sign the treaty.

—*Latin America*—what our arms policy and role vis-à-vis insurgencies should be.

—*Selective Service Reform*—what changes should be made in the draft system now and/or after the Southeast Asia conflict is resolved.

—*Termination Day (T-Day) Planning*—what military, political, and economic plans should we be making for phasing down the Southeast Asia conflict.

A Final—and Minor—Point. In numbering NSDMs, it would seem more logical to me to have the NSDM, which establishes the NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series, numbered 1. It presently carries the number 3.

Robert E. Pursley[5]
Colonel, USAF

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

10. National Security Decision Memorandum 1[1]

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series

At the direction of the President, the following two memoranda series are hereby established to inform the Departments and Agencies of Presidential action:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM).* This series shall be used to report Presidential decisions (whether the result of NSC

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Confidential.

meetings or appropriate consultation with the Department head concerned).[2]

—*National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM).* This series shall be used to direct that studies be undertaken (normally for NSC consideration).[3]

The National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) series is hereby abolished. An NSDM to be issued shortly will describe the status of existing NSAMs.[4]

Henry A. Kissinger

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[2] Copies of NSDM 1 through NSDM 264 (August 6, 1974) are ibid., Boxes H–208–H–248. Copies of NSDM 1 through NSDM 348 (January 20, 1977) are ibid., RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83D305.

[3] Copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 206 (July 29, 1974) are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda. Copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 248 (November 13, 1976) and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in ibid., RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83D212, and copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 200 are also in ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–122-H–207, National Security Study Memoranda.

[4] In NSDM 5, February 3, the President listed 30 NSAMs that would continue in force until further notice, specified a review process for 40 other NSAMs, and directed that all other NSAMs "be considered inactive as of this date." (Ibid., Box H–209)

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11. National Security Decision Memorandum 2[1]

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 363, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential. A January 13 memorandum from Pedersen to Rogers proposing revisions in NSDMs 2 and 3, together with typed drafts of the NSDMs with handwritten revisions, are ibid., RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, NSC.

SUBJECT

Reorganization of the National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be reorganized as follows:

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The National Security Council shall be the[2] principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The nature of the issues to be considered may range from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.

The Council shall meet regularly, and discussion will—except in unusual circumstances—be limited to agenda subjects.[3] The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council Staff, as provided by law.

B. The National Security Council Review Group

An NSC Review Group is hereby established to examine papers prior to their submission to the NSC. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups,[4] from NSC Ad Hoc Groups,[5] or from Departments (at their discretion).

The role of the Review Group shall be to review papers to be discussed by the NSC to assure that: 1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention; 2) all realistic alternatives are presented; 3) the facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out. The Review Group shall also be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

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[2] NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) stated that the NSC shall be "a" principal forum, not "the" principal forum.

[3] The Director of Central Intelligence will brief the NSC on each agenda item prior to its consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] Discussed below. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] Discussed below. [Footnote in the source text.]

The membership of the Review Group shall include:[6]

—The Ambassador to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman);
—The representative of the Secretary of State;
—The representative of the Secretary of Defense;
—The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence;
—The representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

C. The National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider:

1. Issues which are referred to it by the NSC Review Group.

2. Matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas:

—which are of an operational nature[7] (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question); *and*
—on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such groups; *and*
—which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; *and*
—which are then referred to it by the Secretary of State.

The results of NSC Under Secretaries Committee consideration of the matters listed in 2. above, will be submitted to the Secretary of State.

3. Other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The membership of the Under Secretaries Committee shall include:

—The Under Secretary of State (Chairman);
—The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
—The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
—The Director of Central Intelligence;
—The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

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[6] NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) did not include the words "The representative of" for any members.

[7] Determination shall be made jointly by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

D. National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups

Existing Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the existing Political-Military Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, are hereby reconstituted as part of the National Security Council structure. The Interdepartmental Groups shall perform the following functions: 1) discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; 2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; 3) preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC.

The membership of the interdepartmental regional groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Review Group. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.[8]

E. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups

When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend regional boundaries.

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary over personnel from his Department serving on interdepartmental committees—including the authority to give necessary guidance to his representatives in the performance of interdepartmental group duties—is not limited by this NSDM. Nor does this NSDM limit the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State for those interdepartmental matters assigned to him by NSDM 3.[9]

Copies of reports of the interdepartmental groups shall be transmitted to the heads of Departments and Agencies simultaneously with their submission to the NSC Review Group.

NSAM 341 is hereby rescinded.[10]

Richard Nixon

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[8] Committee Data Sheets, prepared annually for each IG, which provide information on membership and meeting frequency, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Interagency Committee Files: Lot 76 D 185, Committee Lists.

[9] Document 12.

[10] See Document 3 and footnote 3 thereto.

12. National Security Decision Memorandum 3[1]

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas

The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy adviser. He is also responsible, in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy. I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law[2] for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. Such activities do not include those of the United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander, such other military activities as I elect as Commander-in-Chief to conduct through military channels, and activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall US overseas program in a country or region.

In discharging this authority and responsibility, the Secretary of State will be assisted by the NSC Interdepartmental Groups and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, as constituted in NSDM 2[3] and in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 3. Confidential.

[2] Including continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance and sales programs, as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Document 11.

Within the purview of this NSDM, the Secretary of State may delegate full powers of decision to the Under Secretary of State, as Executive Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, subject to the right of a member who does not concur to request the referral of a matter to the NSC.[4]

Richard Nixon

[4] NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) did not include this paragraph. On January 28, following a telephone conversation between Rogers and Kissinger regarding the paragraph, Pedersen sent Kissinger substitute wording which Pedersen anticipated would be issued to recipients of NSDM 3 under a covering memorandum explaining that it replaced "incorrect text" that was "inadvertently issued." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 3) Instead the substitute wording was issued, with revisions, as NSDM 7, which reads: "The authority of the Secretary of State under NSDM 3 includes the right to delegate full powers of decision to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Groups on all matters within the purview of NSDM 3 subject to the right of a member who does not agree to request the referral of a matter to a higher level of authority." (Ibid., NSDM 7)

13. National Security Decision Memorandum 4[1]

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the U.S. Information Agency
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Program Analyses

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. No classification marking.

The President has directed the preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions. These analyses will be used as the basis for National Security Council discussion and decision on policy and program issues and, where appropriate, will be related to existing programming activities.

These studies shall be performed under the supervision of a permanent program analysis staff under the National Security Council. The staff shall consist primarily of personnel on assignment from the relevant agencies and responsible to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It shall work in close cooperation with similar staffs within the various departments and agencies and the Bureau of the Budget.

Each study shall be performed by an ad hoc group made up of (1) personnel on temporary assignment from the relevant agencies; and (2) members of the program analysis staff. The chairman of each group shall be appointed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in consultation with the Secretary of State. Studies will be made available to the departments concerned for their information and for comment prior to National Security Council consideration.

Henry A. Kissinger

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14. Editorial Note

At the first meeting of the National Security Council, held on January 21, 1969, the President directed that regular attendance at NSC meetings be limited to statutory members, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State, and, on an ad hoc basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (see Document 15). In a February 3 letter to Nixon, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information requested that U.S. Information Agency Director Frank Shakespeare be included on a regular basis at NSC meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6–6) In his February 23 reply, Nixon stated that Shakespeare would be invited to "all meetings in which matters of particular concern to USIA are under discussion" but that to use the NSC forum effectively he must limit regular attendance to statutory members. (Ibid.)

In a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell, January 23 at 2:35 p.m.:

"Mr. Mitchell noted his exclusion from NSC meetings, 'which was wonderful for him.' HAK said it is the President's intention to bring

him in gradually, and wants him to be fully briefed, but reason he hasn't been at the meetings up to now is that the Pres wants to exclude some of the Cabinet members who are not statutory members, and in order to have a basis to do that, he has confined the list to statutory members. HAK will make sure Mr. Mitchell is kept informed—for example, there is some by-play in Paris which doesn't appear in reports and when it jells he will be in touch." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

On April 28, however, H.R. Haldeman notified Henry Kissinger that the President had directed that henceforth Attorney General John Mitchell be automatically included in all Council meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. II, 4/1/69–5/30/69)

Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy expressed dismay over his limited participation in NSC meetings in a January 20, 1970, letter to Kissinger, and Kissinger admitted in response that at times they may have been overzealous in restricting attendance. (See Document 94 and footnote 3 thereto) A year and a half later, in National Security Decision Memorandum 123, July 27, 1971, the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury (John Connally, who had replaced Kennedy in February 1971) as well as the Attorney General participate in all regular NSC meetings. Upon Attorney General Mitchell's resignation in February 1972, however, it was determined that his successor, Richard Kleindienst, would be not be invited to NSC meetings. (Memorandum from Davis to Haig, March 2, 1972; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. I, 1/20/69–3/31/69) On the other hand, it was decided to invite Connally's successor at Treasury, George Shultz, to NSC meetings, but Connally's proposal in May 1972, on the eve of his departure, that the Secretary of the Treasury be made a statutory NSC member was ignored. (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, June 4, 1972; ibid., Vol. III, 6/1/69–12/31/69)

15. Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Security Council[1]

Washington, January 21, 1969, 2 p.m.

Meeting was opened by the President and in attendance were:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, CIA
Secretary of the Treasury[2]
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The inaugural meeting commenced with a 7-minute still and motion picture photography session, after which the President announced that he would discuss briefly at this inaugural meeting the staff of procedural problems which the National Security Council will be concerned with, making the following points:

Number of meetings will generally follow a scenario which calls for two meetings per week up to the 1st of March, followed by a meeting every Thursday at 10:00 a.m. which should be finished by 2:00 p.m. and which should last for another month, after which he anticipates meetings will be held bimonthly.[3]

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan–Mar 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) The Diary indicates that Haig also attended the meeting, and presumably he prepared the minutes. The Record of Actions prepared by Haig is ibid., NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 955, Chron—Col. Haig–January 1969.

[2] During a telephone conversation on the morning of January 21, Secretary Kennedy told Kissinger that he thought he should attend the NSC meeting. Kissinger said he would check with Nixon and get back to him. Kennedy stated further that Nixon had told him he would be sent an agenda for every meeting and he would decide whether he wanted to attend. Kissinger said his understanding was that Kennedy would attend if there were issues such as international monetary policy on the agenda. (Note from Eagleburger to Joan McCarthy, January 21; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

[3] According to a list of NSC meetings compiled by the NSC Staff in 1974, the NSC met 36 times in 1969 (averaging four times a month from January through June and twice a month from July through December), 21 times in 1970, 11 times in 1971, and 3 times in 1972. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; ibid., Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75) See also

The President desires that members of the National Security Council appoint their most qualified planners to sit on the NSC Review Group and urged the attendees to select their best brains at the second level in their respective departments.

The President stated that he wished to have a review of the international situation and that this review should be subject to the scrutiny of the best brains available each year.

Membership of the National Security Council must be tightly limited and the President prefers to have the statutory members always in attendance, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of State. Beyond this, the Secretary of the Treasury should participate on an ad hoc basis during sessions in which budgetary or commercial considerations must be treated.

The President emphasized that the Secretary of the Treasury is the only other non-statutory Cabinet Member who will participate on a regular basis.[4]

The President discussed the role of the Director, CIA, at NSC meetings, emphasizing that he anticipates that the Director will normally give a briefing to update the membership on the intelligence aspects of the agenda items but the Director will not sit in on the substantive portions of the meetings.

The President pointed out that he wished the Director's role to be distinct in this regard and that he is basically an expert on intelligence rather than a policy formulator but that when the agenda item so dictates, he would, of course, be included in the substantive discussion.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Attorney General would not be included in council meetings at the present time. The President emphasized the importance he places upon the maintenance of security with respect to deliberations of the council, adding that President Johnson had warned him that leaks throughout government had been one of his primary concerns.

The President added that he had no personal problem such as President Johnson manifested on leaks but that the system and organization itself must be disciplined in order to prevent wholesale disclosures which have characterized the style of government recently.

The President emphasized that he wanted the deliberations of the group to be open and free and to assure each member that they should feel completely free to speak their piece.

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footnote 2, Document 178. Minutes for many of the meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–109 and H–110, NSC Minutes. Folders on each meeting containing talking points, briefing memoranda, analytical summaries, and background papers are ibid., Boxes 83–89.

[4] See Document 14.

The President emphasized that he did not want detailed debriefings in the respective departments following an NSC meeting, adding that he was conscious of the struggles for power within and among agencies and that leaks to the press had become an habitual vehicle for this in-fighting. He urged each statutory member to emphasize to their respective departments that their views would be heard at the NSC level, that they will not be watered down and that there could be no excuse for bringing their frustrations to the press.

The President then emphasized the careful selection process that had gone into the formulation of the membership of the Security Council, expressing his confidence that the very best men available had been chosen and that he had the utmost confidence in this body. Discussing the style and procedural approach that would be followed, the President stated that the NSC was not a decision-making body, that he would not call for votes on a particular issue and that he did not want them to feel obliged to hammer out a consensus.

The President stated, "I will make the decisions. To do this, I will need all points of view. I will then deliberate in private and make the decision. In this process, I might talk to individuals prior to finalizing my decision."

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, and Peru.]

The President asked Mr. Kissinger to discuss with him the following day the scheduling of a worldwide intelligence briefing. He then turned the meeting over to Mr. Kissinger who outlined the following procedural points to the group:

a. Agenda items would be furnished to the membership in writing.
b. The NSC Review Group would meet prior to the Council, carefully consider the substantive issues, to include the costs of the various options to be presented.

The President then stated that he wanted the Director of OEP to serve on the Review Group. At this point, the Secretary of Defense asked if the President wished to have the same individuals sitting on the Review Group and the Under Secretaries' Committee. Mr. Kissinger stated that the Under Secretaries' Group should primarily be involved in operational matters, much like the old OCB while the Review Group would focus primarily on policy matters. The Under Secretary Group has much of the same character as the old OCB and would be chaired by the Under Secretary of State while the Review Group would have much of the character of the old Planning Group.

General Lincoln stated he had no planner available to participate on the Review Group and the President told him to get one as soon as possible.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Turning next to procedural matters, Mr. Kissinger stated that while some papers were prepared initially by the NSC staff, normal procedure in the future would be that these papers would be prepared by the interdepartmental groups, regional or functional, or by special ad hoc groups, that they would then be presented to the Review Group the week preceding consideration by the Security Council.

Mr. Kissinger stated that there were two issues that he would have to discuss with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, which involved (a) contingency planning and (b) studies to be conducted which involved the technical characteristics of weapons.

Mr. Kissinger stated that gaps had been left in the initial NSC agendas to provide for ad hoc problem areas which might arise from time to time. He stated that the published schedule would be revised at the President's direction to move the Middle East item to the 1st of February and slip the SIOP briefing to February 5.

Mr. Kissinger emphasized that the President wanted alternatives presented to the NSC, not a single answer waffle.

The President interjected that he felt strongly about this point and if minority views existed that he wanted to see them clearly stated.

Secretary Kennedy asked how the President wished to have the facts presented to the Council. Secretary Rogers replied that we should get people such as the Director of CIA or interdepartmental briefings to accomplish this.

The President stated that that was the system that should be used rather than through papers alone, that he would like to get the facts through briefings.

Secretary of State stated, "I don't want to read papers, I want to hear facts and be brought up to date."

The President then asked how regularly we were in contact with Ambassador Lodge, to which Secretary of State replied, "several times a day."

The President asked if we could not simplify our communication procedures with Lodge.

The President expressed his confidence in the Paris negotiating team and emphasized the importance that they moved in tandem with Washington.

As the meeting adjourned, the Vice President asked how he should handle confidential papers which he was receiving. Mr. Rogers said he would have him briefed on this problem.

Meeting was adjourned at 11:35 a.m.[5]

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[5] This time is in error. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting, which began at 2 p.m., adjourned by 3:30 p.m., when Nixon met alone with Kissinger and Wheeler. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

16. Editorial Note

In a January 22, 1969, memorandum to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird raised the issue of "communication channels between the Department of Defense (DoD) and your office. It would be exceedingly valuable to me—and I believe a useful practice for the NSC system—if all official communications between DoD and your office were to come through the Secretary of Defense. In that way I could better keep abreast of developments, both within the Department (a task which may be rigorous under the best of circumstances) and between the Department and its principal outside contacts. I shall ask the DoD elements which will be involved in NSC matters to forward their official communications through the Secretary's office." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1347, NSC Nixon Files—1969) Laird made the same points in a January 22 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75–89, 334 NSC Jan 1969) Kissinger responded to Laird in a January 25 memorandum that in the future "all official National Security Council communications will be routed through you" with courtesy copies provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This routing, however, was "not intended to affect the direct access between the President (and the NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor their statutory role as the principal military advisers to the President and the NSC." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1347, NSC Nixon Files—1969)

Both President Nixon (for the White House) and Laird (for the Defense Department) issued guidelines for liaison between the two agencies. Both specified that on issues involving national security or defense policy communication would be between Nixon or Kissinger on the one hand and Laird on the other. On other issues communication would be channeled through Nixon's Military Assistant and Laird's Special Assistant. (Memorandum from Laird to Nixon, March 15, 1971, and memorandum from Nixon to Laird, April 8, 1971; ibid., Agency Files, Box 226, Dept of Defense, Vol. XI, 24 Feb 71–15 May 71 and memorandum from Laird, January 24, 1972, attached to Staff Meeting Minutes for January 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 7628, OSD Office Chronological Files) Laird expressed his concern over breakdowns in White House-DoD channels of communication with some frequency. For example, he raised the issue directly with President Nixon in 1971 and at a number of his own staff meetings, including those on August 24 and 31, 1970; April 12, 1971; January 10 and 24, June 5, June 19, and October 16, 1972. (Staff Meeting Minutes; ibid.) Following the White House's discovery in Decem-

ber 1971 that the JCS had been receiving copies of NSC documents by illicit means (see Document 164) Laird sent copies of his two January 22, 1969, memoranda to Attorney General Mitchell under cover of a January 5, 1972, memorandum in which he stated, "As you will see, on January 22, 1969—my first day as Secretary of Defense—I counseled both the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against a private NSC–JCS channel. As you know, I have since repeated that admonition numerous times." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 7445, Signer's Copies, January 1972)

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17. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, January 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Meeting, 23 January 1969

1. The first meeting of the NSC Review Group was held in the White House Situation Room on 23 January under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger.[2] Others in attendance as regular members of the Review Group were Dick Pederson, Department of State; Paul Warnke, Department of Defense; Lt. General William Rosson, Joint Staff; and Haakon Lindjord, Office of Emergency Preparedness. In addition, Morton Halperin, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Spurgeon Keeny—all members of the White House Staff; General Andrew Goodpaster, temporary advisor to Kissinger; Hugh Ryan, U.S. Information Agency; and Samuel DePalma, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. The first part of the meeting was devoted to a description by Kissinger of the functions of the NSC Review Group. He described it as being essentially like the NSC Planning Board of the Eisenhower

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting. Secret. Drafted by Smith on January 25.

[2] According to the Record of Decisions at the meeting, it was decided that the Review Group would meet weekly. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Chronological File) According to a list compiled by the NSC Staff in 1974, the NSC Review Group and its successor the Senior Review Group met 140 times from 1969 through 1972. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75) Other records indicate, however, that there were additional meetings not included on the list. See also footnote 2, Document 178.

administration but with the primary task of presenting papers on major policy issues to the NSC in such form that choices could be made among feasible alternatives. He made a sharp distinction between *policy* exploration and *operational* decisions. He said the Review Group would deal only with the policy issues and leave operational decisions to the appropriate departments. The fundamental role of the Review Group is to select, on the basis of the best information and judgment available, those issues appropriate for NSC decision and to present those issues in a format which would facilitate choices among options.[3]

3. Kissinger placed considerable emphasis on the President's desire for secrecy regarding all NSC discussions. The President wishes to have a free give-and-take during NSC meetings and wishes not to be restrained by fear of leaks or public discussions of views expressed. He wishes to keep secret even the subjects under discussion. Regarding Review Group meetings, Kissinger at first urged that the information be handled as NoDis is now handled. In the subsequent discussion he was made aware that the various agencies could not perform their tasks without providing dissemination to IRG representatives as well as heads of key offices. At this point Kissinger invited each member to present at the next meeting his needs for communicating within his own agency the actions of the Review Group. It was also agreed that the Secretary of the Review Group, presently Morton Halperin, would distribute minutes of the meetings which could be used as a basis for briefing within the separate agencies.[4]

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[3] In reporting on the Review Group meeting at the DCI's morning meeting on January 24, R. Jack Smith, Deputy Director for Intelligence, emphasized that the group "will make no decisions but will identify choices and options." (Memorandum for the Record by R. J. Smith, January 24; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting) Kissinger reported at the Review Group's March 6 meeting that the President had told him "he likes the options format for NSC papers. He wishes, however, that obviously absurd options be removed and wants the Review Group to indicate which options appear to be the more logical or 'respectable.'" (Memorandum for the Record by R. J. Smith, March 7; ibid.)

[4] According to the Record of Decisions at the January 23 meeting, no record was to be made of the group's discussions but instead the NSC staff would distribute a record of decisions that would provide the basis for de-briefings of decisions according to a procedure to be determined at the group's next meeting. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Chronological File) However, beginning in June 1969 and continuing into 1973 minutes for most meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–111-H–113, SRG Meeting Minutes, Originals. Talking points, papers for discussion, and other briefing and background material for individual meetings from January 1969 to December 1976 are ibid., Boxes 90–103. Briefing and background material for meetings from January 1969 to January 1977 along with minutes for many meetings are also at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 302–307. R.J. Smith's records of discussion at a number of meetings between January 1969 and June 1970, including meetings for which there are no minutes at the NSC, are in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting.

4. This organizational discussion was followed by a discussion of the paper on [the] Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was a crisp substantive discussion during the course of which a number of descriptions of pros and cons underlying key issues were modified. A revised draft was to be circulated to the members on the following day for coordination. Early in the following week the paper is to be distributed to the NSC members as a basis for discussion at the next meeting.

R. J. Smith
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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18. Editorial Note

The National Security Council's 303 Committee and its successor, the 40 Committee, reviewed proposals for major and/or politically sensitive covert action programs. For documentation on the 303 Committee and the 40 Committee, as well as on the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Net Assessment Group within the NSC Staff, both of which were established on November 5, 1971, see Documents 92, 182, 184, 185, 189, 195, 203, 218, 228, 239, 242–47, 250, 251, 256, 265, 266, 268, 270, 278, 279, 286, and 287.

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19. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, January 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Contact Between the White House Staff and Foreign Diplomats

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 1, Miscellaneous Hold. Confidential; Literally Personal and Eyes Only.

Henry Kissinger has sent you a careful memcon of his talk with Bui Diem on January 24, which I attach simply for reference.[2] You will note that the last paragraph contains Henry's invitation to the Ambassador to come in any time he wants.

I have very strong feelings on this broad subject of contact between White House staff members and foreign diplomats, and I think they are based on considerations of orderliness and historical experience which go far beyond any parochial feeling—or any sense that John Burke and I have some clue on how to find out what is really on Bui Diem's mind.

In a nutshell, I think the annual practice of members of the White House staff receiving foreign ambassadors personally is an immense mistake. To my recollection, it did not exist at all under Bobby Cutler, Dillon Anderson, or Gordon Gray in the Eisenhower Administration—and if it had been attempted in the Truman Administration I venture that there would have been additions to the lines of the unemployed.

However, the strong and personal White House staff installed by President Kennedy—led by another relative of mine—produced a gradual and important change in practice which has now come to be accepted—and which Henry obviously deems himself to be following. Not only Mac and Walt Rostow, but a great many others made a practice of not only being available to foreign ambassadors or seeing them a great deal in a social way, but of actively seeking them out. Sometimes this was coordinated with the Department and the results were [a] plus, sometimes it was done on the express orders of the President and as a way of giving extra force to representations—a notable example being both Mac's and Walt's contacts with Dobrynin. It is not by any means all bad or to be ruled out—but it would be my own considered view that it should be cut to the absolute minimum and in no circumstances engaged in except on the express orders of the President or yourself, and with the understanding of *both* the President and yourself.

To state the substantive arguments briefly, the *advantages* of authorized and directed formal contact by the White House staff are (a) to convey direct messages from the President where it would be embarrassing, insecure, or excessively formal to summon the ambassador to the Oval Room; (b) to get exploratory discussion of key topics on a very relaxed basis and without the formality that some ambassadors feel about their regular points of contact in the Department. I accept the validity of (a) in rare cases. But I submit that (b) should not be the case if the Department and specifically the assistant secre-

[2] Not printed.

tary are doing the job you are entitled to expect of them. (I leave out of account the authorized use of CAS contacts in Washington, which again is a very rare hole card and can be occasionally put on a real "cut-out" basis to good effect and with good reason.)

On the other hand, the *disadvantages* seem to me enormous and normally overriding. You can judge for yourself whether Henry's third point goes beyond what you said to the Ambassador the other day. Obviously, in this instance, no harm has been done and the report is scrupulous. But the cases have been legion—and in numerous cases documented to us through Tom Hughes' best sources—where members of the White House staff have given a significantly different slant to a problem and to the US position on it, from the position that we in the Department were conveying on the express authority of the Secretary. Apart from questions of misinterpretation, the chances of being whipsawed are just terribly great, and I would reckon that there are many embassies in town that have now established, or are at this moment seeking to establish, dual lines of contact to the White House and to the Department on the whole range of foreign policy issues. (I might add that the danger extends to the Pentagon, but has never been in the slightest degree significant in recent years with the caliber of men that we have had in the crucial ISA positions.)

In short, my personal suggestion to you would be to develop very clear and strict ground rules on this matter in whatever way you see fit.

I might add that the question of course washes over into contacts at social gatherings. I do not sense that Henry and his men have any great appetite for such gatherings, but they will be sorely tempted by the ingenious Diplomatic Corps. Obviously, they cannot be put on a freeze, but very strict rules of discretion and an absolute requirement of reporting the significant seem to me a minimum solution.

This is a question not of executive suite politics, but of your personal and institutional position and above all of the orderly and precise conduct of our foreign affairs. I say this with the utmost respect, with nothing but healed scar tissue from the past, and with only the warmest and most admiring feelings for Henry and for all of his staff whom I know.

I am making no carbon of this memorandum, and only you and I and my secretary will ever know it was written.

WPB

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, February 1, 1969.

The President has directed that all State Department matters concerning the President's personal schedule be cleared through my office. This will also apply to all details of the President's schedule when he is on foreign trips.[2]

Will you please take the necessary steps to insure that all such matters arising in the State Department are referred to my office—and that I have the opportunity to review all incoming cable traffic regarding the President's schedule and all outgoing traffic before it is sent. This would include any proposed turn-downs as well as acceptances or other schedule details. No commitments, express or implicit, for the President's time should ever be made without prior approval from my office. As you well recognize, this is essential to insure proper coordination.

This procedure should not, of course, in any way affect the normal clearance procedures already established with Henry Kissinger's office except in the specific areas of the President's schedule.[3]

HR Haldeman

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Ehrlichman. A blind copy was sent to Ken Cole.

[2] In his diary entry for January 31, Haldeman wrote the following: "Had long session about schedule and [President] called K[issinger] and me in to meeting with General Goodpaster about K's problems with State. P refused to tackle it head-on. Started by shifting schedule and personnel responsibilities regarding State from K to me, to get K out of trivia. Especially emphasized this about trip." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

[3] In a February 3 memorandum to Rogers, Haldeman indicated that the President had "somewhat revised" the procedure outlined in this memorandum: "I will continue to have responsibility for schedule planning but the responsibility for personnel appointments has been assigned to John Ehrlichman." (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) In another February 3 memorandum to Rogers, Haldeman indicated that the President had directed him to assume responsibility for overall planning of the President's proposed European trip, and that he assumed "that steps have been taken to insure that I receive copies of all incoming cable traffic and all outgoing traffic before it is sent regarding all details and facets of the President's trip." (Ibid.)

21. Editorial Note

On February 6, 1969, the White House issued a press release announcing the steps that President Nixon had taken to "restore the National Security Council to the role set for it in the National Security Act of 1947." The press release also announced that the President had "directed the reorganization and strengthening of the NSC staff." The substantive components of the staff now consisted of: 1) an Operations Staff with seven subdivisions—for Latin America, Europe, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, Africa, International Economic Affairs, and Science, Disarmament and Atomic Energy; 2) Assistants for Programs; 3) a Planning Staff; and 4) the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. For text of the press release, see Department of State *Bulletin,* February 24, 1969, pages 163–164.

Also on February 6 the Department of State issued *Foreign Affairs Manual Circular* No. 521 outlining the New National Security Council System as well as the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State in the new system. In a message that same day to officers and employees of the Department of State, Secretary Rogers apprised them of the new system and assured them that it was the President's intention that the Department "play a central and dynamic role" in the system. For text, see ibid., pages 164–165. The Secretary's message was transmitted to all diplomatic and consular post in telegram 019246, February 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1)

Earlier, in a January 25 memorandum, Secretary of Defense Laird had established procedures for Department of Defense participation in the National Security Council and its various components. He designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as the central point of contact for NSC matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as advisor to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary for NSC matters. He also specified procedures to expedite coordination between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on agenda items prior to meetings of the NSC, the NSC Review Group, and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Box 5, NSC/RG) In a January 28 memorandum, Paul Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, established basic responsibilities in ISA for carrying out the functions assigned to him by Secretary Laird. (Ibid.) In a January 29 memorandum, L.K. White, Executive Director Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency, outlined the new NSC system and established institutions and procedures for providing the system with CIA support. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Folder 220, National Security Council)

22. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 7, 1969.

I have expressed to you on several occasions my concern that the NSC staff is not properly organized and that the functions of the components of the staff, i.e., the Operators, the Planners and the Programmers have not been sufficiently delineated and formalized to insure the kind of smooth staff work that is essential. I am equally concerned that the interface between the NSC staff and your personal staff, which should be oriented primarily to support the White House and the President, is also ragged and requires some finite functional sorting.

I have no personal ambitions with respect to this problem and am honored to serve in any capacity at this level, providing I have assured myself that you are getting the kind of support which you must have. It would be a tragedy if our failure to sort out organizational problems and establish sound internal management were to detract from the kind of service that I am sure you can provide to the President and to the country.

You mentioned to me on several occasions the problem of establishing a Deputy's billet. After careful reflection, I am convinced that such a billet should be established, provided you are willing to delegate to the incumbent of that billet the authority that is needed to permit him to move promptly and decisively on organizational matters and to enable him to relieve you of the mounting inconsequential procedural details with which you are currently being plagued by various members of the NSC staff. As I suggested earlier, I think it is essential that the following things be done as soon as possible:

a. A detailed organizational charter be promulgated among the staff, outlining the specific responsibilities of each staff member which provides for a finite interface between each staff section, and includes a conceptual flow of work projects through these sections, as well as appoints senior points of contact where appropriate, i.e., within planning and programming sections. It is equally important that the interface between your urgent, one-time support requirements for the President and the long-term, more formalized development of NSC projects be carefully outlined. I would foresee this as a primary responsibility for your Deputy, who should deal directly with the staff and the pri-

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (2), 2/7/69–2/11/69. Eyes Only; Private.

mary officers within the three sections of the staff to insure that the frictions of the past two weeks are promptly eliminated.

b. Establish an Administrative Secretariat in the EOB under the supervision of a non-substantive, yet highly qualified administrative officer.

c. Put Larry Eagleburger and your Deputy, or just the latter, in the office next to you and move all NSC administrative business to the EOB.

d. Continue the preparation of Daily Presidential Briefs as currently set up but with a mandatory one hour coordinating period each evening to insure that the business and intelligence details included in the brief are carefully refined by you personally or by your Deputy and also to insure that you are thoroughly prepared before your morning meeting with the President.

e. Dependent on the seniority of the Deputy that you select, the interface between Larry Eagleburger and the Deputy will require the most careful coordination. In any case, it is essential that these two individuals work together on a give and take basis, that one can fill for the other and that both are totally cognizant of each others' responsibilities and the current actions being handled by each. As I visualize it, your Deputy's principal focus would be on the flow of substantive information between the NSC staff and you and the requirement to insure that this information is provided on a timely basis and is substantively responsive to your guidance. I visualize that Larry Eagleburger will continue to provide you the broad personal attention in every area of activity in which you are involved.

While I am not volunteering to assume the Deputy's responsibilities outlined above, I would be honored to serve you in this capacity and believe I could do much to relieve the errors and confusion of our first organizational days. In any event, I think it is essential that you move promptly to establish the lines of responsibility which I have outlined so that the best energies of our staff can be channeled to support you in an efficient manner.

If you approve this action, I am prepared to move, without delay, this weekend, to sort out these details in coordination with the members of the staff and in full recognition that there will be certain bruises develop with which I am prepared to cope.[2]

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[2] Haig was promoted to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in June 1970. In an April 15, 1969, letter to Laird in which he supported Haig's candidacy for promotion to Brigadier General, Kissinger praised Haig's "superb" performance. "He deals daily with a multitude of complicated and extremely sensitive subjects with an ease and maturity I have seldom seen, including supervision of much of the work my staff does for the National Security Council." Kissinger concluded, "In short, I could not operate without him. He is the finest officer I have known." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

23. Memorandum by the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)[1]

NSC–U/DM 1 Washington, February 7, 1969.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

The Organization and Functioning of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee

NSDM No. 2 of January 20[2] established the NSC Under Secretaries Committee under my chairmanship. In order to have time reserved on our calendars for meetings of the Committee, I wish to confirm that we will hold 4:00 p.m. Thursday each week. It is understood that the Committee will probably not meet each week and I will attempt to get word to you on meetings as far in advance as possible. I think it important, however, to hold this time so that operational problems can be scheduled for consideration by the Committee on fairly short notice.

I have discussed with Henry Kissinger the problem of assuring closest coordination of all phases of NSC activity. In order to make our procedures as consistent with the NSC and Review Group operations as possible, my staff will use the following designations on documents:

—NSC–U/DM (Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum)
—NSC–U/SM (Under Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum)[3]

In addition, the Committee will use two auxiliary series:

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–270, Under Secretaries Decision Memoranda, U/DM 1. Information copies were sent to the Acting Director of AID, the Director of USIA, the Director of OEP, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury.

[2] Document 11.

[3] Copies of NSC U/SM 1 through NSC U/SM 150 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–249 through H–269, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda and ibid., RG 59 S/S–U/SM Files: Lot 81 D 309. Copies of NSC U/D 1 through NSC U/DM 126 are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–270 through H–280 and ibid., RG 59, S/S–U/DM Files: Lot 83 D 276.

—NSC–U/N (Under Secretaries Committee Administrative Notices)[4]

—NSC–U/M (Under Secretaries Committee Minutes)

I hope in the next few days to be able to indicate several subjects and the date for consideration of these subjects in the Under Secretaries Committee. I also hope that you will feel free to suggest to me matters that you wish brought before this Committee. I would then discuss these suggestions with Henry Kissinger in order to assure appropriate coordination with other parts of the NSC structure.

Elliot

[4] Copies of NSC U/N 1 through NSC U/N 149 are ibid, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–281, U/N and ibid, RG 59, S/S–U/N Files: Lot 83 D 277.

24. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Organization of National Security Council Staff and White House Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

In coordination with Mr. Eagleburger, I have completed an analysis of the organizational structure of the National Security Council staff and of your White House office and am submitting herewith our recommendations for the reorganization of both.

The plan provides recommendations in three broad areas:

a. Section I—The organization of your White House office.

b. Section II—The organization of the National Security Staff Secretariat and,

c. Section III—The organization of the National Security Council Staff.

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (2), 2/7/69–2/11/69. No classification marking.

Within each of these three areas, functional responsibilities are delineated and the interface between all three are outlined.

Section I—Organization of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Executive Assistant

Duties

The Executive Assistant (Larry Eagleburger) would continue to provide full range of personal staff assistance to you. He would maintain complete cognizance of your daily activities and serve as your focal point for the transmission of instructions to and from the Office of the President through the designated Assistants to the President and intergovernmentally at the Special Assistant level and above, and to the NSC staff through the Military Assistant. Normally, the Executive Assistant will delegate to the Military Assistant liaison at the Special Assistant/Military Assistant level with the Department of Defense, Director, OEP, and Central Intelligence Agency. It is emphasized that contacts with the NSC staff would be effected through the Military Assistant or in coordination with him with the view toward relieving the Executive Assistant of time consuming coordination with the NSC staff so that he can be totally responsive to the rapid pace of your daily activities, plan ahead to preclude short deadlines in your schedule and foresee potential trouble spots.

In processing the flow of business related to the NSC, the Executive Assistant will, after clearance of NSC substantive papers by the Military Assistant, present them to you with staff assistance as required and in sufficient time to insure assimilation and/or modification prior to consideration by the National Security Council and/or the Review Group.

The Executive Assistant would be located in the office adjacent to yours, with the desk against the window so that both of you would have easy access to each other through the interconnecting door, thus avoiding the risks associated with the reception room conduct of business. Entry to your office through the front door would be limited to scheduled visitors as controlled by your private secretary in coordination with you and the Executive Assistant.

Approve[2]

Disapprove

Other

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[2] Kissinger checked this option.

Military Assistant

Duties

The Military Assistant, Colonel Haig, will maintain cognizance of the full range of activities handled by the Executive Assistant and will be specifically charged with coordination of and liaison with National Security Council staff through the Staff Secretary or designated senior geographic substantive officers and the designated senior representatives of the Planning and Programming Sections as described in Section III.

The Military Assistant will insure that NSC and Review Group papers were available to you on a timely basis and are consistent with substantive guidance which you have provided. In effect, the Military Assistant would serve as the de facto Chief of Staff for substantive NSC affairs and be the single point of contact to insure final review of NSC papers prior to presentation through the Executive Assistant to you.

Military Assistant will be responsible for setting up thru the NSC Secretary or the substantive officer concerned, staff briefings, special briefings and meetings as may be required in the conduct of NSC business.

Military Assistant would exercise monitorship of the Daily Intelligence Briefing for the President by conducting a daily coordinating meeting with the substantive geographic officers and Mr. McCafferty and an assistant to be designated as outlined below.

Military Assistant will monitor 303 Committee agendas and activities working in close coordination with Mr. Frank Chapin and insure you are briefed on this material in a timely manner and that follow-up action is accomplished in timely fashion.

Military Assistant will be located with the Executive Assistant and be the point of contact with the NSC staff and will be able, as required, to fill in for the Executive Assistant in his absence.

Approve[3]

Disapprove

Other

Administrative Assistant

Duties

The Administrative Assistant, Bob Houdek, will be the point of receipt for all material forwarded to you from the NSC Staff Secretariat

[3] Kissinger checked this option.

to be relocated in EOB and described in Section III. He will sort this material into categories such as "Information," "Action" and "Signature." He will also receive, for initial screening, material received from the Office of the President or other members of the White House staff and all out-of-house foreign affairs related material of a non-NSC operational nature for your or Presidential action. He will insure that it is properly logged and suspensed by the existing small White House office Administrative Section, dispatch it to the Staff Secretary if appropriate, or refer it to the Executive/Military Assistants. The Executive/Military Assistants will insure that priorities for your attention are established and that the paper work is substantively responsive and coordinated prior to delivery through the Executive Assistant to your desk.

Mr. Houdek would continue to participate in daily press briefings and provide liaison with the office of the Press Secretary.

The Administrative Assistant will continue to be located in the small office to the left of the guard desk in the West Basement.

Approve[4]

Disapprove

Other

Information and Intelligence Operations

Mr. Art McCafferty and one qualified designated Assistant will prepare, based on all source reports (including submissions by the substantive staff) and the daily draft intelligence summary for the President. It will be available by 1730 hours each day in time for the coordinating meeting between you, the Military Assistant and appropriate members of the NSC staff. The meeting will be held in the Situation Room and should include, as necessary, participation by the CIA briefer, Mr. [*name not declassified*].

(This meeting will enable NSC staff members to insure that items presented to the President in the morning brief are accurate, have been subjected to their analysis where required and contain the latest factual data available. Participation by Mr. [*name not declassified*] in this meeting would also permit proper coordination of material contained in the CIA Daily Brief with the basic memoranda prepared for the President. It will also go far toward improving the responsiveness of the CIA Daily Brief by highlighting special items of Presidential interest. Notwithstanding, there will be occasions when the CIA representative will be excused.)

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[4] Kissinger checked this option.

If you are not available for this meeting, it should be conducted by the Military Assistant to insure that the coordination is effected on a timely basis and that a final coordinated draft will be available for your subsequent review prior to your meeting with the President the following morning. The morning update will be conducted for you by the Military Assistant.

Approve

Disapprove

Other[5]

Organization of the White House Office Secretarial Staff

It is essential that the reception room be maintained as an orderly, non-substantive administrative area which is occupied solely by required secretarial support. The following secretarial organization is proposed:

Joan McCarthy—Personal secretary, responsible for the maintenance of your daily calendar, in coordination with the Executive Assistant (a separate analysis of your personal schedule has been prepared by Mr. Eagleburger as attached at Tab F).

Mildred Zayac—Mrs. McCarthy's Deputy, responsive to your personal requirements, with the full capability of filling in for Mrs. McCarthy so that acceptable working hours can be established for both.

Sally Dahler—Perform confidential secretarial duties for you and also fill in as required in general front office clerical work.

Secretary to be designated for the Executive Assistant.

Muriel Hartley—Secretary for the Military Assistant.

It is anticipated that the above secretarial staff would provide the full time competence required to support you, your Executive Assistant and your Military Assistant (each is capable of filling in for the other). Additional late hour assistance can be provided by Mrs. Lora Simkus to insure that the secretarial staff is not subjected to the excessive workloads of recent weeks.

Approve[6]

Disapprove

Other

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[5] Kissinger checked the "Approve" option and next to the "Other" option, wrote: "except for [*name not declassified*] presence."

[6] Kissinger checked this option.

Section II—System for the Processing of Papers
Related to National Security

As soon as practicable, the point of receipt of all paper work related to the National Security Council affairs should be designated as the NSC Staff Secretariat which will be set up under the supervision of the NSC Staff Secretary, Mr. Moose, in the Executive Office Building (Mr. Bromley Smith should serve as his adviser and be located with him). It will be the function of this Staff Secretariat to receive, log and establish suspenses for all NSC related paper work. Decision will be made by the Secretariat as to the processing of this paper. Normally, it will entail immediate dispatch to the responsible substantive officer, or to the Planning or Programming Section and also provide for mandatory coordination between all affected staff members. Logging and suspenses will also be established for all correspondence referred to the NSC for action from your White House office.

Approve[7]

Disapprove

Other

When an issue is urgent and demands your immediate attention, it will be sent simultaneously to your office and to the substantive officer or officers most concerned to minimize delay. Specifically, the Secretariat itself should be organized under Mr. Moose to provide the following:

a. Prompt servicing and central control of all NSC action papers or papers referred to the NSC staff by the White House office.

b. A system for guaranteeing coordination between individual members and staff sections of the NSC staff.

c. The provision of administrative support to the NSC Staff to include clerical assistance, transportation, personnel services, messenger service and space control.

d. Maintenance of the budgetary, personnel and organization framework of the NSC staff. (Mr. Moose has already recommended that he be authorized to acquire the services of a budget specialist to prepare a revised NSC budget. We recommend approval of this action so that budgetary estimates can be promptly prepared.)

e. Maintenance of the NSC staff communications system which will provide for the rapid distribution of cables, intelligence publications, and reports to the NSC staff.

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[7] Kissinger checked this option.

f. Maintain liaison with the departments and agencies within the national security structure at the Staff Secretariat level. As a rule, a Staff Secretary would not deal with the Assistants to the principals of the Departments and Agencies. This liaison should be effected through the Executive Assistant or the Military Assistant as previously outlined.

g. The Staff Secretary will work in close coordination with the Chief of the Planning Section and especially the Chief of the NSC Support Group, in the preparation and timely distribution of all NSC agenda related papers. The Staff Secretary will insure that all NSC related papers, including NSSMs, NSDMs, are standardized as to format and style and are properly numbered and distributed among the interested agencies on a timely basis. Based on guidance from the Chief of the Planning Section, the Staff Secretary will maintain suspense files, a master calendar of NSC and Review Group work schedules and related calendar of NSC business. It is essential that the reproduction capability of the Secretariat provide for the rapid reproduction of multiple copies of NSC documents so that timely distribution of material of substantive interest to *all* staff personnel is promptly furnished these officers for comment as required. The Staff Secretary's Administrative Assistant must be capable of insuring this action in coordination with the Chief of the Planning section who must be equally conscious of this responsibility.

h. Establish a messenger service responsive to the requirements of your White House office and the interagency requirements of the NSC staff.

i. Serve as the single point of contact between your office, for all NSC matters, as well as matters referred by your office to the NSC staff.

j. Serve as the point of contact for the clearance of cables from State, Defense, CIA or other agencies and departments as required. Normal routine would provide for receipt of the cable initially at the White House office and dispatch to the Secretariat through Mr. Houdek who will log the message. Once staff clearance has been obtained, it will be returned to Mr. Houdek for your clearance after which it will be officially cleared by the Staff Secretary who will also maintain a log and suspense on the messages.[8] Some messages which the staff officer considers routine or totally consistent with your views should be cleared by him thru the Secretary without further reference to you. Through this system, a double suspense will insure no cable clearances are missed. This system will also enable us to restrict highly classified or personal traffic to the White House office if so determined by you or your immediate staff.

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[8] In the left margin next to this sentence, Kissinger wrote: "Within 48 hours."

k. Serve as the point of contact for the receipt of White House initiated requirements received by your White House office which should be referred to the Staff Secretariat for logging, suspense and assignment of action to the appropriate substantive officer or staff section. As with cables, a double log and suspense system would be used, first in your office and secondly, within the Staff Secretariat to insure a double check and timely receipt of the response. High priority requirements of the President or his White House staff would be brought to the attention of the Military Assistant or the Executive Assistant by Mr. Houdek prior to or simultaneously with processing through the Staff Secretariat so that you are aware of the requirement.

(Mr. Moose has recommended the acquisition of a highly qualified administrative assistant from the Department of State to assist in establishing the Administrative Section within the Staff Secretariat and it is recommended that he be provided with this assistance.)[9]

Section III—Organization of the National Security Council Staff

There is an urgent need for a prompt and finite delineation of responsibilities within the substantive NSC staff. This delineation of responsibilities will unquestionably generate personal resentment on the part of individuals who had been told or who have assumed that they would play a role which would be greater or perhaps somewhat different from what sound organization dictates.

Recognizing this, we have spoken to several of the principal officers, with the view towards getting a cross section of attitudes on organizational arrangements, especially as they pertain to the interface between the geographic officers and the Planning and the Program sections. Unfortunately, each visualizes a degree of authority and responsibility which could only be achieved at the expense of adjacent staff section or substantive officer. Thus, hard decisions must be made now which are based on the overall efficiency of the NSC staff and more importantly, which provide the kind of balance, expertise and judgment essential at this level.

—At Tab A is a proposed Organizational Chart of the NSC Staff.[10]

—At Tab B is a proposed draft mission statement for the Operations Section.

—At Tab C is a proposed draft mission statement for the Planning Section.

—At Tab D is a proposed draft mission statement for the Programs Section.

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[9] Beneath this paragraph (the bottom of page 8), Kissinger wrote: "OK HK."

[10] Tab A is not attached. Tabs B–F are not printed.

—At Tab E is a Procedure Outline for the processing of papers for Review Group and NSC Meetings prepared primarily by Mr. Halperin.

—At Tab F is a separate analysis of your personal schedule.

Recommendation

That you approve in principle the organizational concept outlined;

That you convene a meeting of the staff and furnish them with copies of the attachments with the provision that functions are in draft only and are subject to refinement in coordination with the Military Assistant;

That, in the interim, the organization be set up as outlined effective February 13, to include execution of all physical moves by the close of business February 13.

(Mr. Dave McManis (NSA) is prepared to serve as Intelligence Assistant and can be here on February 13. He would remain on NSA payroll.)[11]

[11] At the end of the text, Kissinger wrote (presumably referring to the entire memorandum), "want to discuss minor changes—Role of Halperin etc."

25. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Formation of an Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam

At the present time, no formal link exists between the NSC and the major policy planning group in Washington concerned with Vietnam. Policy planning on this subject has heretofore been handled by an informal interagency group under Department of State auspices. This deficiency has come into sharp focus in recent days as we attempted to get a grasp on existing contingency plans for Vietnam preparatory to your departure for Europe. The attached NSSM (Tab A)[2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–136, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 21. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Document 26.

would formalize this interagency group and provide for the channeling of its policy studies into the NSC Review Group and the NSC, when desirable.

Creation of this Ad Hoc Group should have an immediately beneficial impact in pulling together our politico military contingency planning for U.S. reactions to a major new Communist offensive in South Vietnam. This Ad Hoc Group can be tasked, as below, with this responsibility. It can also oversee the implementation of your decisions on reaction and should prove of particular value if the Vietnamese Communists attempt a major offensive during the period of your upcoming trip to Europe. Conversely, it will not preclude the type of planning we conducted on Tuesday with Mel Laird and General McConnell. I will talk to Mel to insure that the special types of military operations we discussed at the meeting are excluded from this interdepartmental forum.

A study memorandum is enclosed (Tab B)[3] requesting the preparation of an integrated political and military scenario of possible U.S. reactions to Communist attacks on the cities of South Vietnam and to the assassination of President Thieu. Preparation of these papers has been discussed with the Department of State and work is already underway. We thus have reason to expect that the short deadline can be met.

Approved[4]

Disapproved

[3] Not found attached. It can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–136, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 22.

[4] The President initialed this option.

26. National Security Study Memorandum 21[1]

Washington, February 13, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Vietnam

To facilitate the orderly planning and implementation of policy on Vietnam within the framework of the National Security Council, the President has directed the formation of an interdepartmental, Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam.

This group shall be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State and shall include representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.[2] Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman. The Group shall perform the following functions:

1. Preparation of policy and contingency papers for consideration by the NSC Review Group and the NSC. Copies of the papers shall be transmitted to the heads of participating departments and agencies as provided in NSDM 2.[3]

2. Discussion of interdepartmental issues concerning Vietnam and decision on issues which can be appropriately settled by the Ad Hoc Group. This should include the planning and coordination, as appropriate, of the Government's public information policy on Vietnam.

Henry A. Kissinger

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–207, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 21. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

[2] In a February 17 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, Rogers designated Bundy Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group and delineated procedures Bundy should follow in submitting papers to the NSC Review Group or the National Security Council directly. (Ibid.) Following Bundy's departure in May 1969, William Sullivan became chairman of the group.

[3] Document 11.

27. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, February 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Meeting on 13 February

1. The NSC Review Group met on 13 February on NSSM 10, "East-West Relations."[2]

2. This was a precedent-making meeting, marking the first time that there has been a full-scale confrontation between Henry Kissinger—representing the new concepts of NSC procedures—and the European Affairs Bureau of the Department of State—representing the traditional procedures of policy formulation. The paper presented to the Review Group was not a paper setting forth a range of options which would enable the NSC principals to engage fundamental and opposing issues and arrive at a new and more precise consensus. It was instead an advocacy paper designed to advance only one basic policy toward East-West relations. The paper contained some half-hearted gestures toward meeting the options format which Kissinger had requested, but these alternate options were patently straw men, lacking both internal logic and conviction.

3. During the discussion that ensued the paper was attacked by a majority of the Review Group and defended mildly by a minority. The State Department view was that whatever faults the paper had could be blamed on the overlay of "options" which had been forced on it by the NSC Staff. In reality, it was said, there is only one view which "responsible people" can hold regarding policy toward East-West relations, and that view is set forth as Option 3, "Strong Deterrent with Flexible Approach." Gradually during the course of this discussion agreement was reached that Option 3 as stated was so broad that it needed to be articulated in a series of sub-options. As Kissinger put it, "Surely there is divergence between the attitudes expressed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the one hand, and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. Somewhere between these two outer wings are other defensible positions. The President and the NSC should be given the opportunity to discuss this range." Kissinger then

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting. Secret. Drafted by Smith on February 15.

[2] Copies of NSSM 10, January 27, and the resulting paper are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–133, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 10.

directed the NSC Staff to prepare a new draft of the paper to be ready for consideration of the NSC at its scheduled 19 February meeting.

4. During this discussion, Henry Kissinger set forth some views regarding the much discussed "linkage" proposition which I found useful and may be illuminating to others. Linkage, he said, means to him and to the President only that *some* political progress should take place side by side with progress on arms control and related discussions. This does not mean that one expects the Soviets to give up essential positions to satisfy this linkage. One would not expect them to agree to the unification of Germany in order to facilitate arms control and discussions, but one can expect them *not* to exacerbate the Berlin problem or other such problems when it is within their power to refrain from doing so.

5. The next meeting of the Review Group is scheduled for 18 February. Presumably the revised draft on East-West relations will be the principal, if not the sole, topic.

R. J. Smith
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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28. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Comments on National Security Decision Memorandum 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7[2]

I was very much interested in studying the text of the reference NSDMs and in analyzing the national security procedures set forth in them. They seem to me to describe quite clearly the procedures to be followed in security policy formulation and, if carried out in accordance with the intent of these memoranda, they should assure that the National Security Council receives well staffed documents to serve as the basis for Presidential decisions.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, IFG (Institutional File General) 1969 through 1974. Confidential.

[2] Documents 10, 11, 12, and 13. For NSDM 7, see footnote 4, Document 12.

What I do not see is an assignment of responsibility for the functions which must be carried out after Presidential approval of a policy paper. The functions which I have in mind include:

a. The assignment of tasks to subordinate departments and agencies to carry out a Presidential decision.
b. The preparation of departmental and agency programs to discharge the assigned tasks.
c. The coordination of these programs to assure a properly aggregated interdepartmental effort.
d. The manner of approval of these programs prior to implementation, and
e. The evaluation of performance during and following implementation.

The only reference which I find to these functions is in the assignment to the Secretary of State of responsibility "in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy" and "for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas."[3] Without further clarification, I would interpret these references as giving the Secretary of State full authority to assure the proper execution of approved departmental programs in the field of national security, using either the National Security Council machinery or the resources of the Department of State to assist him.

If this reading is correct, this is a formidable responsibility and I question the ability of the Secretary of State to discharge it without a further clarification of what is expected of him. To discharge such a task, he will need a more specific statement from the President setting forth his authority over the other departments involved in national security and the way in which he is expected to use this authority. He will also need an accepted procedure by which he can obtain adequate staff support for his executive and supervisory functions. One might look to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee for such machinery to assist him but, in this case, the duties of the Under Secretaries Committee would have to be broadened substantially beyond the text of NSDM 2.

Since the implementation of national security decisions and the verification of performance of implementation have always been weak

[3] I am not entirely confident of the accuracy of this interpretation because, as I have learned to use the term, "foreign policy" includes all "interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas" and something more, i.e., the limited amount of interdepartmental overseas business, whereas the language of the NSDM seems to suggest that "foreign policy" and "interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas" are two separate categories of activities to which the Secretary of State stands in two differing and separate relationships." [Footnote in the source text.]

points in past procedures, I would suggest strongly the need for a very clear statement at the start of this Administration, setting forth the functions which must be performed in the course of implementation and the responsibility for the execution of each of these functions. I would think that the vehicle for such a clarification would be an additional NSDM added to the series which has just been issued.

M.D.T.

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29. Editorial Note

Early in the Nixon administration the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger began the practice of maintaining special direct channels of communication with some foreign officials and U.S. Ambassadors, bypassing the Department of State. The Kissinger-Dobrynin channel, for example, was arranged within a few weeks of President Nixon's inauguration. In his diary entry for February 15, 1969, the President's Assistant, H.R. Haldeman, noted the following: "Big item was meeting planned for Monday with the Soviet Ambassador. Problem arose because P[resident] wanted me to call Rogers and tell him of meeting, but that Ambassador and P would be alone. I did, Rogers objected, feeling P should never meet alone with an Ambassador, urged a State Department reporter sit in. Back and forth, K[issinger] disturbed because Ambassador has something of great significance to tell P, but if done with State man there word will get out and P will lose control. Decided I should sit in, Rogers said OK, but ridiculous. Ended up State man and K will both sit in, but P will see Ambassador alone for a few minutes first, and will get the dope in written form. K determined P should get word on Soviet intentions direct so he knows he can act on it." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) The President met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on February 17.

Two weeks later, on March 3, Kissinger met with Dobrynin and reported on the meeting in a March 6 memorandum to the President: Dobrynin "said that Moscow had noted his conversation with the President as well as the lunch with me with 'much satisfaction.' Moscow was ready to engage in a 'strictly confidential exchange on delicate and important matters' with the President using the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel. The exchange will be kept very secret. Moscow 'welcomes an informal exchange.'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969)

From March through November 1969 Kissinger met six times alone with Dobrynin and twice together with the President. Then, following a meeting on December 22, Kissinger reported the following to Nixon in a December 24 memorandum: "Dobrynin suggested that he and I meet at regular intervals, discussing a particular topic at each meeting to explore what possible solutions on various issues might look like. We could decide after the discussion of each topic was completed and after it had been discussed with you whether any action was necessary—whether instructions would be given or it should be taken to another level. If you approve, I will agree to meet with him every three weeks after our return from San Clemente on an agenda to be approved by you." Nixon gave his approval. (Ibid.) "Increasingly, the most sensitive business in US-Soviet relations came to be handled between Dobrynin and me," Kissinger wrote in *White House Years,* page 138. Documentation on the channel from February 1969 through April 1973 is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Boxes 489–96, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger. Included are lists of meetings, memoranda of conversation, notes exchanged, and Kissinger's memoranda to the President. Documentation on the channel for the period from May 1973 through August 1974 is ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Boxes 68–71.

Kissinger established special communication channels with other foreign officials. In October 1969, for instance, he arranged a backchannel with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr that also included West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Starting in early 1971 Kissinger and Bahr exchanged messages through a covert Navy operation. For more information, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

Kissinger communicated through backchannels that bypassed the Department of State with a number of U.S. Ambassadors at their posts abroad, among them Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland, Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush, and Ambassador William Porter at the Paris peace talks. President Nixon commented at a meeting with his closest advisers on December 22, 1971, that "there have been more backchannel games played in this administration than any in history because we couldn't trust the God damned State Department." (Conversation 308–13; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes) David McManis, Director of the White House Situation Room, briefed General Brent Scowcroft on the situation in a January 4, 1973, memorandum: "'Backchannel communications' are used to provide an unusual degree of privacy to messages between HAK and selected ambassadors. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

"We have [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] set up several communications links using key materials permitting access to the mes-

sage only here and at the distant end—not at any headquarters or relay point." McManis briefly described procedures for communicating with Ambassadors Bunker and Porter and Egon Bahr and noted that "one alternative has always been the courier run." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1327, NSC Unfiled Material 1971) Later in 1973 Kissinger began having some backchannel messages specially encrypted. (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, April 27, 1973; ibid. Box 1335) Copies of many backchannel communications, including those with Ambassadors Bunker and Farland, are ibid., Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Boxes 410–433.

Kissinger was concerned that the Department of State not become party to his backchannel communications. In a January 12, 1971, message to Bunker he observed that during a discussion with William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Sullivan had "referred to fact that you would be returning to Washington as a result of my backchannel request to you to do so. I was surprised that Department was aware of my use of this channel since I have been proceeding under the assumption that our communication through this channel are kept exclusively between us. I would be grateful if you would reassure me in this respect." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4)

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30. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

The attached memorandum prepared by Mort Halperin on NSC procedures has been discussed by Mort in detail with both Dick Moose and myself and we are in general agreement with its content.

[1] Source: Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, NSC/RG. No classification marking. Kissinger wrote "OK, HK" at the top of the page.

Tab C reflects some modifications with respect to follow-up action which I suggested to Mort. I believe that the scheduling proposed by Mort for NSC business matters and circulating of the agenda in the Review Group is a very sound procedure which will do much to improve the system and, hopefully, better shape NSC discussions. I believe the tab which discusses the manner by which business will be assigned to the NSC system will require a little further thought as it will hinge upon your relationships with Secretary Rogers and the role of Department of State policy. Most importantly, however, it will depend upon the President's own wishes in this matter and I think, therefore, it should be handled very gingerly in any discussion you might have with him.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

This memorandum responds to your request for my thoughts on how the system which has evolved so far can be improved so that you and the President can stay ahead of problems. I take it our goal is to identify issues far enough in advance of the time of Presidential decision so that:

(1) the bureaucracy can be asked to prepare a paper laying out the options and providing the necessary background;
(2) the NSC staff can enlarge upon the options if necessary;
(3) the issue is brought to the President early enough for him to make an unhurried decision which takes account of our long run objectives as well as the tactical concerns of the moment;
(4) there is a follow-through mechanism to insure that the President's decisions are, in fact, implemented.

Changes in the system can be thought of in three categories, discussed in the three attachments:

(1) Improving the procedure for identifying items for NSC consideration (Tab A);
(2) Improving NSC discussion (Tab B);
(3) Monitoring the implementation of Presidential tasks (Tab C).

Tab A

Identifying Actions for NSC Consideration

Thus far, most of the items on the NSC agenda are broad discussions of the major foreign policy issues facing the U.S. While a few specific issues, such as Biafra and Peru, have been put on the NSC agenda, no clear pattern has yet emerged as to how the President will want to deal with a variety of specific issues which will require his attention and for which he should consider options and long run implications.

The choices appear to be:

(1) Wait until the State Department sends the issue to the President.

This will almost certainly mean that the issue arrives very close to the time that the President needs to decide and that he will be confronted with a recommendation rather than options. The NSC staff could add a cover memo stating alternatives, and the President could decide based on the written material, but this does not seem to be compatible with the President's desires.

(2) These matters could be handled on an ad hoc basis with State, and other agencies involved informally asked to give their views in writing to the President who could then convene a meeting of those directly involved. For example, rather than waiting for the Visit Briefing Book for Presidential visitors, the agencies concerned could be asked to provide their views in writing on the main issues long enough in advance to enable the NSC staff to put them together to give the President a view of the issues and raise additional alternatives. The President should then decide whether to hold a meeting of those concerned. Similar procedures could also be used on issues like the FRG offset or our position on the details of mutual withdrawal from SVN. This approach can work and will certainly have to be used for some issues.

(3) Schedule on the NSC Agenda issues for which the President should review options and alternatives and use the existing NSC machinery to develop the necessary papers. This approach has been used thus far to a remarkable degree. The specifics of our Middle East negotiating policy, the issue of Sentinel deployment and the question of Biafran relief have all been handled through the regular NSC procedures despite the temptation to handle them otherwise. (We are skipping the Review Group on the Sentinel issue, but there is no great harm in doing that when the laying out of alternatives is largely the job of a single department. If time had permitted, it would have been useful to circulate the Defense paper in advance and solicit written comments from other agencies.) To continue to use this system for the growing

number of issues that will come before the President requires two things:

(a) A willingness on the part of the President to continue to hold one, and in many cases two NSC meetings per week, and a willingness on his part to schedule several items at a single meeting (in most cases after there has been an initial NSC discussion of the basic issue). These meetings will have to dispense with the formal procedures of CIA and other briefings and focus rather sharply on the immediate issues for decision. They will require the kind of brief agenda papers suggested in the next attachment.

(b) An intensive effort on the part of the NSC staff to identify these issues far enough in advance to put the NSC machinery to work. It will have to be made clear to the operations staff members that such issues should be brought into the NSC system. The NSC planning group will have to carefully monitor forthcoming meetings, visits, matters of Presidential interest and concern, etc. and then work with the Assistants for Operations to put the machinery into motion.

On balance, Option 3 would appear to most closely conform with the President's desires. Setting the machinery into motion on a particular issue does not commit the President to holding an NSC meeting. Papers approved by the Review Group can go to the President for his information and for decisions based on the written documents. Alternatively, the President could call in a subgroup of the NSC to discuss a particular problem. Using the NSC machinery guarantees, in any case, that the President will have put before him a discussion of all of the relevant options as well as a careful analysis of the situation and the long range implications of any decision that he makes.[2]

Tab B

Improving NSC Discussion

NSC discussion thus far has probably suffered because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the NSC members as to what items the President wished to focus on and what policy issues he wished to have their advice on. This is particularly a problem for the kind of general papers that have on the whole been discussed thus far but it will be somewhat of a problem even for more narrowly focused issues.

The NSC discussion has also suffered from the fact that papers have been distributed only a short time before the meetings.

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[2] In a March 10 memorandum to Kissinger, written after Kissinger approved Tab A, Halperin outlined steps to be taken to implement Tab A. (Ibid., Chronological File, January–March 1969)

The schedule is now set up so that beginning with the April 2 discussion of NATO we will have 13 days between the Review Group meeting and the NSC meeting for regularly scheduled items. (We will, of course, have to add on other items with shorter deadlines.) This more extended period between the Review Group meeting and the NSC meeting will have several advantages:

(1) It will permit a more careful rewriting of papers when the Review Group decides that is necessary.
(2) It will permit us to circulate papers substantially in advance of meetings—normally one week.
(3) It will permit the preparation of an agenda paper, discussed below.
(4) It will permit the President to receive his NSC book 48 hours or more before the meeting.

This new time schedule would permit the preparation of an agenda paper which might help to sharpen the focus for NSC discussion. This paper, which would in effect be a combination of what has previously been in the HAK talking points and in the Issues for Decision paper, would indicate to the members of the NSC what areas they should come prepared to discuss and on what specific decisions the President will want their advice.

If agenda papers are to be used, they should be prepared as indicated in the initial procedures memo approved by the President. A draft of the agenda paper would be circulated and discussed at the Review Group meeting and members of the Review Group would then be given two additional days to provide comments on the draft. It would be understood, of course, that the draft was subject to review by the President and that, in any case, he would retain his prerogative to lead the discussion in other directions if he decided to do so. Following the revision of the paper based on Review Group comments, the paper could be distributed to the agencies. Alternatively, and preferably, HAK could discuss the paper with the President eight days before the NSC meeting and secure his general approval for the paper. This would increase the probability that over time there was a reasonably close overlap between the items raised in the agenda paper and those that the President would want to discuss. This will insure that the agenda paper is taken seriously by the staffs and will mean that the NSC members are better prepared to discuss the key issues and major decisions.

Attachment to Tab B

Illustrative Cycle for NSC Meeting

1. Friday: Response to NSSM and/or other paper comes to NSC staff.

2. Tuesday PM: Pre-RG meeting.
3. Thursday: RG meeting. Reach consensus on agenda focus.
4. Monday: Revised draft agenda approved by HAK.
5. Tuesday: HAK checks agenda paper with RN.
6. Wednesday: Agenda paper and IG paper circulated to NSC one week in advance of meeting.
7. Friday: Pre-NSC meeting with HAK with RN and HAK books.
8. Monday: RN book forwarded.
9. Wednesday: NSC meeting.
10. Friday: NSDM sent out with record of decision (to appropriate extent) and assignment of implementation action.

Tab C

Implementation of Decisions

The process for implementing the Presidential decisions which take the form of general policy guidance has been less fully developed than the other parts of the NSC system.

The intention of circulating a Decision Memorandum after each NSC meeting, providing the President's decisions and the rationale for them, has been greatly limited by the President's desire to restrict decisions of NSC meetings to the principals only. Thus, most decisions have passed by debriefs from the members of the NSC to their staffs or from the NSC staff member to his agency counterparts. This process has the drawback that the President's intentions are nowhere clearly stated. It is possible to have different interpretations of his decisions passed on by different participants in the meeting. Where the dispute concerns a particular single decision—should there be a Biafra relief coordinator—the matter can if necessary be referred back to the President, but where the issue concerns style, tone and nuance—just what is our attitude toward Four Power Middle East talks—the current procedure leaves much to be desired and is susceptible to both inadvertent ignoring of Presidential decisions or deliberate distortions.

There is much to be said for trying to return to the original notion of a careful Decision Memorandum stating the President's decision and the reasons for it, while recognizing this cannot be done with some issues. The Decision Memorandum could clearly be separated from the NSC meeting. One need not refer in any way to the NSC deliberations or attempt to include all of what the President said at the NSC meeting. Rather, the Decision Memorandum would be a document carefully written to tell those who will implement the policy what they need to

know about the President's desires in order to do what he intends and to provide enough explanation of why the President has decided as he has to enable those implementing the policy to follow the spirit as well as the letter of the Presidential decision. While such Decision Memoranda would normally be written soon after an NSC meeting, in other cases they might be issued after some delay, when the President clearly came down on position.

The Decision Memoranda should, in most cases, clearly assign responsibility for implementing the decision. This assignment should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In some instances a Cabinet officer should be assigned responsibility (perhaps in consultation with other officials); in other cases responsibility could be assigned to an interdepartmental group: the Under Secretaries Committee, an IG, or an ad hoc group. In other cases responsibility could be assigned to a particular individual. In the absence of a specific delegation it is much less likely that a policy will be implemented and it is much harder to monitor compliance.

There is a related question of long run monitoring of implementation of Presidential decisions. This should be the primary responsibility of the operations officer. At some stage, we may want to consider some system of periodic reporting on the implementation of decisions—perhaps internally by the NSC staff member or formally by interagency group, where it has been assigned responsibility for action. The procedure to be adopted for follow-on will depend in large part on the choice made on how to inform the bureaucracy initially of Presidential decisions and should, therefore, be deferred until there is a longer period of experimentation on the prior question.[3]

[3] In a March 28 memorandum to Halperin, Lake discussed procedures for implementing Presidential decisions. He commented that "the most efficient means of disseminating NSC decisions would be by NSDM, as argued in your memorandum. It appears, however, that the President has ruled this out." (Ibid., NSC/RG)

31. National Security Decision Memorandum 8[1]

Washington, March 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Crisis Anticipation and Management

The President has directed that increased emphasis be placed on the anticipation of potential crisis situations that may affect the interests of the United States. The National Security Council structure provides a means for the orderly review of world situations and of our policies, the formulation of possible courses of action to deal with contingency situations and the initiation of actions, when appropriate, to remedy deteriorating situations.

The President has directed that the National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups shall prepare contingency studies on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC. The studies should include a careful orchestration of political and military actions. It is recognized that not all contingencies can be anticipated and that the specifics of a particular anticipated contingency cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, there are important advantages which might accrue from contingency planning, among which are:

—a clearer assessment of U.S. interests and possible need for U.S. action in a particular situation;
—an increased likelihood that U.S. actions taken will be timely and will minimize risks or losses;
—the possible discovery of actions which might resolve or head off a crisis; and
—the familiarization of key officials with factual material and alternative courses of action in event of a crisis.

The Review Group shall issue instructions for contingency planning and review contingency studies prepared in the Interdepartmental Groups. The Review Group shall forward contingency studies to

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 8. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Documentation on the implementation of NSDM 8 is ibid., and in ibid., RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 8. Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 8. Confidential.

the Under Secretaries Committee. When the study is to be submitted to the National Security Council, the Under Secretaries Committee will comment in light of its responsibilities for crisis management.

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Groups shall have coordinating authority for the management of crises in their areas when these occur, subject to additional policy and operational guidance provided by higher authority.

The Under Secretaries Committee shall determine the organization and procedures for crisis management.

Henry A. Kissinger

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32. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to the Director of Communication for the Executive Branch (Klein)[1]

Washington, March 24, 1969.

Per your request, I talked with the President about the possibility of having Henry Kissinger appear on shows like Meet the Press and specifically about the April 30th date.

The President does *not* want Kissinger to make public television appearances of this sort. He is perfectly willing to have Henry meet with commentators, editors, etc. on a background basis in private sessions but does not want him—or any other White House staff members—to appear as Administration spokesmen in public.

H

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/President Memoranda, 1969–1970. No classification marking. This source text is a copy sent to Kissinger and is marked "HAK" at the top of the page.

33. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Role of Program Analysis Office

On April 9 you signed a NSSM which directs a study of Post Vietnam Asian Policy.[2] The scope of this study includes every major U.S. resource program in East Asia: military grant aids and sales, economic assistance, U.S. bases and forces, and the implications on these programs for the U.S. budget and balance of payments.

I did not see this NSSM in any form until after it had been signed. Now that a formal study of all U.S. resource programs in East Asia has been directed, what does that leave for my Program Analysis Office in the region? I am immediately exposed to the reasonable argument that any study I attempt in the region "is already being done." Over the last few weeks, I have tried without success to obtain the cooperation of your staff on studies in East Asia, in particular, to get a first rate study of Thailand started. Now that I am confronted with this fait accompli, I feel I need to have a better understanding of how you view the role and purpose of my office.

Because I was not asked to comment on NSSM 38 before it went out over your signature and because it can be interpreted (and will be interpreted by the State Department) as pre-empting work which I have underway on East Asian countries, I think it sets a dangerous precedent. The NSSM says nothing about the need for in-depth analysis, and it will be undertaken by operators, yet it can and will be used to suppress the kind of analytical work which is badly needed and which I thought my office was designed to undertake.

The policy decisions that the study will bring forth will in effect dictate a wide variety of program decisions which in my judgment should not be made until we have undertaken the relevant program budgeting studies.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. [Jan. 1969–Aug. 1970]. Secret; Eyes Only. Haig wrote in hand at the top of the first page: "File—Lynn says no longer necessary."

[2] Reference to NSSM 38, April 10. (Ibid., Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 38)

For example, decisions are contemplated with respect to "SEATO," "new regional arrangements," "military forces and deployments," "U.S. bases," "military grant aids and sales," "economic assistance," and "budget and balance of payments costs." In nearly every case program decisions are called for and I can see the results pouring concrete around our policy in, for example, Thailand in a way which precludes analysis. There is little doubt that SEATO and our bilateral ties with Thailand will be reaffirmed, base decisions will be made affecting U.S. forces in Thailand, planning decisions will be made which affect our aid and military assistance programs to Thailand, etc. All this will be accomplished without analysis of U.S. force effectiveness, of the possibilities of developing Thai forces, of the need and opportunities for economic assistance to Thailand, of the costs of alternative commitments, of the likelihood of the anticipated threats, etc.

The fact that the East Asia IG will conduct the study makes it inevitable that, as in the past, costly and possibly ineffective program commitments will be made by operating agencies. NSSM 38 can lead to a sterile product which serves up as policy recommendations the operators' preferences buttressed by nothing more than the conventional wisdom. Meanwhile the possibility that the process of program analysis will affect the thinking of the State Department or obtain the necessary cooperation in Washington or in the field seem to me to have been all but precluded.

I have put together a bright and experienced staff. We have approached our analyses in a deliberate manner, seeking to lay the foundation for an analytical approach to program issues and related policies. Since this kind of work has never been done on a broad scale in the government, careful preparation is necessary both to obtain successful studies and to protect your interests with the agencies.

I have drafted a NSDM[3] which I think is necessary to place our studies in the proper relationship with the results sought by NSSM 38 and other such NSSMs. I believe you should sign it. It is required to give us the latitude necessary for our work.

Since this subject affects my "vital interests" I would like to discuss it with you.

[3] Attached but not printed. The proposed NSDM was not issued.

34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Improvements in Information Support and Communications

It is critically important to be able rapidly to obtain and display in the White House information on national security matters. The facilities to do this should be designed to provide you with instant briefings in critical situations and to support any group of advisers or task force that you might assemble. The White House Situation Room and the communications facilities which link it with the outside world should be designed as an integral whole to meet this need, using the most modern techniques and facilities available.

Realization of this goal requires coordinated action in five areas:

1. design of an improved conference room
2. automation of information handling
3. more space
4. review of communications capabilities
5. development of substantive information files

Improved Conference Room

The Conference Room associated with the Situation Room should be equipped to provide you with instant briefings and also should be able to support any advisory group or task force that you might assemble in a crisis. To do this, the Conference Room should have the following features:

1. It should have rapid access to sizeable central file of facts, as well as to current messages and intelligence.

2. It should have the facilities to rapidly display selected fact sheets, messages and intelligence reports to a group of up to twenty people.

3. It should have facilities for preparing and updating large map displays without interfering with other activities in the Conference Room.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Improvements in Information Support and Communication. Sent for action. No classification marking.

4. It should have telephone facilities to support up to twenty people in the Conference Room, with provisions for the Situation Room staff to screen incoming calls if desired.

5. It should be designed and outfitted to minimize the physical and psychological discomfort associated with any prolonged use of the room by a single task group.

If undertaken in conjunction with the other projects described below, the improved Conference Room can be available in 12 months, and can be paid for out of funds available to the Defense Communications Agency (discussed under *Space* below).

Automated Information Handling

The principal means we have to keep continually abreast of fast-moving developments is to read the messages addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which are routed to the White House for information, and to read the intelligence reports and summaries which are prepared for us by the intelligence community. This incoming information is now received by teletype, manually transferred to the Situation Room, and screened and routed within the White House. It is then manually transmitted to the Executive Office Building where it is further screened, routed and delivered to members of my staff. Once seen, these messages are filed in various places in accordance with a simple classification scheme. These procedures frequently involve handling delays under normal time pressures; in crisis periods such delays could have serious consequences. I would, therefore, like to automate as much of this process as possible, in order to increase the speed and reliability of both initial dissemination and subsequent retrieval of information. A modest, computer-based system, similar to systems now used by the State and Defense Departments, will permit us to do this.

The computer would:

1. display messages for screening and routing as soon as they are received, with simultaneous presentation in the Situation Room and in the NSC Secretariat. (Sensitive messages would be restricted to the White House.)
2. receive indexing and routing instructions from the analysts who screen the messages. (It may also be feasible to have the computer assign index terms and routing instructions based on the contents of the message, subject to verification by the analyst.)
3. automatically print out the required number of copies for immediate distribution.
4. automatically create files accessible by originator, subject, and date/time of receipt.
5. quickly find, display, and print out if desired, messages and other indexed material retained in current files.

It will take about two years to get a fully operational system, assuming a competitive procurement. The system will cost about $500,000 annually for leased equipment, operation and maintenance. This will be partly offset by current communications center costs of $300,000 per year. The White House Communications Agency is prepared to pay all of the costs of this project except for the programming costs which may be associated with the development of special files for the White House/NSC. The development of such files would be part of the Substantive Information project described below.

Space

The most immediate limiting factor in achieving any improvement is space. The present Situation Room conference area is too small for a group of any size, and cannot effectively use modern techniques such as rear projection displays. The communications center is in the bomb shelter, far removed from the Situation Room, and it has no room to install modern message handling, storage and retrieval facilities.

The necessary additional space can be obtained by underground construction immediately behind the Situation Room. The White House Communications Agency has done some preliminary planning for a new communications center there. These plans can be revised to incorporate the new conference room and automatic information handling facilities discussed above. The cost for the entire facility should not exceed $1.5 million, and WHCA can make that amount available within its FY 1970 budget.

Planning, construction and equipment installation will require about one year. Upon completion of the new Conference Room, the existing Situation Room spaces will be reconfigured as necessary to support the new Conference Room, and any excess space will be released for other use.

General Albright (WHCA) has assured me that the noise level associated with excavation will be minimal except when jackhammers are needed to cut around existing manholes. The jackhammer work will be scheduled at times when you are not in residence.

I recommend that you (1) approve the construction of a new Conference Room and Communications Center adjacent to the present Situation Room, (2) approve the installation of improved information handling and display facilities, and (3) authorize General Albright to proceed with construction as soon as Mr. Haldeman and I have approved the detailed plans.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

Review of Communications Capabilities

While facilities in the White House are being modernized, it is important to keep in mind the support you need when you are away from the White House. Staff coordination procedures and information support which can be readily implemented in the White House are much more difficult to achieve when you and part of your staff are elsewhere, or enroute. To cope with these situations, it is important to assure that:

1. Communications facilities are as reliable and responsive as possible, and
2. the limitations of facilities are recognized and staff procedures are designed with these limitations in mind.

I feel that it is also important to review at this time your requirements for communications through the systems of the various Executive Departments, and the present ability of those systems to meet your needs in various circumstances. The results of such a review would be the development of better guidance for the agencies concerned, as well as a better understanding of the procedures which may be necessary to accommodate limitations in communications performance.

I recommend that you authorize me, in consultation with WHCA, to organize a review of the communications facilities and systems which support the National Security functions of your office.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

Substantive Information

The foregoing steps will speed the receipt, dissemination, storage, retrieval and display of information in the White House. However, to assure that accurate information is readily available when desired, it is necessary to identify the specific substantive information desired, to organize this information into accessible files, and to establish procedures for updating the information to keep it current. Information which does not change frequently can be maintained easily in a central data bank. For information which changes frequently, there is a choice which must be considered carefully between maintaining an accurate file in the White House and delegating this responsibility to an appropriate department or agency.

I proposed to have the RAND Corporation assist us in determining information needs, defining the contents of the central data

bank, identifying useful data banks elsewhere to which we should have access, and evaluating the choices between White House versus Agency maintenance of data files. The funds for this task can be provided by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.

Approve

Disapprove

Other[2]

[2] There is no indication of approval or disapproval of any of the recommendations, but Haldeman informed Ken Cole on April 23 that the President had approved all Kissinger's recommendations and Cole informed Kissinger of that fact in an April 29 memorandum. (Ibid.)

35. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

After-Action Report on the Korean Shootdown Incident[2]

Now that the Korean shootdown incident has come and gone, I thought you might be interested in a brief appraisal of the manner in which it was handled within the bureaucracy, with the view toward drawing upon these experiences in the event of future contingencies.

In general, I believe the bureaucracy functioned well, especially during the initial stages of the crisis. The following steps were taken:

1. Establishment of a small working group from each of the Departments/Agencies directly concerned (State, Defense, JCS, CIA, White House).

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969–1971. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] A U.S. Navy EC–121 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on April 14 by North Korean MiG aircraft. See *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume XIX, Japan and Korea.

2. This method made it possible to bring about a rapid and intimate exchange of views and maximum security in the development of highly sensitive options for your consideration. It is significant that there has been no leak of the range of options you considered.

3. The result was the preparation of a master game plan which meshed the political, diplomatic and military actions under each option and which could have been executed with minimum confusion.

The exercise revealed the following shortcomings:

1. Military planning proved generally unresponsive, pedantic and slow. It took more than 72 hours for the JCS to develop a plan for an attack on a single airfield. Part of the problem was interservice rivalry: the Airforce and the Navy could never agree on whether to attack with B–52s or A–6s.

2. We disbanded the Committee too early. As a result, the windup of the operation produced some uncertainty expressed in the slow restarting of reconnaissance operations and some confusion over what force should be left behind in the Korean area. This was remedied by reassembling the Committee.

3. The incident showed the degree to which Vietnam reduces our military options. We would have had difficulty conducting major operations without drawing on our Vietnam deployment. In fairness, it must be pointed out that Vietnam enabled us to envisage a massive concentration of power that would have been unavailable otherwise.

I have asked each agency represented to prepare a critique. Their comments are attached (Tab A).[3]

Recommendations:

1. The emergency machinery should be institutionalized. Every participant agreed that it worked well. It should have been started earlier and kept in being longer.

[3] Attached are a paper by U. Alexis Johnson, which is printed below, and three memoranda to Kissinger, which are not printed, from Nels C. Johnson, Director of the Joint Staff; Thomas Karamessines, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans; and Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

2. Military contingency planning should be tightened up. This would be accomplished by a series of Presidential directives which can be prepared for you if you agree with the basic concept.

Approve[4]

Disapprove

Other

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, April 28, 1969.

Reflections on EC–121 Incident[5]

From my viewpoint the substantive difficulty that we faced with respect to this incident was that our freedom of choice was very limited by the absence of a military capability quickly to respond. Apart from the other problems involved with retaliation, the passage of time required to generate the capability made this a less and less feasible course of action. The only flexible capability in a situation of this kind, entirely subject to our own control, and involving the minimum of political complications with third countries, is a carrier. While recognizing the importance of carrier operations to the conflict in Viet-Nam, I feel that we should balance the need in Viet-Nam against the importance of having some carrier capability available for contingency op-

[4] The President initialed the approval option. Written below in an unidentified hand is the following: "Set up as Permanent Comm./HAK." In a May 8 telephone conversation with John Getz, Johnson's Special Assistant, Haig stated: "Just wanted to get message to Amb. Johnson concerning the 'Korean Group' that functioned during the crisis. The President has looked at all the after-action reports on this, including Amb. Johnson's & the ones from Defense, JCS, and CIA, and he told Kissinger he wants to institutionalize this outfit, for better or for worse, but in so doing he wants also to maintain at the State operational level a group dealing with the coordination of the problem at hand—in other words, this ad hoc group would be 'permanentized' for crises to deal with broader issues, and State would orchestrate the implementation—cables, dispatches, etc., which is, he thought, consistent with what Amb Johnson had in mind." (Notes of Telephone Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

[5] Johnson also discussed the administration's response to the shootdown and the resulting formation of WSAG in his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power,* pp. 524–525.

erations in critical areas, such as Korea has been during the past year and now appears will continue to be for at least sometime to come.

Two problems inherent in any proposed military operation for which full contingency plans do not already exist are the collegial nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the inherent competition among the Services to "get in on the action." In this case, as in others, the first problem results in a delay in obtaining authoritative military views and recommendations except insofar as the Chairman of the JCS can, by the force of personality, impose his views on the other chiefs. The second problem results in a tendency to overstate capabilities and to minimize problems and difficulties. It is thus difficult to obtain entirely unprejudiced and thoroughly staff military advice, particularly in a short-time frame.

These comments in no way reflect upon the individual competence of our military leadership, but rather are inherent in the present system. Under our present executive organization there is no answer to this problem except that there be on the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense (ISA is the logical point) and in State a sufficient knowledge of military affairs blended with political competence to ask the right questions and obtain the answers. It is also only in this way that international political considerations can be fed into the process at an early enough stage to assure that military planning is blended with international political considerations in such a way as to assure the optimum blend of each, and thus assure that the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have the best possible and most realistic alternative courses of action presented to them.

My observation in this case, as well as in other crises in which I have participated, confirmed my conviction that in today's world there can be no purely military planning nor purely political planning but that the two must be integrated right from the beginning. It is my experience that only when they are integrated and examined in detail in the form of a single plan of action that the problem areas best emerge. It is also my observation that presentation in such a succinct integrated plan of action form is most useful for the decision makers as for the operators when decisions are made.

In addition to such a plan of action, it is also my observation that problem areas emerge and can best be dealt with when there is a detailed examination and consideration of what is to be said publicly. Normally this will be a statement or a speech by the President. With these two elements determined, that is the plan of action and the public statement, all other actions readily flow therefrom. I feel that this was well done in this case, and my only comment being that I think that it might have been useful to have started this part of the process somewhat earlier, preparing integrated plans and outlines of statements for various

courses of action. The NSC staff should, of course, be deeply involved in this planning process.

On the other hand, when the President has made decisions it is important that there be an exceptional interdepartmental mechanism for promptly coordinating and assuring their implementation and that this be focused at a single point within the Executive Departments responsible for their execution. This will always involve State, DOD and the JCS, and the CIA should also be involved. This can and should be done by the establishment of what has in the past been called a "Task Force" usually, and I believe logically, chaired by State with participation of the agencies concerned, including, of course, to the extent desired, the NSC staff. Such a Task Force working out of the Operations Center in State can provide to the decision makers a single point of information, a single channel for instructions and assure that decisions are carried out in a coordinated and most effective manner. (This, of course, does not preclude the President from issuing instructions to or through anyone he may desire, it simply assures that when instructions are issued they are promptly disseminated and that there is a common understanding on how they are being implemented.) Such a Task Force should be involved in and expected also to make a major contribution to the planning process.

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36. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 30, 1969.

You asked me yesterday to think about ways of "sub-contracting" some of my functions to others on the Staff because (1) my area of responsibilities was becoming increasingly active, (2) you were con-

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (4), 5/3/69–6/12/69. No classification marking; Personal for Mr. Kissinger. In an attached May 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig summarized the main points of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum. Then, in a long comment, Haig added among other things: "Obviously, Hal assumes that U.S.-Soviet relationships are his exclusive responsibility and since most world-wide issues impinge on this reality, ipso facto, he is responsible

cerned that I was "killing myself" as a result, and (3) that you wanted to be sure I could give my best efforts to those issues that would remain for me to handle. You were kind enough to speak well of my work and to stress that what you were suggesting was not intended to be critical.

You did not mention it, but I take it that your statements were related to Colonel Haig's recent request to me that I give thought to how certain under-employed and consequently frustrated members of the Staff could be more fully utilized.

I will address myself principally to your comments to me since the problem mentioned by Colonel Haig is not one that I feel qualified to deal with specifically. The recommendation I shall make at the end of this memorandum is, however, germane to that problem and may be of help to you in coping with it.

I must necessarily deal with the issue you raised in a somewhat personal vein.

I begin by reminding you that I came here at your invitation to take on these responsibilities fully conscious of their variety, extent, and, in some instances, complexity. If anything is "killing me," to use your phrase, it is not the weight of the substantive problems with which I deal but the impediments placed in the way of doing so effectively. Confining myself only to matters pertinent to your comments, these stem from the overlapping, fragmentation and inadequate definition of responsibilities on this Staff in the area of my assignment. This situation undoubtedly diverts my energy and time from substantive work more than is to be expected in any bureaucratic situation.

Large and significant segments of the issues relating to my area are formally assigned to others on the staff: thus, the whole matter of economic policy toward Europe, with its vital political implications, is the concern of another officer; similarly, the important issue of East-West trade, which encompasses the bulk of our formal relationship with the Communist countries other than the USSR, is the responsibility of another officer; again, the fundamental problems of military policy, with their crucial role in the US-Soviet relationship and in NATO affairs fall outside the scope of my assignment; large portions of the

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for most of the globe." He also endorsed Sonnenfeldt's "excellent point" on planning and his concern about the overextended bureaucracy involved in the NSSM process. Haig indicated that "reports I have received from throughout the bureaucracy indicate that those who do the work are increasingly hard pressed, beginning to lose enthusiasm and becoming resentful of additional requirements, especially those which are demanded on an urgent basis." He concluded that he was also concerned about staff coordination and supervision, though not so much Sonnenfeldt. In Sonnenfeldt's case, Haig wrote that "no system would be totally satisfactory."

disarmament area, a major aspect of our relations with the USSR, are assigned elsewhere; our dealings with the USSR on such issues as the Middle East, on Vietnam and Korea are principally within the purview of other members of the Staff.

I have been encouraged that improved lateral communication within the Staff has in some measure made the discharge of my own responsibilities more effective in recent weeks and the working relationships among those of us who have these overlapping and interrelated assignments have become a good deal smoother over time. In this connection, I should make special note of the highly satisfactory way in which I have been able to share with Larry Lynn the work on the preparations for the SALT talks. Yet much of the work on these subjects remains fragmented, with wholly inadequate lateral contact, insufficient exchange of information and knowledge, lack of coordination, frequent duplication and, worst of all, inadequate coherence of approach. I do not, for example, have the impression that our dealings with the Soviets on the major issues that make up the essence of our present relations with them (e.g., Middle East, Vietnam, Korea, Central Europe, arms control, trade) flow from some consistency of conception; certainly, given the situation as I outlined it above, I have no way of providing it.

I say this not, as you at one time implied, because I seek an accumulation of responsibilities now assigned to others on the staff, but because I do not feel that I can fulfill the responsibility I have (or I thought I had) and because the attempt to do so meets with almost insuperable obstacles under the conditions in which we now function.

The frustrations of overlapping but badly coordinated functions are compounded, at least for me but I think for others too (for whom I do not in any sense purport to speak), by the ill-defined and roaming assignments of certain staff members. These have resulted in separate and uncoordinated contacts with other Executive agencies, foreign embassies and the press on matters of European and Soviet policy and have on several occasions greatly complicated my ability to do my job. Moreover, the still fuzzy line between my responsibilities as the NSC representative on the European IG and Mort Halperin's responsibilities in the NSC process has led to time-consuming and debilitating jurisdictional maneuvering, to confused signals to the agencies and to unnecessary duplication of effort. It seems clear also that those among us supposedly concerned with longer-range analysis and planning find themselves, presumably for lack of a market, irresistably drawn to short-term and operational matters, complicating relations with the agencies and generating irritation.

In a nutshell, a vast amount of organized and spontaneous "subcontracting" is already occurring in the area of my assignment which,

I strongly believe, adversely affects my ability to do an effective and professional job in serving you, and, through you, the President. I cannot in all honesty see how further fragmentation or proliferation of assignments in my area will improve this situation; more likely it will compound it.

What I do believe you should consider is a conscious effort to give substance to your earlier hope of making this staff a focus of longer-range planning in the Government. Indeed, our failure to do so so far has led to an atrophying of the Government's activities in this respect.

In brief, my recommendation is that you do the following:

(1) Revise the present NSSM system by establishing two types of NSC papers, one dealing with nearer term policy problems and the other with real long term issues, including those that overlap geographic and functional areas. The first type could be called National Security Policy Study (NSPS), the second could remain "NSSM."

(2) NSPSs would continue to come up through the IG–RG (or ad hoc group-RG) route and would be handled by the NSC members presently on IGs or other established groups; they would result in Presidential policy decisions, NSDMs and other specific measures.

(3) NSSMs would not come through IGs, which turn out by and large to be poorly suited for longer-range and more reflective studies or for papers that overlap established bureaus. Instead, NSSMs would be developed in specially constituted groups, chaired from whatever agency is principally relevant to the problem being considered. In some cases an NSC planner could be the chairman or the first drafter. Papers might or might not go to the NSC through the RG (they normally would) and would not necessarily require decisions by the President. They might give rise to a follow-up NSPS. Their basic purpose would be to identify trends, objectives, longer term strategies, and basic conceptions of interests and policy.

The virtue of this proposal is

(1) to create a government community, guided by members of the NSC staff, concerned full-time with thinking about the future;

(2) get the IGs out of a line of work in which they are not at their best (though, obviously, they will retain an interest) and put them full-time into a line of work for which they are best suited;

(3) give specified NSC staff members clear responsibility in the area of longer term planning as distinct from other members responsible for operational and short-to-medium term policy, but, obviously, with communication between them.

37. Memorandum From the Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Staff Meeting[2]

At the staff meeting on April 30, I discussed the following issues:

1. Requirement to think ahead on problem areas;

2. Requirement to keep close and intimate contact with what is occurring in the departments and agencies and to flag difficult problems for Mr. Kissinger at an early date;

3. Format, content and responsiveness of staff papers; and

4. Improvement of coordination among the staff.

The following items were raised by the staff:

1. Difficulty in reaching Haig and Eagleburger on the telephone due to limited lines.

2. General consensus that the bureaucracy was getting overloaded with NSC requirements.

3. Heavy press of work and short deadlines were precluding the type of reflective planning which staff members felt was essential to forecast the problem areas.

4. Complaint that response to NSSM's involved such heavy work for operations officers that deadlines set by Osgood could not be met.

5. Halperin's complaint that many of his memoranda are never answered.

6. Uniform feeling of most of substantive staff that they need more face-to-face contact with Mr. Kissinger.

7. Bob Osgood's suggestion of periodic staff meetings to discuss planning issues.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 334, Items to Discuss with the President 2/5–7/14/1969. No classification marking.

[2] Kissinger held his first NSC staff meeting on January 21. Talking points prepared for the meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 314, Staff Meetings. The same folder includes minutes of 44 NSC staff meetings from November 1969 to February 1971, many of them meetings of the NSC Operations staff. Minutes for three NSC staff meetings during September and October 1970 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Young Files, Chronological File, Box 1. Minutes for seven NSC staff meetings during 1971, all but one of them titled Senior Staff Meeting, are ibid., NSC Files, Saunders Files, Box 1272, NSC Operations Staff Meetings, 1971.

8. Hal Sonnenfeldt's recommendation that we forward more correspondence to the Departments for preparation of replies for Presidential signature.

9. Hal Sonnenfeldt's belief that staff needs more feedback on what happens to their papers.

10. Consensus of staff that they need more access to intelligence reports and on a more timely basis.

11. Comment by several operations officers that they need more time to prepare analyses for President's Daily Report if substantive analyses are required.

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38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

National Security Council (NSC) Procedures

Under your able leadership, an excellent organizational system has been molded for considering national security matters. I am concerned, however, about the pattern being established in NSC procedures, particularly with regard to sudden changes in NSC schedules and lateness of papers to be considered by the NSC and the Review Group. In all candor, we are not being provided the time or circumstances for an orderly and studied review of the issues coming before the NSC and the Review Group.

It would seem important that the Review Group—charged as it is with insuring that realistic alternatives are presented to the NSC and that different views are fairly and adequately set out—should be able to function in a reasoned, deliberate manner. For this purpose, its members should have adequate lead time to thoroughly study papers submitted to them. A more important requirement is posed for NSC members who must weigh the pros and cons of various alternatives and recommend to the President policy positions on matters of the highest

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Nixon Files—1969, Box 1347, Nixon Files—1969. Confidential; Eyes Only.

national importance. In recent weeks, however, agenda have been uncertain, and papers have been received too late for adequate review.

I believe it would serve no useful purpose to document the full range of problems we are having with the NSC processes. Rather, I would suggest we strive for a more orderly arrangement, and particularly one that allows the Review Group and National Security Council membership more study and deliberation time before their respective meetings.

I understand the difficult position you are so ably discharging. Please accept my comments as simply a desire to see the system work *more* effectively, to our mutual benefit, to the benefit of the President, and to the benefit of the nation.[2]

Mel Laird

[2] In a May 8 follow-up memorandum to Kissinger, Moose and Davis noted that "all the other NSC participants have voiced similar complaints in various degrees. These are legitimate complaints. The late arrival of papers appears to be more serious than the schedule changes and possibly more susceptible of correction," and "the biggest delay is in the receipt of papers by the NSC Secretariat from the Interdepartmental Groups." (Ibid.) In his May 19 reply to Laird, Kissinger agreed completely with Laird's concerns, indicated that "we are stretching out the schedule to allow more time between all phases of the NSC operation," and noted that "our success, of course, depends on strict observance of the due dates for the papers on which the meeting schedules are pegged." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

39. Memorandum From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)[1]

Washington, May 9, 1969, 10:35 a.m.

MEMORADUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, called from Key Biscayne, Florida. He advised that there is a story today on the front page of the *New York Times* by William Beecher which

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking.

is extraordinarily damaging and uses secret information.[2] Dr. Kissinger said they wondered whether I could make a major effort to find out where that came from. I said I would. Dr. Kissinger said the article is in the lower right hand corner of the front page and to put whatever resources I need to find who did this. I told him I would take care of it right away. Dr. Kissinger said to do it discreetly, of course, but they would like to know where it came from because it is very damaging and potentially very dangerous. I commented it is this kind of thing that gives us headaches of where they come from; that if we can find the source one time and make an example it would put a stop to it. Dr. Kissinger agreed and said that is what they propose to do.[3]

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

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[2] A copy of the article, headlined "Raids in Cambodia by U.S. Unprotested," is attached. The article stated that "American B–52 bombers in recent weeks have raided several Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia for the first time, according to Nixon Administration sources, but Cambodia has not made any protest."

[3] Hoover wrote beneath his signature: "What do you suggest?"

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40. Memorandum by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)[1]

Washington, May 9, 1969, 11:05 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, called from Key Biscayne, Florida, and referred to his earlier call to me this morning[2] regarding an article on the front page of the *New York Times* by William Beecher. He said there were two other stories by the

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking.

[2] See Document 39.

same man within the last ten days—one having to do with our Korean decision and one with the National Security study on strategic forces.[3] He said what they would like is to tie all three together. I told him I would look up the other articles and include them in the inquiry which we have already started.

Dr. Kissinger asked that I call him as soon as we know something, but even if we don't, that I call him sometime tomorrow morning to bring him up to date because this is of most intense interest. I told him I would. I also told him I had read the article this morning and there are many facets where I see it would be embarrassing to the Administration and harmful. Dr. Kissinger said they are disastrous because it makes it hard to do this again. I said it also alerts the enemy right away as to exactly what the plans have been.

I told Dr. Kissinger I would call him in the morning. He stated this is of top priority to them. I told him I understood and have issued orders accordingly. Dr. Kissinger said it was reassuring to know I have taken a personal interest in it.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

[3] Reference is to two first-page stories in *The New York Times* by Beecher, one headlined: "Administration Gets Study Of Global Nuclear Strategy," May 1, and the other headlined "Hints of Reprisal Shield U.S. Planes," May 4.

41. Memorandum by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)[1]

Washington, May 9, 1969, 5:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking. Also a typed note at the bottom of the page reads, "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63–16062–3."

I called Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, at Key Biscayne, Florida. I told him I had some information which I thought he ought to know about so as to bring him up to date.

I told him that in regards to the background of William Beecher, who wrote the article in the *New York Times* today,[2] he is formerly from the *St. Louis Globe Democrat* and then went to the *Wall Street Journal* and was later employed by the *New York Times.* He has been active in the U.S. Army reserve program for a period of time and is described as particularly astute as to military affairs. In 1966 at the request of Marvin Watson, Assistant to the President at that time, we conducted an investigation as to a leak of information concerning United States government policy in the anti-missile field in connection with an article by Beecher in the *New York Times* of December 27, 1966. Our investigation led to nothing very definite except the possibility that his story was primarily on informed speculation as there had been made available publicly a lot of source material from which he could draw his conclusions.

I stated that in regard to the current three articles,[3] it is the conclusion of the contacts we have made that it could have come and probably did from a staff member of the National Security Council. I continued that Beecher while at undergraduate school at Harvard had a roommate who is now a staff member of the National Security Council. There is a strong possibility also that he may have gotten some of his information from the Southeast Asian Desk, Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense, as the Public Affairs Office is constituted of employees who are pronounced anti-Nixon. I continued that Beecher frequents this office as well as the National Security Council, and the employees freely furnish him information inasmuch as they are largely Kennedy people and anti-Nixon. I said that also in the Systems Analysis Agency in the Pentagon, there are at least 110 in the 124 employees who are still McNamara people and express a very definite Kennedy philosophy.[4]

I continued that this situation has made it very easy for Beecher to obtain information; however, the source we have been working through said it should not be ruled out that a staff member of the

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[2] See footnote 2, Document 39.

[3] See Documents 39 and 40.

[4] In a May 13 letter to Kissinger, Hoover stated: "In regard to the current three articles, it is the conclusion of the sources we have contacted that the information probably came from a staff member such as Morton H. Halperin of the National Security Council. Also, it is a strong possibility that some of the information came from the Southeast Asian Desk, Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense, as the Public Affairs Office is constituted of anti-Administration personnel." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 88, Confirmation Hearings—Wiretaps)

National Security Council who obviously was in a position to know the information contained in all three articles could have assisted Beecher. Dr. Kissinger said he has heard this as an allegation, too, but there is no proof; that he has heard it as a speculation. I said, of course, this is speculation all the way through tying it into this man Halperin. I said that Beecher works full time at the Pentagon and was asked today as to what his source of information was, and he said it was an excellent one. He said that his source was from the Air Force, but he did not reveal any names. I continued that he stated the Air Force was particularly anxious to soften up its press in its bomber program and is endeavoring to obtain a favorable image with the press. I commented that I thought that was probably a misleading statement by Beecher to throw it into the Air Force.

I continued that there is a man named Eagleburger who attended the Central State College at Stevens Point and the University of Wisconsin and is presently a State Department Foreign Service officer on detail to the National Security Council at the White House. I said he was formerly an assistant to former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach and is a close friend of Beecher.

I said in regards to Halperin, we conducted an applicant investigation of him in 1962 and in February 1969 and the investigation reflected Halperin and other experts in his field are of the opinion that the United States leadership erred in the Vietnam commitment as we did not possess the interest or capabilities to obtain the original objectives. I said that in 1965 his name appeared on a list of individuals who responded to a request for a public hearing on Vietnam by agreeing to sponsor a national sit-in. I said the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1965 advised that Halperin's name was on a list of Americans who had reportedly received the World Marxist Review Problems of Peace and Socialism, a communist publication.

I continued that from another source it was indicated we should not overlook the Systems Analysis Agency in the Defense Department who had an employee named Ivan Selin and another named Halperin currently employed as staff employee of the National Security Council. I said they are very close to each other and both are so-called arrogant Harvard-type Kennedy men who would not hesitate to do anything to save their jobs. I said it was stated that Halperin was particularly anxious to save Selin's job with the Systems Analysis Agency. I said both men know Beecher and consider him a part of the Harvard clique, and, of course, of the Kennedy era and we should not ignore the possibility that Halperin and/or Selin could be the source of the leak to Beecher.

I said that is as far as we have gotten so far. Dr. Kissinger said he appreciated this very much and he hoped I would follow it up as far

as we can take it and they will destroy whoever did this if we can find him, no matter where he is.

I told Dr. Kissinger I wanted him to know the developments and he said he appreciated it very much and they will certainly keep looking into it at their end. I told him we would keep after it and he said they were counting on whatever we can find out.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

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42. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Assistant to the Director (DeLoach)[1]

Washington, May 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Colonel Alexander M. Haig
Technical Surveillance Request

Pursuant to my conversation with the Director, Sunday, May 11, 1969, there is enclosed a memorandum for the Attorney General which the Director may want to discuss personally with the Attorney General. It involves a high-level request for technical surveillance on four individuals whose names are contained in the memorandum.[2]

As I told the Director, the request emanated from Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff. Haig came to my office Saturday to advise me the request was being made

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking. Typed at the top and bottom of the memorandum is "DO NOT FILE." A typed note to the right of the subject line states "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63–16062–3." Below the subject line is written "SPECOV."

[2] The May 12 memorandum for Mitchell is not attached, but a copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box TS 1, Kissinger, Henry A., Nomination as Secty of State, Hearings. The "Approved" line at the end of the memorandum is signed by Mitchell and dated May 12. Three of the four individuals named in the memorandum were members of the NSC staff at the time. Attached to Sullivan's May 11 memorandum is a typed note on the letterhead of the Office of the Director, FBI, dated May 12, that states: "The attached was approved by the Attorney General at 5:48 PM, May 12, 1969." Written in hand below that note is the following: "6:00 p. called Mr. Sullivan and advised him. HWG[andy]."

on the highest authority and involves a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that it is so sensitive it demands handling on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. In fact, he said, if possible it would even be desirable to have the matter handled without going to the Department; however, I was told the Attorney General is aware in general of the main elements of this serious security problem.

Colonel Haig said it is believed these surveillances will only be necessary for a few days to resolve the issue. We, of course, can handle the matter most discreetly through our Washington Field Office. Colonel Haig said it is not desired that there be any formal dissemination of the results of our coverage to his office. Instead, he will come to my office to review the information developed, which will enable us to maintain tight control of it.

Recommendation

If approved, attached memorandum will not be filed but will be maintained in a secure, off-the-record capacity as basis for authority to proceed in response to this request.[3]

[3] At the bottom of the memorandum Hoover wrote "OK."

43. Editorial Note

The wiretapping of National Security Council staff members, other administration officials, and journalists that began in May 1969 has been treated in a number of studies, among them the following: Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy,* pages 156–162; Roger Morris, *Haig: The General's Progress,* pages 147–167; Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), especially pages 83–97, 318–325; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), especially pages 212–227, 497–500; and David Wise, *The American Police State: The Government Against the People* (New York: Random House, 1976), pages 31–106. Kissinger, Haig, and President Nixon all discussed the wiretapping in their memoirs: Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon,* pages 386–390; Kissinger, *White House Years,* pages 252–253, and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pages 118–122, 426–429, 1114–1119; and Haig, *Inner Circles,* especially 213–223.

Documentation on the wiretapping can be found in a number of locations. Both Seymour Hersh (*Price of Power,* pages 646–647) and Walter Isaacson (*Kissinger: A Biography,* pages 789–791) include helpful information on sources. Among those sources they highlight are *Dr. Kissinger's Role in Wiretapping: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), and the depositions and other material generated by Morton Halperin's lawsuit against Kissinger, *Halperin v. Kissinger,* U.S. District Court, Washington, D.C., case 1187–73. Neither the National Security Council files in the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives nor the NSC files for the first Nixon administration held by the National Security Council contain relevant documentation. However, the records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force at the National Archives, RG 460, contain extensive documentation in a series entitled Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigations. Included are many internal Federal Bureau of Investigation memoranda, Director J. Edgar Hoover's letters and memoranda to Nixon, Kissinger, and Attorney General Mitchell, interviews with FBI agents who participated in the wiretapping, chronologies, and other material. While Henry Kissinger's papers at the Library of Congress contain very little documentation on the wiretapping that dates from the 1969–1970 period (see footnote 4, Document 41, and Document 49), his file on *Halperin v. Kissinger* in Box CL 423 includes his statements regarding wiretapping made in connection with: 1) court cases; 2) his 1973 confirmation hearings as Secretary of State; and 3) his 1974 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Also included is a compendium of those statements arranged chronologically that was prepared in 1976 by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

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44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 15, 1969.

It has come to the President's attention that some members of your staff or the National Security Council staff have been asked to meet

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 817, Haldeman, H.R. Confidential. A copy was sent to Ziegler.

with members of the press for the purpose of background interviews, etc.

The President wants it clearly understood that no one on your staff and no one on the National Security Council staff is ever to hold any meeting with an individual or group of press people either for background or attribution. He wants you to be the only spokesman for the White House and the NSC in the field of national security and foreign policy, and any time a briefing is required you are to conduct it.

Obviously, there may be specific, highly unusual situations where it will be desirable to violate this rule. If this should become the case, it should not be done without the President's specific authorization for each individual case, and you should discuss this directly with the President.

Will you please be sure that the members of your staff understand this. By carbon of this memo, I am also advising Ron Ziegler of the same situation and will ask that he make sure his staff is aware of it too.

H.

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45. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 16, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Washington Special Actions Group

The President has directed that the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Korea be constituted on a permanent basis in the

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969–1971. Confidential.

event of future similar crises worldwide. Henceforth, this committee will be referred to as the Washington Special Actions Group.[2]

The President visualizes that the Washington Special Actions Group will confine itself to consideration of the policies and plans affecting crises. Implementation of policy decisions and coordination of operations will be conducted through the interagency Crisis Task Forces prescribed by the Under Secretaries Committee under the authority of NSDM 8.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger

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[2] In a June 20 memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, the President directed that WSAG "review existing military contingency plans for potential crises areas. Where existing plans appear to be inadequate, it is contemplated that the group will initiate action to have appropriate additional plans prepared." (Ibid.)

[3] Document 31. Minutes for most WSAG meetings starting with the first meeting on July 2, 1969, through the meeting on July 22, 1974, are at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–114-H–117, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Files on each meeting that include talking points, briefing memoranda, background papers, summaries of conclusions, and, for many meetings, minutes are also ibid., Boxes H–070-H–097.

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46. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Director (Hoover)[1]

Washington, May 20, 1969.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Following my conversation with you this morning, Dr. Henry Kissinger and Colonel Haig came into the office around 11:45. Dr. Kissinger read all the logs. On doing this, he said "it is clear that I don't have anybody in my office that I can trust except Colonel Haig here." He mentioned that he was under great pressures to adopt a soft line on foreign policy. But he said he is not going to do so. He did not mention where the pressures came from, but I got the impression that he meant the Department of State and possibly one or two others high in the administration. He indicated that President Nixon definitely wanted to maintain a hard line.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 27, Witness Statements, Sullivan—Depositions. Confidential.

Dr. Kissinger said he wanted the coverage to continue for a while longer yet on the first four names, and to which will be added two new ones I sent over to you today. He said that what he is learning as a result of this coverage is extremely helpful to him while at the same time very disturbing. He said he had not decided how to handle this problem but he did not see as he could delay it much longer. He said that Colonel Haig, as in the past, would come over to read the logs. He asked to be remembered to you.

Respectfully submitted,

Bill Sullivan

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47. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Assistant to the Director (DeLoach)[1]

Washington, May 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Colonel Alexander M. Haig
Technical Surveillance Request

Pursuant to the Director's request, there is enclosed with this memorandum a letter from the Director to President Nixon setting forth some extremely sensitive material on Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Ira Davidson developed yesterday through our delicate coverage.[2]

Colonel Alexander Haig read the material this morning and expressed his grave concern and said he would transmit the details of this to Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Because of the explosive nature of this operation, I would like to restate the original request made by Colonel Haig to me. It will be recalled he said that the instructions for the Bureau's assistance in this

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 27, Witness Statements, Sullivan—Depositions. No classification marking. Typed at the top and bottom of the memorandum is "DO NOT FILE." A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63–16062–3."

[2] The letter to the President is not attached, but a copy of Hoover's letter to Kissinger of the same date, May 28, is ibid., Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH.

matter came from the highest authority; however, to protect the highest authority he would read the materials and advise Dr. Henry Kissinger. He further stated he did not want any of the logs sent over to Dr. Kissinger's office but that he would read it here and have it kept here. In view of this, I would like to suggest that the Director consider taking this matter up personally and directly with President Nixon rather than having it carried to the President. I suggest this because of the sensitivity related above and that the only way that it could be made known to President Nixon without an intermediary would be through the Director. Additionally, President Nixon might not want anyone else in his office to know of this matter. Lastly, the Director might want to discuss this directly with Dr. Kissinger first.

Recommendations

(1) For the information and consideration of the Director.

(2) That this memorandum be returned to W. C. Sullivan to be retained with the rest of this extremely sensitive material.

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48. Editorial Note

In its June 3, 1969, issue, *The New York Times* carried a front page story by Hedrick Smith headlined "U.S. Said to Plan an Okinawa Deal Barring A-Bombs." Henry Kissinger telephoned U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, early that morning and told him the President was "fit to be tied" by the article. (Notes of telephone conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal) The President's Assistant H. R. Haldeman wrote in his diary for that day: "Big flap about Okinawa leak in *New York Times.* Rick Smith had complete and accurate story about contents of an NSC Decision memorandum. P[resident] really upset because of jeopardy to national security. Had me call Cushman, Richardson and Laird, have them get complete internal report on who had access, etc." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman telephoned Richardson and told him: "the point is that it is obvious that this seriously impairs our negotiating position; also obvious that the leak was by someone who had access to the NSC paper; and the President feels that unless we find out who it is, the entire NSC meetings are compromised." (Notes of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons)

In a telephone conversation between Laird and Kissinger, June 3 at 11:40 a.m.: "L said President had given him a note about his concern over the story today in the *New York Times.* K said concern is no expression—he is climbing walls. L said he is sure it is not out of his shop. K said L will get an official request by President to conduct an investigation. K said we have a pretty good idea where it came from, but in order to be fair we are going to ask every senior official to make an investigation. L said it was the worst thing that could have happened over there. K said there was one argument that it was leaked in order to get the hard-line Senators stirred up. L said he would wait for the memo. K said he would get it from Haldeman on the plane. K said frankly we do not think it comes out of L's shop. L said it is a lousy thing to come out now and K said it was disastrous." (Ibid., Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

The referenced memo, if it was prepared, has not been found.

The next morning *The New York Times* carried a front-page article by Hedrick Smith headlined "Nixon–Thieu Talk May Bring Accord on U.S. Troop Cut." In a conversation between Secretary Rogers and Kissinger at 10:30 a.m. that day: "R again said he was concerned about Okinawa thing—we have to be sure that deliberations made by NSC are secure. K asked if R had any idea as to where leak came from. R said no reason why anyone at State would do it—it is quite contrary to our best interests. K said only one on his staff involved was State Dept man, close associate of Alex Johnson's and has the same views." (Ibid.)

In a 2 p.m. conversation with Kissinger on June 3: "The President wanted to know if HAK had any more ideas on where the story came from. HAK felt there was a pattern that is emerging by people trying to get out ahead to steal the thunder. Richardson is really shaken and realizes that the President just won't discuss anything with them if this continues and the President agreed. Only one person in his office was aware of this HAK said. The President's opinion was that it was coming from State. HAK said someone called his attention to the fact that Beecher had not written a byline since these stories started coming from Smith. The President wasn't as concerned about this as he was the Okinawa story. He wanted to make sure HAK had told Rogers he had changed his mind and HAK confirmed that he had discussed this. They agreed to go along the three guidelines and to reaffirm just that." (Ibid.)

Haldeman entered the following in his diary for June 4: "New security flap about troop withdrawal leak. [The President] had me call all Departments again, this time to say we know someone gave a backgrounder, wants report on who. Of course all denied it. Then wanted more detailed push on NSC Okinawa investigation. By evening was really mad. Kept calling me from San Clemente house with new or-

ders to investigate." Haldeman's informal, handwritten notes for June 4 included the following entries: "skip NSC Weds—P. has decided to skeleton them. cut NSC to one every 2 wks—or once a month. less papers[.] more brought privately to P. for his decision w/K. go right fm subcomm to P—*not* to NSC"; and later in his notes, "decided because of leaks—no NSC mtg on SALT talks[;] none from now on until further notice[;] no paper on any of this." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40) In his diary for June 4, Haldeman wrote that the President "decided no more NSC meetings. Result of leak. Can't trust to papers. Will make decisions privately, with K."

Haldeman conveyed the same information in telephone conversation with Kissinger on June 4 at 5:25 p.m. In reply, "K said he agrees with much of this but we have to go thru the NSC on next two sessions on strategic arms talks. K said we have to have a meeting on the 13th and one on the 18th—after that we can put into effect what the Pres wants. K said NSC is President's one way of keeping control of the Govt. K said we need to cancel the Wednesday meeting, but it should be held some other time during the week because we do not want Pres accused of holding up talks. It was agreed to tentatively block out 3:30 on Friday, June 13, for two hours." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files)

In a June 9 memorandum, Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy, advised Kissinger "to discuss [with Nixon] procedures associated with future NSC meetings in the light of the President's reaction to recent leaks. Termination of formal NSC meetings would adequately constitute an unacceptable modification in the announced policy formulation process and would open the Administration to serious charges, which we would have difficulty answering in the face of the justifications promulgated earlier." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 957, Haig Chron—June 1969). The National Security Council met on June 13 and again on June 18 and 25.

The Okinawa leak also spurred further discussion about phone taps. Haldeman noted in his diary for June 3 that he had a "long talk with K[issinger] about his leaks. E[hrlichman] and I had breakfast with him and advised him to move out the suspect people. He later told P that this is what he's doing. Set up detailed plan for tapping all suspects, not carried out." According to Haldeman's informal, handwritten notes for June 3, Ehrlichman made the following proposal: "full list of all who have access to NSC papers[;] tap all exc. K. Haig & members of NSC[,] all sub cab & others—tap on."

49. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Meeting with J. Edgar Hoover, Wednesday, June 4 at 9:30 a.m.

1. Express your appreciation to Mr. Hoover and Mr. Sullivan for their outstanding support in recent weeks in uncovering security problems within the NSC staff. Inform Mr. Hoover that you have discussed these problems in detail with the President (and with Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman).

2. Tell Mr. Hoover of the action to be taken with respect to Davidson.[2]

3. Ask Mr. Hoover for his views on how we should proceed with Halperin, who had been involved in indiscretions and who obviously has a reputation for liberal views but who has yet to be firmly linked with a security breach. I think it best that you seek Mr. Hoover's advice in this instance while avoiding any specific comments pro or con and especially avoiding any opinions on this matter.

4. Request Mr. Hoover's advice on how to proceed with Sonnenfeldt.

5. Ask Mr. Hoover if he has any additional information or guidance which he feels would be helpful in this very difficult situation. Specifically you might inquire about the requirement for prolonging the taps, making it clear that the President wishes to terminate them as soon as possible. (I think in the case of Halperin and Sonnenfeldt that they should be kept on for at least another two weeks so that a pattern of innocence can be firmly established.)[3]

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 88, Confirmation Hearings—Wiretaps. Top Secret; Sensitive. Points 1, 3, and 5 of the memorandum are quoted in full in Morris, *Haig: The General's Progress*, pp. 159–160.

[2] Reference is to Daniel Davidson of the NSC staff, who resigned on May 29.

[3] According to informal notes kept by Haldeman, Ehrlichman made the following comments at a meeting with the President on June 16: "re taps—impt. for K. to get the files out of his office[;] thru E & Mitchell find someone to read taps[;] maybe use Huston etc. for this[;] work out a scheme—minimize what done thru Hoover[;] esp. newsman—shld be done by outsider. K. shldn't be reading these—" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40)

50. Editorial Note

Sometime in the afternoon of June 18, 1969, in a telephone conversation with Attorney General Mitchell: "K[issinger] said he has another State Dept problem with which he wanted to acquaint AG and on which he might need AG's help. Starting this week, State is not sending cables over for clearance before they go out—in any area especially on VN. AG asked including Paris and K said right—they sent Walsh into see Sovt Ambs without clearance from the White House . . . K said Soviets must think we have lost our minds on the basis of what K showed AG on Dobrynin. WH clearance for eight years has been standard. AG asked who signed Cable and K said all cables are signed by Rogers. K said he knows this is direct order from him. AG said he definitely agrees this cannot be. AG asked how K got cable and K said it comes over automatically. AG said he thought K should take up with Pres and K said he would like to say that he had discussed it with AG. AG said by all means—could not be stronger about anything he has run into down here. K said he feels the President has to have control on foreign policy and if K is not doing job well enough, he should get someone else. AG said he agreed that control had to be at WH—they will murder him if he does not have this. AG said K should be as strong as he needs to be and if he needs AG's backup to let him know." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Later that day in a draft memorandum to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger noted two recent instances in which the State Department "had failed to clear highly important communications on Vietnam with the White House" and emphasized how essential it was for the President "to exercise control over important communications of Presidential concern." Kissinger proposed sending a memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers that spelled out the categories of messages that the State Department should refer to the National Security Council for clearance prior to transmission. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1) Kissinger decided instead, however, to forward to Nixon the next day a much briefer memorandum for Rogers that stated: "I have noticed that clearance of some important cables with the White House was recently overlooked by the State Department. I would like to reaffirm my wish that departmental telegrams be cleared with the White House to insure that I am kept fully abreast of communications on important policy and operational matters of Presidential interest." Nixon signed the memorandum, and it was delivered to the Department of State on June 20. (Ibid.)

Rogers drafted a response, making a number of handwritten revisions, in which he stated that it was his understanding "that cables

involving policy matters should be cleared with your staff but I did not understand, nor do I think it wise, that I should clear all cables dealing with operations with your staff. If this is required then my role as Secretary of State would be a mere conduit." Rogers concluded, "Unless you want personally to clear all operational cables then I would think that the discretion as to whether they should be brought to your attention should rest with me." (Ibid., RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)

In a telephone conversation with Kissinger on June 20 at 6:30 p.m., Rogers said that he "was a little upset by the memo the President sent him on these cables. He had an answer he was going to send to the President but wanted to discuss it with HAK first. It was not his understanding that HAK's staff would clear operational cables.

"HAK said he thought we should keep matters where they are. It is certainly satisfactory for everyone's point of view. There was one cable that the President noticed in the regular reading material that HAK gives the President on all Paris negotiations that was in question. This cable had not been cleared but added that we couldn't clear all of Roger's cables. The system that now exists will be no problem—concerning policy cables was the only thing he had in mind. Rogers said if he really wants to see everything we send over. Rogers also express concern over the fact that when he clears a cable then Walsh has to call Sneider and Sneider has to clear it. HAK didn't think this was right and said the Secretary should have the last word.

"Rogers said he would talk to the President about this and HAK agreed that he should. He said he has a general line they follow and that the day to day negotiations really should be done at State. He said it doesn't make any difference what we say in the public sessions but a change in direction he would certainly clear with WH.

"HAK assured him that this was the procedure that had been followed in previous administrations even back to Eisenhower. Rogers wasn't sure it went back that far." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

In a June 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Kissinger's Military Assistant, noted that Nixon's memorandum on cable clearances had "generated a sharp reaction from Rogers and that Rogers indicated he would call the President about this subject. You should point out to the President that it would be most difficult to protect him if, as Rogers insists, clearances be cut down to include only telegrams which involve policy changes. This is ridiculous in terms of past policy and would mean that all operational cables and negotiating traffic, even in times of crises, could legalistically be excluded by the Secretary of State. Past experience has indicated that it is not diffi-

cult to assess a subject on its own merits and to seek White House clearance in cases where the President's interest is evident. This would apply to most Vietnam negotiating traffic and until quite recently all of these messages have been cleared by the White House. You should inform the President that this is an important issue and one in which there could be no compromise if you are to serve him in your present capacity." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 957, Haig Chron–June 1969)

On June 26 President Nixon sent Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird a memorandum (Document 53) that spelled out the categories of messages to be cleared with the NSC using the language that Kissinger had first considered forwarding to the President on June 18.

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51. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Working Groups on Viet-Nam

Recommendation

That you establish a policy-level US/Vietnamese working group to be presided over by yourself and to include Mel Laird, Henry Kissinger, General Wheeler and myself; that the first session of this group take place early next week; and that subsequent meetings be held weekly, preferably on Tuesdays.[2]

Discussion

During my conversation with you on the morning of June 24[3] I reported that President Thieu had proposed the establishment of US/Vietnamese working groups in both Saigon and Washington in order to assure a common strategy as we move forward. President Thieu

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. XIII. Secret.

[2] Nixon neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation.

[3] According to the President's Daily Diary, Rogers and Nixon met at the White House from 10:18 to 11:10 a.m on June 24. No record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

regards such a suggestion as a logical outcome of the conversations which he had with you in Midway on this subject.

This memorandum contains my recommendations for the form in which I believe we should organize ourselves in Washington to meet this request. It does not address the matter of organization in Saigon, which I believe is best left to Thieu and Bunker to determine.

My first recommendation would be that we form a compact group at the policy level over which you would preside and on which Mel Laird, Henry Kissinger, General Wheeler and I would sit. You might wish to expand this unit to include one or two others, such as Dick Helms.

It would be my suggestion that this group meet once a week, preferably on Tuesdays, so that it can have a timely impact on the Thursday negotiating sessions in Paris. The group would also be available to be convoked in emergency situations if circumstances warrant.

Ancillary to this group would be the ad hoc committee on Viet-Nam which Bill Sullivan currently chairs. That group has representation from the White House, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and CIA. An AID representative participates when his presence is needed. They currently meet three times a week or more often if necessary.

On the Vietnamese side, Ambassador Bui Diem is the principal representative here in Washington. I have already informed him that he should meet with Sullivan as often as is necessary. Their first meeting is scheduled for June 25. He has indicated his desire to discuss President Thieu's proposed statement on a political settlement as well as tactics and timing for the Paris negotiations. I have assured him that representatives of the various US Departments and Agencies are available to him through Sullivan's committee and that I myself or other Cabinet-level officials would see him if the situation warrants it.

If these recommendations conform to the views which you expressed in our conversation, I will arrange with Henry Kissinger to have this organization activated. I would suggest that the first session of the policy group take place early next week because I feel that we are pressed for time, particularly with respect to the statement to be issued by President Thieu.

WPM

52. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday, June 25

1. Although you are not scheduled to see the President this morning it is probably essential that you do so, in which case you should discuss Secretary Rogers' proposal for an informal working group on Vietnam.[2]

—I discussed this with Dick Sneider last night and was told that this was an effort by the Secretary of State to avoid a showdown with you and to pose a compromise solution to his long-standing problems on Vietnam. Sneider said that the President had been aware of the proposal and had approved it, and that it had been formulated in the last day or so after receipt of the President's memorandum on cables.[3] Then, as a result of a little plumbing on my part, he stated that the problem had been in the hopper for some time and that the memorandum from the President merely added salt to the wound. Sneider concluded his comments to me with a statement to the effect that you had better accept this one rather than lose the whole ball game. I can only conclude from that that Sneider has been well versed on the evolution of this proposal as well as on many of our other problems with State.

—One additional point that Dick Sneider made when I asked him whether or not the proposal was visualized as being in the framework of the NSC—Dick stated, "of course not. The NSC system is dead, Henry killed it long ago."

—Despite the foregoing, I cannot help but feel that there is some blackmail being exercised by State in an effort to kill the NSC system, to reassert the vicarship of the Secretary and to defuse your power while at the same time avoiding a direct confrontation with the President, which Rogers may not be sure he can win. This has all the earmarks of a State Department ploy to achieve maximum benefits with minimum risks. I do not believe you should roll over on this one.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Daily Briefs, Box 8, June 17–30, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Document 51.

[3] See Document 50. A transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Sneider on June 24 at 7:20 p.m., is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

—Consequently, I recommend you discuss the Rogers' memo with the President, informing him:

(a) of how it was delivered to you and state that the proposed organization might ensure some concentrated attention to the Vietnam situation which is in dire need of thoughtful attention;

(b) you have assumed that the organization would be within the framework of the NSC system, which were it to be otherwise it would emasculate the system and could not but lead to its downfall;

(c) if it is the President's intention to let the system fall of its own weight then you will, of course, accede to the proposal. If not, then you should recommend that the President only adopt this organization within the framework of the NSC system.

2. As I look back over the main failures of the NSC system, if in fact they be failures, the only area with which we have failed to achieve our objectives is that of security. I am personally convinced that the President's confidence has been shaken in the entire system because of inexcusable pattern of leaks which have emanated from State and Defense and perhaps your own staff. The solution that Rogers has proposed is to return to a breakfast group pattern in which a handful of advisers move on policy deliberations which affect the entire country and which will only increase the risk of a lack of bureaucracy consensus for courses of action which might be undertaken. I am personally strongly opposed to this type of government, which cannot but have dire effects for the Nation. If we are afraid to bite the bullet and establish the kind of bureaucratic discipline so essential to the conduct of NSC affairs, then the bypassing of the structure and the designation of a handful of individuals to deal with our policy issues will only enable the Secretaries of State and Defense to overlook a basic deficiency in their organizations (and perhaps you in our own), which will arise again in the future to scuttle the President's programs in another form.

3. On balance, I am convinced that the President should think very hard about discarding the NSC system after such a brief period. A circumventing of the bureaucracy will not solve the basic ills which the shortcomings in the NSC system have uncovered. These ills are a lack of discipline and loyalty to the President himself and a failure on the part of key principals in the Administration to adhere to the policy guidance which I feel he has clearly enunciated on issue after issue. The list of breakdowns is long and frightening and rests primarily on the shoulders of the Secretary of State, whose department, in my view, has frequently[4] been the source of disloyalty to policy guidance enunciated by the President. As examples, I cite:

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[4] "Frequently" is handwritten above "invariably," which was crossed out.

—The President's guidance on SALT.
—The President's guidance on the broad relationship of all ongoing areas of interest to the Soviets as they affect Soviet actions which might lead toward progress in Vietnam.
—Spanish negotiations.
—Recognition of Mongolia, etc.

4. In my view, the time has come for some tough talk and some meaningful action with respect to loyalty to the President's programs. Bureaucratic in-fighting can no longer be tolerated. Unless the President recognizes[5] these issues,[6] ad hoc kitchen cabinets, breakfast groups or any other organizational gimmick will sooner or later suffer the same fate. You may wish to draw upon the above rationale in discussing this issue with the President. If despite your objections, he desires to try the Rogers' proposal I recommend that you agree to do your best to make them work and then sit down with Secretary Rogers face-to-face and set about establishing the procedures for doing so.

[5] "recognizes" is handwritten above "views," which was crossed out.

[6] The words "and finds a solution to them" were typed after the word "issues" but then crossed out.

53. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, June 26, 1969.

I believe you will agree that I am best served when there is full coordination between our respective staffs, and when I am fully apprised of current national security operational and policy questions. To ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to my policy in this area, I thought it would be useful to review the categories of messages which should regularly be referred here prior to transmission. These are:

—Policy cables—those laying out or interpreting general policy for the guidance of officials abroad as well as instructions regarding

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, Department of State, Vol. III, 6/1/69. Confidential. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for the President's signature on June 26. (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, June 26; ibid., President's Daily Briefs, Box 8, June 17–30, 1969) For background on the memorandum, see Document 50.

approaches to foreign governments or positions to be taken by representatives abroad.

—Operational instructions involving policy questions, current negotiations, or the handling of critical situations.

—Foreign visitors, either scheduled or prospective in whom there is a real or potential Presidential interest.

—Any communication which involves or mentions the President or the White House.

—Any telegram relating to a matter currently under consideration or scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council or its related bodies.

—Matters in which there is a known Presidential interest, particularly items which the President has, or may be expected to have, before him for decision.

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54. Editorial Note

During a meeting with his Assistant H.R. Haldeman on June 26, 1969, President Nixon made the following comments in connection with the "K[issinger] plan," according to Haldeman's notes: "re staff talking—in dom. policy wld hope use good jdgmt. Absolute rule—eff. today[:] *nobody* to talk or say anything re foreign policy—on or off record—w/o K. approval esp. Safire, Klein. don't interpret, defend, attack, explain—involved in *very* sophisticated business. certain developments—next 3 mos. absolute curtain. includes *everybody*—just refer to what P. has said. don't re-state, define, etc. still get K. in to explain to them re analysis. P. staff relation w/press[:] staffer has *no* views of his own. have to have central control. whole & *only* job here is to build up presidency & that's not hard to do. can't build up self—all goodies are the P's. hold to absolute rule on *Times–Post.* Kilpatrick OK to except on routine." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40)

55. Memorandum From the Director of the Secretariat Staff of the Department of State (Gleysteen) to the Deputy Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Ruser)[1]

Washington, June 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Under Secretaries' Committee Action Assignments

We have gone through our NSC files and have compiled a list of NSC Under Secretaries' Committee action responsibilities. The result is as follows:

—NSDMs 2 and 3—The Under Secretaries' Committee was assigned certain general responsibilities.[2]

—NSDM 8—The Under Secretaries' Committee was assigned certain responsibilities in connection with crisis anticipation and management.[3]

—NSDM 12—The Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to examine REDCOSTE proposals and to coordinate and monitor U.S. preparations for offset negotiations.[4]

—NSDM 13—The Under Secretaries' Committee was to supervise the preparation of a strategy paper on Okinawa negotiations.[5]

—NSDM 17—The Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to supervise the preparation of certain documents relating to this NSDM.[6]

—NSDM 18—The Under Secretaries' Committee has been assigned the task of reviewing the annual underground nuclear test program and requests for authorization of specific tests.[7]

—NSSM 43—In this document the Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to submit a series of recommendations to implement the President's proposals to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in April.[8]

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos. Secret.

[2] Documents 11 and 12.

[3] Document 31.

[4] NSDM 12, "NATO," April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 12.)

[5] NSDM 13, "Policy Toward Japan," May 28. (Ibid., Box H–210)

[6] NSDM 17, "Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China," June 26. (Ibid.)

[7] NSDM 18, "Review of Underground Nuclear Tests," June 27. (Ibid.)

[8] NSSM 43, "Implementation of President's Proposals to NATO Ministerial Meeting," April 15. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S–NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212)

—NSSM 25—The Under Secretaries' Committee became involved in a study of the relationship of Plowshare to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.[9] Mr. Kissinger's memorandum of May 19 called for further study of this subject.[10]

—The Under Secretaries' Committee has been seized with the problem of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory.

—The Under Secretaries Committee has studied the question of the Brazilian DE construction program.

—The Under Secretary was involved in the Working Group called for by NSSM 4 to review US foreign aid policy.[11]

—The Under Secretaries' Committee has studied US aid to the Japanese space program (memorandum of May 19).[12]

—The Under Secretaries' Committee is studying the question of the Dutch interest in U.S. assistance in the development of nuclear submarines (memo of May 20).[13]

DG

[9] NSSM 25, "Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty," February 20. (Ibid.)

[10] Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State. (National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos)

[11] NSSM 4, "U.S. Foreign Aid Policy," January 21. (Ibid., S/S–NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212)

[12] NSC–U/SM 16, May 19. (Ibid., Lot 81 D 309)

[13] NSC–U/SM 17, May 20. (Ibid.)

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, July 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Proposal for the Establishment of Working Groups on Vietnam

At Tab A is a memorandum from Bill Rogers[2] forwarding the proposal he mentioned to you on June 24, which would establish a policy

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. VIII, 7/1/69–7/31/69. Secret.

[2] Document 51.

level US/Vietnamese working group presided over by yourself and including Bill Rogers, Mel Laird, General Wheeler and myself.

While I agree with Bill's proposal to establish a compact Cabinet level policy group, I fear the organizational lines he proposes would have the practical effect of placing control over both Vietnam policy and operational matters in the hands of the Secretary of State by (a) establishing a Cabinet level working group under your titular chairmanship outside of the National Security Council framework and, (b) by placing the current Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam chaired by Bill Sullivan under this group as staff support.

In practice it is not likely that you would have the time nor the inclination to meet weekly on operational matters associated with Vietnam. Thus, State would, at the departmental level, assume a predominant role in the conduct of Vietnam affairs. Further, on the occasions when the Cabinet level committee did meet to determine important policy issues, agendas, working papers and interdepartmental coordination would be prepared by a committee chaired by State and divorced entirely from the NSC machinery, which now gives equal weight to the views of all the departments concerned. Also, in the conduct of day-to-day affairs, it is probable that White House clearances could then be effectively circumvented because of the special role assigned to the interdepartmental ad hoc committee. The overall impact of this special arrangement would greatly diminish your control over the conduct of Vietnam affairs now afforded by the NSC system. In other words, the proposal is, in effect, the SIG system which State tried so hard to implement last January and which you rejected.

I am sure Mel Laird and General Wheeler would be equally disturbed at the prospect of giving State predominant control over the conduct of Vietnam business. General Goodpaster shares these views. John Mitchell also feels that it would be a grave mistake to take this road.

It therefore seems to me that if there is to be a working group, it should (a) be part of the NSC system, (b) be ad hoc so that your schedule is protected, (c) be served by the NSC staff, and (d) meet only at your request. The action would be completely consistent with the charter of the National Security Council as approved by you in January and would enable you to assemble a more manageable Cabinet level group under your chairmanship to consider issues related to Vietnam. This may prove especially timely during the coming weeks when so many sensitive Vietnam-related issues must be addressed. The Cabinet level working group would receive its support as does the full NSC—by the NSC staff—thereby ensuring the same kind of Presidential control as is currently exercised.

Recommendation

I recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab B to Bill which approves the establishment of a Cabinet level working group on Vietnam but which modifies his proposal by keeping the group within the NSC framework.[3]

[3] See Document 57.

57. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Working Groups on Vietnam

I have given considerable thought to your memorandum of June 24,[2] proposing the formulation of a group on Vietnam, chaired by me and composed of yourself, Laird, Wheeler, and Kissinger. I welcome the opportunity for periodic meetings of this group. However, given the demands on my time, I do not want to commit myself to another fixed meeting. Instead, I propose to convene such a group as the need arises in lieu of the full NSC and as part of the NSC process. I have instructed Henry Kissinger to staff it along these lines.[3]

RN

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. VIII, 7/1/69–7/31/69. Secret.

[2] Document 56.

[3] Below his initials, the President wrote: "I would also like to have John Mitchell as a member of this group—The first meeting should be early next week—"

58. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, July 2, 1969, 10:00 a.m.

Introduction

Introduce the meeting by outlining for group the purpose of the exercise which should include:

1. An overall review of existing military contingency plans by the policy level group in order to:

a. bring the group up to date on the menu of existing contingency plans in the event of emergencies similar to the EC–121 shootdown.

b. enable this policy group to consider whether or not existing military plans are responsive to the most probable crisis situations that can develop over the short range.

c. test these plans carefully in terms of their own technical suitability, i.e., levels of force, response time, impact on ability to react to concurrent crises elsewhere, impact on Vietnam conflict, etc.

d. enable group to direct the development of additional military contingency plans where gaps appear as a result of the review.

e. prepare an integrated game plan blending military and political actions to permit immediate response from a policy perspective in the event contingencies occur.

2. Emphasize that the operation of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) should not conflict with ongoing politico-military contingency planning done at the Interdepartmental level nor should it conflict in time of crisis with the operational implementation of the policy decisions which will emanate through the WSAG to the Department of State for implementation and interdepartmental coordination.

3. Elicit discussion from the group on the objectives and charter of the WSAG.

[Omitted here is discussion of contingency planning for Korea.]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969–1971, Korea, 7/2/69. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy. The July 2 meeting was the WSAG's first meeting.

59. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, July 2, 1969, 11:42 a.m.–12:28 p.m.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP (WSAG) MEETING

SUBJECT

Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman
State—U. Alexis Johnson
Defense—G. Warren Nutter
CIA—Cord Meyer
JCS—Vice Adm. Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff
Col. Alexander M. Haig
Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

1. The WSAG will review the NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea[2] instead of the NSC Review Group.

2. The NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea will be the agenda item for the next WSAG meeting on July 11, 1969.

3. The areas of immediate concern to the WSAG are Korea, Berlin and the Middle East. Following WSAG review of relevant interdepartmental and military contingency plans for these areas, further requirements will be met by task forces functioning as working groups under the WSAG. The existing Berlin and Korean Task Forces will be employed, and action initiated to form a similar element for the Middle East.

4. The contingency of actual Sino-Soviet hostilities will be an additional concern of the WSAG.

Kissinger opened the meeting stating that its purpose was primarily organizational although some time would be devoted to the "Red Books" (covering military plans for Korean contingencies) provided the Committee Members by the Joint Staff. He reviewed the President's thoughts on the need for updated and effective procedures for contingency planning, having in mind documents which would be useful for incidents similar to the EC–121 "shoot down." Kissinger said he envi-

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Behr, who forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a July 3 memorandum. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] NSSM 34, March 21, 1969, and the Contingency Study are ibid.

sioned the WSAG to have policy responsibility for the content of contingency plans but that the implementation of these plans would clearly rest with organizations such as those within the State Department that have already been structured to accept these responsibilities. Moreover he wished it to be clearly understood that actual operations during contingencies would not be run from the White House Situation Room. What has to be done now is to develop ways of interfacing military and political considerations and to answer the question "who does what"? He noted that military plans for contingencies are highly sensitive and that, for WSAG actions, only the principals should have access to the documents. They would not be reproduced and would be returned to the Joint Staff after having been worked in the WSAG. Ultimately, what will be required are contingency folders, approved by the WSAG, then kept on file in the White House Situation Room for use in possible emergencies. He then asked the group members for their comments.

Secretary Johnson immediately called to mind the comparison between the Berlin Task Force and the Korean Task Force under Ambassador Brown, which has prepared a plan for Korean contingencies in response to NSSM 34. He commended this plan to Kissinger saying that it covers much of the same ground as the "Red Books" sent to the Group by the Joint Staff. He remarked on the effectiveness of the "Live Oak" plans done by the Berlin Task Force. This is an on-going operation which has produced plans in great detail and with an underlying concept that the planning group would also be deeply involved in the emergency actions incident to Berlin contingencies. He stated that with respect to the Korean Task Force, much valuable work has already been done. What should now be done is to refine the work under the direction of the WSAG serving as a "Watch Dog" committee. Kissinger remarked that the President was not telling the WSAG how to organize, but that he desires the group to provide plans which will give him the same kind of assurance that he had during the EC–121 incident.

Secretary Johnson stated that the Korean Task Force work is now ready to be looked at by the NSC Review Group. Kissinger rejoined that the plan should not be handled by the Review Group but by the WSAG. He did not believe the Review Group could address the problems with the same precision that the President needs for decision making in contingency situations. Admiral Johnson concurred, stating that the military aspects of the contingency plans are highly sensitive and that the security aspects of these plans are of paramount importance.[3] Kissinger

[3] In NSDM 19, issued July 3 and signed by Kissinger, the President directed that "henceforth political-military contingency plans prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups in accordance with NSDM 8 should be forwarded to the NSC Washington Special Actions Group." (Ibid.)

added that whether the plan would eventually appear on the NSC Agenda was a decision the President would have to make at a later date.

Turning to Admiral Johnson, Kissinger asked whether the military participated in the Korean contingency plan. Admiral Johnson said that they had but he was not sure to what extent. He thought the document reflected military planning in outline form but not in the detail contained in the "Red Books" before the members. He then reported an exercise internal to the Joint Staff which resulted in a "Crisis Data Book." This effort visualized hypothetical contingency situations, how they could develop, predicted the reactions of other affected countries, then postulated reasonable US actions and their consequences.

Kissinger returned to the President's objectives with respect to contingency plans. The President wants, he said, no generalized statements, but instead courses of action which would be useful in specific situations. For example, if he wants three B–52s to strike a designated objective, what else would he have to do. He is interested in knowing the possible reactions of affected people and governments. What exactly is likely to happen in a political/military sense? He wants a check list of what he has to do—not esoteric speculation about events that could lead to a crisis. Additionally, follow-on factors have to be considered such as how to deal with reinforcement levels. Secretary Johnson opined there was a need to amplify the contingency scenarios. Kissinger reflected on his own thought processes during the EC–121 incident and remarked that his initial reactions were probably naive. The main lesson he learned from the incident was that the trick in any action taken would be to preclude a counter blow. He reported some after-thoughts the President had on the EC–121 incident to the effect that if such an occasion arose in the future and a B–52 strike was believed necessary, the price you pay really isn't much greater for a strike with twenty-five aircraft than with three. The need is to look determined and, if the object is to prevent counter-responses, the action taken should be powerful blow. If a similar situation were to arise today, he (the President) would probably either do nothing or select an option toward the extreme of the range of possibilities. Admiral Johnson said that he agreed with the President's ideas as do the Joint Chiefs. For example, if you attack an airfield but don't take out the enemy's air order of battle, you are in deep trouble.

Nutter suggested a parallel between the President's philosophy and Golda Meir's "A Seven-fold Retaliation" policy. Secretary Johnson said that the military aspects had to be balanced by an understanding of their political implications. For example, when would we expect the Soviet Union to become involved? We had the *Pueblo*[4] and the E–121

[4] Documentation on the *Pueblo* incident can be found in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Documents 212–331.

incidents but the next time it might be the political assassination of a US Ambassador or the President of South Korea, or it might be the destruction of a vital industrial facility such as an oil refinery.

Kissinger thought that if any of the contingencies mentioned by Secretary Johnson were to occur today the President would probably take positive action.

Kissinger then returned the attention of the group to the "Red Books" containing representative military contingency plans for Korea. He expressed an opinion that it would be non-productive for the group to review each of the 25 plans in the book. There was basically a great similarity among the plans, and that probably what should be done would be to group them within categories of response. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Admiral Johnson then displayed a graphic prepared by the Joint Staff—a map on which was marked the objectives of the 25 plans contained in the "Red Book." [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Secretary Johnson then asked how the group proposed to work the problem at hand? He suggested that the Korean Task Force work be referred to WSAG and not to the Review Group. Additionally, he thought it advisable that members of WSAG look carefully at the Korean Task Force plan in preparation for the next morning. Kissinger agreed with the two courses of action but suggested that the Joint Staff also work on the "Red Books" to group the contingencies by challenges and responses. He inquired whether the work could be done within a week? Admiral Johnson thought this was possible. Secretary Johnson remarked that the "Red Books" contained no treatment of the political aspects of the various courses of actions suggested in them. Admiral Johnson agreed and said it was not their purpose to address the political issues. All members agreed there was a need for expanded scenarios to include their political ramifications.

Secretary Johnson thought there was an additional requirement to examine the steps, from a political-military standpoint, that could be taken to confine the actions to a low level. Admiral Johnson remarked that a CIA assessment of possible enemy reactions would be needed. Secretary Johnson said he wanted Ambassador Brown in on the act. (It was not clear whether he meant representation on the WSAG or whether he meant in Brown's capacity as head of the Korean Task Force.) The group agreed that, with the work in front of them, frequent meetings would be required.

Secretary Johnson stated that, of all possible contingencies, Berlin problems had been dealt with more extensively than any of the others. Admiral Johnson remarked that no plan, however detailed, is any good if it is static. All contingency plans must undergo periodic review. Secretary Johnson agreed and recommended a standing Task Force

working continuously, but not necessarily on a day-to-day basis, within each of the contingency areas. Meyer asked about the membership of the Korean Task Force? Secretary Johnson then gave a rundown of the task force membership under Ambassador Brown. Kissinger said he has no objection to the task force concept provided they have access to the kind of material necessary to work the problems effectively. Under any circumstances, he considered the WSAG as the proper reviewing authority for the type of planning being considered by the group. Admiral Johnson said it would be possible for the military to provide detailed briefings, giving the necessary background information, but omitting unnecessary operational detail.

Kissinger then inquired about the level of activity of the Berlin Task Force. Secretary Johnson said that its structure and mechanics were still in existence but that its recent activities have been limited. Kissinger stated his belief that, because of the pressure of other duties, the WSAG cannot function as a planning group but only as a reviewing agency.

Secretary Johnson then said the Korean Task Force plan was on its way but he was not really certain of its status within the NSC reporting process.

Kissinger said that for the next meeting the Joint Staff should attempt to group the plans in the "Red Books" and that the WSAG should be prepared to discuss what kinds of provocations would lead to what kinds of responses.

Secretary Johnson then outlined the six general contingency areas set forth in the NSSM 34 study.

Kissinger remarked that, if the work of the Korean Task Force fits the objectives defined by the WSAG, the work should be used and people should not have to do it over again. After the WSAG looks over the Korean Task Force plan, the Korean Task Force could then be used as a Working Group for the WSAG to make whatever revisions will be required. Similarly, when Berlin contingencies are considered in the very near future the Berlin Task Force can assume responsibility for follow-on work. Moreover, because contingency planning is underway for the Middle East there is a need for a similar Task Force to handle those problems. He noted that the military contingency plans which deal with a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East are somewhat unrelated to politics and seem to be deficient in the logistic arrangements that are called for. Admiral Johnson replied that the military plans for the Middle East are undergoing revision at the present time and that part of the problem in making sense out of logistic requirements is the lack of military bases in the area.

Kissinger then asked whether the next WSAG meeting could be held on the 11th of July. The agenda would be the Korean Task Force

plan. Nutter remarked that the members should also consider that plans other than those for the Middle East, Berlin, and Korea would probably be required. Secretary Johnson agreed, but said that further NSC directives were unnecessary because the current general instructions for contingency planning are sufficiently comprehensive. Nutter stated that there are grave problems associated with Berlin planning because of the tripartite and quadripartite character of those plans. There are very difficult security problems and almost insurmountable military problems. Secretary Johnson agreed that the Berlin plans were immensely complicated and represented years of work.

Kissinger recalled his participation in a 1961 Berlin War Game. The results of that game were comforting because they indicated we could not lose. Now the situation is somewhat different. He further questioned what we would do in the event of actual hostilities between the Soviet Union and Communist China. He noted that the President had inquired about this problem earlier in the morning. Early answers to this question are needed.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson to see what could be done bureaucratically to set up a Middle East planning element. Secretary Johnson replied that he would look into what has been done in Middle East planning in the recent past and under the former administration. He will report his findings to the Group at their next meeting. All agreed that, subject to the President's schedule, the next meeting will be held on Friday, July 11th at 1400 hours.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:28 P.M.

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60. Memorandum From the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting, July 11, 1969

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, 7/11/69 Korea. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Colonel Robert Behr. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 76, WSAG, July–Aug. 1969)

I. Procedures

Before considering the substance of the contingency plan for Korea I believe that it would be useful to spend a few minutes at the WSAG meeting clarifying the procedures which the WSAG will use. The issues which you might wish to raise are:

1. *What should be the end-product of WSAG deliberation?*

What I believe is needed is a relatively short contingency plan which:

a. States the likely contingencies which might arise.
b. Summarizes the available courses of military action and their pros and cons.
c. Provide a real time scenario of military and diplomatic moves to implement some or all of the courses of action.

This paper would be kept on file in the Situation Room and periodically updated. Neither the political/military plans as they emerge from the IG or the military plans from the Pentagon will fit this bill. Both plans are needed: the military plan for obvious reasons and the IG plan to guide the task force in the State Department in supporting the WSAG during a crisis. These papers should be consistent with the WSAG Contingency Plans.

The WSAG should be asked to agree on format for this paper as indicated above.

2. *How should these WSAG Contingency Plans be prepared?*

I do not believe that the IGs or Task Forces should be charged with preparing the WSAG Contingency Plans. This is true for several reasons: (1) the IG chairman simply will not give priority to this task, (2) JCS will be unwilling to release the operations plans to these groups, (3) there is great value in having the same individuals prepare each of these Contingency Plans, (4) the review of the IG paper should not be done by those who draft it.

This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that a special ad hoc working group should be created to draft the WSAG Contingency Plans. This group should be chaired by the NSC Staff. It could be either at the Senior Staff or working level. I believe that the latter has great advantages and suggest that Col. Behr chair the group.

If you accept this approach the procedure might work as follows:

(1) IGs submit contingency papers to the WSAG.
(2) The WSAG Working Group examines the plan and reaches a preliminary judgment as to whether the contingency merits a WSAG Contingency Plan.
(3) These recommendations go to the WSAG.
(4) If the WSAG determines that a Plan is needed the Working Group examines the IG paper and the military operations plan and provides the WSAG with a means of possible contingencies and military responses.

(5) The WSAG discusses this menu and directs the Working Group to prepare a Contingency Plan.

(6) The Working Group drafts the Plan working in the Situation Room.

(7) The WSAG approves the Plan.

(8) The IG paper and the military planning is then altered to conform with the WSAG Contingency Plan.

(9) The Working Group periodically examines the Plan and updates as necessary calling major changes to the attention of the WSAG.

II. Korea

If this approach is to be followed the WSAG at this meeting should discuss which contingencies and which possible military responses should be covered in the Contingency Plan. A menu based on the IG paper and the military operations plan should be distributed at the meeting for discussion.

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61. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Reactivation of the Committee of Principals

Recommendation

That you speak to the President and Henry Kissinger about making use of the Committee of Principals, within the NSC framework, to backstop on-going disarmament negotiations.[2]

Discussion

I believe it would be highly desirable to reactivate the Committee of Principals as the principal mechanism below the Presidential level for backstopping the various on-going disarmament negotiations. The

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 18. Secret; Limdis. Smith forwarded the memorandum to Richardson under cover of a July 10 memorandum stating that he wanted very much to talk with Richardson regarding the draft proposal. (Ibid.)

[2] There is no indication of approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

Committee of Principals (COP) which has been in existence since 1958, and has been chaired by the Secretary of State, has in the past been the principal forum for either decision making or for formulation of issues for the President in the disarmament field and the COP and the COP Deputies have backstopped negotiations. The NSC framework established this year does not give any specific place to the COP, though such a place is not precluded.

The new NSC structure with its pre-scheduled agenda, Review Group, and ad hoc steering committees established to prepare studies for various specific items to be presented to the President, is a useful mechanism for the establishment of basic national policies, and particularly during the initial review of foreign policy by the new Administration. However, I believe that the experience with the present NSC setup and the likely requirements of on-going disarmament negotiations suggest the desirability of having a more flexible, and at the same time more clearly established, procedure for high level backstopping of negotiations in the disarmament field. This is particularly true for the forthcoming SALT negotiations but also applies to the negotiations in the ENDC at Geneva and to subsequent discussions in the fall at the UN General Assembly.

We cannot expect to have the pace of the ENDC and SALT negotiations fit predetermined schedules of the NSC, which of necessity are not very flexible, involving as they must the President. For many ENDC and UN matters, I believe it is not desirable to involve the President in the relatively less important matters of substance that are bound to arise and require higher level interagency discussion. This would not of course preclude raising matters with the President in the NSC when they cannot be resolved in the COP or by their deputies. Moreover, it is desirable that we have one fixed body below the Presidential level consider the various disarmament matters. At present we have different steering committees (some of the same composition) considering CW/BW, seabeds, etc.

With respect to SALT, I am sure the President will wish to oversee the negotiations in a rather intimate way. However, there will be day-to-day instructions involving tactical issues that the COP or deputies should be authorized to backstop.

Moreover, the Committee of Principals would be a highly useful mechanism for the preparations on short notice of issues arising during the SALT or ENDC negotiations for presentation to the President.

One further thought which I believe is of importance. It is essential that, within the Administration, facts and issues be clearly brought into focus for consideration by the President. My experience in past Administrations, and during the current one, is that in consideration of issues in the disarmament field there is a reticence among high of-

ficials to engage, in a meeting before the President, in the sharp examination of assertions by one or another Principal that leads to questionable premises being challenged. I believe it would be very healthy for preliminary discussion of some issues in an on-going negotiation to take place at the Principals level prior to their discussion with the President.

Attached for your information at Tab A is a brief résumé of the history of the Committee of Principals.[3]

I urge that you raise this matter with the President and Henry Kissinger and if you wish, I would be very happy to participate in this discussion.[4]

Gerard Smith[5]

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[3] Not printed.

[4] Richardson responded in a July 15 memorandum that he thought the proposal was a good one and that Smith should take it up with Rogers, but he advised Smith to make clear that "we are not attempting to bypass the NSC" and warned that "we would have to be very careful in discussing this with the President or Henry Kissinger." He pointed out that the arguments in the third to last paragraph "seem to question the whole NSC system." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 18)

[5] Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

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62. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, July 11, 1969, 2:13–2:50 p.m.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP (WSAG) MEETING

SUBJECT

Military Contingency Planning for Korea

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Behr, who forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a July 11 memorandum. (Ibid.) The meeting was the WSAG's second and was held in the White House Situation Room.

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman

State—
U. Alexis Johnson
Winthrop Brown

Defense—G. Warren Nutter

CIA—Cord Meyer

JCS—Vice Adm. Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff—
Col. Alexander M. Haig
John H. Holdridge
Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

1. A Working Group under Ambassador Brown, responsive to the WSAG, will produce three sets of contingency plans for Korea. These plans will be structured in the form of sequences of events and will cover low, intermediate and high levels of military involvement.

2. A similar Working Group will be formed for Middle East plans.

3. The WSAG meeting time will be standardized at 2:00 P.M. on Fridays.

The meeting began at 2:13 P.M. Secretary Johnson suggested to the Chairman that he be permitted to report to the Group the results of a "rump meeting" between the two Johnsons which took place on July 10th. Kissinger yielded to Secretary Johnson who then discussed the State-Defense meeting of the previous day. Its purpose was to review the work done by the Joint Staff in grouping the various military plans into categories of response (called for at the last WSAG meeting), and to map a course of action which would distill from the NSSM 34 Study[2] and the DOD plans a paper having greater utility for decision-makers. Because much of the work on the probable nature of NK provocation has been done in the NSSM 34 Study, the follow-on effort should concentrate on building scenarios for various levels of military response without too much regard for how the particular contingency would arise. This work could be done by a Working Group under Ambassador Brown, with representation appointed by the WSAG principals.

Kissinger remarked that what the "rump session" had concluded was coincident with his own thoughts. He would not, therefore, have to take the time of the Group by critiquing the NSSM 34 Study (which he regards as an excellent foundation document) in order to express the same conclusions with respect to an approach to the problem of providing the President with useful options in the event of another Korean emergency.

[2] NSSM 34, March 21, 1969, and the NSSM 34 Study are ibid., Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, 7/11/69 Korea.

Admiral Johnson clarified what he sees to be the working arrangement—a small ad hoc group responsible to the WSAG as opposed to a NSC/IG effort. All agreed.

Kissinger stated that the Working Group should not concern itself with recommendations about when and why a particular plan should be implemented. All that is called for is a set of options including at the one extreme "surgical strikes," heavy military involvement at the other extreme, with in-between options such as attack against several airfields. Admiral Johnson noted that diplomatic maneuverings were, of course, related but a thing apart and not germane to the task at hand. Secretary Johnson remarked that the work on the scenarios would be eased by the nature of the problem itself. When a specific course of action is selected for development, that course then logically dictates what must be done to carry it out. He visualized the end-product as a sequence of events similar to that produced during the EC–121 incident.

Kissinger cautioned that a philosophical attachment to one class of response—be it minimum, intermediate, or maximum violence—often tends to cloud contingency plans. What we need are scenarios for the decision-makers. They will have to exercise their responsibility to choose the appropriate level of response from among a group of options. Returning to the plan of action, Secretary Johnson suggested a "plan a week" approach—for example, the next WSAG meeting should look at the "surgical" strike category, with the other options following at weekly intervals. Kissinger agreed and standardized future meeting times—Fridays at 2:00 P.M. There were no dissents.

Kissinger conjectured that if the President had, today, to select a response to a provocation similar to those of recent history, he would probably pick an intermediate option—say, [*8 lines of source text not declassified*] Admiral Johnson thought the attacks should be regarded as punitive, and that they would not result in permanent damage.

Kissinger inquired how an attack against the [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*] Secretary Johnson inquired about other "nerve-center" targets. Kissinger asked Cord Meyer to identify a number of these targets and to report them to the WSAG by 15 July. Meyer agreed to do so. Nutter brought up a point relating to international law, citing a body of opinion which holds that the target must somehow be related to the "crime." In other words, if you get hit *from* an airfield, you have to attack an airfield in response. At this point Secretary Johnson asked what one is really after in striking [*9 lines of source text not declassified*]

Admiral Johnson raised the question of format, noting that the work his staff had done for him this past week was perhaps too detailed. The consensus of the Group was that the EC–121 sequence of events is a good model.

Admiral Johnson returned to Kissinger's earlier evaluation of the NSSM 34 Study. He concurred in the evident merit of the work and hoped that the Korean Task Force would keep it up to date. All agreed that the NSSM 34 Study—and all other IG plans—should be periodically reviewed and made current.

Brown departed at this point after being informed that his WSAG Working Group would include Bill Nelson (CIA), Colonel Boylan (OSD), John Holdridge (NSC), with a Joint Staff member to be reported later.

Kissinger then asked about Middle East plans. Secretary Johnson reported that these plans are not in the same good state as the Korean study. He has told Roger Davies to get with other agency representatives and move! As he (Johnson) sees it the Middle East problem should be developed by starting from the circumstance of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities, what we can do to deter Soviet involvement, and then try to decide what to do if they do become involved. With regard to how the problem should be managed, he suggested another small ad hoc group working under Davies and responsive to WSAG direction. Admiral Johnson said that the Joint Staff is presently engaged in a Middle East study. The work already done will be relevant and useful. Meyer noted the variety of ways in which the Soviets could become actively involved. Admiral Johnson agreed this was a problem and mentioned, additionally, the situation in which the Israelis threaten the UAR with missiles. Kissinger said that another group was dealing with the missile problem, primarily with its diplomatic aspects.

Secretary Johnson then mentioned some vexing operational problems that come to mind when one considers US military responses in the Middle East. Among these are overflight rights (Spain and Turkey) and the lack of bases available to the US. Admiral Johnson suggested this was a problem for State to solve. He then recounted our successful use of Athens International Airport during the June 67 war. (US aircraft staged out of Athens on "mercy missions"—parachute delivery of water into the Sinai.) Nutter questioned whether Ethiopia could be used, but all agreed its location was not sufficiently proximate to the probable area of operations.

Secretary Johnson said that Davies would present a progress report on Middle East studies at the next WSAG meeting. He stated further that he had instructed Mr. Springsteen to be prepared to brief on Berlin. All agreed, however, that Berlin could be put off until later. Secretary Johnson said work on Berlin would nevertheless proceed concentrating on specific military options. Kissinger broke in with a caution that the basic plans must be appraised. Do we really mean them? There followed a brief discussion among the Group on the implications of Gromyko's recent statements on the willingness of the USSR to talk

about Berlin. Careful analysis of his remarks is in order. Kissinger offered the suggestion that the Soviets may have rejected a Berlin confrontation as a direct implement, regarding the option as a tool to gain their objectives should a crisis develop in another area—such as the Cuban incident.

There was no further discussion. The meeting adjourned at 2:50 P.M.

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63. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with the Attorney General, 2:30 p.m., Saturday, July 12, 1969

Introduction

—Advise Mr. Mitchell that you have requested meeting to discuss with him what you consider to be a most serious situation with respect to the President's relationships with the Secretary of State and your role in serving the President as his foreign policy adviser.[2]

—Point out that you have asked Colonel Haig to join the discussion because as a professional officer with considerable high level experience, he will be able to comment on the problem as an unbiased observer of the Washington scene over the past 8 years. You have asked Colonel Haig to interject his personal comments at any time if he feels that your presentation of the facts are either inaccurate or a distortion of the critical issues.

Discussion

—State that at the outset of the Administration the President had certain assets available to him which had to be carefully nurtured and

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 26, State Department–White House Relations, 1969. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote "ACDA cable" in the upper right hand corner of the first page. The tabs are attached but not printed.

[2] No record of Kissinger's meeting with Mitchell has been found.

intelligently and systematically integrated into an overall Game Plan for achieving U.S. objectives in both the short and the long term.

—On a short term basis, these assets were of critical importance for the achievement of an acceptable solution to the Vietnam conflict and on a longer term basis, these assets had to provide the means by which the President's long term objectives could be achieved.

—For this reason, at the outset of the Administration the general outlines of U.S. short term and long term policies were reviewed in a National Security Council and the President promulgated an overall conceptual framework for proceeding, giving major emphasis to efforts designed to achieve a settlement to the Vietnam conflict. In its broadest context, this framework called for:

(1) A new appreciation for the role of the Soviet Union's support for Hanoi with accompanying U.S. tactical and strategic approaches.

(2) A recognition that Soviet interests and anxieties should be manipulated to work for the U.S. Government, with the view toward influencing the Soviets to exert maximum pressure on Hanoi to achieve an acceptable solution to the conflict. Pressure points included: (a) recognition of Soviet concern for growing tension with Communist China, (b) the actual or apparent concern of the Soviets to arrive at early understandings which might crystallize parity with the U.S. in the area of strategic forces, (c) a recognition that Soviet interests in the Middle East might be jeopardized by the uncontrolled and volatile forces in the area which could prematurely trigger an Arab-Israeli conflict at a time and under circumstances not acceptable to the Soviets, (d) an appreciation for the Soviet's overall concern in retaining discipline within the Communist camp, especially as it pertained to the separatists' movements in Eastern Europe, and (e) a recognition of internal economic and bureaucratic divergencies within the Soviet Union itself.

—Inter alia, the above Soviet concerns constituted what could be considered U.S. assets in seeking our short term and long term objectives. As a result, the President approved in concept a short term approach which would involve a somewhat harder attitude toward the Soviet Union; which would involve a patient and reserved attitude toward movement in those areas of Soviet interest until the Soviets had, in turn, indicated a willingness to reciprocate in areas of prime concern to the U.S. Government. This involved:

(1) A carefully measured U.S. approach to SALT negotiations being urged by the Soviets.

(2) A carefully measured and flexible demeanor toward the Middle East crisis.

(3) A slowdown of bridge building actions set in train by the previous Administration, especially in the area of trade.

(4) Carefully worked out U.S. initiatives to increase Soviet concern that the U.S. and Communist China were moving closer together against the Soviet Union and,

(5) A carefully developed Game Plan for a solution to the Vietnam conflict which would seek to retain the viability of the Saigon regime, at least to the degree that Saigon would have an opportunity to compete for survival in the post-settlement political competition in South Vietnam.

—The above factors constitute the Presidentially approved framework upon which U.S. policy in the short term would be pursued. Despite the fact that Secretary of State was provided a detailed guidance on countless occasions, including formal NSC meetings, a personal letter from the President to the Secretary of State and countless detailed specific instructions, he has consistently worked along lines contrary to this conceptual approach and systematically dissipated those assets available to the President.

—We have discussed State efforts to steamroller early SALT negotiations.

—You have also recounted for the Attorney General, State efforts to inject the U.S. into the Middle East situation in such a way that our flexibility would be seriously jeopardized.

—With respect to stated Presidential policy on trade with the Soviet Bloc and specifically the "Most Favored Nation Clause," State has, in recent weeks, repeatedly attempted to circumvent the President's stated policy.

—With respect to Vietnam, Secretary Rogers has systematically diverged from Presidential guidance with respect to:

(1) The pace of Vietnamization.
(2) The level of pressure applied to the Saigon regime to broaden its base.
(3) Tactical approaches in Paris, specifically as they pertain to the conduct of private talks both in timing and substance.
(4) Approach to the issue of ceasefire.
(5) Approach to the issue of de-escalation.

The above difficulties have not been the result of a coherently articulated disagreement by Secretary Rogers with the overall framework of U.S. policy but rather manifest themselves in countless variations from approved Presidential policy in patterns which are primarily tactical but which have had the overall effect of seriously denuding all of the President's foreign policy assets. In recent weeks, the pace and style of Rogers' freewheeling has increased in tempo. Recent divergencies include:

(1) An apparent decision on the part of the Secretary to bypass the White House in major policy areas.
(2) A situation which finds countless carefully worked out policy issues being leaked to the press, with increasing regularity.
(3) Unwillingness in those instances where White House clearances are requested, to accept substantive realignment of cables with-

out escalating the issue to the Secretary's level, placing the Assistant to the President in a position of accepting State language or forcing an undesirable Presidential confrontation with the Secretary.[3]

Cite Most Recent Specific Examples

1. Undue pressure on Thieu to give forthcoming political statement. Show cable Tab A.[4]

2. Undue pressure on Thieu with respect to the substance of his talk. Show cable Tab B.[5] (The Thieu speech is at Tab C.)[6]

3. Discuss problems in the development of the President's statement in support of Thieu's speech. (President's statement is at Tab D. Secretary Rogers' statement commenting on the Gromyko speech is at Tab E.)[7] Make the point that Rogers' statement was released within two hours of the President's statement supporting Thieu; that it was done without any coordination with the White House and prior to the Secretary's having read the full text of Gromyko's statement. Procedurally, it tended to detract from the impact of the President's statement but more seriously, it again diverged from foreign policy guidance with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations and was counter to our recent efforts to recoup additional assets on the Soviet-China issue. (Romania visit.)

4. Discuss Secretary's blatant attempt to circumvent the President's written directive to convene another private meeting in Paris. President's directive at Tab F.[8] Draft cable forwarded last evening at Tab G.[9]

Conclusions

While any of the individual incidents outlined above might be passed over as isolated though serious breaches of discipline by the Secretary, in sum, they represent a fundamental disloyalty to Presidential policy which has the most serious implications for the U.S. national interest. They have stripped the President of a large measure of his ability to conduct foreign policy in a coherent and effective way and, based on these facts, you believe that it is essential that the President move swiftly and decisively before it is too late.

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[3] Kissinger marked this paragraph with a check in the right hand margin.

[4] Telegram 13543 from Saigon, July 5.

[5] Telegram 13723 from Saigon, July 8.

[6] Telegram 13916 from Saigon, July 10.

[7] Both statements are dated July 11, 1969.

[8] Dated July 9.

[9] Draft telegram to Paris dated July 11.

—Courses of action which are open vary from:

(1) a direct ultimatum by the President to the Secretary demanding adherence to the established policy and requiring coordination with the White House on policy matters or resignation.

(2) If the above is not acceptable to the President, you would be willing to step down or even to assume an essentially non-substantive role, which would give the Secretary of State the kind of leeway which he apparently has assumed to be his prerogative.

—In either event, the situation is now intolerable since the national interest will no longer permit the type of freewheeling, undisciplined and at times disloyal style followed by Secretary Rogers. The situation has progressed to the point that members of the State staff have brought this to your attention and you are soliciting the Attorney General's assistance in bringing this to the attention of the President without delay.

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64. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

First Meeting of Verification Committee[2]

Following is an outline of the procedures you can follow in conducting the first meeting of the Verification Committee.

What Can the Verification Committee Accomplish?

The committee can put the verification issue in the proper perspective by addressing the following questions:

—What exactly are present and projected U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor various arms control agreements?

—In the light of the criteria for strategic sufficiency in NSDM 16,[3] are unilateral U.S. intelligence capabilities under the various agreements adequate to insure that U.S. strategic sufficiency can be maintained?

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–004, Verification Panel Meeting—Review of Capabilities 7/22/69. Top Secret; Umbra.

[2] The first meeting was held on July 22; see Document 65.

[3] Dated June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305)

(On this question, each agency should state its views and supporting rationale. If any agency's views are based on criteria or objectives other than those in NSDM 16, this should be made clear.)

—If we detect violations of an agreement, in what circumstances can we let this fact be known without compromising our intelligence capabilities?

How Should the Work of the Verification Panel be Carried Out?

A draft memorandum to the principals setting up the first meeting is at Tab A.[4] Before a final copy is typed, you should indicate who you want to attend.

Initial Meeting of Principals.

I recommended that the principals meet to accomplish the following:

—review the issues that give rise to the need for a new verification study,

—approve general terms of reference for the preparation of a committee report,

—agree to set up a working group, with a designated chairman, to prepare the committee report,

—establish a deadline for completion of the report (August 15 or 30, for example).

Working Group Procedures.

I suggest the working group function in the following way:

—In Phase 1, the necessary factual information on present and projected U.S. monitoring capabilities and on the extent to which detected violations can be revealed without compromising intelligence capabilities should be developed.

—In Phase 2, the results of Phase 1 should be provided to Defense, JCS, State and ACDA, who would be responsible for preparing agency positions on the adequacy of our capabilities.

—Based on the Phase 1 analysis and agency positions, a final report would be drafted by the working group director and presented to the Committee's principals for approval.

Terms of Reference.

In my judgment, terms of reference should be provided for Phase 1. I have drafted a suggested set which is at Tab B. You could discuss this paper at the first meeting of the principals or leave the matter to the chairman of the working group.

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[4] None of the tabs are printed.

Detailed terms of reference will not be needed for Phase 2.

Chairmanship of Working Group.

You approved the alternative of designating me as chairman of the working group of experts. You should indicate this to the principals.

Membership of Working Group.

I believe CIA, DIA, and INR should be represented. I strongly recommend that the National Security Agency also be represented. NSA after all has the experts on the raw data, and we should draw directly on their expertise. DDR&E should probably also be included. Finally, another member of your staff should participate. (Bill Hyland or John Court)

Summary.

If this general approach is satisfactory, you could use the talking points at Tab C in your first meeting with the principals.

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65. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 21, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Attorney General
Under Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Verification Capabilities

The President has directed that a review of U.S. capabilities to monitor arms control agreements be undertaken on a priority basis.

He has asked me to convene a committee consisting of the addresses to carry out this review. Accordingly, I would like to have a

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–004, Verification Panel Meeting—Review of Capabilities 7/22/69. Top Secret; Nodis.

meeting of the committee at 10:00 a.m., July 22, 1969 in the White House Situation Room to:

—review the issues that give rise to the need for a review of U.S. verification capability,

—approve general terms of reference for the preparation of the committee report,

—agree to procedures for establishing a working group to conduct the review,

—establish a deadline for completion of the report.[2]

Henry A. Kissinger

[2] According to the minutes, Kissinger opened the meeting by stating: "[Gerard] Smith suggested panel. Need systematic review, statement of disagreements, statement of capabilities and limitations. This group would review MIRV Panel report, but charter would be broader." (Ibid., Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals—1969–3/8/72) Minutes for Verification Panel meetings from July 22, 1969, through June 4, 1974, are ibid. Folders containing briefing and background material for each meeting from July 22, 1969, through June 4, 1974, are ibid., Boxes H–004-H–018. For Smith's recollections of the Verification Panel and the NSC system, see his memoirs, *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I,* especially pp. 108–113; and *Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator,* especially p. 158. Source documentation on the proposal for the Verification Panel and the revivification of the Committee of Principals (see Document 61) is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA/D Files: FRC 383 98 89, Notes for the Files.

66. Paper Prepared by the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin)[1]

Washington, undated.

THE NSC AND NEW INITIATIVES

This memorandum responds to your request for my views on possible NSC work schedule over the next several months with particular reference to the possibility of "bold initiatives." This memorandum: (1) describes some of the current shortcomings of the NSC system; (2) considers items currently on the NSC Agenda and what initiatives may result from them; (3) considers possible new initiatives.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 817, Name Files, Halperin, Morton H. Secret. Halperin forwarded this paper, together with two other papers, to Kissinger under cover of an August 5 memorandum in which he noted that Winston Lord did "most of the drafting of these papers." (Ibid.) The papers were forwarded to Kissinger by Haig under an August 15 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

I. Current Status of the NSC System

I think that the new NSC system has functioned far better during its first six months than we had any right to expect. The process has actually been used and has resulted in Presidential decisions on a number of issues. More important, the bureaucracy has begun to think in terms of options and alternatives rather than a single course of action. The system has also resulted in the President and his principal advisors coming to grips with major issues, such as Okinawa reversion and German offset, in a systematic way, taking account of long-range considerations and without the pressure of immediate deadlines.

However, there are beginning to be danger signals which suggest that the system is running into serious trouble. The main concerns are:

1. *Major issues are moving outside the NSC system.* Three of the most important issues—perhaps the most important—facing the government, are now being dealt with largely outside the NSC system, while they were initially within the system. For differing reasons, Vietnam, SALT, and the Middle East are now effectively outside the NSC procedures. I recognize that there were valid reasons for treating each of these items as we have, but the result is to begin to move toward the Eisenhower Syndrome of using the NSC for low priority issues and dealing with important matters in other ways. Unless the line is drawn and these issues are moved back into the system there will be increasing pressure to deal with other major issues on an ad hoc basis.

The memorandum in which the President made his decisions regarding China also had unfortunate implications. After the bureaucracy had labored long and hard to produce a reasonable paper on China policy, without warning and without explanation to the bureaucracy, and prior to NSC consideration of that paper, the President announced decisions on many issues contained in that document.[2] While I think I can guess at the reasons for the President's action, it tended to undercut the belief that the President would not make major decisions unless the issues were fully argued out in the NSC system. This can only lead to attempts to have the process short-circuited on other issues, arguing the pressure of time or security.

2. *Deadlines are beginning to slip badly.* A number of responses to NSSMs have been delayed repeatedly, even in cases such as India-Pakistan military policy and SVN internal security where the request for the study came personally from the President. Initially the delays resulted in part from the overloading of the system but this is no longer the case. Delays now result in part from the fact that people have discovered

[2] NSSM 14, "U.S. China Policy," February 5, 1969, and related papers are ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–134, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 14.

that it is relatively easy to get a delay. They also result from the fact that some studies submitted on time (frequently because of weekends and long nights of work) have been cancelled out of the Review Group, often at the last minute and without explanation. This has produced a good deal of cynicism in the bureaucracy. For example, we have just been asked whether we really want the Sino-Soviet paper when we say we want it and whether we can give assurance that the schedule will be adhered to. The paper can be done on time only by long hours during the summer and there is reluctance to do so if the study will lie on the shelf when it is completed. (We have given these assurances.)

Delays are also resulting from the failure of some of the operators on the NSC staff to emphasize the importance of deadlines and to give priority to their own participation in these projects. This results in part from the fact that they are overworked, and in part from the fact that some of them do not really accept the system.

The failure to meet deadlines and the accompanying failure in some cases to take the project seriously leads to inferior papers and also to delays in making necessary policy decisions. For example, the Indian, Pakistani, and Greek governments have all been told for some months that our military assistance policies are under review in the NSC system but we still do not even have papers completed. I suspect that Sisco believes in the end that he will get decisions by some informal means. If he is proven to be correct, the system will be further undermined. In any case, the long delays tend to make the papers less relevant and to lead people to believe the system cannot be used where relatively quick decisions are needed.[3]

3. *Implementation of NSC decisions is unsatisfactory.* We have not done very well at all in devising procedures to implement NSC decisions and to monitor that implementation. As you pointed out many times, one of the main failures of the Johnson Administration was that the bureaucracy was never informed as to why the President was making the decisions he was making. I believe that we are almost equally guilty of that charge. Moreover, in many cases, no decisions have been reported at all or only to a very limited circle and there is no procedure for NSC staff follow-up. Aside from implementation problems, this lack of concrete results from NSC meetings undercuts the morale of the bureaucracy which labors to produce the papers and prepare for the meetings. This poses the danger that the NSC will be considered more and more as a high level seminar rather than a decision-producing body.

[Omitted here is Part II, NSC Agenda Items (pages 3–11 of the paper).]

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[3] Kissinger wrote in the left margin next to this paragraph, "Let's force that issue & get specific deadlines."

67. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Analysis For Vietnam

On several occasions we have discussed the need for analysis on Vietnam. Looking back on our experience over the last few years, it is remarkable how frequently we have let our preconceptions about Vietnam lead us astray even though readily available facts would have told us differently had we analyzed them and made the analysis available to top decision-makers. The examples are legend:

—the shortcomings of the Strategic Hamlet Program were obvious to any discerning observer of the rural political and economic situation in Vietnam, but we promoted the program without recognizing that it was often counter-productive;

—U.S. force deployments in 1965 were predicted on intelligence estimates of enemy strength that underestimated it by half;

—our overly optimistic expectations for the bombing campaign against North Vietnam were attributable to our failure to appreciate the minor influence of manpower and logistic constraints on the North Vietnamese effort in South Vietnam;

—our mistaken optimism in 1966 that the North Vietnamese could no longer sustain heavy casualties in the South were in complete contradiction with the facts of North Vietnamese demography; nevertheless, we persisted in our beliefs, which would not have stood up to a few simple manpower calculations;

—our excessive expectations for the various "revolutionary-development" type cadre programs can be traced to our mis-reading of the basis for Viet Cong appeal in the villages—mature, highly organized, ideologically motivated, and grievance-responsive political leadership;

—the shock of the Tet offensive was in part attributable to our failure to analyze available intelligence accurately;

—our tolerance of GVN inaction on crucial issues like land reform has been due to the paucity of the most basic type of political analysis on the Viet Cong movement in the early 1960s. Such analysis would have shown that a large measure of their success can be attributed to their exploitation of tenure-related social and economic grievances;

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–001, Vietnam Special Study Group (VSSG) Meetings, VSSG Meeting 10–20–69. Secret; No Dissem. Sent for action.

—we have persistently misled ourselves as to the capability of the South Vietnamese forces, refusing to recognize that all the critical indicators—night patrols, small unit actions, desertion rates, etc.—suggest a lesser capability.

I cite these examples because of my concern that there is less analysis of Vietnam matters going on in the government today and such analysis is more infrequently weighed by top decision-makers than at anytime since the 1965–66 period. This paucity of analysis at a time when major changes are taking place in our policy could be extremely costly if we cannot anticipate or understand developments in Vietnam.

I contrast the current situation with our position at the time of the NSSM 1 effort earlier in the year.[2]

In our compilation of the NSSM 1 responses on pacification, bombing, the Phoenix program, and Vietnamese army performance, we were quite surprised at how far we had progressed by early 1969 toward agreement or at least clarified disagreement, on these subjects. I attribute the progress which took place in 1967–68, which we capitalized on in NSSM 1, to the role of analysis in improving the quality of interagency discussion and program understanding.

For example, in the case of the Phoenix program, every NSSM 1 respondent including MACV and CIA (the program sponsors) agreed on what we could and could not expect from anti-infrastructure activities in 1970. Analysis of the pacification program clarified the category "C" hamlet dispute, which is central to any conclusion on the situation in rural Vietnam. On Vietnamese force effectiveness, we were beginning to understand the reasons for poor leadership (small numbers of NCOs and junior officers in combat and inadequate incentives for combat performance) and high desertion rates (an army lacking in political legitimacy in the estimate of the rural populace, from which it takes most of its recruits).

What was significant about NSSM 1 was that much of the analysis had never before been considered at the White House level, and never before had much effort gone into the resolution of the inconsistencies in the analyses of the departments and agencies. But no new analysis was produced for NSSM 1; it had all been done before.

I am concerned that after a good start with NSSM 1 we have not followed through. We are now getting only a trickle of analysis on Vietnam issues at the NSC level. Therefore, we may be missing an important opportunity to enlighten ourselves on matters of great concern.

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[2] NSSM 1, "Situation in Vietnam," January 21, and the Summary of Interagency Responses, March 22, are both printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970. See Documents 4 and 44.

I think we should give careful consideration to whether we have marshaled and analyzed all the available evidence on:

—the progress of Vietnamese force modernization and the current performance capability of Vietnamese forces;

—the effect on Viet Cong political activities and the rebuilding potential for Viet Cong local force and guerilla units pursuant to U.S. troop withdrawals from the Delta; (This is probably the major unanswered question in Vietnam today.)

—the real progress, if any, of the GVN toward the implementation of the recently proposed land reform program for which we have allocated $40M;

—the extent to which some of our more successful economic assistance programs might allow us to quicken what has been the quite remarkable eroding effect that our economic assistance has had on Viet Cong political fortunes in the countryside;

—the nature of the recently registered gains in pacification effort and their vulnerability to a decline in GVN–U.S. military capability.

The NSSM procedure cannot provide for continuous attention to a particular subject like analysis for Vietnam. What is needed is a special mechanism of a semi-permanent nature to provide continuity to the analysis and serve as a touchstone for those in Washington and elsewhere who can make analytical contributions. This mechanism should give direction to the analysis and serve as a forum for the resolution of analytical questions. It should also focus non-government analytical talent on the problems of greatest concern to us.

One way to accomplish this task would be to establish a Vietnam Program Analysis Group under the aegis of the NSC staff. The group should perhaps be co-chaired by a representative from the State Department or the Defense Department and it should include representatives from OSD, JCS, CIA, OST, and BOB. Such a group could sponsor analytical efforts and provide for the circulation of the analytical work within the government. When appropriate these studies could be forwarded through the NSC framework to the NSC Review Group.

I would recommend that the agenda for the Vietnam program analysis group be determined by you after discussion with State and Defense. The group should not have operational responsibilities. It should fill requests arising from:

—the need for analysis on program issues ancillary to pending decisions by the President or members of the National Security Council;

—the requirement to have a better analytic understanding of the accomplishments of major U.S. programs in Vietnam (e.g. the pacification, Phoenix, Vietnamization, bombing, land reform, and stabilization programs) as the accomplishments of these programs or our expectations about them become matters of high-level interest;

—the requirement to have an assessment of the internal developments following major U.S. program changes in Vietnam, for example,

the response of GVN and Viet Cong programs in the delta pursuant to the withdrawal of the 9th U.S. Division.

Recommendation

My views as expressed herein do not reflect any attempt on my part to solicit more work, far from it. I bring these views to your attention as a matter of principle. I think careful scrutiny of the record will show that had we coolly and persistently expended more effort on analysis, our course in Vietnam would have been less perilous.

I recommend that you explore these issues with Richardson and Packard and suggest some sort of program analysis arrangement to accomplish the objectives outlined above. If you wish, I can explore the possibilities at the staff level and give you recommendations on organizations, people and possible roles and agenda.[3]

[3] Kissinger initialed the approval option. Below it he wrote, "Do quietly. Let me surface pro" but then crossed it out and wrote below that: "Do memo for Pres. & let us set it up *before* we negotiate it. Talk to me." Kissinger's September 5 memorandum to the President, drafted by Lynn, is printed ibid., Document 115.

68. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, August 26, 1969.

Secy Rogers calling from Walter Reed (there for a check-up). Re Thailand, Secy said we should all keep quiet about it now. Amb J said Tanat is very very happy. Secy said to tell everyone to keep quiet—we have nothing else to say. Amb agreed with this line.

Secy said he had couple of run-ins with Henry Kissinger yesterday Secy said first he and Newsom[2] were working on Nigeria when he got a roundabout message from Lake saying that President didn't want anything done until he returned from Calif. When Secy asked Lake who told him to call, he said Henry. Secy then called Kissinger to find out what was going on—Henry said that it was a mistake, Lake

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 696, Telcons, Personal. No classification marking.

[2] David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

should not have called. Then later in day Secy was working on Thai message to Fon Min when Marshall Green's[3] office rec'd message from the White House saying that the President wanted to send the message. Secy called Henry again asked what the devil was going on—Henry had earlier told Secy that such incidents would not take place again. Kissinger again said it was mistake that Ted Eliot should have been informed of this. Secy told Kissinger that President should not be sending messages to FonMins—Kissinger agreed. Secy told Kissinger in no uncertain terms that he wanted this business of Kissinger's subordinates sending him messages stopped—said Kissinger's messages were "not worth a damn" and that he had no intention of following them!

Secy asked Amb to get out message for his signature to Kissinger along following lines: "To make certain that we get directions clearly and readily understood and be sure directed to appropriate people who handle them, has been agreed with White House staff that directions from President will come directly to me or to the Secretariat." Secy said he wanted something that sounded friendly, not like having a feud.

Amb J asked Secy when he would be coming back. Secy said he would be in tomorrow. Amb said he had several things to discuss and that he would be going back to San Clemente for a meeting on Sept. 4th. Secy said he would be going back around the same time. Amb said he would report conversation he had with boss when he sees Secy tomorrow.

[3] Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

69. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

San Clemente, California, August 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Program Analysis Studies

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Both the President and Kissinger were at the Western White House in San Clemente. A copy of the memorandum is marked, "Hand carried to Pres., 8–30–69." (Ibid.)

At the August 14 meeting of the NSC, you were briefed on the results of a program analysis of Korea completed under NSSM 27.[2]

You indicated your desire to have a comprehensive five-year program plan for Korea developed to serve as a guide for agency planning. I am taking the necessary steps to see that this is accomplished for your review.

The Korea study is the first in a series of such country/regional studies being carried out under NSDM–4 (Tab A).[3] The next ones to be completed will be for Brazil and Thailand. Their overall purposes are:

—To pull together in one place information on all U.S. activities in the area and categorize them by the policy objectives they serve.

—Based on careful analysis, to develop alternative U.S. objectives, policies and programs for the ensuing five years so that rational choices can be made.

—To formulate the issues in such a way that the President can provide clear and consistent policy and program guidance to the relevant agencies, as opposed to letting each agency determine its priorities and programs based on its own interpretation of national policy.

—To provide a basis for translating Presidential guidance into a comprehensive five-year program plan that can be used by each agency for planning purposes and can be reviewed and revised periodically as necessary.

Now that we have a better understanding of the great potential of program analysis studies, as well as a better idea of how to go about it than we had on January 20, and in consonance with your expressed interest in developing programs on a long-term basis, I believe we should revise NSDM–4 to:

—clarify the purpose and organization of these study efforts,
—specify the procedures for management of these studies and for implementation of NSC decisions resulting from them, and
—emphasize the importance of preparing five-year programs as a planning guide to all agencies.

I have enclosed at Tab B a revised version of NSDM–4.[4] The revisions are in line with procedures I have agreed to with Elliot Richardson. If you approve, I will issue it.[5]

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[2] NSSM 27, "Interagency Planning Programming Budgeting Study for Korea," February 22, 1969. (Ibid., Boxes H–138–139, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 27)

[3] Document 13.

[4] Document 71.

[5] The President initialed his approved on September 2.

70. Telegram From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1, 1969, 2255Z.

CSWH 90020. I have been disturbed in recent days by the lack of teamwork in the conduct of national security affairs.[2] Consequently, I am reaffirming my policies with respect to this matter.

1. Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public communications on matters of known or potential Presidential interest must be carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant to the President for National Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for coordination with the Departments and agencies who share overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or inter-departmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance.

2. Official communications: All official communications with policy implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your Department as well as among Departments.[3]

Richard Nixon

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The President flew to Colorado Springs, Colorado, from San Clemente on September 1 to attend the National Governors Conference.

[2] In an undated memorandum to Mitchell that was prepared at San Clemente in August and sent forward about September 2, Kissinger detailed "a series of incidents in which the bureaucracy [including DOD and CIA as well as State] was either unresponsive to the President's desires or displayed an extraordinary inability to coordinate matters within itself. These problems have too often been due to a failure to clear public statements and policy cables with the White House." In addition, Kissinger continued, "we must now face the question of the Secretary of State's working relationship with me. If not, what seems to be an increasingly serious sort of bureaucratic guerrilla war may have very serious consequences for the management of our foreign affairs." (Ibid.)

[3] Helms responded in a September 2 telegram: "You may rest assured of total compliance in the Central Intelligence Agency. I shall be in touch with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on this matter." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 207, CIA, Vol. I)

71. National Security Decision Memorandum 4 (Revised)[1]

Washington, September 4, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of U.S. Information Agency
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Program Analysis Studies

The President has directed the preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions. These analyses will develop alternative statements of U.S. interests, objectives, policy options and their associated program and budget implications for consideration and decision by the National Security Council. On the basis of NSC guidance/decisions, five-year country/regional program plans will be developed to be used by all agencies for planning purposes.

The following procedures will be followed in performing and implementing program analysis studies:

1. The studies will be performed under the supervision of the Program Analysis staff of the National Security Council. This staff should cooperate closely with similar staffs within the various departments and agencies and the Bureau of the Budget.

2. The countries and regions to be studied and the scope of each study will be designated in National Security Study Memoranda.

3. The analyses will be performed by Ad Hoc groups composed principally of personnel from agencies directly concerned. Where appropriate a steering committee composed of senior officers in the agencies will provide guidance and focus for the efforts of the Ad Hoc group.

4. The Ad Hoc groups shall work in close consultation with each agency, with their regional bureaus and country desks, and with the U.S. Mission in the country.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSDM 4 was first issued on January 20; see Document 13.

5. Upon completion, the analyses will be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He will then obtain the comments of the relevant Interdepartmental Group and forward the study along with these comments to the NSC Review Group prior to NSC consultations.

6. On the basis of NSC guidance and decisions, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will direct the preparation of a five-year program memorandum to serve as a basis for agency planning in the country or region concerned.

7. The five-year plans will be reviewed and revised periodically as necessary to keep them up to date.

Henry A. Kissinger

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72. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary, National Security Council (Watts) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Revised NSC Staff Arrangements

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69. Confidential. This memorandum is Tab B to a September 14 covering memorandum from Watts to Kissinger, which discusses some personnel actions. Tab A, suggested talking points for Kissinger's use at the September 15 staff meeting, refers to the departure of Morton Halperin from the NSC Staff. In an August 15 memorandum to Kissinger in which he discussed two alternative approaches to planning in the NSC system, Halperin commented on his possible departure: "I must tell you frankly, the question of whether it makes sense for me to remain on the staff is related not only to the issue of the problems involved in my dealings with Defense and the question of my relations with the Assistants for Operations, but also to the question of whether, given your own style of operation, any job on the NSC staff involves enough responsibility and opportunity for independent initiative." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 817, Halperin, Morton H.) In an August 22 letter to Kissinger, Halperin wrote: "I am prepared to stay on for a two-month trial period provided we can reach a clear understanding on my functions and provided that you communicate this understanding at a staff meeting as soon as you return from California." Halperin attached a job description for himself as Chief, NSC Planning Group, and talking points Kissinger could use on the NSC system at a staff meeting. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69) Halperin's proposals apparently failed to prevent his departure. A draft of this memorandum, dated September 12, is ibid. A September 13 draft is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, Staff Meetings.

At your direction, a revised National Security Council staff pattern follows:

I. The Planning Group

This group will have four broad areas of activity.

A. *Identification of Problem Areas*

Focused effort must be directed to the isolation and identification of potential problems in the near and middle-range future, as well as over the long haul. What kinds of questions need to be answered? What is the range of choices facing the USG? What actions can we begin to take in the immediate future to ward off or ameliorate these problems?

The operations staff rarely has the time to concentrate on such considerations. This must, accordingly, be a prime function of the planning group.

In many instances, problem areas which the planners identify will lead to operational requirements. In these cases the planners and operators will work together, with coordination by the Staff Secretary.

The operators, of course, will maintain contact with their counterparts in other agencies. At the same time, the planners will also develop ties with their logical counterparts, particularly in the new Office of Planning and Coordination in State.

B. *Assessments and Choices*

In order to provide Dr. Kissinger with constant intellectual stimulation over and above what is contained in the standard operational paper flow, the planners will be charged with developing think-pieces, policy options and alternative approaches on the entire range of National Security Affairs issues.

Clearly, such efforts may also have operational consequences. Again, it will fall upon the Staff Secretary to coordinate this with the operations staff.

C. *NSC Planning*

The NSC system needs constant idea regeneration if it is to maintain momentum. To this end, the planners must be concerned with planning questions to be channeled into the formal NSC system, just as the operators will be concerned with operational questions. The planners and the operators will work together in development of NSC papers, with primary responsibility dependent upon the topic at hand. The Staff Secretary will be responsible for coordination.

D. *Crisis Management*

The planning group can broaden staff strength at times of emergent and actual crises. The planners can provide support to the operators, as they form ad hoc emergency groups under the direction of Dr. Kissinger.

The planning group will include:

1. Osgood—Director
2. Kennedy—Deputy Director
3. Morris (plus Africa)
4. Lord (plus UN)
5. Rodman

II. Operations Staff

This remains largely unchanged. Close cooperation between operators and planners, as discussed above, will be critical.

Assignments would be:

Latin America—Vaky/Nachmanoff
Europe—Sonnefeldt/Hyland/Lesh (Lesh will be replaced shortly by Arthur Downey from the Office of the Legal Adviser in State)
East Asia—Holdridge/Moor/Grant
Near East and South Asia—Saunders/Foster (Foster will be replaced shortly by Hoskinson)
Africa—Morris
United Nations—Lord
International Economic Affairs—Bergsten/Johnston/Hormats
Scientific Affairs (space cooperation, science and technology, CBW, disarmaments and Seabeds)—Behr. This area has much in common with Sonnenfeldt's interests in SALT and NATO, so they need to work closely together. Behr will also have a special relationship with WSAG.

III. The Secretariat

The distribution and filing activities of Information Liaison (IL) will continue as is.

The same applies to the entire handling of day-to-day paper flow relating to operational actions. This includes screening of incoming messages, assignment of action, logging through of activities from start to finish, and keeping other agencies informed of decisions made. Overall immediate supervision of the logging and status function will be performed (under Mrs. Davis' guidance) by John Murphy who will shortly join the staff. The regular and official channel for action, guidances and directives will be via the NSC Secretariat to the State Secretariat.

The most critical function is handling from beginning to end of NSC paper work. This includes scheduling, assuring that requisite papers for each meeting are on hand on time, preparation of books for each meeting (books for NSC and other meetings must be in Dr. Kissinger's hands 48 hours in advance), note-taking, record-keeping and follow-up. These activities must be formally centralized in the Secretariat to provide continuity and a single voice and point of contact.

Notes at National Security Council meeting will be taken by Watts. Note-taking and record-keeping at all other meetings (Review Group,

pre-NSC and pre-RG meetings, etc.) will be handled by Mrs. Davis.

The informal channels which exist between operators, planners and the program analysis staff, on the one hand and their counterparts in other agencies on the other must, of course, continue open and active. Only in this way, and through a constant monitoring of the entire system, will it be possible to get the kind of supervision and performance record that is required.

The Secretariat, working closely in each case with the appropriate concerned staff men, will establish and maintain a system of monitoring the status of action, including implementation of decisions, on all items that have been brought into the NSC system. The framework is now being worked out by Mrs. Davis and Guthrie, who has just joined the staff. In order to complete this operation as quickly as possible, Rodman will help out for the next few weeks. Once established, the system will be actively maintained by Davis and Guthrie, under the direction of Watts. Rodman will then move to his regular assignment on the Planning Staff.

The Secretariat will maintain close contact with various special groups, such as the Verification Panel, the Defense Program Review Committee and WSAG.

IV. Program Analysis Staff

This staff and its functions remain essentially unchanged. More emphasis needs to be placed on program budgeting, as Larry Lynn desires, and greater activity in this area is anticipated.

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73. National Security Decision Memorandum 23[1]

Washington, September 16, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Vietnam Special Studies Group

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 23. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to more systematically assess the facts upon which Vietnam policy decisions should be based, the President has directed the formation of a Vietnam Special Studies Group.[2]

This group will:

—sponsor and direct on a continuous basis systematic analyses of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam,
—undertake special analytical studies on a priority basis as required to support broad policy and related program decisions,
—provide a forum for and encourage systematic interagency analysis of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam.

The Group will meet as necessary to initiate and review studies and to supervise the preparations of issues papers for consideration by the President and the National Security Council. The Group will conduct its affairs without prejudice to the existing interdepartmental framework concerned with day-to-day operational matters on Vietnam.

The membership of the Vietnam Special Studies Group shall include:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

Henry A. Kissinger

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[2] Kissinger proposed establishing the group in a September 5 memorandum to the President in which he cited six examples from 1962–1968 of "how frequently officials have let their preconceptions about Vietnam lead them astray even though a careful and objective analysis of readily available facts would have told them differently." He then listed six issues that needed "careful consideration [as] to whether we have marshaled and analyzed all the available evidence," and proposed that the Vietnam Special Studies Group "give continuous direction to the analyses." For text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 115.

74. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, September 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Defense Program and Budget Review Committee

Your remarks at the NSC meeting on the U.S. military posture,[2] strongly underscored your view that resolution of major defense strategy and program issues must no longer be the result of "treaties" negotiated between DOD and BOB or compromises struck among the military services.

As a result of the NSC meeting, I recommend that we move to establish an interagency Defense Program Review Committee. Such a committee could be chaired by me as your representative with Dave Packard, Elliot Richardson, Dick Helms, Bob Mayo and General Wheeler as permanent members.

The Defense Program Review Committee will satisfy your objectives by evaluating the diplomatic, military and political consequences of:

—changes in the defense budget and programs,
—changes in U.S. overseas force deployments and in committed forces based in the U.S.,
—changes in tactical nuclear weapons deployment,[3]
—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

The Committee can meet as necessary and prepare issues papers for you and the NSC to consider. For example, once a five year force and program plan for DOD has been established, the Committee can review significant changes to this plan proposed by DOD or BOB or initiated by Congress.

Recommendation: Because of the importance of this decision, I recommend that you sign the enclosed NSDM to establish this Commit-

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 958, Haig Chron—September 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

[2] The meeting was held on September 10. Handwritten notes of the discussion are at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

[3] This reference to tactical nuclear weapons deployment was omitted from the implementing NSDM (see Document 79). According to a September 20 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, Kissinger had "expressed concern about the nuclear issue," which was conveyed to Laird. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969) For other changes made in Kissinger's proposal, see Document 76.

tee.[4] The Committee itself can establish appropriate organizational arrangements.[5]

[4] Nixon signed attached NSDM but, in response to Laird's September 22 letter (Document 75), it was revised before it was issued (see Document 79). In a September 10 memorandum to Kissinger forwarding the draft NSDM, Lynn warned that "this plan, or for that matter, any plan which carries out the President's directive, may create real problems with Mel Laird, who stands to lose a great deal of his potential power as Secretary of Defense." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969)

[5] The President initialed his approval.

75. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 22, 1969.

Dear Henry:

Following our conversations, I have reviewed NSDM–23[2] again and believe that you should know about some of the things we are doing over here along these lines.

On 17 June, I directed Warren Nutter to form an OSD task group to study and supervise the Vietnamization effort in order to ensure that Vietnamization continues in an orderly, equitable, efficient, and explainable way. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Comptroller, Installations and Logistics, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Public Affairs, and Systems Analysis are represented in the task group. The group is chaired by Warren's deputy for East Asia, Dennis Doolin, and meets on a daily basis. A copy of the group's current task list is appended.[3] Every morning, Warren, Doolin, and Admiral Bill Lemos meet with me on Vietnam and Vietnam related matters. We are presently expanding the staff in Warren's office and adding full-time analysts to the task group to study redeployment planning, concepts and strategy, leadership, and Vietnamese force improvements.

You are also aware of the Vietnam Ad Hoc Group,[4] chaired by Bill Sullivan at State. This group meets every Tuesday and Friday, and has

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 23.

[2] Document 73.

[3] Not printed.

[4] See Documents 25 and 26.

representatives from State, Defense (OSD and Joint Staff), AID, CIA, and your own staff.

Although NSDM–23 does not so state, I understand that the creation of a permanent working group is being considered to carry out the tasks outlined in your memo. Is such a group necessary in view of ongoing efforts? If so, would it not be more advisable and effective to place this group under the already established WSAG, rather than under a new special study group at the Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary level? I will be happy to discuss this with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Mel

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76. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Military Assistant (Pursley) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

Secretary Laird recently discussed with you the proposal for a Defense Program Review Committee.[2] Mr. Laird indicated to you his agreement with the general nature of the proposed Committee and the direction its work would provide on national security deliberations and on programs.

The Secretary still agrees with the general thrust of your proposal. However, since the last discussion with you, three modifications in the draft National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) have occurred to him. He has asked me to outline the modifications for your consideration:

a. What the Committee Will Do.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 26. Secret.

[2] See Document 74 for Kissinger's proposal.

The present draft NSDM says "This Committee will review the diplomatic, military and political consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination . . . ."

Mr. Laird suggests the charter be broadened to read: "This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political, *and economic* consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination . . . ."

In reality, the U.S. will probably be confronted on a continuing basis with the call for more national security commitments from the various diplomatic, military, and political claimants than we shall have resources to fulfill. In effect, then, two of the key jobs confronting the Defense Program Review Committee would be the delineation of:

—Sound U.S. *diplomatic, military,* and *economic goals,* at least as they look to those involved in national security matters.

—*Alternative national security strategies,* i.e., the ways in which resources can be allocated to meet, or at a minimum to avoid violating, the prescribed goals.

b. Committee Membership.

To fulfill the broader charter recommended above, Mr. Laird suggests: *adding the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the membership.* The counsel of a professional economist will be needed to insure that economic goals are clearly recognized and that the economic impact of alternative national security strategies is considered and evaluated in the Committee's deliberations. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, while an important member of the Committee, cannot be expected to fill such a role.

c. The Specific Committee Charter.

Currently, the draft NSDM indicates the Committee, inter alia, will review issues requiring Presidential determination that *result from*

—changes in defense strategy, programs and budgets, and

—changes in U.S. overseas force deployments and in committed forces based in the U.S.

Secretary Laird believes the Committee would be more useful if it were to consider, and make recommendations on proposals affecting strategy, programs, budgets, etc., *before* changes went into effect. Mr. Laird suggests recasting the NSDM, therefore, as follows:

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political, and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

—*proposals to change* defense strategy, programs and budgets,

—*proposals to change* overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S., and

—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.[3]

Robert E. Pursley
Colonel, USAF

[3] Under cover of an October 9 memorandum to the President, Kissinger forwarded a "slightly revised" version of the NSDM setting up the Defense Program Review Committee. The revisions incorporated the changes proposed by Laird. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 67, Defense Program Review Committee)

77. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Staff, National Security Council (Osgood) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Role, Functions, and Requirements of NSC Planning Staff

The purpose of this memorandum is to make as precise as possible, at this experimental stage, the responsibilities of the Planning Staff. It outlines a role that we regard as substantively necessary and organizationally workable. We present it for your approval or modification in the form of an Action Memorandum because of the importance of defining relationships between the planning and operational members of the NSC Staff in a way that will elicit your support and their cooperation.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material 1969. Confidential. Sent for action. In forwarding the memorandum to Kissinger, Haig stated that it was "replete with generalities but does codify much of what you have outlined as the role of the Planning Staff." (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, September 26; ibid.) In an October 1 memorandum to the President, Kissinger commented that the Planning Staff was "being strengthened under Osgood's direction to do medium and long-range planning and to consider policy and program alternatives in some key areas," with a greater emphasis "placed on trying to isolate some critical issues which do not get the kind of advance attention they deserve. I expect this to assume an increasingly important role in generating new thinking and alternatives for Council consideration." (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6–6)

I. Role

The principal role of the Planning Staff is to assure that (a) U.S. policies and policy studies reflect systematic foresight in light of significant considerations in a period of from one to five years ahead, and that (b) they are coordinated with one another according to a coherent concept of American interests. This foresight and coordination should be applied to three kinds of issues:

(1) Issues which arise with respect to decisions or NSSMs that are up for consideration in the near future.
(2) Issues that are anticipated to arise from international trends and developments but which are not being dealt with by decisions or NSSMs in the near future.
(3) Issues raised by possible crises that one may anticipate.

II. Functions

Broadly speaking, the Planning Staff can play this role in two ways:

(1) providing education and enlightenment to those with operational responsibilities, including the President and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs;
(2) participating more directly in the formulation and consideration of policies and policy options.

The first function should be the primary responsibility of the Planning Staff, but it also needs to perform the second function to a degree in order to keep informed and remain relevant.

The first function can be performed through think-pieces, conferences, memoranda, consultants, and other intellectual media. The principal instruments of the latter are the NSSM process and the operational staff in their dealings with the departments.

The second function is difficult because it requires being familiar with operational matters and participating in the policy process to an extent that may not be easy to reconcile with the intellectual or organizational requirements of good planning. And it is largely this latter function that raises delicate problems of the relationship between the operational and planning staff.

III. Responsibilities

To carry out these functions properly I recommend the following guidelines concerning the responsibilities of the Planning Staff and its relationship to the Operators.

(1) Planners should develop their own papers, particularly on issues of mid-range or longer-range significance which are not adequately dealt with in NSSMs elsewhere. Operators should suggest papers and studies for the Planning Staff and advise the staff in preparing them.
(2) The Operators are responsible for managing NSSMs. They should represent you at meetings and prepare you and the President

for Review Group and NSC meetings. The Planners should not deal with Department personnel on matters concerning the content of NSSMs under the management of Operators.

(3) Planners should make suggestions to Operators concerning the longer-range implications of policy positions in NSSMs as they are being drafted.

(4) The Planning Staff should be free to present to you occasionally comments and alternative positions reflecting longer-range perspectives on NSSMs as they come to the Review Group and the NSC.

(5) The Planners should, from time to time, give you analyses of developments in international politics with significant bearing upon U.S. policies in the longer run.

(6) On a few particularly important longer range issues with which the NSSMs do not adequately deal, the Planning Staff should initiate Planning NSSMs that would be conducted by Departmental personnel and draw on other Planning Staffs. We would manage these as the Operators manage regular NSSMs. We would, of course, check with Operators in order to guard against duplication of effort and would work closely with them while the NSSM studies were being prepared.

(7) The Planning Staff would be responsible for an Annual Review of American Foreign Policy, stating concisely the interests and policies of the U.S. in relation to the international environment.

IV. Requirements

In order to fulfill its responsibilities the Planning Staff will need certain kinds of authorization and assistance.

(1) NSC system documents put out by the Secretariat (schedules, memoranda, NSSMs, NSDMs, etc.), EXDIS and NODIS cables, sensitive intelligence reports, and other material necessary to keep the Staff abreast of ongoing actions and alert to problems needing planning attention.

(2) Draft copies of NSSMs as they become available to the Operators.

(3) Authorization to initiate and manage a select few Planning NSSMs, while keeping the Operators fully informed.

(4) Access to a reasonable portion of funds available to utilizing consultants, calling conferences, commissioning outside studies, etc.

(5) Permission for a Planning Staff representative to sit in on Pre-NSC Review Group meetings and, occasionally, Review Group, Pre-NSC, and NSC meetings, when they have an important bearing on subjects in which the Planning Staff is particularly interested.

Recommendation

That you consider the proposals and views in this memorandum as the basis for a memorandum from you to the NSC Staff as a whole.[2]

[2] There is no indication of approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

78. National Security Study Memorandum 77[1]

Washington, October 8, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the U.S. Information Agency
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
President of the Export-Import Bank

SUBJECT

Program Budgets

The President has directed that program budgets will be prepared for selected countries where the United States has major overseas diplomatic, military, economic assistance, intelligence, and information programs. Where appropriate, these program budgets will be used as the basis for U.S. program decisions.

To implement this directive, the addressee agencies will designate individuals, by country, by October 10, 1969 to be available for a period of 90 days to develop program budgets for the following countries:

Thailand	India	Brazil
Korea	Pakistan	Chile
Philippines	Turkey	Colombia
Indonesia	Greece	
Taiwan		
Vietnam		

These program budget groups will work under the supervision of the Program Analysis staff of the National Security Council which will cooperate closely with the staff of the Bureau of the Budget. The completed program budgets will be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by December 15, 1969.

Where appropriate the AID and PL 480 program budgets will be used as the basis for the FY 70 country program memoranda submitted to the President pursuant to NSDM 10.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–163, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 77. Confidential.

[2] NSDM 10, "AID and PL–480 Commitments," April 11, 1969 (Ibid., Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 10)

In the case of the three Latin American countries on the above list (Brazil, Chile and Colombia), the program budgeting studies directed by this memorandum should be related to the extent possible to existing programming activities under the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) system.

Henry A. Kissinger

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79. National Security Decision Memorandum 26[1]

Washington, October 11, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee.[2]

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

—proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
—proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,
—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget—Vol. I—1970. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] Records of DPRC meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098–H–106. Included are minutes for many meetings as well as talking points, other briefing material, and background memoranda and papers, 1969–1973.

The Committee will meet as necessary and supervise the preparation of issues papers for consideration by the National Security Council. Issues will be brought to the attention of this group at the initiation of the addressee agencies or of the Chairman. Studies of defense policy and program issues undertaken in response to National Security Study Memorandums will be submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee prior to NSC consideration rather than to the NSC Review Group.

The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee shall include:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

Richard Nixon

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80. Editorial Note

The President's Assistant, H.R. Haldeman, included the following entry in his diary for October 15, 1969: "Had Rogers and Laird in after NSC to try to get them in line about Vietnam and November 3 speech. Apparently this uncovered all their problems with K[issinger], because P[resident] called me in to discuss it. Says he'll have to bring Mitchell in more because K can't deal with Rogers and Laird, has problem of communicating with them, and has become an issue. Wants me to make all this clear to K, hard to do. Problem is his insistence on perfection and total adherence to the line in every detail. Also injects himself too much into everything, between P and Cabinet officers, and they just won't buy it, so he becomes ineffective even at getting them to do what they already were ready to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

Twelve days later, for October 27, the following entry appears in Haldeman's diary: "The K problem came to a head today. P had me in early to review some items, then got into problem of K vs. State, and

especially Rogers which we had discussed last week and which K had churned up some more over the weekend, in phone calls with P. As we were talking, K and Ziegler came in for morning briefing. K got going on State, this time saying he had decided not to force Sisco to cancel appointment with Dobrynin, because that would be worse than keeping it, but then went on and on about what a terrible mistake it was. Then got into Lebanon problem, Israel jets, etc. Finally P said 'well that's all for today, have to get to work' and got up and walked out into little office. K then said he wanted me in the noon meeting because he had to get into the Rogers problem with P. I took him into my office and tried to point out the fallacy of his technique, regardless of merits of case. I think he saw it a little, at least. P called me in to restate his concern with this as latest example. Feels K is impairing his usefulness, and is obsessed beyond reason with this problem. Later P called Mitchell and me in to discuss further, and asked Mitchell to have a talk with K. Tough one, because there is some real merit to K's concern about Rogers' loyalty." (Ibid.)

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81. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) will meet in the situation room tomorrow at 10:00 a.m.[2] At this meeting, I believe you should:

—*provide general guidelines on the types of issues* the DPRC should address as a matter of routine;

—*indicate a tentative approach to the FY 71 DOD budget* so that issues with policy implications requiring Presidential determination are identified early:

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 234, DPRC & DEF Budget 1969. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] The meeting, the DRPC's first, was held on October 22.

—*initiate interagency (State and Budget) involvement in setting up the Defense Five Year Force and Program Plan* (FYFPP) by asking all the DPRC members to assist in defining the FYFPP format. The idea is that this document will serve as a basic reference and control document for the President and the DPRC.

At the next meeting of the DPRC you could then begin the process of reviewing the FY 71 DOD budget in terms of its policy implications.

All these topics are discussed in more detail below—issues are identified and some proposals for proceeding are suggested.

Defense Program Review Committee—Issues

The charter for the DPRC as established by NSDM 26[3] is to "review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from:

—proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets;
—proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.;
—major defense policy and program issues and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums."

These issues are of the following types:

1. *Strategic Guidelines.* These guidelines, based on Presidential and NSC decisions, will set the framework of purposes, objectives, and goals, which the Defense Five Year Force and Program Plan will serve. There are several defense-related NSSMs now underway which will assist in expanding and clarifying these guidelines:

—studies on the role of nuclear weapons in Europe (NSSM 65) and Asia (NSSM 69);[4]
—a study on strategic requirements to deter less than all-out nuclear attacks on the U.S. (NSSM 64);
—an upcoming NSSM on U.S. strategies and forces for NATO.

2. *Budgetary Guidelines.* The budget level guidelines, drawn from Presidential decisions, set the overall limits for the Defense budget. Pressures for changing these budget guidelines may arise through the year resulting from:

—*changes in the budgetary planning assumptions* concerning the level of U.S. activity in Vietnam: higher (or lower) deployments, ammunition consumption, etc;

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[3] Document 79.

[4] Copies of NSSMs and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–122 through H–207, National Security Study Memoranda.

—*changes in U.S. Government revenue projections* which might constrain further the availability of funds for defense;

—*new national priorities* which could require reallocating government funds away from defense toward domestic programs or vice versa.

3. *Force and Program Guidance.* NSDM 27[5] specified the general level of military capability the U.S. will maintain to support its international objectives and commitments. As we modify existing forces so they are consistent with the NSDM 27 decision, diplomatic and political reactions could develop which raises major policy issues for the President and the NSC;

—How do we explain diplomatically the relative roles of Korea and Southeast Asia in determining the forces we will maintain in the Pacific after the war in Vietnam?

—What obstacles will domestic political pressure groups present when we consider ways to redesign the Army Reserve force structure so that the Reserves support the worldwide strategy?

—What weapon system procurement plans will become major Congressional issues—shipbuilding (under study in NSSMs 50 and 54), advanced strategic weapon systems (ABM and ULMs, etc.)?

4. *Overseas Deployments.* When we told NATO what forces we would commit during 1970, we had some difficulties in coordinating our diplomatic scenario with our military plans. Other similar issues may arise requiring Presidential determinations:

—The Korea Program Analysis (NSSM 27), includes alternatives with different deployments to Korea.

—Elliot Richardson, in his report on the Defense Program Questionnaire (DPQ 69) for NATO, indicated that further changes in our forces committed to NATO may be necessary.

—Our deployments to Thailand are becoming a symbolic and political issue in Congress which may eventually require Presidential determination. (NSSM 51 will address the Thailand issue.)

As a general rule major issues of these types should be reviewed by the DPRC. After examining each issue, the DPRC should decide whether it should be forwarded for NSC or direct Presidential consideration.

The FY 71 Budget and the Five Year Defense Force and Program Plan.

In addressing the Committee's responsibilities in reviewing the FY 71 DOD budget, I believe you should involve the members of the Committee immediately by:

—asking State to begin identifying the defense program implications of NSDM 27 which will raise diplomatic policy issues;

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[5] NSDM 27, "U.S. Military Posture," October 11, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda Nos. 1–50)

—asking BOB to identify the major procurement issues which may raise policy issues in Congress (FDL, C5A, F14);

—asking BOB and Defense to identify areas where costs might so exceed projections that either budgetary guidelines or the force level must be adjusted.

I believe it is important for agencies to begin addressing these issues now so that when Defense submits its budget, no time will be lost in identifying issues for NSC or Presidential attention.

The Five Year Force and Program Plan—Setting It Up

NSDM 27 calls for the submission to the DPRC by the Secretary of Defense of his proposed Five Year Force and Program Plan by next January 15, together with an explanation and rationale for the forces in each major force category.

This plan, when completed, will be in effect a *basic reference-control document* which the DPRC can use to track defense decisions. Whenever DOD or any agency proposes to change elements of this plan, that would automatically create a potential issue for the DPRC, which it could take up or not depending on the policy implications and the diplomatic consequences of the proposal.

The non-defense members of the Committee can be involved in designing the format for the plan. If the plan is designed correctly, it will include enough detail so that the non-defense agencies can become aware early in the process of defense program change proposals with policy implications.

With respect to the specific procedures that might be followed in developing the FYFPP format, I believe you should consider either:

—asking Dave Packard to form a small working group, chaired by a Defense representative and including representatives of each DPRC member, to define the format; or

—providing a "straw man" format to serve as preliminary guidance for DOD and to provide other DPRC members a framework in which to place their own suggested additions. (An outline and several illustrative tables are attached (tab A);[6] however, more work should be done before you could distribute the document informally.)

I believe you can go either way. Clearly, there are bureaucratic reasons for giving Dave Packard a major role in designing the proper format. On the other hand, since the primary orientation of the DPRC is toward the broader policy implications of defense program changes, with particular emphasis on all the dimensions of a problem, I believe you should retain the dominant role in indicating the level of detail and the basic categories in the FYFPP.

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[6] The tabs are not printed.

I have prepared talking points along the lines just described for the first DPRC meeting (tab B).[7]

[7] According to the minutes, Kissinger opened the October 22 meeting as follows: "Originally, President found himself arbitrating defense issues on a line-by-line basis. He didn't like being put into this position. We're concerned with political doctrinal implications of long-term force projections. You've seen NSDM 26. Implications of force postures, in relation to five year projection, and in relation to NSSMs. In this context, the Group performs same function NSC Review Group performs. Other contexts are five-year plan due by Jan 15 and next year's DOD budget. We can't reopen budget line-by-line. We can review implication, e.g., NATO implication, doctrinal implications, it's this problem we are here to deal with. Defense strategy, overseas deployments and policies and programs." Richardson then commented that "As a Group we should be concerned with regular mechanism between State and Defense, see that political implications are taken into account." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–099, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DRPC Meeting 10–22–69)

82. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Mayo, Ehrlichman on FY 71 Budget

I understand you will be meeting this afternoon with Bob Mayo and John Ehrlichman on the FY 71 budget.

From what I can tell, Bob Mayo will probably have two issues to discuss:

—The extremely tight financial situation, which he may believe requires a further reduction in projected FY 71 defense outlays of about $2 billion (from around $75 billion, including pay raises, which is what DOD is shooting for now, to about $73 billion).

—Procedures whereby the FY 71 defense budget will be reviewed by the President, including the role of the DPRC.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DRPC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

Discussion

Financial Situation.

I have always been concerned about the quality of the Government's financial projections and about the procedures whereby BOB decides how overall budget cuts are to be allocated among agencies.

The BOB's power to fix the revenue and spending targets and to decide which agency gets what gives BOB enormous leverage over the President's program and particularly over new programs. I believe Mayo's analysis should be carefully reviewed by responsible policy officials *before* Mayo takes action, but this may be a larger issue than you want to take on.

At the least, however, I think *Mayo should be required to take his case for further cuts in DOD's budget to the DPRC* for a full policy review. This is what the DPRC is for.

Further, I believe *such a review should take place as soon as possible.* From what I can tell, Mayo's final ideas on DOD's budget probably wouldn't be given to DOD until early December as things stand now.

General Procedures for Reviewing DOD's Budget.

BOB "Model." BOB people are under the impression that the President wants them to treat DOD like any other agency as far as the budget review is concerned. This means that something like the following would take place:

—In early December, BOB would give DOD its final budget "mark."
—Laird would respond with a memorandum for the President containing his recommendations on those issues which he and the Budget Director differ.
—Mayo would then prepare a memorandum for the President laying out Laird's views and giving BOB's recommendations on how the issues should be resolved.
—A meeting would take place in mid-December with the President, you, Laird, the JCS and possibly Mayo to reach final decisions.

The specific issues would probably be centered mainly on specific weapons programs, although many BOB staffers feel they must now analyze their issues in a broad strategic context related to NSDM 27.[2] In any event, the President's staff work would be done by BOB.

[2] NSDM 27, "U.S. Military Posture," October 11, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda Nos. 1–50)

DPRC "Model." My understanding is that the President wants to put an end to these eleventh hour confrontations and to broaden the review process and the way issues are framed.

This could be done by using the DPRC as the forum for reviewing issues and laying them out for the President. This would mean that:

—Mayo would take his proposals on the DOD Budget and on program issues to the DPRC for full review. Laird's positions on these questions would also be debated in this forum.

—Based on DPRC review, you, as Chairman, would forward a memorandum to the President outlining his choices and the basic judgments he must make in resolving them.

—The staffing would be a joint enterprise of the DPRC so that BOB's view of the world would not be the primary view the President sees.

—Mayo could still meet privately with the President to present his views if that's what the President wanted, but at least a balanced DPRC evaluation would be available to the President.

In this model, the *DPRC would be the central focus for reviewing DOD's budget* and related issues.

Since *Mayo's independence and freedom of action would be materially reduced,* you can expect him to resist the idea that his role be compromised by having him work through the DPRC.[3]

(My personal view is that there should be a domestic equivalent to the DPRC. The dominant role of the Budget Director has got to be changed in favor of a more substantive process.)

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[3] In a March 23, 1970, memorandum to Kissinger, Mayo indicated he had been expecting implementation of the changes agreed upon at the October 24 meeting, in particular his withdrawal as a designated member of the DPRC "in light of BOB's responsibilities covering the entire range of the Government's programs" whereas the DPRC made budget recommendations to the President "on a partial as opposed to an overall basis." Moreover, Mayo stated, since "by its very nature, the DPRC can provide nothing more than a partial judgment," overall tradeoffs between defense and non-defense functions "must be considered in a wider forum than that represented by the DPRC." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget)

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83. Editorial Note

In an October 27, 1969, memorandum, President's Assistant John Ehrlichman informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger that President Nixon had suggested moving ahead with removing the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning from the National Security Council. Kissinger jotted on the memoran-

dum: "John—Let's talk. I don't think he is the worst villain." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness—through 11/69, Vol. I) Kissinger responded formally to Ehrlichman in a November 12 memorandum in which he stated that he saw no national security objection to removing OEP from statutory membership in the NSC but deferred to Ehrlichman with respect to domestic and Congressional aspects of the issue. Under cover of his memorandum, Kissinger forwarded a brief study which discussed some of the issues involved in removing OEP from the NSC. (Ibid.)

Kenneth BeLieu, President's Deputy Assistant for Senate Relations, discussed the issue in late December with Senator Henry Jackson (D–Washington) and Bryce Harlow, Counselor to the President. BeLieu reported in a December 29 memorandum to Egil Krogh, the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs, that Jackson felt the issue should not be taken up at that time "because it will give some in Congress an opportunity to 'open up' on NSC matters far beyond the intended action. That during an election year with many critical matters under NSC consideration foes of the Administration could seize the opportunity to hold expanded hearings and perhaps embarrass us." Harlow also felt "it may not be to our advantage to expose NSC procedures to Congress next session." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. III, 6/1/69–12/31/69) In a January 20, 1970, memorandum to Ehrlichman, Krogh recommended deferring removal "until more propitious political times arrive." (Ibid.) Ehrlichman advised the President in a January 22 memorandum that a reorganization plan removing OEP from the NSC be prepared but held "in abeyance until such time as it is politically easier to enact in Congress." Nixon approved. (Ibid.)

On December 14, 1970, at 4:47 p.m. Arnold Weber of the Office of Management and Budget and Kissinger had the following telephone conversation:

"W: I was asked to call you to inform you that the President has apparently indicated we should go ahead with plans for abolishing OEP, which is one of the members of the NSC or certainly in your area of interest. The purpose of this call is to inform you, and if you or your staff have any comments . . . This recommendation was made by the Ash Council.

"K: That's one way to get a man off the NSC.

"W: I believe it's in the interest of economy.

"K: I have no immediate view. I will see if any of my colleagues do.

"W: This is confidential—General Lincoln is not aware of it. Knowing how these things work, we can't say with assurance whether this will happen, but we thought you should be aware of it.

"K: All right." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

OEP's Director remained a statutory member of the National Security Council, however, until the agency was abolished by Reorganization Plan 1 of 1973.

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84. Memorandum by Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, October 28, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

National Security Decision Memorandum 26[2] established the Defense Program Review Committee to assist the President in carrying out his responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs. The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee is:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Additionally, other agencies may be represented at the discretion of the Chairman depending upon the issue under consideration.

This Committee was established by the President at my request to review *major* Defense issues requiring Presidential determination.

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Accession 74–0045, Signer's Copies October 1969. Secret. Marked "Revised by Col RE Pursley 25 Oct 69."

[2] Document 79.

Major defense issues should be interpreted to include only those select and broad national policy matters in which the highest level military, political, and economic considerations are involved.

The Committee was not established to monitor Department of Defense on-going internal operations, programs, or budgeting processes. The basic Department of Defense program proposals and decisions will continue to be developed through established Defense procedures, and the operations of the Department will continue to be administered through established command channels.

Mel Laird[3]

[3] Printed from a copy with this stamped signature.

85. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Continuing Problems with State Department

General

In recent weeks, the momentum of deteriorating relationships with the Department of State has continued to grow. From the outset of the Administration, our problems have been characterized by a failure of the Department of State, and in particular the Secretary, to cooperate with this office, to adhere to broad policy lines approved by the President and to abide by established ground rules for minimum coordination of policy matters across a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues:

SALT

—The history of our relationships with State and, in turn, U.S. Government's relationships with the Soviet Union on Strategic Arms

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John Ehrlichman, Box 26, State Department—White House Relations, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is an updated version of Haig's October 27 memorandum to Kissinger on the same subject. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1)

Limitation negotiations is replete with examples of the consistent failure of the Secretary of State, the Department of State and ACDA to adhere to the minimum policy guidelines promulgated by the President or Assistant to the President in the President's behalf.

—At enclosure 1 is a detailed chronology of the earlier problems experienced with State in the evolution of the SALT issue.[2] Subsequent to that chronology, in recent weeks, the following problems have arisen:

(1) In contrast to the President's desire to maintain a cool and aloof relationship with the Soviets, at least until his November 3d speech, State moved with excessive eagerness to accept the long overdue Soviet response on SALT talks.

(2) Despite a firm Presidential directive to the effect that the talks should not be held in Helsinki, Secretary Rogers in effect agreed to this site in his discussions with Dobrynin in New York and subsequently after having been instructed to the contrary, continued to acquiesce in Helsinki as the location, for preliminary talks.

(3) Despite obvious desire on the part of the White House to achieve maximum credit for the President on the SALT issue, it appears that State moved, through press contacts, to insure that the Secretary of State received maximum credit for the favorable Soviet response.

(4) On October 24, the Secretary of State sent a memorandum to the President, designed to give State and ACDA almost autonomous control of SALT negotiations, despite the existence of White House memoranda designed to retain control here.

(5) State has not yet responded to a request for copies of memcons covering the Rogers–Dobrynin conversations on Wednesday, October 22, 1969.

(6) Despite an urgent requirement suggested from the White House that careful coordination be effected with our European Allies on the SALT announcement, the State Department did not execute such coordination until late Friday afternoon, just a few hours before the announcement was to be made and well after serious leaks were already reflected in the press. (Except for the fact that we utilized White House channels to notify the Big Three confidentially on Thursday, October 23, this could have been a serious affront to our Allies.)

(7) Despite the full realization in the Department of State of the President's interest in any contacts with the Soviets, State, without consulting with or notifying the White House, arranged a meeting between

[2] The attached April 30 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon is not printed.

Gerard Smith and Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss the "mechanics" of the forthcoming SALT talks for October 29. Concurrently, a new flurry of speculative press articles apparently emanating from ACDA sources have started to appear in the media, the most significant being today's Marquis Child's article indicating that Gerard Smith will move rapidly to initiate talks on the MIRV ban with the Soviets once the talks start.[3]

(8) In sum, State's handling of the Soviet SALT reply was contrary to the tactics desired by the President. It clearly damaged the atmosphere that we were attempting to maintain vis-à-vis the Soviets. It is apparent that unless the Department of State and its subordinate agency, ACDA, are immediately brought under firm control that the freewheeling, undisciplined and frequently disloyal style of operating which has characterized the SALT issue will continue unabated. These discrepancies can continue only at the greatest risk to the national security now that substantive talks are about to get underway.

Colorado Springs Directive

—On 1 September (enclosure 2), the President sent a directive to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of CIA,[4] reiterating his desire that all communications with policy implications be cleared with the White House, adding that in cases of doubt the rule would be to seek clearance. It is obvious that this directive has not been disseminated to the appropriate bureaus in the Department of State. In fact, contrary to this directive, we have received several indications that guidance has been issued to at least some bureaus and members of the State Department staff that they should strictly limit coordination and collaboration with members of the NSC staff.

—For example, our African staff man was informed by the Chief of the African Bureau that the African Bureau has received a directive from the 7th Floor that it is not to coordinate its actions with him.

—As a further manifestation of this problem, State dispatched a cable to Bonn dealing with the future of the Berlin issue, containing strong policy implications, without obtaining necessary clearance from the White House.[5] Despite continued efforts by the NSC staff, State adamantly refused to accept White House guidance until the issue was finally resolved between Dr. Kissinger and the Under Secretary of State.

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[3] Marquis Childs, "SALT Talks Offer Chance to Curb Spiraling Arms Race," *The Washington Post,* October 29, 1969, p. A25.

[4] Document 70.

[5] Telegram 174682 to Bonn, October 15. For text see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

—One of the most serious breaches of the President's directive occurred on October 8 when the Department of State, unilaterally and without White House approval, passed to a French Embassy officer for relay to the North Vietnamese, U.S. medical journals containing articles on the treatment of hemorrhagic fever, reportedly rampant in North Vietnam. This is an incredible act which may have been motivated by humanitarian concerns but which represented a fundamental policy decision which was not even cleared with Ambassador Lodge, who registered a strong complaint upon learning that it was done. Background material at enclosure 3.[6]

—On October 8, Department of State dispatched a message to Moscow, Paris and Saigon, without White House clearance, which reported a meeting between Ambassador Sullivan and the Soviet Minister Tcherniakov which established a totally unauthorized new communication link between Sullivan and the Soviets and Habib and the Soviet representative Oberemko in Paris, designed to deal actively with the Vietnam problem. (Cable at enclosure 4).[7] It took energetic action by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with the President himself to rectify this situation.

Middle East

—On October 25, we received notification by information memorandum from the Secretary of State that he intended to launch a major Middle East initiative on Wednesday, October 29.[8] The memorandum indicated that Joe Sisco would launch talks with the Soviets in an effort to seek Soviet agreement with a proposal that would have the Israelis return to their pre-war borders, with some exceptions, in return for guarantees for the future of Israel. When State was informed that such an initiative at this time would be contrary to the U.S.-Soviet atmospherics sought in conjunction with the Vietnam speech, we were informed that Secretary Rogers had already made a commitment to Dobrynin on October 22 to launch these talks and that it would be embarrassing, if not impossible, to draw back now. The White House had not been informed of this commitment. In view of the President's preoccupation with his weekend speeches, the Assistant to the President acceded to the State initiative rather than bother the President whose personal intercession would be required to modify what was presented to the White House as a course of action approved by the Secretary of State.

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[6] Attached but not printed.

[7] Telegram 170777 to Moscow, October 8; attached but not printed.

[8] Not found.

Latin America

—After a copy of the President's draft speech on Latin America was provided to State, we noted indications that it was immediately taken over by the Secretary, who initiated a series of coordinating actions which would risk the security of its contents—but which could then gain maximum credit for State for whatever initiative the President would ultimately include.

—The President had approved and directed the upgrading of the State bureau responsible for Latin American Affairs, from Assistant Secretary to Under Secretary level, to be included as one of the initiatives reported in the October 31 speech.[9] Rather than accepting this directive, Secretary Rogers called Dr. Kissinger and insisted that if he were to so reorganize State it would be necessary for Dr. Kissinger similarly to reorganize the NSC staff, upgrading his Latin American specialist. Dr. Kissinger agreed, despite the meaningless nature of such an exercise. (NSC staff members do not have clearly defined titles in any case.)

—Immediately after the draft of the President's speech was furnished to the Department of State, press speculation began to build concerning its contents. The most flagrant of these was an article in today's *New York Times* by Tad Szulc, obviously leaked by State, which intimated that the President's speech would be in large measure a recitation of Governor Rockefeller's recommendations for Latin America.[10]

—Although each of the most recent drafts have been furnished to State, they have initiated a process of nitpicking, seeking both substantive and stylistic changes, despite the fact that the broad outlines of the proposals contained in the speech were approved by the President and promulgated as Presidential directives, following NSC consideration of our Latin American policies. Furthermore, the Secretary called the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on Tuesday, October 28, and informed him that he intended to take over the substance of the speech on Thursday and Friday of this week and insure that it was consistent with his views.

Africa

—On October 16, State slipped a new option into the discussion of Southern Africa at the Review Group meeting on that subject without prior consultation with the NSC staff, in a clear effort to circumvent the usual channels of preparation for Review Group meetings.

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[9] See Document 80.

[10] Tad Szulc, "Rockefeller Seeks Latin-Policy Shift," *The New York Times,* October 29, 1969, p. 1.

—More serious was the testimony of State's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs before the House Subcommittee on Africa. His confidential testimony revealed State's recommendations on closing our Consulate in Southern Rhodesia and on importing Rhodesian chrome, issues under NSC consideration. Both of these recommendations were (as State knew) consistent with the views of the Subcommittee Chairman, Congressman Diggs. The effect of this can only be that, if the President chooses a different course from that recommended by State, Congressman Diggs and his colleagues will know that their friends in State fought the good fight against the "wrong-headed" White House.

State under-cut the President's position in this manner, despite specific instructions from BOB that its testimony before Congressman Diggs should avoid all statements implying what our policy is or should be. Commerce and Treasury received similar instructions and followed them in their testimony.

Summary

In sum, it has become increasingly apparent that State-White House relationships have deteriorated to the point that the most serious damage to the national interest cannot but result. The situation today differs only in degree from the problems that have been experienced since January 21st. At enclosure 5 is a summary of major problems up to July 12, included in a memorandum prepared by the Assistant to the President by Colonel Haig.[11] At enclosure 6 is a memorandum which was prepared in August at San Clemente, summarizing the problems that had occurred over the summer weeks.[12] The impression gained from review of the history of our problems with State suggest that their continuation can no longer be tolerated.

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[11] Document 63.

[12] See footnote 2, Document 70.

86. Memorandum From W. Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relations with the State Department

As you requested, I am putting down on paper some of my thoughts about the present state of our relations with the State Department. I have done this in the form of separate papers on: the problem and its consequences; the reasons which I believe lie behind the problem; and some possible remedial measures.[2]

In discussing only the problem, there is the danger that the picture can be painted in overly bleak tones. I do not mention the many areas of close and friendly collaboration with State—e.g., with Ted Eliot.

The memorandum incorporates the comments of the senior staff operators. I discovered that Bill Watts was independently writing a similar memo. Many of the comments in my memo are taken from Bill's (with his blessings).[3]

Attachment A

Washington, undated.

The Problem and Its Consequences

Almost without exception, the staff members agreed with my view that working relations between the NSC staff and the State Department are at their lowest ebb in years. This is most obvious in the extraordinary failures of the State Department to coordinate its activities with this staff in a number of important ways. (Some of the specific incidents of which you are aware come as a particular shock to me when I recall the meticulous way in which my former bosses at State checked

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 2. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis.

[2] All three papers are attached but only the first two, attachments A and B, are printed.

[3] Attachment D; printed below.

almost everything of importance with the White House, and were sincerely embarrassed when there was some slip-up.)

Most of the operators also said that the State Department sees the NSC now in an adversary role in a way that it has not before. There seems to be less effort than before to resolve problems by compromise. This is an atypical attitude for the State Department, which has not been noted in the past for the overt ferocity of its bureaucratic methods.

I will not recount the many cases of State failure to clear statements and instructions, or to carry out Presidential directives, etc. There are a number of categories of operational problems, however, which can usefully be listed.

—Almost daily, policy statements and positions are taken through speeches or cable directives which were not sent to the White House for prior clearance.

—Implicit and explicit directives have been sent from the 7th floor to certain bureaus telling them not to deal with their NSC counterparts.

—As the information flow has thus diminished or stopped, NSC staff members have been unaware of issues on which a White House view could usefully be given.

—Papers are sent over from State (sometimes probably deliberately) late before meetings, so as to make meaningful comment almost impossible by the NSC staff.

—The 7th floor is signing off on a greater number of cables than in the past. The Bureaus are increasingly preparing messages without White House clearance and obtaining 7th floor approval before they come to us for clearance. This pattern allows the Bureaus to avoid confrontation with our staff and has the particularly pernicious effect of involving the 7th floor and you in disagreements which should have been resolved at lower levels.

—Papers are frequently produced which simply do not produce realistic alternatives for the President to consider, but rather put the entire weight on the favored State position.

—Specific Presidential orders and policy guidelines have been ignored. This has, of course, happened in past Administrations—but never in recent history to such a degree, particularly with regard to press statements.

—In addition to disregard of Presidential policy directives, bureaucratic directives from the President have been suppressed and ignored. For example, the Colorado Springs directive[4] was never given any distribution within the State Department.

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[4] See Document 70.

These problems vary greatly, of course, among the Regional Bureaus.

Consequences

The major consequences of these problems have been obvious to you: the serious inconsistencies we have displayed to foreigners with regard to critically important substantive issues and the impression of indiscipline and lack of coherence we have displayed to the press. The gravity of these consequences, particularly the former, cannot be overstated.

Another consequence has been less important substantively, but also concerns me. It is the amount of time and physical and psychic energy which goes into our bureaucratic struggles. This has, I believe, seriously affected the efficiency and performance of our operation—and of the Government as a whole.

Attachment B

Washington, undated.

The Reasons

Most of the problem revolves around the Secretary's relationship with the President and you, as noted in Bill's memo. Substantive disagreements with the White House also play a strong part. In addition, there are a number of bureaucratic reasons for the problem. They are basically atmospheric:

—Relations vary from geographic area to geographic area, depending largely on the personalities involved. Psychological interactions involved here include a feeling by some Assistant Secretaries that they have been bulldozed by more competent NSC staff officers and resultant fears that continued close contact will damage their own positions in the bureaucracy, as well as occasional resentment at the bureaucratic as well as personal power of the NSC staff.

—The whole 7th floor has (I believe properly) encouraged the Bureaus to show more initiative in developing new policies, etc., to show that the State Department *can* play a more positive role in our foreign affairs establishment. This has been interpreted by some Bureaus to mean that they should circumvent the NSC staff.

—Many in the State Department lack confidence in the present NSC system. There is reportedly a widespread belief that it was designed from its inception to constrain the State Department. Many State officers therefore do not believe that they will gain anything by submitting differences with the NSC staff to the NSC structure.

—There is also reportedly an unfortunate belief in some Bureaus that you are anti-State Department in outlook. I gather, without knowing specifics, that some comments attributed to you denigrating the State Department have been given fairly wide circulation in some Bureaus.

—Some Bureaus reportedly believe that some of the President's directives, as put out in NSSM's, NSDM's, and other memoranda over your signature, reflected your desires more than the President's, and even on occasion that they were put out without the President's knowledge. These rumors have debased the effectiveness of these directives.

—As you saw in the Green memorandum, some State officers have the impression that the White House does a great deal of back channel manipulation of the field.

All of these factors have contributed to a vicious circle of reactions and counter-reactions between the staff and the State Department, which has contributed to an increasing loss of confidence in each other.

Attachment D[5]

Memorandum From William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

On Dealing with State

I. Background

In the last analysis, the whole question of relationships between the National Security Council and the Department of State turns on your relations with Secretary Rogers. With the mistrust and suspicion that now exist, it is inevitable that he will seek to circumvent and undermine your efforts. The result is that the working relationships between the Department of State and your staff will have not only the

[5] Roger Morris, who was a member of Kissinger's NSC staff from January 1969 to April 1970, later wrote in his book, *Haig: The General Progress*, p. 129, that "when Watts, the staff secretary, sent Kissinger an unusual memo early in 1970. 'On Dealing with State,' urging an end to the venom and harsher habits of rivalry, Haig openly ridiculed Watts with Kissinger and other officers."

chronic abrasions of an unwielding bureaucracy, but may suffer an outright break-down. Simply put, this jeopardizes the very basis of the national policy process.

Institutional corrections are probably possible and worth trying, but ultimately it all will hang on the Kissinger/Rogers axis.

This basic fact is complicated by an additional reality which must be as galling to Secretary Rogers as it is obvious to the President. To wit, the whole NSC operation, from you on down, stands head and shoulders above the Department of State in terms of quality of product and degree of initiative. The President obviously meant it when he said at the staff meeting in the Cabinet Room that State hadn't turned out a new idea in 20 years. He clearly looks to you for his most sophisticated advice and counsel, and this is now sufficiently obvious to everyone that it is bound to exacerbate the entire State/NSC relationship.

II. The Problem

All of this gets translated into reality in increasingly obvious and crude forms:

—policy statements and positions are taken through speeches or cable directives, which are not sent to the White House for clearance.

—specific Presidential orders are frequently ignored, or not enforced.

—papers are produced which simply do not present realistic alternatives for the President to consider, but rather put the entire weight on the favorite State program.

—papers are sent over from State deliberately late before meeting dates or other deadlines, so as to make meaningful comment here almost impossible.

—implicit and explicit directives have been circulated within the State Department telling staff men not to deal with their NSC counterparts.

—And so forth.

It would not be fair, however, to suggest the problem is all one way. Many at State are deeply concerned that the White House is undertaking clandestine policy initiatives without even clueing State in. In addition, there is concern that communications from the Secretary to the President, or at other levels, either do not get through to the President or are presented in a way which does not give full force to the State position.

III. What to do?

In point of fact, the cards are stacked heavily in your favor. You have an overwhelming dual advantage: your own very special relationship with the President, and the superior quality of NSC staff work.

This is a situation which the 7th floor at State certainly recognizes. *But in its insecurity and rancor, State is just not going to put out its hand first.*

Under these circumstances, only an initiative on your part can bring a genuine improvement in White House/State relations.

You hold the high ground. You can clearly afford to offer State a greater role, in the full confidence that, if State is unable or unwilling to respond, it can only blame itself.

The need for such an initiative grows day by day. It is simply a monumental waste of your time to have to spend so much energy on smoking out and preventing end runs. It is debilitating to the staff to be constantly in the same position, when in fact what they should be doing is working in close harmony with their State counterparts and thereby serving you in a far more creative capacity. What is going on now approximates a slow war of attrition, in which State regularly tries to limit your capacity for action, and looks upon the NSC as its main adversary on the Washington landscape.

As I said at the outset, this all revolves around your relations with the Secretary of State. If there is to be genuine relief of tension and improvement of working relations, the process must start with you and Secretary Rogers.

Such an initiative could be followed up by a range of additional actions, the purpose of which would be to try and make better use of the resources available at State (they are not inconsiderable), and to engender the kind of active inter-relationship which is so badly needed.

A number of specific steps follow:

1. A private meeting between yourself and the Secretary, in which you would stress your own desire to see nothing but the closest relations between the members of your staff and their counterparts at State. This kind of forthcoming opening on your part could at least lay the groundwork for a bit of relaxation from the Secretary's side, and prepare the way for a subsequent session with the important working-level people at State—primarily the Assistant Secretaries.

2. A meeting of you with Elliot Richardson and the IG Chairman (with the Secretary invited, although he might not want to be there), as a follow-up to your overture to the Secretary. You would lay out in some detail just what kind of product the IG papers really should be, and what the President needs. Some of my discussions lead me to believe that there is genuine confusion on this score. Some straight talk from you, stressing the importance of these papers and showing just how basic they could be if done properly might result in a vastly improved product. Your message would be that the NSC staff wants to work with—and not against—the IG process.

3. You should continue to encourage NSC staff members to consult more actively with their State Department counterparts *throughout* policy deliberations over at State. This is a subject that would be well worth discussing with Secretary Rogers; he could (hopefully) be made to see that it is in his interest that such close consultations do go forward. As it is now, conflict all too often emerges in the very last stages, and this is just one more factor which escalates issues for decision to a show-down of sorts between you and the Secretary.

4. The role of the Under Secretaries Committee should be strengthened, putting an increased responsibility on State's shoulders. State must be *challenged* to do a better job and the way to do that best is to *give them* responsibility, not take it away. A number of NSSMs already in process could be directed straight to the Under Secretaries Committee in the first instance, and this line of approach should be more actively followed in the future. This can be handled in part by the very way the NSSMs are drafted.

5. Every effort must be made to move papers through the White House system as quickly as possible. Admittedly, State is notoriously delinquent in the way it sends papers over late for clearance, with horrendous last minute deadlines. This is something for which we constantly jump on them for and we will continue to do so. But to the extent that our own hands are clean, and decision papers do not languish here, the onus for delay is on State.

6. There will always be very private White House initiatives. This is required both by Presidential style and the concern over possible leaks. Nonetheless, this is also a formula which needs to be used with utmost discrimination, only where absolutely necessary.

In sum, there is a major problem. No one else in this government—who is in a position to deal with it—will. You *can*. To lift the current malaise, to everyone's advantage, you *should*. I believe—and I say this in the full knowledge that I am drawing heavily on my credit balance with you—you *must*.

It is in your interest, in the President's interest, and—ultimately—in the national interest.

87. Memorandum From William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Staff: Comments and Recommendations

At the end of my first interview with you last summer about joining your staff, you said, "No matter how many difficulties and problems I have described to you, it is in my interest to make this system work."

I left the Governor and came to work for you because I believed (and continue to believe) that I could serve you in your interest. What follows has that fully in mind, and is set forth in the spirit of candor which must underpin my usefulness to you.

As you have made clear on a number of occasions, there is a real justification for the NSC system as it now exists only if the NSC staff effort is clearly superior to that produced anywhere else in the government. On the basis of experience to date, the President has come to expect from you work of the highest caliber (so much so, I would venture, that he has clearly carried the pattern you established in organizing a domestic staff counterpart under John Ehrlichman). This is a key element in your strength and ability to intercede in the foreign policy process. To the degree that you are not served to full capacity by your staff, further refinements are required.

Overall quality of staff work is going to depend in large measure on three internal factors:

(1) Personnel
(2) Bureaucratic efficiency
(3) Morale

Let me treat these separately.

Personnel—Your staff is widely recognized as the most competent and skilled group in Washington. So it should be. There are, however, some specific weaknesses, and these need to be dealt with.

We have already touched on this subject briefly in recent conversations. I recommend that you, Al Haig, Tony Lake and I get together

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only.

in the near future to settle on some specific steps. It does no good to know that certain members of the staff are not up to snuff, and yet not take steps to find replacements. But in order to move on this, we need your guidance and authorization.

Bureacratic Efficiency—Your staff has grown in size far beyond its final counterpart under Walt Rostow. The flow of paper is staggering, as are the numbers of individual action assignments.

This has required the development of internal bureaucratic machinery which has taken time to shape and tune. Where shortcomings remain—as they obviously do—I am trying to work them out.

We are just now getting into action a far more institutionalized review procedure, which should enable us to almost automatically see that deadlines don't slip, due dates are met, and all members of the staff are kept up to the mark in terms of their assignment responsibilities. I do not pretend that by automating status reports and upgrading our review capability we can guarantee absolute quality. That relates closely, after all, to the personnel question. But real improvement (particularly if some personnel changes are made) should be inevitable.

Morale—Your best men are not looking for special status or prestige. They know that the very nature of their assignment, their location close to the center of power in this power-oriented city, gives them all this and more.

I know you feel you should not have to worry about the morale of your staff. But it is an objective reality, I believe, that performance and morale are directly and irrevocably linked. If this is so, then it follows that it is *very much* in your interest to promote the morale of your good men.

I am concerned that you do not fully accept just how deeply committed your best men are to your position and what you are doing. One of the chief criticisms, in fact, of the NSC staff in the bureaucracy is that they are loyal to your positions and concepts almost to the point of inflexibility. They have gained a reputation of defending your views (as those of the President's) to a point where they are sometimes seen as unyielding.

I also hope you realize that your best men are willing to follow your lead and work the very long hours they do—weekends and holidays included, of course—not because they necessarily want to, but because they know what you are doing holds the entire national security and foreign affairs system in this government together. It is your preeminence, your ability to contribute what is unique and creative in this Administration's foreign policy, that makes these men go. They are, in this sense, very concerned indeed with *your* morale; they strive to give you the best, to help let you be the best.

I am satisfied that the good men on your staff are not trying to sabotage you. If they wanted to, after all, it would be simple enough to do, and would be quickly apparent.

I am also satisfied, however, that their product could be improved. In fact, I can visualize a joint staff effort working with you and on your behalf which could hum in a fashion capable of meeting even your most exacting standards.

Those of us responsible for doing so, consistently work with the staff to get their product more fully in tune with what you want. In some instances, as I have indicated above, this is a futile exercise. In those cases, changes must be made; and the machinery needs continuing improvement.

But there will continue to be, even under the best of circumstances, another side of the equation. In turning to this, I must speak bluntly. If I can't, then I shouldn't be here.

There are several specific points I wish to raise.

1. *Imprecise instructions*—None of us, no matter how hard we try, can read your mind. You have said on more than one occasion that you know what you want when you see it. Fair enough, but it means that as the staff man is trying to get what you want, he frequently works without a very clear understanding of what he is supposed to be driving at. I am sure you can appreciate that this puts him at a disadvantage.

To the degree, then, that you can *make your own instructions* as to what you want or what you need as *precise and focused* as possible, your best men will be able to satisfy you quickly and painlessly. Everybody stands to benefit.

2. *Contradictory instructions*—From time to time, staff men get from you—directly and indirectly—different sets of instructions which are clearly at odds with each other.

Let me be specific. In the case of the CBW exercise, I think it is fair to say that everyone involved with the product was at one point or another substantially confused. I recognize that this effort was not managed well, and I hold myself primarily responsible. A game plan should have been drawn up immediately after the NSC meeting so that everyone involved would have known what they should be doing. (This will be done in the future.) Nonetheless, I stand on the judgment that instructions and directives were being changed so rapidly that it was extraordinarily difficult to proceed coherently and cohesively.

I realize that the President frequently changes his mind, putting you in an equally tenuous position. Just as that makes your task the more difficult, so is the task of those who genuinely want to get you what you need vastly complicated when they work under colliding instructions.

3. *Public Reprimands and Downgrading of Your Staff*—If anything can break the spirit of the men working for you (whether in your own White House basement office, or in the EOB), it is drilling them for inadequate performance or downgrading them in front of their peers. Your best men find this hard to understand and accept, and it hardly motivates them to produce the highest quality of which they are capable. The downgrading also seriously undermines their own effectiveness as they deal with their counterparts in the bureaucracy.

When you feel a reprimand is in order, I recommend you do this *in private,* and in a way that lets the man know *what* he is being *rapped for.*

The reverse, of course, holds as well. A few *words of encouragement* after a particularly exacting effort mean a great deal.

4. *Absence of debriefing on decisions and agreements you make privately*. You do a lot of important work in private meetings with key Administration officials, at which no other member of the NSC staff is present. This kind of personal forum enables you to move quickly and informally on a wide range of issues. It also, I assume, permits a degree of candor which would be lacking if other people were around.

I have in mind primarily your breakfast or luncheon meetings with Richardson; but this also applies to similar meetings with Packard, Mayo, Ehrlichman and others, where items of direct interest to your staff members are discussed.

What subsequently happens all too frequently, I fear, is that your staff men hear about specific decisions or guidance—which they need to know—only indirectly, through the staff subordinates of the other principals. Richardson and Packard et al, do debrief, in extenso, following their meetings with you. This puts your staff members in the difficult and embarrassing position of finding out what you have agreed to, recommended, or decided, through overtures to their counterparts around Washington. Furthermore, what your men get may well be warped and flavored in a way which favors the other principal's position when it differs from yours.

I urge you to *give readouts* after such key private policy and decision-making meetings. In order to conserve your time, this can, of course, be done through one channel—Al Haig/Tony Lake. It would help me if I could sit in, but I make no particular brief for that. I do make a strong brief that the readouts be given.

As I said at the outset, I have put these thoughts in writing in what I honestly believe to be your best interests. If I can usefully develop any of this more fully, either orally or in writing, let me know.

88. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Problems with the Program Analysis Operation

You should be aware that Larry Lynn is becoming increasingly discouraged from the attitude displayed by the Department of Defense toward his various projects. While there are many minor problems, I believe the most serious involves the role of the DPRC and the fact that Secretary Laird has put out some extremely prohibitive guidance to the Department of Defense which is now being translated into a stonewall position against Lynn in most of the areas with which he is dealing and which involve the DPRC, as well as some of the non-associated NSSMs such as the NATO Tactical Nuclear issue.

I believe that it is essential that you meet with Larry early this week to discuss the specifics of his problem. Following that meeting, you should ask for a meeting between Mel Laird, Dave Packard, Larry and yourself, together with whomever Mr. Laird might want to include to sort out the many problems. If you do not do so, I am convinced that the following situation will develop.

1. Larry will resign his position within a matter of weeks.
2. The entire DPRC system will remain stillborn.
3. All other Defense related relationships involving the NSC will suffer accordingly.

As you know, you do not have a Richardson counterpart in Defense. Also, as you probably know, Mr. Packard is being systematically isolated by Secretary Laird from Defense policy issues so that, in effect, any agreements arrived at between our office and Mr. Packard are meaningless. There is also an indication that many of the staff sections in the Defense Department are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the NSC system which they consider as a drilling formation, a bottleneck for actions which they believe they have worked diligently to prepare only to find them stalemated for weeks at a time, at the NSC level.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

All of the above convinces me that unless prompt remedial action is taken and that unless a constructive dialogue is developed between you and the Department, we are headed for a complete collapse of our relationships with the Department of Defense. I do not believe we can or should permit this to happen, especially in view of the growing problems with State. To me, all that is necessary is a rational, high-level discussion of the issues and, if necessary, some give on our part. This is not a matter that we can procrastinate on any longer, nor can we keep Larry at arm's length, pouting over his frustrations and harboring strong resentments toward you for lack of support or toward the Department of Defense for its lack of cooperation.

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89. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1969.

Attached is the letter from Bob Mayo, providing his views to me on the pending completion of the FY 1971 budget preparation and the initial stages of the FY 1972 planning cycle.[2] I concur in his views that (a) an issue identification process for the Department of Defense, as outlined in the Budget Bureau Bulletin 68–9, is appropriate, and (b) it is premature to deal with the FY 1972 cycle.

Much of Bob's letter bothers me, however. The tone of the letter is strongly aimed at further Defense cuts. The basis for such a predilection is not well-founded, in my judgment. It may be that for any number of reasons such a course will be prudent. But if we do choose that course, it should be on the basis of sound and reasoned analysis, not on the rudimentary analyses which have typified budget and national security resource availability in the past. I believe we have an opportunity to make a quantum jump in our decision-making process at the national level in striving for an optimum resource allocation among our national goals. Pursuing Bob Mayo's course would miss that opportunity.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec–31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Secret.

[2] Dated November 19; not printed.

Bob highlights, for example, "... the worsening fiscal picture for 1971...." He concludes, without providing the analysis, that we cannot meet our fiscal goals (unspecified) without a lower Defense target. It is not clear that if employment levels and national production rates slacken, thereby impinging on the revenue flow, the best—much less the only—course is to cut federal outlays. Economic analysis might show that employment levels, production rates, and therefore federal revenues would be enhanced by continuing, or even increased, federal outlays. I do not know. I am simply suggesting the case is not clear based on Bob's statements.

For projecting security outlays in 1972, Bob suggests we wait until the middle of next year to have our discussions, i.e., until *Bureau of the Budget* has had the opportunity to reexamine economic projections, the revenue picture, the Administration's other critical programs, and our progress in Vietnam. I agree on the timing. But it would be far better in my judgment to have a broader look than the Bureau of the Budget can provide by itself. To do the analytical job properly, we need to study:

—*The overall economic picture,* including the GNP projections; the resources which will likely be available for federal programs; the impact of various spending levels on national goals such as defense, full employment, economic growth, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium.

—*The sensitivity* of higher and lower federal spending increments on our key national goals, i.e., what price do we pay in inflation, if any, for more national security.

—*The allocation of the resources within the Federal sector for optimum distribution.*

—*The relation between the supply side of the national security equation and the demand side, i.e., our basic national security commitments.*

We now have an institutional arrangement in the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) to consider such issues. We should use the DPRC for just these purposes. To do so will in my judgment constitute a major accomplishment for this Administration.

At the same time, if we use the DPRC for lesser tasks, such as assessing the program of individual weapons systems or alternative regional force levels, we shall risk the loss in utility of the Review Committee. Maybe at some later time the DPRC can assimilate such important, but lesser, tasks. But at the start—or at least for the ensuing budget cycles—we should reserve to the DPRC *only* those major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most national goals.

Mel Laird

90. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Deteriorating Relationships with DOD

Our official relationships with DOD continue to deteriorate, at least as far as my activities are concerned. Since I last discussed this problem with you, we have received new and disturbing evidence of DOD's unwillingness to cooperate with NSC activities.

I realize that you cannot do battle with the bureaucracy on every incident. However, we are faced with a series of incidents, any one of which could be tolerated but which, taken together, create a serious problem.

My immediate problem is that it is extremely difficult to get the other agencies to cooperate with us if DOD can consistently withhold its cooperation and get away with it.

My general concern is that this refusal to cooperate, even when the President himself has directed it, coupled with the serious lack of leadership and competence in OSD, may eventually cost the President heavily in bad policies and programs, missed opportunities, and problems with Congress.

The history of the last two decades demonstrates that when things don't go well in the Pentagon, the country as well as the party in power pay a stiff price.

The specific problems are as follows.

Program Budgets

On 8 October you signed NSSM 77[2] directing that program budgets be prepared for 13 countries and asking the agencies to designate individuals to work on the project.

Every agency but DOD responded by designating representatives. After overcoming the reluctance of the State Department and the Budget Bureau and reaching some statesman-like compromises on schedule and procedures, a phased work program was developed.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec–31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

[2] Document 78. Copies of NSSMs and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–122 through H–207, National Security Study Memoranda.

Dave Packard's reply was received on December 3, two months late (See Tab A).[3]

After lecturing us on how busy they are and on how difficult it is to develop program budgets, he says,

—he will support the program analysis efforts for the four countries for which separate NSSMs have already been issued (though their cooperation on Korea and Turkey has been minimal at best),

—he will not cooperate with developing a program budget for Vietnam,

—two to four of the remaining eight countries could be undertaken as a matter of second priority if people are available and after the others are done and evaluated.

I consider the reply insulting and the assertions about the difficulty of the task wrong. If we accept the DOD reply, NSSM 77 will in effect have been rescinded.

I can live with this situation. The strategy would be to wait until the NSC has reviewed the Korea and Thailand program analyses and then attempt to reissue the NSSM with stronger Presidential support.

What I object to is the principle of the matter and the fact that the other agencies will draw inferences about who has the upper hand.

NSSM 50, A Review of U.S. Naval Forces

As you recall, DOD submitted an extremely poor study on U.S. Naval Forces in response to NSSM 50. On November 21, you sent a memorandum to DOD pointing out that the President was personally interested in the study, that the study was deficient, and that a series of specific questions should be answered before you reported to the President.

On December 2, Packard replied (See Tab B),[4] noting that,

—many of the questions were valid and that answers would be forwarded by 21 January 1970,

—you cannot consider the capabilities of a single service apart from the capabilities of the entire Department of Defense,

—DOD's views on naval forces will be transmitted in September 1970, as called for by NSDM 27 (U.S. Military Posture). "Only at that time will we be able to provide the President with a meaningful presentation on U.S. naval forces." The NSSM 50 report is a Navy study with no DOD endorsement. (We asked for a DOD study, not a Navy study.)

What we will get in September 1970, of course, is a coordinated DOD view on naval force requirements for the next five years, not an

[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed.

imaginative study on how and for what purposes the Navy of the future might be designed and what the major problems are. Thus DOD is saying that it is not going to take any responsibility for NSSM 50, period.

There is nothing we can or should do until the answers to the questions come in on January 21. I would like to note, however, that:

—today, the Navy is quite beyond civilian control. Unlike the other two services, the Navy has no intention of subordinating itself to Secretary of Defense leadership and will use every trick in the book to get its way. Relatively speaking, they escaped scott free during the current budget review.

—the Navy is a museum, not a fully effective fighting force. For years they have sacrificed the basic elements of real effectiveness—trained crews, sonobuoys, support ships, spare parts—to keep the maximum number of combatant ships afloat and the maximum number of aircraft in the inventory. (I remember that two years after a new support aircraft had been introduced into the inventory, only 30 percent were operationally ready; they had simply not bought spare parts. At the time they were insisting in the strongest terms that they needed to buy more of these aircraft. The FY 71 budget review has, according to my informants, dramatically compounded such problems.)

—the Navy is increasingly becoming a relic. It is run largely by 57 year old Admirals who haven't had a new idea since their battleships were sunk from under them; they won't have their next new idea until their carriers are sunk from under them. The whole concept of the Navy should be thoughtfully reviewed, but there isn't a prayer of this happening under present DOD leadership.

DPRC

On December 1, September Laird wrote you on the proper role of the DPRC. (See Tab C)[5]

In Secretary Laird's view, the DPRC should,

—analyze the overall economic picture,

—evaluate the sensitivity of our key national goals to higher and lower national spending levels,

—study the optimum allocation of total Federal resources,

—evaluate our basic national security commitments.

The DPRC should *not:*

—assess the programs of individual weapons systems (Safeguard? AMSA? CVAs?)

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[5] Document 89. In a December 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Lynn wrote: "My view is that he [Laird] is trying to get the DPRC off his back and divert you to fighting with Mayo, Treasury, and the Council of Economic Advisers over national priorities and the size of the defense budget. ('Let's you and them fight.')" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 234, DPRC & DEF Budget 1969)

—assess alternative regional force levels (NATO? Korea?) The clear implication is that the DPRC should not review the Defense policy and program NSSM's.

In summary Secretary Laird believes "we should reserve to the DPRC *only* those major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most goals."

His views are preposterous. If you were to do what he suggests, the columnists would be writing that Henry Kissinger is not only Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense but President as well.

More than that, he is proposing a flat rejection of both the spirit and the letter of the NSDM that established the DPRC. (It is interesting to note that only 5 of about 35 NSDMs have been signed by the President himself; the NSDM on the DPRC was one of them; a copy of the NSDM is at Tab D.[6] Not only that, at one NSC meeting the President went on at some length about wanting to put a stop to the bilateral bargaining between BOB and DOD and to the inter-service log rolling.

There are a number of ways to handle the situation:

—You could ignore Laird; as the defense NSSMs, such as the ones on Korea, Thailand, nuclear forces, etc. come up, schedule them for the DPRC, perhaps with a call from you to Laird in each case.

This approach puts Packard in an exposed position. He has already exceeded Laird's guidelines in laying issues before the DPRC. We could regard this as Packard's problem, not ours.

Yes

No

—Call Laird and explain the President's wishes.

Yes

No

—Forward Laird's memo to the President, explain the problem to him, and get a renewed charter from the President which you could transmit to Laird.

Yes

No[7]

Format for DOD's Five Year Force and Program Plan

On October 31 you asked *Packard* to comment on a draft format for DOD's submission of a Five Year Force and Program Plan called for by NSDM 27.

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[6] Document 79.

[7] None of the options is checked.

You also asked for DOD suggestions on a format for showing overseas deployments and military assistance programs and DOD recommendations as to the number and content of the detailed program status tables.

The purposes of the exercise were to give guidance to DOD and to get an interagency discussion of the kinds of information on the Defense program that should be available to senior officials.

Laird replied on 25 November (See Tab E).[8] He said that he wasn't going to comply with the request and to wait and see what he submits in January. This was a simple request. I understand that a somewhat more forthcoming response was proposed for his signature but that it was toughened up in his office. (He says he will use NSDM 27 as a guide, but NSDM is not specific enough to be a guide.)

Here, too, if this were the only problem, we wouldn't have to go to the mat on it. In the context of the other problems, however, noncompliance is significant.

Recommendation

I don't see how you can let this string of rebuffs go unanswered. I recommend that you meet with Laird to resolve the problem or to decide what disagreements should be referred to the President.[9]

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[8] Not printed.

[9] See Document 91.

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91. Editorial Note

On December 11, 1969, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Laird met for breakfast to discuss the Defense Department's role in the National Security Council process and, in particular, the function of the Defense Program Review Committee. No record of their discussion has been found.

Asked by Kissinger to provide talking points, Laurence Lynn, Director of the NSC's Office of Program Analysis, provided notes for discussion that highlighted some of the problems he had discussed in his December 8 memorandum to Kissinger (Document 90). Among his points were the following: 1) "Many in DOD (mainly in Systems Analysis and ISA) appear to attach a low priority to compliance with NSSMs and to cooperation with the interagency groups such as the DPRC and the VSSG. More and more I hear the question, 'Is the President really

interested, or just you?'" 2) "Deputy Assistant Secretary Wu has told me Laird does not intend to have the defense policy and program NSSMs submitted to the DPRC, that this is not his understanding of the DPRC's function. (Wu said to me, 'after all, Laird created the DPRC.')" 3) "The problem, simply, is that OSD is not putting its best efforts—or even at times any effort at all—into responding to the interagency, NSC instigated or led study and analysis efforts. I attribute this to Mel Laird's indifference or outright opposition, to Packard's impatience with interagency studies staffed by 'clerks,' to poor relationships between Packard and Laird, and to incompetence in ISA." (Undated memorandum; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr.)

A set of talking points for Kissinger's breakfast meeting, prepared by an unidentified member of the NSC staff, reads in part:

"1. Main issue is role of DPRC. Key points are:

"—Though the analysis of national priorities and the allocation of total Federal resources should receive top level attention, as Laird suggests, this task is too ambitious for the DPRC; a special staff and much wider agency participation would be required.

"—On the other hand, Laird is quite right in believing that DPRC shouldn't be another 'project manager' for DOD programs. It shouldn't consider which tactical aircraft to buy or how to equip a division.

"—The President's intent was to have an interagency forum to consider those issues with major doctrinal, diplomatic, or economic implications. The President wants State, CIA, BOB, and CEA views considered in the process of reviewing such issues.

"—The DPRC seems to be the most logical forum to review the defense policy and program NSSMs. [Laird has opposed this rather strongly.] The NSSMs typically address issues of Presidential interest with broad implications." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec–31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Brackets in the source text)

92. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 9, 1970.

Dear Henry:

I am writing about the new Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Laos which was launched by your memorandum of December 6, 1969.[2]

Jonathan Moore, who chairs the Group, and I have both felt that there was a need for some mechanism for improving interagency coordination of our actions and programs in Laos. Otherwise there is danger of our examining and making decisions in fragmentary fashion without relating the various pieces which make up the whole in a way that will provide continuing cohesive control over our actions in Laos.

Our earlier practice of examining CIA-related proposals in a private session between State and Agency representatives can be improved upon, particularly by bringing in Defense representation and by enabling more coordinated analytical staff work. I appreciate that the Agency is reluctant to have some of its activities exposed too much, but the Defense Department is considerably more upset to be virtually excluded from deliberations which can affect them in a very material manner. The concept of the new Laos Interagency Group is welcomed by Defense representatives even though it does not go as far as they were proposing, and the Agency representatives on the Group are quite satisfied with its workings thus far. I am convinced that the Group can function in a discreet and controlled fashion.

The more recent guidance we have received from you raises in relevant fashion the relationship of the Ad Hoc Group to higher-level interagency bodies. I have two quick observations on it. First, in order to function effectively, the new Lao Group does require clarification on its relationship to other mechanisms such as the 303 Committee. Second, for the same reason, it needs to have some responsibility for

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. III, 11 Oct 69–31 Jan 70. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] In the memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, the President directed that the group was "to be similar to the Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam in both composition and function" and should perform the following functions: "1. Coordination and assessment of military planning and operations in Laos. 2. Discussion of interdepartmental issues concerning operational developments in Laos and decision on issues which could appropriately be settled by the Ad Hoc Group, with referral to Principals on those which cannot," and determination of a public posture on military developments if required. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 LAOS)

preliminary screening, staffing, and drawing up recommendations. It is obvious that the new group should not try to do the job by itself, but unless it plays a meaningful staffing role it cannot be really useful to higher-level policy bodies, the memberships of which are not in continuous contact with developments and considerations relating to U.S. policy in Laos. Our current feeling is that the new Lao Group should be the core mechanism, monitoring comprehensively Laos developments and being competent to analyze proposals and develop positions on them for forwarding to the most appropriate higher policy body in the given instance.

The current practice of the members of the new Lao Group of keeping their respective principals fully informed and seeking guidance from them is a necessary one which insures better coordination and control. Given this, we feel the group should have the continuing responsibility of determining which matters to refer to higher authority and which parent mechanism is the most appropriate in a given instance. The nature of the decision being examined must be known before we can know which higher-level body is the most appropriate for referral. The WSAG, the 303 Committee, and units of the NSC system itself all have relevance, but being somewhat specialized, none has sole responsibility for formulating policy for Laos and none, it seems to me, can undertake the functions of the new Lao Group as I have described them herein. The 303 Committee, for instance, examines CIA operations, but on a broad conceptual basis rather than an operational one and it carries no strictly military representation.

There may be matters of ultra-sensitivity requiring special handling. Such matters will not be referred to the Group unless you or other higher authorities so direct. If such a matter first comes to the attention of the Chairman of the Group, he, recognizing its sensitivity, will take the initiative to consult you or other higher authority as to the best channel for handling.

I am taking the liberty of making these preliminary comments in this channel because you have been generous enough to invite it and because it has been so useful previously, and in the hope that they will be helpful to you in considering this matter. Perhaps you and I and Jonathan can chat about this when you find time now that you are back in Washington.[3]

Sincerely,

Marshall

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[3] Kissinger responded in a January 14 letter: "I agree fully with the general procedures outlined and especially the view that only major *intelligence* issues be referred to 303." (Ibid.)

93. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Defense Program Review Committee[1]

Washington, January 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Defense Program Review Committee Working Group

Based on our prior discussions and the presentation to us at our last meeting[2] of the draft Fiscal Guidance for the Defense Department, the agenda for the Defense Program Review Committee for the coming months should include:

General issues:

—Analysis of Forces, Threats, and Strategies in Relation to U.S. Overseas Commitments and Policies;
—Analysis of Resources Required for Defense and Relation of Defense Budgets to Civilian Programs and the Economy;
—Review of U.S. General Purposes Forces Postures;
—Review of U.S. Strategic Posture.

Specific issues:

—Future Strategic Role of Manned Bombers;
—Requirements for Aircraft Carriers;
—Continental Air Defense.

These issues, together with any other issues suggested by members of the Committee, will be considered by the DPRC during the period prior to the submission by the Defense Department in September of their Five Year Force and Program Plan for FY 72–76.

It is essential that the Committee have a regular procedure for organizing and preparing for its consideration of these issues. To that end, the President has directed that the Defense Program Review Committee establish a Working Group to assist it in its work.

This Working Group will be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and will include a representative of each regular member of the Committee.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] January 15.

The responsibility of the Working Group will be the preparation, prior to DPRC consideration of an issue, of a paper which will:

—set forth and analyze the issue or problem;
—state with precision any difference of views within the Government and the reasons therefor;
—present the options available to the President, indicating in summary form their advantages and disadvantages.

The Working Group will be responsible for organizing and supervising whatever studies and analyses are required for the preparation of the DPRC papers, drawing on the participating agencies for staff support.

Please let me have the name of your representative on the Working Group by January 23, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

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94. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 20, 1970.

Dear Henry:

You will recall discussions with you, as well as discussions with the President, at which you were present, relating to the participation by the Treasury in national security matters. The President clearly stated that I should participate whenever financial and economic matters are involved. It was pointed out that this was true in most cases—not controlling, of course, but frequently of great importance. Examples of where the Treasury would not participate and I would not be expected to take time, would be those cases where technical discussions of weapon systems or internal operations were concerned.

A year now has passed and Treasury participation has been negligible. It seems to me it has been on a "hit and miss" basis. Occasion-

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Confidential. Kissinger wrote at the top of the first page: "Draft reply. This shouldn't sit for a month. Make some excuse for delay." See Document 14.

ally, I have been invited. Usually it has been at the last minute and with briefing papers furnished just prior to the meeting and frequently without previous participation by Treasury staff. In fact, in some cases Treasury staff has been excluded completely or until positions have been finalized. Yet in a number of cases I could cite, Treasury participation has made a real contribution to the ultimate decision.

Let me give you a few glaring examples that have come to my attention in recent days of where Treasury has been by-passed in the national security process and where we have responsibility and could make a contribution to effective policy.

a. *NSSM 26—U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia.* Clearly, Treasury has responsibility in the Aid program including military assistance. In this paper, however, the omission of Treasury at the Review Committee level was even more obvious since the paper was completely rewritten as a result of Treasury recommendations. At the IG level the basic paper was discussed and the corrections which were largely incorporated in the final draft were a direct result of Treasury participation. Yet Treasury was omitted from the Review Committee Meeting as well as the NSC Meeting itself.

b. *NSSM 51—Policy Toward Thailand* (Program Analysis). Again, a major thrust of this paper was the Aid and military assistance program which Treasury participated in prior to the paper and has subsequently been asked to participate in the subject area. During the course of the NSC procedure we were not asked to take part.

c. *NSSM 60—U.S. Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France.* During the early drafts of the NSC paper, Treasury made direct contributions. At the Review Committee level and also at the NSC Meeting Treasury was not invited.

d. Treasury has recently been asked to participate in a triumvirate task force (State, DOD, and Treasury) on Viet Nam's economic and fiscal policy in which we certainly do have a responsibility. You are well aware of the serious economic and fiscal situation in Viet Nam and its implications upon our policy. Again, however, the various papers dealing with the subject have not included Treasury at any level in the NSC process.

e. *NSSM 46—Spain.* Considerable effort has been expended on this most important paper by Treasury. We have had to clarify our own thinking and position in Treasury which has taken some time but in the process we have helped both State and Defense with their views. Even with this background we were not invited to the NSC Review Committee Meeting and the indications are that we will not be invited to the NSC Meeting itself.

The above are merely current examples and a recent review of the titles of your NSC papers by one of my staff suggests that there are

many policies in which Treasury has a responsibility that are being developed without Treasury participation.

I believe it is time to review the operating procedure of the NSC with respect to Treasury participation. Hopefully, a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out between you and me. If not, I feel that I must see the President on this important problem.[2]

With kind regards,

David M. Kennedy

[2] Following his rejection of a draft reply that was "much too abject," Kissinger responded to Kennedy in a March 12 letter in which he agreed that the record of Treasury's participation in national security affairs provided by Kennedy "leaves much to be desired. While it was not intended to be on a 'hit or miss' basis, it is apparent that at times we have been overzealous in our efforts to comply with the President's desire that NSC meetings be held to the absolute minimum of participants." Kissinger stated further that he had instructed his staff "to carefully review each item on the NSC and Review Groups agendas to ensure that Treasury participation is provided for whenever its interests are involved." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974)

95. Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy by President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 18, 1970.

PART I: THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

If we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come, we had to begin with a basic restructuring of the process by which policy is made.

Our fresh purposes demanded new methods of planning and a more rigorous and systematic process of policymaking. We required a

[1] Source: Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace; A Report to the Congress* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 17–23. Also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970,* pp. 122–126. Nixon's 2nd and 3rd reports to the Congress, dated February 25, 1971, and February 9, 1972, respectively, also included

system which would summon and gather the best ideas, the best analyses and the best information available to the government and the nation.

Efficient procedure does not insure wisdom in the substance of policy. But given the complexity of contemporary choices, adequate procedures are an indispensable component of the act of judgment. I have long believed that the most pressing issues are not necessarily the most fundamental ones; we know that an effective American policy requires clarity of purpose for the future as well as a procedure for dealing with the present. We do not want to exhaust ourselves managing crises; our basic goal is to shape the future.

At the outset, therefore, I directed that the National Security Council be reestablished as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign policy issues. The revitalized Council—composed by statute of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness—and its new system of supporting groups are designed to respond to the requirements of leadership in the 1970's:

—Our policy must be *creative:* foreign policy must mean more than reacting to emergencies; we must fashion a new and positive vision of a peaceful world, and design new policies to achieve it.

—Our policymaking must be *systematic:* our actions must be the products of thorough analysis, forward planning, and deliberate decision. We must master problems before they master us.

—We must know the *facts:* intelligent discussions in the National Security Council and wise decisions require the most reliable information available. Disputes in the government have been caused too often by an incomplete awareness or understanding of the facts.

—We must know the *alternatives:* we must know what our real options are and not simply what compromise has found bureaucratic acceptance. Every view and every alternative must have a fair hearing. Presidential leadership is not the same as ratifying bureaucratic consensus.

—We must be prepared if *crises* occur: we must anticipate crises where possible. If they cannot be prevented, we must plan for dealing with them. All the elements of emergency action, political as well as military, must be related to each other.

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sections on the NSC system: *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building the Peace* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 226–232; and *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 208–212. Also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971,* pp. 341–344; and *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972,* pp. 341–345.

—Finally, we must have effective *implementation:* it does little good to plan intelligently and imaginatively if our decisions are not well carried out.

Creativity: Above all, a foreign policy for the 1970's demands imaginative thought. In a world of onrushing change, we can no longer rest content with familiar ideas or assume that the future will be a projection of the present. If we are to meet both the peril and the opportunity of change, we require a clear and positive vision of the world we seek—and of America's contribution to bringing it about.

As modern bureaucracy has grown, the understanding of change and the formulation of new purposes have become more difficult. Like men, governments find old ways hard to change and new paths difficult to discover.

The mandate I have given to the National Security Council system, and the overriding objective of every policy review undertaken, is to clarify our view of where we want to be in the next three to five years. Only then can we ask, and answer, the question of how to proceed.

In central areas of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policymaking so as to address the broader questions of long-term objectives first; we define our purposes, and then address the specific operational issues. In this manner, for example, the NSC first addressed the basic questions of the rationale and doctrine of our strategic posture, and then considered—in the light of new criteria of strategic sufficiency—our specific weapons programs and our specific policy for the negotiations on strategic arms limitation. We determined that our relationship with Japan for the 1970's and beyond had to be founded on our mutual and increasingly collaborative concern for peace and security in the Far East; we then addressed the issue of Okinawa's status in the light of this fundamental objective.

Systematic Planning: American foreign policy must not be merely the result of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by the pressures of events. If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and deliberate choice. We need a system which forces consideration of problems before they become emergencies, which enables us to make our basic determinations of purpose before being pressed by events, and to mesh policies.

The National Security Council itself met 37 times in 1969, and considered over a score of different major problems of national security. Each Council meeting was the culmination of an interagency process of systematic and comprehensive review.

This is how the process works: I assign an issue to an Interdepartmental Group—chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State—for in-

tensive study, asking it to formulate the policy choices and to analyze the pros and cons of the different courses of action. This group's report is examined by an interagency Review Group of senior officials—chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—to insure that the issues, options, and views are presented fully and fairly. The paper is then presented to me and the full National Security Council.

Some topics requiring specialized knowledge are handled through different channels before reaching the National Security Council. But the purpose is the same—systematic review and analysis, bringing together all the agencies concerned:

—The major issues of defense policy are treated in systematic and integrated fashion by the NSC Defense Program Review Committee. This group reviews at the Under Secretary level the major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic, and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities.

—Through other NSC interagency groups, the United States Government has undertaken its first substantial effort to review all its resource programs within certain countries on a systematic and integrated basis, instead of haphazardly and piecemeal.

Determination of the Facts: Intelligent discussions and decisions at the highest level demand the fullest possible information. Too often in the past, the process of policymaking has been impaired or distorted by incomplete information and by disputes in the government which resulted from the lack of a common appreciation of the facts. It is an essential function of the NSC system, therefore, to bring together all the agencies of the government concerned with foreign affairs to elicit, assess, and present to me and the Council all the pertinent knowledge available.

Normally, NSC Interdepartmental Groups are assigned this task. But other interagency groups perform this function for certain special topics. For example:

—The Verification Panel was formed to gather the essential facts relating to a number of important issues of strategic arms limitation, such as Soviet strategic capabilities, and our potential means of verifying compliance with various possible agreements. This Panel was designed not to induce agreement on policy views, but to establish as firmly as possible the *data* on which to base policy discussions. It helped to resolve many major policy differences which might otherwise have been intractable. As the section on Arms Control in this report explains in detail, the Panel played a central part in making our preparation for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union the most thorough in which the U.S. Government has ever engaged.

—The Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) gathers and presents to the highest levels of the United States Government the fullest

and most up-to-date information on trends and conditions in the countryside in Vietnam. This group is of key assistance in our major and sustained effort to understand the factors which will determine the course of Vietnamization.

Full Range of Options: I do not believe that Presidential leadership consists merely in ratifying a consensus reached among departments and agencies. The President bears the Constitutional responsibility of making the judgments and decisions that form our policy.

The new NSC system is designed to make certain that clear policy choices reach the top, so that the various positions can be fully debated in the meeting of the Council. Differences of view are identified and defended, rather than muted or buried. I refuse to be confronted with a bureaucratic consensus that leaves me no options but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist.

The NSC system also insures that all agencies and departments receive a fair hearing before I make my decisions. All departments concerned with a problem participate on the groups that draft and review the policy papers. They know that their positions and arguments will reach the Council without dilution, along with the other alternatives. Council meetings are not rubber-stamp sessions. And as my decisions are reached they are circulated in writing, so that all departments concerned are fully informed of our policy, and so that implementation can be monitored.

Crisis Planning: Some events in the world over which we have little control may produce crises that we cannot prevent, even though our systematized study forewarns us of their possibility. But we can be the masters of events when crises occur, to the extent that we are able to prepare ourselves in advance.

For this purpose, we created within the NSC system a special senior panel known as the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). This group drafts contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. The action responsibilities of the departments of the Government are planned in detail, and specific responsibilities assigned in an agreed time sequence in advance. While no one can anticipate exactly the timing and course of a possible crisis, the WSAG's planning helps insure that we have asked the right questions in advance, and thought through the implications of various responses.

Policy Implementation: The variety and complexity of foreign policy issues in today's world places an enormous premium on the effective implementation of policy. Just as our policies are shaped and our programs formed through a constant process of interagency discussion and debate within the NSC framework, so the implementation of our major policies needs review and coordination on a continuing basis.

This is done by an interdepartmental committee at the Under Secretary level chaired by the Under Secretary of State.

Conclusions

There is no textbook prescription for organizing the machinery of policymaking, and no procedural formula for making wise decisions. The policies of this Administration will be judged on their results, not on how methodically they were made.

The NSC system is meant to help us address the fundamental issues, clarify our basic purposes, examine all alternatives, and plan intelligent actions. It is meant to promote the thoroughness and deliberation which are essential for an effective American foreign policy. It gives us the means to bring to bear the best foresight and insight of which the nation is capable.

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96. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 21, 1970.

Henry:

Per your instructions, I have prepared a memorandum for you including talking points for your use in your meeting with the President tomorrow.[2] I have pondered this most difficult of problems at great length this weekend and have concluded that you should not raise this issue in either the terms I have outlined or in any other terms unless you have in your own mind definitely decided to leave Government without any qualms or reservations. In my view, there is no way to pose a set of alternatives to the President along the lines outlined which will not ultimately result in your departure. As I told you earlier, I believe the President will pay any price to keep you happy and on board, but only at the expense of a bill which he will collect on later and probably to your disadvantage.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig wrote in hand at the top of the first page: "my file only; get all other copies Laura has."

[2] The attached memorandum is printed but not the talking points.

I am confident that the President has been completely aware of your problems with Rogers, perhaps to a greater degree than you realize. If you are to hit him with the hard alternative now, it should not be with the view toward achieving a temporary victory which will ultimately deteriorate, but rather with the view toward providing him with notice that you intend to leave as soon as it can be conveniently managed.

I recognize the risks that your continuation in this job will pose for you personally and even for the country in the long run; however, I also believe that the overriding consideration is our country's current need for the kind of counsel and advice that only you have been able to provide in the present structure of things. Thus, after careful thought, I am against your taking this course of action now.

Al

Attachment

Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Discussion with the President on Relationships with Secretary Rogers and the Department of State

General

Attached is a brief talking paper which represents my best judgment on the tack and rationale you should employ in your discussion with the President on Sunday, February 22, dealing with your relationships with Secretary Rogers. As you know, I do not believe that you will want to permit the discussion to deteriorate into a bleeding litany of the almost incredible record of poor cooperation, intentional violations of Presidential instructions and, on occasion, deliberate deceit. Nor do I think you will wish to press too strongly on the difficulties you have experienced because of what appears to be a direct confrontation between you and Secretary Rogers with the parallel and increasing efforts by the Secretary and his staff to manipulate an anti-Kissinger press campaign. Rather, I believe you will wish to present to the President a calm, deliberate but unshakeable decision on your part to leave the Administration if the President, for whatever reasons, is unwilling to provide you with the kind of direct support essential to a clear-cut and effective working relationship between you, the Secretary of State and his Department.

Particulars

The history of Secretary Rogers' uncooperative attitude with respect to the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is lengthy and tragic and includes documented accounts of poor faith in the following major areas:

a. State's uncoordinated and unauthorized policy actions with regard to SALT talks and the preparations therefor.

b. State's abrogations of the Colorado Springs directive of September 1, 1969.[3]

c. State's unresponsive and frequently hostile performance with regard to such major policy issues as the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

d. State's systematic efforts to erode Presidential policy decisions on the concept of linkage and, in the early days, Presidential efforts to hold the line on Vietnam issues.

e. The recent imbroglios with State involving the visit of Prime Minister Palme, the handling of the Symington Subcommittee Hearings (which, incidentally, can best be attested to by John Ehrlichman who was the President's principal staff agent and who witnessed firsthand Secretary Rogers' direct refusal to comply with instructions from the White House), the policy study on France, the issue of Nigerian relief, and finally and perhaps most importantly, the near fiasco resulting from State's lack of coordination in the preparation of the President's Annual Review of U.S. Foreign Policy.[4]

Discussion

The bill of particulars concerning our problems with the Department of State in general, and Secretary Rogers in particular, is awesome, detailed and thoroughly documented by you. It would be naive to believe that the President is not thoroughly familiar with the problems you have been having with Secretary Rogers and, while I believe he has been uniformly in your corner, there have been continuing manifestations of an unwillingness on his part to draw the line in a direct and unequivocal fashion with the Secretary himself. The result of this has only contributed to Rogers' inclination and perhaps growing determination to do you in with a jugular fight. His disappointment over the public setback associated with the Annual Review cannot but, in my opinion, add to this determination and raise the risks of even more serious confrontations in the near future. For this reason, I believe it is essential that you measuredly lay the situation before the President while avoiding the bill of particulars which is available to him at any time if he feels it necessary to review it, and that you do so in a fashion which would leave absolutely no uncertainty in the President's

[3] Document 70.

[4] See Document 95.

mind as to your determination to leave Government rather than to continue with a situation which cannot but pose the most serious risks to the national interest, if not to the future effectiveness of the President's authority within the bureaucracy.

Recommendation

That you draw from the attached talking points in a discussion with the President on your relationships with the Secretary of State, the discussion to be held prior to the return of the Secretary on February 23.[5]

[5] According to the President's Daily Diary, Kissinger had lunch and met with Nixon at Camp David from noon to 3:15 p.m. on Sunday, February 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Haldeman recorded in his diary entry for February 23: "K back from his journey Saturday night. Reported to P Sunday at Camp David. Is pretty pleased, feels made a start towards some real progress. Long talks and he was (he says) very tough." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

97. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 26, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee Working Group Procedures

I have designated Dr. Laurence E. Lynn as my representative to, and chairman of, the Working Group.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget—1970—Vol. I. Secret.

These procedures will govern the functions of the Working Group:

—The DPRC, normally after receiving a proposal or presentation from the Defense Department will identify issues requiring further consideration and will refer them to the Working Group.

—The Working Group will assign the agency most concerned, usually the Department of Defense, or, if appropriate, an interagency team, the task of preparing an initial paper. For example, the Defense Department Representative would normally prepare papers on issues involving force levels or weapons systems, analyzing the issue and setting forth the DOD position, or the alternatives among which it recommends that choice be made.

—The Working Group will then review the paper for completeness, adequate presentation of differing views, and inclusion of an adequate range of alternatives.

—After necessary revisions, the paper will be forwarded to the DPRC for discussion.[2]

Henry A. Kissinger

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[2] The first meeting of the DPRC Working Group took place on March 4. Lynn's March 3 briefing memorandum for DPRC members is at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–101, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC Working Group Meetings. A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Laird on March 12, 1970, at 10:25 a.m. begins as follows:

"K: The DPRC went very well. I want to make one thing clear to you Mel. I am not going to get involved in the individual weapons systems. I am not going to get into your business on this.

"L: I understand. I just wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding.

"K: And the way Dave [Packard] handled it was just what we had in mind.

"L: Good." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcon), Box 1, Chronological File.)

98. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)

I believe that we should carefully reconsider the role of the DPRC. Your memoranda of January 19 and February 26, 1970[2] indicate that we do not share the same views on this subject. I hope we can fully agree on this issue, because I believe that the DPRC should, and can, fulfill a critical function which is not being, and which has never been, performed.

The primary concern of the DPRC should be the allocation of resources within our economy. The studies would include the allocations between the public and private sectors, within the public sector, and between defense and other Federal programs.

In considering this problem of overall resource allocation, the DPRC should examine the following types of questions:

1. *The resources available for defense.* This would include studying the total level of overall resources, the availability of resources to the public sector, and allocations within the public sector between defense and other needs.
2. *Our national security objectives and strategy.* We need a better understanding of the implications of our current strategy in terms of the broad tasks to be accomplished.
3. *The relationships among goals, resource availability and policy.* To meet national security goals, while striving for other public sector objectives, may require fiscal, monetary, and debt policies—even to include controls—that constitute diminution of other national goals. We should consider the trade-offs, for example, among national security, price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and the absence of controls.
4. *The foreign policy implications of defense actions.* If we cannot meet all obligations within reasonable terms, a variable in our studies should be reformulation of US interests and commitments.

As you note in your memoranda, DOD will normally be the agency most concerned with the issues before the DPRC. Under your proposed

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Confidential.

[2] Documents 93 and 97.

procedure, the Working Group would thus usually be referring its work to DOD. Given this situation, I believe it is essential that a DPRC Working Group be chaired by someone within DOD, that is, if the Working Group is to be maintained. I would designate my Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Dr. Gardiner Tucker, to direct such DPRC Staff work.

Melvin R. Laird[3]

[3] Printed from a copy that indicates Laird signed the original.

99. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) Working Group Procedures

As I am indicating in a separate memorandum to you,[2] I am concerned about the role and utilization of the DPRC. It appears the DPRC may not be addressing the major and critical task for which it was established. Rather, the DPRC appears to be addressing other issues—of importance, to be sure—but for which other institutional arrangements for resolution already exist.

We agree, presumably, there is inadequate analysis of the distribution of resources within the public sector. The following outline illustrates, using Defense as an example, the chain of allocation decisions which must be made:

Sector and Optimization Level

1. Overall US Economy—Consumer vs. Business vs. Gvt Uses
2. Within Government Sector—Federal vs. State vs. Local
3. Among Federal Govt Uses—Defense vs. HEW vs. Trnsp, etc.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Confidential.

[2] Document 98.

4. Within Defense—Strategic vs. GenPurp vs. R&D, etc.

5. Within a Given Def Use—ICBMs vs. SLBMs vs. Bombers

6. Within a Given System—MinMan vs. Titan, vs. Other

7. Within a Particular Weapon—Warhead vs. Guidance vs. Pen Aids, etc.

The DPRC should, in my judgment, address the optimizations at the first three levels, as outlined above. We have existing and appropriate arrangements for considering the lower-level optimizations. (I will soon forward to you a proposed DPRC agenda for the next six months.) Given those fundamentals, I believe it is desirable to reassess the role and mechanics of a DPRC Working Group. It is not clear a Working Group, in a formal sense, would be needed.

As you note in your memoranda, DOD will normally be the agency most concerned with the issues before the DPRC. Under your proposed procedure, the Working Group would thus usually be referring its work to DOD. Given this situation, I believe it is essential that a DPRC Working Group be chaired by someone within DOD, that is, if the Working Group is to be maintained. I would designate my Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Dr. Gardiner Tucker, to direct such DPRC Staff work.

Melvin R. Laird

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100. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 14, 1970.

Henry:

Attached on the right flap is Lynn's comprehensive analysis of the future work of the DPRC.[2] On the left flap are two memoranda just received from Secretary Laird[3] which in my view constitute a major assault on the approach we are currently using for DPRC work. Laird in

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger, March 13; not printed.

[3] Documents 98 and 99.

effect is stating keep out of force structure and force program decisions and focus your attention on the allocation of national resources for defense and competing enterprises, sort out major doctrinal and strategic issues and I will worry about individual programs.

As I told you earlier, I think Laird is more right than we are, and that in a gut fight it will be difficult to muster support for the individual program approach. What has to be done is to clearly enunciate the cut-off point by a detailed discussion of how individual programs and force structure dictates the larger questions and therefore why there must be some minimum investigation of costly programs and force structure as preliminary work before addressing the larger questions.

I am convinced that Secretary Laird would not have written these two memoranda, the language of which has been very carefully chosen, if he did not intend to go to the mat with you on this issue. I know that although this may be distasteful to you, you want my best judgment. Personally, I think you are on very weak ground for two reasons. One is in principle Laird is more correct than we are. The second reason is because we have apparently failed to communicate with him on the entire issue. By this, I mean he does not understand because we have failed to convince him that certain costly programs must be investigated by the DPRC as the building blocks to the more important discussions on resource allocation at the highest level. I would suggest that you meet with Secretary Laird at the first opportunity and arrive at a more acceptable solution rather than to continue to add to the kind of tensions which must have spawned these two memoranda. As I told you earlier, I am also concerned that we have not looked at the very questions that Laird is asking us to solve nor have we given him a sympathetic reception when he has raised them. For better or worse, I believe that our domestic spending has been totally out of balance with our security spending and that this is the responsibility of your office to rectify it. If the President were to overrule that judgment, then his actions should be based on consideration of all the facts none of which have been brought to his attention to the best of my knowledge.

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101. Editorial Note

On March 26, 1970, Laurence Lynn, Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council, drafted a memorandum to the President from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry

Kissinger explaining Kissinger's disagreement with Secretary of Defense Laird concerning the role of the Defense Program Review Committee. The memorandum reads in part as follows:

"The Issues

"Secretary Laird and I are in complete agreement on four issues:

"—We both believe that systematic analysis of the proper size and allocation of the Federal budget is badly needed and would be of great assistance to you in your budget planning.

"—We (and Budget Bureau officials as well) agree that the process whereby major domestic program decisions are made throughout the year, whereas the DOD budget is reviewed only near the end of the budget cycle, may put DOD at a distinct disadvantage: if new domestic program initiatives taken during the year cause your spending commitments to exceed projected revenue by the time DOD's budget comes to your attention, DOD may be forced to take disproportionate cuts in its budget to bring total spending and revenues into balance.

"—We agree that the DPRC should analyze alternative DOD budget levels in the light of their impact on spending for domestic programs, on our ability to fulfill our obligations and commitments, and on the overall capabilities of our military posture. Studies to accomplish these objectives are already underway.

"—We agree that the DPRC should not become involved in detailed program management or weapons design issues.

"Our disagreements are as follows:

"—I do not believe that the DPRC—the primary function of which, as I understand it, is to insure balanced and comprehensive analysis of major Defense policy and program issues—should concern itself with analyzing the size and scope of government activities, the proper level of Federal spending and the allocation of the Federal budget among DOD and other agencies. The DPRC is not constituted for these tasks, as it lacks non-defense agency representation, and I question whether it would be appropriate for me to oversee this work.

"However, at such time as your Domestic Policy Council is in a position to undertake an analytical presentation of domestic program 'strategies' and their costs, we could join forces with them and discuss the larger questions Secretary Laird raises with the entire Cabinet. I see no intellectual obstacles to achieving this within six months.

"—I believe that, in addition to analyzing our national security objectives, strategies and overall budgets the DPRC must analyze major DOD policy and program issues well in advance of the final budget review.

"We cannot analyze the size of the DOD budget in the abstract. It must be done in the context of specific threats to our security and our

interests, capabilities required to meet these threats at various levels of risk, and the implications for defense and non-defense spending of implementing any particular alternative.

"For example, in my January 19, 1969 [*1970*], memorandum [Document 93] to which Secretary Laird is responding, I suggested a work program as follows:

"—Analysis of forces, threats and strategies in relation to U.S. overseas commitments and policies,
"—Analysis of resources required for defense and relation of defense budgets to civilian programs and the economy.

"(Secretary Laird and I are in agreement on the need for these first two studies, and they are underway.)

"—review of U.S. general purpose forces posture;
"—review of U.S. strategic posture;
"—future strategic role of manned bombers;
"—requirements for aircraft carriers;
"—continental air defense.

"In addition, the State Department has proposed a study of our overall base structure in East Asia.

"In my judgment, if such analyses could be completed and reviewed by you during the next three or four months, you could indicate your decisions and priorities to both DOD and the Budget Bureau well in advance of the final budget review and foreclose the necessity of making most major decisions at the last minute without knowledge of their implications.

"Moreover, Secretary Laird would no longer be at the 'end of the line' when the final budget review took place.

"Equally important, you would have a much better opportunity to shape our defense posture in accordance with your thinking rather than having the posture reflect compromises struck among three competing Military Services." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970.)

Lynn forwarded the draft memorandum to Kissinger together with a draft memorandum from the President to the Chairman of the DPRC (Kissinger) stating Kissinger's view of the DPRC's role and directing that a series of studies be done. Kissinger decided not to send the former to the President but forwarded the latter to him under cover of a March 30 memorandum. The President signed it on April 2 (Document 102).

102. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the Defense Program Review Committee (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 2, 1970.

This year, I would like to review major defense policy and program issues when the Defense program is still in its formative stages, well in advance of the final review of the Defense Department's budget in December.

I would like the Defense Program Review Committee to assist me in this review by undertaking immediately a series of studies on our military posture and forwarding the results to me over the next six months.

I would like this review to cover the following subjects:

—a definition and analysis of our overall strategy for general purpose and theater nuclear forces in relation to the threats we face and to our interests and commitments:

—the availability of funds for defense and non-defense programs over the next five years and potential trade-offs between defense and non-defense expenditures;

—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our general purpose forces in relation to specific military threats, in particular Army and Marine Corps land forces, carrier-based and land-based tactical air forces, and anti-submarine warfare forces;

—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our strategic nuclear forces in relation to the Soviet and Chinese threats and to our criteria for strategic sufficiency, including analysis of U.S. requirements for a manned bomber and for continental air defense forces;

—an analysis of our overall concept and programs for military research and development in relation to projected requirements for new weapon systems.

Would you please have the Defense Program Review Committee prepare terms of reference and a schedule of completion for these studies and forward them to me for my review by April 10, 1970.

Richard Nixon

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lynn and forwarded to the President for his signature by Kissinger on March 30. (Ibid.)

103. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff and William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

The NSC System

You asked for recommendations on how the system can be strengthened and made to work more effectively. The following recommendations, none of which involves *major* changes, in our judgment would in the aggregate move in the direction you want.

The NSC Structure and Agency Relationships

The Review Group would be strengthened if it were clearly understood that more of the papers will be referred directly from the Review Group by memorandum to the President for decision. This is the way the process has been working to an increasing extent.

The system is suffering an overload. Many of the papers neither warrant nor need a full NSC meeting as a prelude to Presidential decision. Given the number of *major* issues which will require full NSC consideration and the President's wish to limit the number of such meetings, more of the burden must fall on the Review Group.

But the Review Group was not constituted originally to consider the substantive merits of options presented, or to reach a decision on which option should be pursued. At several recent meetings, State, Defense and JCS representatives have made it clear that they are not empowered to state the positions of their agencies. Their role has been to assure that a full range of options is presented and that each is argued fairly and completely.

To stimulate the discussion and advocacy you seek from the Review Group, the members could be asked to present agency viewpoints on the issues and options. The Review Group's charter requires it to assure that "all department and agency views are fairly and adequately

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Offices Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/3/70–4/27/71. No classification marking. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Watts and Jeanne Davis. An attached handwritten note from DRY [David Young] to Haig asks: "Do you want me to keep this for Tue & Thur mtg?" Haig wrote on the note, "Yes."

set out." In this context the Review Group members could be asked either:

—to present the views of their respective agencies at the meeting when the paper is discussed, *or*

—as you have required on a number of occasions, to present a formal statement of Agency views and recommendations when the paper is returned after redrafting in accordance with Review Group instructions.

We recommend the first course. If this course is to be followed, it need only be announced at a Review Group meeting that this procedure will be observed.

—Discussion will be stimulated and issues clearly exposed if each agency representative is required at the meeting to give his agency's recommendation as to whether the subject and the paper need be brought before the full NSC and, if not, to state his agency's viewpoint on the substantive issues and options.

—The Review Group members will have to seek agreement from their principals in detail. The flexibility of the Review Group members consequently will be limited, but the issues will be exposed and addressed substantively.

The two courses are not mutually exclusive. If discussion focuses issues more clearly, a redraft of the paper may be needed. Agency views then can be included with the resubmission.

The Use of the IGs

You have rightly observed that in most instances IG papers have been considerably less than first class. The IGs, however, have much to offer in the way of expertise. They also, in the final analysis, will shape the specifics of day-to-day implementation of decisions. For these reasons they should be brought more directly into the process rather than being progressively excluded.

There is another important reason for enhancing the IG-Review Group mechanism and making it work. Participation by the principal agencies in the actual formulation and drafting of issues and options is an essential ingredient of the system.

—Without this participation, the Department of State will dominate the process of issue formulation subject only to the check-rein of the NSC staff. Increasingly, the NSC staff will be forced into open opposition to State to maintain the integrity of the policy formulation process. The NSC staff will have to play devil's advocate for other interested agencies as well as to play its role of objective evaluation.

—Over-reliance on ad hoc arrangements, in which one or another agency does not fully participate, will generate growing resistance to the system and increasing isolation of the NSC staff. It will make man-

agement of implementation of decisions more and more difficult and we will face an increasing problem of clearing cables as a means of policy control. As a practical matter, some papers, ostensibly prepared by ad hoc groups chaired by State, actually are prepared in the IG framework.

—The following steps should be taken to improve the quality of IG papers:

1. *Participation by the NSC Staff.* Each IG includes a senior NSC Staff member. He knows both the quality and manner of presentation which is wanted and he should carry the burden of guiding the drafting group to bring forth the desired product.

—The NSC Planner should assist him during the draft phase with comments and recommendations both as to substance and manner of presentation.

—The Policy and Coordination Staff of the Department of State (Cargo) oversees the work of the IG Chairmen and also should be in a position to influence significantly the quality of the paper. The NSC Planner should maintain a close working relationship with State Planning and Coordination Staff to this end.

2. *Return Unsatisfactory Papers.* An IG paper which does not meet acceptable substance and presentation standards should be returned for redraft before the Review Group is asked to consider it. The Review Group should not be forced to address papers which are grossly inadequate. If this were done with a rigidly enforced tight deadline, the departmental coordination staffs and the IGs themselves would respond.

The Management and Discipline of the System

The emphasis, of course, must be on the intellectual approach to the substantive issues at hand. But this can be helped or hindered by the management and administration of the system itself. The agencies for the most part have overcome the administrative headaches which they experienced in the first few months—they are prepared to respond.

—*Scheduling* has become a major problem. Adjustments will be required but they can and should be held to a minimum. The NSC Planner, Staff Secretary and the Director of the Secretariat should work closely with the operators to coordinate the order of presentation and consideration of papers and to assure that related subjects subjects have been arrayed and scheduled in the most meaningful way. Events external to the NSC system which affect the timing of the decision-making process must be taken into account. Schedules when set should be adhered to as closely as possible. You should meet bi-weekly with the NSC Planner, the Staff Secretary and the Director of the Secretariat to discuss scheduling.

—*Due dates* for papers to be submitted to the Review Group should take into account (1) timing of the need for decision, (2) the length of

time reasonably required for preparation of a quality paper, and (3) the scheduled date for consideration of the paper by the Review Group (the submission date should be at least two weeks before the scheduled Review Group meeting on the paper).

—Once set, due dates and schedule should be adhered to—the agencies should know what is required of them and when it is required. The Director of the Secretariat should stay in close touch with the IG Staff Directors and Cargo's Policy and Coordination Staff on these matters.

—*NSSMs* should be carefully reviewed before they are issued to assure that the right questions are being asked of the right people.

—The Staff Secretary/Director of Secretariat should assure that before submission for approval, every NSSM has been reviewed by the NSC operators concerned and the NSC Planner to be certain that (1) the subject for study has been so delineated that the basic issues will be surfaced and addressed, (2) the relationship of the NSSM with all others on related subjects is clear, and (3) the due date proposed for submission is realistic in terms of the complexity of the problem, the timing of decision and the schedule for consideration. The *need* for a NSSM should be clearly demonstrated in a memorandum requesting its approval.

—The substance of the proposed NSSM should be discussed informally with the IG members representing the agencies principally concerned and with State's Planning and Coordination Staff before being submitted for final approval. The participants in the study (1) will have something to contribute to sharpen and focus the study request and (2) will understand more clearly at the outset what is needed.

—*Follow-Up Actions*

—*Review Group Follow-up*

—Review Group consideration of a paper invariably requires some redrafting either for matters of substance or manner of presentation. Immediately following the Review Group meeting, the NSC operator, the NSC Planner, Director of Secretariat and the representative of the Department charged with the redraft (usually State) should meet to clearly identify the redrafting instructions and the date for submission. This should be followed by a memorandum from the Director of Secretariat to the Review Group members confirming the Review Group requirements.

—*NSC Meeting Follow Up* (Applicable also to Presidential Decision based on Memorandum submission).

—A draft NSDM should be prepared before the NSC meeting based upon the recommendations contained in your Memorandum for the President and the Issues for Decision paper. If the paper is to be submitted for decision by memorandum, the draft NSDM should accompany the recommendations for the President's consideration.

—Immediately following the NSC meeting, the Staff Secretary, operators concerned, the NSC Planner, and Director of Secretariat should meet for a debrief of the meeting and assignment of tasks resulting from it. The draft NSDM should be reviewed in light of the discussion at the NSC meeting.

—The draft NSDM revised as necessary should be prepared for submission to the President for approval and issuance.

—Every NSDM should require a report by the *Under Secretaries' Committee* of the actions taken to implement the decision—date for submission of the USC report will be determined by the nature of the implementing actions or programs required.

The Under Secretaries' Committee

Senior NSC Staff Members frequently attend meetings of the USC representing you. They should be armed with your guidance. A memorandum should be submitted prior to the meeting stating the issues to be discussed and recommended positions to be taken by the NSC Staff Member as a means of obtaining that guidance.

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104. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with Elliot Richardson at Luncheon Meeting, Wednesday, April 15, 1970

1. Raise the issue posed by the joint State–Defense message (Enclosure #1, Tab A)[2] on European Security which we received late yesterday afternoon for clearance after approval by Secretary Rogers. This action constitutes a most serious challenge to the President's established

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings April–May 1970. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. In the right-hand margin near the top of the first page: Kissinger wrote: "1. Development of a Reduction plan for IRBM. 2. Elaboration of on-site inspection proposal. 3. Limits on size of mobile IRBM's."

[2] At Tab A is an April 14 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger which asserts that "State has sent for clearance a massive cable giving the coordinated State, Defense, ACDA views on several major questions: our approach to an ESC [European Security Conference]; how to handle MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], and the question of East-West cooperation. The cable effectively preempts most of the questions and decisions contained in the NSSM 83 study which the Review Group is to consider on Thursday and the NSC on April 29." (Ibid.) NSSM 83, "U.S. Approach to European Security Issues," November 21, 1969, and follow-up studies are ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–166, National Security Study Memoranda.

system for handling policy issues within the National Security Council system. The fact that two Cabinet officers would join in imposing the White House with a locked policy paper of this type is absolutely unacceptable. In this instance it is especially bad because State was completely aware of ongoing actions within the NSC system designed to address the issues explicitly covered in the message. We had, in fact, even gone so far as to move the date of the Review Group consideration of these problems forward to assist State's time problem. An additional and perhaps more troublesome feature is that State has gotten Defense to go along with them on fundamental policy issues which have not been considered appropriately within the NSC framework and which may be completely at odds with what the President wants. In effect, dispatch of this message would cause us to scrap NSSM 83. I recommend that you ask Elliot to speak with the Secretary in order to have this message considered in the Review Group on Thursday.[3] Hal Sonnenfeldt assures me that this would provide adequate time to meet Ellsworth's requirements. An additional nettling fact about this operation is the extensive interdepartmental coordination that was done without the responsible authors at State having had the courtesy of notifying our staff that the exercise was under way.[4] These are the kinds of action which shatter what have been up to now improving State-NSC relationships. I believe you should pull no punches in informing Elliot of this problem.[5]

I have discussed this with Mr. Richardson:

Yes

No

Comments:[6]

[Omitted here are items #2–#12.]

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[3] April 16.

[4] In the left margin next to this and the following sentence, Kissinger wrote: "similarly State Defense on ME."

[5] No record of the Kissinger–Richardson luncheon discussion has been found.

[6] Neither option is marked and nothing is written after "Comments."

105. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Treasury's Special Assistant (Jurich) to the President's Counselor (Harlow)[1]

Washington, April 16, 1970.

Just a thought for you to consider. In order to help the national security situation here in the White House, would it be possible to strengthen the Vice President's position.

At this time he does not have any staff members that participate in the process, as I understand it. He does attend the NSC meetings but is not sufficiently briefed to make significant contributions.

I also understand that he does not have a representative on the domestic council. This, too, could be strengthened.

Perhaps an addition to the Vice President's staff is not feasible, or you may feel it would not be a place to make a major contribution. I'll let you be the judge.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 6–6. No classification marking. Anthony J. Jurich was Secretary Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The memorandum is written on paper with no letterhead. On April 24 Harlow wrote the following note at the top of the memorandum: "Stan Blair—Please call me re this—Brice Harlow"

106. Draft Letter From W. Anthony Lake and Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, undated.

Dear Henry:

With this letter we submit our resignations from the NSC staff effective _____. We do so with regret and upon long reflection.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Lake Chron, Box 1047, Tony Lake Chron File [Jun. 1969–May 1970] Personal; Eyes Only. The letter is unsigned and was not sent. In a much briefer version of the resignation letter, sent to Kissinger on April 29, Lake and Morris spoke of their "grave reservations about the value of using U.S. troops in Cambodia" and their "increasing alienation" from the administration that predated and went beyond the Cambodian problem, but they did not explain their disaffection in any greater detail. (Ibid.)

In view of the closeness and apparent mutual respect of our working relations in the past, we naturally want to be completely honest in describing the reasons for our resignations. They involve some very strong feelings about this Administration. As we have said before, we sympathize with your difficult position and the pressures you are under, and do not intend this letter as an attack on you personally. But the strength of our feelings requires our writing this.

We are leaving the staff in order to take positions at _____[2] in which we hope to make a contribution in an area of need. Yet we leave at this time only after judging that this is possible without seriously embarrassing you or placing an undue burden of work on other members of the staff.

As we told you in February, we find ourselves increasing alienated by the domestic and many of the foreign policies of this Administration. Because of our continuing personal loyalty to you and what you are trying to do, however, we have no desire for our resignations to become even a minor public issue.

We do indeed believe, as the Annual Review suggests, that a new era requires a new quality of leadership. It demands above all an understanding of urgent needs in America and abroad and a commitment to meet them. We have found neither. We have often heard courage equated with standing up to criticism. But it is not enough to dismiss the critics for their motives or manliness, nor to ridicule them with the catch phrases of the Right.

We think real courage means recognizing the validity of the problems, however they are raised, and leading an effort to resolve them. We think Presidential politics should be the means to that end and not, as we see it practiced now, an end in itself through obsession with public relations.

From past discussions you are aware of the nature of our specific disagreement with a number of the Administration's foreign policies, particularly with regard to Southeast Asia. We must also say that we are appalled by the attitudes of leaders in this Administration on racial issues, and their cynical approach to other domestic problems which demand immediate redress rather than political maneuver.

Moreover, we are deeply disturbed by the process of policy making as well as the policies themselves. While we continue to have the highest respect for your intellect and what you are trying to accomplish in forging a rational and disciplined means of making foreign policy, it is equally clear to us that you have not and will not be able to accomplish this goal single-handedly. Under the best of circum-

[2] Omission in the source text.

stances, this would have been an enormous job in this Administration. In any case, it would have required a genuine joint effort by you and a closely-knit staff acting for you, with and in your full confidence. But we think they can only act effectively for you if you share with them what it is that you are trying to accomplish and the information you hold, trusting them and giving them support.

Finally, our disagreement with the Administration's approach to foreign and domestic problems is compounded by its working atmosphere. Relations among the highest officials establish the atmosphere for the whole government. We have both worked for senior officials in the Johnson Administration. Whatever that Administration's faults, we were left unprepared for the atmosphere of suspicion, manipulation and malice which we have seen over the past year. Working this near the center of power should be, we believe, an exciting and, in some measure, gratifying experience. Instead, we have been increasingly depressed by it.

During our time on the staff, we have always made an honest effort to act in your interests, even when they may have been costly either in terms of our relations elsewhere in the government or through conflict with our own personal or intellectual preferences. We hope you will accept this letter for what it is: the candor which you would expect and which our personal regard for you required.

Sincerely,[3]

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[3] Following the departures of Lake and Morris from the NSC (Halperin also resigned as an NSC consultant in May), Kissinger opened the NSC staff meeting on June 15 with the following comments on the NSC system:

"Dr. Kissinger noted the departure from the norm of the last few weeks, acknowledged the extra burdens which had been placed on some staff members, and said we should now return to the regular pattern. He stressed the necessity of cranking up the NSC system and said he would discuss this with Col. Kennedy. He also noted there would be new staff members. He emphasized that NSC staff members cannot be spokesmen of the bureaucracy—they are spokesmen only of the President and must carry out both the letter and the spirit of the President's intentions. The President must have available to him every significant point of view, but once his decision has been made, the staff must see to it that it is carried out. The staff must stay conceptually ahead of the bureaucracy, must ask the questions that no one else is asking. We cannot be ratifiers of the bureaucratic process. He thought in the areas where we had taken the lead, such as SALT, we had been successful and had served the President well." (Memorandum for the Record by Jeanne W. Davis, June 16; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71)

107. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Production Activities of the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG)

1. Ever since its inception in September 1969, I have followed the activities of the VSSG and its associated Working Group with close personal interest. This continuing interest in the activities of the Working Group and its panels is a direct reflection of the importance I attach to providing the President with the best intelligence possible on the status of Vietnamization and other topics pertinent to his continuing concern for matters bearing on Vietnam policy decisions.

2. The intelligence product submitted to the VSSG so far reflects an impressive amount of innovative analysis and hard work on the part of all concerned. The subjects analyzed—security in the countryside and the enemy's manpower capabilities—include some of the fundamental factors that will greatly affect the eventual outcome of the struggle and will shape the climate within which decisions must be made. As you are well aware, these papers presented some highly usable and frank evaluations of the situation in Vietnam. They will be of great value over the next few months and, in concert with other papers to be produced for the VSSG, will provide the policymakers of this Government with very useful background material.

3. I therefore believe that the members of the VSSG can take a lot of satisfaction in the progress made to date. At the same time, I am sure that we are all properly concerned at the extent to which key analytical talent of all the agencies involved has been tied up on these projects. The priority attached to these special projects has certainly warranted these intensive but somewhat disruptive efforts. With the issuance of NSDM 52[2] and its attendant requirement for a regular production cycle of quarterly reports, I think we should take a fresh look at the process through which Working Group support is provided to the VSSG. I am, therefore, suggesting for your consideration a few ideas that could meet the President's requirements and at the same time

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–002, Vietnam Special Studies Group, VSSG Meeting 5–20–70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

[2] NSDM 52, "Quarterly Report on the State of the War and Vietnamization," April 10, 1970. (Ibid., Box H–215, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 52)

lessen the disruption of normal intelligence support activities for which VSSG member agencies retain a continuing responsibility. My suggestions should also lighten the load of Dr. Lynn and his staff who must carry out other continuing and special responsibilities for you.

4. In order to effect a more equitable spread in the responsibility for overseeing the production of periodic VSSG reports, I suggest that primary responsibility for each of the main topics on which NSDM 52 calls for quarterly reports be assigned to separate designated project officers in the appropriate agencies and departments represented in the VSSG. For each report, once terms of reference had been approved by the VSSG Working Group and principals, the project officer would be charged with full responsibility for the production and coordination of the draft of the report assigned to him. Members of all VSSG components would participate in the preparation of every report and, when completed, each project officer's draft would be submitted to the Working Group for review and referral to the VSSG principals for their final endorsement.

5. This manner of proceeding seems to have a number of basic advantages and should avoid a lot of the costly, though necessary, expenditure of time and resources that went into our first series of reports. As an illustration of a possible division of assignments, CIA could undertake primary responsibility for preparing the quarterly study of Enemy Capabilities, Strategy and Intentions called for in NSDM 52. I have not discussed these matters with the other principals of the VSSG, but, if they are agreeable, it would seem in order for the Department of Defense to undertake primary responsibility for the quarterly studies on the Main Force War. If this general approach strikes you as having merits, you might raise it at the next VSSG meeting and there decide the best allocation of primary responsibility for each of the three quarterly studies called for in NSDM 52.

Dick

108. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Director Helms' Memorandum on VSSG Activities[2]

CIA Director Helms has written you a lengthy memorandum on the activities of the VSSG, in particular the Quarterly Report (QR) on the War (NSDM 52). You should be familiar with his views in case he raises them at Wednesday's VSSG meeting.

Helms is generous in his praise for the VSSG's "innovative analysis and hard work" thus far. However, his main point seems to be that the NSDM 52 should signal an end to his "intensive but somewhat disruptive efforts" to support the VSSG as well as "lighten the load on Dr. Lynn and his staff."

He believes the responsibility for preparing the QR can be divided among State, DOD, and CIA with each taking primary responsibility for that part closest to its traditional interest. Each agency's working group would include members from other agencies and receive guidance from the VSSG working group in the preparation of its report.

At close inspection Helms' proposal, if accepted, would subvert the process that has produced the only innovative and objective analysis we have had on Vietnam for several years.

Our approach has been to draw on the best talent in the government to prepare the countryside and manpower papers. This has resulted in high-quality contribution from low-level talent in all agencies. Most of the creative analysis was done or directly stimulated by my staff. We obtained good analysis because:

—we disrupted the cozy accommodation between George Carver and his friends around town,

—we by-passed tired philosophers like Carver and Lou Sarris to tap those with analytical talent and an intimate knowledge of Vietnam,

—we were able to provide firm direction from the NSC for the analysis and obtain a non-bureaucratic response.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–002, Vietnam Special Studies Group, VSSG Meeting 5–20–70. Secret.

[2] Document 107.

Helms' recommendation would wreck these arrangements. If implemented it would mean:

—On enemy strategy, we will get a CIA rendition of the latest COSVN directive and their assessments of recent changes in Hanoi's pecking order rather than an analysis of the enemy's activities by-type, his manpower and force structure, and his logistic efforts in terms of what they imply for alternative enemy strategies. Issues such as the use of Phnom Penh as a supply conduit will not get aired.

—On the main force war, we will get DOD's officially blessed view backed by whatever off-the-shelf analysis supports it.

—I am not sure what we will get from the State Department, but State's failure to do anything on the political analysis of the countryside—for which they were assigned *primary responsibility* at the last VSSG meeting—is no basis for confidence that Helms' approach will result in a State contribution.

Helms' proposal can be handled by reminding him of the logic of the VSSG process:

—to obtain a high-quality product, we need to draw the best talent from *all* agencies to work on a subject,

—after the basic intellectual capital is built up by the VSSG, it can be drawn on by the reporting process, for example the QR. We are at this point with the countryside and manpower analyses. The community, with the exception of INR, has accepted the techniques used—although CIA and DOD strongly opposed them at first—and I plan to ask DOD to assume primary responsibility for the countryside portion of the QR.

The VSSG's main force, enemy strategy, and political analyses are not yet developed to the point that we can turn them over to the community. If we assign primary responsibility for these studies to the agencies, the NSC will lose direction of the best talent in the government, which will continue to be stifled as it has been thus far.

I met with the VSSG Working Group on Monday and went over these points. They seemed to accept the idea that:

—the first innovative phase of the analysis is carried out under close supervision of the VSSG Working Group,

—after we have obtained an agreed framework for analysis, the most capable agency will be responsible for preparing that portion of the QR under the direction of the VSSG Working Group with continued interagency participation.

If this subject comes up at Wednesday's meeting, I suggest you make these same points.

Another approach you might use to respond to Helms' views would be to say that you believe the VSSG process has worked successfully thus far and that you are not inclined to change it. You might note that you prefer to leave the exact allocation of work to the VSSG Working Group, and that you understand the Working Group intends

to "spin-off" responsibility for the direction of analysis as soon as the basic and innovative work is done.

Finally, this talk about my staff being over-worked is rubbish. Everytime the VSSG analysis has bogged down it has been because of a lack of support from the agencies, particularly DOD. My staff has always been further ahead in their portion of the analysis, and done a greater share of the total work than CIA.

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109. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, June 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Under Secretaries Committee

The Under Secretaries Committee has achieved an extremely important role in the decision-making process in the Government and the chairmanship of this committee has enabled the State Department to play a very important role in the formulation of policy decisions. It is important that nothing be done to detract from State's role.

For example, a draft paper is in circulation by Kissinger's office, remitting to the Under Secretaries Committee a watching brief over the EC enlargement negotiations and the U.S. Government's relations with the European Community. I am told by one of the members of the NSC staff that the question has already been raised by one agency as to whether this watching brief ought not now to be placed elsewhere.

Considering the importance of the Under Secretaries Committee and State's role in it, I suggest that if a new Under Secretary is not designated prior to Elliot's confirmation,[2] it might be desirable upon his confirmation to designate Alex Johnson as Chairman of the Committee, at least pro tem, and so advise all other agencies.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 2, Administrative, Vol. 1. No classification marking.

[2] Richardson stepped down as Under Secretary of State on June 23 to become Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. In a June 12 memorandum, NSC–U/N 23, Richardson notified members of the Under Secretaries Committee that he had asked Johnson to become acting chairman pending the arrival of a successor. (Ibid., S/S–NSC–U/N Files: Lot 83 D 277) John Irwin entered on duty as Under Secretary of State on September 21 and assumed chairmanship of the Under Secretaries Committee on October 14. (Ibid.)

110. Talking Points Prepared by the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn)[1]

Washington, undated.

Meeting with Shultz, Ehrlichman on DPRC, Defense Budget

I. Background of DPRC

Two major factors contributed to establishment of DPRC:

—*National Security Study Memorandum 3, Review of the U.S. Military Posture;*

—Initiated on January 20, 1969;

—Produced a substantive review of alternative strategies for strategic and general purpose forces;

—For the first time showed the trade-offs between defense and non-defense spending within the framework of our overall economic and fiscal policy for a five year period; [The NSSM 3 Report on General Purpose Forces is at Tab A; see the table on page 29.][2]

—Though analysis was admittedly crude, *it enabled the President to decide on a world-wide defense strategy in the light of its implications for both defense and non-defense spending.* [NSDM 27 recording that decision is at Tab B.][3]

—President was quite impressed with the value of this work in helping him shape our defense posture.

—Last summer, in anticipation of a $3 billion reduction in the Administration's defense budget by Congress, *the Administration decided to formulate its own program for reducing the defense posture.*

This exercise produced a classic confrontation between the Budget Bureau and the Defense Department on the scope and nature of the reductions. *The President was forced into a position of having to referee disputes over specific line items and dollar amounts without any idea of the implications of his decisions.* Further, he first learned of some DOD plans, e.g., reducing our NATO naval forces, in the newspapers.

Based on these experiences, the President decided to establish an Under Secretary-level group to insure balanced and objective analysis of major DOD policy and program issues, along the general lines of

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget, 1970, Vol. I. Secret. Lynn drafted the talking points for Kissinger's meeting with Shultz and Ehrlichman scheduled for June 24. (Ibid.)

[2] All brackets are in the source text. Tab A is not printed.

[3] Tab B is not printed.

the NSSM 3 work, on a continuing basis. At the final NSC meeting on NSSM 3, he underscored two points:

—*He wanted to stop the bilateral bargaining between BOB and DOD,* which failed to shed any light on the major defense issues and which puts him in the position of having to arbitrate disputes on literally dozens of line items, usually at the last minute when all parties are set in concrete and there is no time for thoughtful analysis;

—*He wanted to prevent a situation in which inter-service logrolling and compromising among the chiefs was the basis for the defense posture.*

Accordingly, *the DPRC was formed on October 11, 1969.* [NSDM 26 on the DPRC is at Tab C.][4] Its major purpose is to consider the political, economic, diplomatic and military consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from:

—proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
—proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,
—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies.

In all candor, it must be admitted that the DPRC has been a controversial institution since its inception:

—The Director of the Budget Bureau has been concerned that the DPRC might interfere with his prerogatives as the President's budget adviser and with the role of the BOB staff. [On October 24, 1969 I analyzed Director Mayo's position and the issues it raised in a memorandum to you which is at Tab D.][5]

Moreover, Director Mayo's concept for the FY 72 budget review really doesn't contemplate a fundamental role for the DPRC; it envisions BOB's traditional role in the budget review process with some modifications. [My April 8, 1970 analysis of Director Mayo's views are at Tab F.][6]

—Secretary Laird has wanted the DPRC to focus on the broad questions of defense versus non-defense spending and avoid concern with the Defense program. [On March 26, 1970 I sent you a memorandum analyzing Secretary Laird's views. See Tab E.][7]

Nevertheless, *the DPRC has been active.*

—In a series of meetings last fall, the DPRC reviewed the Defense budget and major unresolved issues. [At Tab G are talking points you used last fall to brief Ehrlichman and the President on the DPRC re-

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[4] Document 79.
[5] Document 82.
[6] Not printed.
[7] See Document 101.

view.][8] The major focus was on the ABM program, on which about 4 meetings were held.

In the end, the DPRC played no real role except on the ABM. However, as a result of this process, the President indicated that he wanted a variety of substantive issues reviewed by the DPRC prior to next year's budget review.

—To insure more orderly staff work for the DPRC in preparing papers, the President established the DPRC Working Group on January 19, 1970. [See Tab H][9] The same directive outlined the studies that were to be undertaken by the DPRC, under the general supervision of the Working Group.

—However, Secretary Laird sent you two memorandums on March 14, 1970 questioning the DPRC's role.[10] Because of the controversy, including the question of who should chair the Working Group, no progress was made on the studies.

—On March 23, 1970, you held a meeting of the DPRC to review where we stood. [Your papers for that meeting are at Tab I.][11] The main result of this meeting was that Packard initiated an exercise within DOD to cut $3 billion from the FY 72 DOD fiscal guidance, $1 billion from each Service.

—To break the impasse over the DPRC's role, the President directed a series of studies on April 2, 1970 designed to flush out the basic issues in shaping the Defense posture for 1972 and beyond. [The Directive is at Tab J.][12] At Secretary Laird's request, you agreed to have Gardiner Tucker, ASD(SA), chair most of the studies under the general supervision of the Working Group. The DPRC met on April 24, 1970, at which time you provided guidance to the DPRC Working Group on how the studies should be carried out, with Tucker's role spelled out.

—On the weekend of May 30–31, Secretary Laird gave the President a three page memorandum which indicated that we faced an $18 billion budget deficit in FY 72. Thus, he proposed that "unless I hear from you to the contrary," he would revise the DOD fiscal guidance downward by $6 billion in FY 72. He said, "We will keep you informed of necessary changes in our strategy and commitments as our planning proceeds." [Tab K][13]

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[8] Not printed.

[9] Document 93.

[10] Documents 98 and 99.

[11] Not printed.

[12] Document 102.

[13] Tabs K, L, M, and N are not printed.

Note that the DPRC was informed on March 23, 1970, that the deficit projected for FY 72 was $3 billion using standard projections and almost $7 billion using pessimistic assumptions. Two months later, Secretary Laird, with BOB's concurrence, was talking of a deficit of $18 billion, a staggering deterioration. I understand the story will get even worse, perhaps by $3–4 billion.

The President reacted on June 2, 1970 by directing the DPRC "to consider urgently the full implications" of Secretary Laird's memorandum in time for NSC consideration on July 15, 1970. [Tab L] On June 13, 1970 you directed the DPRC Working Group to prepare the analysis. [Tab M] This work is now underway.

II. The Present Situation

In the face of an admittedly bleak fiscal outlook, DOD and BOB have already reached agreement that $6 billion must be cut from DOD's fiscal guidance. [Recent BOB tables showing fiscal projections are at Tab N.]

This serious fiscal situation has implications for critically important issues:

—NATO force deployments (including the delicate question of timing our decisions with respect to the NATO posture review and possible BFR discussions),
—SALT (DOD's view on the timing and the substance of our SALT discussions is now dominated by budgetary considerations),
—ABM,
—the U.S. naval posture in the Mediterranean and its implications for the military balance in the Middle East,
—our whole Vietnam posture: withdrawal schedules, air activity levels and effectiveness, etc.
—troop levels in Korea,
—the combat readiness of our entire military posture.

Of course, vitally important issues on the domestic side are affected as well.

The question is, *how can the President be given the opportunity to make key policy decisions in a timely manner, in the light of a rational and objective evaluation of their implications?*

—The DPRC was set up by the President to provide the support he needs on the national security side. The President clearly wants it to function effectively. For this to happen, the agencies involved must cooperate.

Moreover, the DPRC's activities must be meshed with the agencies' internal decision making processes.

—But there must be order on the domestic side as well. Secretary Laird complains that the President's domestic advisers persuade (or allow) the President to make incremental commitments to domestic programs out of political necessity without alerting him to their implica-

tions for the fiscal outlook or explaining how he may be mortgaging the future; when the inevitable fiscal crisis comes, DOD, because its spending is controllable, absorbs a disproportiate share of the punishment.

On this point, Secretary Laird is right. There has been no domestic NSSM 3, there is no domestic DPRC, and there is no widespread recognition of the need to examine systematically and in advance the total problem and the issues that must be resolved in setting priorities and allocating funds. To date, the domestic agencies don't even have fiscal targets for FY 72 and haven't begun to face up to their fiscal problems.

There are three key questions at this point:

—What decisions should the President make in the cause of putting together the budget?
—What facts and analyses are needed to inform the President's decisions, and how should they be prepared?
—How and when should the President make these decisions?

Shultz, Ehrlichman and Kissinger should address these questions as a matter of priority and set up an orderly process to insure Presidential control over the formation of his budget and program.[14]

[14] No record of the discussion at their June 24 meeting has been found.

111. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Organization on the Indochina Problem

1. I am the first to recognize that I have already discussed with you and with Alexis Johnson the problem of how the Government

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. III, 1 Jul–31 Dec 70. Secret; Eyes Only. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a July 18 covering memorandum in which he stated: "This paper makes some telling points. Perhaps we should have study done—by Holdrige—Nutter & Green." Kissinger wrote in response on Haig's note: "No—We should implement it. Helms is right. Let's implement it. Put [William] Smyser in charge & have him act as traffic cop to other groups."

should organize to fight the political and military war in Indochina. Therefore, this memorandum may strike you as redundant or unrealistic in light of the complexities inherent in the "bureaucracy." Nevertheless, I risk your ire, because I genuinely believe that the issue involved is one of great importance. I am much persuaded that Hanoi regards the battle for Vietnam as a single struggle involving Laos and Cambodia as well. If one accepts this belief as valid, a corollary is that to combat the North Vietnamese effectively and efficiently, the United States should also view Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as component elements of a single struggle and conduct its affairs accordingly.

2. When one looks today at how this Government conducts its affairs in the Indochina area, one comes across the following: A plethora of working level and policy level groups and committees, with much overlapping membership, are grappling with various component parts of the total Indochina problem but in a way that almost precludes effective, efficient address to the total problem. We have, for example, an NSC Vietnam ad hoc subcommittee[2] which specifically avoids considering Laos or Cambodia, a Laos ad hoc committee[3] which does not look at Vietnam (and whose activities have waned as those of WSAG have waxed), a Vietnam Special Studies Group[4] which is different from both, and various subgroups of all three—some of which work on overlapping problems (e.g., cease fire, where there has long been a subgroup working on cease fire under Mr. Sullivan's NSC Vietnam subcommittee and there is also a VSSG Working Group cease-fire panel, under a different chairman, with overlapping but different membership). One special ad hoc group drafts the response to NSSM–94, another drafts the response to NSSM–95,[5] while the VSSG Working Group, in an organizationally separate exercise (but using some of the same people), drafts a different paper that materially bears on the conclusions of both. Meanwhile, the WSAG, or its working group, ploughs the same, or adjacent, terrain in separate fashion though, again, with some overlapping membership. This whole arrangement virtually guarantees duplicate efforts, confusion, wasted energy, missed opportunities, and poor staff work to support decision-making echelons of the government, including the President and yourself.

3. It would seem to me that a drastic rationalization and consolidation of this staff support and coordination effort would be of great

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[2] See Document 26.

[3] See Document 92 and footnote 2 thereto.

[4] See Document 73.

[5] NSSM 94, "Diplomatic Initiatives in Indo-China," May 25, 1970, and NSSM 95, "U.S. Policy Objectives in Indo-China," June 6, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–172, National Security Study Memoranda.

benefit to the United States Government and those who determine its policies, particularly since the latter have every right to expect that the government's full resources will be efficiently marshalled to support and implement their decisions.

4. I am certainly no organization expert, but I recognize that when one is critical of a condition, one should not stop at carping. One should at least have a suggestion. I would, therefore, recommend that there be appointed within the NSC staff a single senior officer who would serve full-time as, in effect, your Indochina manager. This officer should relieve you of detailed concern on Indochina matters, and should have a small staff assisting him on a full-time basis. He should chair an interagency committee whose members from appropriate agencies should be of at least two- or three-star rank or at a civilian equivalent. This group would replace the present VSSG Working Group, the Vietnam ad hoc group, the Laos ad hoc group, and all similar bodies. Its members would have direct access to their respective principals and be empowered to vote their agency's stock on routine matters. It is not envisaged that this Indochina Committee would attempt on its own to do substantive analysis or detailed operational planning. Instead it should levy such tasks on the component of government most directly responsible, asking that component to prepare a draft with the participation and in consultation with other government components. The Chairman of the Indochina Committee would confine himself to setting terms of reference for commissioned projects, reviewing the drafts, directing revisions, assembling completed packages for policy review, and insuring that policy decisions are in fact carried out. The Committee would, of course, report to you and to whatever higher authorities you deemed appropriate or desirable.

Dick

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112. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for July 15, 1970, President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman recorded that "K[issinger] is building up a new head of steam about Rogers. Bill has made some startling statements about Cambodia as a non-success, encouragement of Chinese, harm done to his Middle East efforts by White House comments, etc. K still feels this is all part of a plan to do him in and to take over foreign policy by State from White House. Talked to me several times." Haldeman agreed to "get Haig in with P to discuss the whole problem." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

The next day, according to his diary entry, Haldeman had a long talk with President Nixon about Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger. "P was willing to listen to my version of K and Haig's story. He only bought part of it. He knows what the Rogers problem is, but he feels K is too self-concerned and inclined to overdramatize, which is true. Solution lies in better understanding both ways, but it's not likely because neither Rogers nor K will really admit the other might be right. P also feel K is overly concerned about anything that affects Israel. Had me call Haig for reaction to Rogers press conference [on July 15]. Al felt he had backtracked very well but that still doesn't solve real problem, which is the clear impression of a major wedge between State and WH on basic major foreign policy positions. Hard to cover that up now that it's out, and the weasels will use it to the hilt. P doesn't fully buy Haig's view, but understands it." (Ibid.)

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113. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, July 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

Planning for Southeast Asia

I understand that following their recent trip to Southeast Asia, Members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board expressed to you the need for more planning on our future political, military and economic involvement in Southeast Asia.

As indicated in the enclosed summary,[2] the Administration has in fact done a great deal of planning for Asia—both within and outside of the NSSM series—and a very substantial portion of this has been done in the Department of State. Rather than observing a dearth, I am concerned as to what might be done to bring more order and greater consistency to these many efforts going forward in a multiplicity of contexts and forums.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Kissinger under an August 3 covering memorandum (Document 114).

[2] The attachment, "Southeast Asia Planning," is not printed.

Looking over the record, and taking into account my talks with our Ambassadors at the recent Chiefs of Mission meeting in Tokyo, I believe our work on Asia can be improved in two respects:

—A senior group, short of the NSC, should provide a forum for substantive review and discussion of plans and programs for Asia—to the extent such planning efforts cannot be scheduled for, or do not warrant, NSC review. Many of these studies—even, in some cases, when commissioned in the NSSM series—do not now get a full and proper hearing—assuring that the best thinking of our planners be brought to bear on day-to-day operations.

—Even more urgent, these various plans and programs must be knit together in a multi-year strategy for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine. This was one of the principal points unanimously made by our Ambassadors at the Tokyo meeting. It should be one of the first tasks of the senior planning group.

A Planning Mandate for the Under Secretaries Committee

I believe that this planning function should be assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee, which would be restricted to its permanent membership for this purpose.

The Committee should schedule meetings from time to time to discuss our longer-term interests and objectives in Asia beyond the present emergency and to appraise current political and program issues—including negotiations, the security situation in Southeast Asia, U.S. and Asian forces posture objectives, aid and trade problems, relations with mainland China—as they bear on these longer-term concerns. As the occasion arises, the Committee should discuss and review planning documents prepared anywhere in the Government—although it should not, of course, preempt other NSC bodies and reviews.

These meetings would be informal but the Committee should, as it wishes, submit its thoughts to you in personal reports individually from its members or jointly through its Chairman.

To do its work properly, the Committee will require some staff support. A few months ago, I constituted a small in-house study group, under Ambassador Green's chairmanship, which began to examine our options in Cambodia in the perspective of alternative outcomes in Southeast Asia, great power relations, and U.S. long-term objectives. This group, whose existence is classified, has done very useful work. A similar staff group, under Ambassador Green's chairmanship, should support the deliberations of the senior group.

A Five-Year Strategic Plan for Asia

As one of its first tasks, the Committee should undertake the preparation of a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, taking into account the severe constraints imposed by ever-growing Congressional limitations and shrinking budgetary resources.

Such a planning effort, which should involve senior levels of the Government on a continuing basis, is needed:

—to provide multi-year planning guidance for all the agencies of the U.S. Government;

—to provide concrete and specific guidance from which our Ambassadors can speak to our Asian friends and allies about our long-term intentions;

—to clarify for the Congress and, as appropriate, the American public the Administration's specific long-term intentions and purposes in Asia.

Accordingly, the plan should relate U.S. forces posture planning, military and economic assistance, Asian and U.S. diplomatic and political programs and initiatives, and our continuing bilateral and multilateral commitments. If possible, it should be supported by a comprehensive inter-agency program budget in line with NSDM 4,[3] which would provide multi-year program guidance.

This plan will not be easy to prepare during the present period of rapid change in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, within the context of the Nixon doctrine, I believe an effort should now be made to define more precisely our long-term political, security and economic goals beyond the present emergency and relate current diplomatic and program decisions more closely to these objectives.

Recommendations

If you agree with the foregoing, I recommend that you authorize the issue of a NSDM or other appropriate directive, which would provide:

1. *That the permanent members of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) assume responsibility as a senior planning group for Asia.*

2. *That the Under Secretaries Committee be supported by a small interdepartmental staff group, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Green, for this purpose.*

3. *That you direct the Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, which would undertake a more precise definition of U.S. objectives in Asia, beyond Vietnamization, and encompass a political, security and development strategy for the area.*[4]

William P. Rogers

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[3] Document 13. The revised version of NSDM is Document 71.

[4] There is no indication of approval or disapproval of these recommendations.

114. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, August 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from the Secretary of State

Secretary Rogers has forwarded to you a memorandum which deals with the criticism made by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the lack of an overall military, economic and political plan for Southeast Asia (Tab B).[2] The Secretary quite rightly emphasizes that the Administration has in fact done a great deal of planning for Asia both within and outside of the NSSM series. At the same time he correctly makes the point that an additional mechanism is required to pull together the proliferation of contexts and forums currently involved in Southeast Asian planning.

To solve this problem, the Secretary has recommended that the Under Secretaries Committee (chaired by State), supported by a small interdepartmental group chaired by Ambassador Green, be given responsibility for planning for Southeast Asia and that they be charged with the preparation of a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. This is an attempt to undo the NSC system set up in January 1969 by, in effect, reinstituting the previous Administration's Senior Interdepartmental Group which headed a State-dominated system for national security policy. I therefore would like to put the issue before you in some detail.

Studies Underway

As I informed you by memorandum of July 20, our planning efforts for Southeast Asia have been extensive and include:[3]

—NSSM 37, Vietnam Negotiating Plans
—NSSM 38, Post-Vietnam Asian Policy
—NSSM 94, Diplomatic Initiatives in Indo-China (considered in July 21 NSC Meeting)
—NSSM 95, Alternative Courses in Cambodia
—Study of Various Vietnam Ceasefire Proposals (also considered at NSC Meeting)

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Document 113.

[3] For text of the July 20 memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 347. Copies of NSSMs cited below and the resulting papers are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Boxes 122–207, National Security Study Memoranda.

—NSSMs on Thailand Program Analysis, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
—NSSM 69 on Asian Nuclear Policy
—Strategy for Southeast Asia (being prepared by the JCS at the request of the Secretary of Defense and the White House)
—Vietnam Studies on Vietnamization, Pacification, and Economic Problems

Discussion

We have followed our usual "building bloc" approach that we applied to SALT. This gives us an opportunity:

a. to isolate the issues;
b. keeps the bureaucracy from log-rolling;
c. forces a sharp statement of the issues; and
d. makes bureaucratic sabotage harder.

The principal forum for the conduct of the foregoing planning effort has been the National Security Council structure and, more specifically, the Washington Special Actions Group which met daily throughout the Cambodian crisis and has met at least weekly since. We have also utilized the Vietnam Special Studies Group with a subsidiary working group to investigate a host of more technical problems including ceasefire, pacification and air sortie levels. Both of these forums are constituted at the Under Secretary level under my Chairmanship. Where needed, preliminary work has been done through interdepartmental working groups chaired as appropriate by State or Defense, or from within the NSC staff.

However, having now drawn together the essential facts associated with our day-to-day operations and long-term interests in Southeast Asia we need to pull pieces of the puzzle together with the view towards developing a comprehensive political, military and economic strategy for the long haul. I have already had an informal working group looking at this strategic perspective.

The basic question raised in the Secretary's memorandum is who will control the policy planning process. Thus far you have consistently insisted that policy formulation belongs within the NSC system where all agencies have a fair opportunity to present their views. Within this framework you have rejected the concept of a vicarship role for any agency, including the Department of State, which would be strongly resented by both Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this system State nevertheless plays a central role reflecting its prime interest, including Chairmanship of Interdepartmental Groups at the Assistant Secretary level and of the Under Secretaries Committee which is primarily charged with operational questions and policy implementation.

The approach recommended by Secretary Rogers for the crucial area of Southeast Asian planning would seriously undermine the NSC frame-

work. His proposal to place the most important current U.S. policy planning effort under State Chairmanship simply constitutes another of the frequent challenges to the system which has worked so effectively in such complex policy issues as SALT negotiations, Japanese base negotiations, the Korean drawdown, and chemical and biological warfare. It would reopen the issues that were debated vigorously back in 1969 when the NSC system was established and would result in the following consequences:

(1) Would put machinery under State.
(2) Give State an opportunity to block recommendations.
(3) Destroy the impact of my office and the NSC staff.

We already have experienced some problems in implementing your policies in the existing framework—the Secretary's proposal would compound these problems by giving State control of staffing arrangements and chairmanship of working groups for Southeast Asian planning. (In addition, the Under Secretaries Committee was specifically established as an operating body and not as a planning group).

For these reasons I would be strongly opposed to the implementation of Secretary Rogers' recommendation which could in the long run constitute a death blow to the National Security Council system itself and could represent a fundamental shift back to the previous Administration's system which delegated to the Secretary of State the vicarship role for national security policy formulation.

I strongly recommend instead that you take the approach outlined in the proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.[4] This memorandum agrees with his stated need to establish a framework for the synthesization of the various ongoing planning efforts involving Southeast Asia. It states, however, that you wish to do so in a framework analogous to the other policy planning groups, such as that for the Middle East, which have been convened at the Under Secretary level under the chairmanship of your Assistant for National Security Affairs, and points out that subsidiary working groups will be established and chaired by the Department of State where political considerations are paramount.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.

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[4] Not printed. The August 5 memorandum, which Nixon signed after adding a sentence, advised Rogers that the planning framework for Southeast Asia should be analogous to other special groups, such as the Special Review Group for the Middle East, with Kissinger as chairman. This would allow for equal participation by Defense and other agencies where they have a major interest. Nixon also informed Rogers about the establishment of the Special Review Group for Southeast Asia (see Document 117). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70)

115. Editorial Note

In an August 3, 1970, memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Frank Shakespeare, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, requested that effective immediately the USIA Director attend all meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group dealing with Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia. Kissinger wrote "nonsense" at the top of the memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) In a November 5 memorandum to Alexander Haig, USIA Deputy Director Loomis noted that of 89 National Security Decision Memorandums mentioned in a recent report, USIA had received only 9. "While we recognize that some of these NSDMs deal with subjects of marginal concern to this Agency, there are others that USIA needs if it is to do its job. For only if we know what U.S. policy is on a specific subject can we make sure that our media are accurately portraying and effectively supporting it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.) Jeanne Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, wrote Haig on November 12: "As you know, more than a year ago we cut back on the amount of information we were giving USIA about NSC activities at Mr. Kissinger's request. Then, when the Review Group (which Frank Shakespeare attended) was abolished in favor of the SRG (which he does not attend) their isolation was almost complete. Our rationale has been, of course, that USIA receives its policy guidance from the State Department. But, given the history of 'interpretations' of Presidential decisions, it may be wise to provide, or at least supplement, this guidance more directly from here." (Ibid.) On November 16 Haig sent Loomis copies of 24 NSDMs. (Ibid.)

About the same time Shakespeare asked for a meeting with the President. "We can probably pinpoint two points on Shakespeare's mind from a series of recent memos," Harold Saunders of the NSC staff conjectured in a November 18 memorandum to Haig: "(1) Soviet duplicity in the Mid-East and (2) the importance of keeping USIA informed on the foreign policy line we want projected." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) Shakespeare met with the President on November 25 and, according to Haldeman, had a long session "about his concern about Rogers and lack of loyalty at State, Rogers' lack of conformity to P's Soviet policy, State effort to 'get' him, etc." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman informed Kissinger that at the meeting the President had "agreed that, from time to time, Frank should be in on certain NSC meetings to give him some

background on the subjects covered. You should look for opportunities for Frank to sit in on such meetings." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.)

On January 3, 1972, Shakespeare met with Haldeman to discuss his resignation, which he had submitted to the President on December 15, 1970. According to Haldeman, Shakespeare "said his reasons for resigning were, first, that he wanted to get back to the business world. That he couldn't stay beyond this year anyway, but second, and undoubtedly far more important, was his disagreement with our basic foreign policy in terms of our failure to accept the Soviet threat as such. His third reason was exclusion from knowledge and participation which makes it impossible for him to function, especially since his views run counter to those of the establishment, although parallel to those of the P[resident]. He said our problem is that we've got to make a basic decision. Either we do or don't want an independent USIA. The State Department, of course, wants to take it over and keep it locked up under its wing. If we do want an independent USIA that represents the P and his policy, then we've got to have the right director first, and second, the director must know why we are doing things in foreign policy. He has to be present at all NSC, Cabinet and WSAG meetings, both so he'll be informed, and so that the bureaucracy will know that he's part of the internal establishment. It's essential that he be fully informed on policy and the reasons for it." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

On March 29, 1971, Shakespeare met with Kissinger and reached an understanding that he outlined in an April 15 letter to Kissinger asking for confirmation; he would not be a formal member of the NSC or the Cabinet but would be invited to all Cabinet and NSC meetings as well as all WSAG and Senior Review Group meetings; the arrangement was personal and would not be extended to another USIA officer in his absence or to his successor in the event of his departure. On that basis Shakespeare indicated he would withdraw his resignation. He remained Director of USIA until February 7, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 295, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [Jan–Oct 1972])

116. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

National Security Council System (U)

1. The Department of Defense has been exploring ways to make the operation of the National Security Council (NSC) system more productive, more efficient, and less costly in time and effort.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with me that, in general, the NSC system is working well. The following observations support this view:

a. Current procedures insure that the views of all interested agencies are available for consideration during planning and deliberations at all levels within the NSC structure.
b. The NSC system provides for exchanges of views between the departments and agencies directly concerned.
c. Dissent and appeal procedures permit the inclusion of the views of all agencies concerned.
d. The President is presented with realistic alternatives as a basis for decision.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are also in agreement that the system could be improved by incorporating the following recommendations:

a. *More Care in the Selection of, and the Assignment of Priorities to, Study Topics.* Review of the subjects now being studied under NSC auspices indicates that, generally, they are appropriate and should be completed. However, more care in selecting study topics would be beneficial, particularly with respect to their relationship to ongoing studies, so as to avoid duplication. Additionally, there is a requirement for continual review of ongoing studies to insure that appropriate emphasis is placed on the most critical topics throughout the year. Therefore, I propose to submit quarterly recommendations to the NSC suggesting priorities for ongoing studies and new subjects for consideration.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–299, NSC System, New NSC System. Confidential. Kissinger wrote at the top of the first page: "When will I get analysis." On June 10 Haig forwarded to Kissinger an "under-the-table" draft of the memorandum, prepared by the JCS in response to a request made by Laird at a March 9 meeting. (JCSM–259–70, May 28; ibid.) In his covering memorandum Haig commented that "a number of the criticisms are valid and most of the recommendations worthy of consideration. I believe it is time for a major streamlining and tightening of procedures. This process may help give a needed shot-in-the-arm to the system." (Ibid.)

The following ongoing studies should be addressed on a priority basis:

—The various studies bearing on US nuclear policy.
—The various studies bearing on NATO.
—Studies affecting fiscal guidance which should be completed prior to the time that the Five-Year Defense Plan and fiscal issues are considered by the NSC.
—US policy on current Sino-Soviet differences.

The following subjects should be considered for future study on a priority basis:

—Problems inherent in changes to overseas force deployments to include an assessment of the relationship of base structure to strategy.
—Economic impact of reductions in defense manpower and procurement and the requirement to provide standby facilities to reinitiate or expand defense production.
—Future US policy toward the Middle East.
—Policy on the use of Reserve component forces.
—An annual study of resource allocation to and among Federal programs for the forthcoming five years.

b. *More Care in Initiating Studies to Insure that the Nature of the Requirements is Clear.* The problem of imparting top-level guidance early enough in the NSC processes to be effective appears to be a function of the clarity with which the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and subsequent terms of reference are drawn and the appropriateness of the deadlines prescribed. Study requirements established by NSSMs are not in all cases, clear and complete, and the deadlines established are not always realistic. Also, more consideration should be given to determining the agency of primary responsibility for NSSMs. Some studies of primary concern to the Department of Defense are being developed under the aegis of interdepartmental groups or the NSC staff rather than the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, the response to NSSM 59 (US Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents)[2] should have been prepared by the Department of Defense. A means for improvement would be the coordination of the NSSM with the cognizant agencies prior to its being issued. In addition, the organization tasked with the responsibility for the preparation of a report in response to a NSSM should be required to prepare a study directive and to coordinate that directive with the interested departments and agencies. This directive should state explicitly the terms of reference (i.e., the problem, objectives, limits, scope, assumptions, and essential elements of analysis),

[2] A copy of NSSM 59, May 28, 1969, and the response are ibid., Box H–153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 59.

should establish the study schedule, and should provide for in-process review. The NSC Review Group would appear to be the appropriate element to approve such a directive. While such a requirement might be more time consuming in the initial stages, it should sharpen and speed the study by allowing the principals the opportunity to guide the direction of the effort by focusing on agreed requirements.

c. *More Consistent use of the US Intelligence Board to Support the NSC System Requirements.* The US Intelligence Board (USIB) has not always been used to the best advantage within the NSC structure. Special committees or working groups addressing NSSMs should function from a common intelligence base resulting from proper coordination of intelligence content with the USIB during preparation of the NSSM. Agreed national intelligence should provide the basis for all NSSMs. Whenever there are intelligence judgments in a study which are in major disagreement with the intelligence assessments of the USIB, these disagreements should be stated clearly in the study, and the reasons for the disagreements should be indicated.

d. *Reserving National Security Decision Memorandums for Promulgation of Presidential Decisions on National Security Policy Matters.* The National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs) were designed initially to be reserved for Presidential decisions on national security matters. However, some of the NSDMs have been used to announce administrative and study requirements rather than policy decisions. It would be useful to have requirements of an administrative nature announced through a separate series of memorandums with a wider distribution and have study requirements announced through NSSMs.

e. *Strengthening the NSC Administrative System.* Administrative shortcomings, such as unannounced schedule changes, papers arriving too late for adequate review, and the lack of feedback from meetings at various levels, indicate a requirement for improved administrative procedures. It is recommended that the NSC staff:

—Insure that all study requirements, including those for the Defense Program Review Committee, are promulgated in NSSMs.

—Record and distribute minutes of meetings.

—Maintain and promulgate the status of all papers within the NSC system.

—Maintain and promulgate schedules for meetings of the NSC groups.

—Maintain a quarterly publication, updated monthly, providing a priority listing of pending subjects for NSC consideration. This publication should be coordinated with the Review Group prior to issuance.

—Have the NSC staff member on interagency groups monitor the progress of the study being conducted to insure that divergent views are included in papers and that agencies have sufficient time to review all papers adequately.

f. *Expanding Review Group Responsibilities.* It would be useful to modify Review Group meeting procedures to include addressal of:

—Proposals for studies.
—The terms of reference of NSSMs.
—Proposed priorities and schedules.

g. *Minimizing the Proliferation of High-Level Ad Hoc Groups.* I believe that the present structure of the NSC system should be used and that proliferation of high-level ad hoc groups should be discouraged.

4. I believe that more attention should be paid to the functioning of the WSAG. The primary purpose of the WSAG is to provide a group prepared to assume the important task of advising the NSC and the President on the handling of time-urgent crises. Because of its small size and tightly controlled representation it is well suited for dealing with planning for contingencies of this type and should continue to do so. However, either because of the sensitivity of some of the plans or because of the proliferation of groups within the NSC system charged with such planning, the WSAG planning effort has not always been properly coordinated with other planning done within the NSC system. Such coordination is mandatory and should be accomplished by submission of WSAG plans to the Under Secretaries Committee or the NSC, as appropriate. Also of great importance and concern is the occasional extension of WSAG interest and action into matters of an ongoing operational nature. These matters should be presented to the President through well-established operational channels rather than through the WSAG.

Mel Laird

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117. National Security Decision Memorandum 79[1]

Washington, August 13, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 51–96. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Special Review Group for Southeast Asia

The President has directed the establishment of a Special Review Group for South East Asia comprising the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The Special Review Group for South East Asia is responsible within the National Security Council framework for coordination of planning for the area and for the development of a comprehensive long-range political, military and economic policy document for the area.

In carrying out its responsibilities the Special Review Group will establish such interdepartmental working groups as may be required. Existing interdepartmental working groups, ad hoc groups and committees charged with specific responsibilities pertaining to the area may be called upon to assist the Special Review Group or may be consolidated or reconstituted as required by the Special Review Group. Studies being performed by such groups will be coordinated by the Special Review Group for South East Asia.

Henry A. Kissinger

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118. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, August 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group

It has become increasingly clear that the NSC Review Group should be a senior group comprising agency representatives at the Under Secretary level. When you issued NSDM–2[2] establishing the NSC structure, the level of agency representation for the Review Group was

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] Document 11.

not specified. Subsequently the group was formed comprising representatives at the Assistant Secretary level.

The Review Group's function of examining NSC papers prior to their consideration by the NSC is a vital one. It is to assure that the issues are sharply defined and that Agency views are presented clearly and argued effectively. In the case of both the Departments of State and Defense, intra-agency differences often are strong—e.g., the viewpoint of State's economic bureau and that of a regional bureau on a given issue may differ widely. The Under Secretary level can resolve these intra-agency disputes but it is far less certain that a representative at the Assistant Secretary level can. The tendency of the agency representatives to the present Review Group therefore has been to address papers editorially and procedurally rather than to focus substantively on the issues.

We are moving to strengthen the system at the same time that we are bringing into it for consideration issues of increasingly broad and long-range significance—e.g., Southeast Asia strategy, long-range European policy. We have increasingly relied upon the senior level ad hoc or Special Groups to perform the Review Group function in respect to issues central to our security policy in order to assure full exposition of fundamental policy questions and viewpoints.

I believe the system will be strengthened and the probing analysis of the issues on which we must insist will be better assured if we regularize consideration of these papers at the Under Secretary level. A Review Group at this level also would conform to the pattern which has been established for dealing with operational questions through the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee and contingency planning through the Senior Washington Special Actions Group.

A proposed NSDM which would establish a Senior Review Group at the Under Secretary level is at Tab A.

Recommendation: That you sign the NSDM at Tab A which establishes the Senior Review Group in the NSC structure.[3]

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[3] Nixon initialed his approval on September 4 and signed the attached NSDM, which was designated NSDM 83 and dated September 4 but then withheld for further consideration at Kissinger's order. Kissinger penned a note to Haig, on a September 4 memorandum from Lord, stating, "Let me speak to you about the Senior Review Gp. On 2nd thought I don't like the idea." Documentation on the decision to withhold the NSDM is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. On September 14 after Kissinger had read Kennedy's September 8 memorandum (Document 120), the NSDM was issued without any changes as NSDM 85 (Document 121).

119. Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the Planning Group, National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Improving the Efficiency of the Department of State

Attached are two reports produced in the Department of State on the subject of reform and reorganization of the Department.[2] Rogers brought them to the President's attention; he wrote a brief note to you on the front page of each, suggesting that we might want to look them over to see if they contain anything useful.

The documents are:

—(Tab B) A report on "Management Tools," by a Task Force chaired by Robert A. Hurwitch. [The President wrote on it: "Maybe there are some goods ideas here."][3]

—(Tab C) A paper by Robert Dickson Crane entitled "The New State Department: Harnessing Research and Resources to Policymaking." [The President called Crane "a bright (erratic) guy," and suggested "perhaps we should look this over".]

I have done brief summaries, which follow at Tab I (in the form of a memorandum to the President, which you might want to send him in view of the interest he expressed).[4]

The papers are mediocre and cluttered with jargon. The Hurwitch Task Force report does, however, contain some concrete recommendations. Of particular interest are its critical comments on the NSC system, which I have extracted for you (but not for the President) at Tab II.[5] (I have given them to Dick Kennedy as well.)

I see no need for further action. Since both papers are State products, the Department is presumably in a position to benefit from what-

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. IX. No classification marking. Sent for action.

[2] See Document 31 for information on the task force project that produced the two reports. Neither report is attached. Copies are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. IX, attached to a September 23 memorandum from Kissinger to the President that Kissinger signed but that apparently did not go forward.

[3] All brackets in the source text.

[4] Not attached.

[5] Printed below. The pages of the report from which the excerpts were taken are noted at the end of each excerpt. The portion of text in the parentheses added by hand.

ever wisdom they contain. This is not the occasion for a White House démarche to State on State's reorganization.

Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I if you think his expression of interest warrants a reply.

Attachment

Comments on the NSC System
From Report of Task Force XIII

I. State's Role in the NSC System

The Task Force found that while there are some concerns in the Department that the re-invigorated NSC machinery has usurped certain State Department functions and responsibilities, on balance, this machinery, if properly used, provides excellent opportunities for the Department to exercise leadership in the foreign affairs community. The principal advantage of the NSC machinery is that it provides the Department with a Presidential enabling authority for exercising leadership in reaching and enforcing policy decisions in an interdepartmental context at all levels of the NSC system.

Both in the Department and elsewhere in the foreign affairs community, we found a growing appreciation that the number of U.S. agencies involved in foreign affairs and the complexity of foreign affairs problems required some inter-agency system such as the NSC mechanism to ensure full and orderly examination of the issues. However, procedures that prescribed a channel from the Bureau Assistant Secretaries' (Inter-departmental Groups—IG's) to the NSC Review Group without Seventh Floor involvement were found to be unrealistic in practice and potentially disruptive of the Department of State as an integral institution. A further weakness in the NSC system is the absence of an explicit direct relationship between IG's and the Under Secretaries' Committee. For example, in the process of formulating annual AID programs, the interaction between political considerations and economic development considerations takes place at the Bureau level. But there is no entity on the Seventh Floor that is adequately staffed to vet the total AID package or military and intelligence programs against world-wide political and foreign economic policy considerations. The 7th Floor is obliged to play a relatively passive role in reviewing these programs and other similar matters. This type of situation, resulting largely from inadequate Seventh Floor staff, was found to be one of the major reasons why many entities in the foreign affairs community either no longer looked to the Department of State for leadership or found it inadequate when they sought it. (p. 35)

1. The Task Force recommends that Seventh Floor principals deliberately promote wider use of regional and functional IG's to forge

policies by referring to them issues that involve more than one agency of the foreign affairs community. The IG's should also act as the vehicle through which regional components of the planning process outlined in part A of this chapter ("Decision-Making") would be determined and integrated into the various planning and program budgeting cycles of the other agencies.

2. The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) be empowered to consider policy issues of a broad functional nature and/or involving more than one region that are beyond the scope of a regional or functional IG and do not need to go directly to the NSC. Also it would act as the next court of appeal for issues that could not be resolved at a lower echelon. This recommendation will involve modification of the USC Charter as set forth in NSDM 2.[6]

Adoption of this recommendation would result in a series of hierarchically dependent decision centers, proceeding from the IG's to the USC, finally to the NSC (through the Review Group) and ultimately to the President. Such a system would be analogous to the practice of jurisprudence which has appropriately layered courts and the built-in provision for appeal to higher authority.

The value of a hierarchical appeals system is that it will expedite decision making by inducing decisions to be made at the lowest possible level so that higher levels can concentrate on broader issues. This appeals system would not prevent issues from being introduced at other points in the NSC mechanism as required by the nature of the issue. (p. 46)

2. Identifying Issues

In the foreign affairs community as a whole the principal formal tools which now exist for issue identification are the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) issued by the NSC and the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) used in the Latin American area. The NSSMs reflect issues of concern to the President and NSC staff and have generated some longer-range planning on an inter-agency basis. This process, which is almost always in response to an initiative from outside the Department, now encompasses the bulk of the Department's longer-range issue identification. But it is not a systematic method of identifying long-range issues, and several officials we interviewed felt that issues were often poorly posed in the NSSMs. (p. 22)

3. Implementation

Specific decisions are generally communicated promptly and clearly to the implementing units. On occasion, however, the implementing unit is not specified precisely, and the system suffers. More

[6] Document 11.

often, the specific decision is transmitted without reference to the broader objectives which should guide the action office in carrying it out. Action offices thus must rely on rather rough and ready guidance of their own making, extrapolating from the specific decision and the very broad-brush generalizations contained in public pronouncements by the President and the Secretary. The result can be either inconsistency in implementation or excessive caution. One reason for this lack of guidance is that Departmental inputs to NSSMs are often not framed in such a way as to produce it. Also the Department usually does not participate in the drafting of National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) which it is required to implement.

Problems in the NSC machinery compound this difficulty. There was almost universal agreement among those interviewed that the NSC mechanism is not as effective in downward communication of its decisions as in the upward flow of decision-making. If, as frequently happens, the mechanism operates slowly, conditions to which the decision was originally applicable may have changed. Over-classification often means that not all the action areas affected by a decision are fully aware of it. (pp. 25–26)

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120. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group

In a recent report[2] a task force studying the workings of the Department of State (under the direction of Mr. Macomber) the following recommendation was included:

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) be empowered to consider policy issues of a broad functional nature and/or involving more than one region that are beyond the scope of a regional or functional IG and do not need to go directly to

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kennedy and Rush.

[2] See the attachment to Document 119.

the NSC. Also it would act as the next court of appeal for issues that could not be resolved [at a lower echelon. This recommendation will involve] modification of the USC Charter as set forth in NSDM 2.

If this recommendation is pressed, it will tend to preempt the role you earlier visualized for the Senior Review Group (at the Under Secretaries level).

It would tend to put an increasing share of the policy review function in the Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Under Secretary of State. The role of the Review Groups (as presently constituted) chaired by you would be further diminished.

If you want to go ahead with the Senior Review Group, the possibility that a recommendation from the Secretary of State for an enhanced role for the Under Secretaries Committee in the policy review area may be forthcoming I believe argues for an early issuance of an NSDM. Otherwise, the Senior Review Group NSDM might be seen as a negative reply to a recommendation from the Secretary.[3]

[3] Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "OK—Establish Senior group. HK." The date "Sep 12 1970" is stamped just below. NSDM 85 was issued September 14 (Document 121).

121. National Security Decision Memorandum 85[1]

Washington, September 14, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT

The National Security Council Senior Review Group

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the establishment of the Na-

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Secret.

tional Security Council Senior Review Group which shall assume the functions of the present Review Group constituted by NSDM 2.[2] This Senior Review Group will comprise the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who will act as Chairman. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

The Senior Review Group shall review papers prior to their submission to the National Security Council for consideration or to me for decision. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups, from NSC Ad Hoc Groups, or from Departments (at their discretion). The Senior Review Group shall be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

The role of the Senior Review Group shall be to assure that the issues have been sharply defined, all relevant factors considered, realistic alternatives with their costs and consequences clearly set out, and the views of all interested departments and agencies fairly and adequately presented. The Senior Review Group shall recommend whether a paper, after review by it, should be referred for consideration by the National Security Council, forwarded directly to me for decision or returned to the originating body for revision before further consideration by the Senior Review Group.

The Senior Review Group shall assume the responsibilities assigned by NSDM 79 to the Special Review Group for South East Asia[3] and by memorandum of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of January 2, 1970 to the Ad Hoc Group for the Middle East.

This memorandum supersedes Section B of NSDM 2.

Richard Nixon

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[2] Document 11.

[3] Document 117.

122. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

The National Security Council System

Thank you for your thoughtful memorandum of August 4 on the NSC system.[2] I am glad you think the system is working well generally, and welcome your suggestions for improvement.

Many of your observations closely parallel my own thoughts. In particular, I agree on the desirability of establishing priorities among issues to be discussed, the necessity for clarity and precision in the preparation of the NSSM's, and the monitoring of studies by NSC staff members to ensure that divergent views are reflected in the papers. National Intelligence Estimates and other USIB studies have provided the basic intelligence background for most studies within the NSC system and we will continue to reflect them in the studies.

Continuing emphasis is placed on the setting of priorities for consideration of issues within the system. Your suggestions were helpful and in large part coincided with our planning. The series of discussions in the DPRC and NSC on Defense budget issues, the on-going series of meetings on European issues, and the series of Special Review Group and NSC meetings on the Middle East are examples. Other issues which you have suggested will be considered at an early date.

I recognize the difficulties created by the unavoidable schedule changes and hope you will agree we have been doing better in this regard recently. A monthly report on the status of all papers within the NSC system is being circulated to NSC members as you have suggested. The inconvenience of some of the tight deadlines arises, as I know you are aware, from the degree of importance and urgency which the President attaches to certain issues as well as the time sensitivity of the issues themselves.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Confidential. Drafted by Kennedy and Davis and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 25 memorandum in which they stated that many of Laird's suggestions were "good ones and in line with things we are now trying to do to make the system more effective. Others are not-too-well disguised attempts to remove major issues from the NSC and the interdepartmental arena and get them back into the hands of the 'agency of primary responsibility.'" (Ibid.)

[2] Document 116.

I believe that the establishment of the Senior Review Group at the Under Secretary level, which the President has just directed, will serve to meet two of your recommendations—expanding Review Group responsibilities, and minimizing the proliferation of high-level ad hoc groups.[3]

The WSAG has functioned effectively within the framework of the NSC system. It has coordinated the preparation of a variety of political-military contingency plans which stand ready for consideration by the NSC and the President should the occasion require. Moreover, it has provided, within the NSC framework, a senior body able to promptly and effectively consider policies and plans incident to crisis situations and to effect essential interagency coordination in the process of their development.

I will review carefully all of your suggestions and will continue to take all possible steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NSC system in line with the President's wishes.

Henry A. Kissinger

[3] Kissinger's response to Laird's August 25 memorandum was delayed pending a final decision on the establishment of the Senior Review Group, about which Kissinger had second thoughts (see footnote 3, Document 118).

123. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 25, 1970, 7:15 p.m.

R: I just heard about the press conference.[2] Did the President tell you to say all those things. You know you talked about the peace

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3. No classification marking. Drafted by W.G. Hall of the NSC staff. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "File or destroy?"

[2] Kissinger held a press backgrounder on September 25 from 2:30 to 3:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) A transcript of the briefing is ibid., Box 426, Briefings, Background. Kissinger responded to questions concerning, among other things, the President's upcoming visit to Yugoslavia, the components of a Middle East settlement, his own trip to Paris, the status of the Paris peace negotiations, Madame Binh's proposals, the U.S. role in the Middle East, Soviet activities in the Middle East, U.S. relations with Jordan, the reasons for the President's trip, the timing of the trip, and the possible establishment of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba.

initiative in Paris, the Middle East. Didn't realize the whole thing, the President wanted you to do.

K: Can't say exactly every last word of it.

R: God dammit, you said you would let me know.

K: I did.

R: Come on now, I talked to you about lunch and you didn't mention it.

K: I reject this tone. You always talk. . . . I got you at the Dutch Embassy.

R: You never mentioned anything like this.

K: Told Ted Eliot.

R: You told him about the backgrounder and then talked about all these other things.

K: Related to the trip[3] almost every one of them.

R: If that is the way it is going to be played, the Hell with it!

K: About what?

R: About everything. First you talk about Chile and got us in a hell of a jam. Had no idea you were going to _____.[4] Now I'm hearing all about the peace initiative that you are sponsoring.

K: I said exactly the opposite. No peace initiative. Why don't you read what I said before you start popping off. I said if the Soviets continue it would be of the utmost seriousness. Referred to the Kennedy statement Alex Johnson raised here yesterday and was supposed to be put out by State.

R: If it comes from the White House, it is a different matter.

K: I knew you would use the opportunity to do that. I am sick and tired of it.

R: Don't think you have a corner on being sick and tired of it. That we are having serious confrontation, is that what he wants? If the President is giving signals I don't know about I don't understand. Why didn't Ziegler handle it?

K: All of them being based on the previous Defense Department releases. The only thing that was changed was that I changed "utmost concern" to "the utmost seriousness." Literally the only thing that was changed.

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[3] Kissinger departed that evening for Paris for the Vietnam peace talks, and to meet with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. The President departed September 27 to visit five European countries and the Vatican, accompanied by Rogers for all but the Vatican visit.

[4] Omission in source text.

R: What I don't understand is if the President wants to play that way, fine I will do it that way. I am a good team player, I can help build up a crisis too if he wants it.

K: That is the last thing he wants. There would be no controversy if Defense hadn't blown every day.

R: Ziegler from all circumstances to stay away from this thing.

K: Ziegler spent a full 1/2 hour trying to stay away from it. The story broke and we found ourselves in this position. Result was we were confronted with this [series][5] of questions.

R: Prior backgrounder _____.[6]

K: Perhaps I didn't use the exact precise language but I have no interest in having a crisis on this issue. This job just isn't worth doing if this constant harassment from you . . .

R: Don't think you have a monopoly on this thing. There was no reason to have a backgrounder under these circumstances.

K: I informed Ted Eliot.

R: He didn't know you were going to talk about this thing.

K: If this thing hadn't blown out of Defense, there would have been no possibility of my saying anything like this. I _____[7] you on this. Haig and I went over so we _____.[8]

R: If anything _____.[9]

K: No, exactly the opposite.

R: You talked about the Paris thing, that you are going to Paris on a new peace initiative.

K: _____.[10]

R: I understand that but why was it necessary to have a background meeting.

K: Getting into a hell of a jam because of the State Department.

R: A jam because of the State Department, I haven't said a thing.

K: Not today. I said exactly the opposite, no initiative, no announcement, nothing coming out of this meeting or the Islander meeting. Read the backgrounder, see if it could have been said in a more explicit fashion than it has been said.

R: I will talk to the President. If we have this each time. . . .

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[5] All brackets are in the source text.

[6] Omission in source text.

[7] Omission in source text.

[8] Omission in source text.

[9] Omission in source text.

[10] Omission in source text.

K: I know who started all this about expel.[11]

R: Hell, I wasn't even in the country. I understand and think you . . .

K: Do not have the slightest interest in continuing. Three years from now they won't know who was up and who was down. I got you out of the Dutch Embassy.

R: You didn't mention a word about this.

K: I had informed your Executive Secretary.

R: When I was out of my office.

K: At a time when I didn't know you were out of the office. When I tried to reach you, I was so preoccupied with this disaster. Wish that the backgrounder had been delayed until after the Ziegler announcement. I will send you the text immediately and urge you to look at the actual language of what I said.

R: You commented on Madame Binh and what she said. If the President wants you to announce foreign policy [Okay, but it is either you or me].

K: Don't want to be in a position that we did nothing. Couldn't [just say it was on a trip] say this is a backgrounder on the trip, has nothing to do with Madame Binh's trip, completely dissassociate myself from Madame Binh.

R: I will think about what you have said.

K: Okay

R: Fine, I will see you in the morning.

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[11] A reference to Kissinger's statement at a July editors' briefing in San Clemente that it might be necessary to "expel" Russian technicians and pilots from Egypt. Marquis Childs reported in a July 20 column in *The Washington Post* that "this did not contribute to the peace initiative and Kissinger sent Rogers a telegram apologizing for his slip." Kissinger assured the President in a memorandum the same day that the report of an apology for using the word expel was "absolutely incorrect." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII 1 Jul 70–Aug 70)

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124. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for September 25, 1970, President's Assistant H. R. Haldeman wrote the following: "K[issinger] called at home tonight to say Rogers had called him in a blind rage, yelling at him, about the briefing [see Document 123]. Said K tricked P[resident] into

hard line about Cuba. Also claims K indicated there'd be a new peace initiative and that's why K going to Paris tonight (not true). Said 'One of us has got to go' and is going to P. K then felt he had to stay here to protect himself. Haig and I talked him into going." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

The next day, September 26, Haldeman told the President about Kissinger's call the previous evening. "P then had Haig in and went over the whole thing with both of us. Made it clear he felt K had erred in briefing yesterday, Haig said K knew it. P gave Haig his whole theory about how to handle crisis, said we couldn't let K–Rogers battles get in way of dealing with substance. Recognizes both were tired and strained, but that will always be the case in a major crisis. Simply have to get them both to quit acting like little children, trying to nail the other and prove him wrong. Since P sees exactly what they're doing, it's obvious neither will get away with it. I told P I had agreed with K that maybe he should think of leaving, he felt it was good to shake him a little. Said if K does go, he'd put Haig in the spot. But would really be a major loss, and then State and Rogers would run rampant which would be very bad." (Ibid.)

The President brought up the "K–Rogers battle" again on September 27, according to Haldeman's diary. President "wants me to get into it and try to work it out. Real problem is ego of both and determination of both to justify themselves, instead of selling the P and his program. In any event, have to find a way to avoid these wrangles in future. Asked if I felt time had come that one had to go. I said no, but we did have to resolve the problem. He indicated that if one did go it would have to be K, and he's obviously still thinking of Haig as replacement." (Ibid.)

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125. Memorandum From Jeanne Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Your Luncheon with Under Secretary Irwin, Thursday, October 15

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 340, HAK/Irwin Meetings. Secret.

This is the first of your planned weekly luncheons with Under Secretary Irwin,[2] continuance of your regular sessions with Elliot Richardson. We have canvassed the staff for items you may wish to raise, with the following results:

[Omitted here are items concerning Jordanian relief activities and the Middle East.]

State's Role in Interagency Coordination

State is still resisting the basic interagency concept of the NSC mechanism: specifically, papers prepared for the NSC or its subordinate bodies by the Interdepartmental Groups, the Under Secretaries Committee, or other groups chaired by State are, in many cases, being "approved" by the Secretary or an Under Secretary before they are sent here. Papers have often been seriously delayed, or even blocked, by this device. Wayne Smith's recent experience with the "provocative attacks" paper is an example. In addition, State has taken the position that these papers, once blessed by the Secretary, are no longer open to interagency dissent.

This is unfair to the other agencies who, in effect, are being subjected to the veto power of the Secretary of State. It is not consistent with the basic concept which is designed to assure that all agency views can and should be put forward. The Secretary of State, of course, is free to submit his views separately if he wishes.

You may wish to remind Mr. Irwin of the direct responsibility of the IG Chairman (and the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee) to the NSC, and the necessity for providing other agencies full opportunity to make their views known.[3]

[Omitted here is an item concerning security at the United Nations.]

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[2] Richardson stepped down as Under Secretary of State on June 23, 1970, to become Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. John Irwin entered on duty as Under Secretary of State on September 21, 1970.

[3] According to his record of schedule, Kissinger and Irwin met from 1:35 to 2:32 p.m. on October 15, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976)

126. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State (Cargo) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, October 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures—Your Lunch with Henry Kissinger

There are three related problems that I believe can usefully be discussed at your Wednesday lunch.

[Omitted here is discussion of the first problem, "FY 1971 Supplemental."]

2. Presentation of Issues to the President

In recent months and increasingly with the advent of the SRG, there has been confusion on the specifics and timing of the presentation of issues to the President. NSSM 99 on Cambodia[2] is a good example. After two meetings of the SRG, Alex Johnson circulated a draft cable which summed up the preliminary conclusions of the group (DOD and AID concurred) and suggested the next steps necessary in the process of consulting with the governments in the area.

Instead of getting approval of that message the President was asked by NSC staff to approve a NSDM, subsequently issued as NSDM 89 (Tab D).[3] The NSC staff then redrafted our message to include the text of the NSDM which gives the President's specific endorsement of Strategy 3 variant 3. Both we and Defense had not felt that such an approval, conveyed to the field, would help guide our missions. Instead we had conveyed the general purposes of our approach and specific guidelines for their discussions.

The issue here is not what goes in a cable but rather what goes to the President for decision and when. Without seeing what went to the President, it is difficult for us to know if indeed the President was approving all the analysis and conclusions of NSSM 99. Secretaries Rogers and Laird do not have the opportunity to comment in a timely and

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Hartman. Sent through U. Alexis Johnson and Eliot.

[2] NSSM 99, "U.S. Strategy for Southeast Asia," August 17, 1970. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–173, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 99)

[3] NSDM 89, "Cambodia Strategy," October 26, 1970. (Ibid., Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 89)

meaningful way to the President. They can clear a cable; they cannot be expected to approve a paper more than 100 pages long.

The principle to be guarded is that the Secretary have an opportunity to see the form in which an issue is being presented to the President, and based on this to make his recommendation. An NSC meeting offers the Secretary the opportunity to do this. The present procedures wherein issues frequently go directly from the SRG, Verification Panel or similar NSC bodies to the President for decision does not. Our recommendation therefore is that if a decision by the President is required after meetings of the SRG, Verification Panel or similar bodies, that recommendation be set forth in a memo from the group to the President. Then both Secretaries Rogers and Laird will have an opportunity to comment or add their own formal or informal advice.

(This same point arises in connection with the presentation to the President for decision of the options on handling the "provocative attack" issue discussed today by the Verification Panel. It is important, as you have already noted, for the Department and the Secretary to know exactly what is being presented to the President.)[4]

3. Timing of Meetings

As an aid to all concerned, and while recognizing Henry Kissinger's scheduling problems, I recommend that you put to Henry the suggestion that two or three specific times be set aside on the SRG members' schedules to be kept for possible meetings. This will, except in rare and unavoidable cases, obviate the necessity of changing meeting times constantly.

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[4] The Department of State's record of the Kissinger–Irwin luncheon on October 28 indicates that Irwin expressed State's concern over the system to be followed in presenting issues to the President with the advent of the SRG. Irwin noted that Kissinger had presented NSSM 99 to the President for a decision following the SRG meeting without holding an NSC meeting or informing the agency principals in attendance at the SRG that he would go directly to the President. The "basic question," Irwin stated, is: "At what point does the Secretary of State personally participate in the decision-making process under these circumstances?" According to the record, "the discussion was inconclusive and probably can be considered as the beginning of a continuing dialogue as required." (Veliotes, Record of Irwin/Kissinger Lunch of October 29, November 3; ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings) Veliotes incorrectly gives October 29 as the date of the lunch. Irwin and Kissinger met on October 28 at 12:10 p.m., but not on October 29. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

127. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon Today with Henry Kissinger

Two of the regional Assistant Secretaries (Marshall Green and Joe Sisco) have raised with me the difficulties caused them by virtue of the fact that when the President meets with foreign leaders, State Department representatives are usually not included in the meetings. The normal practice is for Henry Kissinger to be the only American present besides the President and, if necessary, an interpreter.

Henry usually takes some time to prepare and distribute a record of the meeting. Our Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors in the field are therefore left in the dark as to what has happened on matters which often are in a state of flux. For example, we do not yet have records of any of the President's meetings with foreign leaders this past weekend.

I suggest that you raise this problem with Henry and urge him to persuade the President to include an appropriate State Department official whenever he meets with foreign leaders except on a tête-à-tête basis. You could tell Henry that we would of course not distribute records of Presidential conversations without White House concurrence. But this new procedure would enable us quickly to prepare action and information telegrams on matters of importance that are discussed in these meetings.[2]

TLE

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings. Confidential.

[2] At the top of page 1 is written, "next HK/JNI meeting." The issue was not raised at the October 28 lunch. (Veliotes, Record of Irwin/Kissinger Lunch of October 29, November 3; ibid.)

128. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to All Assistant Secretaries of State and Bureau Heads[1]

Washington, November 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

White House Clearances of Policy Telegrams

The Executive Secretariat has had many questions recently about White House clearances and the procedures involved in obtaining such clearances. I hope that the following comments will be of assistance to you and your Country Directors and Desk Officers.

1. In general, when a Bureau is following policy already established by the NSC system, the highest clearance needed on an outgoing telegram is that of an Assistant Secretary or his Deputy or a Country Director. (Procedurally, both Exdis and Nodis cables receive an S/S clearance for administrative reasons.)

2. In cases where a telegram has major policy implications or involves the interest or special competence of one of the principal officers (the Secretary, the Under Secretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries or the Counselor) a clearance from the appropriate Principal should be obtained.

3. If a Bureau believes that, because of policy changes or innovations, a White House clearance may be required on a telegram, the telegram should be drafted for the approval of a Principal, and S/S should be advised of the possible need for White House clearance. S/S will seek the Principal's judgment as to whether a White House clearance is necessary.

4. When need for White House clearance is established, S/S is charged with responsibility for obtaining the appropriate clearance in coordination with the NSC Secretariat.

5. Please ask your staffs to bear in mind in considering requests from other offices to be included "on clearance," *the need for clearance* as contrasted with *the need to be informed* (which can be covered with a copy of the outgoing cable). As you are aware most substantive telegrams are routinely distributed to the NSC.

6. Procedures for obtaining White House clearance on non-policy telegrams (e.g., those involving the schedules of the President or mem-

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Memoranda Files: Lot 72 D 370, Memos, November 1970, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Veliotes and Williams (U); Getz and Monjo (J); Suchman (D); and McHenry (C).

bers of the White House staff, non-substantive Presidential messages to foreign leaders) are the same as the foregoing except that approval by a Principal is not necessary.

Don't hesitate to call on me or one of my Deputies (Mr. Brewster or Mr. Curran) if you have any general or specific questions on this matter.[2]

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

[2] The Executive Secretary provided the same guidance in a memorandum distributed on April 21, 1971. (Ibid., S/S Memos, April 1971, Vol. 4)

129. Editorial Note

On November 28, 1970, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig forwarded to the President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman five items that he considered "indicative of the problems we are having with the Department of State." One item, for example, was a Jack Anderson column stating that "diplomats are saying Richard Nixon may go down in history as the President who lost Latin America." In his covering memorandum, Haig contended that the "lack of discipline" was "largely attributable to known or imagined differences between the White House and State Department. Secretary Rogers is a major factor," but "even on issues where the Secretary may not be directly involved Department personnel know they can exploit the existence of a divergence between Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger as they pursue their own policy conceptions whether or not they coincide with approved Presidential policies. I cannot overemphasize the concern with which I view this problem area within security terms and in terms of the problems which it will pose for the President as '72 approaches." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3)

On both December 3 and 4, the President discussed the problem of State Department leaking with Haldeman. On December 4, according to Haldeman's diary entry, Nixon told him that he should definitely "go ahead on the talk with Rogers, making the point that there are two different fights involved here. One is with K[issinger] and Rogers, and that the P[resident], of course, has to side with Rogers on. But the second one is much more important: that's the foreign service vs. the P. There it's unforgivable, and the P is going to have heads

rolling. Since Cambodia, they've been taking on the P, leaking, etc. These things don't just happen, and from now on, it's us or them. State can't be told anything, and that's the way it is." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

At the same time the President asked for a record of press leaks attributable to State which undercut Presidential policy. On December 7 Haig sent the President a 23-page detailed description of more than 70 press leaks concerning, among other topics, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and SALT. In his covering memorandum Haig stated the leaks were "clearly and probably attributable to State" and indicated a "a consistent pattern of dissent." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3)

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130. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, December 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Diplomacy by the NSC Staff

One aspect of the operations of the NSC staff is particularly troublesome: direct dealings on official foreign policy matters with foreign officials without the participation or knowledge of the State Department.

Three recent examples are:

—John Thomson's visit to discuss the Indian Ocean (telegram at Tab A).[2]

—Henry's discussion with the Pakistan Ambassador on a special U.S. delegation to East Pakistan (telegram at Tab B).[3]

—About 10 days ago, Mr. Nachmanoff informed the Brazilian Ambassador that the Administration would not give a commitment at this time that it would tax Brazilian soluble coffee. We learned this when

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings. Confidential; Eyes Only.

[2] Not attached.

[3] Not attached.

we were provided the language at Tab C to be added to a telegram we were sending on recent Ways and Means Committee action on the International Coffee Agreement.[4]

We have no way of knowing of other such actions about which we have not been told.

I think the point to be made to Henry is that unless the President specifically requests that the Secretary of State not be consulted or advised of direct diplomacy by the NSC staff, we expect to be consulted and advised.

Furthermore, we regard all three of the above examples as "operational" and of the kind the State Department, in charge of foreign operations, should have had action on. For the NSC staff to undercut the Department in these ways harms the ability of the Department to carry out the functions the President has assigned to it.

I believe that this matter is so serious and important that you should convey the thought to Henry by implication that if this sort of problem recurs, the Secretary may raise it with the President.[5]

TLE

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[4] Attached but not printed. Arnold Nachmanoff was a member of the NSC's Operations Staff for Latin America.

[5] The State Department's record of Irwin's luncheon with Kissinger on December 10 states that Irwin raised the issue of NSC diplomacy "in general terms as well as the specifics of the three cases in point. HK agreed that the White House NSC staff should not be conducting diplomatic business directly with foreign governments." (Nicholas Veliotes, Memorandum for the Files, December 10; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Summaries of the Under Secretary's Meetings with the National Security Advisor)

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131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, January 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Coordination of Official Contacts with the USSR

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Matters Files, Lot 73 D 288, Senior Review Group Memos. Secret.

The President wishes to achieve more adequate coordination of our numerous official contacts with the USSR. He wants to ensure that he and members of the NSC can at all times be fully informed of the status of these contacts and that our activities with respect to the USSR are integrated to the fullest extent feasible.

The President has selected the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, reporting to the Senior Review Group, as the vehicle for serving this function. Accordingly, the IG/EUR, including representatives of department and agency heads concerned with one or another aspect of our relations with the USSR, should in the first instance devise effective means whereby our several contacts with the USSR will be carried out in a coherent and coordinated manner. These means should take due account of the need for prompt action when this is operationally required. When fully functioning on this matter, the IG/EUR should act as the coordinating body for our activities (other than covert) with respect to the USSR. It will also be the responsibility of the IG/EUR to maintain an up-to-date record of the status of all ongoing diplomatic and other official contacts with the USSR; it will further maintain an up-to-date projection of likely future contacts and activities.

This directive does not affect existing mechanisms dealing with certain aspects of our relations with the USSR, such as the SALT Backstopping Committee, the Berlin Task Force and committees already functioning within the NSC system. The IG/EUR will, however, be responsible for ensuring that heads of these existing groups are aware of ongoing and projected activities with respect to the USSR. Heads of existing groups, in turn, should keep the chairman of the IG/EUR as fully informed as possible of their decisions and the actions deriving therefrom.

The Chairman of the IG/EUR is requested to prepare a report to the Senior Review Group on the effectiveness of this operation after approximately three months, together with recommendations resulting from this initial experience.

Henry A. Kissinger

132. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Programming

The Problem

In my judgment, some major programming problems have arisen that need resolution if we are to have a comprehensive picture of the government's programming activities in selected countries and ensure adequate White House control over the government's activities.

—(1) The full harmonization of our policies and programs in key countries and regions requires that our efforts be viewed in their totality and systematically analyzed. You commented on this requirement in your memorandum to the President on Secretary Laird's "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence."[2]

"My view of a national security strategy encompasses a different set of issues than Secretary Laird's. A true national security strategy should include our diplomatic posture, our economic assistance and trade policies, and our cultural and educational programs as well as our military posture.

"If all of these instruments are brought to bear in an integrated fashion, we will establish a broader and more lasting basis for national security than that obtainable by forces alone. There must be an overall design. Then the policies of our allies and friends will enhance our interests, and the options open to our potential enemies will be minimized."

—(2) Program management and administration, already diffuse, are becoming even further fragmented. The NSC system is designed to strengthen attention given to our various programs and policies in order to broaden the range of choice for the President and other high-level decision makers. The NSC system is also intended to facilitate the integration of our entire program effort in key countries and regions.

Yet, in fact, the JCS, OSD, and State operate almost as independently as before, and none exercises overall control. Further fragmentation of

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. Confidential. Sent for action.

[2] Laird's paper on "The National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" and Kissinger's memorandum are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 236, DPRC & DEF Budget.

our programs is clearly visible. The "new approach to foreign assistance" will divide AID into three separate entities: one for developing lending, one for most technical assistance, and one for supporting assistance. However, this particular fragmentation could *help* our effort. AID is responsible for country programming of *some* of our programs now, but does them inadequately and does not have a sufficiently broad scope. By destroying a responsible but inadequate present mechanism, we are creating a new vacuum which we could exploit.

OMB has little control over these diverse programs, no inclination to adopt a country programming approach, a strong budgetary bias on all program issues, and a proclivity to view their function as being technicians. I was shocked at the recent FY 1972 OMB budget review of assistance programs at the lack of analysis. Alternative country assistance levels were bandied about without any substantive basis for evaluation. Decisions were made on the most arbitrary basis. Basic information such as a country-by-country presentation of our lending through international institutions was not available.

The point is that if our programs are to serve foreign policy goals, program decisions must be made in a foreign policy context. While this is being done on an ad hoc basis through the SRG, DPRC, and WSAG, it is not being done in a systematic way for all programs in key countries and regions.

—(3) There are gross inefficiencies in the allocation of our resources in selected countries and regions. International lending is a case in point. We do not always know how it serves our interests. In Vietnam we spend over half our resources for air activities while ground forces are only sparsely supported. Commenting recently on the capability of ARVN to deploy into Cambodia and at the same time continue operations against base areas within South Vietnam, the Chief of the JGS Combat Operations Division said:

"Additional [ground][3] units are needed and an expansion of the army is necessary, but there are not enough funds to support any more units. The JGS is seriously concerned about the problems and conditions of the soldiers it already has on its payroll."

We recently expanded military assistance to Jordan without looking at the requirement for additional economic assistance to allow the economy to sustain higher force levels.

We have made a decision on force levels and economic support for Cambodia (NSSM 99/NSDM 89)[4] but there is no forum for insur-

[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4] See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 126.

ing that the force levels and pay rates the GKR has opted for and our economic and military assistance plans are consistent. We have no way of knowing whether CINCPAC and the Mission even are adhering to NSDM 89's guidelines. State has voiced concern over the absence of coordination of these programs.

I believe the trade-offs between development assistance, supporting assistance, and military assistance and the relation of all three to our overall political goals lie at the heart of the Nixon Doctrine. Yet, our decision-making apparatus still reflects the naive belief that when we give hardware support to a country, e.g., Indonesia, Cambodia, or Thailand, we get military capability. We treat force levels and military pay on the one hand and supporting assistance on the other as if they were two separate factors, when, in fact, they are intimately connected. We place development on a pedestal above other goals, when, in fact, it is closely linked to military and economic strength and involves basic questions of political commitment to undertake reforms. These, in turn, as has been demonstrated in Korea and Taiwan and in a different way by Brazil, are related to foreign policies of the U.S. and the country in question.

The lesson of these examples is not that we need a comprehensive country mechanism for all countries. Rather, it is that in key countries such as Jordan, Vietnam, Cambodia, we need to insure that our program efforts are not counter-productive and that they make the most efficient use possible of the total resources we have.

—(4) Another difficulty is bureaucratic. State and Defense are already moving to pre-empt White House control of country programming. They can see a vacuum as well as we can. Motivated in particular by the security assistance review both agencies have recognized the need for country programming which by itself is desirable—but it needs to be integrated with our other programs as well. The Under Secretaries Committee's report[5] (Fred Bergsten is providing you with a separate memo on this) cited as common to all of its organizational options the requirement that "a single policy document covering all aspects of security assistance be prepared annually to guide program development."

State is considering letting a research contract to a team of systems analysts to help them devise such a country programming system. In

[5] A copy of the draft report dated December 5, 1970, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, Security Assistance, 1970–1971. A copy of the final report dated February 5, 1971, is ibid., Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, Security Assistance—Key Papers.

his report to you on the outcome of the security assistance deliberations, Under Secretary Irwin noted that:

"The Committee concludes that the present respective statutory responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense for direction, supervision and administration of these programs should be maintained. However, there must be improved coordination and liaison between the two Departments to ensure that these programs are integrated in as effective a manner as possible with U.S. defense plans and programs and U.S. foreign policy. The two Departments are now reviewing their internal organizations to determine what changes should be made toward this end."

This is fine, but past history shows that "improved coordination and liaison between the two Departments" usually means a negotiated compromise not alternatives based on analysis.

Your Alternatives

Any solution to this problem must overcome two obstacles. The first obstacle to a country programming approach has been the lack of agreed analytical techniques for integrated analysis and planning. The second is the requirement that the responsibility for country programming reside at a level that is close enough to the White House to (a) insure adequate White House control and (b) provide the leverage necessary to force State, DOD, and CIA to take integrated country programming seriously.

OMB and NSC are the likely candidates for this latter task. My reservations on having OMB do it are stated above. The key consideration, however, is the program budget.

The methodological arguments used by AID at the SRG meeting on Brazil notwithstanding, I believe we have developed the capability to do good country programming on a limited number of countries. This capability has been demonstrated in the following studies:[6]

—Cambodia (NSSM 99 Phase I—NSDM 89)
—Korea (NSSM 27—NSDM 48)
—Vietnam (NSSM 77, NSSM 99)
—Thailand (NSSM 51)

We now have a firm analytical foundation for these countries. They also are countries for which annual budget decisions inevitably involve major policy issues, a point amply demonstrated this year by OMB's attempt to arbitrarily cut supporting assistance for Vietnam.

Other countries—for example, Jordan, Indonesia, and India—could be added. The determinants of how many countries would be addressed in a country programming exercise would depend on (a) the

[6] NSSMs and follow up studies, organized by NSSM number are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–163, H–138, H–173, and H–149–H–150; NSDMs and supporting material are ibid.; Boxes H–219, H–215, and H–222.

number of countries for which major program decisions have an important impact on our overall policy, and (b) the number of individuals on the NSC staff you would want to devote to this project, and (c) the support we receive from the agencies.

How Country Programming Would Work

If we were to formalize what has to date been an ad hoc country programming effort, it should be designed to accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Influence the development of program issues and alternatives before final budget decisions are made.
(2) Provide a substantative basis for final budget deliberations either between you and George Shultz or by the SRG, and final decision by the President if necessary.
(3) Provide for at least some monitoring of the execution of White House decisions before and during the fiscal year.

For example, country programming might proceed as follows for FY 1973:

—In January or February, in cooperation with OMB, guidance would be issued to the agencies and the field for the development of program issues and analysis for FY 1973. This would be followed by an interagency meeting at my level. The meeting would initiate the development of a Country Program Memorandum (CPM) that would be the final decision-making document for the FY 1973 budget.

—In the late summer of 1971 we would hold an initial program review at the working level to consider draft FY 1973 CPM's. The NSC staff would devise a format for the CPM's and provide technical direction for their development. Primary responsibility for drafting each CPM would be assigned to selected agencies (most likely those which have major programs in the country) or to the NSC or OMB staff. For example, India might be handled by AID, Korea by DOD, Jordan by State, Thailand by OMB and Vietnam by NSC. While one agency would be assigned primary responsibility, the final CPM would be an inter-agency document.

—The CPM's would then be forwarded to you as Chairman of the SRG and to OMB Director Shultz by mid-October. You could decide to hold a meeting on one or several of them, to consider the issues raised in a meeting with Shultz, and/or forward them to the President.

Setting Up the CPM System

Two current NSDM's relate to the procedure I have outlined above. NSDM 4, as revised September 4, 1969, (at Tab B)[7] is the charter for detailed country studies that are undertaken on an ad hoc basis. I

[7] Document 71.

believe NSDM 4 should remain in effect. We need to retain the option of exploring at great depth selected problem areas without being locked into the budget cycle.

NSDM 10 (at Tab C)[8] is the other decision document that bears on country programming. It directs the Secretary of State to submit annually "a country memorandum setting forth the total economic assistance program, including AID and PL 480, for major countries." The AID Administrator initiates the memoranda.

I have reviewed the NSDM 10 submissions. They have three serious drawbacks:

—all U.S. country programs are not included. The NSDM 10 requirement covers only PL 480 and AID programs, not military assistance, U.S. multi-lateral lending, direct U.S. involvement, trade, etc.

—in most cases no alternatives are presented. Instead the agency view is forwarded for Presidential endorsement. In the few cases where alternatives are presented they are of the "high," "intermediate," and "low," variety with the middle option inevitably being selected.

—very little analysis is provided. How are our interests served by what is proposed? What trade-offs are possible and what alternatives do they suggest (e.g., indigenous forces for U.S. forces, indigenous ground forces versus air forces, economic versus military support). On what issues does one's choice of the options turn? These questions are simply not addressed. Moreover, there is no program budget or other basis for analysis.

The Drawbacks

There are drawbacks to embarking on an integrated country programming effort under NSC direction:

—OMB's support would be mandatory. Shultz would have to be willing to expose his budget arguments to substantive scrutiny by the SRG or by you. I believe Shultz is committed to decision-making based on analysis and thus would be receptive to a country programming approach.

—You would have to obtain firm Presidential backing in order to convince the agencies that NSC direction is a workable solution to our country programming problems. State and DOD see a role for themselves. While the approach outlined above gives them a major role in the preparation of the CPM's, it would be clear that overall direction would be an NSC responsibility. I have no firm basis for predicting State, DOD or CIA's reaction to a country programming NSDM. It is possible that if the groundwork were carefully laid, we could pull the

[8] Dated April 11, 1969. Attached but not printed.

whole thing off with little pain. But a major bureaucratic battle cannot be ruled out.

—A new factor is the pending creation of the International Economic Policy Council. Its policy making and coordinating mandate on all foreign economic policy will certainly include trade, but also—within the general policy guidance of the NSC—may include foreign aid (presumably only of the economic variety). Trade should not be much of a problem, because we can't really include it very meaningfully into country programs anyway. Aid would seem to be the main potential source of difficulty. Even here, the new Council should restrict itself to broad policy issues and not try to get into individual country situations—and it probably will not if the present plan to keep it without its own staff survives. However, this development does raise one more issue which you may have to iron out with Shultz.

—Additional NSC manpower would be required to guarantee the necessary bureaucratic and quality control of the CPM effort. For example, if my office were given this additional responsibility, I estimate that at least 1 and probably 2 more people would be needed. And I think this would be true for other offices (e.g., Bergsten's) which you might want to give this responsibility.

Recommendation

I strongly believe that the advantages of a country programming effort far out-weigh its bureaucratic drawbacks, that it represents an area where we can add greatly to our existing intellectual capital stock and that the Administration should embark on a country programming effort of limited scope for FY 1973. Seven countries—South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, India, Jordan, and Indonesia—are prime candidates to be covered in the first year.

I have prepared a memorandum for the President (at Tab A) to obtain his approval of the country programming effort and an implementing NSDM (attached to his memorandum).

I recommend that you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A,[9] and upon receipt of his approval, sign the attached NSDM.

Fred Bergsten concurs in this memorandum.

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[9] Not printed. Kissinger did not sign the memorandum. Instead, he wrote on page 1 of Smith's memorandum: "Arrange a meeting with Schultz [*sic*] & then let's do a jt. [joint] memo." Beneath his note the date "Jan 20 1971" is stamped. In a March 27 memorandum to Kissinger, Smith reported that he had met with Shultz, who strongly supported Smith's proposal but suggested two modifications in the proposed NSDM, which Smith incorporated. Smith drafted a joint memorandum to the President which Shultz signed and Smith forwarded for Kissinger's signature under cover of his March 27 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–290, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112.) See Documents 149 and 150.

133. Editorial Note

On January 18, 1971, *The New York Times* carried an article entitled "Foreign Policy: Decision Power Ebbing at the State Department," the first in a series of seven articles in the *Times* on the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. The opening paragraph stated: "The Department of State, once the proud and undisputed steward of foreign policy, has finally acknowledged what others have long been saying: that it is no longer in charge of the United States' foreign affairs and that it cannot reasonably expect to be so again." President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman noted in his diary entry for January 18 that the article generated a "big flap" and "had Rogers quite upset; and he succeeded in getting the P[resident] into the same frame of mind. The P's reaction was to put out a statement from him blasting the article; but a careful reading of it convinced me that it's got enough basis in fact and accuracy that such a statement wouldn't be a good thing to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

Following remarks critical of Secretary of State William Rogers by Senator George Aiken (R–Vermont) that were carried by one of the wire services, the President assured Aiken in a February 9 letter that "Rogers takes part in every step of the planning and discussion associated with foreign policy" and "he has my complete confidence." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential File, FG 11) Aiken responded in a February 11 letter to Nixon that his letter was "most welcome" since "there was, indeed, a growing feeling on the Hill that Bill Rogers was not carrying the weight in formulating foreign policy to which the Secretary of State would naturally be entitled." (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG)

On March 2 Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) gave an address on the Senate floor that was released to the press under the title "Further Concentration of Power, Executive Privilege, and the 'Kissinger Syndrome.' " Symington made note of *The New York Times* articles and proceeded "to examine both the nature and the scope of Dr. Kissinger's present authority." Among other things, he reviewed the "complex structure of six committees" that Kissinger had established under the National Security Council, noting pointedly that Kissinger was chairman of all six. And he emphasized that, unlike the Secretary of State, Kissinger wielded his far-reaching authority "without any accountability of any kind whatever to the Congress." (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5) In response Kissinger prepared a memorandum for President Nixon, undated, calling Symington's address "a fundamental misunderstanding of how the NSC system actually works. He does not recognize that the function of the National Security Council system is to advise the President and support him in his decision making role. The NSC does not

as an entity itself make decisions—only you do." Kissinger then highlighted ten additional examples of "factual errors and misconceptions" in Symington's statement. (Ibid.)

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134. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)[1]

Washington, January 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

Coordination of Official Contacts with the USSR

Upon reading Mr. Kissinger's memorandum of January 7 on the above subject,[2] the Secretary asked me to inform you that the procedures outlined in the memorandum should not alter our internal procedures for clearances of substantive cables with the White House. This means that such cables will only be cleared with the White House if the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or the Under Secretary for Political Affairs deem it necessary.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.[3]

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Memoranda Files: Lots 72 D 371, Memos, 1971, Vol. 3. Secret. Copies were sent to Rogers, Irwin, Johnson, Pedersen, Stevenson, the heads of 10 bureaus, and the Director of ACDA.

[2] Document 131.

[3] Printed from a copy that indicates Eliot signed the original.

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135. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for January 20, 1971, President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman wrote the following: "We had a long meeting this afternoon with E[hrlichman], Shultz, Mitchell, and K[issinger], at Henry's request to discuss in detail his problems with the State Department. He walked into the meeting with huge thick folders for each of us with all kinds of papers documenting his case on the terrible things State has been doing in the public press, and how they've been undercutting him in

internal operations, and how they've disobeyed Presidential orders, cable traffic and all sorts of stuff. He did an extremely good job, for a change, of presenting his case quite unemotionally and very rationally; this made it far more effective than it usually is when he gets going. He really wrapped it up by saying he wasn't going to discuss with the P[resident], but was hoping we would find a way to approach it, and that problem had to be resolved. He would not continue this method of operation. If it couldn't be resolved, he would leave; if it could be, he'd be perfectly willing to work within a new approach, as long as NSC has complete control and Rogers is, as he puts it, 'brought to heel.'" (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

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136. Draft Paper Prepared in the National Security Council[1]

Washington, January 20, 1971.

WHITE HOUSE–STATE RELATIONSHIPS

1. All contacts with the White House by the Secretary of State which deal with national security affairs and foreign policy must, as a general rule, be channeled through the NSC office. Direct telephone calls from the Secretary to the President should normally be handled this way. Exceptions should be brought immediately to Dr. Kissinger's attention so that he is fully apprised of the contents of the Secretary's exchange with the President.

2. The President's directive from Colorado Springs of September 1, 1969[2] and from Washington on December 21, 1970, are in full force.[3] They require that all cables and contacts involving policy matters and especially those with the Soviet Union, including Ambassadorial contacts, will be cleared by the President through the NSC office. Cases of doubt will be resolved in favor of clearance. Following such a contact, the President, through Dr. Kissinger, will be immediately informed in writing of the full context of the exchange.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Typed 4:15 p.m." The paper was presumably prepared in connection with Kissinger's meeting on January 20 with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Shultz, and Mitchell that is described in Document 135.

[2] Document 70.

[3] A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

3. Henceforth, the Middle East situation will be managed within the broad framework of the National Security Council system as with any national security matter. Existing White House clearance procedures will be applicable. (Dr. Kissinger agrees that if the President so directs, he will defer to the Secretary of State on policy issues involving the Middle East situation but this arrangement must be applied within the established NSC system.)

4. Just as press leaks emanating from the White House which are derogatory to the Department of State are unacceptable to the national security, similarly attacks on White House policies emanating from State sources constitute attacks on the Presidency and are no longer acceptable. Immediate remedial steps should be taken to insure greater discipline in their respect.

5. Dr. Kissinger will agree to notify the Secretary of State prior to any contacts involving policy matters between him and the representatives of foreign governments. Notification of the fact of contact will be made beforehand and a memorandum of conversation will be furnished in writing on an exclusive basis, following the contact.

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137. Memorandum From Seymour Weiss of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State to the Staff Director (Cargo)[1]

Washington, January 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSSM Process

In response to your request, the following three examples illustrate in varying ways how the NSSM process might be adjusted to secure a better result:

1) *NSSM 69—US Nuclear Policy in Asia.* The NSSM sought an analysis of a sensible nuclear strategy for the United States in Asia.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, Review of NSSM Process. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Hartman. Weiss' memorandum responded to a January 22 request from Cargo. In response to the same request, five other staff members also prepared memoranda reviewing the NSSM process, which are ibid.

However its terms of reference largely ignored the fact that a major, if not the major, determinant in such a strategy is the political context within which one might realistically anticipate that nuclear weapons might be used to secure US objectives. This failure, together with the assignment of the responsibility for Chairmanship to DOD, resulted in a study which, though launched in July of 1969, has yet to be completed! Draft, after draft, after draft, was produced each advancing no more forward than its predecessor in effectively analyzing the problem and the range of issues bearing on it. Eventually an ad hoc accommodation was worked out among State, OSD, JCS and the NSC staff, resulting in a study being produced. The resultant study still lacked cohesiveness and an integrated approach and was typified, quite literally, by agency footnotes to footnotes. Some discussion of the terms of reference before they were issued might just possibly have resulted in a better end product.

2. *NSSM 84—US Strategies and Forces for NATO.* Responsibility for chairing this study was again delegated to the Department of Defense, despite the fact that in this case the NSSM did recognize a number of the political variables which required analysis. The terms of reference and the subsequent procedures were deficient in the following respects: (a) not all or even necessarily the most important political implications were identified for analysis; (b) placing the chairmanship in Defense implied that the overriding concern and the ultimate focus of the study should appropriately be militarily rather than politically oriented; and (c) the nature of the studies themselves were extremely unrealistic. To amplify the last point, extensive war gaming type of analysis were included for the purpose of establishing a statistical measure of what was required for appropriate military strategy for NATO. These efforts were voluminous, time consuming, repetitious and in some measure duplicatory of work done in previous years, and in the end not productive of new insights. The single most important action on which a decision was needed dealt with the maintenance of US forces committed to NATO, and this decision emerged not from the NSSM 84 study but as a result of a memorandum from the Secretary to the President!

3. *NSSM 100—Military Cooperation with France.* This study, currently in process, was assigned to State, in this case appropriately recognizing the overriding political implications of the subject. Moreover such a study was needed and in all candor would probably not have been initiated by the Department. So far so good. The problem lay in interpreting what was desired. Literal reading of the terms of reference suggested a rather narrow focus on certain specific areas of cooperation, such as in R&D. In fact the study was accompanied by an oral interpretation suggesting that a broader approach was desired. Because of the room for confusion, State insisted that an NSC representative ac-

tually participate in the development of the study, a somewhat unusual procedure. This in fact resulted in three different NSC staff members participating at differing periods, each advancing a different interpretation of what was desired. Had there been an opportunity for a preliminary State–Defense–NSC staff discussion before the terms of reference were issued, some of the ensuing confusion might have been obviated.

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138. Memorandum From John Negroponte of the National Security Council Planning Group to the Director of the Planning Group (Kennedy)[1]

Washington, February 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Under Secretaries Committee

Introduction

In its 2 year existence, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has put out some 91 U/SMs (analogous to our NSSMs). Topics covered have varied greatly. About 60 percent of them have been in what one might call the political/military category. Scientific and technical issues represent about 20 percent and economic ones the remaining 20 percent.

Following the terms of its original charter in NSDM 2,[2] the Committee's work has flowed mostly from matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group (now supplanted by the Senior Review Group) and matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger. The Secretary of State also has the authority to refer matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities overseas to the Committee, although he uses it sparingly.

Almost by definition, the Committee does not handle matters of major policy which require NSC or Presidential consideration. Thus while Dr. Kissinger is a standing member, he rarely attends its meetings. He is normally represented by a member of his staff.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential.

[2] Document 11.

NSC Staffing of the Under Secretaries Committee

Once a topic has been assigned, the Under Secretaries Committee staffs it by drawing on the resources of interdepartmental or ad hoc groups. NSC staff participation in the process is determined by functional specialization. Thus Behr will be responsible when science and technology is involved, Bergsten for economic matters, etcetera. The usual practice seems to be that staff members will follow the progress of a project using their own judgment as to when—if at all—Dr. Kissinger should be informed of how issues are developing.

Where guidance is required, it is usually requested in a memorandum analysing the problem and suggesting what is considered to be the appropriate guidance. When a meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee itself is in question there is sometimes a recommendation as to whether Dr. Kissinger himself should attend the meeting. My impression is that the recommendation cannot help but be influenced by the knowledge that Dr. Kissinger normally prefers not to attend.

Problem Areas

There appear to be no dramatic difficulties with respect to the Under Secretaries Committee. Some problem areas are worth signalling:

1. Substance of the Committee's Work

There are occasional complaints that the kind of work assigned to the Committee is not important enough and that it is simply a sort of catch-all for problems other elements of the NSC system do not want to deal with.

Despite these occasional grumblings, my impression from talking to Art Hartman was that this is not a serious bone of contention at this time. The Committee accepts its role and the kind of work it is doing. And if it has any concrete proposals for altering the substance of its work in any way, Hartman did not mention or infer them to me.

As far as the NSC is concerned, I can see no compelling reason for any change in the kind of work delegated to the Committee.

2. Duplication of Effort

In a way there is a built-in check against duplication of effort since much of the staff work done by the Under Secretaries Committee is accomplished by the same people who staff other constituent parts of the NSC. There are, however, occasional instances where a new NSSM will appear to duplicate efforts planned or underway in the Committee. NSSM 112[3] on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in future

[3] NSSM 112, "U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy on Use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War," January 15, 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 112.)

wars is one such example. This NSSM was issued at just the same time as the Under Secretaries Committee was about to recommend a similar study. (There is a background to this and the issuance of the NSSM may have been inevitable.)

What the NSSM 112 experience does suggest is that before a NSSM is issued we be doubly sure that it does not cross wires with projects planned or under way and which might adequately be handled elsewhere. Any decision to cross wires like this should at least be made consciously and not inadvertently.

One way to handle this would be to require that in submitting draft NSSMs, staff officers attach a listing of similar high-level studies being conducted elsewhere in the government and, where it seems appropriate, an explanation why these studies would not serve the purposes of the contemplated NSSM.

3. Systematic Staffing

The present NSC staffing of the Under Secretaries Committee appears to have no major shortcomings. Principal problems would appear to relate to the demands on Dr. Kissinger's own time. Since he cannot attend as many meetings as some would like, it is important that he at least have time to focus on the relevant papers and be properly represented at the meetings.

It is perhaps not wise to set out too elaborate or rigid a mechanism for staffing the Committee. The present informal system appears to be working fairly well and any excessively formalized procedures might end up being honored in the breech.

However, it might be worth considering establishment of a few ground rules which, if approved, could be circulated to the staff in the form of a memorandum. Among the points we would want to make would be the following.

1. Dr. Kissinger is interested in being kept informed of important developments in the work of the Under Secretaries Committee.
2. Staff officers should continue their practice of summarizing issues to be discussed at Committee meetings and, where appropriate, recommend what position we should take on them. There should also be a recommendation as to whether or not he should attend the meeting. Briefing papers of this kind should reach Dr. Kissinger's office a week before the scheduled meeting.
3. In the event Dr. Kissinger does not attend a scheduled Under Secretaries Committee meeting, representation from the NSC should be at the Senior Staff level.

4. The Council on International Economic Policy

Though not directly germane to this discussion, Art Hartman mentioned that the creation of this new council would involve a period of adjustment as we sort out which issues are handled where. This is something that will have to be worked out as time goes by, and will probably affect the work of the Under Secretaries Committee only slightly.

139. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, February 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

State–White House Clearance Procedures

In recent weeks a number of outgoing State cables, which have not been coordinated with the White House, in my view needed clearance in order to comply with the President's directives on clearance procedures. As you know, the President described his wishes concerning White House clearance in his Colorado Springs memorandum of September 1, 1969,[2] and reaffirmed them in his memorandum of December 21, 1970, Subject: "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements."[3] In both directives the President stated that, "Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental interests, it will be resolved in favor of clearance."

The following cables are examples of cables which appear to have violated the spirit of the President's instructions: State 209304 (Dec. 24); State 005063 (Jan. 12); State 005520 (Jan. 13); State 006930 (Jan. 14);[4] State 007936 (Jan. 15); State 007497 (Jan. 15); State 007861 (Jan. 15); State 008169 (Jan. 17); State 016543 (Jan. 30) and State 016548 (Jan. 30). Many of these messages, undoubtedly, were dispatched without your being made aware of the clearance process followed. I noted, for example, that in the case of State 016543 you had only cleared the message in substance.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the top of page 1 reads: "Dispatched by hand to Ted Eliot, 2–5–71."

[2] Document 70.

[3] A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

[4] In a January 16 memorandum to Rogers which is attached to a January 16 cover note stating "Do not send! Hold per Gen Haig," Kissinger called Rogers' attention to the Presidential directives on White House clearance in light of telegram 006930 to Cairo: According to Kissinger, "a message to the Egyptian Foreign Minister repeated to six Ambassadors abroad as well as our Ambassador to the United Nations and authorizing the latter to show it to Ambassador Jarring by definition involves national policy and requires White House clearance under the provisions of the President's directives." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4)

I know that you share my interest in insuring adherence to the clearance and coordination procedures established by the President. In the future, if there is doubt as to White House interest or insufficient time for following formal procedures, I would welcome a phone call on outgoing cables dealing with policy issues.

Henry A. Kissinger

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140. National Security Decision Memorandum 98[1]

Washington, February 9, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Coordination of Foreign Affairs Research Sponsored by the Federal Government

The President has reviewed the report of the Ad Hoc Committee set up under the authority of the memorandum of May 28, 1969, to review present procedures for coordinating foreign affairs research sponsored by the Federal Government.[2] He considers that the report underscores the necessity for closer coordination of foreign affairs research to avoid duplication of effort and to enhance the quality and utility of the research project.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–222, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 98. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, and the Treasury; the Directors NSF, NASA, OEP, and OST; the Chairmen of AEC and the JCS; and the Administrator of AID.

[2] The May 28, 1969, memorandum and the Ad Hoc Committee report, forwarded to Kissinger by Cline under cover of an August 14, 1970, memorandum, are ibid. The committee recommended establishment of a new Interdepartmental Group for Foreign Affairs Research. In a 4-page memorandum to Kissinger, December 1, 1970, Smith and Kennedy summarized and evaluated the report, including DOD and ACDA dissent, and recommended that the President assign responsibility for interagency coordination of foreign affairs research to the Under Secretaries Committee, not a new IG. (Ibid.)

The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee assume the responsibility for assuring interagency coordination of the external foreign affairs research sponsored by the departments and agencies in receipt of this Memorandum.[3] In this connection, the Under Secretaries Committee is charged with coordinating the preparation of an annual foreign affairs consolidated research plan to be submitted for approval by the President. This plan should state group-wide and individual agency research goals and priorities, present a multi-year plan for regional and functional areas indicating agency responsibilities, and suggest joint funding of particular activities. It should be designed to avoid duplication and assure maximum interagency utility of the end product in terms of both content and availability. The Under Secretaries Committee also should make recommendations on related matters, including the state of in-house research programs and capabilities.

The Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee may establish an interagency subcommittee or working group, including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum as appropriate, to assist the Under Secretaries Committee in the discharge of this responsibility.

Those parts of the terms of reference proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the purpose, scope, membership, and functions of a coordinating body should be drawn upon by the Under Secretaries Committee as appropriate in carrying out its responsibilities.

Henry A. Kissinger

[3] In response to a comment by Kissinger on their December 1 memorandum, Smith and Kennedy added the latter part of this sentence to the NSDM "to make clear that NSC-sponsored research in not included within the Under Secretaries Committee's scope of authority." (Memorandum from Smith and Kennedy to Kissinger, February 5; ibid.)

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141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 10, 1971.

I have reviewed the cables referred to in your memorandum of February 5.[2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] Document 139.

The applicable part of the President's two directives to which you refer is that governing official communications, which states: "All official communications with policy implications must be cleared with the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. . . ."[3]

Early in the Administration I established procedures within the Department concerning clearances with the White House. These procedures fully accord with the President's memoranda of September 1, 1969[4] and December 21, 1970.[5] All of the cables mentioned in your memorandum were handled in accordance with these procedures. They do not in my view depart from policy established by the President, and I therefore do not consider that the question of policy implication arises.

William P. Rogers

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[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

[4] Document 70.

[5] A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

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142. Editorial Note

President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman and Secretary of State Rogers met for lunch in the 8th floor dining room of the Department of State on February 22, 1971, from 1:05 to 4:24 p.m. They were joined during the lunch by U. Alexis Johnson. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books)

In his diary entry for that day, Haldeman wrote the following: "I had a three hour lunch with Rogers, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing State Department personnel, which we did go into in considerable detail. It was clear, however, that Rogers' principal concern was to try to work out the Henry K problem, and he specifically asked for ways that he could direct communications to the P[resident] directly, rather than via Henry. Also wanted some help on trying to undo some of the operation of the NSSMs which have him concerned, as well as Mel Laird. Basically he is sincerely trying to do what he thinks is best for the P and, of course, so is Henry; but the two of them just stay on a collision course, and somehow we've got to figure out how to work it out. Henry caught me later and made it clear that his dissatisfaction is again reaching a peak also, so we have a lot to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

143. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 26, 1971.

We have now had over two years' experience with the NSSM system.

On the whole, I believe this system has served the President well. It has frequently presented him with opportunities to make key decisions based on a full range of opinions and facts. Moreover, I think the efficiency of the system has improved with experience.

I believe that the system could be further improved if there were consultation between us on the objectives, scope, timing, and action assignment of NSSMs before they are issued. I have in mind the desirability of precluding—or holding to the minimum—instances in which the preparation of studies might be delayed or made unnecessarily difficult by lack of a common appreciation of the purposes to be served and of the study approaches which might most effectively be employed. I also have in mind the usefulness of ensuring that the Under Secretaries Committee, within the limits of its responsibilities, shares fully in the total workload of the system.

I believe that the most practical means of consultation would be for you and me or Jack Irwin to discuss possible NSSMs and to agree beforehand on their central elements.

Such a procedure would be helpful in making the NSSM system even more useful to the President than it now is. Please let me have your reaction.[2]

William P. Rogers

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71. Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum. Kennedy wrote at the top: "Rogers gangs up with Laird."

[2] Kennedy drafted a memorandum in response on March 1, revised it on March 5, and revised it again on March 9 after Kissinger commented: "Do it as a letter—as if it is something I don't have to do. I'll dictate." The final draft stated: "From time to time, once the President has decided on the topics which he wishes studied, I would hope to be able to discuss with you or Jack Irwin the specific requirements which certain NSSM's would lay out." The letter was apparently "OBE" (overtaken by events) and not sent, but an agreement was presumably reached (see, Document 155). Documentation on the response to Rogers' February 26 memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5; and ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974.

144. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, March 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

DPRC

The DPRC has proven to be an important and worthwhile step in institutionalizing the role of State in the Defense budget process and in focusing the attention of senior officials on major Defense planning issues with fiscal or foreign policy implications. However, the performance of the DPRC has not matched our original expectations in many respects. I am particularly concerned that the working procedures within the DPRC are not contributing to the overall effectiveness of that organization and, in turn, limiting its usefulness to the President.

Among the positive contributions that the DPRC offers in the formulation of Defense policy are the following:

—Acts as a sounding board for top level ideas.
—Facilitates the exchange of information between Departments.
—Provides a vehicle for integrating, not just coordinating, various Defense programs.
—Helps to highlight crucial Defense problem areas for the President and informs him of various Department's views (ABM).
—Elicits concrete guidance from the President.

While the DPRC has provided a desirable forum for the exchange of ideas among the top echelons of the various USG agencies, its specific accomplishments have been limited. In analyzing the purpose and history of the DPRC the following problem areas are noted:

1. DOD drafts most of the papers considered by the DPRC with minimum consultation or opportunity for study by other members prior to meetings.

2. The DPRC Working Group is not used effectively. It meets infrequently and does not get involved in preparing papers for DPRC consideration.

3. The DPRC, itself, meets sporadically, and with an agenda that is put together on an ad hoc basis. This provides little opportunity for research of complex issues at lower levels prior to meetings.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings. Secret with Top Secret attachment. Drafted by Robert Ainsworth of PM/ISP on March 2 and cleared by Leon Sloss (PM/ISP) and Weiss (S/PC).

4. There is no apparent follow-up on many of the issues raised. There is no pressure to get projects out and reported back to DPRC.

5. The organization is not used to review NSSMs as originally intended.

6. Normally, there is no conclusion reached or even substantive agreement on issues discussed. (Except ABM.)

7. While we have taken the initiative on several occasions to bring problems and proposals before the Committee for discussion, there might be a better, more structured way of focusing on key issues. At present, there is no prescribed way of getting issues before the DPRC, and no apparent agreement on what types of issues should be raised and who should be responsible for introducing these issues to the DPRC.

8. DOD appears reluctant to use the DPRC to review such considerations as force size and deployments. This is perhaps the most critical of all the problems facing the DPRC. Unless DOD opposition to the full and candid use of the DPRC in resolving the more difficult Defense questions can be overcome, no amount of improvement in the working procedures of the DPRC will help to make the organization an effective management tool for assisting the President.

I recognize that a number of practical problems contribute to this state of affairs, but I believe we can and should improve upon the present system in order to make it more responsive to the needs of the President and his advisors. The following suggestions are offered:

a. We should propose more interagency drafting of DPRC papers.

b. We should urge that drafts be discussed at the staff level before senior-level review in DOD.

c. We should urge more meetings of the DPRC Working Group.

d. We should recommend a regular schedule of recurring discussion topics over a given Fiscal Year to facilitate advanced planning and study (i.e., 5-Year Force and Program Plan).

e. We should obtain agreement as to types and the scope of issues to be raised at the DPRC and a set procedure for bringing these issues before the Committee for review. We feel the ideal would be to have DOD prepare the basic paper and turn it over to the Working Group who, in turn, would review the paper for the purpose of highlighting and focusing attention on the key issues prior to submission to the DPRC.

f. We should encourage the monthly dissemination of a DPRC Working Group Status Report which would provide a description of the issue under study, the individual(s) responsible for the study, the expected completion date for presentation to the DPRC, and scheduled meeting date(s) of the Working Group for the coming month.

Recommendation

I suggest that you discuss our concern about the DPRC and the above suggestions informally with Dr. Kissinger at one of your up-

coming luncheons.[2] We have reason to believe that he and his staff share many of the views noted above. If you wish, we would be happy to discuss these matters with you prior to such a meeting.

A brief review and analysis of the DPRC to date is attached.[3]

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[2] Veliotes forwarded Spiers' memorandum to Irwin under cover of a March 15 memorandum in which he touched on the DPRC and three other topics for Irwin's March 16 lunch with Kissinger. Irwin returned the memorandum to Veliotes with a note next to the DPRC item stating: "not discussed. Give me back for next luncheon." (Ibid.) Kissinger and Irwin met for lunch on March 16 from 1:21 to 2:20 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No record of the discussion at the next luncheon has been found.

[3] Attached but not printed. There is no indication of approval of the recommendation. To the right is written: "Ron agrees no discussion required."

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145. Memorandum by the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, April 16, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Legislative Coordination in National Security Affairs

The President has reestablished the White House Working Group and directed that this Group be responsible for supervision of Administration policy on legislative matters involving national security affairs.

The White House Working Group will carry out its responsibilities through the establishment of a Legislative Interdepartmental Group composed of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Counselor to the President for Congressional Relations.

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1971, Directive #89. No classification marking.

The LIG will meet fortnightly or more often as required.

Please designate your representative for the first meeting of the LIG by Tuesday, April 20. A meeting will be scheduled in the very near future.[2]

H.

[2] Minutes or summaries of conclusions for 10 LIG meetings during 1971 and 8 meetings during 1972 are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 301–302, Legislative Interdepartmental Group.

146. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 26, 1971.

Henry—

Attached are the NSSM's and projects under NSC auspices which include economic facets.[2] The first group has a specific economic component and the second group marginal economic facets. Each of the studies listed cannot be fragmented into its economic component without severely complicating the nature of the study and its overall processing. For this reason, I think it would be foolish to permit Peterson to have a free shot at this kind of essentially political and broadly based product.

I understand that Peterson's real problem is in developing specific agenda items for the Economic Council and in preparing his own NSSM's. In my view, we should invite his participation at the IG and working group level in the preparation of our studies, elicit his participation in the Review Group Meetings but under no circumstances jury-rig a special economic overview under his aegis which could seriously distort the development of broadly based policy studies.

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/30/70–4/21/71. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Attached but not printed.

The development of appropriate study requirements for the Economic Council and for Peterson's shop does not appear to be an insurmountable one to me. There are a host of purely or primarily economic issues which might well be considered within Peterson's framework. These include the day-to-day actions of the type so frequently dealt with by Fred Bergsten—shoe imports, meat quotas, petroleum issues, etc. Our best bet here would be to join with Peterson, utilizing either Fred Bergsten or his successor to come up with an agreed target list of economic issues which should be considered by Peterson and the Economic Council. He should also develop a list of recommendations from the trade-oriented departments such as Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture. I think the quicker Peterson gets inundated in these kinds of issues, the more likely he is to avoid involvement in foreign policy-laden studies. If you agree, I will have Fred and Dick Kennedy meet with a member of Peterson's staff to:

1. Review our ongoing studies from the attached paper, making it clear that a breakout of the economic issues is not feasible but inviting their participation and comment on the studies, dependent on their current state of production.[3]

2. Assure Peterson that his participation in the Review Group Meeting is welcome.[4]

3. Assist Peterson's staff in developing a list of primarily economic issues for consideration within the Peterson framework.[5]

4. Suggest that Peterson solicit recommendations from Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture for future study limited to subject areas which are primarily economic in nature.[6]

5. Establish a formal system for regular coordination of NSC and economic related study efforts between Kennedy and Bergsten/his replacement and a designated member of Peterson's staff. (This should be done without your involvement until knotty issues arise.) Kennedy and Bergsten are preparing a memorandum for you on this subject which will flesh out the details of the problem.[7]

In addition to the foregoing problems which, regardless of the efficiency of our coordination and liaison with Peterson, will pose us with difficult jurisdictional questions, there is a fundamental issue which needs sorting out not only between the NSC and Peterson's staff but also within the NSC staff. I am speaking of responsibility for security assistance functions. The recently completed paper on Indonesia was done

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[3] There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

[4] Kissinger initialed his approval.

[5] Kissinger initialed his disapproval and wrote: "That's his problem."

[6] Kissinger initialed his approval.

[7] Kissinger initialed his approval.

by Wayne Smith. In my view, it should have been done by John Holdridge, with assistance from Wayne's staff. Wayne has interpreted his principal role on the Indonesian paper as a charter for staff supremacy on all future internal security issues. I believe this has built-in frictions which cannot but work to your disadvantage and result in the alienation of the substantive officers who have specific geographic responsibility. I have thought about this long and hard and, as you know, have discussed ongoing frictions with both Wayne and Dick Kennedy. It is clear to me that with a charter that includes internal security, Wayne's staff will have primary responsibility for the large majority of policy issues which come to our attention. As you know, Wayne now carries the heaviest load on SALT, a large portion of the load on Vietnam and full shots at any issue which is primarily Defense-oriented. I know you are not interested in morale problems nor am I. However, I see no reason for carrying this one to the extreme by salting all the wounds among the operations staff. It seems to me in special cases you can use Wayne to do a job but as a full-time charter this is self-defeating. For this reason, I would recommend you let me promulgate to the staff that security assistance issues will normally be handled by the operators, that they will coordinate actions and obtain staff support from Wayne and that in special cases directed by you the Program Analysis staff will have primary responsibility for such action.[8]

[8] Kissinger initialed his approval.

147. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSC Staff and CIEP Staff Responsibilities

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, Reorganization of the NSC System. Secret. Concurred in by Bergsten. Haig wrote a note to Kennedy at the top of page 1, "where do we stand." The memorandum is unsigned. An initialed copy is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/30/70–4/21/71.

A review of the terms of reference of the CIEP and its subsidiary bodies (including the Operations Group)[2] evidences a clear overlap with the responsibilities of the NSC Staff and the NSC subsidiary bodies (including the Under Secretaries Committee). Specifically:

—The CIEP is to "Provide a clear top-level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues; deal with international economic policies—including trade, investment, balance of payments, finance—as a coherent whole; and consider the international economic aspects of essentially foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and defense, under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council."

—The Operations Group is responsible for follow up of decisions reached, coordination where necessary of government actions, and review of problems arising from actions of other governments or outstanding economic developments. The Operations Group "insofar as international economic policy is concerned" replaces the work of the Under Secretaries Committee.

The Problem

Clearly it will be difficult in many instances to separate those issues which are specifically the responsibility of the CIEP and those which have implications of concern within the NSC structure. Many issues, which on their face would seem to be primarily "international economic policy" questions, will have a high political or strategic interest. And many will have to be sorted out on an "Ad Hoc" basis.

It should not be too difficult, however, to distinguish from the outset between those issues which have a *broad policy character* and thus are essentially NSC issues and those which are *more narrowly focused* on trade and investment policies with an important but not overriding political content and thus are essentially CIEP issues. *But* there are a variety of economic issues, particularly those involving (1) cases in which the economic issue provides leverage in our relations with a country in respect to other issues, and (2) foreign aid and defense matters, which will be less easy to resolve unless there is a clear understanding from the beginning.

The Current Situation

Mr. Peterson has assumed responsibility for a broad range of issues clearly falling within the CIEP terms of reference. Even here, however, there are questionable areas which need to be examined:

—Specific commodity areas including textiles, shoes, sugar (and possibly the movie industry).

—International monetary problems.

—Trade and legislative strategy.

—Foreign investment policy (both by the U.S. abroad and by others in the U.S.).

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[2] See *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 49.

None of the foregoing would seem to be of primary interest to the NSC though obviously each has a foreign policy content and impact.

—Preferences—this one obviously has a high foreign policy impact as to our relations with Latin America and our relationships with the Europeans vis-à-vis their arrangements with third countries (e.g. Spain, the French, and others with North Africa, etc.).

—East-West Trade—the question here could be as much political as economic and within the government a strong strategic argument will be raised inevitably by Defense and probably CIA.

—Balance of Payments—this issue may be one of the most knotty we will have to face in the next couple of years. Clearly it transcends military and purely foreign policy issues *but* it cannot help but involve to a major extent foreign aid (both military and economic), offset arrangements, and the costs of military deployments overseas. Moreover, the whole question of military sales (already raised by Mr. Laird with you) will impact heavily in this area. There is a highly important security content to this issue.

—Plans for major international initiatives (in international economic policy)—until one sees the nature of the initiatives the relationship with NSC actions cannot be defined.

There are a number of ongoing studies within the NSC structure which have economic content of varying degrees (Tab A).[3] None of these, however, is *primarily* an economic study. Most fall within the range of broad policy studies in which there is an important economic element. Only three would *seem* suitable for transfer to the primary concern of the CIEP:

—USC Study of Caribbean Bauxite (this study was initiated primarily because of Defense's interests in the strategic implications of nationalization of assets in the area).

—USC Study of the Pan American Highway (this one is of direct interest to the President, has some security interest, and has a high political content).

—USC Study of the Ecuador–Chile–Peru Fisheries problem (this study is completed and is of course directly related to the entire Law of Sea and Oceans Policy question).

Thus none of the ongoing studies would seem appropriate for "turnover to the CIEP." We should initiate coordination, however, to assure that the CIEP staff's interests are appropriately reflected (as has been done in the case of NSSM 122—Japan Study).

The Options

The choices for dealing with the basic issues seem to boil down to:

[3] Attached but not printed. With the exception of one added item, the list is the same as that referenced in footnote 2, Document 146.

For Broad Policy Studies

—Make the CIEP responsible for all economic issues to be dealt with in separate papers and merged at the White House level, or

—Continue to have these studies done through the NSC–IG process with discussion of economic issues prepared with Mr. Peterson's participation.

—The *first* option would put the CIEP staff in on the ground floor in a controlling way on economic issues. (Presumably Mr. Peterson would not wish to become involved himself at the working level.) *But* it would have the serious disadvantage that (as in the case of the Japan study) a rational look at the political and security questions can hardly be taken in isolation from the economic issues. Moreover, even if a way could be found to reasonably separate these interrelated matters in the study, the task of integrating the study at the White House level would be far more complicated (and thus unsatisfactory) than would a joint review performed by the NSC staff and the CIEP staff of a single coherent paper. The *second* option would keep control within the NSC framework but would involve Mr. Peterson in three ways:

—He would be represented in the development of the paper as to the economic issues, and

—The economic section would be developed primarily by the State Economic Bureau which provides the support now for the CIEP Operations Group (the CIEP Operations Group chairman is Nat Samuels; Phil Trezise acts for him in his absence.)

—Mr. Peterson could participate in the SRG meeting on the subject.

—The *second* option seems clearly preferable.

For AID and Defense Matters

—Here the issue is more complicated. We need now a clear understanding as to the extent to which the CIEP will involve itself in AID (both military and economic) and Defense matters.

—Economic aid is more complicated because of the formation of the two corporations. One of their prime objectives will be to complement the multilateralizing of most of our programs for development assistance. The difficulty will be in getting consideration of important foreign policy aspects.

—Security assistance has both economic and military components. Both certainly must continue to be primarily the responsibility of the NSC structure.

—MASF, and military programs involving major balance of payments questions (e.g. forces in Europe, offset, overseas bases), all clearly should continue to be the responsibility of the NSC structure but the CIEP charter gives them a major interest.

The *choices* are:

1. Retain primary responsibility for *all* aid (both development and security assistance) and defense issues with the NSC, coordinating appropriately at the White House level with the CIEP staff.

2. Retain the security assistance programs including both the economic and military components (and possibly also the humanitarian assistance program because it includes disaster relief) as the responsibility of the NSC structure, and make the development assistance program the responsibility of the CIEP.

3. Retain the security assistance program and all major country development programs (at least where these also involve security assistance as well) in the NSC structure, and make development *policy* the responsibility of the CIEP.

There is no simple and wholly satisfactory way to deal with this problem. The *third* option, however, seems to make the most reasonable division. Each of the options would require the closest of cooperation at the White House level but the third retains for the NSC structure the essentially security oriented issues and most of those with a high foreign policy content. It also would retain for you the flexibility to develop country program budgets in some selected cases if you later wish to do so (Option 2 also would do this *but* only in cases where both security and development assistance were involved—India would not be included, for example). Mr. Peterson would be responsible for broad development policy but *not* for specific country programs.

In any case there will have to be CIEP representation during the program formulation process within the NSC structure and this should be manageable. A close liaison must be established between the CIEP staff and your regional operators in order that foreign policy guidance will be fed in on each issue. On aid matters this will be important in the case of either Option 3, and especially so in the case of Option 2.

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148. H.R. Haldeman Diary Entry[1]

Washington, May 19, 1971.

This was about a 99 percent SALT day, as we set the notification process in motion.[2] Henry met with Gerry Smith for breakfast at 8:30.

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[1] Source: *The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition.* "P" is the President and "K" is Kissinger.

[2] In anticipation of making a public announcement on May 20, Nixon and Kissinger notified Rogers and Gerard Smith, Director of ACDA, on May 19 that a breakthrough had been reached on SALT with the Soviets through a negotiating channel between

The P had Rogers in at 9:00, and they informed both of them. The P called me in at 10:20, also Henry was in, and reported on Rogers' reaction. The P had the feeling that there was very much of a problem, that Rogers' reaction was really almost no reaction at all, but he clearly had the feeling of wondering what was going on. While we were in talking about this and starting to lay plans for timing for tomorrow, Rogers asked me to be called out of the meeting with the P and asked me to come over to see him. I went back into the Oval Office; the P told me to go ahead and do it, to make the point to him that this wasn't a State Department matter, that it cuts across Departmental lines and is clearly the P's responsibility, and that it was not in the interests of anybody to inform anyone. In January, when he initiated the first letter, he expected nothing; when Dobrynin came back from the Party Congress, Rogers was gone and then it gelled fast. The P told me to be frank on the whole relationship with Rogers and to be tough. If Rogers got to a point of a very stiff objection, I should tell him to take whatever action he felt he had to take. He said to make the point that it was important that no one get any credit for this except the P. That K will background because it cuts across Departmental lines, but there will be no claim of credit; that's the mutual arrangement we've made with the Russians, and it has to be kept that way.

I then went over to the State Department, had about a hour with Rogers. He was clearly very upset. His basic point was "Why didn't you tell me that you were doing this? There's no need for me to be involved, but I do have to be informed." He made the point that both K and the P had promised him that they would not have any other further meetings with any Ambassadors, and particularly Dobrynin, without letting him know. He said he would bet a large amount that all the magazines would have a full report on the number of meetings K had with Dobrynin, etc. This would make him a laughingstock again; it destroys his effectiveness and credibility. For instance, at NATO everybody will know that he's not in on what's going on. He also made it clear that he's hurt and raised the question of whether the P's sending him a signal; if so, he'll go. I didn't really respond to that. He said he just didn't know what to do. He did want the P to know his feelings.

Washington and Moscow that was completely independent of the official diplomatic talks and unknown either to Rogers or Smith. Kissinger commented in *White House Years,* p. 819, that the successful backchannel negotiations "gave Nixon considerable anguish, for he would now have to tell his Secretary of State that negotiations had been going on for months without his knowledge and were on the verge of being consummated by a formal announcement."

He then interjected that he thinks it's a great development and he's all for it, but then he went on to say how can he explain it to Congress. He was particularly disturbed because the P told him that he was going to inform Smith this afternoon, but as soon as Rogers got back to the State Department, Smith came in and Rogers learned that he had breakfast with Henry and was told before Rogers was. Smith said to Bill that he was sorry about the whole thing and that he wanted Bill to know he didn't have anything to do with it. Bill said if there's any leak on any of this it will be from the White House, because no one at State knows anything about it. He returned the secret letters, so that he could say he didn't have them. He made the point that if the P doesn't trust him, he can't do his work. He was very clearly upset. He didn't buy my explanation regarding the cutting across Party lines, and so forth. He didn't buy my point that Dulles and Eisenhower dealt this way, that Eisenhower dealt directly with the Soviets because he said Dulles always knew what Eisenhower was doing. He very clearly resents K; he asked how many meetings Henry had with Dobrynin and whether there were memos of conversation. He claims he's fully posted Henry on everything that he's done, but is not being posted by Henry. This is in direct opposition to what Henry says, and I raised that and Bill got quite distressed.

To sum it up: it was clear he was very worried about the short-term impact on his own image and hadn't yet figured out the long-term implications.

When I got back to the office he called, saying he had been thinking about it, and it was clear that we should develop a Party line as to how this all transpired. He wanted to know what the P wants to say regarding who was involved, and so forth. I then went back into the P's office and reported all of this to him, after which he had Henry come in and we discussed it some more, particularly the point of establishing the line. The P said that first I should remind Rogers about the fact that in January the P had told him that he was going to send a letter. He told Rogers he doesn't trust Gerry Smith or the SALT group, and therefore in order to break the deadlock, he might send a message or write a letter to see if he could get something going; he would do this on his own. He said that I should make the point strongly that our line is that this is a Presidential initiative, that we will not discuss the details of how it was accomplished; we won't let anyone describe the process. We don't want any puffing, because it was a mutual thing with the Russians. The point is the P broke the deadlock, and then it was implemented at the appropriate levels in the government. It's not in our interests to indicate what the negotiations were. He told me to point out to Bill that as a matter of fact, Rogers was the only one to know anything about this ahead of time, and therefore, he's being oversensitive. He said that after his letter early

this year, nothing gelled except garbage until the Monday after Rogers had left for Europe, when Dobrynin came back from the Party Congress and took exactly the line the P had offered in January and that the Russians had earlier refused. If Bill's asked whether he was involved, he should say we won't disclose any details of the negotiation, but he can say he was informed. Also he can make the point that the position was, of course, well worked out with the NSC and all concerned ahead of time, and the P stated his position in a press conference.

The P then had me go out and call Rogers and give him that line. In the meantime, Rogers had put a call in to the P; so I called Bill, filled him in on this, and then the P returned his call and had a pretty good chat with him. Made the point that he wanted Bill to call Mansfield and tell him, before the vote, that this was coming up, not in specific terms but an important development, but that the P was holding off on notifying anyone or calling a leaders meeting until after the vote, because he didn't want to appear to be trying to affect the vote. Right after he hung up from that call, Ziegler came in, and the P, as he hung up, heaved a deep sigh, looked out the window and said it would be goddamn easy to run this office if you didn't have to deal with people.

Later this afternoon, he had Ziegler in for discussion with K on how to handle the basic line and the announcement. They went over some wording on how to open the P's announcement. That was at 4:00, and at 4:40, he had Ziegler, Scali, K and me in to review the line Henry's going to use in his briefings. It was really pretty funny because he kept telling Henry to go ahead and tell him what he was going to say, and then every time Henry would start a sentence, the P would interrupt him to tell him what he should say. He made the point that Henry must not discuss at all how it happened, not one word in any of his sessions. He should describe the nature of the breakthrough, that the negotiations were stalemated because the Soviets had limited it only to defensive weapons, and that we've insisted that it include offensive weapons, as the P had pointed out in several press conferences. He then should say that as a result of negotiations involving the highest levels of both governments, there has been a break and that we are now able to move ahead with simultaneous negotiations in offensive and defensive weapons. There is already a lot of substantive work done, and this is a chance to give a pat to the SALT team, etc.

We got into considerable discussions on timing of the various briefing meetings and locale for the P's announcement. We ended up doing it in the press room as originally planned, with a Cabinet meeting at 9:00 and a leaders meeting at 10:00.

The other big thing for today was the Mansfield vote,[3] which started in the afternoon with a resounding defeat for the Nelson Amendment, which was the first one up and was the compromise that they'd all agreed to back, but it lost very heavily. Then as the afternoon went on, they got into debate and then started moving into the other amendments, which went on into the night, all of them losing by substantial margins, which of course, pleased the P greatly. At one point after the Mathias Amendment, which was supposed to be the crucial one but which lost 73–24, the P was going to call Cooper—because he and Rogers had been working on Cooper—to thank him. I suggested he not do it until we get the final vote on Mansfield, which he agreed to, and that was a lucky thing because it turned out after we got the tally that Cooper had voted with Mathias; so it would have been singularly inappropriate to have called and thanked him at that particular point. The final vote on the Mansfield Amendment came through at 10:30, and we won it 61–36, which was a much stronger vote than we expected. So we came out extremely well.

[3] A reference to the Mansfield amendment calling for a reduction in U.S. troops in Europe, which was rejected by the Senate on May 19 in a 36–61 roll-call vote.

149. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 24, 1971.

Henry:

Wayne Smith continues to raise the country programming issue. You signed the memorandum to the President[2] but had reservations about it due to inter-departmental sensitivity, and wanted to think about it before forwarding it to the President. There was no good opportunity to discuss it last week due to your schedule. I have been

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for action.

[2] Reference is to the joint memorandum to the President from Shultz and Kissinger drafted by Smith. See footnote 9, Document 132.

holding the memorandum, as you directed, pending a careful analysis of where we were going.

There will be considerable resistance to this NSDM from State, Defense and probably AID. As you know, George Shultz has already signed the memorandum which can be dated today and forwarded to the President tomorrow, if you so determine. My main concern is that our substantive officers and the departments may feel somewhat usurped by the action. It would also put Smith's staff into the guts of the operators' cabbage patch. This does not bother me in the least but will generate some friction. The main benefit of the exercise which appears to me to be overriding is that you will have a systems analyst's approach focused on selected countries. This cannot hurt and should only help our overall appreciation of the needs of the countries and the extent of our efforts in each.

The one key problem at hand is that Rogers may resent your not coordinating the decision memorandum with him. He will know that it was cooked up between your office and Shultz and may claim foul. The only option would be to have Kennedy or Smith discuss it beforehand with Rogers, or you may wish to raise it with him during your meeting tomorrow.

Decision

Send directly to the President[3]

Send to the President after I discuss with Rogers tomorrow

Send to the President after having Kennedy/Smith coordinate with State

Hold up on the issue

AH

[3] Kissinger initialed this option. Haig wrote in the left-hand margin: "date today & send." The memorandum is Document 150.

150. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Programming

Problem

A critical determinant of the success of our national security and foreign policies is the effectiveness with which we integrate the policies and programs in key countries such as South Vietnam, Jordan, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and Cambodia. These are the countries where the Nixon Doctrine will succeed or fail. They play pivotal roles in the balance of power in their regions.

These countries have the fullest U.S. involvement, encompassing in most cases a U.S. force presence, a large military assistance program, and economic development and supporting assistance programs, in addition to the usual U.S. trade, educational, cultural, and information efforts.

Despite the importance of these countries to our foreign policy objectives:

—*We lack an overview of all of our programs in these countries.* Our programs are often not consistent with our primary policy goals. In Thailand, for instance, a recent country programming effort found that, despite the Nixon Doctrine, as U.S. forces withdraw, our total assistance to the Thai was scheduled to decline. No one (except the Thai) had added up the total of our effort.

—*Our programs are fragmented and often contradictory.* We found recently that our PL 480 rice sales to Indonesia to stabilize its economy had all but pre-empted Thailand's traditional export market. Thus, while we had an economic development program in Thailand, it was more than offset by the effect of low rice prices (caused in part by our rice exports to Indonesia) on Thai rural incomes.

—*There is little attempt to make program trade-offs.* It takes major bureaucratic surgery to obtain $10 million a year for three Thai special guerrilla units, yet a 10% cutback in U.S. fast-moving jet sorties for one month would save $10 million. It is always easier to spend money on our own forces than on someone else's. The key aspect of the Nixon Doctrine is how best to develop local capabilities to substitute for U.S. capabilities, but our options are rarely presented in such trade-off terms.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

Country Programming

We have worked on these problems on an ad hoc basis from the beginning of your Administration. For example, the Korea study was a path-breaking effort to develop explicit options on possible trade-offs between U.S. forces and local forces assisted by military and economic assistance.

From our programming experience with Korea, Cambodia, Thailand and aspects of our effort in Vietnam, we have developed a *country* programming approach to the problems cited above. Country programming:

—pulls together in one presentation all major U.S. and U.S.-supported programs related to a particular country allowing one to view both the totality of our effort and its major thrusts in relation to our objectives;

—permits analysis of key program trade-offs, for example, between U.S. and local forces;

—facilitates the development of options on central issues such as: (a) assistance for economic growth versus assistance for stabilization (Indonesia), (b) ground versus air interdiction in South Laos, and (c) balanced local air/ground/navy forces versus local force specialization (e.g., in ground forces) complemented by U.S. (air and naval) forces.

We are recommending that you approve the implementation of a country programming effort limited to a short list of key countries. Such an effort would enable the highest levels of this Administration to give attention to the problems identified above in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, India, Indonesia, and Jordan. (These are the obvious candidates, although the list could be modified at the initiative of State, Defense or CIA.)

For these countries, before FY 1973 budget decisions are made, a Country Programming Memorandum (CPM) would be completed and submitted to the Senior Review Group and, if necessary, to you for final decision.

The CPM would be prepared under the technical direction of the NSC and OMB staffs. It would be developed by an inter-agency committee chaired by the agency with major program responsibility in the particular country. This set up would insure that State and DOD have the fullest opportunity to exercise leadership of these studies within the NSC system.

At Tab A is a proposed NSDM to implement the country programming effort we have outlined.[2]

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[2] Attached but not printed.

We believe that the country programming effort just described will play a vital role in the strengthening the basis for decisions on national security affairs and that it should be undertaken as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you authorize the issuance of the NSDM at Tab A.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger
George P. Shultz

[3] The President initialed his approval. The memorandum is attached to a note card on which Kissinger wrote: "We ought to make clear who gets the chairmanship of the first countries in directive to ease gas pains. Perhaps separate directive." In a June 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Smith submitted a revised NSDM for Kissinger's signature and a "supplementary memorandum" which, according to Smith, "attempts to avoid ill-feeling in State by stressing State's responsibilities while placing the exercise fully in the NSC system" and "reduces agency resistance by stressing that the CPMs will deal with a few policy issues and not with the details of individual programs." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112) Kissinger signed both documents (see Document 151).

151. National Security Decision Memorandum 112[1]

Washington, June 10, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs

SUBJECT

Country Programming

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. NSDM 112 was reissued on August 24 with revisions noted in footnotes 2 and 3 below. (Ibid.) Agreement between NSC and State on the revisions was finally reached on August 19 following two months of discussions within and among State, NSC, and DOD that are documented in Documents 152, 155–157, and 160–162.

The President has directed the preparation annually of Country Programming Memoranda (CPMs) encompassing all U.S. and U.S.-related programs in selected countries.

These CPMs will be prepared for the Senior Review Group and serve as the basis for: (a) decisions on the key program issues including trade-offs among programs, (b) final budget decisions for the upcoming fiscal year, and (c) periodic country program reviews as dictated by developments throughout the budget year.

The focus of the CPMs will be on key program alternatives and policy issues attendant to the choice and mix of programs, particularly alternatives for the upcoming fiscal year. Analysis of the effects of alternatives will be summarized. The CPMs will include summaries of each major program category with analysis of past and current programs using a program budget. Agency and Mission views and preferred programs will be indicated. Sensitive programs will be examined in a separate annex.

Overall direction of the development of the CPMs and the analysis therein will be the responsibility of the CPM Working Group, chaired by the NSC Director for Program Analysis and including the senior program officer of each addressee.

The development of individual CPMs and the analysis therein will be the responsibility of interagency CPM committees for each country chaired by the Department of State, or the Department of Defense where its programs are exceptionally important.[2]

Completed CPMs will be submitted to the Chairman of the SRG with a copy to the Director of OMB.

After final review by the SRG and decision by the President, major and significant departures from the CPM plan, either as a result of actions by the Administration and the Congress or as a result of negotiation and the implementation of the program, will be submitted by the responsible agency as an amendment to the CPM for review by the SRG and approval by the President as necessary.

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[2] The final 11 words in this paragraph were omitted from the revised NSDM 112 issued on August 24. Kissinger's accompanying memorandum (see footnote 3, Document 150) was also revised. His June 10 memorandum stated that "the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, should select a single individual chairman of each of the CPM inter-agency committees dealing with a specific country. Where indicated by the importance of Defense programs in the country, the nature of issues involved, and the availability of personnel, the chairman should be from the Department of Defense." Kissinger's August 24 memorandum accompanying the revised NSDM 112 omitted the second sentence. Both memoranda and the revised NSDM 112 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112.

OMB and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs will be members of the SRG when it considers CPMs or CPM amendments.

The countries tentatively selected for full FY 1973 CPM preparation are: South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, India, Jordan, Indonesia, and Cambodia.[3]

For FY 1972 new program initiatives or significant program changes in already planned and approved programs for the CPM countries will be submitted to the Chairman of the SRG for possible consideration in accordance with the procedures of this NSDM.

For non-CPM countries, substantive and budget issues for decision pertaining to economic assistance and PL 480 will be handled in accordance with existing procedures as outlined in NSDM 10. Other issues for decision in the case of these non-CPM countries including those involving security assistance will be handled in accordance with existing interagency procedures.

NSDM 4 (revised September 4, 1969) and NSSM 77 (October 8, 1969)[4] are hereby rescinded.

Henry A. Kissinger

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[3] In the revised NSDM 112 this and the following paragraphs were restated as follows: "The countries tentatively selected for full FY 1974 CPM preparation are: Thailand and Cambodia. Additional countries may be selected for country programming studies for FY 1974 and succeeding years. The FY 1974 Country Program studies will be completed by June 30, 1972, and after approval of the CPM will constitute guidance for development of the Security Assistance Program and other U.S. programs for the countries concerned." (Ibid.)

[4] Documents 71 and 78.

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152. Editorial Note

The following exchanges between President Nixon and his assistant H.R. Haldeman took place in the Oval Office on June 12, 1971, sometime between 11:19 and 11:50 a.m.

"Haldeman (reporting on Attorney General John Mitchell's views on dealing with Israel): He says the problem is that there's no one in the White House, nobody looking at it for the President. He thinks you've got to get someone to monitor it for you, not let Rogers make foreign policy in this area, which is what in effect—.

"President: He doesn't make foreign policy in any area, does he?

"Haldeman: Basically no. And then John would argue that. He says Rogers should not. You know—the President should not allow foreign policy in any area.

"President: Well, foreign policy, the Secretary of State, Bob, does make foreign policy in other administrations. That's the problem."

And then shortly thereafter:

"Haldeman: What you've go to look at is that with you as President—this is different with other Presidents—with you as President—

"President: Nobody else can run the foreign policy.

"Haldeman: The Secretary of State should be a man who, a staff man to the President on foreign policy, not the competitor.

"President: Basically the difficulty is [Dean] Rusk was not the right kind of a foreign secretary for Johnson—

"Haldeman: He's superb for you.

"President: Because he didn't tell Johnson. He let Johnson be off and state his own view. Rusk would be perfect for me because he'd do what the hell I said. He'd argue but then he'd go out and do it, loyally.

"Haldeman: So would Eliot Richardson.

"President: Oh, Eliot Richardson is great.

"Haldeman: Because he can function as a staff man to you." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, June 12, 1971, 11:19–11:50 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 518–6)

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153. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, June 12, 1971.

Attached are the NSDM (Tab A)[2] and Henry's explanatory memo (Tab B)[3] on "country programming" which I mentioned to you on the phone.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2. Confidential; Eyes Only.

[2] Document 151.

[3] Attached at Tab B but not printed is the country programming memorandum, dated June 10; see footnote 3, Document 150, and footnote 2, Document 151.

There was no advance consultation with anyone in the Department on these instructions. I have confirmed that fact with Jack Irwin, Alex Johnson, Ron Spiers and Bill Cargo.

All of us are agreed that this instruction cuts across what we are doing, at the President's direction, to establish and obtain legislative authority for a coordinator for Security Assistance at the Under Secretary level in the Department.[4] In fact the system outlined in Henry's memo would appear to have the Coordinator report to one of Henry's staff.

We all also have doubts that the NSC staff will be able to cope with this system. It was unable to cope with a similar, less ambitious effort last year.

The new system also appears to be an attempt to give DOD greater authority than it received when the President decided in favor of the security assistance coordinator (Tab C).[5] For example, DOD would chair coordinating program committees for certain key countries.

The real issue, it seems to me, is whether the Secretary of State or the NSC staff will coordinate resource allocations and ultimately foreign assistance operations.

Jack Irwin thinks you may want to sound out Secretary Laird to determine whether he favors (or stimulated) Henry's memos or would join with you in first trying to make the new Presidentially approved system at Tab C work.

Both Jack and I believe also that this can be sorted out only by you with the President. In the meantime, as you requested, I am telling Haig that we regret we were not consulted on the new memos, that we have serious substantive and legislative problems with them and that at your instructions I am taking no action on them pending further consultations.

Talking points for you are at Tab D.[6]

TE

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[4] Based on a study of security assistance prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee, Irwin proposed to Rogers in a January 21 memorandum that a coordinator for security assistance be established within the Department "who would be responsible for day-to-day policy guidance and review, planning, program development and Congressional presentation of security assistance programs." Rogers approved moving ahead with the proposal on February 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, Stevenson–Macomber Letter—Org of Security Assistance Programs).

[5] Attached at Tab C but not printed is Kissinger's March 25 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Irwin.

[6] Attached but not printed.

154. Editorial Note

On June 13, 1971, *The New York Times* began publishing a series of articles based on the "Pentagon Papers," the Department of Defense's top secret history of U.S. policy-making in Vietnam from World War II to 1968. The study, most of which Daniel Ellsberg leaked to the *Times,* included several thousand pages of Department of Defense, Department of State, White House, and Central Intelligence Agency documents. The following exchange took place during a telephone conversation on June 13 in which Alexander Haig, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, briefed President Nixon on the "Pentagon Papers":

"H[aig]: It's the most incredible thing. All of the White House papers; Rostow papers; communications with the ambassadors; JCS studies.

"P[resident]: We have been more careful, haven't we? We have kept a lot from State, I know, and enough from Defense.

"H: Your White House papers are in very good shape.

"P: That's why we don't tell them anything." (Transcript of telephone conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Haig Chronological File, Box 998, Haig Telcons—1971)

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155. Memorandum From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, June 21, 1971.

You will recall that on June 10 Mr. Kissinger issued NSDM 112 regarding country programming (Tab A)[2] and an explanatory memorandum of the NSDM (Tab B).[3] Ted established that this had been issued without any advance consultation with us, and even though it was a NSDM instead of a NSSM, felt that the instruction cut across what we were doing here, at the President's direction, to establish a

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2. Confidential; Eyes Only. Rogers wrote at the top of the memorandum: "Bob—Where do we stand on this?"

[2] Document 151.

[3] Attached but not printed.

coordinator for security assistance at the Under Secretary level. On June 12 Ted spoke to General Haig and said that he regretted we were not consulted, that we had serious substantive and legislative problems with this, and that we were taking no further action pending further consultation. General Haig subsequently called Ted back and said that Mr. Kissinger agreed that this inter-agency consultation should be done and that all addressees would be informed not to implement NSDM 112 until after this consultation had been completed.

This morning, at Mr. Irwin's suggestion, I informed Colonel Kennedy (who is sitting in for General Haig) that you regarded NSDM 112 as covered by your agreement with Mr. Kissinger[4] and that the Department would take no further action on it unless they wished to discuss the matter with you. Colonel Kennedy called me this afternoon to say that Dr. Kissinger understood his agreement to refer to Interdepartmental Groups and such matters and not this specific matter (which is a NSDM rather than a NSSM). I reiterated that Henry should call you.

I assume Mr. Kissinger may be calling you on this, and have included at Tab C[5] the main reasons why NSDM 112 as it now stands is objectionable to us.

RCB

[4] See Document 143.

[5] Attached but not printed.

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156. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Program Memoranda (NSDM–112)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for information.

Secretary Laird has responded enthusiastically to the Country Programming NSDM (112)[2] and your accompanying memo. His memorandum (at Tab A)[3] makes the following points:

—CPMs can be a "most significant step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence."

—CPMs options offer an opportunity to mesh U.S. force planning and aid budget decisions.

—DOD has a major contribution to make to all seven proposed CPMs except India, and DOD would like to chair the CPM committees on Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Korea where U.S. support of increased local defensive strength will directly impact on planning of U.S. force levels, overseas deployment and DOD budget requirements.

Comment: While DOD's enthusiasm for what it may see as the opportunity to win back from State some measure of control over security assistance planning is the other side of the coin of State's disinterest, DOD interest in country programming is genuine (although of recent origin with Secretary Laird), and DOD has demonstrated a greater capacity (in OSD/SA and JCS) to do country programming than State has shown.

In the meantime, the longer State continues to oppose implementation of NSDM–112 the more difficult it will be to do seven major CPMs by the budget deadline.

My understanding is that Colonel Kennedy is trying to work out an arrangement that will accommodate State's objections within the general framework established in the NSDM. If a compromise can't be worked out, I have no doubts that the analysis will not be done and that the country will be the real loser in this fight over bureaucratic prerogatives. You will want to assess this situation by July 1st and possibly consider other alternatives. A formal reply to Laird's memo can await that assessment.

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[2] Document 151.

[3] Laird's June 21 memorandum is attached but not printed.

157. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

I–8821/71 Washington, June 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Program Memoranda (CPMs)—NSDM 112

In a 21 June memorandum to Mr. Kissinger (Tab A),[2] the Secretary strongly endorsed the President's decision (NSDM 112, Tab B)[3] to establish a new system for comprehensive review of US policies and programs in key foreign countries. On 17 June the NSDM was withdrawn pending its revision, apparently at State's insistence. We understand State's objection is based on the position that the Coordinator for Security Assistance, rather than the NSC Director for Program Analysis should head any CPM mechanism that is established. (However, State may be split, with some elements arguing that since the CPMs are intended to deal with the spectrum of US relations with and programs in various countries, the geographic bureaus in State should take the lead, through the IGs, in preparing the CPMs for senior level consideration.)

NSDM 112, in our view, would:

—provide for thorough analysis of long-term US objectives as well as current and future programs in selected countries in the new context of the President's national security strategy and our defense strategy of realistic deterrence;

—provide for systematic channeling of basic policy issues regarding these countries through the SRG to the President for decision;

—provide DOD substantial assurance that US defense interests were given appropriate weight in options on US security and other aid to key friends and allies;

—by channeling key country foreign aid options to the President through the SRG, probably lead to overall Security Assistance Program options following the same route in the November–December budget review, as opposed to their being framed by the new State Department Coordinator for Security Assistance.

I anticipate that Mr. Kissinger will discuss the NSDM with State this week. In view of the importance to DOD of the issues at stake here,

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74 040, NSC June 1971. Confidential.

[2] See Document 156.

[3] Document 151.

I recommend that you phone Mr. Kissinger early in the week, refer to the Secretary's 21 June memorandum and underline DOD's concerns on the following points:

—The interagency CPM approach to reviewing US policies toward critical foreign countries is a sound one and the NSC machinery—particularly the SRG—is well suited to the task of coordinating the country reviews.

—The schedule for completion of the CPMs should be adhered to in order to permit careful review and policy decisions prior to the FY 73 budget decisions. This will require expeditious reissuance of the NSDM.

—Particularly as a consequence of actions in train to implement the concept of total force planning in the FY 73–77 Defense PPB cycle, we would expect to make a major contribution to the CPMs for six of the seven countries selected for review.

—As Secretary Laird stated in his 21 June memorandum, we believe DOD should chair at least the CPM committees for South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Korea.

G. Warren Nutter

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158. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 20, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

The President has directed that Departments and Agencies concerned refrain from commenting on the implications of his July 15, 1971 announcement concerning the People's Republic of China.[2] This directive applies to both on the record and background statements as

[1] Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1971, Directive #89. Confidential. A copy was sent to Moorer.

[2] For text of the President's remarks to the nation announcing acceptance of an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971,* pp. 819–820. Nixon visited the People's Public of China February 21–28, 1972.

well as to inquiries within official and diplomatic channels. In those instances where it is considered that substantive statements must be made, he has asked that such statements be cleared with him through the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Henry A. Kissinger[3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Editorial Note

According to a study prepared in 1991 by the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970 to June 1974, "concluded that the Nixon–Kissinger approach was to 'divide and conquer' the bureaucracy by selectively withholding information. To overcome it, Zumwalt related years later, he resorted to (1) occasional private lunches with Dr. Kissinger, (2) assigning carefully chosen lieutenants to serve as Kissinger's aides, and (3) frequent meetings with Admiral Welander and his predecessor [in the JCS liaison office at the National Security Council], Rear Admiral Rembrandt Robinson. General Alexander M. Haig, who was Dr. Kissinger's Deputy, performed a similar service for General Westmoreland." The quoted passage is footnoted as follows: "Written comment by ADM Zumwalt on draft manuscript, 12 Apr 90." (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume X: 1969–1972,* page 9)

160. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin)[1]

NSC–U/DM 71 Washington, August 5, 1971.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of Treasury
The Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Establishment of Security Assistance Program Review Committee

In order to advise and assist the Secretary of State in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities for the Security Assistance Program, I believe we should establish an interagency group to be designated the Security Assistance Program Review Committee. Under existing delegations of authority from the Secretary of State, I will serve as Executive Chairman of the Committee until passage of the pending legislation and the formal appointment of the Coordinator for Security Assistance in the Department of State.

The Committee will operate under the following terms of reference in advising and assisting the Chairman:

—to review FY 1973 country[2] program plans and make recommendations for approval or changes.

—to make recommendations on all outstanding policy issues involving Security Assistance goals and objectives, resource allocation and proposed budgetary levels.

—to provide guidance for such post-FY 1973 planning efforts as may be required to insure effective cooperation and coordination among participating agencies.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112. Confidential. The memorandum was rescinded and a revised memorandum issued on August 20. (Ibid.) The revisions, proposed to Rogers by Haig in an August 16 memorandum (ibid.) and agreed to on August 19 (see Document 162), are noted in footnotes 2 and 3.

[2] In the revised memorandum the words "security assistance" were added after "country."

—to prepare a recommended FY 1973 and subsequent fiscal years budgetary submissions to the Office of Management and Budget.[3]

Representatives of the following Agencies and Departments are being asked to participate in the Committee's work: State, Defense, JCS, AID, the NSC Staff, ACDA, CIA, OMB, Treasury and Commerce. We hope each of you will serve but will also designate an alternate. Until the Coordinator is appointed, Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State will serve as my alternate. Please communicate the name of your alternate to Mr. Spiers.

John N. Irwin II

[3] In the revised memorandum a new paragraph was inserted following this term of reference: "In cases of countries for which Country Program Memoranda have been approved in accordance with the procedures of NSDM 112, the Country Program Memoranda will serve as the basic guidance for preparation of the Security Assistance Program." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112)

161. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, August 18, 1971.

COUNTRY PROGRAMMING AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING

We owe General Haig an answer to his note of August 16 to Alex Johnson transmitting a revision of our Security Assistance Program Review memorandum and a revised version of NSDM 112 (attached).[2]

Since the Secretary forcefully objected to the original version of 112, I believe this matter must be taken up with him before replying to General Haig. However, I believe our recommendation to him should be that NSDM 112 in its revised form is no more acceptable than before and that we should reaffirm our intention to proceed with the Se-

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Spiers.

[2] Attached but not printed.

curity Assistance Program Review Committee as outlined in our original memorandum.

I believe that the major points which need to be made are as follows:

(1) NSDM 112 usurps the responsibility of the Department of State for foreign policy planning. We find particularly objectionable the concept of asking Defense to chair interagency country programming committees where "its programs are exceptionally important." We do not conceive of any instances where Defense interests would be more important than all other foreign policy interests.

(2) In the case of many countries, the country programming concept would inevitably overlap the security assistance planning function which has, upon Presidential decision, been vested in the Department of State. In the specific countries listed in the memorandum (i.e. Jordan, Thailand and Cambodia), our Security Assistance Programs, including MASF in the case of Thailand, would be the major focus of our planning effort.

(3) In other cases (e.g. Japan) were Security Assistance Programs are minimal or non-existent, CPM's would either overlap present NSSM studies or would create unnecessary duplications of present NSC procedures.

(4) The NSC Program Analysis Staff is heavily defense oriented and badly overextended (it also staffs the VP, DPRC, and VSSG where its efforts are more germane). Its record in bringing major country studies (undertaken under NSDM 4)[3] before the NSC system for decision has not been good (one—Korea—out of four). In addition, Administration decisions have largely ignored these studies (e.g. Korea).

(5) The SRG could not make major budget decisions. Under existing procedures major program and budget issues are already submitted to the President for decision and are, of course, reviewed by the NSC or CIEP staffs.

Although we see some virtue in the comprehensive tabulation and analysis of all U.S. programs in a given country across agency lines and by major purpose, we believe this objective can be achieved through the regular NSC process, which should concentrate, initially, on selected countries which would not duplicate the work of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

As regards the Security Assistance Program Review Committee, we note that the NSC staff does not have any objection to its establishment provided that it works within the "basic guidance" provided by Country Program Memoranda. Since we will need to prepare guidance for the field for the 1974 Security Assistance Program by December of this year, the deadline set forth in the revised NSDM 112 (mid-1972) would be too late and the Security Assistance Coordinator could not rely on the Country Program Memorandum for such guidance.

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[3] Documents 13 and 71.

In sum, we believe that NSDM 112 should remain a dead letter. Specific country programming studies can be undertaken in regular SRG channels, with the Department of State, in consonance with its responsibility for relations with foreign countries, taking the lead in the interdepartmental work on these studies. In the case of predominantly security assistance countries, the work should proceed under the aegis of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

If the Secretary accepts this recommendation, Alex Johnson should convey these points orally to General Haig.[4]

[4] See Document 162.

162. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Getz) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)[1]

Washington, August 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Security Assistance and NSDM 112

Alex Johnson talked to Al Haig this afternoon and reached agreement with him on the NSDM 112 and the Under Secretary's memorandum on the Security Assistance Program Review Committee:

1. We accept the NSDM with two amendments:[2]

a. That the sentence at the top of page 2 will end following "the Department of State," and the remainder of the sentence shall be deleted (i.e., "or the Department of Defense where its programs are exceptionally important").

b. In the list of countries selected for FY74, Jordan will be deleted, Thailand and Cambodia remain.

2. Regarding the Under Secretary's memorandum on the establishment of a Security Assistance Program Review Committee, this will be reissued including the amendments proposed by General Haig

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1–1 US. Limited Official Use.

[2] See Document 151 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

under cover of his note to Ambassador Johnson of August 16.[3] The memorandum, however, in its revised form will be issued as a State Department document over the Under Secretary's signature rather than a memorandum from the Chairman of the Under Secretaries' Committee.[4]

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[3] See Document 160 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

[4] The memorandum was issued, however, over Irwin's signature as Chairman of the Under Secretaries' Committee rather than Under Secretary of State.

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163. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

USC Activities

PARTICIPANTS

State: David Biltchik[2]
NSC: T.C. Pinckney

In pursuing our intent to get a closer follow-up of USC affairs, I called Dave Biltchik and requested current lists of USC study memos, decisions, and continuing actions.

Dave seemed happy to comply and promised to send them over right away. He went on to suggest that we in the NSC should assign more actions to the USC and illustrated his point by referring to a need for a presidential mandate on monitoring U.S. personnel abroad and to the absence of response to Under Secretary Irwin's recent suggestion that the USC supervise policy for nuclear tests.

I assured Dave that I would look into both these matters, though not necessarily report anything to him. I also suggested that he call me if he had further thoughts on possible assignments for the USC. I promised to drop by and get acquainted when visiting the Department.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Pinckney.

[2] Biltchik was a member of the Department of State Planning and Coordination Staff. Pinckney was a member of the NSC Planning Group.

Because (1) NSDM 2[3] states, "The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider . . . matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas . . . which are of an operational nature (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question) . . ."[4] and (2) the USC seems anxious to do more, perhaps we should keep in mind suggesting more frequently to Dr. Kissinger that they be assigned operational items. A spin-off benefit might be that if kept busy, they might not be as inclined to delve into policy matters.

[3] Document 11.

[4] Ellipses in the source text.

164. Editorial Note

At 6:07 p.m. on December 21, 1971, 10 minutes after arriving at the White House by helicopter, President Nixon met in the Oval Office with Attorney General John Mitchell and Presidential Assistants H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) Mitchell and Ehrlichman insisted on the meeting, Haldeman noted in his diary, because in their investigation of leaks in recent Jack Anderson columns in *The Washington Post,* "they had uncovered the fact that a yeoman in the NSC shop, assigned to liaison with the Joint Chiefs, was the almost certain source of not only the leaks, but also the absconding of information from Henry's and Haig's and other people's briefcases, which were turned over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The P was quite shocked, naturally, by the whole situation and agreed that very strong action had to be taken, but very carefully, since we don't want to blow up the whole relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Mitchell warned the President during the meeting "as to what this would lead to if you pursued it by way of prosecution or even a public confrontation. You would have the Joint Chiefs allied on that side directly against you. What has been done has been done and I think the important thing is to paper this thing over. First of all, get that liaison office the hell out of the NSC and put it back in the Pentagon." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, Oval Office, Conversation No. 639–30)

Investigations of the episode revealed that Navy yeoman Charles Radford, assigned since September 1970 to the JCS liaison office at the

National Security Council, had purloined a huge quantity of documents which were passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the liaison office heads: Rear Admirals Rembrant Robinson and his successor, Robert O. Welander. Radford illicitly duplicated documents at the NSC and stole them while accompanying Kissinger and Haig on trips. During one trip, Kissinger noted in his memoir, Radford "used the occasion to make himself generally useful, in the process—as he later testified—going through my briefcase, reading or duplicating whatever papers he could get his hands on, and sometimes retaining discarded carbon copies of sensitive documents that were intended to be disposed of in the 'burn bag.' " (*Years of Upheaval,* pages 806–807)

The textual files in the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives contain very little material on the JCS spy operation and the White House handling of it. Included in the White House tapes, however, are audio recordings of the series of Presidential meetings commencing on December 21 at which the President and his aides discussed the accumulating evidence and deliberated how they should deal with the problem—in particular with the JCS officials directly involved and with JCS Chairman Moorer. At a December 23 meeting with Nixon, for instance, Haldeman recounted an earlier meeting at which Haldeman and Ehrlichman told Henry Kissinger about the spying. According to Haldeman, Kissinger asked "what do you do, what do you do on that, and John [Ehrlichman] said, well, that's most of the question now. It's in the hands of the Attorney General and he's got to determine what we do obviously. He said Admiral Welander thinks we should put the yeoman in jail. Admiral Moorer thinks we should put Welander in jail." Kissinger "said I think Moorer should be in jail. John and I both laughed; he said as you go up the ladder everybody's going to crucify the guy under him and nobody will take the blame himself." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, Executive Office, Conversation No. 310–19) At a meeting the next day, December 24, Ehrlichman told Nixon that Alexander Haig and Kissinger "both agree in very strong terms that Moorer should go. They're both now satisfied that Moorer is heavily implicated. They're doubly concerned because they've been using Moorer's backchannels for all kinds of communications and they're afraid that they've been compromised." Nixon commented that "Moorer's too good a man" and "I don't feel that way at all." (Ibid., Conversation 309–1) The President's telephone conversation with Haig later that day is Document 166.

The Radford episode is treated briefly in Nixon's and Kissinger's memoirs (Nixon, *RN,* pages 531–532; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval,* pages 806–809) and at greater length by Ehrlichman in *Witness to Power,* pages

302–310. Discussions in secondary works include Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pages 380–385; Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power,* pages 465–479; and John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), pages 315–317.

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165. Editorial Note

Following a discussion in the Oval Office on December 22, 1971 of the Charles Radford-Joint Chiefs of Staff pipeline, the following exchange took place between President Nixon and his Assistant H.R. Haldeman:

"Haldeman: The worst thing about it is you start, which we've managed to avoid, maybe too much, you start getting paranoid. You start wondering about everything, and everybody, and—

"President: I know. Well, don't be too damned sure of anybody. Don't get too sure of anybody.

"Haldeman: You can't be.

"President: I'm never sure of anybody. The reason I am so close-mouthed is, did you notice I haven't [unintelligible] that—let me put it [unintelligible]. Do you not now see why I don't have staff meetings?

"Haldeman: Damn right.

"President: You agree?

"Haldeman: Oh yea.

"President: Do you think I'm right?

"Haldeman: I sure as hell do.

"President: I don't have staff meetings. I'd rather—I know it would charge up the staff for me to sit around and talk to them direct, but who knows. First, without evil intentions some would leak.

"Haldeman: That's right.

"President: Beyond that there might be somebody in there, like a little guy like this, that'll get it all. But the end thing, I tell you whenever there's anything important you don't tell anybody. You know, it's really tough. It's tough. We don't tell Rogers, Laird, anybody. We just don't tell any son-of-a-bitch at all.

"Haldeman: It's a horrible way to have to work, but it's essential." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, December 22, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 640–3)

166. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, December 24, 1971, 5:01–5:08 p.m.

[Omitted here are opening comments and brief discussion of Henry Kissinger and the India-Pakistan conflict.]

President: On the other thing, incidentally, on the Moorer thing,[2] you just couldn't even dream of having Moorer out of that thing. I mean, he's part of a system, and the damn thing I'm sure started before he was there. I think it goes back over years, and it probably went further than he ever expected it was going to go. That's my guess.

Haig: [unclear] I think that—

President: And we got to remember that basically he's our ally in terms of what we believe in, and the worse thing we could do now is to hurt the military. I tried to get that through what Henry said, but that's what, that's the line we're playing on the thing. Don't you agree? We just gotta do that. In June, of course we could take a look, but not now.

Haig: [unclear]

President: Well, after all, Moorer's a good man, and he's with us. This thing, of course, is pretty bad, it's a, understand, not sending the information over but going through briefcases, that goes too far.

Haig: [Inaudible comment]

President: It just develops. The guy thought he was, you know, doing his job. And then we got a guy that starts to leak. That of course is the worst, but that's the Ellsberg syndrome.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger, his conflict with Secretary of State Rogers, the India-Pakistan war, and Vietnam.]

President: I told him [Kissinger] to forget this thing about the Moorer thing. Just forget it. Leave it to Mitchell to work out. I've already decided we're going to cool this thing. We're gonna, and I'm gonna, I told Ehrlichman we ought to keep that yeoman right here in

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haig, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 17–28. No classification marking. Haig's voice on the tape is extremely faint. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

[2] See Document 164.

Washington. Sign him over to the Pentagon where we can watch him, 24 hours a day and then that's it.[3]

[Omitted here is further discussion of Yeoman Radford and closing comments.]

[3] The President telephoned John Mitchell at 5:33 p.m. on December 24 and conveyed a similar message: "I think the main thing is to keep it under as close control as we can. But I—We cannot move to do anything to discredit the uniform. That's what I'm convinced of." "Our best interests are served by not, you know, raising holy hell." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Mitchell, December 24, 1971, 5:33 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 17–37) Yeoman Radford was transferred to the Northwest.

167. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, January 10, 1972.

In the Sunday, January 9, *New York Times* there is an article by Benjamin Wells on India–Pakistan. I want you to clip the article and without discussing it with Henry and stirring him up have a quiet talk with Bill Rogers. The problem is that somebody in State, with no justification whatever, is trying to continue a running battle with the White House on this issue. Of course, an idea as to how the State people feel is the disrespectful tone of the quote, "Nixon is mad at India, etc.," rather than that the President is opposed to aiding India. You will also note that the high State Department official who gave the story to Wells made a big point of the fact that 104 million dollars in letters of credit were not cut off and that 30 million dollars or so in development loans were not cut off.

The difficulty with this kind of article is that it appears that the State Department bureaucracy is (one) disrespectful toward the President; (two) deliberately failed to follow his directions with regard to cutting off aid during the period of the war and thereafter; and (three) are trying to move back toward India at a time that we are for other reasons trying to play it cool.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Personal Files, Box 3, Memoranda from the President, 1969–1974, Memos—January 1972. Confidential.

My attitude toward India, as Bill knows, is that in the long run we must continue to aid them, but I think we gain nothing whatever by running to them so fast and particularly in this manner which would lead Mrs. Gandhi to believe that the State Department was totally on her side, the President was the only one who was against her.

Bill has handled the questions in fine shape. What is needed is to have the government speak with one voice on this and not give an indication that policy enunciated by the President and Secretary of State is being undercut by career diplomats.

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168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, January 14, 1972.

The President has directed that henceforth meetings with representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Washington on any topic and with representatives of foreign governments on the Middle East situation be cleared with him.

In conjunction with these clearances, the President wishes to have a memorandum outlining the objective of the meeting and the manner in which it will be conducted. Following the meeting, the President wishes to have a written memorandum for the record covering the contents of the discussion.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haldeman and Mitchell. Written by hand at the top of the memorandum is: "At the Secretary's request, this was shown only to him." Stamped beneath is: "Retained in S/S–I due to extreme or continued sensitivity. No Distribution without S/S concurrence on a need-to-know."

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169. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for January 16, 1972, President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman noted that Secretary of State Rogers called him that afternoon and "said I have a preemptory memo from Henry [Document

168] and I won't take it. I have orders from the P[resident] and I'm following those. I thought we had an understanding here that this was a two way thing. The theory is that the P has announced his policy, the State Department's carrying it out. He doesn't mind checking with Henry if Henry agrees to check with him too, and now he wants to talk to the P about it. He thinks it's hurting the whole situation. I raised the question of why the NSC wasn't in the meetings with the Israelis and he said they're not there because they're not supposed to be in operations, especially about the Middle East. He says we've been doing this for three years, and it's worked well. Why should we change it now." Moreover, Rogers stated, "the P knows all about the Israel stuff, that he has memos from the P about what he should do. That the policy in the Middle East has been good, and he will not have Henry second guessing him all the time. He's happy to keep the P fully advised. Says the meetings he's had with Rabin were pursuant to a directive from the P. He doesn't want the thing to end up as if State is withholding things. The main thing is that K doesn't keep Rogers advised at all on what he's doing. For instance he knows nothing about the Russia and China trips except what Al [Haig] told him the other day. Therefore, he will disregard the instructions from K, he's not working for K." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

During an Oval Office meeting with the President the next day, January 17, Haldeman recounted in detail his telephone conversation with Rogers. Haldeman then commented, "One basic fallacy in this is the principles that Rogers operates on, which is—he goes back to when we first came into office—is that the NSC has nothing to do with operations—that it's supposed to be a policy body but not an operating body. Now, there was some mumbling of that theory in the early days but it rapidly changed after about an hour after we got into office, and it's ludicrous to pretend that." Haldeman continued, "we've got to put it to Bill to a certain degree. I think we've got to make the point to Bill that he does have to keep you posted and that he keep you posted through Henry. It's ridiculous to argue otherwise." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, January 17, 1972, Oval Office, Conversation No. 648–4)

Haldeman made the following entry in his diary for January 18: "Then met with the Attorney General, about the K–Rogers problem. Brought him up to date on a flap from over the weekend as a result of Henry's directive to Bill. We agreed that we have to change Rogers' view that the NSC is for policy only and not for operations. And that we have to deal with the point that Al Haig raises of Rogers' fundamental misconception that if some matter is in the NSC and the SRG then it's K's responsibility, otherwise everything else is State's, and therefore, they cut out State's reserve, and they misconstrue the whole purpose of the NSC system. We had Henry and Haig join us to lay

down the rules to them after Mitchell and I agreed that the only way to solve this was a memorandum from the P to both Rogers and K [Document 170], that would both repeat the K directive, at least the contents of it, but in better form and would instruct K (that would go to and then instruct K) to keep Rogers filled in at the P's direction." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

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170. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 19, 1972.

Confirming the discussions you have had recently with the Attorney General and Bob Haldeman, it is essential that we all have a clear agreement as to our basic operating procedure with regard to all matters relating to China, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Cuba and Chile.

Because of the sensitive nature of our relationships in these areas, I must be kept fully informed at all times of any contacts made and action taken. Also I must have the opportunity to review any proposed contacts or actions *before* they are undertaken—with sufficient advance time so that I can provide additional instructions or guidance if necessary.

I am asking, therefore, that each of you assume the responsibility of seeing that I am so informed regarding any such actions or contacts by yourself or any member of your department.

Without limiting the general sense of this request—I want to be particularly sure that all meetings on any topic with representatives of the Soviet Union, PRC, Israel, the Arab States or Chile are cleared in advance with me. I would appreciate an outline of the proposed objective of the meeting and the specific talking points to be covered. I will, of course, also need a complete memorandum of conversation following the meeting.

I am fully aware that there are some problems involved in carrying out these instructions, and I know they have been discussed at length. I'm sure, however, that you will both understand the importance during this critical year of making sure we find a way to handle this and I will appreciate your cooperation.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 25, WPR—President Nixon. Secret; Eyes Only; Personal.

171. Editorial Note

The Defense Program Review Committee met on February 10, 1972. In a February 3 briefing memorandum for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Philip Odeen, Director of the National Security Council's Program Analysis Staff, emphasized that the meeting marked "an important first for the DPRC in two respects: It will be the first time DOD has presented its five-year program to the DPRC as directed by NSDM 27. Also for the first time since 1969, OMB will provide a five-year look at Federal revenues and spending. In the past OMB has refused to provide this important information, which bears directly on our defense effort. *This meeting is a critical first step in our efforts to get better control over the Defense program.* Laird will be putting out his Strategy and Fiscal Guidance in late February which will provide guidance for detailed service preparation of the FY 74 program and our force posture for the rest of the 1970s. *If we don't get our oar in now, it will be much harder to influence the Defense program later in the planning cycle since most of the decisions will already have been made."* (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–104, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC Meeting DOD Five Year Program 2–10–72)

Secretary of Defense Laird discussed the February 10 meeting of the DPRC at a meeting with his staff (the Armed Forces Policy Council) on February 14, according to minutes prepared by the Staff Secretary. Following a summary of the committee's deliberations by the three staff members who attended on February 10, Laird said "we need to get the DPRC talking about over-all budget and economic posture of the country. Unless the DPRC goes the route of over-all national planning, it will fall." Laird noted that at a breakfast meeting that morning with Kissinger he had expressed his disappointment over the outcome of the DPRC discussions as reported to him. Laird felt, he told his staff, "we are headed toward arbitrary budget decisions in November rather than having the President present over-all options in all areas of federal budgeting." "We do not want the DPRC to provide fiscal guidance to the Department of Defense at this stage of the game. We want such guidance and decisions to be made from the President." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Accession 76–0028, OSD Office Chronological Files, Box 14)

172. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, February 28, 1972.

Defense Planning Issues

Following the last DPRC meeting, you raised the question of how we might work most effectively with the Pentagon as they develop their Five-Year Force Program and Budget to assure that Defense programs are consistent with foreign policy. We had hoped that the DPRC would provide a vehicle for more effective interagency participation in the major policy issues arising from the Defense planning and budget process. While we still believe it in our interest to support, and where possible strengthen, the DPRC we need not look to that forum as the sole mechanism for engaging DOD on defense budgetary issues. This seems to be particularly important in view of the infrequency of the meetings and the resistance of the Pentagon to bringing many major policy issues into the DPRC. This makes it unclear what the ultimate value of that forum will be.

At the present, the State Department staff maintains a continuous liaison with the Services and various elements of OSD which enables us to identify major program and budget issues at a fairly early stage. What is lacking is a mechanism for effectively influencing these key decisions. We recognize that your intention is to secure a frank exchange of views on common problems, rather than necessarily insisting on changes by DOD to accommodate the diplomatic issues, as we see them. Nevertheless, if DOD is to take seriously our concerns it will require your personal participation and, from time to time, that of the Secretary. Thus, we very much welcome your interest and would encourage you to meet regularly with Mr. Rush, Admiral Moorer and others, as appropriate to discuss specific policy issues as we can identify them and call them to your attention.

To begin this process, we have prepared the attached set of papers to illustrate the budget process in DOD and the kinds of issues that arise. At Tab A is the DOD schedule for the review of Five-Year Programs and the Budget during the coming year. Tab B describes six fairly immediate program issues that have come to our attention through our

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Secret. Drafted by Leon Sloss (PM/ISP) on February 24 and concurred in by EUR, EA, and S/PC. The tabs are not printed.

review of the FY 73 Presidential Budget Submission and the FY 74–78 Defense Planning briefing given by OSD to the DPRC on Thursday, February 10. Each of these issues affects our foreign policy planning. We believe a discussion by you with DOD representatives at an early date might help us to find mutually acceptable solutions to these problems. At Tab C are examples of some longer-range issues that could be the subject of future meetings.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to set up a meeting with Mr. Rush at an early date for two purposes: (a) To discuss the DOD budget/program cycle and at what points in that cycle and in what form State Department inputs could be useful and appropriate; (b) To discuss the specific issues noted at Tab B. We will, in conjunction with other appropriate Bureaus, provide you with talking points prior to the meeting.[2]

[2] Irwin initialed his approval on March 14.

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173. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, March 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

President's Visit to the Soviet Union

As we intensify preparations for the President's visit to the Soviet Union,[2] I plan to take personal charge of State Department coordinating efforts with the various relevant departments of the Government. I shall be having a series of meetings this week within the Department of State to review the current situation, after which I intend to call in Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss the various bilateral negotiations presently or potentially under way which might have a bearing on the Summit conference. We may also be meeting with representatives of

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Confidential. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

[2] President Nixon visited the Soviet Union May 22–30 for the Moscow Summit at which the SALT I and ABM treaties were signed. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I.

other agencies who are, or will be conducting discussions with the Soviets during the pre-Summit period, with a view to insuring that their efforts fit into the general framework both as to timing and possible use in connection with the Presidential visit. Marty Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, will be working closely with me on the substantive side pursuant to Presidential decisions.

As far as planning the physical arrangements for the trip are concerned, our principal representative will be John Thomas. I will appreciate it if as you proceed to make plans for the visit that Mr. Thomas can attend meetings and be kept fully posted.

William P. Rogers

[3] In a March 15 memorandum to Haldeman, Kissinger stated that "a personal coordinating role by the Secretary could, obviously, pose serious problems with respect to the preparation of substantive matters which have already been set in motion" and thus he believed it essential that Haldeman "remind the Secretary that whatever coordinating role he visualizes for himself should be within the framework of the provisions of the NSC directives which have already been promulgated." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5) Kissinger attached a draft memorandum from Haldeman to Rogers which, with revisions, Haldeman dispatched on March 16 (Document 174).

174. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, March 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

The President's Visit to the Soviet Union

I have reviewed with the President your memorandum to me of March 14.[2] He is, of course, pleased that you are giving personal attention to the State Department preparations for his visit to the Soviet Union.

However, because of the myriad of departmental interests in the substantive issues, it is important that there be no misunderstanding

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 22, WPR—White House Correspondence. Secret. Drafted by Kissinger.

[2] Document 173.

about the coordinating mechanism which should be followed. As has been fully covered in previous memoranda, the NSC Senior Review Group and the CIEP must be the focal points for preparation and coordination of substantive bilateral matters pertaining to the Soviet Summit. All meetings and discussions which you have should be conducted within this framework and consistent with the President's memorandum to you of January 19, 1972.[3]

With respect to the physical arrangements, the President has designated Dwight Chapin as the point of contact with whomever Ambassador Dobrynin might designate from the Soviet side. You may be sure that Mr. Chapin will include John Thomas in the preparatory meetings which are held for implementing the physical arrangements for the trip.[4]

HR Haldeman

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[3] Document 170.

[4] At the bottom of the memorandum Rogers wrote: "I discussed this on the phone. The matter has been straightened out to my satisfaction. WPR"

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175. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

The NSC System—An Appraisal

You asked for my appraisal of the System. Accordingly, I have set down here my personal views.

The system after 3-1/2 years remains the most effective way of assuring that decisions are based upon consideration of the relevant facts, a clean definition of the issues, and all reasonable options. If used effectively, it also provides the best means of harnessing and controlling the bureaucracy in policy formulation and execution.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Personal and Confidential. Sent for information. Typed at the top of page 1 is: "[Outside the System]"

The system was strengthened by the elevation of the Review Group to the Deputy Secretary level and by the creation of the WSAG. For 2-1/2 years rigorous discipline paid off in better and more timely papers, increasingly effective discussion of them, and a tight framework for policy implementation.

But the system now is showing signs of malaise—not necessarily fatal but requiring urgent and strong action if it is to continue to serve what is an unquestioned need for you and the President.

My appraisal of the elements of the system follows:

—*The NSC* does not meet often enough. The past year has been atypical, and we should reinstate the procedure of meeting on all major decisions and even occasionally for a briefing/update on major issues.

—*The IG/SRG Structure*

—The IG's are not functioning. State had been disciplined into line and brought to understand that other elements of this government have a valid and vital role to play in the conduct of foreign policy. But it is again slipping back into its traditional way of thinking that it sets the line and everyone else hues to it.

—State's Program and Resource Allocation (PARA) system is being pushed too far into a policy-determining mechanism. (The PARA is a worthwhile management tool which State has long needed to translate the generalities of country policy into realistic action programs with resource support. But the Bureaus are attempting to squeeze out new policy directions through this mechanism. We are watching every one of the documents closely to prevent this. The NSSM process is the most effective counter in the major countries, e.g., Korea.)

—The IG's have responded well and quickly to NSSM requirements. But, in all too many cases, the paper called for with a short deadline to meet a stated need has languished here because we were unable to consider it. The failure to consider completed papers within a reasonable time tends to break down the discipline of the system—the writers see no incentive to put forth their best efforts and the product suffers. In some cases we have moved the papers by memo, but often this is an unsatisfactory substitute for a face-to-face airing of issues and points of view among the principals.

—*The WSAG.* This has worked well through a variety of situations extending well beyond its original conception.

—But it has *not* performed the principal function for which it was originally created—advance contingency planning. I have given you a separate memorandum[2] which would correct this structural deficiency by the creation of a Working Group to draft contingency plans and keep them under review under WSAG direction.

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[2] Not found.

—*The Verification Panel* has worked well and, with its working group and backstopping committee, is keeping control of the complex issues in SALT and MBFR.

—*The DPRC.* This body should be one of the most influential in the entire system. But a review of its activity against its charter suggests that it simply is not working. Secretary Laird, of course, has been recalcitrant, but I believe the problem is deeper than that.

—We are dealing here with issues and decisions on strategy, weapons, forces and resources, all of which go to the heart of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities.

—The Secretary and his subordinates, I believe, would be more comfortable and willing to play this vital game if *they* were tasked to prepare the basic papers without being directly "supervised" by your staff during their preparation. [Your staff, after all, has final review in preparing those papers for consideration by you and the DPRC.][3]

—Careful definition of the issues to be considered can frame the response in a way that will pin-point the key decisions needed and the considerations which will underlie the decision.

—Raising too many specific issues individually rather than in the context of the broader strategic and force decisions can only lead to a charge of "nitpicking" interference and thus generate basic resistance.

—*The NSCIC.* This is a vital need but one which has not lived up to its promise. Again I believe the problem is in approach.

—Too much involvement of a directive character at the outset of a study (net assessment or other) is likely to hamper, not help, get the product that is needed.

—Your staff can and should provide the impartial analytical overview of work done by the elements of the bureaucracy under specific NSSM requests.

—*The Under Secretaries Committee (USC)* has simply not functioned effectively. It started out to do so but there is an inherent conflict of interest.

—We purposely increased the number and range of actions assigned to it to following up on the implementation of policy decisions (this in response to anguished pleas). But it works at this task languidly and seldom meets.

—Even then it acts often by asserting the Executive Chairmanship prerogative and thereby diminishes further its effectiveness as other Departments immediately seek to overturn the "decision" by appeal to the President. The "decision" should never have been made in the first place if there was a major difference of view.

—The reasons for its ineffectiveness are simple—State's obsession with asserting its prerogatives and its desire to preempt for the USC a

[3] Brackets in the source text.

significant policy-making role (a la the SIG whose role is now that of the SRG).

—To correct the situation will require a reorientation of State's thinking toward performance instead of prerogatives. Insistence on regular meetings of the USC and regular attendance by you or your designated representative would help to move and discipline it.

—*The 40 Committee* meets far too infrequently. We have instituted a procedure to deal with many of the simple matters by memo but have had to use this procedure even on major matters which would have benefited from a thorough vetting at the table. It should meet at least once every two months and whenever a major matter is before it.

All of the ills described above can be corrected by a dose of hard-headed realism and bureaucratic savvy. This adds up to:

—A memorandum from the President to the members of the National Security Council reaffirming his insistence that the IG structure be used as set forth in NSDM 2[4] and that it be responsive to him (and you), and only secondarily to the Secretary of State.

—Reinstituting the successful pattern of regular meetings of the groups you chair to consider papers within a reasonable time after they have been submitted. Meetings need not and should not be lengthy. The quality of your preparation, consistently much superior to that of any of the other principals, guarantees this.

—A clear definition in study directives (in all cases, but particularly for the DPRC) of what is required and who is to do it, and then assurance of a minimum of meddling (as contrasted with helpful participation and contribution) while it is being done.

None of these ideas is new. I conveyed much the same thoughts to you three years ago. For two years we followed these principles, for the most part with considerable success. It is imperative, I believe, that we reaffirm them now both to your own staff and to the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy cannot be beaten into submission but it can be brought and kept under control through the proper use of the System.

I will provide a separate memorandum outlining a work/study program of major issues for your consideration.

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[4] See Document 11.

176. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Future Role of the DPRC

You asked for a paper on the future role of the DPRC. The past year Secretary Laird's intransigence has essentially prevented the DPRC from performing its planned functions. My earlier memo listing uncompleted work and ignored study directives is at Tab A.

The fundamental purpose of the DPRC is to ensure the DOD program is supportive of the President's strategy and foreign policy objectives. To this end, it should go beyond arms control planning (SAL[*T*] and MBFR) and get into broad strategy questions as well as DOD programs and budgets.

Conceptually, the *strategy decisions* made by the President are separable from the *force planning* prerogatives of DOD. The President's *strategic* objectives should provide a broad framework for force planning while DOD develops the detailed force postures to support the President's strategy.

This neat conceptual separation, however, does not work in practice. Without the White House becoming involved in DOD force planning, it is clear that the President's strategy will not be supported.

—Strategic objectives have been changed with very little effect on force postures (e.g., NATO and Air Defense).

—DOD budget requests have been out of line with the President's economic goals and NSC has ended up as a broker mediating between the demands of OMB (which emphasize economic considerations) and Laird who wants to maximize the DOD budget.

—DOD procurement and force planning policies have strategic implications all their own which can't be ignored.

Future DPRC Functions

There are four broad functions which the DPRC could perform:

—*Setting the strategic objectives* which govern our *force planning* and ensuring these objectives are coordinated with the President's overall

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 237, DPRC & Defense Budget, Aug–Dec 1972. Secret. Sent for urgent action. The tabs are not printed. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote "thru Scowcroft" at the top of page 1. Kissinger wrote on page 1: "Dick—Here is another stupid Laird."

foreign policy goals. Possibilities for the future include establishing strategic doctrines to govern our naval force planning and to guide Asian planning in the future.

—*Ensuring the availability of adequate funds to cover DOD's long term spending plans* by projecting total long term revenues and spending to check the consistency between the President's economic, fiscal, and strategic planning.

—*Examining the adequacy of planned forces* to support the President's strategic objectives by considering reinforcement capabilities, deployment plans and the near term diplomatic impact of our force planning. A review of our capability to implement the NATO strategy with its emphasis on providing an initial ground defense and improved anti-tank capability is an appropriate new initiative in this area.

—*Reviewing the suitability and efficiency of specific weapons systems* for their role in carrying out our strategy. Is the B–1 the type of manned bomber we need for the future? Are we building carriers suited to the needs of the future?

Some degree of NSC involvement is, in my view, essential in all four areas. The key question is which areas should be addressed by the DPRC, with its full interagency membership, and which should be addressed through other bilateral channels. *To a major extent the answer to this depends on the understanding you and the President reach with Elliot Richardson.* Without his cooperation, the DPRC will not function effectively.

Broad resource allocation and strategy issues as well as the adequacy of DOD programs to carry out strategy have direct broad interagency policy implications and definitely fall under the DPRC. Specific weapons systems design and development decisions are primarily DOD's responsibility even though State, ACDA, OMB, etc., have a burning interest.

The weapons issues of interest to the President should be handled on a *bilateral* basis with DOD. This White House involvement could be helpful to the incoming Secretary of Defense. For example, the drive towards complex and costly new weapons systems is very powerful and White House pressure can be of value in containing the R&D advocates.

How to Proceed

There are many important and timely issues to be addressed in each of the functional areas listed above. A partial list of these issues is at Tab B.

In view of the slow down of the DPRC mechanism over the past six months, it is imperative that we take a strong initiative to get work moving ahead when the new administration takes office. The key problem is to assign priorities and develop a rational schedule to ensure that over the next year or so we make meaningful progress in developing the President's strategy and ensuring the forces will support it.

First priority should go to bringing to decision those studies which have largely been completed. The prime examples are the NSSM 69 Asian force and deployments study and the Strategic Objectives Study.[2] Both could be ready for the DPRC and NSC some time early next year.

At the same time, we need to get work underway on new strategy studies which the President will want to review over the coming year. Primary candidates are studies of the strategic rationale for our Navy and tactical nuclear forces and planning. Both areas represent real gaps in our strategic planning. These studies will take months to complete and we should start now in order to have something by next summer.

Regarding DOD long term budget planning, the important thing is to ensure rough consistency between the five year plan and the President's intention not to increase taxes. Rather than redoing NSSM 3, I propose:

—Issuing five year budgetary guidance to DOD which holds spending levels about constant in real terms. This guidance should be issued in late January or February in order to influence next year's DOD planning cycle.

—Directing DOD to present in the summer an analysis of the strategic implications of a five to ten percent increase or decrease in spending. This would be the basis for firm fiscal guidance for FY 75–79 period.

Finally, I believe we should aim towards studying several special weapons systems with work done on a *bilateral* NSC/DOD basis. Examples include the suitability of the B–1 manned bomber, the need for the FY 78 Trident IOC, and large air defense modernization programs and close air support needs. (Army, Air Force, and Marines are all developing aircraft for this mission.)

It may also be wise to ask the new Secretary of Defense to review the currently planned modernization effort to see what could be done to slow the move toward even more costly and complex weapons and equipment. This idea will be treated in my memo on steps to rationalize the Defense program.[3]

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[2] Copies are ibid., RG 59, S/S–NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 65 and NSSM 69.

[3] Kissinger indicated his approval by writing "in principle" and below that "See me" next to the agree option.

177. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, November 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Organization and Staffing

At Staff Meeting you asked for thoughts on organization and staffing. This paper is more lengthy than planned, but I believe accurately reflects some of our principal problems. None is major, but in the aggregate they make the organization less effective than it might be.

1. The Senior Staff's Role

—The Senior Staff can and should be extensions of Henry Kissinger.

• They want to be and are capable of it.
• If the bureaucracy knows without question they are speaking for him, regard for our staff and in turn for HAK will grow.
• And the work will get done and the problems of assuring adherence to the policy line will be reduced (to the extent there are any problems—I think there are fewer than HAK imagines, and can produce a long list of constant follow-ups to demonstrate this).

—*The only way* that this can be accomplished is for these men to *know* what Henry Kissinger thinks and wants.

• Staff meetings could help, but we both know that he is uncomfortable with them and they have not long survived each reincarnation.
• You have been helpful to them (and in a more limited way I have tried to be) for one reason—we knew what Henry Kissinger said to a Cabinet officer, an Assistant Secretary, to us in his office, etc.
• There is nothing more demoralizing and demeaning (to HAK's loss) for one of the senior staff than to be told by a colleague from a Department what HAK has said on a subject on which the colleague had been debriefed by his principal and our man was not.
• HAK's new ideas may be helpful but the process will be greatly furthered if (a) they can read *relevant* telecons (they could be protected), and (b) if there is a reading file of staff papers on the EOB side which the *Seniors* could leaf through each day to get the flavor of his thinking on issues and his reactions.

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, Reorganization of the NSC System. Personal; Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum is not signed. A 2-page attachment, January 29, that discusses alternative ways of structuring the NSC staff, is not printed. Typed at the top of page 1 is: "[Outside the System]"

2. Systems Analysis

—The Systems Analysis function should be pared down and focused on strategic and defense issues.

—Moreover, it will be far more effective if it stops directing and starts participating and contributing.

• It has improved but there are still some vestiges of the past, and we suffer the after-effects of earlier excesses.

• The writing of papers in this staff and then trying to sell them or ram them down the throats of the bureaucracy is hardly calculated to get what the system is supposed to produce—"all relevant facts, the views of all involved agencies, and a fair presentation of all reasonable options." Experience has shown amply that (1) this is seen as simple arrogance, and (2) this generates the strongest and most effective kind of bureaucratic resistance to implementation of a decision.

—If it is to do an analytical work concerning a country, region or issue which is the responsibility of one of the senior staff (either functional or regional), then it should do that work *for him* and not totally independently (e.g., the country programming exercise on which more later, and some economic issues, etc.). This takes people whose satisfaction is in their work and contribution, not in names on papers.

• In the last analysis, it does not serve HAK well to have radically different viewpoints expressed, neither of which has taken into account the valid aspects of the other. It is just bad staff work.

• This in no way implies that differing viewpoints should not be put forward—they should. But if they are to be useful they ought to be integrated in a way which shows their relevance one to the other and that is what the regional staff officer is for.

3. The HAK personal staff has become a buffer—unfortunately in the poorer sense of the word.

—There are too many (though the quality is superb); and because they are there, Henry simply turns to them.

—If he cannot trust people on the EOB side, then he should replace them, not fence them out. When HAK has said: "I want you to work on this yourself and I do not want anyone else to know," that is precisely the way it has been. If that is what the situation calls for, it is precisely what HAK should get. But that does not mean that he needs to establish a completely separate staff which he refers to as "his staff" as distinct from the others.

4. The NSCIC

—The NSCIC fills a vital need but for it to *do* net assessment is, in my judgment a non-starter. A year's experience lends some credence to this view.

—There should be a net assessment group established directly under the Director of Central Intelligence which reports to the

NSCIC and is tasked by it (and HAK) through the Director of Central Intelligence.

- The NSC staff element's role should be to (1) *participate* in that group, and (2) provide for HAK the independent analysis of the work done by the Net Assessment Group.
- Let the DCI (who has functions prescribed by law) fight the battle with the Secretary of Defense rather than engaging HAK in a direct confrontation. HAK can step in when he wants to do so on ground of his choosing rather than be continually engaged in energy sapping and useless bureaucratic fights started by others.

5. The Staff and the System

—If the NSC System is to function effectively, the NSC Staff has to play the game. It cannot denigrate the efforts of the bureaucracy; it must encourage them and help to improve them. We have come some distance along this road but we show signs of falling back.

- It should stimulate IG meetings, not decry their lack.
- It should help the Group charged with preparing a paper to produce a responsive and respectable product. It should not sit back and complain about the product or write a superior one independently to crow about.

6. Consultants

—The use of consultants should be brought under control.

—I find it incredible that we could have a consultant on board to do a study which had not yet been approved; and when it was, was directed by HAK to be performed by an IG. But that is exactly what happened in a recent case.

—Consultants, as a celebrated case made amply clear, can lead to real disaster.

—Their usefulness is unquestioned but common sense dictates tight control over their employment and terms of reference. This should be exercised by HAK. If the question must be put to him, my guess is that it might not even be asked in some instances.

7. Staff Needs

—I do not need four people on a continuing basis, though the present fourth man—the White House Fellow—has helped greatly to lighten the load over the last three months, much of which I have spent in HAK's office during your absence. Three is about right. Most of what we do is as a service and to be of help to the senior operators, but we also handle Security Assistance and (increasingly) other aid matters, and a variety of cats and dogs which need to be done.

—We need to get a senior man for *Africa and UN* matters and he should have a junior assistant.

—We need a senior man for *Scientific Affairs* and relationships with OST.

—We need a *Security Officer* who will handle not only the personnel security matters but equally as important, physical and document security matters.

—We need a *Senior Economics man* (Hormats is superb but the task is going to be enormous). When we gave way on the CIEP, we created a monster which is just now beginning to get itself involved in a way that complicates the foreign policy-making process and HAK must get a hold of this.

8. Country Programming

—HAK expended major capital 18 months ago vis-à-vis Rogers and Laird to get out NSDM 112 calling for Country Program studies,[2] but absolutely nothing has emerged. It was a major confrontation which we had to unscramble as you recall (and it was the *third* issuance of essentially the same directive since January 1969). The exercise was supposed to provide a base for Security Assistance and Economic Aid estimates for FY 73 and FY 74, but no papers were completed. Even before joining the staff, the futility of this exercise (and the cost to the prestige of the System) was evident to me. The bureaucracy had dug its heels in and, though it cooperated, it was convinced universally that nothing useful would emerge. (The Korea and Brazil examples bore them out—however excellent the academic exercises were, the conclusions could not stand the test of the real world.)

—The principle is sound. But the way to get it done is to task the bureaucracy to do it, not hire a staff here to direct it.

—This non-starter (three times) should be wiped off the slate and we can then move to get the desired product in an effective way. (The System Analysts won't like this because it is a bread-and-butter fall-back to rekindle whenever you run out of other work.)

9. Morale

—I know you have heard more on this than you really care to. But it would be unfair and less than candid if I failed to tell you that the prevailing mood is not helped by the lack of decent recognition of this superb staff which serves the President faithfully and well and (except for a very few notable examples) facelessly.

—As a simple and oft-repeated example, when half of the Domestic Staff can eat in the Mess, the fact that the Senior NSC Staff—a

[2] See Document 151 and footnotes 1–3 thereto.

handful in number—cannot, is simply a reflection on their stature *and* on HAK's.

—The fact that this staff has worked as devotedly as it has, being treated as it has, is testimony to its selflessness and its greatness. Few Commanders would expect such a result.

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178. Memorandum From Donald Stukel of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the National Security Council Planning Group (Kennedy)[1]

Washington, December 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

The NSC System

At Tab A is a summary of meetings held by the various groups of the NSC system during the past four years.[2] This summary indicates some trends which need to be thought about, especially if we are to have a chapter in the Annual Review on the NSC system. The way we have described the operation of the system in the past and the way it actually operates seem to diverge more each year. Over and above what goes in the Annual Review, we need to reexamine the system to see if changes would make it more effective.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Major Stukel was a White House Fellow on temporary assignment to the NSC.

[2] The figures in the text of this memorandum and in the attached summary should be considered approximate rather than exact. They vary, for example, from the figures for meetings of the same groups during the same period that NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis reported to Kissinger on January 18, 1974. Davis listed 71 (versus Stukel's 76) NSC meetings (but agreed on 3 for 1972), 140 (versus 160) Review Group and Senior Review Group meetings, 153 (versus 148) WSAG meetings, 23 (versus 30) DPRC meetings, 45 (versus 38) Verification Panel meetings, and 1 Intelligence Committee meeting. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75)

The purpose of this memo is to raise questions with the hope of stimulating our thinking on what we should say about the system and what we can do to make it more effective.

National Security Council

The number of NSC meetings per year has shown a steady decline (37, 23, 13, 3). This year there have been three NSC meetings—two on Vietnam and one on SALT. The last NSC meeting was on May 8, 1972.

Questions:

—What accounts for the decline in the number of NSC meetings?
—Is the decline in the number of NSC meetings typical for an Administration?
—Is the NSC going to play a significant role in the next four years?
—In our writings do we want to start downplaying the role of the NSC in the NSC system?

Senior Review Group

The SRG was established on September 13, 1970. It assumed the functions of the Review Group. The role of the SRG is to assure that the issues have been sharply defined, all relevant factors considered, realistic alternatives with their costs and consequences clearly set out, and the views of all interested departments and agencies fairly and adequately presented. The number of SRG meetings dropped from about 50 each of the last two years to 16 this year. Ten of the 16 meetings were on Vietnam, South Asia, and CSCE/MBFR.

Questions:

—What accounts for the decrease in the use of the SRG?
—Is there a more efficient and acceptable means of handling NSSM studies than by a meeting of the SRG?

Defense Program Review Committee

The DPRC was established on October 11, 1969. The DPRC was to analyze the choices inherent in defense budget decisions, relating alternative levels of defense expenditure to other national priorities, both domestic and foreign. It has a very broad charter but has been a real disappointment because of its inability to come to grips with significant issues.

Questions:

—Does the DPRC serve a useful purpose?
—Does OMB perform the functions given to the DPRC?
—Does OMB give sufficient emphasis to NSC interests?
—Can the DPRC be restructured to be more effective by reducing its membership?
—What is the proper forum for examining long-term implications and strategic aspects of different defense postures?

Washington Special Actions Group

According to the directive (May 16, 1969)[3] which established the WSAG, it was to confine itself to consideration of the policies and plans affecting crises. The WSAG was later (June 20, 1969)[4] given the task of reviewing existing military plans for potential crisis areas. During the last three years the WSAG has met almost exclusively on South East Asia, South Asia, or Middle East matters. 52 of the 55 WSAG meetings this year were on South East Asia matters.

Questions:

—Do we need a group that is responsible for anticipating future crises?
—Do we need a group which concentrates on matters related to contingency planning?
—As used today, does the WSAG duplicate the SRG?
—Since the membership of the WSAG is essentially the same as the SRG, is there a need for two separate groups?

Verification Panel

The Verification Panel is charged with the technical analysis of arms control issues. This year the VP met 10 times on SALT. In the past, the VP met 6 times on MBFR, but this year MBFR was handled by the SRG (4 meetings).

Questions:

—Could the arms control issues be handled as well by the SRG?

Intelligence Committee

The IC is charged with advising the President on the quality, scope, and timeliness of the intelligence input to Presidential decision and on the steps to improve it. The IC has met once since it was established in November 1971.

Questions:

—Is is necessary to have a separate group (made up of essentially the same people as the other groups) to perform this function?
—Is the IC going to be used in the future?

Overall

There is an almost total overlap in the membership of the various groups in the NSC system below the NSC. The Big 5 (Kissinger, Irwin, Rush, Moorer, and Helms) are the principal players on the SRG, DPRC,

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[3] Document 45.

[4] See footnote 2, ibid.

WSAG, IC, and VP. The charters of some of these groups have become blurred to the point that they are insignificant. All groups or committees (except the WSAG) have met less this year. In part this is due to the pressures of Vietnam and maybe the election. It would be a mistake to attribute the total decline to Vietnam and the peace talks.

Questions:

—Is it necessary to have all the various committees and groups?
—Do the charters of these groups need to be redefined or refined?
—Do we want to change our presentation of the working of the NSC system?

Tab A

	1969	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*Total*
NSC Meetings	37	23	13	3	76
SRG Meetings	41	53	50	16	160
DPRC Meetings	4	11	11	4	30
WSAG Meetings	12	39	42	55	148
VP Meetings	1	10	17	10	38
IC Meetings	—	—	1	0	1
Total	95	136	134	88	

The Intelligence Community and the White House

179. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President-Elect Nixon[1]

Washington, January 6, 1969.

1. You have asked for my assessment of the strengths and limitations of the Government's foreign intelligence coverage and my views as to measures which could be taken to improve this effort. I am generally satisfied with the adequacy of our intelligence on such matters as:

a. The military capabilities of foreign nations of strategic concern to the United States (including the characteristics and state of deployment of their missiles and other strategic weapons); and

b. World economic developments and political trends in most non-Communist countries of significant interest to the United States.

2. [*6 lines of source text not declassified*]

3. There are, in my opinion, certain steps that should be taken to improve the intelligence effort. The most important of these are: (a) implementation of plans for the development of a satellite borne photographic reconnaissance system, capable of practically instantaneous transmission of pictures for interpretation in Washington; and (b) the appointment of an Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense to advise and assist him on intelligence resources with a view to sharpening the focus of intelligence activity and eliminating marginal programs.

4. The following paragraphs will give you in somewhat greater detail my views about the effectiveness of our intelligence programs.

a. Communist Military Capabilities.

(1) It is, I think, obvious that the competence and scope of our intelligence effort has improved and expanded substantially during the past ten to twelve years. We can count on reliable information about the size and disposition of military forces around the world. Improved overhead photographic reconnaissance systems, which regularly produce coverage of wide geographic areas with [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] give us a reasonably complete understanding [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*].

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA, Vol. I, Jan 69–31 Dec 69. Top Secret; Handle via Byeman Comint Channels.

(2) Through signals intelligence activities, conducted largely by units of our military services, acting under the technical direction of the National Security Agency, [*8 lines of source text not declassified*].

(3) [*1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified*]

(4) Generally speaking, we can provide planners in the Defense Department and military services with information which permits them to make decisions concerning the level and character of forces and weapons systems needed by the United States with reasonably precise knowledge of the probable nature of the military threat against which these forces and weapons will be used. One of the imperatives of good defense planning, of course, is adequate advance notice of the emergence or likely emergence of new enemy weapons systems. We have reason for confidence in our ability to detect and identify [*5 lines of source text not declassified*]

b. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]

(1) [*1 paragraph (25½ lines of source text) not declassified*]

(2) [*1 paragraph (25 lines of source text) not declassified*]

(3) [*1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified*]

c. Economic Coverage and Intelligence on Areas Outside the Communist Bloc.

(1) Our understanding of economic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally is reasonably complete. This coverage is, of course, a factor in an assessment of probable military strengths, force levels and projected weapons production in Communist countries.

(2) Intelligence coverage of political and economic developments outside of the Communist Bloc is generally satisfactory. [*6½ lines of source text not declassified*]

(3) In Latin America, programs for the penetration of Communist parties and surveillance of potentially subversive Communist supported political activity have progressed satisfactorily.

(4) In Southeast Asia the main emphasis, of course, has been in Vietnam where all elements of the intelligence community are extremely active. The United States military commands have been primarily responsible for the development of order of battle intelligence and tactical intelligence support to combat commands. CIA has been active in the rural development and pacification programs and in counterintelligence work designed to penetrate the Viet Cong organization and subversive programs, as well as in providing political coverage of the South Vietnamese government. [*8 lines of source text not declassified*]

(5) [*1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified*]

5. *Turning to the question of what should be done to strengthen United States intelligence, I believe that some improvements can be made in the or-*

ganizational structure and procedures of the Central Intelligence Agency. As you are, of course, aware, the organization of CIA was originally shaped by the experience of OSS in World War II and has evolved through the administration of five Presidents. Its organizational pattern has changed as experience in crises, from the blockade of Berlin to the recent Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, has suggested better arrangements for the collation, analysis and speedy dissemination of information. Since its creation in 1947 it has been the subject of numerous reviews by groups which included such highly qualified and responsible members as General James Doolittle, Robert Cutler, C. D. Jackson, General Mark Clark, Edward Rickenbacker, Mansfield Sprague, Livingston Merchant, James Killian, Clark Clifford, General Maxwell Taylor, and John McCone.

6. I have just completed my own survey of the Agency which has satisfied me that in general it is performing effectively the functions entrusted to it by law and by the National Security Council and that its organizational structure is basically sound.

7. I believe, however, that some modifications of its organization and in the scope and emphasis of certain of its activities may be desirable. Specifically, I believe that improvements can be made in the organizational arrangements and procedures through which coordinated National Intelligence Estimates are produced. I hope to be able to streamline and improve the facilities within the Agency for the automatic or computerized handling, storage, and dissemination of information. I also believe that the resources available for research and analysis, particularly as an adjunct to the formulation of estimates of probable political trends and occurrences in foreign countries, should be reviewed and can perhaps be strengthened.

8. Another factor of cardinal importance to the Central Intelligence Agency is the cover and security available for its operational personnel overseas. [*18 lines of source text not declassified*]

9. I believe that steps can also be taken which will improve the effectiveness of the intelligence community as a whole. As far as capabilities for the collection and rapid dissemination of data are concerned, [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*]. We also have plans for a new satellite borne photographic reconnaissance system providing [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. Finally, as I have suggested in paragraph 3., I believe that we should proceed with the design and development of a satellite photographic system which would include a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This would permit us to follow certain events and developments in foreign and potentially hostile regions on an hour-to-hour basis almost as they occur. Obviously the development of such a capability would be expensive and may burden the facilities presently available to exploit and interpret photography. Nevertheless, I believe that we should acquire this new system and am as-

sured by technical experts, including Dr. Edwin Land of the Polaroid Corporation, that it is technically feasible.

10. In addition to plans for improving our collection systems, we also are undertaking action calculated to insure that our automated facilities and related procedures for the storage, collation and rapid retrieval and dissemination of information of interest to the intelligence community as a whole are modern and as efficient as possible.

11. *Another matter of considerable importance, as I have also indicated in paragraph 3., is the need for greater centralization of control over the intelligence activities conducted in the Department of Defense.* [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] They are managed through three principal programs:

a. *The Consolidated Cryptologic Program* (CCP). The bulk of communications intelligence and electronic intelligence activities of the United States Government are managed under the CCP, the total budget for which runs in FY1969 to about [*dollar amount not declassified*]. The National Security Agency is responsible for this effort to the Secretary of Defense, to whom the Director, NSA, reports through the Director for Defense Research and Engineering.

b. *The National Reconnaissance Program* (NRP). This program encompasses all projects for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights of denied areas by both manned aircraft and satellite vehicles. It is managed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Director of which is simultaneously the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, although the Director, NRO, reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on reconnaissance matters. The budget for the NRP for FY 69 is approximately [*dollar amount not declassified*]. Guidance to the reconnaissance effort is provided by an Executive Committee consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the Director of Central Intelligence.

c. *The Consolidated Intelligence Program* (CIP). This program includes the various activities of DIA and the military services which collect and produce information of primary interest to military planning, operations and readiness. These activities include a considerable mapping and charting effort, peripheral reconnaissance (as distinguished from overhead reconnaissance conducted under the NRP), the Defense attaché system and the Atomic Energy Detection System. The cost of these programs amounts to [*dollar amount not declassified*] in FY 69. The CIP is the direct responsibility of the Director, DIA, who reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12. Although existing arrangements for the control and review of these three individual programs are adequate, no machinery exists in the Department of Defense for the interrelation of all three programs

with each other. A common element in the review of these programs is afforded by my own representatives who participate in the review of each individual program. I have no managerial authority over components of the Defense Department, however, and my influence over these programs is necessarily limited to broad and generalized guidance. I have recently established a National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB),[2] with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State as members, to help me determine what resources are really needed in the intelligence effort. My role, however, as far as Defense Department programs are concerned is advisory only. I have no authority to compel any action with respect to Defense Department activities. No other machinery exists, below the level of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through which integrated control of these programs is actually exercised.

13. In view of the sensitivity and importance of intelligence programs, it is essential that those conducted under the managerial authority of the Secretary of Defense should continue to be supervised and administered by individuals with direct access to the very highest level of the Department of Defense. In recent years oversight and policy direction of these three programs has been increasingly the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary of Defense personally. It is important that no intermediate echelon should develop to constitute a bureaucratic layer between the Deputy Secretary and the Directors of these three important programs. On the other hand, experience has proved that it is impossible for a man with the broad responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary of Defense individually to exercise continuing administrative supervision over the complex of activities represented in these three large programs. Nor would it be desirable to add this responsibility to the functions of any of the Assistant Secretaries. Accordingly, I believe that a very senior and competent individual who is thoroughly experienced in intelligence should be appointed to act as an Assistant to the Deputy Secretary with a small staff to advise and assist the Deputy Secretary on matters relating to intelligence resources.

14. *Another subsidiary change calculated to improve the management of intelligence programs would be to divest the Director, National Reconnaissance Office of responsibility for any matters other than the reconnaissance program itself.* At the moment the Director, NRO, is also the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, a responsibility which has seriously limited the time and attention which he can

[2] For documentation on the establishment of the NIRB, see *Foreign Relations,* 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 278 and 285.

devote to the affairs of the National Reconnaissance Program. It should be possible to arrange some official designation, in the Air Force or otherwise, which would explain his presence in the Defense Department and serve as a cover for his actual activities but which would nevertheless not detract from his efficiency by burdening him with administrative or other responsibilities outside the reconnaissance field. I also believe that the Director, NSA, should report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense instead of through the Director for Defense Research and Engineering who, however, should be consulted on matters in all three intelligence programs which have technical or engineering implications.

15. I believe that with these changes in arrangements for the supervision of intelligence in the Defense Department it should be possible for us to reduce the cost of certain existing programs and activities, some of which produce data and information of marginal importance. Economies and improvements in the efficiency of existing programs would permit us, I hope, to offset the substantial cost of developing new and expensive facilities, such as the capability for an immediate readout of satellite photography which I have mentioned above, and which are badly needed to improve the effectiveness of our over-all effort.

Richard Helms

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180. Memorandum From [*name not declassified*] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Intelligence Community

1. The National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency. The authority given the Director of Central Intelligence by the Act was twofold: he is the President's principal intelligence advisor and also the operating chief of the Central Intelligence

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, HAK Administrative and Staff Files—Transition, Nov. 1968–Jan. 1969, C.I.A. Confidential.

Agency. As Director of Central Intelligence, the Director attends NSC meetings as an advisory member.

2. The United States Intelligence Board was set up to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his mission as the President's principal intelligence advisor. In addition to the Director of Central Intelligence, who is its Chairman, United States Intelligence Board consists of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as the CIA representative, plus the Directors of Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and deputy directors from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. Senior military officers attend as advisors to the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency. They have the statutory right of dissent if they do not agree with the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. National Intelligence is that intelligence which is produced and fully coordinated by members of the intelligence community for use by high-level policy makers. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the prime example of national intelligence. So, too, is the daily *Central Intelligence Bulletin.* All concerned members of United States Intelligence Board approve a draft NIE, or dissent in writing if they disagree with any part of the estimate.

4. Departmental intelligence is that intelligence produced individually and not coordinated with other community members. It is usually produced solely for use within the producing agency or for lower-level policy makers. Examples: INR Studies, DIA Summary, Vietnam Sitrep.

5. Defense Intelligence Agency was created in 1961 to eliminate the cumbersome and often duplicate efforts of collection and production of intelligence within the Department of Defense. The separate services still produce detailed technical intelligence for use by their operating units. Defense Intelligence Agency produces a single all inclusive daily Department of Defense publications for all the services. Thus, the senior officials, both civilian and military, read the same intelligence and are not being subjected to biases which sometimes were evident when each service produced its own intelligence publication.

6. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides policy oriented political intelligence for the Secretary of State and other department officials.

7. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has responsibility for counter-intelligence activities in the United States, therefore, a representative sits in United States Intelligence Board to participate in meetings when the internal security of the United States is discussed.

8. Atomic Energy Commission has the responsibility for providing information regarding the monitoring and analysis of nuclear detonators of foreign nations.

9. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), now chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, is comprised of former high ranking government officials and prominent businessmen who agree to monitor in the President's behalf the caliber of the intelligence community's performance. PFIAB meets regularly or at the call of its Chairman for the purpose of assessing the intelligence "record" during a crisis (the Tet Offensive in 1968, for example), to receive briefings on emergent crises. It assures the Chief Executive of an impartial, outside evaluation of the intelligence he receives.

10. In addition to PFIAB, there exist a number of lesser known advisory or consultative boards established for the purpose of coordinating field collection, determining national intelligence priorities, for ensuring that the latest technological advances are exploited for whatever intelligence value they may have, for overseeing security procedures throughout the Federal Government, etc. During your visit to Central Intelligence Agency in Langley on 8 January, R. J. Smith, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, will be prepared to provide you with a "15 minute" briefing on the intelligence community. Between now and Inauguration, I will have brought to New York whatever organizational charts, explanatory texts, etc., you may wish.

[*name not declassified*]

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181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, January 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

President's Daily Brief

1. The President has today authorized me to send you the *President's Daily Brief.* The *Brief* is designed to give the President a systematic but concise review of the day's most significant intelligence. It is hand-tailored to his personal needs and he controls its content and its distribution.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 1, Folder 10, State. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Godfrey on January 21.

2. The *Brief* is all-source including the most sensitive materials at hand. This in turn requires special handling: the *Brief* is not permitted to move through normal intelligence channels. Rather, it is delivered directly to your office by my couriers for you personally. The couriers will pick up the previous issue when they deliver; the only files are in my office and the White House. I would appreciate it if you would ask your personal assistant to contact Mr. E. Drexel Godfrey, Director of Current Intelligence, extension 7424, to make arrangements.

3. The only other authorized recipients are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

4. The schedule of production and delivery is not yet firm. For the next few days we will be printing in the afternoon and the *Brief* will be available about 1800. We can deliver either in the evening or the following morning, at your convenience.

Richard Helms[2]

[2] Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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182. Memorandum From Frank Chapin of the National Security Council Staff to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, January 23, 1969.

1. After a half hour wait in an outer office permeated with understandable turmoil, I had my first meeting with Mr. Kissinger at 5:00 p.m. yesterday.

2. It was largely a question-and-answer session with little opportunity for an orderly presentation on the origins and functioning of the 303 Committee, although some of the functioning aspects were worked in. Mr. Kissinger observed that I would find he asked many questions. I responded that I would do my best to answer them or get him answers promptly. [2 *lines of source text not declassified*]

[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee. Secret; Eyes Only.

3. Prefacing his questioning with the comment that he is inexperienced in the intelligence field and in covert actions, he wanted to know:

a. Once a proposal is considered and approved by the Committee, does he then have to obtain the President's approval? I explained that this would be a matter for his judgment. Sometimes the Committee approves, sometimes it is elevated to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and some items are taken to the President. I cited the Radios[2] as certainly falling into the latter category.

b. Once a proposal is approved, does it go on ad infinitum? I assured him not and stated that the Committee would be so advised. I also mentioned status reports.

c. Are there contingency plans in every proposal covering what will be said and done in the event something goes wrong? I explained that there is contained in every 303 Committee paper an assessment of the security and risks involved but generally not a specific contingency plan—although this is taken into consideration in the operational planning. In this connection I explained that in submitting any proposal to the Committee your procedure is to have standing by outside of the Situation Room the Division or Staff Chief, or other most qualified officer, to discuss any details Committee principals might request. Mr. Kissinger stated rather emphatically he was going to want to know about contingency plans in order to protect the President. I would suggest that a new section in the 303 papers might be appropriate on this point.

d. What is the origin of proposals? How do they reach the Committee? I explained that they might originate with an ambassador, COS, Headquarters, in the State Department or in the Committee itself. He expressed considerable interest in the latter and thought the Committee members should be generators. He said I would find that he was not averse to covert operations (despite his previous line of questioning) as long as they were *supplemental* to U.S. policy and overt operations. I assured him we felt the same way. I think it would be useful to get to him fairly soon the long range think-piece that the CA Staff is compiling in view of his expressed interest in new ideas.

4. Other highlights:

a. Mr. Kissinger will not consider a paper at a 303 Committee meeting unless he has it in hand at least 48 hours in advance. He wants the other principals to have the same opportunity to staff and study them. I assured him this would be done.

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[2] Reference is to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

b. He expressed a preference for scheduling 303 Committee meetings at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesdays. He would like the first meeting on Tuesday, 28 January 1969, to be a general briefing on the Committee and on-going activities contained in the Briefing Book which he had quickly scanned in an earlier meeting with you. He indicated that this meeting should encompass at least two hours. I suggested that such briefings might be spread out a bit more and that the decisions on the Radios were rather pressing, but he was called to the President's office at this point. As he left, he indicated a desire to talk to me further on Friday, 24 January.

c. Mr. Kissinger requested that I identify for him, as his staff member, those items in the Briefing Book on which he should brief the President. If you have particular guidance on this I shall appreciate it.

In response to his query, I suggested that the special relationship existing with [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was one item on which the President should be knowledgeable. [*3½ lines of source text not declassified*] I would guess that at least in earlier meetings of the Committee Mr. Kissinger may wish to ask for more detail on operational methods and techniques than has been usual in the past.

d. Mr. Kissinger expressed absolutely no knowledge of the JRC and NRO Schedules, which I had listed as a tentative agenda item. It would therefore seem desirable for General Steakley to provide a briefing, either at the Committee meeting or beforehand.[3]

F.M.C.

[3] In a February 13 memorandum to Helms, Karamessines indicated that he and Chapin planned to meet with Mitchell on February 17 to "give him a very brief rundown on the history of the 303, describe its current procedures, and give a general indication of the types of matters that are referred to it." (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDO Files, Job 79–00480A, Box 7, Folder 1, US4—Other Government Agencies, 1969)

183. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence's Deputy for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, January 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

Report on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community

1. I am submitting herewith my report on the organization of CIA and the intelligence community.[2]

2. As I have pointed out before, the report is in considerable measure an explanation and a defense of existing organizational arrangements (particularly as regards the Agency). Parts I., II., and V. of the report are purely expository. Part III. includes a discussion of what have appeared to me to be some of the more complicated organizational problems in CIA and some indication of my reasons for believing that the organizational dilemmas which these problems present should be resolved in favor of the existing structure. In reaching these conclusions I do not intend to imply that everything is working perfectly. I simply mean that organizational changes in themselves will not, in my opinion, improve the effectiveness or efficiency of particular programs.

3. Part VI. contains a discussion of what appear to me to be the important factors involved in an assessment of the present organization of the community. Here again, except for the specific actions proposed, I do not believe that organizational changes are needed to improve the over-all intelligence effort although improvement is clearly necessary and possible and will depend more on the individual competence and qualities of leadership of the senior managerial officials of the community than anything else.

4. It will be noted that some at least of the items which I have included in the list of matters requiring action are really not organizational matters. Possibilities for improving dissemination of counterintelligence information, personnel procurement or research facilities do not necessarily have organizational implications. They do, however, involve the interrelationship of several organizational components and, it seems to me, are properly noted within the context of an organizational survey because of their importance.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 4, Folder 2, Intelligence Community Reorganization. Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] Attached but not printed is the Report to the DCI on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community, January 20.

5. Finally, it will be noted that most of my specific recommendations call for further reviews. This is not because of any particular reluctance on my part to take a position on the problems at issue. All of them, however, are extremely complicated and their solution involves what are in very considerable measure subjective judgements. It seemed to me unlikely, within the time frame of this review and without a staff which was larger than appeared necessary or desirable under the circumstances, that I could develop conclusions which were sufficiently informed and which reflected anything like the consensus necessary to support really helpful recommendations. On the other hand, it seemed to me that it would be helpful to identify those areas where additional attention and review would really serve a useful purpose.

6. Attached, in addition to the survey itself, is a brief summary of specific recommendations.[3]

John A. Bross

[3] Attached but not printed. Comments on Bross' report by Abbot Smith and John Huizenga, Director and Deputy Director of Office of National Estimates, respectively, are in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–R01621R, Box 1, Folder 19, D/ONE Files, 1969. Comments on the report by DDI Jack Smith are ibid., Job 80–R01442R, Box 2, Folder 13, National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE), 1969.

184. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Helms' Memorandum of Understanding re Covert Operations

The attached is, I think, an accurate reflection of what you said to Dick Helms a few days ago on covert financing. But—for the record—we need your official approval.

[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee. Secret.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached memorandum.

Approve[2]

Disapprove

Approve as amended

Attachment[3]

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

1. In the course of a meeting with the President on 30 January 1969 at the White House,[4] there was a discussion of the guidelines which emerged for the Katzenbach report of March 1967[5] concerning covert action operations. These guidelines established that:

"It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance and support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations."

2. As a result of the discussion, it was agreed that the guidelines should be modified along the following lines:

a. In the future the restrictions of the Katzenbach guidelines would not be applied to Agency collaboration with [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

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[2] The President checked this option.

[3] Secret; Sensitive. Helms forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a February 3 memorandum in which he stated that he thought Kissinger would "find it accurate and faithful to the understanding reached" at the January 30 meeting with the President. (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee)

[4] According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Rogers, Helms, Kissinger, and Thomas Karamessines and Cord Meyer (CIA) from 11:08 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. on January 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) In a telephone conversation with the President on February 4, at 5:35 p.m., concerning the January 30 meeting: "K[issinger] said Helms had reported that nothing had given his staff such a shot in the arm—first time a President took him seriously in eight years." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files)

[5] For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967*, pp. 1214–1217. For background information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 260.

b. No covert financial support should be provided to American foundations or educational institutions.

3. Proposals for Agency operations in the area of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be presented to the 303 Committee for review and approval.

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185. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, February 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 5 February 1969

PRESENT

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger (Chairman), Mr. U. Alexis Johnson,
Mr. David Packard, and Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Robert P. Mayo and Mr. C. W. Fischer were present for Item 1.
Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. [*name not declassified*] were present for Items 1, 2, and 3.
Mr. William Trueheart was present for the entire meeting.

The Chairman opened the meeting with some general remarks before commencing discussion on the agenda items. Deriving from these remarks, it was agreed:

a. that each Tuesday, 10:00 a.m. will be reserved for the 303 Committee meeting[2]
b. that a systematic review of all current on-going activities will be undertaken for the information of the Committee principals. This is not to interfere with presentation of new proposals requiring consideration
c. that in the future, covert actions before the Committee will be subjected to an annual or other specified time review, or be approved subject to a specific termination date
d. that future covert action proposals will contain a section describing the possible consequences of disclosure of the operation and contingency plans therefor.

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee, Minutes, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Chapin on February 6. Copies were sent to Johnson, Packard, Helms, and Mayo (item 1 only).

[2] Minutes for meetings of the 303 Committee and its successor, the 40 Committee, are ibid. There are minutes for 18 meetings in 1969, 19 meetings in 1970, 17 meetings in 1971, and 3 meetings in 1972. Also included are records of "telephonic approvals": 1 for 1969, 3 for 1970, 11 for 1971, and 24 for 1972.

The Chairman stated that in his discussions with the President, the President had demonstrated an interest in the origin of covert action proposals and asked that the Committee undertake to identify those major national objectives which can be usefully supported by supplemental covert actions and to generate proposals for this purpose.[3] It was made clear that covert action proposals are to be supplemental to and in support of overt Government activities. There are to be no covert actions for the sake of having covert actions. There was unanimous agreement with this thesis.[4]

[Omitted here is discussion of 4 agenda items.]

Frank M. Chapin

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[3] Written in an unidentified hand in the margin next to this sentence is the following: "is concerned above all that covert actions support overall national objectives. He wants a general plan & not depend only on local conditions."

[4] In the second part of a telephone conversation with Attorney General John Mitchell, February 5 at 6:05 p.m., Kissinger reported as follows:

"President and HAK wondered whether the AG might be willing to serve on the 303 Committee, which is in charge of covert activities of the USG overseas. It would be a way to keep him connected with our foreign policy operations. HAK told him it meets once a week, Tuesdays at 10:00, and its function is to approve new operations which CIA is to undertake, and to review old ones. He said the President wouldn't insist on it if the AG's schedule is too full. Attorney General said he would certainly like to attempt to do it. HAK said he would make sure AG got briefing book the day before and, if he agrees, he would send Frank Chapin by to bring the AG up to date. If AG could spare a half hour, Chapin could tell him what it is all about.

"Mitchell agreed to try it, and HAK said the President would be very pleased if he would find it possible to do so.

"HAK said, 'We'll see you next Tuesday at 10:00. We meet in the Situation Room.' He pointed out that the AG would be the senior member of a group which is at the deputy level, but that didn't bother the AG." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

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186. Editorial Note

A telephone conversation between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell on February 11, 1969, at 2:40 p.m., began with a discussion of a draft Executive Order proposing changes in the organization of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board:

"AG said he was calling about Foreign Intelligence Board on which he seems to be the central clearing house. K said this is not new. AG said both Laird and Helms feel this is upgrading the activity. Laird is concerned that this may be running afoul of comparable setup in the

Congress and it should be made clear that the Board is to have advisory functions—should be called the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. K said we took the Advisory out in order to have it new, but that neither he nor the President have any views on it. AG said both Laird and Helms mentioned the fact that the title is being changed to Executive Director and they feel this upgrades the position. K said he would take this up with General Taylor tomorrow when he comes in—he is the source of the recommendation. AG referred to K's section 1, para 3, Helms has a point on this which seems to have merit—something on the positive side should be said. AG read language which K said sounded good to him.

"K said he would talk to Taylor about all of this tomorrow and with the President on Thursday morning—he will let AG know results by Noon Thursday. K asked whether this would have to go back to BOB—AG said he thought we could just send them a copy." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files)

Kissinger and Helms continued the discussion in a telephone conversation the following day at 8:45 a.m.:

"Discussed Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—K said he is going along with H on this. H said Coyne has tried to get the position upgraded a couple of times before." (Ibid.)

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187. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of Defense Laird and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, February 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

Major Intelligence Problems, Particularly in the SIGINT Field

1. With further reference to my memorandum of 18 February,[2] I am enclosing a paper which outlines my views on the Government's SIGINT activities.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 14, Folder 8, DCI Chron 1969. Top Secret; Handle via Byeman Comint Channels.

[2] Not found.

2. In July 1967 the President directed that a special review of these activities be conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The purpose of the review was to assess the efficiency of these operations and their responsiveness to national needs at minimum necessary cost. To assist me I appointed a special study group chaired by Mr. Frederick M. Eaton, which submitted its report in August 1968. Since then I have received comments on the report from various elements of the Department of Defense as well as from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. A copy of the Eaton report is attached.[3] The other members of the study group were Mr. Livingston Merchant, General Lauris Norstad, and Mr. Eugene Fubini.

3. The annexed memorandum sets forth in rather general terms some of the conclusions which I have reached after considering the Eaton recommendations and the various comments on them. I propose ultimately to transmit my recommendations concerning possible measures to improve the organization and administration of the SIGINT effort to the President through you. Before putting such recommendations in final form, however, I would like to discuss with you personally the broad outlines of the main problem as I see them. In anticipation of such a discussion, the attached paper provides a summary of my views. When you have had a chance to review it, I should appreciate an opportunity to talk to you about specific actions that may be taken.

Richard Helms[4]

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms

Washington, undated.

Conclusions Concerning Possible Improvements in the Organization and Administration of U.S. SIGINT Programs

1. There is a need to bring together review of the three major intelligence programs of the Department of Defense (the Consolidated

[3] Not attached. Documentation on the Special Study Group (known as the Eaton Group) is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Sigint Study Group. Copies of the report are ibid., Job 86–B00269R, Box 8, Folder 39, Eaton Report—16 August 1968; and ibid., Box 14, Folder 125, The Eaton Report, Comint and Elint Program, 16 Aug 68.

[4] Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

Cryptologic Program, the Consolidated Intelligence Program and the National Reconnaissance Program). As you know, these account together for something on the order of 85% of the total resources devoted to national intelligence. In the past these programs have been considered by separate reviewing authorities, which has complicated the problem of identifying gaps and redundancies in the intelligence effort as a whole. Better arrangements are needed for identifying and evaluating all the resources and activities committed to the coverage of particular targets and problems, particularly where high cost systems are involved. It is also important that all of the Defense Department's intelligence programs at the national level should be kept under more or less continuous review and that this be done with full recognition of the relationship of each to the others and to the total efforts of the community. In this way it should be possible to assess more clearly the intelligence impact of resource decisions. It was largely to facilitate the process of continuing review of the totality of the Defense Department intelligence effort that I recommended that you appoint a senior official to act as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary for intelligence resource matters.

2. Resources must be more closely related to intelligence needs than they now are. I believe that we have made considerable progress in trying to achieve this. Among the more important steps is the establishment of the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB), consisting of top representatives of the principal intelligence producers, i.e., DIA, State and CIA, chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The purpose of this Board is to provide me with informed advice concerning the real need for particular systems or activities when the information which they produce, or are likely to produce, is balanced against their cost. We have established a Target Oriented Display (TOD) to assist the NIRB in identifying and assessing the totality of resources applied to particular national intelligence needs. In this connection, we will need your help in persuading certain elements of the intelligence community to conduct their business so that they can be adequately responsive to calls for information on the resources which they deploy, including cost data.

3. We are also endeavoring to devise more effective means of arriving at an accurate assessment of the true value of the intelligence which is eventually produced as a result of the operation of particular resources. This is a most complex problem and we have been trying to attack it in several different ways, including the use of advanced methods of systems analysis.

4. The mechanism of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and its functional committees has been useful in developing intelligence requirements in the first instance. A good deal of progress has been made

in developing procedures to provide a continuing assessment and refinement of these requirements with the objective of keeping the flow of raw intelligence information within reasonable and effective bounds. This problem has been exacerbated by the steadily increasing technical effectiveness of collection systems. Here we have encountered a certain amount of natural reluctance to make hard selective decisions concerning what data is really essential or at least important. I suggest that we will all have to work together to achieve a proper balance between the "nice to know" and the "need to know."

5. Much thought has been given to the desirability of attempting to formulate a long term national intelligence plan to determine the objectives, targets and priorities of the intelligence effort. A plan, in the conventional sense of the word, is probably too elaborate and rigid a format for the provision of practical guidance for intelligence activity. It is hard to conceive of a planning document which would be very helpful in projecting the intricate and multitudinous activities contemplated for American intelligence activity over an appreciable period of time. An alternative would be a series of program memoranda related to the intelligence effort against the more important areas. Such memoranda could define the objectives of the effort in the area, describe the resources committed and recommend the maintenance of a particular level of effort and the allocation of particular resources to this effort. The recommendations of the memoranda, insofar as they relate to resources, would be based, in part at least, on the results of systems evaluations completed during the course of a program year. Preparation of such program memoranda would be the joint responsibility of the DCI's staff and designated elements of the Defense Department.

6. One of the most difficult problems in the SIGINT field is to achieve a proper allocation of resources as between those devoted to national requirements and those which are necessary to support military units, particularly in the case of ELINT. Under NSCID 6,[5] NSA is assigned the mission to provide "an effective unified organization and control of the COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the U.S." This would appear to be ample authority for NSA but in practice this centralized control has been eroded. At the heart of the problem is the fact that almost all the collection resources of the CCP are operated by one of the three service cryptologic agencies (SCA's). The SCA's are oriented in large measure to the needs of their respective parent services. Thus, while NSA nominally has tasking authority over all COMINT and ELINT collection facilities, it has perforce dele-

[5] Reference is to NSCID 6, Communications Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence, September 15, 1958, and January 18, 1961; neither found.

gated control of a substantial portion of these facilities to the SCA's so they might fulfill the intelligence needs placed upon them by their parent services. Particularly in the area of ELINT collection, resources programmed against national requirements are at times diverted to meet the tactical needs of local military commanders without the consent of the Director, NSA. The result has been that a portion of the resources of the CCP which are allocated and justified on the basis of national intelligence needs are subsequently tasked to meet other requirements.

There are some resources which are now clearly and unequivocally being tasked for exclusively tactical needs. Such resources should be identified by careful study, then removed from the CCP and assigned to the sole jurisdiction of the military commands they are serving, as elements essential to military operations and readiness. Criteria should be not the nature of the equipment but the purpose it serves. They should be funded through normal service channels rather than under one of the national intelligence programs. By undertaking such action, I believe that some of the tugging and hauling for resources that now goes on between NSA and the military services can be eliminated.

7. The authority of the Director, NSA over all resources, other than those transferred to the military services or commands on the grounds that they serve essentially tactical purposes, should be confirmed and strengthened.

8. It would be desirable to do away with the present subordination of the Director of NSA to DDR&E, and to have him report directly to the Deputy Secretary, recognizing that additional staff support in the form of the senior assistant proposed will be necessary. The establishment of a cryptologic career within the services should be encouraged and supported. Steps toward this objective have already been taken but further progress is possible.

9. The capability of the Director, NSA for direction and guidance of the cryptologic community should be strengthened by the assignment of senior officials with experience and competence in planning and programming.

10. Existing arrangements between the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the rest of the intelligence community, including NSA, appear to me generally satisfactory. The NRO agreement was negotiated with considerable difficulty with a view to accommodating conflicting interests. It has provided an increasingly effective mechanism through which the potentialities and capabilities of various agencies of the Government for overhead reconnaissance have been exploited. Design, development and operational control of overhead sensors has proceeded under the overall direction and coordination of the Director, NRO. Guidance to this effort is established through the appropriate USIB mechanisms which determine the number, frequency

and objectives of missions required from particular sensors, e.g., the resolution of photography for certain purposes, frequencies, band widths and general characteristics of signals to be intercepted, is determined as a result of a dialogue between the substantive elements of the community (acting through USIB) and the appropriate echelons of the NRO. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is adequately represented in USIB and maintains effective working relationships, at the technical level, with the NRO.

The processing facilities of NSA play an essential part in the exploitation of data collected from SIGINT satellite operations just as the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) plays an essential part in the exploitation of overhead photography. Action to ensure that facilities for processing the take from overhead reconnaissance activities are adequate can be taken through the appropriate USIB mechanisms and in any event should be part of the program review responsibilities of the managers of the intelligence programs. The measures recommended above to establish more centralized supervision over the intelligence activities of the Defense Department would help to ensure that appropriate action is taken to relate all processing facilities to all collection activities.

11. I believe that these general conclusions can serve as the basis for specific actions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of all Defense Department intelligence programs, including specifically SIGINT.

188. Executive Order 11460[1]

Washington, March 20, 1969.

ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter referred to as "the Board." The Board shall:

(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort;[2]

(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;

(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and

(4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.[3]

SEC. 2. In order to facilitate performance of the Board's functions, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all other departments and agencies shall make available to the Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence and related matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President in accordance with the terms of this Order. Such information

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[1] Source: 34 *Federal Register* 5535. Documentation on the formulation of the executive order—including the draft executive order prepared by PFIAB member Frank Lincoln, revisions urged by PFIAB Chairman Maxwell Taylor, and objections raised by Laird and Helms—is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 274, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—Vol. 1 [1969]. Also see Document 186. Significant differences in E.O. 11460 from E.O. 10938 of May 4, 1961, which it replaced, are footnoted below. E.O. 10938 is in 26 *Federal Register* 3951.

[2] E.O. 10938 stated that "the function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security."

[3] E.O. 10938 required the Board to report to the President "each six months or more frequently as deemed appropriate."

made available to the Board shall be given all necessary security protection in accordance with the terms and provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

SEC. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed by the President from among persons outside the Government, qualified on the basis of knowledge and experience in matters relating to the national defense and security, or possessing other knowledge and abilities which may be expected to contribute to the effective performance of the Board's duties.[4] The members of the Board shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter.

SEC. 4. The Board shall have a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be authorized, subject to the approval of the Board and consonant with law, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Board's duties.[5]

SEC. 5. Compensation and allowances of the Board, the Executive Secretary, and members of the staff, together with other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in the Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969, Public Law 90–350, 82 Stat. 195, and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673).

SEC. 6. Executive Order No. 10938 of May 4, 1961, is hereby revoked.

Richard Nixon[6]

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[4] E.O. 10938 stated that "members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government."

[5] This section is new.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

189. Memorandum From Frank Chapin of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)[1]

Washington, April 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Oral Briefings of the 303 Committee

I refer to Item 2, *Integration of Covert Actions with U.S. Policy,* in the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting of 15 April 1969[2] and to our conversation the day following this meeting.

I believe Dr. Kissinger, in raising the point at the 15 April meeting, was expressing more than one concern. I think he is mindful that the Committee has not yet been brought fully up to date on on-going covert actions approved by the previous administration. He also is seeking reassurance that such activities do in fact have a relationship to and are in support of U.S. national objectives. Additionally, I believe he has in mind the thought that the Committee members themselves might generate ideas for covert actions in support of broad U.S. national objectives. He has several times raised these interrelated concerns.

It seems to me that in preparing an oral briefing, or briefings, as the Director suggested in the 303 Committee meeting, all of the above points should be borne in mind. I think that in briefings on any individual activity there should be stress on how that activity is supplemental to and in support of overt U.S. programs and activities designed to further U.S. objectives in the country or region concerned. I also believe that some general comments on how covert actions originate, how they are carefully coordinated and evaluated and endorsed throughout various policy levels up to and including the 303 Committee might be in order. I think Dr. Kissinger is still seeking a certain amount of reassurance that some covert operations are not devised, planned, and implemented without appropriate integration into the over-all U.S. national objectives for a given area or on a world-wide basis.

Lastly, Dr. Kissinger has more than once expressed the view that ideas for covert operations in support of broad U.S. objectives might

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee. Secret.

[2] At the April 15 meeting "the Chairman raised the question of the status of a review of covert actions to make sure that they fit into and are in support of overall U.S. national policy objectives." Helms "suggested that this might best be handled by an oral briefing and said he would arrange for such a briefing to reflect how these activities are integrated as supporting elements to U.S. policy objectives." (Ibid., Minutes)

well be generated within the 303 Committee forum. He has repeatedly expressed interest in receiving the "future ideas" paper which you mentioned was being worked on in the Agency in your late January 1969 briefing of him. Hence, I think he would be interested in hearing of any suggestions for future covert actions in support of U.S. policy objectives even though they might require a good deal of developmental work before they could be presented in any concrete form.

You might wish to check these impressions with the Director sometime to see if he agrees that the points cited above are what are bothering Dr. Kissinger.

Frank M. Chapin[3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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190. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Research, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Walsh) to the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (Proctor)[1]

Washington, June 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relations with DIA

1. This memorandum is in response to the recent request of the DDI for delineation of those major problems with DIA which would be appropriate for discussion by the DDCI and, hopefully, resolvable at his level with DIA.

2. For the past four years components of OER engaged in work on the Vietnam War have worked very closely with their DIA counterparts. The wide variety of relations between the two agencies have included exchanges between working level analysts, informal and formal coordination of intelligence reports, participation in joint working groups and the publication of joint intelligence reports. The working relationship between the two agencies is better than it was a few years

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–T01159A, Box 4, Folder 3, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1969–1970. Secret.

ago and there has been marked progress in developing more consensus and agreement on critical intelligence problems. Nevertheless, the relationship has been an exceedingly trying experience which has frequently impeded the intelligence process, particularly on matters of national intelligence concern.

3. Our difficulties with DIA reflect both institutional arrangements and management practices within DIA, and the basic DIA philosophy about its relationship to the national intelligence community on the one hand and to the field commanders and their intelligence units on the other hand.

Institutional-Management Factors

4. Several facets of DIA organizational arrangements and management practices have a disruptive effect on harmonious and effective CIA–DIA relationships. Some of the more important of these follows:

a. DIA has chosen to diffuse and to decentralize a number of the intelligence functions associated with the Vietnam War. At the same time, however, they have not set up procedures or machinery to coordinate or resolve differences of view between the separate DIA units that may be concerned with a particular aspect of the war. Thus CIA may find that it cannot reach agreement with DIA because two or more relatively autonomous DIA units are in disagreement. Apparently such a disagreement can only be resolved at the highest levels of DIA, levels to which lesser ranking units are unable or reluctant to bring their cases. As a result, the DIA position frequently becomes such a watered-down compromise that it is not meaningful, or the reaching of CIA–DIA agreement is impossible or must be deferred for unacceptably long periods of time.

b. Another obstacle to effective inter-agency relationships results from a DIA unwillingness to authorize its officers—at almost every level—to enter into official inter-agency agreements on intelligence questions. It is not uncommon after days of hammering out an "agreed" position to find that the position accepted by the DIA representative is completely unofficial and informal. Moreover, the subsequent amendments to the DIA representative's position are so numerous and from so many different levels of the organization that any supposed agreement is rapidly undone.

The Philosophy Problem

5. This heading is a rubric for a basic DIA approach to the intelligence function that is a constant irritant to effective inter-agency relations and, more significantly, has a harmful impact on the whole national intelligence function.

6. The problem arises from the conflicting pressure within DIA on the one hand, to present the best possible input into national intelligence and on the other hand to conform with and to support the intelligence judgments of the military services and field commanders. This dilemma has several untoward results. DIA frequently feels compelled,

for example, to espouse viewpoints of field commanders with which it does not agree. Or, in seeking to accommodate divergent views, DIA produces intelligence that inadequately presents the views of either side. This situation in one famous instance—the enemy strength debate—delayed for over 15 months the production of highly significant national intelligence.

7. This entire philosophical dilemma is pertinent to the very basic issue of determining the fundamental purpose and function of a national defense intelligence agency—should it be an independent and objective intelligence voice for the Department of Defense or should it be a conveyance for the intelligence views of field commanders?

Paul V. Walsh

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191. Memorandum From [*name not declassified*] of the Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, June 18, 1969.

My reconstruction of The President's remarks at the NSC meeting this morning:[2]

"People have been showing a tendency to use intelligence to *support* conclusions, rather than to *arrive at* conclusions. I don't mean to say that they are lying about the intelligence or distorting it, but I want you fellows to be very careful to separate facts from opinions in your briefings.[3] After all, I'm the one who has to form the opinion—I'm the only one who has to run, I'm the one who has the sole responsibility when things go to pot.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, NSC Meetings. Secret. Helms sent copies of the memorandum to the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Plans, and Science and Technology, the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, under cover of a June 18 note stating: "This is an accurate reflection of what the President said, and we must be most scrupulous in abiding by his wishes."

[2] The NSC met for a discussion of U.S. strategic power and SALT. Notes of the meeting are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–022, NSC Meeting 6/18/69 SALT (NSSM 28) [1 of 2].

[3] Helms added the following words to this sentence in a marginal notation: "and in your intelligence papers."

"The fact is that the intelligence projections for 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968—and I've seen them all—have been up to 50 percent off in what the Russians were going to have—and on the low side.

"Now, certainly we can have opinions, and I want to hear them expressed here in this room, but we have got to start with fact, and all the fact, and reach the conclusions on the basis of hard fact. Is that understood now?"

[*name not declassified*]

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192. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, July 22, 1969.

Dear Dave:

I have read Bob Froehlke's tentative report on Defense intelligence with great interest.[2] It seems to me that he has done an impressive and commendable job. In general his recommendations are compatible with views which I have held for some time and the over-all thrust of his report in the direction of greater centralization and control over Defense Department intelligence resources seems to me highly desirable.

The details of how to implement his recommendations will obviously take some time to work out. For example, formulation of a truly consolidated Defense intelligence program, as he proposes, is a complicated matter and it may take considerable time to develop satisfactory procedures for the issuance of calls and assembling of data for such a program. Until this can be done, you may wish to continue the existing individual program presentations. I think it particularly important, at least for the time being, to continue to give independent visibility to the National Reconnaissance Program because of its importance and expense and also because our congressional committees are familiar with it.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 3, Folder 25, Defense Intelligence Reorganization. Secret; Handle via Byeman Control System Only.

[2] See Document 193 and footnote 2 thereto. A copy of Froehlke's Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence, July 11, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 3, Folder 25, Defense Intelligence Reorganization.

I note that objective 4 of the report calls for a reappraisal of security policies and procedures. I have no objection to such a review but, if one is to be initiated, I would like to be associated with it in view of my statutory responsibility for the security of intelligence sources and methods.

The observation in the report to the effect that in practice there are fluctuations in manpower and money from approved levels seems to me particularly pertinent. A corollary of improved programming procedures for intelligence activities of the Defense Department should be the establishment of more effective controls to ensure that resource levels in fact conform to program decisions.

Two specific recommendations of the report give me concern. One is the location of the proposed Special Assistant. While I heartily concur in the need for such an Assistant, his location appears to me a matter of prime importance. Because of their sensitivity, complexity, expense and national importance, matters involving intelligence, including resource management, have heretofore normally been handled by the Deputy Secretary of Defense personally. In view of the overall burden of responsibility on the Deputy Secretary, it seems to me desirable that he should delegate some of his responsibility in the intelligence field and certainly that he should be assisted by a trusted and competent senior official with an appropriately qualified staff.

I am extremely doubtful, however, whether this function of assisting and acting for the Deputy Secretary on intelligence matters can properly be performed by any individual, no matter how able, who is simultaneously charged with performing all the responsibilities given to any of the established Assistant Secretaries. Any existing Assistant Secretary would only be able to devote part time to intelligence matters which would have to compete for his attention with other important matters. This means inevitable delay in decision making in an area where quick reaction is essential. It also means that the actual work of developing, negotiating and coordinating positions on intelligence matters would be delegated to a subordinate staff level. Given the political significance and importance of many of the problems which determine the need for intelligence activities and the technical complexity and diversity of these activities as well as the fact that they must be responsive to a broad spectrum of officials and components of the Government, it seems to me important that their general supervision be the personal responsibility of a senior official and not delegated to a subordinate level.

As to the location of the Special Assistant, I therefore come down very strongly in favor of Bob Froehlke's option 4.

My second concern is with the proposal to replace the Executive Committee of the NRO with an Executive Council charged with ad-

vising the Secretary of Defense on all intelligence matters. It is not clear to me how substitution of the new proposed Council would affect the administration of the national reconnaissance program with which of course I am personally involved.

The Executive Committee of the NRO as far as I know is a unique institution in Government. It provides, in effect, a forum in which those with participating interests in the development and operation of the national reconnaissance program can meet and make speedy and reasonably informal decisions. The agreement provides that in the event of disagreement the Secretary of Defense will meet with the Executive Committee and make the final decision. This arrangement has worked very well and has given me and the intelligence community what has seemed to me an appropriate voice in the program. I do not believe that the new Council would be as satisfactory for this purpose.

What is perhaps more important, a Council with larger membership, such as the one proposed, would probably not have the flexibility and capacity for prompt action which characterizes the present Executive Committee. In addition, it is an arrangement which has been worked out through years of difficult negotiation. In view of the critical nature of the information involved and the expense of the programs, together with the strong Congressional interest in this area generally, I believe we should be most circumspect in altering an arrangement in which we have joint responsibilities without carefully measuring losses as against possible gains.

I assume that any change in the arrangements for the administration of Defense Department intelligence resources would not be intended to change the relationship which currently exists between the USIB and my office generally and the intelligence agencies and components of the Defense Department through which general guidance is provided concerning the objectives and priorities of the national intelligence effort. Both the National Reconnaissance Program and the SIGINT program of the United States are, of course, national programs.

In this connection the suggestion has been made that the Special Assistant for Intelligence would replace the Director, DIA on the National Intelligence Resources Board. I would welcome such an arrangement. I assume, however, that the Directive, DIA would continue to represent the Defense Department on the USIB.

Sincerely,

Dick

193. Memorandum by Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, August 1, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Responsibilities for Intelligence in the Department of Defense

After carefully reviewing the attached memorandum and Report from Bob Froehlke, Dave Packard and I have decided that changes are required to improve the management of intelligence functions within the Department of Defense and have accepted Bob's recommendations. Accordingly, I hereby assign additional responsibilities for intelligence to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (ASD(A)).

In discharging these responsibilities I fully expect the ASD(A) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the defense intelligence community. In order to accomplish this improvement he is charged with the following responsibilities:

1. To establish an intelligence resource review and decision making process which will comprise:

a. A mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DoD decision makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence.
b. A Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan.
c. A procedure for identifying and surfacing major issues of intelligence resource allocation and management.
d. A continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements balanced against collection resources.

2. To improve intelligence communications among DoD agencies and between the Department of Defense and other agencies.

3. To evaluate intelligence organizational relationships, roles, and missions.

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 74 132, Intelligence Matters. For Official Use Only.

4. To review security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and compartmentation.

I expect the ASD(A) to be fully in business—staff aboard and office space selected, equipped, and placed in operation—by October 1, 1969. In the interim, to insure a smooth transition, I would appreciate it if you would continue to work on such intelligence papers or projects you might have which now become his responsibility with a view toward (a) finishing the paper or project in coordination with Bob, or (b) taking the necessary steps in conjunction with Bob to transfer the action to him.

The important thing is to insure that nothing "drops through the crack" during this transition period.

In view of the importance of this assignment, both to the Department of Defense and to the nation, I would appreciate your giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration your complete and continuing support in this effort.

Mel Laird

Attachment[2]

Report Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (Froehlke)

Washington, July 29, 1969.

Report on Defense Intelligence

Introduction

In the months ahead it is likely that intelligence products which are as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make them will be even more critical than they are today. There are serious and severe problems within the Defense intelligence community. Many of these problems stem from the methods we presently employ to allocate intelligence resources against requirements. Others relate to

[2] Froehlke forwarded the report to Laird under cover of a July 29 memorandum in which he discussed the comments he had received following circulation of his Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence to interested parties in the intelligence community on July 11. He indicated he had revised his report in light of the comments without changing his basic recommendations. Froehlke prepared the report in response to Laird's April 29 memorandum assigning him additional duty as Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary and Deputy and requesting him to provide within 45 days a study of the intelligence efforts in DOD. (All ibid.)

inadequacies in the collection and utilization of intelligence or to difficulties in the estimating processes.

As a result of my investigation, I have concluded that:

—In the area of resource allocation, a new line function must be established.

—In the other areas an improved staff element is necessary in OSD rather than a line function.

This report therefore proposes that a Special Assistant be established to perform the line resource allocation function and to improve OSD staff participation in the other areas.

Background

In 1953, the Secretary of Defense established the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). This Assistant recommended policies and provided guidance on planning and program development to DoD intelligence agencies and components, reviewed plans and programs, developed DoD positions on intelligence problems, and made recommendations to the Secretary on the actions necessary to provide for more efficient and economical operations. In practice the position was almost exclusively concerned with supervision of NSA. It was seriously handicapped by the lack of a charter to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource management.

In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick, was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment of a focal point within OSD to exercise broad management review authority over military intelligence programs, and to provide overall coordination of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various defense components. The report emphasized the operation and use of intelligence rather than resource management. However, it was one input considered when DIA was established in 1961. The DoD press release of 2 August 1961, announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a "more efficient allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating facilities and organizations" was expected. The position of Assistant for Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establishment of DIA. His responsibilities vis-à-vis NSA were assigned to DDR&E.

Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP), the DIA "manages" only about 25% of the DoD resources devoted to satisfying both military and "national" intelligence requirements. The bulk of the resources are found in a number of other programs such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), or are treated outside any formal program.

The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is no review which compares the resources in one program targeted against a requirement with the resources committed against the same requirement in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement for evaluating information requirements in terms of intelligence objectives. In addition, this situation has been complicated by excessive classification and security compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and thwart comparisons.

Objectives

The ultimate objective of a good intelligence program is to provide a better intelligence product to the consumers; a product which is as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make it. The attainment of this overall objective requires improvements in (1) collection and utilization of intelligence; (2) the estimating processes; and (3) allocation of resources. The functions of a Special Assistant are different with respect to the operational and estimating processes of the intelligence community than they are with resource management.

Any organization or personnel changes resulting from this report should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in priority. (You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed at resource management and intelligence policies, and not management of intelligence operations of a day-to-day nature. This does not imply that the management of the intelligence operations is flawless. On the contrary, there is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations of defense intelligence. However, improved management and operations can better result through improved personnel and policies rather than a radically new organization.) The objectives are:

Objective 1. To establish a resource review and decision-making process for major intelligence activities. By resource review I mean determining the appropriate level and mix of significant resources for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements. There are inseparable reinforcing objectives which are essential elements of this overall Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1) To establish a mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DoD decision-makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence (What form this mechanism takes is relatively unimportant. It should be simple and understandable. I'll refer to it, whatever form it takes, as the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP)); (2) to improve Defense intelligence resources allocation planning for the mid-range period by establishing a Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan updated annually; and (3) to focus attention on decisive points in this program by developing major issue studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource allocation and management.

Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (CIP, CCP, and others) are institutionalized and are not evaluated in relation to mutual target objectives or in terms of mission-oriented information needs.

The DoD intelligence community at the present time does not know the minimum level of information that will satisfy a stated requirement. While there is no upper boundary on intelligence requirements, there is a limit on resources. Therefore, resource limitations make it important to ascertain requirements as precisely as possible. We need to insure that all valid requirements are met to some minimum level, without going to higher levels on some requirements while ignoring other valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved in acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts must be known.

The focus of intelligence planning and programming activities tends to be in the near term period (one or two years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical collection systems, automated processing systems and automated analytic and production aids create the need to develop a long term intelligence resource plan. Without such planning, intelligence decisions rely on short term considerations. Further, there is a tendency to develop options made available by rapidly expanding technology simply because they are available.

In the present programming process, recommendations reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show fluctuations in manpower and money from previously approved levels but more significant issues do not tend to surface within DoD. Frequently, past decisions on elements or systems having high dollar value or significant ramifications in a functional area have been reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups convened by the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense to study each problem when it arises—generally in a time frame which does not permit in-depth analysis.

Objective 2. To improve information flow and policy transmission on intelligence matters between the DoD and other government agencies concerned with intelligence resources by functioning as DoD focal point for interagency relations.

Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the authority to participate across the board in an effective dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies. Representation today is fragmented among a number of DoD intelligence officials none of whom possesses the necessary responsibility for all DoD programs. Since the Special Assistant will not be the sole DoD representative in the intelligence community, it is indispensable that senior DoD intelligence officials do not operate independently of each other.

Objective 3. To obtain a more efficient distribution of the functional responsibilities of the DoD intelligence agencies and organizations

through an evaluation of their organizational relationships, roles, and missions.

The U.S. Congress, in the HACIT Report of 1968,[3] and other government agencies have been concerned that the military Services are performing functions specifically delegated to the DIA and vice versa. Additionally, the relationship of the National Security Agency (NSA) to counterpart agencies in the military Services as well as to the Unified and Specified Commands, has been questioned. The institutional structure of the Defense intelligence community is the result of a piecemeal process which seldom addressed the interrelationships of the elements in the community as a whole.

Objective 4. To improve intelligence flow by insuring that a realistic reappraisal of security policies and procedures is undertaken with a view toward modifying standards which lead to unnecessary classification and over-compartmentation of intelligence information. (Obviously any activity along this line would have to be coordinated among all elements of the intelligence community and with the DCI specifically.)

Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelligence programs is restricted. As a result, at times officials charged with reviewing existing programs are denied information essential to the formulation of recommendations.

Organization

I recommend that you name one individual to act as the Special Assistant to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense intelligence. He would be responsible for intelligence resource management. In addition, he would act as staff advisor to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for all other DoD intelligence activities. The solution to our current problems in intelligence management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization. There are no clear cut solutions to the problems we face. The Special Assistant will be feeling his way along a path that will require the closest cooperation of all members of the intelligence community to insure meaningful progress.

The Special Assistant will make the trade-offs among intelligence programs competing for resources. Directors of DoD intelligence agencies would of course have the right of reclama to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. In other matters, the Directors of DoD intelligence agencies would report to the Secretary but the Special Assistant would act as the Secretary's principal staff element.

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[3] Not found.

On occasion the Special Assistant would undoubtedly direct certain broad management activities other than resources. When so doing, he would be acting for the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. (It would serve little purpose to attempt to delineate to what extent and when the Special Assistant would become involved in day-to-day operations. Suffice that he will become involved at the pleasure of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary and probably about as often as they have in the past.) For substantive intelligence matters this approach will allow essential and healthy differences in intelligence judgments within the community to continue to exist and to be presented to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary.

I recommend that the Special Assistant, as a management technique, create a forum where the leaders in the Defense intelligence community can discuss and communicate items of general interest. In time it could become a decision making body. The exact make up of the forum and its modus operandi should be left to the Special Assistant. (This forum was labeled the DoD Intelligence Board in my tentative report.)

I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council for Defense Intelligence. It can either supersede or serve in addition to a similar committee. If it supersedes, the similar committee should continue as a subcommittee of the Executive Council. In that way, all the understandings and agreements that were involved in setting up the existing committee could be continued.

The Council should consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence, the President's Scientific Advisor, the Chairman of the JCS and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. The Special Assistant would sit ex officio.

The Council would be an advisory body (however with the Deputy Secretary as its Chairman, its advice would certainly be heeded). The primary purpose of setting the Council up would be to have the benefit of this advice. An important fringe benefit would be the communication channel it would provide to and from the intelligence community. Ideally, as time goes on, the Council should do the following things:

1) Guide and participate in the formulation of resource programs.
2) Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for resource programs.
3) Recommend allocations of responsibility and corresponding funds for R&D for appropriate systems.
4) Recommend approval or modifications to the resource programs.
5) Periodically review essential features of the major programs.

Staffing Alternatives

There are a series of staffing alternatives which provide varying levels of capability to achieve the objectives outlined.

Three alternatives to provide staff support to the Special Assistant have been considered:

Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of intelligence expertise for the Special Assistant, leaving currently assigned responsibilities of OSD elements essentially as they are now. It is estimated that it would require five professionals and two clerical spaces for this staff.

Alternative 2. Transfer professional positions and the necessary clerical support currently dealing with intelligence resource management to the office of the Special Assistant. The objective would be to consolidate a number of existing intelligence management activities in one office. The transfer of positions might be accomplished as follows (This does not necessarily mean incumbents would transfer with the position.):

ASD(A)	3
DIA	5
DDR&E's Office of Special Intelligence	4
ASD(SA)	2
	14

Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed intelligence staff to a level at which it would be capable of performing, on a totally centralized basis, the full range of intelligence resource management functions: development and ranking of requirements, mid-range planning, program and budget development, and review of intelligence issues. While a detailed analysis of personnel requirements has not been made, it is estimated that it would take about 150–200 professionals to accomplish these functions.

In determining which staff Alternative to recommend, I considered each in light of the objectives listed earlier:

> *Objective 1.* (Establish a resource review and decision making process for intelligence resources management.)

The Special Assistant and his staff would have to: (1) Establish and conduct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) which would encompass all DoD managed intelligence resources (Tactical intelligence resources—once defined—would not be managed by the Special Assistant. However, he must be cognizant of them to the extent that he can properly evaluate their impact on the employment of resources allocated to the satisfaction of the highest level military and national intelligence requirements); (2) Establish a Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan to improve intelligence resource allocation planning for the mid-range period; and (3) Formulate major issues of intelligence resources allocation and management.

Initially, it will take a considerable number of man years to achieve this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for the initial

surge of personnel needs. This initial surge could be met on an ad hoc basis from within DoD.

This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being met. Decision makers need a framework for selecting alternative options and corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to provide this framework, and conducting an annual review has primary claim on manpower assigned to the Special Assistant. An early goal should be the reduction of detail that currently characterizes the present intelligence reviews (CIP and CCP). There is unanimous agreement that excessive detail makes these reviews unwieldy and makes it necessary to devote manpower to these efforts to an unwarranted level. (The Directors of the DoD intelligence agencies will be directly responsible for the development of their respective programs.)

The Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan will strive: (1) to permit resource allocation decisions to be made as early as possible, especially for long lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of resources to meet future needs; (3) to present the costs and benefits of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs; and (4) to understand better the resource implications of satisfying various future requirements.

A major factor in the development of the Plan is the pressing need to establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs and risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since there is no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how much information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates of what it costs to obtain the information. (There are a number of efforts underway which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this problem.)

The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of gaining those objectives. Formulating major issues has never been attempted successfully in the Defense intelligence community. It is, however, necessary in order to determine the proper courses to follow.

In theory Objective 1 could be accomplished by any of the three staffing Alternatives. However, if Alternative 1 (the minimum staff) were selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a monitor, with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies. As a practical matter, therefore, it is questionable whether Alternative 1 could do the job.

Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications among DoD and other agencies.)

It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB, and other non-DoD members of the intelligence community. One of the less obvious responsibilities would be to keep communication channels open at all times unimpeded by a lack of rapport and understanding.

Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this Objective.

Objective 3. (Evaluate the intelligence organizational relationship, roles and missions.)

It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc study group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely candidate.) As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the Alternatives.

Objective 4. (Reappraise security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and over-compartmentation in the intelligence field.)

This Objective would necessitate a review, under the aegis of the DCI, of current security policies and procedures. It is a continuing effort because of the ever present tendency to over-classify and over-do compartmentation.

There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classification and over-compartmentation exist. It is a natural tendency and I observed evidence of it. If it is present in any significant degree, it certainly is bad because over-classification impedes the flow of information and over-compartmentation excludes agencies and individuals who may have a legitimate need for the information.

Both Alternatives 2 and 3 (the middle and maximum staffing Alternatives) could accomplish this Objective. Alternative 1 (the minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the function was farmed out to other OSD elements.

The primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is that it requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant. Cosmetically, this is advantageous.

The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be impossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives without relying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD. This raises the distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the image of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out.

Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing sufficient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the Special Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be under the supervision of the Special Assistant. It also clearly reduces fragmentation of DoD responsibilities for intelligence.

The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing will not allow the Special Assistant to become involved in the day-to-day operations of the intelligence agencies. Another disadvantage, if it is one, is that the Special Assistant will spend a good deal of his time dealing with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence community because staff will not be available.

At this stage, it is impossible to say whether or not the Special Assistant's duties will require his full-time attention: in other words, will the workload prevent assigning the job to an ASD as additional duty? From all my observations and conversations, I feel that it will not be a full-time job, although getting the new system started will certainly require a lot of attention. Once the new organization is started and running, you may perceive that it is indeed a full-time job. At that time the billet can be so designated. The same reasoning applies to the size of the staff: as more is learned about the workload, you will be better able to determine the size of the Special Assistant's staff. As of now, about 15 professionals appear to be adequate to get the system started.

Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has the advantage of being able to accomplish all objectives—and then some. It not only allows the Special Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence resource management but could permit him to become deeply [involved] in the day-to-day intelligence operations. The primary disadvantages of Alternative 3 are the cosmetic one of added manpower and the disruption caused by major reorganization. Both Congress and the intelligence community would react adversely to this.

Alternative 3, because of the considerable additional OSD manpower and disruption, does not make sense at this time.

Alternative 1 would be an improvement over the present but the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special Assistant would probably leave responsibility diffused.

I recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It would accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of reorganization and personnel.

Location of the Special Assistant

The number of options available for the location of a Special Assistant for Intelligence narrows down to five:

Option 1. "Normalize" present intelligence resource management and allocation with a Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan, Development Concept Papers (DCP's) from the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and Major Program Memoranda (MPM's) from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), with a minimum role being played by the Special Assistant.

Option 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of Defense the responsibilities described in this report for the Special Assistant for Intelligence.

Option 3. Establish the Special Assistant under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Option 4. Establish a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as a separate office directly subordinate to the Secretary.

Option 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

Analysis of the Options

Option 1 does not truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort, and it puts sizing and development of intelligence forces under officials who have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing weapons or in setting force levels. It has the effect of placing the intelligence resource management responsibilities in the hands of officials who are customers for various parts of the intelligence product. (This Option actually lends itself only to staffing Alternative 1.)

Option 2 furnishes the man charged with the job with the prestige and authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies, possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelligence management function envisioned should not require the full-time attention of an ASD. However, when required, the authority of his office as an ASD is available.

Option 3. The JCS are oriented primarily toward strategic planning and direction and to those activities of the military Services which supply these functions. The assignment of intelligence resource management to the JCS would short-circuit those responsibilities for resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The JCS are also customers for major portions of the intelligence product. Their responsibility in intelligence management is more properly one of providing views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and the combat forces.

Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is handicapped by the lack of position and authority normally associated with an ASD. The Special Assistant in this Option is solely dependent on his relationship to the Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As a result, there is an aura of the "ad hoc" about a separate Special Assistant.

Option 5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or Congressional action to add an ASD because of the statutory limit of seven Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence function suggested in staff Alternatives 1 and 2, in terms of manning levels and percentage of the total DoD budget managed, is relatively small and therefore militates against Option 5.

Recommendations

I eliminate location Option 1 (normalize present practice) and 3 (JCS) because it appears to me that either could result in the Special Assistant being unable to achieve the stated objectives.

I recommend Option 2 (assigned to an existing ASD).

If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would recommend Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 (New ASD).

Respectfully submitted,

Bob

194. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talk by Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Senior Military Adviser to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

1. Colonel Haig spoke on the evening of 15 September to the combined CIA military reservists and other interested CIA personnel. His subject: "The Role of the White House in the Conduct of National Security Affairs."

2. The most interesting portion of Colonel Haig's talk came about mid-way. He said that at the beginning of the new administration it became obvious to him and to Dr. Kissinger that "CIA wanted control over the intelligence getting to the President." Haig then went into a long song of praise for the high quality and timeliness of the CIA product that goes to the White House. But, he went on, the President did not want CIA to have exclusive control over intelligence material reaching him. The President, Haig explained, feels "the intelligence community is best served by a certain degree of competition."

3. Each morning the NSC staff sends a "presidential brief" to the President's office. CIA provides "the foundation" of this, but inputs are added from the Department of State and "others." In addition, the NSC staff itself adds "substantive analysis on operational matters." During the course of the day additional "ad hoc" information is passed to the President when its importance warrants.

4. The Situation Room at the White House is small and efficient, "but as battalion commander I had one 20 times as large," Colonel Haig stated. He added that he would like to "improve" the White House Situation Room "when funds become available." One thing he would like to add is some equipment for "the storage and immediate retrieval" of information.

[Omitted here is Haig's discussion of the National Security Council system.]

[*name not declassified*]
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division, OCI

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 1, Folder 2, White House. Secret. Drafted on September 23.

195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, October 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

303

The President has requested that henceforth all CIA programs of a clandestine or covert nature which normally involve approval by the 303 Committee be subject to review by the Committee every 12 months. Such programs which have not been reviewed by the 303 Committee will be terminated or held in abeyance pending 303 approval.[2]

Henry A. Kissinger

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 3, Folder 33, C–17—303 Committee. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] According to the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting on October 17, "The Chairman asked for re-affirmation of his understanding that CIA covert action proposals approved by the Committee are automatically cancelled if not reviewed by the Committee every six months or a year. Mr. Helms responded affirmatively with the suggestion that annual review is appropriate in most cases, but that the Committee can request six month or more frequent periodic reviews where desirable in specific instances." (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, NSC Files, 303/40 Committee Minutes, 1969)

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196. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor)[1]

Washington, October 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Annual Report on Coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 14, Folder 8, ER Files—DCI Chron, 1969. Top Secret; Handle via Byeman Comint Control Systems Jointly; Handle via Talent-Keyhole Channels Only.

1. I submit herewith my report on developments relating to the coordination of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort during the past year.

2. Last year I introduced my report with some preliminary observations about the complexity of the arrangements through which the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense were supervised and managed. I pointed out that substantially all intelligence activities in the Defense Department are funded through three major defense intelligence programs which are now constituted as follows:

a. SIGINT activities are carried out under the general over-all direction of the Director, NSA, in the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) at a cost in FY 1970 of [*dollar amount not declassified*].

b. The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), in which CIA, the Air Force and other agencies of the government participate, functions under the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and is funded in FY 1970 at [*dollar amount not declassified*].

c. Other intelligence operations of the Defense Department, including peripheral reconnaissance, mapping and charting, service attachés, clandestine collection and other activities generally supervised by the Director, DIA, are funded through the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP) at a cost in FY 1970 of [*dollar amount not declassified*].

3. These programs were administered and supervised by the Deputy Secretary of Defense through different staff channels and as of last year no very satisfactory arrangements existed for the interrelationship of these three separate programs nor for an integrated review of problems common to all three. Responsibility for coordinating and evaluating the responsiveness of these programs to our common intelligence needs was seriously complicated by the lack of an adequate institutional framework through which common direction could be provided.

4. This problem was discussed on various occasions with the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy and various organizational solutions to the problem were suggested by different elements of the Defense Department and by my own representatives. I had a number of personal conversations on the subject with the present Secretary of Defense and his predecessor and their respective deputies. My own views were formally submitted to the present Secretary of Defense in the context of my comments on the Eaton report. In substance I recommended the designation of a Special Assistant for Intelligence who would be exclusively concerned with intelligence resource matters and would report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

5. The recommendations finally adopted by the Secretary of Defense differed in certain respects from my own views in that they established an existing Assistant Secretary (the Assistant Secretary for Administration) as the authority charged with supervision and coordination of Defense Department intelligence activities. Time may prove

that, given the complexity, importance and sensitivity of intelligence activities, it is not the best solution to combine responsibility for supervision of these activities with responsibility for the many other functions of any existing Assistant Secretary. I personally believe that it is unlikely that any individual will be able to perform the functions presently assigned to an Assistant Secretary and be able also to devote adequate attention to the problems of the Defense Department in the intelligence community. I believe, however, that the Secretary of Defense's decision to assign this responsibility to Mr. Froehlke, at least initially, is a definite step in the right direction and that it will serve very substantially to modify, if not totally eliminate, the difficulties resulting from lack of centralization of control of the Defense Department programs which I described last year.

6. As part of the new arrangements designed to strengthen managerial supervision of Defense Department intelligence activities and relate these activities as closely as possible to the needs of the community as a whole, it has been decided that Mr. Froehlke will replace the Director, DIA, as the Defense Department member of the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB). As I mentioned last year, the purpose of this Board is to provide me with informed advice concerning the need for individual activities or systems. The NIRB depends upon USIB for authoritative guidance concerning the community's requirements for information and their priorities. It is charged with responsibility for advising me in general terms whether the data acquired or anticipated from particular activities is really responsive to these informational requirements, and it develops judgments as to whether available or planned resources are worth their cost in light of the informational returns which they provide. In formulating its judgments, the NIRB is authorized to deal directly with the USIB committee structure and to task elements of the community. It has relied primarily on my National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff (NIPE) for staff support.

7. I believe that the Board will be greatly strengthened by Mr. Froehlke's presence as a member.

8. The organizational improvements described above appear to me to be particularly significant developments during the period covered by this report. I believe that developments under the following headings are of continuing interest to the PFIAB.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Richard Helms[2]

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[2] Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

197. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 24, 1969.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 275, PFIAB, Vol. II. Top Secret; Handle via Byeman Talent Control Systems Jointly. 4 pages of source text not declassified in time for publication.]

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198. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

NIE 11–8–69, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces"

Attached at Tab C is the intelligence community's latest effort at a comprehensive estimate of present and future Soviet strategic attack capabilities. (A covering memo from Director Helms is at Tab B.) A memorandum from Secretary Laird on the subject is at Tab D.[2]

I.

The highlights of the NIE are:

—The Soviets continue the buildup of the basic units of their force—the SS–9, large payload ICBM; the SS–11, Minuteman-type ICBM; and Polaris-type ballistic missile submarines—at rates at least equal to those of the past two years.

—The SS–9 is a real threat to Minuteman *if* the Soviets have a MIRV system for it and can make the missile carry the heavy MIRV payload the required distance.

—It is agreed that the heavy payload SS–9 could be made to go far enough to reach five of the six Minuteman complexes. Whether it could reach the sixth from present SS–9 sites is disputed.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 360, National Intelligence Estimates. Top Secret; Ruff; Umbra. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Lynn on December 9.

[2] The tabs are attached but not printed.

—The intelligence community is divided over whether the present tests of a triple warhead system for the SS–9 are aimed at developing a MIRV, but it is agreed that even if they are not, the Soviets could develop a hard-target MIRV capability for the SS–9 by 1972.

—The Soviets must be expected to develop a "next generation" of missiles. But progress this year on identified systems has been less than hectic. Work on solid fuel systems is going slowly; construction of test facilities for several systems has halted. However, several missiles, including a possible new land-based ballistic missile and a new submarine-launched missile have been tested.

—We know very little about the purposes of the Soviet force. That the Soviets desire strategic "parity" with the U.S. and will build at least 1,300 missiles is agreed. Whether they seek "superiority," how they would define it, and the likely upper limit of present ICBM construction plans are disputed. Moreover, little is known of Soviet doctrine on such matters as targeting or command and control.

—The force for "peripheral" strategic attacks, i.e., attacks on Europe and Asia but not the U.S.—which consists chiefly of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (500–3,000 miles) and medium bombers—continues to be maintained at approximately past levels.

The Soviets have begun deploying SS–11 ICBMs in what the intelligence community believes to be an IR/MRBM role and a prototype new medium-to-long range bomber has been sighted.

Numbers of major units are in the table on the next page.[3]

II.

This estimate illustrates what I believe are serious limitations in the process by which estimates are made. This process is an inadequate means for providing basic analysis of Soviet strategic developments and prospects for the future.[4]

1. The most serious defect is the lack of sharply-defined, clearly-argued discussions of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet strategic forces. Admittedly, it is harder to be precise about Soviet deployment objectives or war planning than about the wing span of a bomber prototype. But there is evidence relevant to these questions—ranging from studies of missile silo orientation to analyses of power relationships in the Politburo—and it should be reflected in the NIE.[5]

Since 1964, the Soviets have been steadily expanding their strategic forces. You are entitled to know from the intelligence community

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[3] The source text does not contain the table indicated by Kissinger.

[4] Next to this paragraph the President wrote: *"agreed."*

[5] Next to this paragraph the President wrote: *"Right."*

what evidence we have to support various possible hypotheses about the motive for that buildup. Examples of such hypotheses are:

—a conservatively planned second strike or "assured destruction" posture deliberately designed to deter a U.S. attack using our present forces;

—a posture which hedges against a possible U.S. effort to approach or achieve a "first strike" capability;

—a posture reflecting a simple quest for numerical equality or slight margin of superiority for political bargaining purposes;

—a posture reflecting the largely purposeless pressure from Soviet "military-industrial complex" for ever-larger forces;

—an attempt to achieve a significant "first use" offensive capability through force superiority.

Instead, what discussion of Soviet objectives there is in the NIE is superficial. There is no analysis of the evidence, no systematic presentation of the alternatives. Indeed, there is not even a precise definition of what our people disagree about and what evidence would resolve their disputes.[6]

2. The NIE is too often satisfied with reciting facts and reluctant to raise fundamental questions about their significance.

As a typical example, the estimate notes that the Soviets have made two tests which may indicate development of a new, longer range (3,000 mile) submarine missile. The missile, however, appears to be too large to be fitted into the ballistic missile submarine they are now building without extensive modification.

Yet the NIE is silent on possible implications of this development.

—What are possible explanations for a new missile too large to be fitted into submarines now being built?

—Would a longer range missile complicate our ASW problem? Would it make continuous on-station patrolling easier for the Soviets?

3. The NIE too often fails to make explicit the judgments and background which underlie its conclusions.

For example, one disputed issue is whether the SS–9 has the range needed to target our whole Minuteman force.

—One side argues that we must assume it has because the Soviets would not continue to deploy SS–9 unless they were certain it had the range to carry out the anti-MM mission for which it is apparently intended.

—The other side says that the Soviets would not rely on their missile having the necessary range until they had tested it.

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[6] Next to this paragraph the President wrote: *"I agree."*

Both sides, therefore, are making assertions about likely patterns of Soviet behavior. But neither presents evidence about either the apparent "rationality" of past Soviet weapon system development or the thoroughness of Soviet testing in the past.

4. Even on more technical issues, the NIE is sometimes inadequate. Dissents are certainly better than meaningless compromise euphemisms. But, where the intelligence community cannot agree on such basic questions as the hardness of Soviet silos, the accuracy of the SS–9, or whether the Soviets are developing a MIRV for the SS–9, we can at least expect that the disputants will explain precisely what it is they disagree about and will marshal the evidence for the competing positions. This is seldom done.

Furthermore, on some issues, there are disturbing indications that differences of opinion are more the product of efforts to defend previous views, than of different evaluations of current evidence.

For example, the CIA has abandoned its earlier insistence, adhered to as recently as last June, that 1,500 was an upper bound on Soviet ICBM deployment, but it now says the determinants of Soviet action are too uncertain to make any meaningful estimate of an upper limit.

III.

Secretary Laird's memorandum at Tab C sets forth the DIA position on "recent trends in Soviet strategic forces." Except for some updating to include recently-acquired data, it recites the same facts as the NIE, presenting the analysis in a way which supports the DIA position, as expressed in their various dissents in the NIE. But it is also without any general themes or working hypotheses about what the Soviets' strategic purposes may be.

IV.

I am continuing to examine what can be done to get more rigorous analysis and more effective presentation of evidence into the products of the intelligence community. I will have recommendations for improvements shortly.[7]

[7] The President wrote below this paragraph: "1) Improvements are essential; 2. This report is virtually useless—except for a superficial mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press, i.e.—the USSR is building lots of new missiles." "12–8–69" is written below in an unknown hand.

199. Editorial Note

Following up the President's December 9, 1969, letter to Ambassadors (Document 310), the Department of State transmitted an airgram to Ambassadors on December 17 concerning their responsibilities for the direction and coordination of intelligence activities. The airgram indicated that Chiefs of Station had been instructed to ensure that Ambassadors "are sufficiently informed of covert action projects and espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs to enable you to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved." For text of the airgram, see Document 311.

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200. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, January 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Intelligence Information Handling Problem

Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board forwarded the memorandum at Tab A[2] recommending that you issue a directive which would centralize design and management responsibilities for intelligence information handling systems under the Director of Central Intelligence.

An identical proposal was submitted by the Board in 1967, but the intelligence community resisted it strongly, and the Board's report was finally sent to the community for information only.[3] Since a directive of the type recommended is difficult to enforce, I have asked my staff

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Agency Files, Box 275, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. III, 1–1–70 through 4–30–70. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Lynn.

[2] Memorandum from Taylor to Nixon, September 8, 1969. (Ibid., Vol. II) Not printed.

[3] The July 20, 1967, memorandum from Clark Clifford, PFIAB Chairman, to President Johnson and NSAM 368, February 9, 1968, which requested the DCI to consider the recommendations in the memorandum, are printed in *Foreign Relations,* 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 268 and 273.

to try to develop some options in this area for your consideration. I also requested the views of the Director of Central Intelligence on the Board's recommendation. His views are attached (Tab B).[4]

Briefly, he feels that adequate progress is being made, that a more expansive approach would have undesirable budgetary implications, and that no Presidential Directive is needed now.

To assure that the senior officials of the intelligence community are fully aware of the potentials of information science and technology, and of its possible impact on the organization of the intelligence community, a seminar has been planned for January 8, 1970. At this seminar, the members of the Board's Information Handling Panel will discuss opportunities and problems in this area, and the principal invitees will have an opportunity to respond with questions or observations. Invitations are being extended to the head of each intelligence agency; to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, who coordinates these matters for Secretary Laird; and to a representative of the Bureau of the Budget.

Recommendation

I recommend that you postpone any action on this matter until after the seminar, at which time I will let you know the results of the seminar and the options which are available to you.[5]

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[4] Memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, December 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Agency Files, Box 275, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. II, 7–1–69 through 12–30–69) Not printed.

[5] Haldeman initialed the approval option for the President on January 12.

201. Memorandum From James Gardner of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Hurwitch)[1]

Washington, January 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Responsibility of CIA to Consult Department on Issues Arising from Intelligence Collection

You have asked for an exploration of the issues raised by CIA's handling of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], an item distributed in Washington [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

[*4 lines of source text not declassified*] Mission chiefs in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Santiago were informed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

The Agency's decision not to interfere was reached on its own, without consultation or coordination with the Department of State. You have stated that policy considerations were involved in this decision and that it should not have been reached without consultation with the Department.

The issue of the extent of CIA responsibility to the Department that is exemplified by this episode has never been clearly resolved. The Agency has held that its responsibility to consult on clandestine collection activities is confined to mission chiefs and does not include the Department. The history of this problem as it has developed over the years, does not in DDC's view necessarily bear out the Agency's contention. This history can be briefly and informally stated:

National Security Council Directive number 5 as adopted in 1958,[2] stated that "in a foreign area . . . the DCI shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State ensure that the senior U.S. representative . . . is appropriately advised of U.S. espionage and clandestine counter intelligence activities conducted in or from the area."[3] This language, which is echoed in DCID Number 5, 1959, was accepted by State Department representatives on the drafting committee on the understanding that it meant that sensitive collection activities that might have major repercussions should be undertaken only after clearance with the Department. State representatives understood that this view was

[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, State/CIA Relations, 1970–1972. Secret. James R. Gardiner was in the office of INR's Deputy Director for Coordination.

[2] Not found.

[3] All ellipses in the source text.

shared by CIA representatives on the committee. Prior to the National Security Council meeting which adopted the directive, Acting Secretary Herter was advised by INR to accept the language in question on the basis of this understanding, but there is no record that he either did or did not make this condition clear. Since adoption of the provision by the NSC, Agency representatives, with rare exception, have held that their obligation to consult on clandestine collection activities runs only to the mission chief and does not reach the Department. Indeed, CIA did not consider that it was required to consult mission chiefs until President Kennedy's letter of 1961 confirmed and clarified their authority. From time to time the issue has been debated by State and CIA elements, but there has been no authorization determination by the highest level of either agency of the precise nature of the Agency obligation.

Agency representatives, in defending the proposition that they are not required to consult the Department on clandestine collection activities, also maintain that they need not consult on issues stemming from but collateral to the intelligence collection process as long as these issues are discussed with appropriate mission chiefs. The agency's failure to discuss with the Department its decision not to intervene [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was an application of this doctrine.

This position has obvious difficulties. It would seem that no matter what the merits of the Agency position on collection activities, we could reasonably request that we be consulted when policy-related decisions are made on the basis of the information collected. A bureau-level informal approach, in which DDC would be glad to cooperate, would seem sufficient for the purpose and would probably be effective. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] case could be used as an apt illustration of the sort of problem on which the Department expects to be consulted.

To ask at this time that the Agency consult on the collection activities themselves would probably not be effective at the bureau level. The Agency is almost sure to balk, and the history of efforts in past years to gain the support of the top level of the Department in this cause does not encourage an assumption that it would be automatically forthcoming. There is indeed much opinion in the Department that the Ambassadorial level is the only one at which consultation should be obligatory; the Ambassador, in this view, is after all free to refer delicate problems to the Department if he wishes. The Agency is understandably most reluctant to discuss methods of collection and identities of informants; the fact that information about these matters occasionally would be directly relevant to policy decisions in the Department has not affected this Agency position.[4] The problem has

[4] The DCI finds in the National Security Act of 1947 statutory mandate for assuming the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources. [Footnote in the source text.]

proved to be a difficult one; past efforts at its solution in DDC have had inconclusive results. Mr. Cline, INR's new director, has had as you know extensive experience in intelligence collection and the problems that it involves. His expertise in this field will of course be of great value to Departmental consideration of the issue when it is decided that we should focus on it. It is one of a series of matters that DDC is currently discussing with Mr. Cline.[5]

[5] Responding to a query concerning coordination of intelligence activities from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom, Wymberley Coerr (INR/DDC) stated in a June 3 memorandum: "Central to this problem is the question of the extent to which clandestine activities should be coordinated from Washington. The intelligence operators, because of President Kennedy's and President Nixon's letters to Chiefs of Mission, admit to a responsibility to keep Ambassadors appropriately advised on clandestine activities. They have not in practice agreed to any arrangement to coordinate such activities here in Washington. There are divided views in State on whether we should seek Washington coordination or work for firm coordination procedures by our ambassadors." Written in the margin next to the last sentence is the following: "Ray [Cline] feels field coordination is probably best solution." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, State/CIA Relations, 1970–1972)

202. Statement Prepared for Secretary of Defense Laird in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration[1]

Washington, January 30, 1970.

Intelligence Resource Management

The Department of Defense is confronted with several problems of intelligence resource management. These are: (1) the inability to determine the value of the intelligence product; (2) the inability to compare the resources in different programs against the same targets; (3) the absence of long-range resource management planning as a base for programming; (4) the need to conduct studies leading to program trade-offs; and (5) the absence of frank and unrestricted dialogue within the intelligence community.

As a result of Bob Froehlke's study last summer[2] I have given him the responsibilities to first, set up an intelligence resource review

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 74 142, Folder #33 (Items of Special Interest). No classification marking.

[2] Attachment to Document 193.

process that will look at the total effort; second, to open up the dialogue in the intelligence community; third, to take a look at organizations, roles, and missions; and fourth, to review security policies with the objective of eliminating unnecessary classification and compartmentation. His objectives are to insure the most economical and effective allocation of resources, and most importantly, to insure that the decision-makers get timely intelligence in which they can have high confidence.

He now has a small staff of eleven professionals under Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen Jr. to address the problems I have outlined. This group was directly involved in the recent review of the intelligence portion of the FY 71 budget. They were instrumental in sorting out over $167 million in intelligence program reductions. Concurrently, Admiral Bowen established the fiscal guidance in the intelligence portion of the Five Year Defense Program.

Secretary Froehlke, replacing the Director DIA, now sits as the DoD representative of the National Intelligence Resources Board, which advises the DCI, the Secretary of State and myself on intelligence resource needs to support the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

To accomplish their on-going tasks, Secretary Froehlke and Admiral Bowen are developing a display of intelligence resources which will serve as the baseline of resources and tell us what the resources are doing. While doing this, we are keeping in mind the need to reduce requirements for trivia. This display, the Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS), tells us *what* we are doing, but not how *well* nor what *should* the community be doing.

Since we must know whose needs come first and how much it is reasonable to spend, Secretary Froehlke has tied the CIRIS data base to the concept of a Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP). Inherent to the CDIP is the selection and study of major issues involving intelligence resources. We will address questions involving the impact—dollar wise—of technological advances and their relationship to the efficiency and effectiveness of existing systems; questions involving who takes what cuts in overall system reductions; and questions concerning future changes in requirements, systems capabilities, and in operating conditions.

At present our efforts center on data collection and development of study methodology and format. Major issue studies will be done this year in conjunction with the first cut of a Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program. Relative to our intelligence activities, I expect the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel to provide some inputs on roles and missions.

Improvement lies not in drastic reorganization. The right people and techniques are being brought together to accomplish our objectives.

203. National Security Decision Memorandum 40[1]

Washington, February 17, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations

I have determined that it is essential to the defense and security of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government continue to be supplemented by covert action operations.

By covert action operations I mean those activities which, although designed to further official U.S. programs and policies abroad, are so planned and executed that the hand of the U.S. Government is not apparent to unauthorized persons.

The covert actions of the U.S. Government abroad shall be subject to coordination and control by the Director of Central Intelligence. All such covert action operations, unless otherwise specifically assigned by the President, shall be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for assuring that covert action operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies, and for consulting with and obtaining appropriate coordination from any other interested agencies or officers on a need-to-know basis. The Director of Central Intelligence shall obtain policy approval for all major and/or politically sensitive covert action programs through The 40 Committee.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–213, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 40. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Mitchell and Kissinger. In forwarding NSDM 40 to the President for his signature, Kissinger noted that "in view of recent mention of the 303 Committee in the public media, the directive changes the committee name to coincide with the number assigned to the NSDM itself, which is 40." (Undated memorandum; National Security Council, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee)

[2] Upon reviewing a draft of NSDM 40, which stated that the DCI shall obtain the 40 Committee's policy approval for "all major covert action programs," Wymberley Coerr of INR proposed in a December 16 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson that the words "politically sensitive" be substituted for the word "major" since "there has never been an agreed inter-Agency position on what constitutes a major covert action program" and "there is no necessary relationship between the dollar costs and potential political costs." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee)

The 40 Committee as presently constituted consists of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the Attorney General, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for insuring an annual review by The 40 Committee of all covert action programs previously approved.

Also subject to The 40 Committee's policy review and specific operational mission approval are the following programs originating in the Department of Defense: the monthly Joint Reconnaissance Center Schedule, missions of the National Reconnaissance Organization and the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].[3] Furthermore, any proposals for covert activities or operations from agencies not represented on The 40 Committee shall be subject to that committee's approval unless otherwise directed by the President.

Covert action operations shall include any type of activity necessary to carry out approved purposes except that they will not include armed conflict by regular military forces, or cover and deception for active military operations by the armed forces of the United States.

This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 5412/2.

Richard Nixon

[3] In a February 5 memorandum to CIA's four deputy directors in which he summarized the sense of a discussion they had had, L. K. White stated: "Formerly, matters emanating from or affecting the Clandestine Service dominated the proceedings of the 303 and its predecessor organs. While it is clear that the scrutiny of sensitive covert activities remains the principal charter of the 303 mechanism, it is also evident that the review of reconnaissance and certain other technical activities now has become a major preoccupation of the Committee. Our internal staffing arrangements need to be governed accordingly." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 3, Folder 22, C–17—303 Committee)

204. Memorandum From the Consultant to the National Security Council (Joyce) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Information Handling

Background

On January 7, you sent to the President the PFIAB memorandum on intelligence information handling and the DCI's comments on its recommendations (Tab A).[2] You may recall that the Board recommended that the President *direct* the DCI to undertake the design and management of a unified intelligence information handling system, exploiting to the maximum practicable extent scientific and technological advances in the field of information handling.

You informed the President of the seminar scheduled for January 8 and recommended that he postpone action on this matter until after the seminar. This was approved by the President.

Results of the Seminar

At the seminar, Dr. William O. Baker of the PFIAB and five consultants presented their views on the role of technology in intelligence information handling. The reaction of Andy Marshall, Larry, and I, which seems to match the reaction of other attendees, is that:

1. The talks were broad, technical, and were *not* made *clearly relevant* to the problems recognized by top intelligence officials.
2. In the current and foreseeable fiscal situation, the resources to implement the ideas presented are unlikely to be forthcoming.

There is also a feeling within the intelligence community that the Board has not made itself fully aware of what the intelligence community has done recently in this area. Since the seminar, Mr. Helms has sent you a summary of data processing activities in CIA, and has reaffirmed his belief that satisfactory progress is being made in the light of budgetary limitations (Tab B).[3]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. I, 1969–1971. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Lynn.

[2] Document 200.

[3] Attached but not printed.

What Is Needed Now?

Right now there are a variety of automated, information handling projects in operation or under development at various places throughout the intelligence community. Many of these have attracted some interested users, some have not. But strikingly absent in the community is any real understanding of the value of these automation projects to the intelligence function.

To take one example, both Andy Marshall and I have looked into the biographics area, and neither of us can see exactly what would be gained by further automation of biographics. What is needed is a thorough analysis of the biographics function to see how it can be improved.

Similarly, the Institute for Defense Analyses has recently studied in depth the functions of the National Indications Center (NIC). The study's principal conclusion was that the mission and scope of the warning function are not now well understood, and that responsibilities are ill defined. With respect to computer support, the study concluded that in the *present* mode of operation of the NIC, computers do not offer significant aids to the warning process.

What is needed now is therefore:

1. thorough evaluation of the experimental and operational projects now in being, and
2. clarification of the purpose and design concept for a future unified information handling system.

What is *not* needed right now is a massive effort to design and build a unified information handling system.

How Might Desirable Progress Be Achieved?

The Board's recommendation is to set up a central manager under the DCI, with a charter to design and manage a unified information handling system, making maximum practical use of technology.

An approach which could either complement or replace the actions recommended by the Board would be to exert increasing White House pressure for the intelligence community to:

1. fully exploit on-going projects to learn more about their *utility,* and
2. seriously address the problem of clarifying the concept and use of a unified information handling system.

To exert such pressure I could, with your approval, brief the appropriate community officials on what I have found in reviewing this area, and encourage them to initiate the actions described in Tab C.[4] I

[4] Attached but not printed.

have received indications that the National Intelligence Resources Board (Cushman, Cline, Froehlke) might be willing to sponsor the necessary steps.

I could also try to arrange for the White House to have access to the COINS system during its test and evaluation phase. (COINS is a system linking intelligence agencies so analysts at any agency have direct access to selected computerized data files.)

If the above informal approach proves unproductive, or if you want to start out on a more formal plane, the NSC structure could be brought into play, e.g., through an Information Handling Working Group. There is ample precedent for NSC direction of intelligence affairs (see Tab D).[5]

You need to decide now what recommendation to make to the President on the Board's proposed directive, and what other actions, if any, you want to take.

The PFIAB Directive: Pro and Con

The principal argument *for* the PFIAB directive is that a DCI *who is disposed to do so* could use the charter thus provided to exert an increasingly significant control over the *entire intelligence effort.*

The arguments against the directive are:

1. All indications are that the present DCI is *not disposed* to exert any such control.
2. The proposed directive is open to misuse: it could be taken as a charter to request *greatly increased information handling budgets* to build a "unified information handling system." As I pointed out above, the time is not right for such an effort.

It can be argued that the President should issue the directive *even if* the likelihood is that it will be ignored or misused, because:

1. The overall goal is sound.
2. The DCI might just decide to use the charter properly.
3. Even if the present DCI decides to ignore the directive, a future DCI might effectively use it.
4. The PFIAB will monitor the activities of the community and prevent any abuses.

If you are impressed by the potentials and not too concerned about the abuses, you could recommend that the President issue the directive.

If you are skeptical about the realization of these potentials and want to avoid the possible abuses, you could recommend deferring ac-

[5] Attached but not printed.

tion on the Board's proposals while pursuing the actions described in Tab C.

A third alternative would be for the President to issue the directive, but also to establish an NSC group to maintain visibility on what is happening and to try to focus attention on the right issues. Such a group could focus initially on the issues raised in Tab C.

In weighing the desirability of getting your office or the NSC involved in this area, you should recognize that the more we know about, and influence, the community's information handling systems, the more effectively we can get the new Presidential Information and Communications Center firmly "wired in" to the community.

Decision

1. Do you want to recommend *for* or *against* the signing by the President of the Board's proposed directive?

For

Against

No recommendation—give the President the arguments and let him decide.

2. Do you want to pursue the approach described in Tab C?

Informally, *or*

Through appropriate NSC machinery, *or*

Not at all.[6]

[6] None of the options for responding to either question is marked. In a February 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig recommended that Kissinger meet with Joyce and Marshall "on this very complex problem. Memo is tough to grapple with." Kissinger asked Haig to set up the meeting, but no record of the meeting or of further action has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. I, 1969–1971)

205. Memorandum From the Consultant to the National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of the Process Leading to the President's Morning Intelligence Reading Package

The purpose of this memorandum is (1) to present a general assessment of the process that leads to the President's morning intelligence reading package,[2] (2) to raise some problems for discussion, and (3) to put forward some alternative solutions for consideration.

General Assessment

After looking at the process of preparing the package for a couple of months and interviewing most of the sources of the input, my assessment is rather favorable. The final product, in particular the memorandum prepared for your signature in the Situation Room, is adequate. However, the product is more satisfactory than the process leading to it.

In one of our earlier discussions you expressed some concern as to whether the process worked in such a way as to pick up essentially all available information. I feel I can reassure you on that matter. The process leading to the package on the Presidential desk each morning is fed by what is now the strongest and best part of the U.S. intelligence community; that is, its current intelligence activities. Over the last five or six years there has been a strong development of the current intelligence effort, including the installation of 24-hour-a-day operations centers in all important elements of the community. This development has taken place partly as an adaptation to the crisis atmosphere of the '60s, the two Cuba crises, etc. Pressures for an information system capable of staying on top of fast-breaking events were increased by President Johnson's continuous demand for up-to-date intelligence and other information input. Thus, you are now tapping a very vigorous, responsive, well established, government-wide activity

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. I, 1969–1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The tabs are attached but not printed.

[2] Copies of the morning intelligence reading package for the President, dated from January 1969 to August 1974, are ibid., Boxes 1–61, President's Daily Briefs.

that surveys all of the collected material and funnels it up to the top of the governmental bureaucracy and to the White House.

The part of the total package produced in the Situation Room provides a unique product with its close blending of policy analysis and intelligence. Analysts in the intelligence community are inhibited, both by U.S. intelligence doctrine and by their more limited awareness of policy issues and Presidential concerns, from producing a similar product. Comparison of the substantive coverage of topics in the CIA PDB and the Situation Room product shows this, although it is clear from other evidence that some parts of the NSC staff include more policy analysis than others. Hence, in some geographic areas there is probably more of a difference between the CIA PDB and the Situation Room product than there is in other areas.

The involvement of the NSC staff in the preparation of the Situation Room product is the proximate cause of this difference in the type of analysis and comment. A survey undertaken by the people in the Situation Room for me showed that during a selected period 60% of the items came from the NSC staff, another 20% were prepared by McManis and Fazio sometimes with interaction with staff members, and 20% were reproductions of items from CIA, NSA, or DIA publications.

In any case, the memorandum signed by you and prepared in the Situation Room is a success; it probably is the only part of the package which the President regularly reads. Indeed, judging from a survey of marginal jottings by the President, it may be the only piece he ever reads. This should be gratifying to you. But this situation can lead to unexpected and unwanted responsibilities and problems. I want to discuss some of the problems I see.

1. The Current Anomalous Position of the CIA PDB

The success of the Situation Room product probably has driven the CIA PDB out of the President's focus of attention. However, a survey of the Situation Room product and the PDB shows that there is about one-third overlap in coverage in the two products. That is, only about one-third of the items in the PDB are reported in the Situation Room product. Thus, two-thirds of the items in the PDB the President may never see. Probably they are of lesser importance to him since a lot of thought goes into the selection of the one-third overlap for inclusion in the Situation Room product.

However, an ambiguous situation exists. The selection procedures for inclusion in the Situation Room product may not be wholly consistent with the widely shared suspicion that the President does not ever read the CIA PDB. If one really believes that the PDB is not read, is one-third overlap too low? Should one provide more overlap, perhaps changing the format of the Situation Room product to make this

easier?[3] Does not the current level of overlap tend to make the President feel it is safe not to read the CIA PDB? Should steps be taken to shut off production of the PDB? A great amount of energy and talent goes into producing the PDB. (See Tab A for a description of the process, written by Drexel Godfrey of CIA.) It may now be largely wasted effort. How can it be saved or made useful?

This situation presents a number of awkward problems. The CIA is not likely to suggest stopping production of the PDB. CIA has a major institutional stake in the PDB. It will not give it up easily. Moreover, in a recent discussion with Jack Smith, he strongly expressed his view that the CIA people consider themselves almost as part of the President's staff. They have no other natural superior. I told him I thought that view somewhat unrealistic in organizational and bureaucratic terms.[4] But nonetheless, it may be the view of some of them and suggestive of their likely reluctance to give up publication of the PDB. Over time they are likely to find out about the current situation if it persists. Their likely reaction is not clear. A possible CIA response could be to continue publication, but to put in less effort and allow the quality to slip, hoping to live through the current situation and later regain the position the PDB had with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

However, you need to address this problem. What worries me is that: (a) You may get in trouble with the President if post hoc an important item slipped by him because it was in the CIA PDB but not the Situation Room product, especially if he has come to feel, or has been encouraged to feel, that everything of importance to him is included in the Situation Room product. (b) The PDB goes to the SecDef and Secretary of State, who may not be aware the President seldom reads it. They may be almost entirely unaware of the Situation Room product and its displacement of the PDB. This could lead to some misunderstandings.

I suggest we discuss some solutions or strategies for changing the current situation. But I may be too concerned because of some things in the situation I am not aware of.

One possible solution is a format for the total package which could make the CIA PDB input an integral part. Another idea is that of a President's brief divided in two parts—one part to include items like those currently supplied by the NSC staff, that is, items based in part on intelligence inputs but including policy discussion and other analysis; the second part to include a number of brief information items. There

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[3] In the margin next to this sentence, Kissinger wrote "Agree."

[4] In the margin next to this and the previous two sentences, Kissinger wrote "Don't discourage too much."

might be some reduction in the number of longer analytic items supplied by the NSC staff and an increase in the number of brief news items. If the format of the President's reading package were changed in this direction, one could ask CIA to provide the news item portion, overlap in coverage between the two parts of the package being eliminated through daily discussion between McManis/Fazio and Godfrey.

Another alternative would be to leave the Situation Room product as it is, but include at the end of it a reference to other news items appearing in the PDB. At present, if the President does not even open the PDB, there is no way of his being aware of what items it includes that might be of interest to him.

2. Deficiencies of Feedback and Guidance

As my investigation of the process of preparing the President's morning intelligence brief proceeded, I became more and more aware of a feedback and guidance problem. As the process now operates, it does not produce much guidance and/or feedback for those providing inputs. There are a number of factors that produce this situation, and it varies in effect from one input source to another. Several of the proposals made later in this report are primarily motivated by my belief that some steps should be taken to improve feedback and guidance. You and the President will be better served if some progress can be made in this area.

Neither you nor the President can read all of the relevant information available; others must sort, screen, and package the information. The less feedback and guidance the "others" get, the less assurance there is that you and the President get what is wanted and needed. Today CIA writes a type of newspaper, the PDB, hoping it is interesting and relevant. The Situation Room people and the NSC staff collaborate to produce a memorandum for your signature. They have more effective feedback and guidance than CIA does, but almost uniformly feel they don't get enough to do as good a job as could be done. I feel there is a real problem here, and it starts at your and the President's levels.

(Let me say my investigation of current sources of feedback and guidance made it clear that the current NSC process produces a good deal more feedback and guidance to the bureaucracy as to what the important issues are than the prior arrangements. Most people I talked to were quite pleased with the new NSC process and the NSSM study process, for this reason.)

I will deal with the feedback problem as it applies to the NSC staff, below. Here I want to address the feedback and guidance problem of those producing the PDB. They feel they do not get much

direct guidance or feedback they can use in the selection of their items. Currently they describe the process used to pick items for the PDB as follows:

(a) There are usually one or two obvious items in every day's news (there is for these an overlap problem with the Situation Room product that may be settled in phone conversations with McManis);

(b) Good additional items are surprise developments: coups, deaths of important foreign governmental people, etc.;

(c) Continuing items known to be of interest: Vietnam, the Middle East situation;

(d) Soviet missile tests and new Soviet aircraft; usually these are reports containing the results of completed intelligence studies and, as such, are different from the usual current intelligence content of the PDB;

(e) Occasionally an item will be weeded out of the draft PDB late in the day on the basis of a call from McManis that it has already been sufficiently covered;[5]

(f) Some items are included with the conscious notion of making a record (not being caught out later);

(g) Drexel Godfrey makes a call to Al Haig perhaps once every two weeks to get guidance on a specific item, but doesn't want to wear out his welcome by calling more frequently.

As you can see from the above, the selection process is based mainly on very general knowledge of what is of interest to the President. It is derived in part from the participation in the NSC process of people like Helms and Jack Smith, but to a large extent, I believe, from a sense of what's timely as judged from the *New York Times,* press, and wire service coverage. There is rather little specific feedback within the process itself that comes directly from the White House as to the President's interests and concerns.

What to do about this will depend on what you decide to do about the PDB.

3. Problems in Preparing the Situation Room Product

Lack of Feedback—There is no way for most NSC staff people preparing inputs to know whether the President reads their items, what his reaction was, how their inputs could be improved, etc. Clearly the position of people on the NSC staff is better than of those preparing the PDB. They get a lot of indirect signals about what is of interest to the President and what you feel is of interest to him. But the process of preparing the morning reading package does not involve any direct feedback from the President. Occasionally there are marginal comments. But a survey showed relatively few Presidential comments;

[5] In the margin next to this item (e) Kissinger noted: "I don't want this sort of intelligence."

about one in six of the packages have any marginal comments in them. Frequency of comment seems to fluctuate considerably over time.[6] In the sample period covered, there was a clustering of the comments in a period of one week, suggesting that for some reason the President was reading the material more closely and/or was more disposed during that week to make comments. Comments by several of the staff have indicated that they are not sufficiently aware of the low frequency of the Presidential comments. Some may feel they are being cut off from a more plentiful supply of Presidential marginal notes and comments that does not exist.

It's hard to say what to do about this general feedback problem. Your style of work and that of the President, perhaps, are not conducive to a lot of feedback. Moreover, most of the people who work most actively with you and are in the best position to give feedback to the NSC staff and Situation Room people are themselves very busy. Others are reluctant to impose upon them. I know it is hard for you to find time to provide feedback and guidance. The staff meetings when you attended, everyone agrees, were very fruitful. Even if held infrequently, they are worth considering again.

A totally different sort of solution is discussed below and in Tab C. This involves a major shift in the way in which intelligence and other news items are transmitted to you, and perhaps eventually, to the President. It is something that could, perhaps, be available in about 18 months when the Situation Room addition is completed and the new computer facilities are installed.

Need for Guidance to the NSC Staff—Interviews I have had with all of the major NSC staff contributors convince me that they have not had enough guidance and general information about the President's morning intelligence package. They may not have an adequate framework within which to prepare their own materials. I found that many of the NSC staff people do have a clear idea of what is in the package, how the Situation Room product is related to the CIA PDB, and what overlap exists between them. Several were concerned that they did not know whether in covering an article or an issue they were the only ones covering it for the day or whether it was also in the PDB. I might add that probably they have made no effort to find out.[7] The most organized and active group supplying input are informed on PDB content and use this information both substantively and to avoid undue overlap. Most have no feeling for what is read, whether the Situation

[6] In the margin next to this and the previous four sentences, Kissinger wrote: "He should *never* have seen this."

[7] Kissinger wrote in the margin: "So what."

Room product and/or the PDB. (See Tab B for a summary of the interviews with NSC staff members.)

In discussing how they went about preparing their input, one or two expressed their concern that they felt they didn't have a good basis for judging how important it was to prepare their items; that is, whether they should spend a lot of effort or not very much. They are reminded daily of the need for product, by phone calls from the Situation Room; but some are left with an ambiguous sense of how important it really is.

One result of this situation is that there is great variability in the amount of effort spent in different subparts of the NSC staff in preparing input. Some groups are very well organized and think of preparing the input as being an important part of their job. These devote considerable time and energy throughout the day. One of these is the Saunders/Hoskinson team that produce almost 50% of the input currently received from the NSC staff. They have the advantage, perhaps, of covering a very active and high interest area, but they are perhaps the most systematically organized to produce input. At the other extremes there are people who have not organized systematically at all and who pass in an item if they think of it as being of interest. These tend to put much less effort into melding an item of information and policy analysis.

I believe that if there were more guidance to the staff concerning the importance of the Situation Room product, a little more information conveyed about the total package, there might be more uniformity of effort and an improved response by the staff. Such guidance could be conveyed in a staff meeting or by a memo. After discussion with you, I would be glad to draft such a memo.

Changes in the Product—I have one change to suggest for your consideration, the switch to a two-part format. Several people questioned whether the total package was not becoming too big; perhaps even the Situation Room product was too long and had too many items involving policy discussion and analysis. You are in the best situation to judge if the size of the package is now excessive, even if the President only reads the Situation Room product. Might not a changed format with fewer analytic items in one section and a second section devoted to a number of short information items be better? Again you are in the best position to judge. I remind you that such a change might be a part of a solution to the PDB problem.

Samples could be prepared of this alternative format by the Situation Room people if you wish to see them.[8]

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[8] Kissinger wrote "Yes" next to this sentence.

Need for Secure Telephones—As you can see in Tab B, several of the NSC staff check regularly with CIA and State Department contacts when preparing input to the Situation Room product. This interaction would probably be more frequent and more informative if a limited number of secure telephones were available to the NSC staff. Only Frank Chapin, not a contributor to the Situation Room product, has such a phone. The other available secure phone is in the Situation Room. Neither of these two phones is a real alternative to having a few (8 to 12) secure phones in staff members' offices.

A preliminary look at the cost and likely availability of the appropriate equipment suggests that obtaining a limited number of secure phones (so-called green phones) turned up no major problems. Cost could be limited by having only two or three lines, a switching system, and 8 to 12 phones. I recommend that this possibility be looked into more thoroughly unless you feel there is some reason why the staff should not have such phones. I believe it is a good idea. Discussion with sources of intelligence input can be freer and more frequent. Some discussion undoubtedly now goes on over unsecure phone lines that ought not to; the secure phones would help to reduce this somewhat.

A More Radical Suggestion for the Future—In the course of my investigations I had a number of discussions with Charlie Joyce about the many problems in supplying well selected intelligence information to the President. Out of these developed a proposal for a radical change in the way in which intelligence and other information materials are presented to you, and perhaps could be presented to the President at a later date. This proposed change could significantly alter the whole process of preparing the President's morning reading package; indeed, it might eventually eliminate it altogether as a separate hard-copy item. At present the cost and feasibility of the proposal are unevaluated, but they are under study. Your reactions would be valuable; a lot depends upon how you feel about the proposal. If you definitely don't see yourself liking it, we should drop the idea.

Attached at Tab C are two memoranda that Charlie Joyce wrote to sum up the results of our discussions. In summary, the notion is that the use of available computer technology might allow the development of a very flexible on-line reading program for you and/or the President. The reading program would be available on a TV screen at all times, with controls allowing the reader to pick subjects that he wants to read about, to start reading at a very summary level, to select the areas in which he wants to read in more detail, to stop reading any subject when he is satisfied, and to move on to another. The system could automatically provide feedback on what you and/or the President reads, and how much attention is paid to particular subject areas in the reading program. A button could also be supplied for the reader

to indicate his desire for more material, whether he liked the presentation or not. A microphone could be supplied for dictation of comments and critique.

The essential objective of this system is to supply you and/or the President with a good deal more control over what you read, and to supply feedback to the organizations attempting to supply you with information so they can do a better job. The role of the machinery is simply to make this feedback more available, more effective, and also to allow you to have a richer, more flexible reading program that you can easily reach by the manipulation of a few buttons.

We would favor developing such a system for you, leaving it open as to whether at a later stage the President is supplied with a similar system. Experience with executives in business has shown that their willingness to obtain information from TV consoles and through machinery of one sort or another is highly sensitive to their personal tastes. Some people want nothing to do with such contraptions, others are quite willing to use them. On the whole, the balance of experience has been that top-level executives don't like gadgets. It would undoubtedly be very chancy to try the thing directly on the President. It may be very chancy trying it on you.

If this kind of a system pleased you, in the sense that you found it useful and easy to live with, you might invite the President down to see the information system you had for yourself. He could try it in your office and see how it worked. If he liked it, a duplicate could be provided in his office.

I think you ought to give consideration to this system and discuss it fully, especially with Charlie Joyce, to see whether it seems attractive enough to you to go forward with more detailed system design. Let me say that our notion is that one should keep the size of the system and the complexity of the hardware limited. We believe this need not be a big, fancy system.

206. Memorandum From the Consultant to the National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Inputs for Major Issues: A Substantive Evaluation and Proposals for Improvement

When we first talked, you indicated a concern for the quality of the intelligence product you receive on major issues such as the SS–9 program, trends in Soviet strategic forces, etc. During the last two months I have focused on the intelligence product on the Soviet military strategic weapons and forces and the question: How can you get a better product in the future?

The standard products of the intelligence community do not give you and your staff what you want and what you need. The NIE's are of little use to top level decision makers and/or their staffs, even though that is their ostensible audience. Their real service is that of supplying an agreed intelligence input to the work of staffs several levels down in the bureaucracy, and as a starting point for the NIPP (now the DIPP, Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning).

Other products vary in usefulness. The new President's Quarterly Report on Soviet Strategic Forces is factual, concise, and well presented. Some of the Caesar series[2] provide valuable background on Soviet leaders, the structure and functioning of the upper level bureaucracy. But most of the product, when it goes beyond the reporting of factual information, or immediate inferences from it, is not very impressive.

The analysis of hard data and factual reporting on Soviet forces is good; indeed, we now know a great deal more about today's Soviet military posture and R&D programs than we knew about the 1960 Soviet force posture and programs in 1960. Intelligence on Soviet forces and programs is better today than in the past; but it can still be improved. Intelligence reporting and analysis can and should do a better job of assisting top level decision makers.

The weakest point I find is in the judgments of intelligence analysts and estimators about plausible or likely Soviet behavior, in particular their understanding of the decision processes that influence

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. I, 1969–1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The tabs are attached but not printed.

[2] In the margin Kissinger wrote: "What's the Caesar series?"

Soviet military posture. The explicit or implicit assumptions and hypotheses concerning the roots of Soviet behavior seem much too simplified, and rely too frequently upon a model of the Soviet government as a single unified actor pursuing an easily stated strategy.[3]

Presumably the governmental decision-making process there is just as complex as ours, involves the interaction of contending bureaucratic elements, and can attain only a limited measure of rationality. None of this shows through in the standard intelligence product, except in those paragraphs designed to protect against future developments falsifying the estimate or judgment. These include sentences listing the factors that may also influence future Soviet behavior: economic difficulties, bureaucratic conflicts, bloc political problems, etc. A form of defensive writing in the spirit of defense driving.

The fact that intelligence analysts' judgments about likely Soviet behavior do not seem that much better than those of less involved persons is disappointing. In principle, they should be the real experts, and in some ways they are. But I have long felt that intelligence analysts have not devoted enough effort to studying past Soviet behavior with regard to military posture formation; have not sufficiently focused upon understanding the structure and objectives of the various organizations involved in the relevant decision-making processes.

In my view, if we are to understand past Soviet force posture decisions, or to improve our forecasts of alternative future force postures, we have to entertain more complicated hypotheses about the sources of Soviet behavior regarding military force posture formation.

Substantially improving the intellectual quality of the analysis of Soviet behavior is a longer term goal. I hope some effort can be made to push forward in this area. But let me return to the more immediate problem of getting you a better product.[4]

What Do You Really Need?

It is hard for me to answer that question completely. Only you, Larry Lynn, and others immediately concerned with specific decisions and problem areas can do it. However, I would suggest that on a few issues each year

—where a great deal is at stake,
—where there are contending views on which option to choose,
—where major uncertainties almost certainly exist as to the future evolution of Soviet strategic forces,

you need a different sort of intelligence product than you now get.

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[3] Nixon drew parallel lines in the margin next to this paragraph.

[4] Kissinger wrote an illegible word in the margin next to this and the previous sentence.

For at least these few problems you need in-depth intelligence studies that surface the uncertainties, display and argue alternative explanatory hypotheses regarding past Soviet behavior and future projections. These studies should give you

—as much separation of facts and judgments as is possible,
—where major judgments are made, argument as to the basis of the judgment.

On these really important issues you should dig into the intelligence analysis as deeply as you can before making decisions. You have to understand what is behind it before you can accept it. The only alternative is boxscoring of experts. In general that is not a feasible procedure.

What Can Be Done?

A number of things can be done to get you better, more useful products. I believe you ought to use the following strategy:

—Improved communication of your and your staff's needs. *You are not getting through loudly and clearly now.*[5] Clear and persistent statement of needs should lead to an improved product. Put the burden on Helms and the community to find the ways to satisfy you.
—Initiate discussion with Helms aiming at a major review of the intelligence community's support of yourself, the NSC decision-making process.
—Develop new procedures to get non-standard products now for a few selected problems of highest importance to you.

Specifics of the strategy are covered below. Note that it is designed to get a better product for you, not to improve the structure and functioning of the intelligence community in the short run. It attempts to bypass, for the moment, the probable sources of the problem. You might prefer a more intrusive strategy that tries to influence the structure and functioning of the community at an early date. If so, see Tab A.

Better Communication of Your Needs

One general observation to begin with: Causes of product deficiencies lie on both sides of the producer-consumer interface. Top level needs have not been expressed clearly or persistently enough. There is little feedback or criticism of the intelligence product.

The community misperceives some of the needs of top level people, and a doctrine that limits their response. Moreover, the intelligence community does nothing that could be called research on customer needs. The organization of the interface between the two groups does not facilitate communication of customer needs, and discussion of how to match needs and producer capabilities.

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[5] In the margin next to this sentence Kissinger wrote: "On what issues."

I recommend the following:

1. Preparation of a statement to Helms expressing your needs (see Tab B for some things it should say), coordinated with guidance on the format and content of the Soviet Military NIE's. (See memo on that matter from Larry Lynn and A. W. Marshall.)[6] Probably it would cover some of the same ground, but discuss alternative ways of getting a more useful product as well. *Repetition will not hurt. Do not underestimate the communication problem.* Follow up with detailed discussion with Helms and others on how to get the new procedures going.

2. Use at least one person on your, or the NSC, staff full time as a communication link, mainly to CIA. Tom Latimer is coming on board. Consider setting some part of his time aside for this function. Another person might be added to the NSC staff solely to perform this communication function. I can suggest some names if you are interested. Principle characteristics should be a familiarity with all community organizations, and a personal disposition to consider intelligence as a service to consumers, not an activity with its own goals.

The communication function will be time-consuming, if done right. It is not the standard sort of liaison function that is needed. *Frequent trips to CIA, and elsewhere, and extended meetings with people at all levels in the community will be required to keep their view of your needs correctly focused.*

Helms as DCI and CIA are the key communication targets. CIA has the best current capability to respond; there is just no where else to go. But you should communicate your needs also to DIA (Defense) and INR (State).

Again I stress the difficulty of the communication problem. The procedures to obtain non-standard products, discussed in the section after the next one, are designed to assist the communication problem; indeed, these procedures should be thought of as part of the communication effort.

Steps to Initiate a Major Review of Intelligence Support of the NSC Decision Process

While short-run measures are taken to obtain more useful products, a more basic look can be taken at intelligence community organization and functioning in support of you and the NSC decision process. The timing for such a review may be good. For example:

1. The Office of National Estimates (ONE) is going through a transition period. It is at the end of an era. Abbott Smith, the head of ONE, will retire as soon as a successor can be picked. Helms and others lean

[6] Not found.

toward bringing in someone from the outside; this is an opportunity to add some new blood and leadership. But equally at stake are: What sort of organization should ONE be? What should its role be? How should the NIE process operate?

You have a major stake in the choice of the successor and the DCI conception of what sort of an organization ONE is to be, what sort of a role ONE is to have in the future. (See Tab C.)

2. The Blue-Ribbon Panel will report on Department of Defense organization and management on 30 June 1970. It will focus in part on the need to change Defense intelligence organization and management. You have a major stake in what is decided, in particular as regards the future development of DIA. (See Tab D.)

I think you will want to rebuild the national intelligence process. At present it is foundering because of the decline in the ONE/BNE role and status, reflected in the virtual DDI monopoly of the intelligence role in the NSSM process, and other causes. One view of what to do about the national process is contained in Tab A. But what is really needed is a full-scale review of the current situation and recommendations for change. The review or study group should include representatives of the intelligence community, of NSC members, and of the NSC staff. It is very important that consumer representatives as well as intelligence representatives be involved in the review.

In the nature of things, the national process, if it involves inputs from several components of the intelligence community, is an adversary process. Special attention will have to be paid to designing a process that works well. More attention than in the past must be given to structuring the incentive systems in the adversary process.

I suggest you begin discussion with Helms about the design and procedures for a review of the national intelligence process. The aims of the review would be an assessment of its current operation in support of your office, and the NSC decision process; and recommendations for future redesign of the national intelligence process.

New Procedures to Get Non-Standard Products

You need not only to communicate your needs, and hope for a good response, but to develop procedures to get what you want now.

I recommend that you:

1. Limit efforts to improve the NIE's. Neither the process that produces them nor the performance of ONE/BNE can be changed in the short run. The solution to the NIE problem is part of the review effort.

2. Push for procedures to produce in-depth intelligence studies on a small number of selected intelligence problems each year. Selection

of problem areas to be yours, perhaps in some cases in conjunction with the Secretaries of State and Defense.[7] (See Tab B.)

The essential features of these procedures should be:

—Involvement of top level decision makers and/or their staffs in the selection of study areas, drafting of terms of reference and the goals of the study.

—Provisions for monitoring of the study as it proceeds and continued guidance and feedback from upper level people to all levels in the intelligence community.

Joint decision of upper level representatives and intelligence working level people concerning modification of study efforts to accommodate data and analysis problems and in-course redirection of study.

It will be very important that it not seem that the White House is writing its own intelligence estimates. The objective should clearly be to obtain from the intelligence community relevant facts, judgments, etc.

3. Continue a study of the SS–9 system initiated 1 April 1970 (see Tab E). It is an attempt to produce a non-standard product; one you or Larry Lynn might give a good grade. Projected completion is end September. It will take only a day or two per month to follow it and hopefully keep it going in the right direction. CIA has started a good effort in this study. It should be a good test of their current capabilities to explore some more complex, organizational behavior hypotheses in addition to the standard ones.

I plan to continue to manage this effort as I visit Washington periodically in the course of other work.[8]

Constant attention will have to be given to see that the procedures that are developed continue to function. The intelligence bureaucracy at all levels may resist these methods of operation. No fixed set of procedures may work all of the time. The recent study of the Israeli-Arab military balance, while not a typical intelligence study, may be a good model from which to draw some lessons.

In the case of that study, the keys to success appear to have been:

—Study confined to fact finding, technical study, policy implications played down;

—Full-time involvement of a NSC staff representative (in this case a consultant);

—Lots of feedback of specific questions as study progressed;

—No strong bureaucratic stance of State or DOD/Military Services.

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[7] Kissinger put a checkmark in the margin next to this paragraph.

[8] Kissinger initialed the "Approve" option.

By contrast, a 1968 attempt to evaluate the Israeli-Arab military balance produced only badly split views expressing policy preferences.

In any case, almost everyone's experience is that the most rewarding and fruitful way of working with the intelligence community is one in which top level people deal more directly with the working level people than is usual. Both the people and the intelligence input at the bottom are better than the standard product.

Postscript

Many changes and improvements in intelligence community performance I would like to see are not easily effected by you. For example, as mentioned earlier I believe that major improvement in the analysis of Soviet decision-making processes is possible. But progress is slow and difficult to stimulate from the outside on this and many other areas of possible improvement. Nonetheless, I have appended at Tab F a short sketch of a number of areas that I feel the community should be doing more about. They mainly concern [what the] R&D community could do on the intelligence analysis, estimating, and projection processes. Two substantive studies are also briefly described.

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207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Reduction in Number of Military Attachés Overseas

Late in February, I informed the Under Secretaries Committee of your desire to make further cuts in the number of military attachés abroad.[2] These cuts were to be considered by a task force already set

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 372, Presidential Directive on Reduction of U.S. Personnel Overseas. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for action.

[2] In a January 9, memorandum to Kissinger, Nixon noted that Ambassador Walter Annenberg had urged a cut in the number of military aides in Embassies abroad. Nixon agreed and requested Kissinger to study how to lower the number. He concluded that the intelligence supplied by military aides stationed overseas was "pretty thin." (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 11)

up to study military representation abroad and a report made to you by May 1.

I have received a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated March 27[3] which states the Defense Department's position that it would not appear in the best interests of the United States Government to make further reductions in the military attaché system at this time because:

—As we consider further reductions in the strength of our armed forces overseas, intelligence collection activities become increasingly important.

—While it is true that we place heavy emphasis on more sophisticated intelligence collection, in many areas of the non-communist world the more valuable contributions are made by attachés on the ground.

—The normal attaché collection is devoted to maintaining a data base of encyclopedic information, of which 30–40 percent is provided uniquely through the attaché system.

—Attachés have a host of representational responsibilities which frequently pay off with side benefits in intelligence information.

—Since 1965, there has been a 46 percent reduction in the number of military attachés. Further reductions should be suspended until we have an opportunity to evaluate the impact of previous reductions on the capabilities of the attaché system.

Arguing against the Defense position are the following factors:

—Much of the intelligence collected by military attachés, which is often (as Mr. Packard points out) encyclopedic in nature, appears to be of marginal value to decision makers in Washington and the field.

—The intelligence collected by attachés often duplicates that collected by other means.

—Some attaché functions can be performed by military commands.

—Many ambassadors have expressed doubts about the quality and overall value of military attaché reporting and believe further cuts could be made in the number of attachés in their missions.

—The military attaché system will be cut only 2.3 percent under OPRED as compared with a 10 percent overall reduction.

—The OPRED cuts are concentrated in two areas of the world (Europe and East Asia) and affect very few countries.

Recommendation:

On the whole, I agree with Mr. Packard's assessment and recommend that you suspend further reductions in the number of military attachés.

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[3] A copy is ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 372, Presidential Directive on Reduction of U.S. Personnel Overseas.

It seems clear, however, that steps need to be taken to upgrade the quality of attachés in any event. If you agree, I will transmit a directive to this effect.[4]

[4] The President approved both recommendations. Kissinger informed Packard in a May 26 memorandum that Nixon had agreed to suspend further personnel reductions in the military attaché system but that he requested "every possible effort be made to upgrade the quality of attachés." (Ibid.)

208. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

CIA Review of NIEs on Soviet Military

Director Helms has initiated a re-examination of the "form and content of the major National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet military subjects." (Tab A)

Andy Marshall and Walter Slocombe[2] talked to the Office of National Estimates staff about some of the dissatisfactions that we had noted from time to time in connection with the major Soviet NIEs. The points they emphasized included:

—suppression of dissents and imprecise statement of differences between agencies where they are revealed;

—failure to develop and present systematically a full range of alternative hypotheses to explain observed data, especially where no USIB member is an institutional advocate of a particular approach;

—inadequate attention to issues of politics, institutions, economics, and society as they may affect foreign and military policy;

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 360, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret. Sent for action. The tabs are attached but not printed. Kissinger wrote at the top of page 1: "Lynn—I want to discuss soonest."

[2] Slocombe was a member of the NSC Program Analysis Staff.

—lack of relationship between doctrinal analysis and force structure discussion;

—use of a single set of documents to serve both top-level policy makers and the lower level bureaucracy;

—arbitrary division of the problem into separate NIEs;

—need for more attention to presentation of evidence and analysis supporting conclusions, and reasons for rejecting alternative hypotheses;

—lack of historical perspective, including failure to identify and discuss the accuracy of past estimates.

The State Department's response (Tab B) suggested:

—separation of the process into a set of "summary estimates" for the top policy makers and a set of much more detailed papers for lower level people. The "summary estimates" would be much shorter than the present NIEs, focusing on the most current and controversial points; the basic NIEs would be considerably expanded to include more evidence and analysis;

—more attention to doctrine and strategy, more closely linked to the force analysis;

—inclusion of tables on U.S. forces, for comparative purposes.

DOD sent a brief reply (Tab C) urging:

—relegating detail to appendices and concentrating in the main body on the more critical aspects;

—more explicit statement of significant changes, intelligence community disagreements, and levels of confidence in the judgments expressed;

—quarterly updating of the major estimates;

—having the NIEs focus on five-year estimate, to mesh with the DOD planning cycle;

—include a discussion of changes from previous NIEs, explaining divergences and attempting to identify systematic errors.

CIA is now working internally toward some very limited changes: (see Tab D)

—*A new set of estimates,* nominally intended for high-level people, will be attempted. The model they seem to have in mind is the recent ONE Memorandum on Soviet Strategic Programs. (Copy at Tab E.)

Comment

Developing a special set of estimates for top-level people is a worthy idea, but if CIA is serious about taking the Strategic Programs memo as a model, no good will come of the effort. That memo was almost a caricature of the defects of CIA's output. (See your memo to

Helms commenting on it, Tab F.) Andy Marshall's memorandum to you on improving the intelligence produced for top-level policy makers suggests some ways to get this effort back on the track.[3]

—*The basic estimates,* 11–8 on offensive forces, 11–3 on defensive forces, and 11–14 on general purpose forces, *would continue as before in terms of format, organization, and scope,* except that ASW would be treated as a part of strategic defensive forces rather than general purpose forces. There would be a declared policy of increased attention to historical perspective, economic aspects of military policy and strategy and doctrine. Annexes would be used as ways of presenting detailed evidence on particular points, especially technical ones.

Comment

It is impossible to quarrel with these intentions. The problem is whether they are carried out in practice. It would be useful to try to see whatever detailed plans CIA makes, particularly any "models" or "samples" which are prepared.

—*More graphics.*

Comment

Good.

There is apparently no plan for:

—serious attention to improved analysis of Soviet doctrine or institutional pressures as factors in estimating Soviet military forces. These points are not even included in the declaratory list of improvements.

—systematic flushing of alternative hypotheses or any basic change in the practice of papering over dissents instead of discussing them openly;

—improved presentation of evidence and argument supporting the conclusions reached.

If the top-level estimates effort can be rescued, a large part of your basic problem would be dealt with. However, you have a strong interest in the basic as well as the top-level estimates:

—The basic estimates exist and will continue; the "top level" ones are still just a project. For the next year or so at least, the basic estimates are likely to be the only ones available.

—Even after the new series is being published, most of the bureaucracy will be relying on the basic estimates, and, very likely top-level people or their staffs will rely on them for many purposes.

To some degree, basic changes in the standard estimates probably depend on restructuring the Office of National Estimates. Andy

[3] Document 206.

Marshall's memo on that subject discusses how you may be able to influence that process so as to improve the output.

However, you may also want to act directly on the basic estimates issue: The basic points have been repeated several times, by you, by the staff, and by other consumers—getting action to follow the communication of the points is another matter. *A direct conversation with Helms would be the most effective way of impressing on him the fact that you are dissatisfied with the estimates and that you think fundamental improvements, going far beyond what seems to be proposed, are required.*

Recommendation

That you talk with Dick Helms, using the talking points at Tab G.

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209. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, June 16, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry A. Kissinger
Richard Helms
David Packard
Ray S. Cline

SUBJECT

Improving the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs and SNIEs)

From my first days in this job the national estimates proved to be a source of education and guidance in judging issues and reaching policy conclusions. They have also been, and remain, a source of some puzzlement. On the one hand, they seem to encapsule more information by far than they convey to the reader. On the other, they often seem to elude questions at the heart of the policy problem at issue. I cannot help feeling that the great care in thought and drafting that goes into the estimates should result in a more useful product.

General complaints of this sort are often heard. But a general complaint contributes little toward making the estimates more useful. I

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 67, 350.059 (Alpha) 1070. Secret.

think, therefore, that we should undertake a systematic study of what we need and would like to get from the estimates—and what our contribution might be in making that possible. The focus would be on the problems and role of the users of the estimates. This only addresses half the question, of course, leaving the problems on the producers' side to be tackled by the intelligence community itself.

For the study to succeed, it must be more flexible and penetrating than a "user survey." I have in mind an approach based on interviews with both senior intelligence users and their staffs. These should be discussions in depth, starting from a suitably structured set of questions, by encouraging the respondents to introduce questions, criticisms and ideas of their own. The study would be useful even if the interviews were limited to the Department of State, but would be greatly enhanced if done on an inter-agency basis.

The design of the study needs careful thought and staffing. Without prejudice to it, I would like to give some of my impressions about the strengths and weaknesses of the estimates and some illustrations of the kinds of questions I would have liked posed, were I among those to be interviewed.

I. Impressions of the Estimates: Their Strengths Give Rise to their Weaknesses.

As I see it, the fundamental strength of the national estimates is their objectivity, the care taken to make them reliable within the limits of the art, a degree of concensus which facilitates inter-agency agreement on policy, and the packaging of a large body of information and wisdom in a brief and nontechnical form. It would be a major error to sacrifice these strengths in pursuit of marginal improvements in the estimates. The strengths must be preserved, but we should equally be forthright in recognizing the ways in which they now constrain the estimating process and the usefulness of the resulting estimates.

For example, the traditional arms-length relationship between the intelligence producer and the policymaker may protect objectivity by paying the price of estimates that lack relevance to the problems of policy. How can the estimators go to the heart of the problem if they are overly insulated from the analysis and concerns that motivate the policymakers? Reliability is important, both for the producer and the user, but it is sometimes achieved by hedging and qualifications that dissipate the substance of the estimate. Inter-agency agreement is valuable when it is real, but not when it is obtained by cannibalizing differences or evading difficult questions. Finally, brevity aims to make the findings more accessible to a busy reader, but may also make it more difficult for him to appraise the underpinnings and uncertainties of the analysis. Given the kinds of staff support now available to senior people, are current formats still desirable?

I do not mean to underestimate either the value of the estimates as now prepared or the difficulties of correcting the weaknesses I have just listed. I doubt, though, that it is beyond our ingenuity to find better procedures, better formats and a more productive relationship between estimators and users. We could provide support on a broader front for future rounds of improvements by canvassing our own needs and ability to contribute more systematically and thoughtfully than hitherto.

I have asked my staff to come up with questions and comments relating to the estimates and have attached them for your consideration.[2] I realize that some of their comments, as well as some of what I have expressed above, were previously set forth by the Department in considering the improvement of the Soviet military estimates but I have included these points in the interests of comprehensiveness.[3]

ELR

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[2] Attached but not printed.

[3] Marshall forwarded Richardson's memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a June 30 memorandum which commented that Richardson had raised many of the important and pertinent issues concerning the usefulness of NIEs and recommended that Kissinger take the initiative to get the study proposed by Richardson started. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VII, 2 May 70–30 Jun 70)

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210. Editorial Note

On July 18, 1970, President Nixon met with his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia and Cambodia in particular. The President expressed his displeasure with the quality of U.S. intelligence on Cambodia and asked the Board to look very carefully into the entire background of the intelligence community's misreading of the importance of Sihanoukville as an entry point for Communist supplies in Cambodia. He then made the following comments, according to the minutes: "The President said there is a tendency in CIA to 'a muted kind of thinking.' He said that he simply cannot put up with people lying to the President of the United States about intelligence. If intelligence is inadequate or if the intelligence depicts a bad situation, he wants to know it and he will not stand being served warped evaluations. He said that an equally bad performance by the intelligence community was its assessments of Soviet ABM developments. The President stated that the United States is spending a total

of about [*dollar amount not declassified*] per year on intelligence and it deserves to receive a lot more for its money than it has been getting. He does not expect the intelligence community to provide the President with proposed courses of action; that is a function for the National Security Council. He does, however, expect the community to present objective intelligence with an indication of majority and minority views where such exist. He said that he understands that the intelligence community has been bitten badly a few times and thus tends to make its reports as bland as possible so that it won't be bitten again. The result is that many reports are completely meaningless. There is another tendency which appears from time to time in the community, viz., the penchant for presenting facts or writing reports designed to fit a preconceived philosophy, e.g., to justify a bombing halt if, in the writer's personal views, such an action is warranted. The President recognized that this tendency is sometimes a subconscious one and that there are people of varying philosophies, e.g., hawks and doves, in the intelligence community as well as the other segments of government. On the other hand, the slanting of intelligence reports is sometimes deliberate and the President feels that the playing down of the importance of Sihanoukville may have been such a case. Sometimes, he said, the authors of these reports do not actually lie; instead, they slant the report in such a way that their personal points of view receive extra emphasis. He believes that those responsible for the deliberate distortion of an intelligence report should be fired. He suggested that the time may be coming when he will have to read the riot act to the entire intelligence community." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume IV, 1 May 70–31 July 70)

211. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Blue Ribbon Panel Recommendations on Intelligence[2]

In connection with your lunch meeting today with PFIAB, this memo:

—summarizes the comments of the Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense intelligence;
—notes their recommendations for administrative changes;
—comments on the limits of the Panel's analysis.

Summary

The Panel paints a gloomy picture of the U.S. Defense intelligence system, marked by effective autonomy of the intelligence elements from the consumers and effective autonomy of the service intelligence components from the two institutions—NSA and DIA—which are supposed to provide a coordinated and unified DOD intelligence service.

As an administrative cure, it proposes centralization of all defense intelligence activities by creating a collection and a production agency with both management and operational control over activities, reporting directly to the Secretary, through an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The present independent service intelligence activities would be abolished.

The Problem

The chief criticisms the Panel makes of the current situation with the defense intelligence community are:

—NSA and DIA (themselves separate institutions with no common chief short of the Secretary of Defense) don't really manage the programs supposedly assigned to them. The Services do.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 239, Defense—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Top Secret. Sent for information.

[2] "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report on National Command and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence," submitted to the President on July 1, 1970. (Ibid., Box 1324, Unfiled Material—1970) The report was a supplement, prepared by a small part of the Panel, to the Panel's main report. The Panel, which began its work in July 1969, was established under the chairmanship of Gilbert Fitzhugh to undertake an extensive study of the Defense Department and make recommendations on its organization and management.

—Both in SIGINT (the supposed area of NSA concern) and general intelligence (DIA), the Services, not the central all-DOD institution, run the people, the budgets, the resources, the R&D, and the product very largely autonomously.

—DIA in particular suffers from "too many jobs and too many masters" since it is supposed to be subordinate to *both* the Secretary and the JCS, whose interests are often in conflict, and since it is supposed to control and coordinate the intelligence components of the individual Services, at the same time that it and its staff are almost wholly dependent on those same Services for both physical and personnel resources and future careers.

—In particular, DIA has been forced to negotiate away its supposed power as the producer of *all* finished DOD intelligence, so that even formally it has "shifted from the production of *all* Defense intelligence to the production of *some* strategic or that intelligence used at the JCS/OSD national level. The members of the JCS, as chiefs of Service, still maintain current intelligence and estimates capabilities on their respective staffs . . ."[3]

—On the NSA side, the Service cryptologic agencies (SCA's) are nominally only collection instrumentalities subject to the management and control of NSA. In reality, they are "jealously guarded prerogatives" effectively independent if not dominant of NSA in personnel, budget, facilities, R&D, methods and procedures. Moreover, all Services run substantial separate security and cryptologic efforts outside the purview of activities run through NSA.

—The lack of coordination with respect to routine intelligence is exacerbated by the existence of "special programs." These tend to be managed at a high level, nominally or practically free of even the weak coordination to which other efforts are subject. These special programs usually involve the development of a new technical capability and there is a tendency to keep control of the *output* as well as the operation with the development agency for too long.

—The result of these divided administrative responsibilities is a divided, uncoordinated product:

—There are separate map agencies in each Service, separate procedures and regulations for security clearance investigations (and a costly and inefficient refusal to accept each other's investigations), and separate sets of estimates and reports on the threat, particularly in the "scientific and technical," i.e., longer-term, area.

—Each Service produces its own flow of current intelligence and estimates, with the attendant danger that the intelligence produced will be tailored to the special interests of the Services, particularly with respect to manipulating the threat to justify victory for the Service on new weapons systems.

These observations have to do primarily with problems of coordination *within* the defense intelligence community. The Panel also,

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[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

although somewhat more cursorily, discusses the problem of the relationship between the defense intelligence community and the consumers:

—The process of assigning requirements for intelligence collection is conducted almost entirely within the intelligence community with very little meaningful input by consumers.

—With respect to compartmentalized intelligence (i.e., SI, TK, B, etc.) access to which lies with the managers of the collection systems, the relationships between the various compartments have never been systematically analyzed and there is a tendency to ignore the importance of balancing the need for security against the need for getting the information to the people who need it.

—The system of writing estimates is said to water down controversy by compromise.

—Neither on the civilian nor the military side is there a truly professional, career defense intelligence service, except to some extent in NSA, with a resulting bad effect on the process and the product.

—The Panel notes comments that the system collects much more information than can be processed or evaluated competently and that what is processed often does not reach the people who need and could use it. Regarding the evaluation of the substance of the intelligence as outside its charter, the Panel does not, however, comment on these charges.

Recommendations

Most of the Panel's recommendations have to do with improving the internal administrative mechanisms for intelligence within DOD. (Incidentally, by its faint praise and its far-reaching recommendations for administrative changes, the Panel clearly implies that it regards as wholly inadequate Laird's efforts to deal with the problem by giving some central intelligence responsibilities to Froehlke, his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.)

Its recommendations would, in effect, take the Services entirely out of the independent intelligence business and set up a separate defense intelligence service, reporting to the Secretary directly and not through the JCS (or any service chain of command). In detail, the Panel would:

—Give overall responsibility for defense intelligence matters to the "Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations." (A basic recommendation of the Panel, considering the Department as a whole, is to create separate Deputy jobs, for Management of Resources and for Operations.)

—Establish under him an "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence" (ASD/I), who would also have the title of "Director of Defense Intelligence" (DDI). This official would:

—represent Defense on USIB and other interagency intelligence boards;

—"direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations (i.e., not the Services) as organic to combatant forces";

—have charge of the allocation of resources, the definition of procedures, establishment of requirements, intelligence-related research and development, and access to information;

—have as his principal subordinates a "Defense Security Command" (DSECC) and a "Defense Intelligence Production Agency" (DIPA).

—DSECC (which would be a military command) would be the successor-in-interest to NSA and would be the basic collection agency. It would:

—take over from the Services all collection activities now conducted by the Service cryptologic agencies (but with authority to delegate operational and administrative responsibility as appropriate);

—include some processing closely related to collection;

—take over all the functions of NSA and expand those functions to include the "processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information."

—DIPA would have charge of all intelligence production not organic to combatant forces. It would be the successor to DIA and would:

—provide all current intelligence, threat assessments, finished ad hoc intelligence, DOD estimates, and DOD inputs to national estimates;

—manage *all* defense intelligence production and dissemination including that organic to combatant forces.

—DSECC and DIPA would each be responsible for planning, evaluation, and review under the ASD/I, of the intelligence activities under their control.

—Set up a unified map and topographic service, under the Deputy Secretary for Management of Resources.

—Create professional, career defense intelligence services, with both civilian and military members.

Comments

These recommendations would greatly centralize the defense intelligence process. The Services can be expected to attack them vigorously as based too much on analysis of abstract management relationships and not sufficiently responsive to the practical and specialized needs of the individual parts of the defense establishment. The Panel explicitly recognizes the importance of a certain degree of competition between intelligence providers, but has concluded that the present system carries competition to absurd extremes.

From your point of view—and probably that of PFIAB—the most important limitation of the Panel's work are:

—that it focuses almost entirely on management and administrative problems and does not suggest much which is directly related to improving the quality of the product; (although, of course, better management, less parochialism, and more professionalism should improve the product)

—that its analysis and recommendations are primarily concerned with relationships within the defense intelligence community itself and not with consumers or with non-defense parts of the intelligence community.

These comments are not meant necessarily as criticisms of the Panel—its job was to look at *defense* intelligence and primarily from a management, not a substantive, point of view. But, the problem is much broader than the Panel's charter permitted it to consider.

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212. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

PFIAB on Blue Ribbon Panel Intelligence Recommendations

At your request (Tab C)[2] PFIAB has commented on the intelligence recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel.

Those recommendations are summarized in the memo at Tab D. In essence, they would put all authority for defense intelligence under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who would represent DOD on USIB and have as his principal subordinates "Defense Security Command" with the functions now performed by the service collection agencies and NSA and NRO and a "Defense Production

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. V, 1 Aug 70–31 Oct 70. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] Tabs A–D are attached but not printed.

Agency" which would have charge of all intelligence production not organic to combatant forces.

While the Panel's re-organization proposals were radical, the PFIAB ideas are very modest—an Assistant Secretary with budgetary and policy but not operational control, better personnel, some concentration of ELINT and cryptologic functions in NSA. Otherwise, existing institutions, responsibilities, and control relationships would continue.[3]

PFIAB says:

1. It is a good idea to have a single official, an "Assistant Secretary for Intelligence," with overall responsibility for intelligence in Defense, *but*

—The directors of NRO and NSA should have direct access to the Secretary;

—DIA should remain separate and not be directed by the ASD(I) because it would be "counterproductive" to have the ASD(I) in the chain of command;

—The ASD(I) should be on USIB, but as an addition to, not a replacement for the DIA, NSA, and service representatives. The broader representation should be maintained to "preserve checks and balances," insure "representation of service views," and because "the tendency to achieve consensus is . . .[4] already too great" and having fewer voices on USIB would "institutionalize" this tendency.

—In effect the ASD(I) should be the advisor to the Secretary for intelligence, management, budget and policy, but have no direct operational control.

2. It is impractical to try to separate collection and production into different agencies:

—NSA and NRO are specialized "national" agencies, which work well under present arrangements; they shouldn't be subordinated to a new "collection" command.

—The Defense Security command would be "disproportionately large" and engaged in "diverse methods of collection." (But, why should it be better to have this "disproportionately large" "diverse" effort under many heads, rather than one?)

—Many collection activities, e.g., prisoner of war interrogation, are integral to the combat commands and couldn't be separated out. (The Blue Ribbon Panel allowed for delegation of responsibility by the Security Command and would not in [any?] case give it control over activities "organic" to combat commands.)

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[3] PFIAB's comments were contained in a September 14 memorandum from Anderson to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 239, Defense—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel)

[4] All ellipses are in the source text.

—So much authority and responsibility should not be in the hands of the commander of the collection command "unless no other alternatives are practicable."

3. The Panel recommendations would remove the Director of Defense Intelligence from his position as the intelligence officer to the JCS. PFIAB's views are that:

—The director of DIA (or whatever it is called) does not have to be "J–2" to the JCS as such, but "he certainly must be fully responsive to the requirements of the JCS."

—There "should be no valid objection to his reporting to the JCS . . . as the principal intelligence officer (J–2)." (Except for asserting that this relationship is a "separate factor" from management of DIA, PFIAB does not comment on the Panel's conclusion that such a divorce from the JCS was necessary because otherwise DIA is trying to serve two masters—as an advisor to the Secretary, the JCS superior, and as a subordinate to the JCS.)

4. The Panel does "not give sufficient stress to the importance of intelligence to combat commanders." Intelligence activities "which are intimately related to military operations should be retained in the services but under firm, centralized policy direction from the Department of Defense." (I don't think the Panel report would disagree with that as a statement of the objective; the problem is how to achieve the result. PFIAB does not comment on the Panel's charge of excessive service independence and empire-building in intelligence.)

5. There is no obligation to a single map and topographic service.

PFIAB's recommendations include:

—(1) "Deliniation under NSA" of cryptologic and ELINT responsibilities. (Presumably this means assigning those functions clearly to NSA and not the services. That would meet some of the Panel's concern with service autonomy, but be subject to some of the objections the PFIAB makes against taking intelligence activities out of the services.)

—(2) Improved "screening and stability" of men assigned to defense intelligence and assignment to intelligence of a "proportionate share" of "superior" personnel. (This is PFIAB's only comment on the proposal of the Panel to create a career military and civilian defense intelligence service.)

—(3) Budgetary, management, and policy supervision and review by the ASD(I) with decentralized operations, with existing organizations retaining their procession responsibilities and functions.

—(4) Retention of separate responsibilities in the services for personnel investigations. (No reason is given.)

PFIAB asks that its comments be transmitted to the Secretary of Defense. The memo at Tab A thanks PFIAB for their comments and the one at Tab B transmits them to Secretary Laird.

(Admiral Anderson has also forwarded his personal comments on the Panel's proposals dealing with restructuring the chain of command in DOD, which I will send to you separately.)

Recommendation

That you sign the memos at Tabs A and B.[5]

[5] Not found. There is no indication that Kissinger signed either memoranda.

213. Editorial Note

At a meeting on October 20, 1970, Robert Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration and Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Action Committee, presented four possible ways of organizing intelligence in the Department of Defense in response to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations (see Document 211). The four alternatives are detailed below. Attending the meeting were Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Robert Cushman and John Bross of the Central Intelligence Agency, Ray Cline of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Gerard Burke of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, James Schlesinger of the Office of Management and Budget, and Vice Admiral John Weinel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Froehlke indicated that his mind was still open but he "tended towards alternative 3." (Memorandum from Froehlke to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, October 21; Washington National Records Center, RG 330 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 67, 350.09 1970) Froehlke invited those present at the meeting to submit comments on the alternatives and expressed the hope that Secretary Laird would make a decision by early December. (Memorandum from Wayne Smith to Kissinger, November 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 239, Defense—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel)

Cushman responded in a November 2 memorandum to Froehlke (Document 214) that alternatives 1, 2, and 4 were "clearly impractical at this time" and that alternative 3, while probably feasible, had "serious problems." Cline replied more positively in his November 2 memorandum to Froehlke: "In reviewing your alternatives, I find that we lean strongly toward alternative three. It has many merits, and would avoid the bureaucratic upheaval that would occur if you tried to move immediately to alternative four—which appears to be a not unreasonable long-term goal." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 239, Defense—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel) Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, questioned the

need for any reorganization at all in his November 7 memorandum to Secretary Laird (Document 215). Burke opined in his October 20 memorandum to Admiral Anderson, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, that "with the possible exception of alternative #3 (and I have concern about that one, too), I personally feel that these alternatives are at best unrealistic." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 239, Defense—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel) In commenting on Froehlke's proposals in a November 27 memorandum to Henry Kissinger, Wayne Smith of the National Security Council staff stated: "As you might expect, all the alternatives are the same—all establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) with not only staffing and programming capabilities but also line responsibilities over NSA, DIA, and the National Reconnaissance Program. PFIAB has sent you a copy of the Froehlke alternatives and a memorandum describing all of these alternatives as 'objectionable in whole or in part' and recommending that such decisions be taken by the NSC because of their community-wide implications." Smith's and PFIAB's memoranda are ibid.

Printed below are descriptions of the four alternatives that Froehlke sent to the intelligence officials on October 20. Froehlke distributed the same material to the Department of Defense officials. Omitted from this material are organizational flow charts for each alternative, lists of pros and cons for each alternative, and a Concept Paper on the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Alternative 1:

"The objective of this alternative is to describe an organization which adheres to the BRDP recommendations to the greatest extent possible. To do so, the proposed organization would establish an ASD(I) whose office would become the DoD center for intelligence with both line and staff responsibilities. He would be the Director of Defense Intelligence. These responsibilities would create a requirement *for a sizeable staff* with line and staff functions. However, these positions could be drawn from within the DoD intelligence community as a result of restructuring actions. (This would probably be met with something less than enthusiasm.)

"Under this alternative it is assumed that all Defense intelligence activities are subordinate to an ASD(I) including national programs currently managed elsewhere within the Department of Defense. However, there would be no immediate transfer of responsibility for the management of organic theater intelligence resources to the ASD(I). Decisions regarding these would not be undertaken pending establishment of the ASD(I) in order that these decisions could be made with his approval.

"Two major organizations are directly subordinate to the ASD(I). The first is the Defense Security Command (DSECC), charged with the re-

sponsibility for all defense intelligence collection activity. The second is the Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), responsible for all defense intelligence production activity. Collection, processing and production currently being performed by DIA, NSA, the national programs and the Services would be delineated by ASD(I) and subordinated to these two major activities. The Director, NSA would be double hatted, also serving as the Commander, Defense Security Command. The Service cryptologic agencies would report to the Commander DSECC. The Director, DIA would become Director Defense Intelligence Production Agency. Both the Commander, DSECC, and Director, DIPA would have command and/or operational control of all subordinate organizations.

"The ASD(I) would represent DoD on USIB and NIRB. He would appoint representatives to the USIB committees from any subordinate DoD intelligence organization on a 'best qualified' basis. These representatives would be DoD representatives—not agency or Service representatives.

"A single change has been made to BRDP recommendations in this alternative. This involves the recommended establishment of a Defense Investigative Service (DIS) as a subordinate element of the Defense Security Command. Analysis of this proposal leads to the conclusion that (1) it is desirable for the ASD(I) to have policy responsibility for all aspects of security and counterintelligence and (2) this activity is not within the general functional area of collection. The creation of such a DIS may not be practicable, and its subordination (if created) to the command charged with collection (DSECC) does not appear to be practicable. Therefore, Alternative #1 would simply combine the responsibility for policies in the fields of Security Classification, Investigation and Counterintelligence at the ASD(I) level with operations retained in the Services. The establishment of a Defense Investigative Service would be the subject of further analysis."

Alternative 2:

"The objective of this alternative is to describe an organization which is consistent with the majority of BRDP Intelligence Annex recommendations yet varies in certain areas. Specifically, the national programs *would not* be subordinate to the DSECC, but would report directly to ASD(I), and as in Alternative #1, there would not initially be a Defense Investigative Service.

"Under this concept, the ASD(I) would have full operational control of DSECC, DIPA and the national programs. The ASD(I) would have both line and staff responsibilities. The organization would differ from that in Alternative #1 in two ways:

"(1) The Director, NSA would not also be the Commander DSECC.

"(2) The Commander DSECC would not control the national programs.

"The ASD(I), as in Alternative #1, would represent DoD on USIB and NIRB, appointing representatives to USIB committees from subordinate DoD intelligence activities on a 'best qualified' basis.

"Decisions regarding any changes in responsibility for the management of organic theater intelligence resources would be made by SecDef upon recommendations of ASD(I) and the JCS."

Alternative 3:

"Alternative #3 describes an organization which is structured to achieve some—but not all—of the BRDP recommendations with a minimum of upheaval in the immediate time frame.

"Conceptually, an ASD(I) would be established whose office would become a focal point for DoD intelligence. The ASD(I) direction and control responsibilities would be those recommended in the BRDP Report and outlined in Alternatives #1 and #2.

"Under this alternative the major deviation from the BRDP Report is found at lower echelons. The DSECC and DIPA would not be created. A review of the NSCID's and DoD Directives indicates that the significant problems highlighted by the BRDP have not resulted primarily from organizational deficiencies. The situation has been compounded by the lack of an OSD level manager other than the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. Therefore, under this alternative, NSA and DIA continue to function as they do now except for the following changes:

"1. ASD(I) is the principal DoD representative to the USIB and he would appoint—as in the other alternatives—the DoD committee representatives.

"2. NSA's responsibilities in the SIGINT environment will be explicitly defined by the Secretary. This would require a review of existing national and DoD Directives with subsequent recommendations.

"3. DIA would not report through the JCS to the Secretary but through the ASD(I). The JCS would then require internal intelligence staff support.

"4. The DIA charter would be revised to strengthen DIA's management role which has been acknowledged tacitly and ignored practically.

"As in Alternatives #1 and #2, policy responsibilities for security classification and procedures (to include special access systems), investigations and counterintelligence activities would be centered in the OASD(I) with consideration given to the establishment of the DIS as an agency reporting to the Secretary, through the ASD(I).

"The intelligence collection and production functions currently being performed by the Services will be examined, and as applicable, subordinated to the Director, DIA."

Alternative 4:

"Alternative #4 describes an organization which is structured substantially the same as that proposed by the BRDP. However, it is pre-

sented as an alternative which would achieve the Panel's principal goals through a more centralized approach than proposed by the BRDP.

"Under this concept the ASD(I) would be established. The ASD(I) would be the principal intelligence, counterintelligence and security staff officer. He would direct all DoD intelligence activities not specifically declared by the Secretary to be organic to combatant forces. His staff would, of necessity, be large. He would be the DoD representative on USIB and would appoint representatives to USIB committees from subordinate agencies.

"Immediately subordinate would be three intelligence activities:

"(1) The Defense Intelligence Operations Agency (DIOA).
"(2) The Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA).
"(3) The Defense Intelligence Support Agency (DISA).

"The Defense Intelligence Operations Agency would supervise all intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The Director would also be the Director, NSA. The Service cryptologic agencies and technical sensor activities would be under the operational control of the Director DIOA. The directors of the national programs would also be under the operational control of the Director DIOA.

"All intelligence production activities would be subordinate to the Director, Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), who would exercise operational control. The DIPA would provide current intelligence and production, support to SecDef, OSD, defense agencies, JCS, and the Service ACSI's. The Director DIPA would act as the alternate DoD representative on USIB. As directed by ASD(I) he would coordinate collection priorities to satisfy intelligence consumer requirements.

"The third agency which would be created under this concept would be the Defense Intelligence Support Agency. The purposes of this agency would be to provide common support services to the Defense intelligence community, to be the focal point for all intelligence R&D, and to provide a headquarters for counterintelligence and security operations. Finally, the DISA could provide common technical services in the field of ELINT analysis, image interpretation, translation, and ADP. Among the common services for which the DISA could be made responsible are the following: personnel services, intelligence career development programs, pay and finances, training/schools, computer services, purchasing and contracting, external contract services, administrative services, communications support, supply and logistics support, graphic arts support, printing support, security guard support, security clearances support, libraries and publications, special security support, and transportation services." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 67, 350.09 1970)

214. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (Froehlke)[1]

Washington, November 2, 1970.

Dear Bob:

Dick Helms has asked me to reply to your request for comments on the alternatives proposed for reorganization of Defense intelligence activities which you discussed with us on October 20th.[2] Implementation of at least some aspects of these proposals would involve amendments to National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Dick of course wishes to reserve expression of a definitive opinion on these matters until such time as they may come up for discussion through normal National Security Council channels and procedures.

In general the alternatives presented are not discussed in sufficient detail for us to be able to endorse any of them, but we will give our comments on them as concepts. We do believe that a measure of centralized control over the development and allocation of intelligence-associated departmental resources is desirable. A knowledgeable judgment about the feasibility of any new organizational plan cannot, however, be made until the fine points are worked out in detail. Of the four alternatives, numbers 1, 2 and 4 would be clearly impractical at this time. Although alternative 3 would probably be feasible to implement, we believe there are serious problems with it.

Two aspects of all the suggested alternatives present difficulties. One of these concerns the management of the national reconnaissance programs and the proposed Assistant Secretary's relationship to them. The other has to do with the authority and functions of the proposed Assistant Secretary in connection with USIB and the process by which substantive intelligence estimates and judgments are formulated and approved.

As regards the national programs, we strongly support leaving the functions and membership of the Executive Committee of the NRO as they are. These are fundamental concepts in the NRO agreement and I believe that it would be a great mistake to change them.

Likewise, we think that it would be inappropriate to subordinate the Director, NRO, to an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. This would be a substantial departure from the terms of the NRO agree-

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–T01159A, Box 4, Folder 1, Department of Defense, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Handle via Byeman Control System Only.

[2] See Document 213.

ment which provides that the Director will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense and that he report directly through the Executive Committee to the Secretary. (As you know, the Deputy Director, NRO, is appointed by the DCI with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.) This arrangement was designed to insure that the activities of the National Reconnaissance Program receive the personal attention of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the President's Science Advisor and, when necessary, the Secretary of Defense. It is true, as you note in your concept paper, that this forces considerable personal involvement by the EXCOM members, particularly the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The nature of the programs involved are, however, of such national importance that this attention seems to us to be desirable.

This raises the question then of what the relationship of an ASD(I) and the D/NRO should be. In general, we think it should be one of coordination and mutual support. In view of the need for the NRO to serve national requirements, we believe it would not be appropriate for an ASD(I) to exercise management control or staff supervision over the National Reconnaissance Program.

A second matter of concern is how to implement the authority contemplated for the new Assistant Secretary in connection with National Intelligence Estimates and as the representative of the Secretary of Defense on USIB.

In the latter connection I note that the concept paper outlining the terms of reference for the Assistant Secretary provides that he will appoint representatives on the various USIB committees. Actually the components represented on USIB committees are specified by directives issued under the authority of the DCI and USIB. I presume that it is intended that any changes in the composition of USIB committees would be worked out between the new Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with established procedures.

The concept paper further provides that the new Assistant Secretary is to "coordinate [the][3] DOD position on National Intelligence Estimates and approve Defense intelligence estimates as prepared by the Director, DIA."

It is not clear to me how the Assistant Secretary's position on substantive matters involved in National Intelligence Estimates will be developed. It could be, I suppose, intended to establish a section in the office of the new Assistant Secretary to serve as a staff for substantive

[3] Brackets in the source text.

matters. On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary's position on estimates could be developed by DIA. I very much hope that the latter arrangement is intended and that the Director, DIA, will continue to remain a member of USIB. DIA, as the main military participant in the development and production of national estimates, can provide essential staff support to the Assistant Secretary as well as contributing the military viewpoint in substantive deliberations of the USIB. As you know, the intelligence chiefs of the three military services also participate fully in the deliberations of the USIB concerned with National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates and Watch Committee reports. They are of course authorized to express any substantially differing opinion on these documents. I would hope that this practice would continue.

The membership of USIB itself is determined by National Security Council Intelligence Directive and changes in the composition of the Board should be definitively decided in the NSC context. Generally speaking, I believe that there would be no objection to including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as a member of USIB but I believe that the question of the over-all military membership appropriate for USIB, and best calculated to serve the interests of the intelligence community, cannot be authoritatively decided at this time but should be taken up in the context of a proposal to amend NSCID No. 1.[4]

Although the proposal to have the Assistant Secretary act as the principal representative for the Secretary of Defense on USIB may raise some problems, I heartily agree with the proposal that he should act as the Department of Defense representative on the National Intelligence Resources Board. This is a very desirable move and one which I strongly support.

Another area that bothers me is the meaning of the proposal that NSA's responsibilities in the SIGINT environment will be explicitly defined by the Secretary of Defense, requiring a review of existing national and DOD directives. At present, SIGINT activities are governed by NSCID No. 6,[5] which includes the following provisions. SIGINT activities are first defined in that document as national responsibilities for which the Secretary of Defense is designated as Executive Agent. The DCI, however, with the technical advice and assistance of the Di-

[4] A copy of NSCID 1, Basic Duties and Responsibilities, revised March 4, 1964, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 275, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. II.

[5] See Document 187 and footnote 5 thereto.

rector, NSA, is the Executive Agent for SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments other than the UK, Canada and Australia. The USIB is responsible for establishing policies for such arrangements, as well as for providing the objectives, requirements and priorities for the production of COMINT and ELINT information by NSA. The Director of NSA also has operational and technical control over SIGINT intercept and processing activities, except those required for direct support over which he has delegated operational control. I hope that the proposal mentioned above is not intended to modify these basic provisions.

I note that under alternative 3 DIA will no longer report through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense and that accordingly the JCS will require internal intelligence staff support. This could lead to an undesirable overlap of responsibility and duplication of effort between DIA and a newly formed J–2, for example in the field of national estimates. It would seem preferable to have DIA continue to provide intelligence support to both the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

I should be only too glad to discuss the points which I have made above or any other questions which may occur to you as a result of comments submitted on the proposed alternatives at any time at your convenience.

Sincerely,

R. E. Cushman, Jr.[6]
Lieutenant General, USMC

[6] Printed from a copy that indicates Cushman signed the original.

215. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

JCSM–514–70 Washington, November 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Responsibilities for Intelligence in the Department of Defense (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to:

a. Your memorandum, dated 1 August 1969, subject as above, wherein additional responsibilities for intelligence management were assigned.[2]

b. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) (ASD(Admin)), dated 14 October 1970, subject: "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Intelligence Recommendations (U)," which requested comments on alternate plans for Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence reorganization.[3]

c. CM–4450–69, dated 26 July 1969, in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forwarded on the "Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence" to the ASD(Admin).[4]

d. JCSM–355–69, dated 6 June 1969, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on DOD intelligence program management.

e. JCSM–582–69, dated 18 November 1969, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting.

2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that considerable divergence exists between the responsibilities assigned in reference 1a for intelligence in the Department of Defense and the proposed alternate plans for DOD intelligence reorganization referred to in reference 1b. As indicated in reference 1c, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in broad agreement with the study which led to additional intelligence responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the management of DOD intelligence as expressed in references 1c and 1d, in that they consider that operational direction of intelligence is not an appropriate function for management at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level but should be left to the operating agencies. In addition,

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76, 350.09. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it. Written by hand at the bottom of page 1 is: "M—Argues against any changes now!"

[2] Document 193.

[3] Not found, but see Document 213.

[4] References c, d, and e were not found.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the removal of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), from a position in the chain of command from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the associated removal of the Director, DIA, from performance of the function of Director for Intelligence (J–2), Joint Staff. A close relationship is essential to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff properly to perform their role as the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The DIA is providing effective intelligence staff support in a dual role which makes the best use of intelligence personnel resources. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the major effect of the implementation of any one of the alternatives contained in reference 1b would be substantially increased centralization of intelligence responsibilities and direction in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which is contrary to the present policy of "decentralized management." Implementation of any of the proposed plans would require additional personnel to staff the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). For the above reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations about the advisability of a reorganization of DOD intelligence functions at this time.

4. (TS) Major changes have been made to improve the management of intelligence within the Department of Defense in the 14 months which commenced with the assignment of intelligence responsibilities to the ASD(Admin) on 1 August 1969 (reference 1a). These changes include the following:

a. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (DASD(I)) was formed and staffed within the OASD (Admin). The DASD(I) has taken important actions to discharge his responsibilities which include the establishment of an intelligence resource review and decisionmaking process, the improvement of intelligence communication between internal and external DOD agencies, evaluation of intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions, and the review of security policies.

b. A Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) has been developed which includes the National Security Agency (NSA) program (the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)); the programs of DIA and the Services (the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)); and national programs. This new programming process, which was derived from and is generally compatible with the Planning Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), was developed during the first half of 1970 and has not been in use sufficiently long for an assessment of effectiveness to be made.

c. New responsibilities and authorities were assigned to the Director, DIA, and the Director, NSA, as program managers for the GDIP and the CCP portions of the CDIP.

d. A Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) was built and integrated with the PPBS procedures. The CIRIS, a target-oriented display of intelligence resource allocation, is used to

evaluate intelligence resources. The CIRIS is intended to be a management tool in the CDIP and PPBS reviews. The DOD CIRIS data bank was not constituted until mid-July 1970; therefore, it has not had sufficient time to influence or contribute to the programming process of the FY 1972 PPBS cycle as intended.

e. Incorporation within the PPBS of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning intelligence requirements and intelligence resources through the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). In addition, intelligence programs have been established as a major mission category under Program III of the Five-Year Defense Program. The FY 1972–1979 PPBS cycle, which commenced in December 1969, rather than its planned inception of July 1969, was the first under a revised directive, and has not run its full course. Experience has not been gained with a full PPBS cycle with these new procedures.

5. (S) The report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on Command and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence[5] was in preparation and supporting information was gathered during the time period when these significant changes were being made. For that reason, the report describes many faults and shortcomings which these very changes were designed to correct.

6. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the recent major functional changes made to improve the management of intelligence in the Department of Defense have not been in effect sufficiently long for the results to be realized. Reorganization prior to a full evaluation of the effects of already implemented changes is not advisable. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no change should be made in the DOD intelligence organization. If, after passage of sufficient time to assess the new arrangements it is determined that management deficiencies exist in the DOD intelligence community, then reconsideration of possible restructuring may be in order.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that any future review be pursued within the concept that broad principles of policy guidance in management (including resource and fiscal management and cross-program integration) are the proper functions for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that line functions of directing operational intelligence matters should not be considered within the purview of any agency in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer

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[5] See Document 211.

216. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 30, 1970.

While I believe your recommendation that we keep Helms should be accepted, I will do so only on condition that there be a thorough housecleaning at other levels at CIA.[2] I want you to get him in and tell him the people you want changed and work out the situation. Also I want a good thinning down of the whole CIA personnel situation, as well as our Intelligence activities generally.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. III, 1 Jul 70–31 Dec 70. Eyes Only.

[2] In a November 25 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig, in reference to the CIA, stated: "I believe you need a complete house-cleaning over there. Smith and Carver are tops on my list," Smith "because he is not on the President's wavelength." Haig stated further that he agreed with Kissinger "that Helms will play whatever role the President wants him to play and, therefore, should be kept on but only if the key left-wing dominated slots under Helms are changed. Actually, as you look at the CIA organization, Helms is being asked to do too much. He becomes at once the overall manager, a role which he cannot play, the President's Number One briefer, which he does very well and the President's Number One evaluator, a role which he can do and should do as the Director but only if he has a sound team player to manager the Agency for him. This means Smith must go." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, WH/State Relationship Vol. 3)

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217. Memorandum From Tom Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Publications and Their Distribution

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 822, Latimer, Tom. Secret. Sent for information.

Central Intelligence Agency

I. Regular Publications

a. *The President's Daily Brief* (PDB)—Published six mornings a week by the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI)—contains short items of current interest plus occasional longer, more interpretive annexes. It is produced solely by CIA and is not coordinated outside that agency.

Distribution: The President, The Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Adm. Moorer, Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Kissinger and the White House Situation Room.

b. *The Central Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB)—Published by OCI six mornings a week in three versions—a Black book containing all source material for the top levels of government, a Red book containing SIGINT but not other sensitive material or satellite photography for all levels of government and a White book containing only Secret level material which is for analysts primarily. Items in the Black and Red books are coordinated with State and Defense Departments unless specifically noted otherwise.

Distribution: The Black book gets high level dissemination, i.e. Cabinet and Assistant Secretary level. The Red and White books are widely distributed throughout the government.

c. *Developments in Indochina*—Published by OCI six afternoons a week, contains articles on developments in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It is designed to give the reader a comprehensive picture of the latest developments in that region. Items are coordinated within CIA but not with other agencies or departments.

Distribution: White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary level plus ad hoc group members.

d. *Weekly Review* (also published in a non-SIGINT version)—Published every Friday by OCI, it is designed for those government officials who do not read the CIB every day but who need a weekly summary of major developments throughout the world. It also provides the analysts a vehicle in which to put individual developments into a larger framework. Items are not coordinated outside CIA.

Distribution: Widely disseminated at all cleared levels of the government.

e. *The Current State of Sino-Soviet Relations*—A bi-weekly report produced at the request of Mr. Kissinger—it is written by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated within CIA but not outside that agency.

Distribution: Closely held—copies to Mr. Kissinger, Secretary and Under Secretary of State, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, ISA, INR and Marshall Green.

f. *Weekly Vietnam Indicators*—A selected list of important statistics related to the war, plus short items of interest on the war. It is produced for the President by the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Mr. George Carver. It is not coordinated throughout CIA and not coordinated at all outside CIA.

Distribution: The White House only.

g. *The South Laos Interdiction Report*—Published weekly, it focuses specifically on efforts by guerrilla teams to interdict North Vietnam's logistics and manpower flow through South Laos. It is produced by the DDP.

Distribution: WSAG only.

h. *Laos Situation Report*—A daily report produced by the DDP, it describes military operations in Laos with particular focus on government operations against the Communists.

Distribution: The Laos ad hoc working group of the NSC.

i. *President's Quarterly Report*—Produced by OSR, it wraps up all pertinent information on Soviet military posture.

Distribution: Closely held—copies to the President, Vice President, Cabinet level and Assistant Secretary level on "need-to-know" basis.

j. *The Economic Situation in South Vietnam* (Monthly)—An analytic report covering economic trends in South Vietnam, originally requested by State.

Distribution: Mr. Kissinger, PFIAB, the Vice President, NSC Staff, State, AID, USIA, DOD, NSA, AEC, FBI, Treasury, OMB and the Department of Agriculture.

k. *Shipping to North Vietnam* (Monthly)—A report of all foreign shipping to North Vietnam.

Distribution: NSC Staff, State, AID, USIA, DOD, NSA, Maritime Administration, Treasury, the Governors [*Governments*?] of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

l. *Shipping to Cambodia* (Semi-annual)

Distribution: NSC Staff, State, Defense, NSA.

m. *Shipping to Cuba* (Annual)

Distribution: NSC Staff, DOD, US Coast Guard, NSA.

II. Ad Hoc Publications

a. *Intelligence Memoranda*—Produced by the components of the Directorate of Intelligence (DD/I). Some are self-initiated within the DDI,

others are requested from other government departments. All are coordinated within CIA but not outside the agency, unless the requestor so specifics.

Distribution: Determined by the classification, the requestor and by the content.

b. *Weekly Review Special Report*—Articles initiated by DDI analysts, usually shorter in length and scope than Intelligence Memoranda—coordinated within CIA but not outside the agency.

Distribution: The same as for the regular Weekly Review.

c. *ONE Staff Memoranda*—Issued through CIA but done by the staff of ONE. They are self initiated and are usually coordinated within CIA but not outside that agency.

Distribution: Determined case by case.

d. The Directorate of Intelligence also produces a variety of other ad hoc and regular publications aimed primarily at other intelligence analysts in the government rather than for policy levels. These include the *Office of Strategic Research Monthly* which contains articles on military developments primarily in the Communist world; the *Weekly Surveyor* put out by the Directorate of Science and Technology. It contains brief items on scientific, medical, space and other technological developments in the world with primary emphasis on the USSR and Communist China; the daily *Missile and Space Summary* produced by the Foreign Missiles and Space Activities Center at CIA. It covers all space and missile activities throughout the world. All of these publications are disseminated widely at the analytical level in the government. The DDP also produces a variety of raw intelligence reports which are disseminated according to the "need-to-know" principle.

III. USIB Publications—In his role as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, the Director of Central Intelligence issues a number of regular and ad hoc reports. These are not CIA reports.

a. *National Intelligence Estimates*—These are either initiated by the Office of National Estimates or by other government officials. They are fully coordinated, interagency estimates of specific problems. They are written by the staff of the Office of National Estimates and are issued after approval by USIB.

Distribution: Determined on a case by case basis.

b. *Special National Intelligence Estimates*—The same as the above but with a much shorter deadline.

c. The USIB also distributes a number of other reports from its many committees, such as the weekly Watch Report from the Watch Committee, defectors reports from the Interagency Defector Commit-

tee, ad hoc reports from the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and so on.

State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

a. *Intelligence Notes, Briefs and Research Studies*—Published on an ad hoc basis, these are initiated by the analysts on subjects thought to be of interest. They are disseminated for the use of other analysts around the community. The major difference in the three types of reports is their length.

Defense Intelligence Agency

I. Regular Publications

a. *Daily Joint Staff Ops-Int Summary*—A digest of selective operational and intelligence reports produced each day by the National Military Command Center of the JCS and by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Unlike CIA publications, this Defense Department daily provides information on both US and foreign government actions.

Distribution: The White House, Vice President, Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State, Admiral Anderson and upper levels of the Defense Department.

b. *Intelligence Summary*—A publication produced six days a week primarily for the needs of the Department of Defense for appropriate current intelligence. The items are not coordinated outside the Defense Department.

Distribution: White House, State, DOD, SALT delegation, CIA, NASA, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps.

c. *Weekly Highlights*—A summary of each week's developments by foreign military services, excluding Southeast Asia which is covered in a separate publication.

Distribution: White House, State, DOD, CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps.

d. *Southeast Asia Summary* (Weekly and Monthly)—This report briefly summarizes and evaluates information on significant enemy activity influencing the war in Indochina.

Distribution: White House, State, DOD, CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps.

e. Daily *Intensity Indicators of VC/NVA Activity*—A series of charts covering vital aspects of the war.

Distribution: White House and DOD.

National Security Agency

NSA publishes three regular reports containing intercepted messages. The three are broken down by area of the world. Thus, there is one on the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] area; one on Southeast Asia and one, in the NSA SIGINT Summary, which briefly covers the most important events throughout the world. All three are widely distributed through the government to officials cleared for SIGINT material.

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218. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for PFIAB Meeting, 12:30 p.m., Thursday, December 3, 1970

1. The following people will be attending the luncheon:

Admiral George Anderson, Chairman
Dr. William Baker
Gordon Gray
Dr. Edwin Land
Franklin Lincoln
Dr. Franklin Murphy
Ambassador Robert Murphy
Frank Pace
Governor Nelson Rockefeller
Dr. Kissinger
General Haig

2. *Intelligence Problems.* You have expressed the intention of talking to the FIAB about the overall intelligence problem and of refining our current bill of particulars which is proof-positive of the deficiencies with which we are faced. I would suggest that you draw on the following points:

—One of the most valuable services the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board could perform would be to take a hard look at

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.

the entire intelligence community to see what we can do to make sure that the President and the National Security Council get the best possible intelligence support.

—It is a fact that, while the National Security Council process itself has been updated to make it more vital and useful to the President, the intelligence community has remained essentially the same, limping along with structure and procedures that are years out of date.

—Since January of 1969, there have been several very serious shortcomings surface underlying intelligence deficiencies. These include:

(a) *The Sihanouk fiasco,* which the FIAB has recently thoroughly investigated and the report on which you now hold.[2] (You may wish to compliment the Board on a comprehensive, hard-hitting and most helpful report. The Board will probably want to know what remedial action is anticipated and you may wish to suggest that the President has directed some personnel changes.)

(b) *The Soviet Strategic Threat.* From the outset of our preparatory work on SALT, it became evident that the intelligence community, and especially CIA, much like the Sihanoukville case was unable or unwilling to grapple with available intelligence data and to analyze this data in a way which accurately reflected Soviet accomplishments toward the development of a MIRV, or capability equivalent to a MIRV. Only in the last few weeks has CIA finally come around to the view that the Soviets have, indeed, been testing such a weapon. This could have had the most serious implications, not only for our SALT preparations but for our whole ABM development program.

(c) *The Middle East Ceasefire Violations.* The manner in which positive evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cheating on the missiles was treated is a classic case of the incompetence of our intelligence community. It took days, and in fact even weeks, before the community ever arrived at a firm assessment of the nature and scope of the extensive cheating which had occurred. In the interim, the Israelis had chapter and verse on this cheating and unfortunately were invariably proved to be correct despite initial incredulity in our community. In this instance, the community's failure to promptly and accurately assess the situation had serious repercussions.

(d) *Chile Assessments.* Here again, the intelligence community failed to sharply assess the full implications of the political trends in Chile or, perhaps more seriously, having assessed them with some accuracy, they permitted policy preconceptions to flavor their final assessments and their proposals for remedial action in the covert area.

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[2] Dated November 25. (Ibid.)

All of the foregoing suggests that there are major deficiencies in our system. Perhaps uppermost among these are the following:

—A tendency from the community to permit their factual assessments to be flavored by policy considerations so that factual data are distorted or omitted in favor of policy preconceptions. It is essential that a new tone of objective professionalism be interjected into the entire system and that the intelligence community be divorced completely from policy input. This is a difficult task, the correction of which will take a massive and complete effort at every level. It might be that the only solution is the reassignment of key analysts, especially at the supervisory level, who over the years have developed preconceptions which inadvertently creep into the community's products.

—The 40 Committee. The scars of the Bay of Pigs and our general psychological abhorrence of interference in the internal affairs of other states has had a disastrous impact on the effectiveness of the 40 Committee. The Committee has, in effect, largely become a rubber-stamp organization whose scope of interest is limited primarily to the approval or disapproval of projects designed to make the life of our individual Ambassadors more comfortable. In essence, it has become a means by which national assets are allotted to the pet projects of our Ambassadors abroad. The Committee's system as it is currently working does not encourage the development of a sophisticated range of covert activity designed primarily to reinforce our overall national security policies. All of this suggests a major overhauling of the means, the attitude, and the conceptual basis on which CIA's covert programs should be carried out. Covert activity remains an essential arm of national security policies. It is, of course, a high-risk business and demands a firm Presidential control. It should not become a tool for the personal whim of our Ambassadors, many of whom are either not familiar with Presidential policy or, even in some cases, who actively oppose it.

—You might wish to close your remarks by noting that the President shares all the concerns you have mentioned and that you are sure he would welcome any positive suggestions from the FIAB on ways to overcome the shortcomings which exist in our national intelligence effort. You might then ask that they prepare a memorandum for you containing their views on how best to tackle this gargantuan task.

3. The Board may bring up the Blue Ribbon Panel's report on Defense intelligence.[3]

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 211.

—You should suggest to them that Defense Department intelligence functions should be looked at as an integral part of the national intelligence picture, not as a separate, self-contained problem.

4. The Board may also inquire about the accuracy of press reports—and the Vice President's statement—about the failure of intelligence on the POW raid into North Vietnam.

—You should point out that the intelligence accurately located the POW camp. The problem was to tell whether or not the POW's would still be there when the operation was launched and that it is an extremely difficult problem due to the cloud cover over North Vietnam much of the time which impedes our reconnaissance efforts and to the time-lag inherent in clandestine services reports [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

5. Time permitting, I am sure that the Board would benefit from your views on the situation in the Middle East, especially on the missile issue, and the situation in Cuba as well as the situation with respect to the understanding that we will conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. (All of these three topics are the source of inquisitiveness by the various members of the Board, and I think they would benefit greatly from receiving from you the party-line on these issues. It would also tend to divert their activities from these sensitive areas.)

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219. Editorial Note

Director of Central Intelligence Helms had a lengthy meeting with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on December 4, 1970, during which they discussed a number of intelligence issues. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by John Bross of the Central Intelligence Agency, the discussion of Laos "provoked a general discussion of the question of the DCI's responsibility for alerting the President individually and his immediate advisers to situations which may have a serious adverse effect on American policy interests. The Director pointed out that he was not a policy making official of the government and that this had been made particularly clear by the present Administration. He pointed out that at the beginning of this Administration he had been told that he would be excluded from policy making deliberations at the NSC and wondered whether Ambassador Murphy could throw any light on this early decision of the Nixon Administration. Ambassador Murphy expressed himself as completely

surprised and unaware that any such policy had been intended by the new Administration." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01440A, DDO Files, Box 8, US 8, President, OPRED/BALPA)

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220. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Senior Personnel

1. Following our conversation in your office last week, I have made certain moves and settled on some longer range plans.[2] Per your request for a prompt response, I have the following forecast with related considerations to submit:

As you know, there are two Presidential appointees in this Agency, the Director and the Deputy Director. Otherwise, there are six principal operating positions at what we call the Deputy Director level: The Deputy who deals on my behalf with the intelligence community, the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, and the four Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Plans, Science and Technology, and Support. The individuals holding three of these positions will be changed within the next three to four months: John Bross, who has been dealing with the intelligence community, will be replaced by Bronson Tweedy (Ambassador Annenberg wrote me when [*1 line of source text not declassified*] "I feel that he is a most outstanding public servant of which our country should be proud.")[3] Abbot Smith will be replaced by John Huizenga, who should bring to the national estimates process a new, more imaginative look.[4] Robert Bannerman who has headed all our Support (administrative) activities, will turn over to John Coffey, a

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80–B01285A, Box 13, Folder 6, DCI Helms Chron, 7/1/70–12/31/70. Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Kissinger met with Helms on Friday, December 4, from 2:37 to 3:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

[3] Tweedy replaced Bross as Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation on January 25, 1971.

[4] Huizenga replaced Smith as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates on April 17, 1971.

younger, thoroughly dedicated officer of long service.[5] During 1971, R. Jack Smith, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, will be reassigned, the pace of movement being determined by my ability to arrange some of the complicated moves involved.[6] Tom Karamessines wants his incumbency reviewed at the end of 1971, but no decision has been made to move him unless he insists for reasons of health.[7] This leaves Carl Duckett, who is forty-seven and who was picked in April 1967 for his job as Deputy Director for Science and Technology after I had conducted an intensive manhunt all over the country for an appropriate incumbent—an individual who had the required skills but would not pose problems of conflict of interest, scientific bias and those other vulnerabilities with which you are so familiar. Carl is energetic and effective, handles congressional committees with skill, and is running an imaginative shop in a difficult area. I would intend to keep him on.[8] Other officers just below this top operating level but working in support of General Cushman and myself will be up for reassignment or retirement during the year 1971. In sum, virtually the entire top level of the Agency will have seen changes within the next year or so.

2. You will appreciate that the foregoing information is highly delicate, because some of the changes are not as yet known to the individuals involved. As you can understand in an Agency such as this, personnel matters must be handled with uncommon care and sensitivity if one is to maintain a high state of morale and dedication. There are no laws in this country with teeth enough to punish the mishandling of classified information short of intentional trafficking with the enemy. Thus tight security and the frustration of penetration attempts by foreign agents are dependent on the loyalty, discipline, and state of mind of the employees. Our professional career service must be managed with these and many other considerations in mind. Hence, I need time to make certain of the moves indicated above.

3. In this general connection, you should be aware that we are retiring all of our officers, with very few exceptions, at age sixty. This is being done to make head-room for the younger generation, to keep the Agency as limber mentally and physically as possible, and to insure the internal shifting, both vertically and laterally, which gives health and resilience to an organization. Further, I have been reducing the total manpower of the Agency over the last few years and will continue to do so. That plus reductions in overseas positions brought about by BALPA and OPRED tend to cut the other way by making for less

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[5] Coffey replaced Bannerman as Deputy Director for Support on January 1, 1971.

[6] Edward Proctor replaced Smith as Deputy Director for Intelligence on May 15, 1971.

[7] Karamessines remained Deputy Director for Plans until February 27, 1973.

[8] Duckett remained Deputy Director for Science and Technology until June 1, 1976.

flexibility in range of assignments. Be that as it may, we are headed on what we believe to be the course the President has designated.

4. I will expand orally to you on some of the points discussed above. This memorandum is an effort to place the basic plan in your hands promptly.

Dick

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221. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Presidential Meeting with OMB on Intelligence Budget

As we discussed briefly on Saturday, OMB is preparing materials for a possible briefing of the President on intelligence programs and resources. *You will be invited to attend.* The purpose of the meeting is to present the CIA budget to the President for his decision and also to provide the President with an overview of the intelligence community's total resources and trends for the period of 1964–1972.

As you know, the President has recently expressed his desire that intelligence resources be cut substantially. According to Weinberger he wants a [*dollar amount not declassified*] cut. OMB thinks that he may be considering a base broader than the approximate [*dollar amount not declassified*] level that will be directly addressed in the OMB briefing. The broader base could include Defense tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

Although OMB does not intend to push for further reductions, it has prepared a listing of possible further cuts (Tab A).[2] The OMB list is arrayed in three bands [*1 line of source text not declassified*] which increase in

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget. Top Secret; Byeman; Comint; [*codeword not declassified*]. Sent for "urgent information."

[2] Attached but not printed.

severity of impact upon priority needs and programs. *The OMB staff has not recommended these additional reductions, believing strongly that a better quality intelligence product can be obtained within currently planned budget levels, if management and organization problems of the intelligence community are corrected.* (The strongest supporter of this position is Schlesinger.)

For that reason the OMB briefing materials will also include a listing of some of those problems. The meeting with the President may be the appropriate forum to seek further guidance from him regarding a possible organizational study of the intelligence community—such a study is long overdue.

Recommendation

I recommend that you attend the briefing if possible. If it is not possible for you to attend, I recommend that you privately urge the President not to make such a large, arbitrary, across-the-board cut. In the absence of the necessary analysis to indicate where cuts can be made, a meat ax approach could be disastrous.

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222. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, December 23, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, JCS
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Department of Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Policy Objectives. I want to be certain that Department of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities are completely consistent with constitutional rights, all other legal provisions, and national security needs. These activities must be conducted in a manner which recognizes and preserves individual human rights. Policy determinations

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 226, Dept of Defense, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–23 Feb 1971. No classification marking.

governing such activities must be retained under civilian cognizance and control.

One matter of particular concern to me is the one related to intelligence and counterintelligence activities involving the use of investigative and counterintelligence personnel. Actions have been taken to eliminate some past abuses incident to such activities, but further corrective actions are necessary, as a matter of urgent priority.[2]

Specific Actions. The remedial actions directed below will take effect at the earliest date practical, but not later than 1 February 1971:

a. Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Froehlke, who is my Special Assistant for Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, will review all policy directives relating to the conduct of investigative and counterintelligence activities and propose changes to insure that Defense policy is clear and consistent with my policy objectives. He will provide for a continuing review of the changes in organizational responsibilities, procedures and practices directed by this memorandum.

b. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will report directly to the Secretary of Defense in the conduct and performance of his duties. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense to the Director, DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be furnished by the Secretary of Defense and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The Director, DIA, will support the intelligence and counterintelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as in the past. A separate J–2 organization within the OJCS will not be reestablished.

c. In addition to his presently assigned duties, the Director, DIA, shall implement my policies and be responsible to me for the planning, conduct, and operational control of all direct intelligence collection by human resources and counterintelligence investigative functions throughout the Department of Defense. Pending promulgation of DIA instructions, all activities and resources within these subject areas (including personnel, funds, equipment, and facilities) will be maintained and conducted at the currently approved or approved-for-planning levels. The Director, DIA, is authorized to delegate operational control to the appropriate Service or operating command. This delegation will be accomplished on a function-by-function basis.

Informing Congress and the Public. Because of the understandable public interest in this matter, it is my desire that, after plans, policies and procedures necessary to establish DIA control over all human re-

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[2] On the same day that Laird issued this memorandum he also publicly announced the changes. Both *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* carried articles the next day that discussed background for the changes: William Beecher, "Laird Acts to Tighten Rule Over Military Intelligence," *The New York Times,* December 24, p. 1, 22 and Michael Getler, "Army Spy Shakeup Ordered: Laird Tightens Civilian Control of Intelligence," *Washington Post,* December 24, p. A–1, A–5.

source activities in the Service as related to intelligence and counterintelligence are completed, my Special Assistant for Intelligence will hold a news briefing to inform the American public about the changes being made from past procedure. Concurrently, appropriate committees of the Congress will be informed of these actions.

Melvin R. Laird

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223. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

CM–468–70 Washington, December 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

Department of Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence

1. I have read your memorandum of 23 December[2] concerning the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Department of Defense, and concur in principle with the policy objectives which you have set forth. The preparation of implementing directives will, of course, require careful study and review in order to assure the most judicious application of our limited collection resources in connection with any future domestic investigative efforts. I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded the opportunity to comment on these directives before they are approved.

2. I note that your memorandum preserves the present role of the Director, DIA, in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe this to be a wise and essential determination if we are to fulfill our obligations to you and to the President. It is my interpretation of your memorandum that the Director, DIA, will report directly to you in the conduct of his duties involving domestic investigative and counterintelligence activities, while in matters involving operational intelligence and foreign intelligence/counterintelligence activities, the chain of command would continue to run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prescribed in DOD Directive

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 76, 020 SD. Confidential.

[2] Document 222.

5105.21.[3] Likewise, guidance in matters involving operational intelligence and foreign intelligence/counterintelligence activities would continue to be furnished by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

3. In view of newspaper speculation that significant changes were intended in the latter channel, some clarification may be necessary.[4]

T.H. Moorer

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[3] Copies of directives are maintained by the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Pentagon.

[4] An annotated agenda prepared by Pursley for Laird's meeting with Packard on December 29 included a discussion item concerning Laird's December 23 memorandum and public announcement that stated: "both actions came *after* lengthy discussions with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. Basic points of concern among the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs include: Removal of *all* DIA intelligence activities from JCS control, despite the assurance of continuing availability of DIA to the Chiefs on all strategic, tactical, and operational intelligence." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 76, 020 SD) Concerns about Laird's December 23 memorandum were also expressed by Secretary of the Navy John Chafee in his January 29 memorandum to Laird and by Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor in his January 30 memorandum to Laird. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 350.09 (Jan–Mar) 1971)

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224. Editorial Note

In a January 21, 1971, memorandum to President Nixon on the "Sihanoukville Intelligence Failure," President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger summarized the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the issue. "The failure of the intelligence community to properly assess the flow of enemy material through Sihanoukville" in Cambodia, Kissinger told the President, "resulted from deficiencies in both intelligence collection and analysis." Kissinger concluded his memorandum by commenting, "As you know, I have been working with Director Helms on appropriate personnel changes in the Agency. In my discussions, I will also include appropriate reassignment of personnel associated with this intelligence failure. I expected to have a complete report in the near future on changes which Director Helms is initiating." Below Kissinger's comment the President wrote: "give me a report on these changes—I want a real shakeup in C.I.A., not just symbolism." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. IV, Jan–Dec 1971)

Kissinger's January 21 memorandum is attached to a February 6 memorandum from David Halperin of the NSC Staff to John Brown III of Haldeman's staff which states: "The housecleaning in CIA directed by the President in his memorandum of November 30 [Document 216] is and will continue to be effected over the course of the next year. It is being done gradually rather than precipitously and General Haig will continue to monitor this." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. IV, Jan–Dec 1971)

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225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (Froehlke) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, February 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Organization for Defense Investigative Programs

I have reviewed organizational proposals to insure that DoD investigative programs guarantee constitutional rights. The following are three possible alternatives:

Alternative 1: The Director of DIA would assume *direct operational control* of the investigative activities of the military services, DASA, SHAPE, and the unified commands. He would be directly subordinate to you. The military departments object strongly to this because it separates them from assets requisite to command support.

Alternative 2: The Director, DIA would assume *supervision and inspection* of the investigative activities of the military departments. The chain of command would run from you to the Director, DIA, to the departmental secretaries. This would be an unusual command arrangement not utilized elsewhere in the Department of Defense. It would put a three star officer in a position of line authority over senior presidential appointees.

Alternative 3: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) would *direct, supervise and inspect* the Defense Investigative Program. To advise him and you, a Review Council would be established (The

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 350.09 (Jan–Mar) 1971. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Chairman; the General Counsel; the Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of each military department; and the Director, DIA). Director, DIA would continue as program manager for fiscal planning. The chain of command would run from you to the Service Secretaries. (The ASD(A) would be delegated to act for you.) The Service Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary would directly supervise and inspect within his department.

Alternative 1 is the closest approach to the original idea expressed in your 23 December memorandum. Alternative 2 would eliminate the military department's objections to operational control by an Agency Director of departmental assets. Alternative 3 would back off from the 23 December decision.[2] This may or may not be bad. However, it clearly would: (1) Be most palatable to the military departments; (2) Provide direct civilian control through the Service Secretaries; (3) Cause the least disruption of current organizational structures; and (4) Provide to you a workable, highly visible management tool to control these activities and demonstrate your control to Congress and the public.

I recommend Alternative 3. Fred Buzhardt concurs. Alternative 2 could be made to work. I do not recommend Alternative 1.[3]

Bob

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[2] See Document 222.

[3] On February 3 Laird approved "Alternative 3." The decision was announced and explained in two February 18 news releases. (New Releases 145–71 and 146–71; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 350.09 (Jan–Mar) 1971)

226. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Improved Liaison with CIA

A few days ago Andy Marshall saw Bronson Tweedy, one of Dick Helms' intimates and one of his immediate subordinates as the head of the National Intelligence Program Evaluation staff. Tweedy is a distinguished clandestine service officer. Several times during the meeting Tweedy raised the question of how to improve feedback and communication between you and the intelligence community. *The focus was on how your needs and views could be best obtained.* Clearly, if you had the time you could do this best of all. But other demands preclude devoting the time necessary to the task of getting your needs across.

Tweedy raised again the idea of your having someone close to you, trusted by you, assume the role of conveying your thoughts, needs in general, detailed requirements of studies to someone Helms would put up, probably Tweedy. Andy promised to convey the proposal to me.

Do you want to try this way of operating? If so, you would need to designate someone you liked and trusted. He would have to see a lot of you and be in on a lot of things in order to do the job well. Can you think of some candidates who might fit the bill?

The job would also be time consuming. On selected issues we can get your needs across if we devote the necessary time to it. The impact on the last NIE 11–8 shows this.[2] Much of the message as to what was wanted was pounded home through visits by members of my staff and by Andy Marshall to various offices in CIA early last year. It appears to take repeated reiteration and clarification of what is needed to make an impact when major changes in the product are wanted. If the number of issues we really care about each year were small, some

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. IV, Jan–Dec 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for "urgent information."

[2] National Intelligence Estimate 11–8–70, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, November 24, 1970. (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 360, National Intelligence Estimates) Cline commented on the estimate in a December 18, 1970, memorandum to Kissinger: "We have been eagerly awaiting the 'new' NIE, which has been tailor-made to try to meet criticisms voiced last Fall, by yourself among others, of previous models. I think this first installment is a pretty good job, although we will be able to tell better when the defensive force estimate is completed and an overall summary is drafted." (Ibid.)

improvement in current methods of interfacing with CIA would be enough. But I think you need more than this. The question is, is the notion of having someone close to you devoted almost full time to liaison with CIA a feasible, desirable option?

Now that we are considering major changes in the organization and management of the intelligence community, this problem of White House/community interface should be folded into the more detailed elaboration of the broad options that will be presented to the President soon. How to achieve product improvement, especially for the very highest level consumers should be focused on more sharply than it has been so far. I think we should take this up in the meeting with Shultz, Weinberger and Schlesinger on Wednesday.[3]

[3] Kissinger met with Shultz, Weinberger, Schlesinger, and Smith from 5:51 to 6:05 p.m. on Monday, February 22. (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) No record of the discussion has been found.

227. Memorandum From President Nixon to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, March 8, 1971.

Dear Dick:

You and the entire intelligence community are to be commended for NIE 11–8–70, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack."[2] It is a considerable improvement over last year's version and reflects the large and imaginative effort which all of you have obviously put into it. I find particularly useful:

—The frequent sharply-defined, clearly argued discussions of various contested issues.

—The attempt to incorporate a wide range of sources, such as clandestine reports and Soviet SALT statements.

—The alternative force models based on explicit differences in underlying assumptions and the attempt to define which were the more likely models.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 360, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 226.

—The quantitative detail for each model which illustrates the differences between the models and gives an operational meaning to some of the general statements.

Again, my congratulations to you and those in the intelligence agencies who worked on NIE 11–8–70 for a job well done.

Sincerely,

RN

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228. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, March 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Factors in Making a Net Assessment of US and Soviet Strategic Forces

This memorandum is in response to your request to INR Deputy Director Len Weiss for a discussion of the factors involved in making a net assessment of US and Soviet forces.

In the intelligence and research community the term "net assessment" is used to refer to a study which arrives at a judgment comparing American forces with hostile or potentially hostile foreign forces. It might describe the relationship between existing Soviet and US forces and also the likely development of future Soviet forces as a consequence of the Soviet perception of US force programs and policies.

Net assessments need not be limited to the military sphere. They are also applicable to political and economic problems. Thus, for example, a net assessment of the Middle East situation would take into account the interaction of the policies and courses of action pursued by the principal powers involved, including the United States. The key distinction involved is between an intelligence "estimate," which traditionally deals only with foreign forces and developments, and a study which relates these matters specifically to American strengths, weaknesses and courses of action.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71. Secret.

In our view, such net assessments of Soviet and American strategic offensive and defensive forces (as well as of other situations) are a valuable analytical tool to assist in making policy and program decisions. Yet there is no systematic preparation of such evaluations, nor is there an existing institutional framework within which the several interested agencies and Departments, with their differing interests and points of view, can regularly work to prepare such assessments.

Format and Substance

In the military sphere the net assessment should be an annual, companion document to the major National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) on Soviet military forces. It would, therefore, require a discussion of US forces similar to those of Soviet forces in the NIE's. Strategic offensive and defensive forces, intercontinental and certain peripheral strategic forces would have to be considered together. For example, the SS–9 ICBM and US ABM's ought to be considered together, while US ICBM's and the Soviet ABM would also have to be considered, thus making this aspect of the net assessment four dimensional.

The net assessment, if done in this manner, would avoid reaching specific policy conclusions, leaving that to another and higher stage of decision-making. It would, however, highlight critical elements in the balance of forces.

In addition, the net assessment, as noted above, should consider the likely inter-action of planned or estimated future force levels. Such a study might point out opportunities and dangers implicit in projected courses of action, and also suggest alternatives. Such assessments of future inter-actions would be speculative, especially if projected over any length of time. Yet they are at the heart of any effort to analyze realistically such matters as a spiralling arms race. The policy decisions on correct courses of United States action, as I have said, would not be made in the net assessment itself, but left for consideration and action elsewhere.

Past and Current Practices

Net assessments of military forces have been attempted over the years. In the 1950's a JCS–CIA joint team set up for this purpose. During the early part of the Kennedy Administration there was a Net Evaluation Subcommittee in the NSC. Later Secretary McNamara tended to gather this function into the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Components of the Department of Defense, such as JCS or an individual command such as SAC also prepare net assessments for their own use. Lately, some net assessments have been made under general NSC auspices either in the DPRC, the Verification Panel or in various NSSM's.

As of now, there is no one locus in the DOD responsible for making authoritative net assessments. There is likewise no established procedure in the Department of State for cranking in political and economic factors in net assessments of broad military developments or complex international conflicts. In some respects the NSSM process and the work of the DPRC and the Verification Panel perform this function, but in these cases net assessments are made irregularly and in response to specific problems at hand, rather than systematically.

NIE's and Net Assessments

In NIE 11–8–70, on Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,[2] the Intelligence Community came close to making a net assessment, or, more accurately, a series of net assessments on specific questions. For example, in describing Soviet capabilities against Minuteman silos, account had to be taken of the hardness of those silos. On a more general plane, it was noted that future Soviet force levels probably would depend in large measure on US force levels. Three illustrative *US* forces were described, and the possible Soviet reaction to each was considered.

Nevertheless, the NIE is not a true net assessment. In fact, this was noted by USIB when it considered the estimate, and Mr. Helms indicated some sympathy with the view that a net assessment, that is, a detailed comparison and evaluation of US and Soviet strategic attack *and* defense forces, would be more useful to top policy makers than just a detailed discussion of Soviet forces. He noted, however, that he, as the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of USIB, does not have the authority to prepare such a study.

The Proper Forum

The need, therefore, is to select a proper forum, adequately reflecting inter-agency interests, for preparing on a regular, systematic basis objective net assessments on which policy and program decisions can be made. For its own part, the Department of State should establish machinery (involving S/PC and INR mainly, but drawing in expertise from all Bureaus) to make net assessments on all foreign policy problems.

In my view, the best inter-agency forum would be a new NSC Committee, something like the old Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC. The group would be separate from and independent of other NSC Committees, and would be responsible solely for preparing net assessments. It would be similar to the Office of National Estimates in the intelligence field and would work closely with it. It would be

[2] See footnote 2, Document 226.

shielded as much as possible from pressure from policy and/or operational offices, and it would be staffed by career professionals from the several agencies which would take part in the net assessment process.

Conclusions

The expanded Soviet military NIE's have taken on some of the characteristics of net assessments of Soviet and US forces, but they are not true, comprehensive net assessments. The current strategic balance, the cost of modern strategic weapons systems and the ramifications—military, political and economic—of modern strategic weapons deployments, such as the Safeguard ABM, require that annual, objective over-all net assessments of US and Soviet strategic forces be prepared to assist top policy makers in making decisions in this area. This is necessary because of the inter-action and relationship of US and Soviet strategic weapons developments. These studies should be carried out by an appropriate inter-agency group, should describe and evaluate the existing balance of US and Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces and should consider likely future developments on both sides. Finally, the annual net assessment of strategic forces should point out for the President and his chief advisors the major issues surfaced by the net assessment and alternative likely courses of action. The Department of State should tool up to support this process by establishing systematic net assessment machinery and procedures inside the Department, and should for its own purposes develop a net assessment program to study complex foreign policy issues involving interaction among a number of nations all reacting to American policies and courses of action. All of this is intended to give us a more systematic way of analyzing where we are and what is likely to happen in foreign affairs before we try to decide what to do about it.

Recommendation

After you have had a chance to think about this matter, I believe it would be useful to discuss it with you. (We have not discussed our ideas much outside INR.) If you agree that it would be desirable to have such net assessments, we can consider further how best to go about setting up a system to make them.[3]

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[3] Cline sent a copy of his memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a March 24 letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71) Latimer forwarded it to Kissinger under cover of a March 26 memorandum in which he commented that "the proposal for establishing a formal NSC subcommittee to systematically prepare net assessments has some merit but the same goal could be achieved either by continuing the present ad hoc procedure via the WSAG or, where pertinent, by instructing Director Helms to include such assessments in key NIE's such as the one on Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces." Kissinger responded noncommittally to Cline in a March 31 letter. (Both ibid.)

229. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Review of the Intelligence Community

Attached is the Presidential approval of yours and Shultz's joint memorandum on intelligence reorganization. Per your instructions and with the agreement of Shultz, the PFIAB was given a copy of the basic study with the review of the various options. It has not seen this package.

As I told you earlier, knowledge of this package has leaked and the Intelligence Community, as well as the PFIAB, are buzzing with its implications. I told George Shultz that the package was returned approved and that we are holding it in strict confidence here, pending comments from the PFIAB on the study itself.

I do not believe we will ever get this study off the ground unless strong Presidential clout is put behind it. I am also somewhat fearful that some of the recommendations such as the establishment of a DDI may prove to be unworkable. For this reason, however we proceed from here we must have the President's man in overall charge of the reorganization effort. I agree with you that Jim Schlesinger might be an ideal person to work directly for the President and you in implementing this package. If this arrangement is adopted, you should do so with your eyes open. This package is going to be the most controversial gutfight in recent bureaucratic experience. It is likely that you will have the PFIAB against you, the military, the entire Intelligence Community and a full array of Congressional opponents. The most important thing I can think of at the moment is organizing to organize.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman Comint.

[2] Kissinger wrote below this paragraph: "I wouldn't have told Shultz it was adopted. I prefer to sit on it. I have no intention to bleed over it."

Attachment

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon[3]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Review of the Intelligence Community

Your expression of serious concern about the performance and cost of the intelligence community has led to a detailed review of the community's present structure and a searching analysis of how you might improve its operation. The review shows that the overriding weakness of the community is the absence of authoritative leadership. Appearances to the contrary, the community lacks both a leader and a staff unit—intimately involved with programmatic issues but without a vested interest in any particular collection system or program—to solve recurrent problems of overlap and duplication, make efficient choices between new and competing systems, and consider the balance between various methods of collection and production. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), while nominal head, suffers from his many burdensome and often conflicting roles; in addition he directly controls only 15 percent of the community's current budget of [*dollar amount not declassified*]. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB)—in which the DCI is assisted by the heads of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Service intelligence chiefs, and State/INR—has also proved incapable of decisive action with respect to community matters. Even within the Department of Defense, which contains 85 percent of the resources, effective direction and control is lacking.

In the absence of leadership, the community has accumulated a host of serious problems. The National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) which established the division of responsibilities and govern community relations are largely obsolete. The blurring of

[3] Top Secret; Handle via Byeman-Comint control systems jointly. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The memorandum is undated but another copy, attached to Smith's June 18 memorandum to Kissinger, is dated March 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I)

traditional community boundaries has caused its activities to become increasingly fragmented and functionally disorganized. Under the impact of new technology, a generally unhealthy and costly competition in collection has been fostered, largely without guidance or planning. At the same time, the concerns of the intelligence consumer and the welfare of the producer have been relegated to the sidelines.

These conclusions are not new. Presidential commission, the PFIAB, special study groups, and BOB/OMB have often expressed dissatisfaction with the performance and cost of the intelligence community and recommended various piecemeal organizational reforms. In the absence of forceful and persistent leadership and under the impact of continuing technology change, these reforms have largely failed. We believe that the solution to the community's problems and achievement of your objectives requires major changes in the organization and functioning of the community. These changes must attack three major problems: (1) the leadership of the community as a whole, (2) direction and control of Department of Defense intelligence activities, and (3) the division of functional responsibilities.

We recommend the following major changes:

- *The role of the DCI should be modified and CIA restructured* so that they are separated from direct responsibility for the conduct of intelligence collection and covert action operations which, along with residual activities, would be inherited by a new agency; the DCI would acquire a strong Presidential mandate to plan, program, and review all intelligence resources and continue to produce all national intelligence required by the President, the NSC, and other national level consumers. A reorganization plan for the new agency is required.
- *A Director of Defense Intelligence should be created* in order to direct and control all Defense intelligence resources; the DDI would concentrate on rationalizing Defense collection and processing capabilities. Substantive intelligence production would remain under the Defense Intelligence Agency, which would continue to report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *The NSCIDs should be revised* to redraw current functional boundaries among intelligence agencies; in particular NSCID #1 should be changed to make the United States Intelligence Board strictly an advisory body to the DCI.

As the attached report indicates, there are other courses of action, both more and less radical, that you could take in light of your objectives. We believe, however, that our recommendations constitute the right steps at this time. They focus on the establishment of leadership centers both within the community as a whole and within the Department of Defense; they require minimum legislative action and cause minimum disruption of the community commensurate with your concerns; and they leave you the option of further modification later.

If you approve the recommended actions, we will prepare the necessary implementing letters and directives.[4]

Henry A. Kissinger

George P. Shultz

Attachment

Study Prepared by the Staffs of the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council[5]

Washington, March 10, 1971.

A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

I. Introduction: The Costs and Benefits of Intelligence

The operations of the intelligence community have produced two disturbing phenomena. The first is an impressive rise in their size and cost. The second is an apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products.

During the past decade alone, the cost of the intelligence community has [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. At the same time, spectacular increases in collection activities have occurred. Where satellite photography is concerned, the increases have led to greatly improved knowledge about the military capabilities of potential enemies. But expanded collection by means other than photography has not brought about a similar reduction in our uncertainty about the intentions, doctrines, and political processes of foreign powers. Instead, the growth in raw intelligence—and here satellite photography must be included—has come to serve as a proxy for improved analysis, inference, and estimation.

[4] The President initialed his approval.

[5] Top Secret; Handle via Byeman-Comint control systems jointly. The study, known both as the "OMB/NSC Study" and the "NSC/OMB Study" and sometimes referred to as the "Schlesinger Report," was prepared jointly by OMB and NSC with James Schlesinger, OMB Assistant Director, playing a key role.

The following report seeks to identify the causes of these two phenomena and the areas in which constructive change can take place. Its principal conclusion is that while a number of specific measures may help to bring about a closer relationship between cost and effectiveness, the main hope for doing so lies in a fundamental reform of the intelligence community's decisionmaking bodies and procedures.

This conclusion is advanced in full recognition that reorganization will, at best, only create the conditions in which wise and imaginative leadership can flourish. In the absence of reorganization, however, the habits of intelligence community will remain as difficult to control as was the performance of the Department of Defense prior to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

II. Cost Trends

To understand the phenomenon of increasing costs, it is necessary to consider briefly the organizational history of the intelligence community. The National Security Act of 1947 and the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) of the late 1940s and early 1950s established the basic division of responsibilities among agencies and departments. This division had its origins in traditional distinctions between military and non-military intelligence, between tactical and national intelligence, and between communications (COMINT) and non-communications (or agent) intelligence. Thus, CIA was directed to employ clandestine agents to collect "non-military" intelligence and produce "national" intelligence. The Department of State was made responsible for the overt collection of "non-military" intelligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) was established to manage COMINT collection. The Military Services were instructed to collect "military" intelligence as well as maintain tactical intelligence capabilities for use in wartime. All were permitted to produce "departmental" intelligence to meet their separate needs. While not ideal, this division of functions and responsibilities worked reasonably well into the mid-1950s.

Since that time, these traditional distinctions and the organizational arrangements which accompanied them have become increasingly obsolescent. The line between "military" and "non-military" has faded; scientific and technical intelligence with both civilian and military applications has become a principal area of endeavor for almost all intelligence organizations. Similarly, under the old distinctions, the national leadership—namely the President and the NSC—concerned itself with "national" intelligence, while presumably only battlefield commanders cared about tactical intelligence. But a rapidly advancing technology which has revolutionized the collection, processing, and

communication of intelligence data casts doubt on the validity of the distinctions.

Simultaneously, technological advances have created new collection possibilities which do not fit conveniently within a structure based on traditional distinctions and were not covered in the original directives. Satellite photography, telemetry intercept, electronic intelligence (ELINT), acoustic detection, and radar have become some of the most important and vital methods of intelligence collection not currently covered by any uniform national policy.

The breakdown of the old distinctions and the appearance of new collection methods has been a simultaneous process raising a host of questions about intelligence organization. Is ELINT related to COMINT, is it technical or military in nature, is it of primary interest to tactical or national consumers? [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] Is telemetry more similar to COMINT or to ELINT; who should analyze it? Who should be responsible for satellite photography? On the more mundane, but nonetheless critical level, questions arise about the organizational responsibilities for such topics as Sihanoukville supply infiltration, VC/NVA order of battle, and missile deployments in the Suez Canal area. Are these military or non-military issues? Is the intelligence about them tactical or national? Who should be responsible for collection and what collection resources should be tasked?

In the absence of an authoritative governing body to resolve these issues, the community has resorted to a series of compromise solutions that adversely affect its performance and cost. In general, these compromises have favored multiple and diffuse collection programs and the neglect of difficult and searching analytical approaches. The most serious of the resulting problems are outlined below in brief form, and discussed in more detail in the appendices.

1. *The distribution of intelligence functions has become increasingly fragmented and disorganized.*

• The old distinctions among national, departmental, and tactical intelligence are out of date. Today, CIA is as likely to produce intelligence relevant to, say, NVA/VC order of battle as DIA or MACV, just as MACV produces many reports that are of interest to the national leadership.

• Similarly, the relatively neat ordering of collection functions that existed after World War II has broken down. CIA now engages in a wide range of collection activities—aircraft and satellite photography, ELINT, COMINT, radar, telemetry as well as clandestine, and overt agent collection. NSA has added telemetry and ELINT to its COMINT capabilities. The Services now have a full panoply of sensors to perform a variety of functions—tactical intelligence, surveillance, early warning, and so on.

Table I illustrates how almost all major components of the intelligence community are involved in each of its various collection and production functions.[6]

2. *The community's activities are dominated by collection competition and have become unproductively duplicative.*

• [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] Despite past massive increases in the collection of photography, COMINT, ELINT, radar and other sensor data, sizeable additional collection capabilities are planned to become operational this calendar year: [*4 lines of source text not declassified*]. Other new collection systems are scheduled to be started in 1972.

• The blurring of traditional boundaries has encouraged community members to engage in a competitive struggle for survival and dominance, primarily through new technology, which has resulted in the redundant acquisition of data at virtually all levels—tactical, theater command, and national.

• Gross redundancies in collection capabilities have become commonplace as exemplified by aircraft in both CIA and Defense which collect photography, and by aircraft which compete with satellites in the collection of ELINT.

• Collection capabilities remain in operation beyond their useful lives. As older systems lose their attractiveness at the national level, they are taken over at the command or tactical level where they duplicate higher level activities or collect data of little value.

• Simultaneously, compartmentalization within various security systems has served to hide or obscure competitive capabilities from evaluation, comparison, and tradeoff analysis.

3. *The community's growth is largely unplanned and unguided.*

• Serious forward planning is often lacking as decisions are made about the allocation of resources.

• The consumer frequently fails to specify his product needs for the producer; the producer, uncertain about eventual demands, encourages the collector to provide data without selectivity or priority; and the collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.

4. *The community's activities have become exceedingly expensive.*

• The fragmentation of intelligence functions and the competitive drive for improved collection technology are important reasons why the cost of intelligence [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

• A significant part of this cost growth is attributable to the acquisition of expensive new systems without simultaneous reductions in obsolescent collection programs.

• In the absence of planning and guidance, internally generated values predominate in the community's institutions. These values favor increasingly sophisticated and expensive collection technologies at the expense of analytical capabilities.

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[6] Not printed.

• Few interagency comparisons are contemplated. Potential tradeoffs between PHOTINT and SIGINT, between PHOTINT and HUMINT, and between data collection and analysis are neglected.

• While the budgetary process might be used to curb some of the more obvious excesses, it cannot substitute for centralized management of the community.

III. Questions About the Product

In a world of perfect information, there would be no uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capabilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information, however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part. Consequently, the intelligence community can at best reduce the uncertainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and often conflicting evidence.

Despite the richness of the data made available by modern methods of collection, and the rising costs of their acquisition, it is not at all clear that our hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities, and activities have improved commensurately in scope and quality. Nor can it be asserted with confidence that the intelligence community has shown much initiative in developing the full range of possible explanations in light of available data. Among the more recent results of this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain new ideas in the face of it, has been a propensity to overlook such unpleasant possibilities as a large-scale exploitation of Sihanoukville by the NVA to transship supplies, a continuation of the SS–9 buildup and its possible MIRVing, or Soviet willingness to invade Czechoslovakia and put forces into the Middle East.

Difficulties of this kind with the intelligence product are all the more disturbing because the need to explore and test a number of hypotheses will, if anything, expand as the Soviets project their military power and come to play a more direct global role. Yet there is no evidence that the intelligence community, given its present structure, will come to grips with this class of problems.

The community's heavy emphasis on collection is itself detrimental to correcting product problems. Because each organization sees the maintenance and expansion of its collection capabilities as the principal route to survival and strength with the community, there is a strong presumption in today's intelligence set-up that additional data collection rather than improved analysis, will provide the answer to particular intelligence problems. It has become commonplace to translate product criticism into demands for enlarged collection efforts. Seldom does anyone ask if a further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth its cost.

The inevitable result is that production remains the stepchild of the community. It is a profession that lacks strong military and civil-

ian career incentives, even within CIA. The analysts, with a heavy burden of responsibility, find themselves swamped with data. The consumers, at the same time, treat their product as a free good, so that demand exceeds supply, priorities are not established, the system becomes overloaded and the quality of the output suffers. As if this were not enough, production, instead of guiding collection, is itself guided by collectors and the impetus of technology. Since the military are the principal collectors, they are more likely to focus on the needs and interests of their own Services than on the issues of concern to the national leadership, and they continue the wasteful practice of counterpart targeting. Under such difficult conditions, it is not surprising that hypotheses tend to harden into dogma, that their sensitivity to changed conditions is not articulated, and that new data are not sought to test them.

IV. Organizational Dilemmas

Questions about cost and product might exist even if the intelligence community possessed strong leadership. It is noteworthy, however, that they have arisen under conditions the most marked of which is a lack of institutions governing the community with the authority and responsibility to resolve issues without excessive compromise, allocate resources according to criteria of effectiveness, and consider the relationship between cost and substantive output from a national perspective.

This lack of governing institutions stems fundamentally from the failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to anticipate the "constitutional" needs of a modern and technologically complex intelligence community. The primary intent of the Act, understandably, was to prevent a recurrence of the intelligence confusions and delays that occurred prior to Pearl Harbor. These problems were seen as having resulted from defects in the central processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence. The critical need, accordingly, was to create an organization which would have access to all intelligence and report its estimates to the national leadership.

In 1947, the size and cost of individual programs were relatively small, and the scope and nature of the management problems associated with today's community were not anticipated. Consequently the issue of how to plan and rationalize the collection of intelligence did not seem of great moment, and the Act did not explicitly provide for a mechanism to perform these functions or evaluate the scope and quality of its product.

There is another reason why the 1947 Act did so little to provide strong leadership for the community: powerful interests in the Military Services and elsewhere opposed (and continue to oppose) more

centralized management of intelligence activities. Partly, this opposition arises from the belief of the Services that direct control over intelligence programs is essential if they are to conduct successful military operations; partly, it results from bureaucratic concerns. The Services are reluctant to accept assurance that information from systems not controlled by them will be available as and when they require it.

Despite such opposition, the National Security Act of 1947 did stipulate that the CIA would coordinate the "intelligence activities" of the Government under the direction of the National Security Council. However, the Act also made clear provision for the continuation of "departmental intelligence." Since then, three Presidents have exhorted the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to play the role of community leader and coordinator, but his authority over the community has remained minimal. While the DCI has been the catalyst in coordinating substantive intelligence production, he has made little use of such authority as he possesses to manage the resources of the community.

Realistically, it is clear that the DCI, as his office is now constituted, cannot be expected to perform effectively the community-wide leadership role because:

- As an agency head he bears a number of weighty operational and advisory responsibilities which limit the effort he can devote to community-wide management.
- He bears a particularly heavy burden for the planning and conduct of covert actions.
- His multiple roles as community leader, agency head, and intelligence adviser to the President, and to a number of sensitive executive committees, are mutually conflicting.
- He is a competitor for resources within the community owing to his responsibilities as Director of CIA, which has large collection programs of its own; thus he cannot be wholly objective in providing guidance for community-wide collection.
- He controls only [*number not declassified*] percent of the community's resources and must therefore rely on persuasion to influence his colleagues regarding the allocation and management of the other [*number not declassified*] percent, which is appropriated to the Department of Defense. Since Defense is legally responsible for these very large resources, it feels that it cannot be bound by outside advice on how they should be used.
- The DCI is outranked by other departmental heads who report directly to the President and are his immediate supervisors on the National Security Council.

In spite of these handicaps, the DCI has established several institutional devices to assist him in leading the community. They are the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff (NIPE) and the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB). However, the principal agencies have largely ignored or resisted the efforts of management by these bodies. As a consequence, the NIPE and the NIRB have concentrated

on developing improved data about intelligence programs and better mechanisms for coordination. Because of their work, both institutions could prove useful to a strong community leader; however, their contribution to the efforts of the currently constituted DCI is small.

In the absence of an effective institutional framework within which one official could be held responsible and accountable for the performance and cost of the intelligence community, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), originally established to advise the DCI, has become a sort of governing body for the community. However, the USIB has proved generally ineffective as a management mechanism for several reasons:

- It is a committee of equals who must form coalitions to make decisions.
- It is dominated by collectors and producers who avoid raising critical questions about the collection programs operated by their colleagues.
- As a result, USIB's collection requirements—which are an aggregate of all requests, new and old—mean all things to all agencies, thus leaving them free to pursue their own interests.
- Since policy-level consumers are not represented on the Board, they are unable to give guidance as to priority needs.

Even within the Department of Defense, there is no centralized management of intelligence resources and activities. Although the Assistant Secretary for Administration has been given a responsibility in this area, together with a small staff for resource analysis, his efforts to master the Defense intelligence complex have proved of little avail for several reasons. First, not all Defense programs come under his purview, and this limits his ability to do cross-program analysis. Second, he remains responsible for his functions as Assistant Secretary for Administration.

Below the level of review provided by an Assistant Secretary, management leadership is still absent. The Directors of DIA and NSA are themselves unable to control the activities of the components supposedly subordinate to them but operated by the Military Services. Because of a history of compromises and "treaties," the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is similarly unable to control a large part of his program which is run by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) in CIA.

This lack of lower-level leadership shows up in the following ways:

- The current failure of NSA adequately to direct Service cryptologic activities, organize them into a coherent system, or manage ELINT activities.
- Large-scale Service-controlled tactical intelligence assets, inflated by the war and partly duplicating both national and allied capabilities, but programmed and operated outside of the community.

• A host of unresolved problems concerning organization and the allocation of resources within both General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and non-GDIP activities, including: duplication in the collection of ELINT between NRO and SAC; internally overlapping activities among varous mapping, charting, and geodesy agencies, and the several investigative services; and inadequate supervision and control of counterintelligence activities.

It follows from this analysis that the President's objectives can be achieved only if reform addresses four organizational issues:

• The leadership of the intelligence community as a whole.
• The direction and control of Defense intelligence activities.
• The division of functions among the major intelligence agencies.
• The structuring, staffing, and funding of the processes by which our raw intelligence data are analyzed and interpreted.

V. Specific Organizational Issues

The effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community depend on a number of organizational variables. Among the most important of these variables are:

• *The power over resources available to the leader of the community.* How much power the leader can exercise, particularly over collection programs, will determine the size of the economies that can be achieved within the community.

• *The size and functions of the staff provided to the leader of the community.* The effectiveness of a national intelligence leader will depend not only on his power over resources, but also on how well informed he is about issues and options within the community, which, in turn, is a function of his immediate staff. Among the potential functions for such a staff are:

—The planning, programming, and budgeting of resources.
—Control over resources once allocated.
—Supervision of R&D.
—Inspection of ongoing programs.
—Production and dissemination of national estimates.
—Net assessments of U.S., allied, and opposing capabilities and doctrines.

• *The future role of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).* As matters now stand, the USIB is both a parliament and a confederate head of the community. If more authoritative leadership is established, the USIB could become simply an obstruction unless its role is specifically redefined. Since the leader of the community, however powerful, will need close and continuing relationships with producers and collectors as well as consumers, one possibility would be to reconstitute the USIB so as to formalize these relationships on an advisory basis. In any case the future role of USIB should be addressed as part of

a comprehensive review of new institutional arrangements for the functioning of a reorganized intelligence community.

• *Future Defense Department control over the resources under its jurisdiction.* Even without changes in the community as a whole, major improvements in effectiveness and efficiency could be achieved if Defense were to master its own massive intelligence operations. However, a number of community-wide issues would still remain; and substantially firmer Defense management of its intelligence resources could prejudice the ability of a future leader of the community to exercise his own authority.

• *The jurisdiction of either a national leader or a Defense leader over the Military Services.* The three Military Services are estimated [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on intelligence activities apart from their support of the national agencies. Yet these activities, which partly duplicate national intelligence programs, are reviewed in isolation from them. If the Services retain control over the assets for this "tactical" intelligence, they can probably weaken efforts to improve the efficiency of the community. At the same time, there is little question about their need to have access to the output of specified assets in both peace and war. How to combine overall resource management and control with this access is an issue that will require resolution.

• *The future functional boundaries of the major intelligence agencies.* Collection and production activities do not now tend to be consolidated by type in particular functional agencies. Important economies can probably be achieved by rationalizing these activities. However, it should be noted that economy and organizational tidiness, without concomitant strengthening of the community leadership, might be achieved at the cost of creating even more powerful vested interests and losing diverse and usefully competitive approaches to collection problems.

• *The number and location of national analytical and estimating centers.* The national estimating machinery no doubt will have to be preserved under the leader of the community in order to continue production of national estimates and inputs to the NSSM process. The continuation of DIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) as producers is essential as well. Beyond that, improvement in the intelligence product will probably depend to a large extent on increasing the competition in the interpretation of evidence and the development of hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities, and strategies. This may require not only the strengthening of existing organizations, but perhaps the addition of new estimating centers. In addition, some entirely new organizational units may be needed to perform currently neglected intelligence analysis functions, for example, to conduct research on improved intelligence analysis methods and techniques.

• *The role of the independent review mechanisms.* Because of the secrecy surrounding the operations of the intelligence community, the need for strong independent review mechanisms within the Executive Branch remains particularly important. Since the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the "40" Committee, the Office of Science and Technology (OST), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) already exist to perform this function, the only issues are how they can be strengthened, to what extent they need larger and more permanent staffs, and whether new review boards should be created, especially to evaluate the analytical and estimating activities of the community.

Subsequent sections do not address all of these issues; nor do they exhaust the list of organizational possibilities. Only the most salient options are presented with respect to the leadership of the community, the Department of Defense, and functional reorganization. Each is described in schematic form.

VI. Leadership of the Community

The effectiveness of a new leader of the community will depend critically on his ability to control intelligence resources and make his decisions stick. Basically, there are three different roles he can play in this respect, each with different organizational implications. They are:

• As legal or direct controller of all or most intelligence resources.
• As de facto manager of most resources even though they are not appropriated to him.
• As coordinator of resources that are appropriated elsewhere, as now.

Although each of the three basic approaches could be institutionalized in a number of different ways, the principal options that accord with these roles are listed below.

A Director of National Intelligence (Option #1), with the bulk of the [*dollar amount not declassified*] intelligence budget appropriated to his office. That office would control all the major collection assets and research and development activities, which are the most costly programs of the community and are most likely to yield large long-term savings. The Director would also operate the Government's principal production and national estimating center and retain the CIA's present responsibility for covert action programs. Defense and State would retain production groups, both to serve their own leadership and to provide competing centers in the analysis of intelligence inputs to the national intelligence process. The Defense Department would maintain budgetary and operational control over only the selected "tactical" collection and processing assets necessary for direct support of military forces, although these assets should be subject to the DNI's review.

This option affords a number of advantages:

• It pinpoints responsibility; the President knows who is in charge.

• It permits major economies through rationalization of the community's functions and through the elimination of duplicative and redundant capabilities.

• It establishes a management system which can deal comprehensively with the implications of evolving technology and make efficient choices between competing collection systems.

• It brings producers and collectors closer together and increases the probability that collectors will become more responsive to producer needs.

• It allows the Director to evaluate fully the contribution each component makes to the final product, enabling ready identification of low performance elements and permitting subsequent adjustments to their mission.

• It provides one responsible point in the community to which high-level consumers can express their changing needs.

• It facilitates the timely selection and coordination of the intelligence assets necessary to provide intelligence support to the President in periods of crisis.

Creation of a DNI has at least five potential disadvantages:

• It gives still further responsibilities to the DCI. A major criticism of the present confederate organization is that the DCI is overloaded and cannot be expected to perform well the many functions now assigned to him. As noted, these include substantive advice to the President and to several high-level committees, day-to-day management of a large operating program, appearing as a witness before Congress, and running numerous sensitive collection and covert action projects. It should be noted, however, that with adequate staff and competent deputies, the Director should be able to delegate responsibilities and ease his task. Also, under this option, the DCI's power would be commensurate with his present responsibilities.

• This option could generate substantial resistance from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs over the transfer of intelligence functions to a new agency. It would also necessitate fundamental changes in the National Security Act which might cause major congressional resistance and open debate on a range of sensitive national security issues.

• Even if all U. S. Government intelligence assets were transferred to the Director, there would remain the serious and continuing problem of finding ways to meet the intelligence needs of Defense without, at the same time, causing the Services to reconstitute their own intelligence activities, even at the expense of other programs.

• There could be adverse reaction from the news media and the public to a consolidation of such sensitive activities under the control of one man, even though so many of them already are controlled, in principle, by the Secretary of Defense.

• It is possible that this option will continue the present dominant influence of collectors relative to producers and consumers in the intelligence process.

A Director of Central Intelligence (Option #2), with a strong Presidential mandate and a substantial staff. NSA, NRO, and DIA would remain under present jurisdiction. The CIA would be divided—one part supplying the DCI staff and intelligence production component, the other part, principally current CIA collection organization, comprising a new agency under a separate director. The DCI would have senior status within the Government and would serve as principal intelligence adviser to the NSC. He would produce all National Intelligence Estimates and other national intelligence required by top level national decisionmakers, and would control the necessary production assets, including NPIC. This would include continued management of a national intelligence process that involved the participation, and inputs from, other intelligence production organizations.

Under Presidential directive, the DCI would review and make recommendations to the President on the Intelligence plans, programs, and budgets of his own office, a reconstituted CIA, and the Department of Defense. He would also present a consolidated intelligence budget for review by the OMB. By this means the Director would be able to guide resource allocation and influence community organization.

Although Option #1 offers the greatest promise of achieving the President's objectives, this option has advantages over it and over the present situation in the following respects:

- The DCI would be freed from the day-to-day management tasks incumbent upon the head of a large operating agency with major collection and covert action responsibilities. This would enable him to devote most of his attention to substantive intelligence matters, the tasking of collectors, and community resource management issues as they relate to his production activities.
- This option eliminates the present situation in which the DCI serves as both advocate for agency programs and judge in community-wide matters, a role which diminishes the community's willingness to accept his guidance as impartial.
- The reforms could be accomplished, without major legislation, by a reorganization plan and Presidential directives to the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and the head of CIA.
- This option would offer improvements in efficiency and effectiveness without the major disruptions in the community required under option one.
- It would enhance the stature of the community leader while avoiding the potentially dangerous concentration of power inherent in option one.

Option #2 has several potential disadvantages:

- Responsibility for the community as a whole would be more diffuse than under option one.
- The ability of the DCI to supervise the detailed activities of the operating parts of the community would be weaker.

• The new DCI, compared to the DNI under option one, would have to rely on persuasion and the process of budgetary review rather than directive authority in order to eliminate redundant and duplicative activities, resolve trade-off issues, and reduce overhead.
• He would lack the ability to mobilize, deploy, and target collection assets in a time of crisis, unless given specific Presidential authority.

A Coordinator of National Intelligence (Option #3), who, under Presidential mandate, would act as White House or NSC overseer of the Intelligence Community, directing particular attention to:

• Intelligence resource and management issues.
• Representing the concerns and needs of national policy level consumers.
• Evaluating the suitability of intelligence output in light of consumer demand.

Under this arrangement, CIA, Defense, and State intelligence responsibilities would remain essentially unchanged. The Coordinator would express the views and concerns of the President and the National Security Council on product needs and quality; he would provide guidance on present and future collection priorities; he would critique and evaluate the current performance of the community, identifying gaps and oversights; and he would conduct studies of specific intelligence community activities as required. But he would not be responsible for the actual production of intelligence. Nor would he have any direct control over resources.

This option offers two advantages:

• The creation of this position would provide a means for more direct representation of Presidential interest in the Intelligence Community. Consumer representation in the intelligence process would be enhanced.
• No legislation would be required, and the President would be spared a number of bureaucratic battles.

The option has several marked disadvantages:

• There is the potential for unproductive competition between the Coordinator and the White House staff.
• Achievement of the President's management and resource control objectives is unlikely.

VII. Department of Defense Leadership

Although the President has indicated his desire to institute community-wide reform, changes within the Department of Defense alone could improve the allocation and management of resources and reduce the overall size of the intelligence budget. Provided that care is taken in making them, these reforms need not be incompatible with subsequent decisions about the governance of the community as a whole.

Within the Department of Defense, there has never been an individual with formal responsibility for management of all DoD intelligence activities. The Deputy Secretary of Defense historically has been charged with this task, but he has very little staff to assist him and can devote only a modest amount of time to the complex intelligence issues that arise within his domain. Consequently, if the problems of Defense intelligence are to be resolved in a fashion satisfactory to the President, it will be necessary either to create a Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) with specific responsibility for the Department's collection assets, or provide the Deputy Secretary with major staff support in the form of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Neither of these posts would be incompatible with options two and three relating to community-wide leadership reform. However, the DDI concept conflicts with option one, in which the bulk of U.S. intelligence resources would be appropriated to a Director of National Intelligence.

A Director of Defense Intelligence would have the authority and responsibility to direct and control all Defense intelligence activities. He would allocate all the Defense intelligence resources, including those for tactical intelligence, the funds for the NRP, and budgets for other national programs under departmental jurisdiction. He would report to and represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters relating to the management of intelligence resources; review the need for, and conduct of, sensitive intelligence collection and operations; review all Defense intelligence "requirements" with resource implications in order to evaluate need and determine priorities; serve as the principal Defense representative on the USIB; and monitor other DoD programs which have clear implications for the collection of intelligence. Under this option the DDI would be able to reorder completely the Defense intelligence collection structure as deemed appropriate.

The DIA would be involved in collection management only if so directed by the DDI, and would concentrate on the production of finished intelligence for the Secretary of Defense and other national consumers.

It is important that the Director of Defense Intelligence be responsive to tasking by the community leader, who would be the principal substantive intelligence official of the Government. Both the community leader and the DDI should receive authoritative guidance about national consumer interests. This could be provided by a Council of Intelligence constituted within the NSC and with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense as its members. The restructuring of USIB and revision of NSCIDs can help in establishing the appropriate DCI/DDI relationship:

The post of DDI has great prospective advantages:

- It would provide for the concentration of resource management authority in one individual, which would allow authoritative comparisons and decisions about competing collection programs.

• It would provide for the centralization of direction and control over all Defense intelligence activities, including conduct of sensitive intelligence collection operations.

But there are possible drawbacks as well, in that the position would:

• Concentrate great power at a single point in Defense. This could possibly diminish the community leader's access to information, as well as his ability to task collection systems in support of national intelligence production, and design balanced collection programs, in support of his production responsibilities.
• Superimpose a large staff over those of other major intelligence managers within Defense (the Directors of DIA, NSA, and NRO), although a reduction in various coordination staffs should be possible at the same time.

An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/I) who would act as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense. His responsibilities would be similar to those of the DDI, except that he would not exercise direct control over Defense intelligence collection programs, and would not be a member of USIB unless the Board were reconstituted to advise the DCI on the allocation of collection resources.

This option has a number of advantages:

• It allows for effective cross-program analysis within Defense.
• It avoids the concentration of power inherent in the DDI option, if that is considered a danger.
• Compared to the DDI, an ASD/I would be more likely to respond to the needs of the present DCI or the community-wide leader established under either option two or three.

The post has a number of potential weaknesses in that, compared with the DDI, it would probably:

• Lack both the strong mandate provided to the DDI and direct authority over Defense intelligence activities, including those carried out by the program managers.
• Make the ASD/I vulnerable to "end runs" by major components within the Defense intelligence community who might wish to appeal directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

VIII. Changing Functional Boundaries and Costs

During the past two years, the budget of the Intelligence Community has been reduced, measured in constant and current dollars, as shown in the following chart:

[*chart not declassified*]

To achieve further economies, particularly without major reorganization, will be difficult for several reasons.

• Savings that we foresee as immediately feasible are likely to be counterbalanced to a considerable degree by further pay and price increases.

• With the heavy R&D costs for proposed new systems, such as the nearly real-time photo satellite, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] there already is built into the budget a strong upward bias which may prove difficult to control, particularly considering the intense interest in high-technology and expensive new systems for SALT and other purposes.

• The U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia will permit reductions in SIGINT and HUMINT resources, but they will only partially offset the above cost increases.

• Some of the largest savings can only result from shifting and consolidating current activities in such a way as to redraw the functional boundaries of the major intelligence organizations.

Despite these difficulties, it is the case that functional boundaries can be withdrawn without a major reorganization of Defense intelligence or the community as a whole. We should stress, however, that actions of this character will still leave a number of community-wide issues unresolved and at the same time arouse all the opposition of the military Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, with the rapid evolution of technology, further changes in boundaries—and comparable upheavals—will probably have to follow in the future.

With all these cautions, there are a number of specific functional actions that can be taken at the present time. Among the most important are the establishment of NSA as a truly national cryptological service with authority over all signal intelligence, and the consolidation of a number of activities now operated separately by the military Services. The effect of these changes should be to achieve economies of scale, eliminate excessive duplication, and promote competition among like activities so as to weed out the less productive programs.

The following table of possible savings, while only an estimate, indicates what economies might be feasible as a result of redrawing functional boundaries, consolidating activities, and eliminating duplication:

	Estimated Savings (In millions of dollars)	
	FY 1972	*FY 1975*
Unify Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities	[*]	[*]
Form a single Defense Investigative Service	[*]	[*]
Establish a Defense Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center	[*]	[*]
Create a National Cryptologic Service	[*]	[*]
Assign NRP aircraft and satellite responsibilities to a single Defense manager	[*]	[*]
[*1 row not declassified*]	[*]	[*]
[*1 row not declassified*]	[*]	[*]
Subject Defense tactical intelligence to consolidated review	[*]	[*]
Assign ELINT authority to NSA	[*]	[*]

[* *entry in table not declassified*]

A major issue arises in connection with changes of such scope and magnitude. It is whether we should attempt to make the reforms now, or await more general reorganization and allow the head of the community to exercise his judgment and authority in instituting them. Our current judgment is that reductions of this magnitude should be attempted only after a reorganization has significantly improved the capabilities of the community to direct, control, and monitor program changes. We also believe that the economies should be effected over a period of years. Without these two conditions, the reductions could prove illusory or transient, and a heavy price in disruption and lowered morale might follow.

It should be noted that the anticipated savings come primarily from collection activities; major analytical and estimating capabilities are not affected. Their improvement is the subject of the next section.

IX. Toward Improvements in the Product

Much of the emphasis by the intelligence community and the bulk of its resources go to the high technology necessary to overcome barriers to information in the USSR and China. Yet this stress on the technology of collection—admittedly important—comes at a time when improved analysis is even more important.

Because of the keener competition from the Soviets, and the narrowing gap in relative resources devoted to defense, the U.S. must

refine its evaluation of foreign capabilities, intentions, activities, and doctrines rather than assume that it has the resources to insure against all possibilities. The community must also improve its current political estimates and find ways of becoming more responsive to national consumers and their concerns.

Important improvements in performance may be feasible without major reorganization. But preliminary investigation suggests that higher quality is much more likely to come about within the framework of a coherently organized community which is focused on improving output rather than input. Indeed, it seems a fair assumption that the President would be willing to rebate some of the potential savings from the community if he had any hope of improved performance as a consequence. As of now, however, he has no such assurance and may reasonably argue that, for current performance, he should at least obtain the benefit of lower costs.

Even if we knew how to measure the benefits of intelligence, it would be difficult to relate specific changes in programs to improvements in performance. Nonetheless, experienced observers believe that the following steps—all of them comparatively inexpensive—should increase the usefulness of the product to the national leadership:

- Major consumer representation to and within the intelligence community, perhaps through a restructured USIB, a high-level consumer council, or other institutionalized ways of communicating consumer needs, priorities, and evaluations to intelligence producers.
- Assessment of the intelligence product through quality control and product evaluation sections within the production organizations themselves.
- Upgrading existing analytical centers to increase the competition of ideas, including a DIA with improved organization and staffing as a major competitor to CIA in the area of military intelligence.
- Periodic reviews by outsiders of intelligence products of the main working hypotheses within the community, and of analytical methods being used.
- A net assessment group established at the national level which, along with the NSSM process, will keep questioning the community and challenging it to refine and support its hypotheses.
- Stronger incentives to attract good analysts, better career opportunities to hold them as analysts instead of forcing them to become supervisors in order to achieve promotion, and a more effective use of personnel already trained and experienced in intelligence.
- Increased resources and improved organizational arrangements within the intelligence community for research on improved methods of analysis and estimation.

It is probably premature to recommend the detailed measures necessary to improve the quality and scope of the intelligence product. In the near future, this issue should be considered at greater length by the leadership of a reorganized community. Indeed, the leadership should be specifically charged with the task of product improvement as a mat-

ter of the highest priority. What steps will prove feasible will depend on the particular type of reorganization selected, and, in the present circumstances, it may be well to be guided in the choice by considerations of economy in the use of resources. But it should be stressed, in conclusion, that improvement of the product at current budget levels is simply another way of achieving the efficiency that is so desperately needed within the intelligence community as it is presently constituted.

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230. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget (Schlesinger) to the Director (Shultz)[1]

Washington, May 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Reorganizing the Intelligence Community

This memorandum is intended to apprise you of the several responses within the intelligence community to the Overview paper,[2] which has been distributed on a highly selected basis. Copies went to the DCI, DOD, State, and the Science Adviser. As might be expected, each agency tended to the protective of its own interests. In terms of resources, the critical response is that of the Department of Defense which was very cautious, though not negative. The other three agencies strongly endorsed the attempt to reform the community, to bring better management, and to achieve greater resource control. In the case of the DCI, the endorsement was qualified by his strong conviction that legislation should be avoided and that no restructuring require "the disembodying of the CIA." In addition, all of the members of PFIAB have reviewed the paper. The response from that quarter is less clear, as each member has somewhat different views. The next meeting of the PFIAB is scheduled for June 4, and there is a belief on the part of

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger. In a May 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Wayne Smith provided a more detailed summary of the comments by CIA, DOD, State, and the Science Adviser, and he attached copies of the respective comments. (Ibid.)

[2] One of two attachments to Document 229.

the members that nothing will or should be done before they have a chance to meet with the President.[3]

Let me summarize the responses from the agencies.

• The State Department was unequivocally enthusiastic about the paper. The Department strongly endorsed Option 2, for a drastic strengthening of the management authority of the DCI over the community. The Department suggested that some experience should be obtained with a new style of organization before attempting to go to the Congress with a legislative package. State also emphasized its own interest and capabilities as a collector, producer, and consumer of intelligence products.

• Speaking as both the DCI and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Helms, not surprisingly, endorsed Option 2, which would strengthen his own influence in dealing with the rest of the community—particularly over the resources in the Department of Defense. Quite plainly, Helms would not like to move to the White House or to be separated from the facilities at Langley. Given the sentiment on the Hill, Helms has a genuine fear of approaching Congress at this time with any package that would open up Congressional criticism of intelligence operations. More directly in response to institutional interests, Helms also wishes to avoid splitting off the DCI's production activities from the Agency's responsibilities on the collection side. In the PFIAB and in OST, there is recognition that continuation of the competing activities of the CIA in the collection field would compromise the ability of the DCI to serve as a disinterested referee. The DCI does recognize the need for a focal point of authority on intelligence matters within the Department of Defense and endorses the establishment of a DDI. He fully appreciates the continued difficulty that the DCI would have in grappling with service interests, particularly in tactical intelligence, from the outside.

• The Science Adviser strongly endorses the position that the DCI–USIB structure should be separated from the institutional interests of the CIA. Consequently, Option 2 is endorsed with a number of amendments. The thrust of the suggested changes is to strengthen the role of the Ex-Com mechanism and to broaden its functions. Under no circumstances, it is argued, should the Ex-Com (on which the Science Adviser sits) be weakened. Given a strengthening of the Ex-Com, it is OST's view that an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will provide adequate staffing for the Deputy Secretary in the attempt to get better control of Defense intelligence activities not within the purview of the Ex-Com at the present time.

• The Department of Defense is concerned about the authority of the Secretary of Defense over his own assets. This is hardly a surprising reaction. With respect to community-wide reform, therefore, the

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[3] In an April 12 memorandum to Kissinger, Anderson reported that PFIAB had reviewed the OMB/NSC study at its meetings on April 1 and 2 and, while it reached no consensus, felt that the study's findings raised serious and far-reaching issues that deserved the most searching consideration. The Board members thus wanted personally to discuss the matter with the President during their June meeting or earlier. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1971, Vol. VI)

DOD is prepared to go with Option 3, which is the weakest of the options, and barely more than a patch-up mechanism. With respect to reform within the DOD, the Department (speaking through Bob Froehlke) favors an "evolutionary" rather than a revolutionary approach. What this means is the establishment of an ASDI rather than a DDI with the ASDI being responsible primarily for fiscal guidance. Late last year Froehlke did a review for the Secretary of Defense on intelligence activities. He discovered that all of the managers of intelligence agencies within Defense were opposed to the establishment of a Director of Defense Intelligence to whom they would report. This was scarcely a surprising development, but it did convince Froehlke that DOD should be very cautious in establishing greater central control and authority over the various intelligence activities. It has been indicated to me that Mel Laird will do whatever the President wants. However, it is clear that Defense is somewhat reluctant to go ahead with major reform, and will have to be pushed. From other sources in the Pentagon I know that Laird feels that he has been badly burned on intelligence issues because of non-support from the White House. Before he goes ahead he would want to be sure that there will be strong support from the White House, when Service resistance (which will be formidable) is encountered.

All in all the response has been more forthcoming than might have been expected. Even the DOD reaction is less adamant than might have been predicted given the interests and the bureaucratic difficulties involved in a major restructuring. Quite plainly people in the community are aware that the President feels very strongly about this issue, and that something will have to be done. Under the circumstances, even the affected parties feel that they should be creative. The State Department, with the least vested interests at stake, and therefore the most disinterested, is most willing to embrace immediate change.

I suggest that you (and Henry, if he wishes to be involved) discuss with the President what he wishes to do next. A number of major tactical issues remain to be resolved.

• Does the President wish to send legislation to the Hill altering the role of the DCI and the CIA? If he does not, it will be possible to sit down with Helms and *to discuss the internal restructuring of the Agency to accomplish most of the President's* objectives. At a minimum the DCI would require an additional deputy for management of agency affairs. The DCI should be placed at a considerable distance from the activities of the clandestine services. Perhaps most important of all, a structure should be elaborated to prevent the promotional activities of DDS&T from biasing the recommendations of the DCI with respect to new systems to be developed and deployed. While less elegant than Option 2, most of our objectives can be obtained if we can discuss them seriously with Helms.

• Helms would be reluctant to make these concessions unless his role in dealing with the rest of the community is strongly enhanced. The President will have to decide whether he will inform the Secretary of Defense that the DCI will now have a major role in deciding how intelligence resources within the Department of Defense will be

utilized. The President would have to be exceedingly forceful on this issue, because the cooperation of the OSD will be essential in order to overcome the expected recalcitrance of the three Services.

• In this connection, the President should decide whether there will be a strong focal point within the DOD on intelligence matters. If so, he will have to inform the DOD to establish a DDI rather than an ASDI and to press the Congressional committees to provide an additional Level III slot.

• No formidable resistance is expected from Defense on this issue, but Defense could undercut the President's desires through its private negotiations with the Armed Services Committees. The establishment of a strong focal point within Defense with authority over the several intelligence activities within the Department—rather than DOD's preferred evolutionary approach—seems to me to be essential to achieving the reduction in resources going into existing programs, with minimal effect on output. A possible alternative is to discuss with Secretary Laird the use of the second Deputy Secretary slot now being requested from Congress for control over intelligence activities. Given the compartmentalization and sprawl of intelligence activities in the Department, whoever is responsible for management of intelligence activities will have to have considerable clout.

• As soon as a direction is charted, we should seek Mel Laird's agreement to sit down and talk to the managers of the Defense intelligence programs—Admiral Gayler, John McLucas, General Bennett, etc., as well as David Packard.

• What role is expected for the PFIAB? Should any announcement be delayed until the President has a chance to meet with the PFIAB. Such a meeting is likely to develop little that is new substantively, but may be essential for cosmetic reasons.

As you are aware, we have drawn up directives to implement the proposals in Option 2. These directives can, of course, be modified to achieve whatever changes and objectives the President now contemplates. We have prepared briefing books and other material, which we are prepared to use at short notice. What we need is a signal. However, you may wish once again to bring to the President's attention how strong the resistance from the JCS and the Services is likely to be to the recommended changes within the DOD. He will have to be prepared to overcome resistance from a quarter, where he may be disinclined to take on a major battle.

J.R. Schlesinger

231. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

NIE 11–3–71, "Soviet Strategic Defenses"

Attached are:[2]

1. A memorandum from you to the President (Tab A) summarizing the national intelligence estimate on Soviet strategic defense forces. Your memorandum to the President also notes that, like the earlier NIE 11–8–70 on "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack," this NIE is a considerable improvement over last year's effort, though additional work still needs to be done.

2. A detailed analytical summary (Tab B), for your reference, of the major points made in the NIE, with comments on the adequacy of the analysis and on the questions the NIE still fails to consider.

3. A copy of NIE 11–3 (Tab C).

4. A copy of my earlier memo to you and your memo to the President on NIE 11–8 (Tab D). The memo to you provides some background on the events leading to the changes this year (pages 3–7) and some comments on the difficulties we must overcome in order to get an even better product (pages 8–10).

Evaluating the NIE 11–3–70

As I indicated in your memorandum to the President, this NIE, like NIE 11–8, is a major improvement over last year's efforts. Richard Helms recognized last year's weaknesses and solicited comments from intelligence consumers. After getting the President's reaction, you provided comments and had your staff work closely with the intelligence community. The results, as reflected by these two NIEs, are encouraging:

—There is some frank, clear discussion of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet forces.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 360, National Intelligence Estimates. Top Secret; Ruff; Zarff; Umbra; Restricted Data. Sent for action. At the top of page 1 is written "Outside system" and, in Kissinger's hand, "Do note from me to Helms." A memorandum to Helms was signed by Kissinger on June 9.

[2] None of the attachments are printed.

—The discussion is backed by considerable detail which is presented in usually very clear ways (e.g., graphics) and which even spills over into a number of annexes.

—A wide range of sources is often used to advance the analysis.

—One of the best improvements is the development of a wide range of alternative force models based on assumed differences in Soviet objectives, the pace of Soviet technological developments, and the resources which the Soviets are willing to apply. This approach forces everyone to remember that estimates rely heavily on underlying assumptions. However, to avoid the real danger that any point along the wide spectrum would be undifferentiated from any other point, the NIE designates certain assumptions and their accompanying illustrative force structures as most likely.

—All the alternative force models are provided in considerable numerical detail which is essential for an understanding of the differences between the alternatives.

I believe that NIE 11–3 shows even greater improvement than found in the last NIE 11–8.

—It introduced and did a creditable job with a whole new section on Soviet ASW capabilities.

—It was more willing to discuss the strategic implications of facts. For instance, with very limited evidence at that time, it analyzed well the significance of the new missile system complex at the Sary Shagan test range.

—It considered in detail Soviet command and control which is so essential to effective use of strategic forces, especially for the complex mission of strategic defense.

More work is still required, however. The present NIE suffers from two serious weaknesses:

1. It fails to draw on all sources and research methods which could advance the analysis. The greatest emphasis is still on observed activity at test ranges, construction sites, and operational bases. However, a variety of other material could be useful—e.g., Soviet doctrinal and strategic writings, economic information, analysis of Soviet institutions.

2. The NIE often fails to estimate Soviet objectives and strategies, yet such information is fundamental to understanding present Soviet programs and estimating future ones. For instance:

—How sophisticated is Soviet strategic thinking? How do various individuals and groups define "parity" and "sufficiency?"

—What are the likely Soviet war plans? What are the Soviet views as to the possibility and outcomes of limited strategic war?

Obtaining Further Improvements

While I noted in the memo on NIE 11–8 that getting further improvements would not be easy, we are mounting an ambitious campaign.

1. Of course, the NSC/OMB work on reorganizing the intelligence community has as one of its objectives improving the intelligence product for consumers.

2. The earlier letter from the President to Richard Helms (Tab B of memo to the President)[3] congratulating Helms and the intelligence community for their work on NIE 11–8–70 has provided some positive feedback which should encourage them. Moreover, it identified the particular strengths of the NIE from your viewpoint.

3. As you directed on my memo regarding NIE 11–8, I will arrange a meeting in mid- to late May between Helms and you to discuss the new NIEs. We waited until NIE 11–3 was published so that you would have a larger sample to discuss.

4. We will continue to send for your signature directives to the intelligence agencies tasking them to do specific work which we are particularly interested in. Already:

—You have asked CIA (Tab E) to restart its in-depth study on the SS–9 focusing on Soviet decision-making processes. (Andy Marshall is now working with CIA at the staff level.)

—Your earlier memo (see Tab F) to Helms in response to the CIA study on the Soviet perception of the U.S. threat has resulted in an inadequate, but good-faith, answer from them. My staff is now working with CIA to improve their work further.

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[3] Document 227.

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232. Report Prepared by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, June 8, 1971.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Handle via Comint Control Systems Jointly. 10 pages of source text not declassified in time for publication.]

233. Memorandum From Thomas Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, June 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Memo on President's 4 June 1971 Meeting with PFIAB

Jerry Burke has sent you PFIAB's memo on the above meeting (Tab A)[2] and I have prepared a note from you to Alex Butterfield forwarding that memo for the President's files.[3] A copy will also go in our files here.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached note to Butterfield.

FYI, at the PFIAB meeting, Admiral Anderson gave a summary of the Board's report on reorganizing the intelligence community.[4] He said that the Board could not substantiate OMB's findings that its proposals would effect significant money savings. He asserted that the Board's proposals, on the other hand, could increase the efficiency of the U.S. intelligence effort.

The President observed that the Board does not take as harsh a view of the U.S. intelligence product as OMB did in its report.[5] Admiral Anderson responded that although the Board is aware of mistakes made in the intelligence community, the Board nonetheless sees substantial progress.

Admiral Anderson went on to state that the Board does not concur in the two reorganization options proposed by OMB which would require seeking legislation from Congress. The President agreed that such a source of action would be inadvisable.

The Board proposed that in lieu of OMB's proposals, the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) be reconstituted along the following lines:

—USIB would be made up of the principal intelligence *users* instead of the producers as is now the case.

—USIB would serve under the DCI as a policy-forming entity and coordinator of the entire U.S. intelligence community.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1971, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Byeman; Contains Codeword. Sent for action.

[2] The 8-page memorandum is not printed. (Ibid.)

[3] Not printed.

[4] Document 232.

[5] Attachment to Document 229.

—The Board also believes that the Director of the National Security Agency should be a Presidential appointee in the rank of 4-star military officer or a civilian of equivalent rank.

Admiral Anderson also pointed to the serious gap in the collection of foreign intelligence in the United States.

—The President agreed and stated that he was well aware of the gap in the domestic collection of foreign intelligence which he attributed to a lack of working cooperation between the "good men" heading up the CIA and the FBI.

—The President observed that it was within his province to solve that problem and that he will take appropriate action in the near future.

Admiral Anderson also raised the problem of shortcomings in the field of collecting foreign economic intelligence and the President asked the Board to arrange to have a two-hour "Peterson briefing" after which he would like to have their specific recommendations for improving the U.S. economic intelligence effort.

Admiral Anderson mentioned his recent trip to West Germany and his discussions with General Goodpaster. As a result of those conversations, he has urged the Director of NSA to visit General Goodpaster to see what can be done to increase the productivity of U.S. SIGINT collection efforts against Soviet forces.

Finally, Dr. Land urged the President to personally intervene in the question of choosing a near real-time readout satellite reconnaissance system. Dr. Land, backed by Dr. Baker, advocates an electronic imaging system which can be read out through a relay satellite while the sensor is still over the target. The President promised to take a hard look at the matter.

234. Draft Memorandum From Wayne Smith and Andrew Marshall of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 30, 1971.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Reorganization: More Limited Options

If you do not want to recommend the reorganization and other measures the NSC/OMB study produced, there are more limited changes that would be useful and that would likely be supported by the PFIAB, OMB, and DCI. They are likely to produce little savings, at least originally, and reduce the chances for any major reforms in the operation of the intelligence community for the foreseeable future.

A minimal package would include:

(1) Net Assessment Group in the White House to review the intelligence community's output.

—Headed by a Senior Member of the NSC staff reporting directly to you.
—Total of 3–5 people.
—Charter to encompass review of NIEs, President's Quarterly Report on Strategic Forces, CIA studies, DIA studies, intelligence community's input required by NSSMs and other directives.

(2) Measures to enhance the authority and capability of the DCI to plan and guide the national intelligence program.

—Presidential directive spelling out changes in DCI responsibilities and objectives of changed community arrangements.
—Delegation of day-to-day operations of CIA so that DCI can concentrate upon national programs.
—Increased staff supporting DCI in this role as manager of community.
—DCI to prepare and present to OMB and President consolidated national intelligence program and budget. CIA and DOD to supply all information on their programs to allow this.
—Revision of NSCID 1 to make USIB advisory body and change structure to set up two major committees. One, essentially the current USIB, to assist DCI in producing substantive national intelligence. The other, a resources committee, to assist DCI in coordination of resource

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman. Kissinger initiated the memorandum.

programs. This to be perhaps a combination of NIRB and Ex Com. Possible revision of other NSCIDs to clarify missions of major elements of community.

—Further development of focal point in DOD for control of intelligence resources. Perhaps assignment to one of the two Deputy Secretaries of Defense as a main responsibility and ASD/I reporting to him, creating point of contact for DCI.

(3) Measures to improve guidance to DCI and community on intelligence product.

—Set up NSC subcommittee chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to review national intelligence product and give guidance to DCI and community.

—Your participation on subcommittee to be staffed by Net Assessment Group.

The strategy would be to task the DCI more clearly with management of community and enhance his status and management capabilities, leaving to him the job of working out the many problems of overlap and inefficiency in use of resources and improving the quality of the product. Some thought should be given to steps to be taken later in the process. Extensive revision of NSCIDs is one example. Another is to look beyond Helms' retirement and to do what can be done to get another John McCone, with strong management abilities, as the next DCI.

Implementation

You will take a good month or so for preparation in appropriate Presidential directive, drafting version of NSCID 1, etc. Plan needs to be made for working with DCI and other community elements. Also preferable not to present as a major reorganization, but as another step toward better management of the community. This limited change may not work. There are many sources of inefficiency and duplication it stands little chance of touching. By itself, it will not do much to improve the product since it will not insure the needed increase in resources devoted to production and to the development of improved intelligence analysis methods.[2]

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[2] According to Haldeman's diary, the President expressed the following views on intelligence during a July 23 budget meeting. "On a general basis, the P said never has a country spent more for less defense than does America. Then he got to intelligence, said we've got to take the same approach there. The CIA tells me nothing I don't read three days earlier in the *New York Times*. Intelligence is a sacred cow. We've done nothing since we've been here about it. The CIA isn't worth a damn. We have to get out the symbolism; so a 25 percent cut across-the-board, get rid of the disloyal types. He told Henry to take a full month to do it, that it couldn't be done by Shultz or Weinberger. It must be in terms of strategy, not in terms of budget." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition,* July 25, 1971)

235. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Community Reorganization

Attached is a self-explanatory joint memorandum from you and Shultz to the President on the reorganization and management of the intelligence community. It has been thoroughly reviewed by Shultz and signed. In my judgment, it represents a workable package, that meets both your and Shultz's major objectives within the parameters of no new legislation, achieving some savings, and making no fundamental organizational changes in DOD.

The accompanying package contains:

—Memorandum to the Intelligence Principals for the President's signature.
—Personal letter from the President to Helms.

The memorandum to the Intelligence Principals directs:

—(1) The DCI to assume leadership of the community and accept major responsibilities for:

—Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities and the allocation of all intelligence resources.
—Producing national intelligence.
—Chairing and staffing of all intelligence community advisory boards or committees.
—Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities within budgetary constraints.
—The DCI to prepare and submit each year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence budget.
—The revision of NSCID 1 to reflect the changed status of the DCI, in the course of which USIB to be made strictly advisory to him.

—(2) The revision of NSCIDs and DOD directives to establish no later than January 1, 1972:

—A unified National Cryptologic Service.
—A single Defense Investigative Service.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. The memorandum is marked "Outside System." A handwritten note states: "Handcarried memo for Pres. to Alex Butterfield on 9/8/71 pm." Other than Tab A (Helm's input), the tabs are not attached.

—A unified Defense Mapping Service with unification restricted largely to production activities.

—A restructured National Reconnaissance Office under DOD control.

—The transfer of full responsibility for all clandestine HUMINT collection to CIA.

—(3) The creation of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, chaired by the DCI, including members from Defense, State, and CIA to advise him on the allocation of budget and resources to programs.

—(4) That USIB assist the DCI in the production of national intelligence and in the efficient allocation of existing intelligence assets.

—(5) Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by you, with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the DCI as members, to give policy direction on intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products.

—(6) The creation of a Net Assessment Group within the NSC staff responsible for reviewing and evaluating intelligence products and for producing net assessments.

These changes require no legislation and focus upon (1) enhancing the DCI's powers to give leadership to the community, (2) eliminating overlap and duplication in roles and missions and thereby achieving some savings, and (3) improving the review and policy guidance devoted to intelligence products.

These changes are more limited than those considered earlier in the NSC/OMB study but are significant and impressive as a total package.

The major savings anticipated result from the restructuring of NRO and the unification of the cryptologic services. Lesser savings are expected from unification of Defense investigative services and Defense mapping activities. All of these items are strongly endorsed by Shultz, however, and represent the only changes from the earlier package I forwarded to you in San Clemente. (At my insistence, OMB fell off a number of other such measures they originally wanted to include.) A Unified National Cryptologic Service and a restructured National Reconnaissance Office under DOD control are changes long overdue. I wonder, however, if the small savings involved in a single Defense Investigative Service and a Unified Defense Mapping Service are worth the inevitable screams we will get from the Services. I am reluctant to jeopardize our more fundamental objectives by including marginal items such as these. You may want to raise this point with Shultz.

The currently proposed reorganization greatly increases the status and capabilities of the DCI and points him toward the goals of:

—More efficient use of resources.
—Abolition of outmoded divisions of labor.
—Improvements in the scope and quality of substantive intelligence products.

The memorandum to the Intelligence Principals states these goals and gives further guidance to the DCI and other members of the community concerning the kinds of additional changes that may be required to attain them. Hopefully, the DCI will proceed as fast as possible to the achievement of these goals. However, to maximize the success of this reorganization, I believe that the following implementation process should also be used:

—As soon as you and Shultz are in basic agreement, Helms should be shown the proposed memorandum to the principals. At Tab A you will find an informal input regarding Helms' view of what is needed to make progress toward a more effective, efficient community in the near term. It is generally in line with the measures in the currently proposed reorganization. Some minor adjustments might be useful, if Helms felt strongly about them. A great deal is being staked on Helms' pushing toward the stated goals. He should be gotten on board as soon as possible.

—Issuance of the memorandum for the Intelligence Principals and letter to Helms after Presidential decision.

—Draft revision of the NSCIDs to be undertaken under the direction of NSC/OMB staffs. Helms' people ought to be involved in this, however. Each word and comma in the current version is freighted with meaning from past controversies. Initial drafts prepared in NSC/OMB should be submitted to Helms' staff for comment. Final drafts might be submitted to NSC Intelligence Committee for final action.

—Meeting of President, you, Shultz, and Helms to discuss the goals of the reorganization and to present to Helms the President's views on problems and issues that need priority attention. I will prepare talking points for this meeting.

—Meeting of Helms' staff and the NSC/OMB staffs to discuss major problems and issues. This meeting would parallel the one above. Its purpose would be to communicate ideas emerging from NSC/OMB study as to major areas of inefficiency and waste, improved staffing to assist Helms in his new role, details of consolidated budget preparation process, etc.

—Meeting of you, Shultz, and Helms with all interested parties, e.g., PFIAB, USIB, Packard, Alexis Johnson, Service intelligence chiefs,

OST representative to press home awareness of President's goals, his view of major problems, and to express support of DCI in his new role. Also, this is the forum in which to stress the need for the more efficient use of resources devoted to collection, the need for upgrading the quality of intelligence analysis, and the value of a multiplicity of vigorous, first-rate centers of intelligence analysis, feeding into an improved process for producing national intelligence.

—Review by NSC/OMB of Helms' plans for delegation of management of CIA, for an enhanced staff to assist him in reviewing, planning, preparing consolidated intelligence budget, and for improving substantive intelligence products.

Recommendations

(1) That you meet with Shultz to resolve any remaining issues.

(2) After you and Shultz agree, that you start the implementing sequence by discussing the memorandum for Intelligence Principals with Helms.

(3) After you have discussed the memo with Helms, that it be forwarded to the President.

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236. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon with PFIAB, Thursday, September 9

Admiral Anderson has invited you and General Haig to lunch with PFIAB at 1:00 p.m., Thursday, September 9 (Tab F).[2] The staff has prepared the following talking points to cover the four topics with which PFIAB is most concerned at the moment.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1971, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Byeman. Sent for action.

[2] Attached but not printed.

1. Economic Intelligence

—The quality of economic intelligence on the reactions to the President's August 15 program has been excellent.[3] However, because it is so voluminous there is little time to synthesize it sufficiently so that it could be passed to the President. The intelligence community might, therefore, consider synthesizing economic intelligence, especially in the next several months when other nations are attempting to formulate a response to the President's new program.

—Also, because the analysis of different agencies is often colored by their policy viewpoint on such questions as the ability of our trading partners to revalue their currencies or institute reforms in the trade and monetary areas, it might be very useful for the CIA to develop analysis on this question. Specifically, we need more information on precisely how far our trading partners can go in revaluing and liberalizing what the effects on their economies of so doing would be, and what the political and economic implications (in the form of retaliation, export subsidies, and capital restraints) would be if we pressed them to do more than was reasonable.

[Omitted here are talking points for topics 2 and 3.]

4. Intelligence Reorganization

In a report dated June 8, 1971, the PFIAB submitted its unanimous findings and recommendations to the President regarding the management and organization of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The report is at Tab A.[4] In terms of organization, the report unanimously recommended:

—Making the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) the coordinating body of the intelligence community and altering the composition of the Board to give dominance to the users of intelligence rather than the collectors and producers. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) would continue to chair the USIB.

—Creating two new committees, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee and an Intelligence Resource Committee, under the USIB, each chaired by the DCI.

—Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/I) to coordinate the intelligence resources of the Department of Defense.

—Relieving the DCI of his day-to-day management and administrative functions in CIA and giving the Director of the National Secu-

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[3] Reference to Nixon's August 15 address to the nation concerning his "New Economic Policy," See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971,* pp. 886–91.

[4] Document 232.

rity Agency increased authority over all government communications and electronics intelligence.

—Maintaining the current status of DIA.

—Removing mapping from the intelligence budget and transferring it to other DOD programs as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

—Authorizing the Chairman of the PFIAB to attend meetings of the USIB.

The report also contained recommendations regarding establishment of a community-wide information handling system, greater emphasis on economic intelligence, more use of embassy officials in intelligence reporting, and more use of FBI in the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence within the United States.

The PFIAB proposal and that developed by the NSC/OMB staffs (Tab B)[5] share many common features, but also have significant differences. Both agree that community-wide leadership is needed. Both agree that resources can be used more efficiently. Both agree that the quality of the product can be improved. Both agree that consumer requirements for intelligence must be an integral part of the process. Both agree that whatever changes are made should be accomplished without new legislation.

However, the NSC/OMB staffs do not believe that strong, continuing, and impartial leadership can be accomplished by a committee or series of committees. This requires the assignment of authority over community resources to a single individual. This is a fundamental requirement that no plan of reform should ignore. Committee-type leadership, in the form of the USIB, has historically failed to be effective. It is not clear, therefore, that a simple reorganization and strengthening of the USIB, is proposed by the PFIAB, would succeed in achieving the President's objectives.

The current proposal calls for five major changes:

—A strengthened community-wide management role for the DCI.

—A new NSC Intelligence Community established primarily to review the substantive intelligence product and to give policy guidance on intelligence needs to the DCI and the community.

—Two advisory groups to the DCI to support him in his stronger community-wide role:

—A new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee which would advise him on the allocation of intelligence resources.

[5] Attachment to Document 229.

—A USIB which would be strictly advisory to him on the efficient use of existing collection assets and production of substantive intelligence.

—A new Net Assessment Group within the NSC staff for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments.

—Limited functional realignment within Defense to accomplish certain consolidations (mapping, investigations); the assignment of full responsibility for clandestine HUMINT collection to CIA; and, a restructuring of the National Reconnaissance Office under DOD control.

These changes are designed to accomplish the President's four major objectives:

—Authoritative and responsible leadership for the community as a whole.

—A more efficient use of resources by the community in the collection of intelligence information.

—Abolition of outmoded divisions of labor within the community.

—Improvements in the quality and scope of the community's substantive product.

You may want to probe the members of the PFIAB regarding some of their recommendations. For example:

—Why do they believe altering the USIB is the best way to achieve better performance and increased efficiency in our intelligence system? Why not pin the responsibility directly on the DCI?

—What areas do they see where substantial savings can be achieved?

—Should the Director of NSA have direct authority over service COMINT and ELINT organizations?

—What are the areas of excessive duplication and overlap in collection activities?

—How can discipline regarding leaks in the community be enhanced?

—Why should the present structure of the NRO be retained?

—Why should mapping, charting and geodesy be removed from the intelligence budget?

—Why does the PFIAB support the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

—How does the above square with their recommendation that requirements for tactical intelligence resources by Unified and Specified military commanders must be fully recognized?

237. Memorandum For the Record[1]

Washington, September 16, 1971.

1. Role of the AEC Intelligence Component

On 16 September 1971, I met with Jim Schlesinger, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in his office in Germantown. The purpose of the meeting was to receive from him the observations about the Agency and the intelligence community gained through his years as an Assistant Director of BOB and OMB. Before getting into this subject, Schlesinger sought my views as to the role of the AEC intelligence unit. I told him that due to an almost complete lack of participation in USIB activities, I was unable to be helpful. I added that I had never heard any adverse comment about the AEC unit or Harold Brown, who has led it for the past several years. I suggested that the Director would be the best person to talk with about this subject. In the course of the conversation, it developed that he feels that the Atomic Energy Commission has played no role whatever in national security policy-making since John McCone left the Commission in 1961. Schlesinger feels that the Commission should play a role and I gather that he questions whether the AEC intelligence unit is now competent to do this. He tends to look upon their current performance as being helpful to CIA in spotting any personalities in various laboratories and really being rather limited in being able to brief the Commissioners on what is really going on in the world. It is apparently Jim's impression that on any subject of importance, they have to whistle up Dave Brandwein or some other CIA analyst to do the briefing. He indicated definitely that he would seek either an early morning or late afternoon appointment with the Director sometime soon to pursue this subject.

2. Community Reorganization

Schlesinger believes that as a result of all the recent deliberations about reorganizing the community that the President will shortly issue some proclamation which will give the Director a good deal more authority in the intelligence community than he now has. Just what form it will take, he is not sure but as a minimum, he thinks the Director will be required to weigh in on an intelligence community budget before it goes to the President. He opined that this proclamation couldn't hurt either the Director or the Central Intelligence Agency and might well

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–M01048A, Box 15, Folder 5, ExDir/Comptroller (Colby) Files, Intelligence Community. Secret; Sensitive.

do some good. He understands that Dr. Hall will be coming aboard very shortly to become the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He has heard both good and bad things about Dr. Hall and has his fingers crossed, believing as he does, he will have a difficult time at best operating at the Assistant Secretary level. He speculated that a lot would depend upon the support he receives from David Packard for whom he has the highest regard but whose management style he characterized as "intuitive." He was emphatic as usual in believing that the first order of business is to get the intelligence problems in the Defense Department straightened out or at least on the right track. With regard to the community generally, he repeated that he thinks far too much is being spent on collection and particularly tactical and SIGINT and that not enough is being spent on analysis. With regard to the cost of the intelligence community, he feels very strongly that SIGINT has to be cut back and alleges that its costs are now understated inasmuch as there are costs such as training which aren't now included in their presentations. He regards the CIA analytical capability as being not only the best in town but really the only truly professional competence in town.

With regards what to do about the intelligence budget, he is convinced that you cannot maintain anything like the present level with sheer logic. Both the President and the Congress seem determined to reduce the size of the budget and Schlesinger's solution, at least in part, would be to find some way to put some of the things now included in the intelligence budget, *Mapping* for example, somewhere else. If this is the game, then we ought to start to play it.

3. CIA's Relationship with OMB

In general, Schlesinger is well disposed toward the Agency and believes that we have fared a good deal better because he has defended us than would have otherwise been the case. He describes the key personalities at OMB as follows: George Schultz is a very broad-gauged and able man who understands the President, doesn't take everything the President says literally and is the man the Director ought somehow to find a way to deal with. Weinberger takes everything the President says literally and is a bureaucrat with very little flexibility. The International Programs Division staff, with which we deal on a day-to-day basis (Frey, Strait, Taylor, Hurley, etc.) are very well disposed toward CIA except on the manpower front where they think we could stand further reductions. They are not, however, as influential in the new setup at OMB as they used to be. Ken Dam, who replaced Schlesinger, has not had any experience in this area and the danger lies in the possibility that he will take his cue from Weinberger. If he also takes his cue from the staff on manpower, we could be in for some pretty rough sledding.

All of the above was given to me in strict candor and also in strict confidence for obvious reasons. If Schlesinger is right about all this, and I am inclined to think he is, it is clear that we should find some way to deal with Schultz more than we have in the past and I think probably only the Director can do this. It is equally clear that the Executive Director-Comptroller, the Deputies, and other key officials should work as closely as possible with Dam.

LKW

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238. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 24, 1971.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Community Improvement

I have discussed with Admiral Anderson FIAB's criticisms of the proposed memorandum to the Intelligence Community on Reorganization. At Enclosure 3 is a memorandum enumerating recommended changes and providing underlined copies of the directive and letter to Director Helms indicating changes. FIAB has compromised on some issues, the most important being accepting you as Chairman of the NSC Intelligence Community rather than the DCI, and made a number of improvements in language and streamlining.

Major Changes:

The following major recommendations of the FIAB appear to be acceptable:

—Retention of the present arrangement for the National Reconnaissance Office rather than making it a Defense instrumentality. The Deputy Secretary of Defense would continue as chairman of the Executive Committee of NRO and the Under Secretary of the Air Force would remain the Director of the NRO. (Wayne Smith feels that the changes proposed by Budget will prevent piecemeal management and

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman. Sent for action. The enclosures are attached but not printed.

allow some cost savings over the long haul. [Wayne's arguments are presented in the paper at Enclosure 4.][2] The FIAB argues the NRO is doing an effective job and would lose its present flexibility if locked entirely in the DOD system. My own assessment of this problem is at Enclosure 5.)

—Addition of the Chairman, JCS and Attorney General to the NSCIC.

—Placement of electronics intelligence activities under NSA. FIAB prefers to specify that NSA will be responsible for unified direction of over-all communications and electronics activities and assessments. Our version had called for "a unified national cryptologic *service.*"

Among the FIAB recommendations which appear unacceptable are the following:

—The FIAB calls for the following membership on the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee: DCI; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Directors of NSA, NRO and DIA; and Deputy Director of CIA. The earlier memo called for the DCI as chairman with senior representatives from DOD, State, OMB, and CIA. In my view the problem with the FIAB arrangement is that it adds special pleaders to the committee and eliminates the consumers and agencies which would be more likely to be interested in efficient allocation of resources.

—A representative of Treasury would be added to the NSCIC. (FIAB is focused on the importance of economic intelligence but improvements in this area could be accomplished more appropriately by building up CIA's assets.)

Enclosure 2 is a list of minor changes, many of which are acceptable improvements.

At Enclosure 1 is a draft directive which reflects the acceptable changes outlined above. If you agree with these modifications, the next step would be to obtain Director Shultz's concurrence. At this point, this should be done at your level. If he does not agree, then a split memorandum could be prepared for the President.

Recommendation

That at your earliest opportunity you discuss with Director Shultz these recommended changes and obtain his concurrence in the draft memorandum at Enclosure 1.[3]

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] Kissinger initialed the approval option.

239. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Community Improvement

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the principal officers of the intelligence community announcing a series of changes in the organization and management of the intelligence community, designed to improve its responsiveness to policy-level intelligence needs, the quality and scope of its products, the efficiency of operations, and the allocation of resources. (Tab A)[2]

The changes are as follows:

1. *A strengthened community-wide management role for the Director of Central Intelligence.* This will require some changes in CIA management in order that the DCI can effectively delegate day-to-day operations of the CIA, and the creation of an analytic staff to assist the DCI in his leadership of the community. In this broader role, he would be responsible for planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and budget. He would continue to be responsible for the production of national intelligence.

2. *A new NSC Intelligence Committee established primarily to review the substantive intelligence product and to give policy guidance on intelligence needs to the DCI and the community.*

3. *Two advisory groups to the DCI to support him in his stronger community-wide role:*

—A new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee which would advise him on the allocation of intelligence resources.

—A United States Intelligence Board which would advise him on the efficient use of existing collection assets and production of substantive intelligence.

4. *A new Net Assessment Group within the NSC staff for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments.* This will require some additional office space in the EOB and four new personnel slots.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman; Comint.

[2] Document 242.

5. *Establishment of a unified National Cryptologic Command under Director, NSA.*

6. *Functional realignment within Defense to accomplish certain consolidations.* (Office of Defense Investigations and Defense Map Agency.)

These changes do not require legislation. They do not represent as sweeping a restructuring of the community as you considered earlier.

We anticipate many of these changes will be opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military Services. We have not recommended a reorganization in top level Defense Department management of intelligence. However, the Secretary of Defense has already proposed (and Congress is likely to approve) the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/I) who would assist the Secretary of Defense in reviewing and evaluating intelligence collection resources. The ASD/I would not be responsible for substantive intelligence; nor would he be in a position to influence it significantly since, even with the reorganization we are proposing, DIA, NRO and NSA would remain separate bodies and the Joint Chiefs would remain responsible for DIA substantive output.

The proposals we are making will also deflect Senator Ellender's meat ax approach to reductions in the intelligence budget and give us time to identify the most marginal programs and make cuts where they are least harmful. Additional and more fundamental reorganization would require legislation.

To give the currently proposed measures the best chance to achieve your aims, we recommend that directives for the specific changes be accomplished by a strong statement as to your goals in making these changes. Thus you should also consider sending the attached letter to the DCI (Tab B)[3] stating your goals and your views as to which of his many new tasks should receive priority. A meeting with the DCI and other intelligence principals to press home your views might also be desirable.

If you approve these changes, the OMB and NSC staffs will prepare revisions of the NSCIDs to incorporate the changes and oversee the implementation of the changes.

Recommendations

That you sign the memo to the Intelligence Principals at Tab A and the letter to Helms at Tab B.[4]

Henry A. Kissinger
George P. Schultz

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[3] Document 240.

[4] A notation on the memorandum indicates the President approved it.

240. Letter From President Nixon to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, November 1, 1971.

Dear Dick:

The need for improving the intelligence product and for increased efficiency in the allocation of resources devoted to the intelligence effort is urgent. In order to achieve these improvements, I will look to you to provide the intelligence community with the strengthened and responsible leadership it needs. I have decided upon some changes that I feel will provide you with the enhanced status and support needed to do the job. They are described in my memorandum to the Intelligence Principals[2] which shall be your guide for implementation.

You should give the role of community leadership your primary attention and delegate, as much as is possible, the day-to-day management of the CIA. Four major responsibilities will require your priority attention.

—Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence and the allocation of all intelligence resources.
—Producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers.
—Chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards or committees.
—Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities with budgetary constraints.

While the formal changes I have directed are limited, I hope and expect additional changes in the functioning and management of the intelligence community. I particularly expect that you will work toward the attainment of three goals:

—A more efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information.
—A more effective assignment of functions within the community.
—Improvement in the quality and scope of the substantive product.

In your efforts to attain these goals, you will have my strong support. Should, in your opinion, further changes in the management and organization of the intelligence community be needed, they will receive prompt and sympathetic attention from me.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–M01048A, Box 15, Folder 5, Ex Dir/Comptroller (Colby) Files, Intelligence Community. Secret.

[2] Document 242.

241. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, November 3, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research & Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

Effective immediately the authorized position of Assistant Secretary of Defense, currently designated Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), is hereby re-designated Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).[2]

The specific authorities, responsibilities and functions assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) will be promulgated subsequently by a DoD Directive.[3]

All functions and personnel currently assigned to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) are transferred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

All other functions and personnel currently assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) are transferred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and placed under a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) in that office.

All existing delegations of authority to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) which do not apply to intelligence matters are re-delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Those delegations applying to intelligence matters are re-delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 Intelligence 1971. No classification marking.

[2] Albert C. Hall served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) from November 9, 1971 to March 25, 1976.

[3] Document 262.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will initiate necessary personnel actions and directive changes to effect these realignments. He will also review those functions transferred to his office and recommend to me any further realignments that appear appropriate.

David Packard

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242. Memorandum by President Nixon[1]

Washington, November 5, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community

I have recently reviewed and accepted recommendations on ways in which to improve the functioning of the intelligence community. This memorandum establishes a set of goals and directs organizational and management changes to attain them. It also expresses my concern about major resource management and substantive production problems as guidance to the community for further changes in the future.[2]

The need for an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence is urgent. Resources available for use by the intelligence community will be increasingly constrained and may have to be reduced. At the same time

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files Job 80–B01086A, Box 9, ER Files—DCI, 1971. Top Secret; Byeman; Comint. Copies were sent to Shultz and Kissinger.

[2] A November 5 public announcement of the reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community is printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, November 8, 1971, p. 1482.

the product of the intelligence community will be of increasing importance to U.S. security and national interests as:

—the relative strength of Soviet and other potential military forces grows with respect to those of the U.S. where previously U.S. superiority was unquestioned;

—the international environment grows more complex; and financial, commercial and economic factors assume greater significance;

—the need for timely intelligence becomes greater.

I. Objectives

Among the major objectives that must be attained if the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community are to increase substantially are:

—The responsiveness of the U.S. intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review.

—Authoritative and responsible leadership for the community as a whole must be assured.

—A more efficient use of resources by the community in the collection of intelligence information must be achieved. Utilization of the means available must be in consonance with approved requirements of U.S. security and national interests.

—Assignment of intelligence functions within the community must be reviewed and revised to eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded activities.

—The quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product must be improved.

—The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of the foreign, military and economic policies of the U.S. Government and the planning for and conduct of military operations by U.S. forces.

II. The Necessary Conditions

A number of specific conditions are necessary to the achievement of these objectives.

—The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) must delegate direct authority to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (as far as is possible without legislation) for the plans, programs, and day-to-day operations of the CIA, and must assume overall leadership of the community.

—More effective review of intelligence product quality and policy must be provided to the DCI, especially by high-level consumers of substantive national intelligence.

—Major issues within the intelligence community must be addressed in such a way that the DCI plays a major role in their resolu-

tion. The DCI must have an increased and restructured personal staff to allow him to discharge his augmented responsibilities.

—The DCI should be supported by two major committees of the intelligence community, each of which he chairs, with clearly defined advisory functions embracing his responsibilities related to the intelligence production and requirements on the one hand and to intelligence budget and allocation of resources on the other.

—Intelligence collection programs, largely financed and managed by the Department of Defense, must come under more effective management and coordination with other intelligence programs.

—The NSCIDs and DCIDs must be rewritten to reflect the changes directed herein and others as they occur, particularly to reflect reassignment of functions.

III. Measures Decided Upon

After careful consideration, I have decided that the measures listed below are to be taken now to move toward attainment of the stated objectives. They are designed primarily to: (1) enhance the authority and capability of the DCI to provide the required community leadership, (2) provide review and guidance regarding the substantive intelligence product, and (3) more effectively restructure intelligence activities.

—I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence to assume leadership of the community in planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence. I shall look to him to improve the performance of the community, to provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and activities (including tactical intelligence), and to recommend the appropriate allocation of resources to be devoted to intelligence.

He will thus assume four major responsibilities:

—Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities and the allocation of all intelligence resources.

—Producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers.

—Chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards or committees.

—Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities within budgetary constraints.

So that he can effectively undertake this community leadership role, I am requesting the DCI to submit to me within 30 days his plan for the appropriate delegation of his current operational responsibilities and for increased staff support for his new role.

—I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare and submit each year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence program budget, including tactical intelligence. All information required from all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch is to be made available to him in order that he may provide me with an annual detailed review of the needs and performance of the intelligence community.

—I am creating an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, including as members a senior representative from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This committee is to advise the DCI on the preparation of the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources among programs, ensuring that they are employed in accordance with approved requirements and that there is no unwarranted duplication.[3]

—I am also directing that the USIB be reconstituted under the chairmanship of the DCI including as members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), State Department; Director of National Security Agency (NSA); Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The USIB will advise and assist the DCI with respect to the production of national intelligence requirements and priorities, the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

—I am authorizing the DCI to call upon all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government to provide requisite information to these two committees and to invite additional participation in their deliberations as may be required in his judgment.

—I am also establishing a National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC). Its members will be the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who will chair the committee. It will give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer.

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[3] In a May 30, 1972, letter to Irwin, Helms indicated that with the establishment of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee by the President's Directive of November 5, the functions of the National Intelligence Resources Board, which he set up in May 1968, had been taken over by IRAC and, "for the record, I think we should note that the NIRB is now officially dissolved." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 4, Folder 13, N–6, National Intelligence Resources Board)

—As a related matter, I am directing that a Net Assessment Group be created within the National Security Council Staff. The group will be headed by a senior staff member and will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments of U.S. capabilities vis-à-vis those of foreign governments constituting a threat to U.S. security.

—I am directing the retention of the present management structure of the National Reconnaissance Office.

—I am directing the Department of Defense to issue such directives as are required to establish no later than January 1, 1972:

- A unified National Cryptologic Command under Director, NSA for the conduct of USG communications intelligence and electronics intelligence activities.
- A single Office of Defense Investigations.
- A consolidated Defense Map Agency by combining the three Service mapping organizations under arrangements that permit optimum efficiency and economy in production without impairing legitimate requirements of the separate Services.
- The retention of the DIA to be fully responsive to tasking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters involving essential intelligence support for military planning and operations.[4]

—I am directing staffs of the NSC, DCI and OMB, in consultation and coordination with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to make appropriate revisions not later than December 1, 1971 to the NSCID's and other directives as needed to implement the provisions of this memorandum.

IV. Remaining Problems

The changes I have directed at this time are limited, but I fully expect further changes in the intelligence community consistent with maximum practicable attainment of my objectives.

By far the largest portion of the intelligence budget is devoted to collection. It is here that savings must be sought. Future assignments of roles and missions within the intelligence community cannot be made satisfactorily by compromises among agencies.

The need to make some savings is so urgent that I have directed the Office of Management and Budget, jointly with the DCI and

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[4] In a November 10 memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the JCS, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Directors of the Defense Agencies, and other DOD officials, Laird asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to develop plans by December 15 to carry out the President's directive in coordination with the DOD components concerned. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 207, 350.09 1971) Seven DIA memoranda dated November 18 to December 2 that discuss alternative approaches to DOD organizational change are ibid.

Secretary of Defense, to review the FY 1973 budget for intelligence and to submit specific reductions from current programs, with particular attention to tactical intelligence.

Significant improvement in the intelligence product is also needed. The NSCIC will afford improved guidance regarding consumer needs. Other changes in the consumer-producer relationship may be needed to achieve a more effective reconciliation of the demands from consumers with the limited resources available for intelligence production. It seems desirable in this connection, that resources devoted to analysis and production should increase and that a determined effort be made to upgrade analysis personnel and analysis methods. More rewarding careers for intelligence analysts, including the opportunity to reach high salary levels while remaining analysts, should be considered. An early task of the DCI should be the preparation of a comprehensive program focused upon improving the intelligence process and product.

Richard Nixon

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243. Minutes of Secretary of Defense Laird's Staff Meeting[1]

Washington, November 8, 1971.

Attendees

Mr. Laird
Mr. Packard
Mr. Froehlke
Mr. BeLieu
General Palmer (for Gen. Westmoreland)
Governor Chafee
Mr. Warner
Admiral Zumwalt
Dr. Seamans
Dr. McLucas
General Ryan
General Chapman
Lt General Vogt
Dr. Rechtin (for Dr. Foster)
Dr. Hall
Mr. Henkin
Mr. Kelley
Mr. Moot
Dr. Nutter
Dr. Wilbur
Mr. Shillito
Dr. Tucker
Mr. Buzhardt
Mr. Wallace
Mr. Baroody
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Solomon
Dr. Walske
Mr. Friedheim
Mr. Peter Cook
B/General Pursley
R/Admiral Murphy
Colonel Furlong
Colonel Boatner
Mr. Livesay

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 028, Chron Files. Top Secret.

1. Attendance.

Mr. Laird began meeting 0932. He said he had asked Admiral Moorer to go to Thailand, Cambodia and Japan after their trip to South Vietnam. Admiral Moorer will be back this coming week-end. General Westmoreland is testifying this morning on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty; General Palmer is attending. Dr. Foster is meeting with his French and German counterparts; Dr. Rechtin is attending.

2. Secretary Laird's Trip to South Vietnam.

[Omitted here are reports on Vietnam.]

3. New Intelligence Organization.

Mr. Laird said the new Intelligence organization announced by the President over the week-end[2] has been worked on for 7 months. Before Mr. Froehlke left to become Secretary of the Army, he was working on the matter. He provided Defense comments on the report prepared for the President by Dr. Schlesinger, who was with OMB at that time.[3] The part of the new organization that bothers Mr. Laird is that they included tactical intelligence, which we had recommended against. OMB feels we have been wasting millions of dollars in the tactical intelligence field. They feel each service is duplicating collection of data. Mr. Laird feels some duplication is necessary in this area. He asked Mr. Froehlke to comment.

Mr. Froehlke said he hoped someone would explain to him what really happened. It is his guess that CIA Director Helms may not be pleased with his new assignment. Mr. Laird said one change that happened while he was gone to South Vietnam is that Helms was to be Chairman of the Net Assessment Group, but it is now in the NSC staff. Mr. Froehlke said he felt it was impossible to put Mr. Helms in charge of all budgeting. Mr. Laird said this was language Mr. Froehlke agreed to. He is not to get involved with our budget detail. The meeting set up for today concerns this. He does not want everyone going over to the meeting today. Mr. Packard said we plan to send Dr. Hall and Fred Buzhardt only. It is his understanding that Mr. Helms has agreed not to get into our organization and tell us what to do. Mr. Laird said he thinks that is the way it ought to be. We do not want to get into difficulty over this situation.

Mr. Packard said it was important for everyone here to understand we made some moves of our own in the Intelligence field, including the appointment of Dr. Hall, to improve management of our Intelligence resources. The steps we have taken are in the right direction. He wouldn't propose that OMB get into our business any more in the future than they have in the past. We will make the decisions. As far as

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[2] Document 242.

[3] Printed as the second attachment to Document 229.

net assessment goes, he doesn't know how it will work and he personally doubts it will make any sense. We will continue to improve our ability to make net assessments, particularly net technical assessments. We want to provide better information to our services and commanders to improve their techniques and ways to deal with the enemy threats.

Mr. Packard said there are things directed to be done by the Department. We have been directed to consolidate the 3 services' mapping activities into one agency. We should be able to do this under a scheme which would enable the requirement for each service to be fully responded to as well as those for the JCS and Unified and Specified Commanders. This is a problem we will have to work out among ourselves. In the field of tactical intelligence there are questions which can not be dealt with outside of this building. This involves military matters, tactics, command, etc. As far as the investigative activities are concerned, we will handle them along the lines Mr. Froehlke and the Defense Investigative Review Council set up. These functions will be transferred over to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). He thinks we can work under the new over-all procedures consistent with what we previously planned. We will keep on course and consider our previous plans carefully. As he indicated at his press conference last Thursday, we need less not more White House involvement.

Dr. Hall said there were two things about the new set up that were bothersome depending on which way they go. Mr. Laird said they might change the idea of taking Mr. Helms out of the assessment business. Mr. Packard said he felt our course would be to continue our own capability of making assessments. Mr. Laird said he is sure some people had gotten the wrong idea about this reorganization, that it will result in saving a billion dollars in the Department of Defense budget. They should not read this into the matter and this reorganization should not be sold on that basis. Dr. Seamans asked how did this discussion compare with the newspapers reporting Mr. Helms becoming the czar of the intelligence field. Mr. Laird thought this was the problem of reading only the first few paragraphs of the release. Mr. Froehlke said the placement of net assessment organization certainly came as a surprise to him. Mr. Laird said he had released a statement on the intelligence reorganization last Saturday.[4]

[Omitted here are reports and discussion on nine additional subjects.]

The meeting adjourned at 1038.

R. Eugene Livesay
Staff Secretary

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[4] A copy of the statement released to the press by Laird on November 6 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 028, Chron Files.

244. Editorial Note

The White House announcement on Friday, November 5, 1971, of the reorganization of the intelligence community (footnote 2, Document 242) came as a surprise to two senior Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) and its chairman, J. William Fulbright (D–Arkansas), both of whom publicly complained about the failure of the administration to consult the Congress. (Symington was also a member of the Armed Services Committee, which had a subcommittee on Central Intelligence chaired by Senator John Stennis (D–Mississippi).) A telephone conversation between Kissinger and Symington sometime in the morning of November 11, 1971, went as follows:

"K: For somebody I like so much you keep going after me.

"S: It's not you; it's the policy. You know that.

"K: I know. You are a good friend and when we are all out of here you will still be. I'm calling about the intelligence reorganization. First, you are absolutely right; I don't know why there was no Congressional consultation before. This wasn't done in my shop. My shop was part of the study . . . but that is no excuse. What I am going to do is to ask George Shultz to come up and see you next week when he gets back in town to explain the Office of Management point of view. Secondly, the purpose of this reorganization wasn't to enhance my office, but to give [get?] other members of the committee to state their aims. I can levy requirements now on behalf of the President; I don't need a committee to do that. It, if anything, limits me personally, but the major test of it isn't what it does to me. My role is marginal; it actually tends to enhance the role of Helms.

"S: Here is where we got off the track. Friday night it began to get around. People came to me and asked what was going on. I hadn't seen anything and I said I didn't know about it. That's embarrassing to have to say that, but you know this committee hasn't met once this year, and that has got to be changed. So I'm awakened in the morning by an early call from a reporter and I have to say I don't know anything about it. Then I read the morning paper. I came to the office. I called CIA and asked to speak to Helms. He was out of the country. There was no one there who would talk with me. I got upset about it. I got home and finally there was a call, and there was a member of the CIA staff who was kind enough to deliver the White House press release to me at my house on Saturday afternoon. I said 'what does it mean?' He said, 'we don't know. Henry, you can't run a railroad like that. By that time I was getting calls from all over my state.'

"K: I don't know what Helms told his people, but he was fully informed, as was the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We ran it

through the intelligence community many times. But the members of the committee should have been informed. There's no excuse for it. And I'm not finding fault with what you said.

"S: I know you well enough to know you wouldn't have. There's no one in the Executive Branch I respect more than you. But if these people there aren't going to tell us what is going on, who is going to?

"K: I will have Shultz give you a briefing.

"S: What about my suggestion that Stennis call his committee together and give it to all them.

"K: Right. Because we ought to try to keep intelligence from being controversial if we can avoid it.

"S: Marchetti (?) said there is steadily increasing pressure . . . My closest friend was Truman's legal advisor. He left plans which assured that it couldn't be administered by the military. Then out comes this general who is a nice guy but as military as they come, who is going to operate it and Helms to coordinate it, and you've got a committee with the Joint Chiefs . . . and they go off to the races.

"K: Helms . . . to maintain control. If Helms is only coordinator then it's not doing its job. I would complain about that. Some people thought of moving Helms out of the CIA; I urged very strongly that he stay.

"S: He won't be a figurehead.

"K: No. We want him to have more of a voice in military intelligence.

"S: I spent more time with some people on Saturday—so it wasn't a jumping off of mine.

"K: No, you are not immoderate. These are reasonable concerns of a serious man. And I'll do what I can to get a briefing for the committee.

"S: And if the committee doesn't want it, then I want it for the Foreign Relations Committee.

"K: They should have it." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. All ellipses are in the source text)

On the same morning at 10:40 a.m. Kissinger called Senator Fulbright:

"K: Two things I'm calling you about. You made some comments about the intelligence reorganization. I agree with you that the committee should have been briefed. This was a slip-up. It was done mostly in the Office of Management and Budget, and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was involved. What I would like to do is when George Shultz comes back—he is out of town now—have him come up and brief you and Senator Symington. My role has not been enhanced by this at all.

"F: It reads that way.

"K: I know it does. And you are not unjust in your comments. Now reports have come to me on behalf of the President. We have got a committee of all the consumers, State and anyone interested, to establish broad guidelines. But the test is whether Helms, his staff and the boards reconstituted for him can get a hold on it and get an integrated approach. It's not to increase White House influence. You didn't make a big case of it, so I'm not complaining. George Shultz is out of town. Are you will to receive him next week to get a run-down on what his intention was?

"F: Sure. Certainly. Glad to.

"K: The second reason I'm calling is if you ever feel like having lunch, breakfast, or a meeting with me alone so I can answer any questions you might have which are harder to answer in the larger group, I am at your disposal.

"F: Good, thank you. A free lunch. I'll take you up on it.

"K: I'll even come to the Hill and let you take me.

"F: When I get this foreign aid off my chest I will be able to. They have me here from 9:00 in the morning until 8:00 at night. But it's almost over now; we are on the floor with it right now.

"K: I will let you go, but whenever you feel you have the time, let me know and I'll do it wherever it's most convenient for you." (Ibid.)

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245. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSCIC Activities

You are scheduled to chair the first meeting of the NSCIC at 3:00 p.m., Friday, December 3, 1971. Talking Points for that meeting will be provided on December 1.[2]

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973. Top Secret. Sent for information.

[2] Marshall's talking points, forwarded to Kissinger on December 3, are ibid.

It would be useful if we could meet to discuss how you prefer the NSCIC to function. Here are some ideas and issues to think about:

—A primary function of the NSCIC will be the issuing of authoritative guidance to Helms and the community with regard to the quality of the product and its responsiveness to high-level decision makers' needs.

—In addition, the NSCIC should supply its best judgments as to the major shifts in top level decision makers' needs over the next five years.

In the assessment of the quality and scope of current product, you should play a major role because of your position and your comparative advantage in drawing upon key sources for the assessment of the current product. These include:

—Evaluations of selected products, or product areas.

—Judgments of the NSC staff involved in the NSSM process as to the intelligence input they receive.

—Net Assessments undertaken by the Net Assessment Group should reveal specific intelligence deficiencies.

The other members of the NSCIC will probably designate some one to provide staff support to them for this committee. A matter for you to think about is whether you want me to meet regularly with these designated people to prepare for the meetings of the NSCIC.

The provision of top-level judgments regarding major shifts in future needs is important. The intelligence community has never received appropriate guidance on this matter. They have not substituted their own judgments, and in consequence have not done much forward planning focused upon intelligence production. Whatever planning they do appears to be driven by the major hardware elements of collection programs. The NSCIC should try to change this situation. A major question is how best to obtain the appropriate judgments. What sorts of studies might be useful as a basis for your or NSCIC judgments? How might they be done?

There are some other intelligence-related matters I would like to discuss with you. They could be addressed in the NSCIC, but might also be kept separate. They are:

—U.S. offensive cover and deception planning and operations.

—U.S. defense against foreign deception operations.

These are, I believe, currently neglected areas.

Procedural Issues

—How frequently to meet? Initially once a month would be useful.

—Additional attendees, at least at some meetings? Representations to attend have been received from Treasury, AEC, and OMB.

246. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 40 Committee (Jessup) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Possible Ways to Improve 40 Committee Procedures

It does no harm to have a look at work in progress. In this connection, facing an election year, two summit-type visits, and who knows what unforeseen crises, it seemed worthwhile to examine what we have been doing in the covert action approval process and to determine if there is any way to streamline the procedures.

In any approach to the type of material discussed in these meetings, it should be emphasized that there is no other existing forum in which covert actions designed to remain nonattributable can be approved.

You, yourself, made it quite clear on 17 October 1969[2] that covert action proposals approved by the 40 Committee are automatically cancelled if not reviewed annually.

Therefore, in a sense we are in a box. To create another committee to handle non-urgent nickel and dime projects would hardly be efficient.

At Tab A is a list of pending approvals, mostly renewals, which fit the context of this memo.

At Tab B is a memo worked on by Colonel Kennedy and myself which analyzes the type of projects reviewed since 1 January 1970. Three additional breakdown charts are attached to that memo as Tabs C, D, and E.

However, I can recommend that we adopt the following step: On such routine matters as renewals and/or completely noncontroversial projects we could do the ground work in advance by clearing the paper through the other principals, getting their o.k.'s, determining whether they have any questions or reservations, then submitting a group of them to you with the normal NSC staff input, and you could sign off or resubmit as an agenda item as you saw fit, much in the same way as the monthly JRC reconnaissance schedule is handled.

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Records, The 40 Committee. Secret; Eyes Only; Outside System. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. The tabs are attached but not printed.

[2] See Document 195 and footnote 2 thereto.

Such a system would save your time as well as the time of others and get the papers cleared more rapidly than now when less pressing items are just postponed from week to week. The meetings would have a lower tedium factor, and specific projects of more immediacy could be handled more promptly.

In other words, Action projects such as [*1 line of source text not declassified*] could take their place in meetings as Category 1 items, whereas obscure [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] et al could be packaged as Category 2 items in a folder for your consideration after all staff work is completed.

I would recommend we try this. Any member who disputes a paper (no matter how innocuous) would, of course, have the right to raise his objection in a meeting and provoke discussion. Dealing with a small intimate group of six persons well known to each other, this could be done easily.

Approve[3]

Disapprove

Other

[3] Kissinger initialed this option.

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247. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Implications for the Department of the President's Reorganization of the Intelligence Community

The President's reorganization of the management of U.S. Intelligence activities is a hopeful and timely move toward strengthening the entire Intelligence Community. The Department of State is likely to benefit substantially from the improvements visualized, since most of the

[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Functions and Responsibilities, 1965–1986.

problems which intelligence agencies are trying to solve relate to key elements in American foreign policy and the conduct of our foreign relations. As you commented some time ago when this reorganization plan was under review, the Department of State ought to play an active role in helping establish the procedures and policies of the "new" system and should be better integrated at all levels in it than in the past.

The reorganization is designed, first, to provide a more positive means for the users of intelligence to define and obtain the intelligence they need in order to reach and implement policy decisions, and, second, to give the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), under the guidance of the new NSC Intelligence Committee, greater responsibility and a stronger hand in the management of U.S. resources dedicated to the collection and production of intelligence.

I believe that this is a strong move toward making intelligence and policy truly "partners"—so that policy may become more informed and effective, and intelligence more purposeful and efficient. It will also give the State Department a greater degree of influence in the intelligence process, influence that it requires if it is to play the role of leader of the foreign affairs community. It is not yet clear how the skeleton structure created by this reorganization directive is to be fleshed out or how the elements in the structure will in fact perform their new roles. This very uncertainty, however, gives the Department an opportunity to act as a catalyst in bringing about much needed improvements if we seriously address ourselves to the task.

The Department's stake in getting and using high-quality raw and finished intelligence is great. Much of what we need is collected and produced by the Department of Defense and CIA, but State itself is an active collector (foreign political and economic reporting) and producer (INR Notes and Studies). It is also a prime user. In many of its activities, for example in preparing for SALT or responding to NSSM's, the Department is obliged to measure carefully the impact of intelligence on its own preferred policy positions and on the proposals of other participants in the national planning process. The intelligence input in this process often serves to define the problem and the environmental conditions under which the problem must be attacked, thereby automatically limiting the range of feasible policy options. The Department cannot afford to rely on the judgments of others on what intelligence to collect or what conclusions can be drawn from it.

State needs good intelligence not only as a basis for its own policy proposals but also for sophisticated interpretation (and, if necessary, rebuttal) of information cited in support of other policy proposals. The cheapest and most effective way to obtain what the Department needs is to make the entire interdepartmental intelligence apparatus

work in a coordinated effort with a strong input from State. Unfortunately, the more limited the role State plays in the work of these interdepartmental groups, the more dominant will be the intelligence judgments and preferences of CIA, of Defense, and of other larger, more bureaucratically aggressive elements. Influence in policy-making and the skillful use of intelligence go hand in hand. In everything related to foreign affairs, State should take a leading role. This principle dictates a strong performance by State in the entire new structure established for the management of intelligence activities.

State's Role in the Intelligence Community Today

Following World War II, the intelligence programs grew for many years at a steady rate, and funds were available for most intelligence needs. More recently, this situation has changed. We are faced with sharply rising intelligence costs when our political leaders are demanding a sharp reduction in the cost of the total intelligence program. Those in need of intelligence to meet their responsibilities must now prepare to fight for programs in which they have a vital interest, whether these programs are managed by Defense, CIA or State.

State today is a user of intelligence, a collector, and a producer. State must perform well in all three spheres, not only for the welfare of the Department but also for the benefit of the government as a whole. State is a major collector of intelligence in that its political and economic officers in foreign posts are a primary source of intelligence on the countries in which they are posted. A recent survey estimated that each year State invests 1065 man years in this activity, and this figure does not include those involved in embassy support activities. These resources, viewed in comparison with the resources of other agencies, need to be taken into account in determinations of the effectiveness and balance of the total U.S. collection effort.

Making sound judgments about U.S. intelligence collection programs requires State to do some serious analysis of the problems involved. Some collection capabilities are so flexible they can be redirected in a matter of hours, but many require advance preparations ranging from months to years. Consequently, sophisticated judgments must be made on need and political feasibility far in advance of actual employment of these capabilities. Such judgments rest in turn on planning assumptions about the location, nature, and severity of threats to our security, on the state of our relations with various countries, on the opportunities for U.S. initiatives in support of our objectives, and on the various types and availability of operating facilities that can serve our intelligence needs. State's views on these questions ought to weigh heavily in decisions on what intelligence to collect, how to collect it, and how much to collect. If State does not have views to put forward, it will in the end get less of what it needs and more of what others want.

State today is also a producer of finished intelligence. By Presidential directive, State has long had primary responsibility within the Intelligence Community for political and sociological intelligence, worldwide, and for economic intelligence on the free world. Over the years, CIA has also developed a capability to produce both political and economic intelligence. CIA production staffs in these areas of State's primary responsibility have grown to sizes much larger than those in State. We are fast approaching a situation, if we have not already reached it, in which the NSC staff and the President depend on CIA and the DOD for the analysis of most of the political and economic activities of foreign nations. These areas of intelligence production traditionally belong to State, since State is the main collector and evaluator in these fields. Usually the quality of our personnel is superior and more experienced, but the greater manpower resources of other agencies sometimes outweigh our efforts.

State sometimes usefully plays another role in the Intelligence Community. It often has an opportunity to provide the political and foreign-policy guidance which helps to determine the appropriate size and focus of collection and production programs. In this process, it is necessary to ensure that there is an effective interaction between intelligence program directors and end users. An input reflecting the knowledge of users at policy and operational levels in the Department of State, carefully weighed against existing and potential intelligence capabilities, is crucial for the effective guidance of collection and production.

Though State is a principal user of intelligence and has important collection and production responsibilities, State's budget for intelligence is small. INR spends less than [*dollar amount not declassified*] a year. The total annual expenditure by State for intelligence, if we include most Foreign Service reporting, would be considerably less than [*dollar amount not declassified*]. The Defense intelligence budget specifically so identified runs to about [*dollar amount not declassified*] and other tactical intelligence activities would greatly enlarge this total if they were included. These intelligence systems managed by Defense provide information of vital importance to the conduct of international affairs, and thus to the Department of State. Today State's influence on the allocation and management of resources in this large Defense program, as well as those in the somewhat less costly CIA program, is by no means commensurate with State's interests in ensuring an optimum intelligence data base for foreign policy planning and the conduct of foreign affairs.

Opportunities Offered by the Reorganization

While the precise impact of the reorganization of the Intelligence Community will not be clear for some time, I am confident that the

new organization offers State an important opportunity to strengthen its role in the whole broad spectrum of intelligence activities. In fact, the potential gains for State are of such importance that we should make a special effort to ensure effective implementation of the new plan.

You are to be a member of the most important of the new committees, the *NSC-Intelligence Committee (NSCIC).* This body will provide general guidance to the Community as a whole, and will make final determinations on assessments of the intelligence product in terms of current and potential contributions to the formulation and execution of national policy.

The *NSC-Net Assessment Group (NAG),* supporting this committee, will be charged with responsibility for making assessments of U.S. foreign and military policy. It is intended for these net assessments to be made in such a manner as to bring to the same table both planners and intelligence officers familiar with the subjects under review, a procedure that some planners and intelligence officers have long recommended. It has the principal advantage of forcing realism upon the planners and requiring relevance from the intelligence officers. As you know, State already has a net assessment project underway and is the only department that has actual current experience with this method of policy analysis. This experience should enable State to approach the work of the NSC Net Assessment Group from a position of strength.

The reorganization will give the Director of Central Intelligence a larger and stronger personal staff. We understand that it will be composed of the *Office of National Estimates and an expanded National Intelligence Program Evaluation group (NIPE),* including a comptroller. I believe that the NIPE staff will play an important role in working out the imbalances and duplications of the past. I am developing within INR a group capable of establishing an effective interface with that staff at all levels, for it is there that we can do some of our most useful work. We are of course already very closely involved in the work of the Office of National Estimates.

The role of the *United States Intelligence Board (USIB)* seems likely to be narrowed and, if so, it will no longer be the highest intelligence group of the land. It will now have a sister committee, the *Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC),* responsible for advising the same person, the DCI. We do not yet know how these two boards will function in relation to each other, but we do know that we now have two more-or-less equal bodies, one responsible primarily for matters of substance and the other for intelligence resources. Membership on the Resources Committee should give us an opportunity to strengthen our influence on intelligence programs of vital importance to our own intelligence analysis and to the development and implementation of our foreign policy.

State Organizational Measures in Response to the Reorganization

Interim Response. I propose getting an early grip on emerging issues involved in the reorganization so that State can influence the formative growth of these new institutions. I have instructed a small group of INR officers presently assigned to interagency relations to stay in close touch with the NSC and DCI staffs and to report to me any opportunities or requirements for a State input. I am designating other officers to discharge new planning and liaison functions stemming from the reorganization. For the time being, they will operate as an ad hoc Special Intelligence Studies Group attached to my office. The head of this group will be our principal point of contact with your staff for planning and carrying out the responsibilities we will share with it and with other elements of the Department, particularly S/PC, whose views will be essential inputs to the solution of intelligence management problems.

Long-Term Response. Generally speaking, I foresee a response from State to this reorganization on three levels. You may wish to set up, perhaps in your own staff or in S/PC, a net assessments group that would be responsible to you for global and regional policy analysis and for working closely with the PARA guidance group. The work of this group would also help INR to define systematically the intelligence needed by State for foreign policy purposes, and would work with INR to provide support for you in the NSC Intelligence Committee.

The new structures and processes of this reorganization will benefit from active participation by many elements of the Department. Because of the need for careful orchestration of a variety of activities, and the specialized nature of much of the subject matter and programs, it is my belief that you should place primary responsibility in INR, which already is very active in certain aspects of this work. We will need some strengthening in numbers and capabilities, but I feel fairly certain that it would be the most effective manner in which to meet this challenge.

I cannot overemphasize the fact that for the Department to achieve effectiveness in the new organizations, it will be necessary for us to go deeply into the analysis of intelligence systems and capabilities, alternative allocations of effort, and potentials of new systems. Experience has shown that we cannot successfully provide direction and guidance for intelligence programs by reviewing and expressing information requirements in the abstract. We need to formulate our needs in full awareness of the wide variety of intelligence collection systems, existing and potential, which might satisfy them.

We need to express these requirements not only in ways that will reflect our policy and operational needs, but also in ways that can be directly translated into the nature and scope of intelligence collection and production. The Department will need to provide its own judgments

in the whole interacting process between guidance of intelligence capabilities and the end-use of intelligence. We will need in INR a few more staff officers with the required expertise in (a) assessing intelligence programs in terms that are meaningful for policy and operational end-users, and (b) applying policy and other end-use considerations to intelligence programs.

State will also need to strengthen its capability to produce finished intelligence in the political and economic fields. It is a deficiency that has been highlighted in the Management Survey of INR of this year, and I anticipate that the NSCIC can profitably address itself to this problem. The Management Survey estimated that INR ought to have 20% more positions (67) in order to carry out our present responsibilities effectively. We have used the Survey's recommendations as the basis for our budget request for FY '73. The additional responsibilities imposed by the reorganization may require us to expand this number somewhat, but I recommend we wait until we get some working experience with the new structure before planning anything beyond our FY '73 request.

If, on the contrary, INR remains understrength in critical areas, it is doubtful that the Department will be able to play the active role it should. In the early days of the reorganization, we have no choice but to work with the people we now have, but we should be able to grow as the work does and as it is possible to recognize our accomplishments on behalf of sound foreign policy planning and efficient management of foreign affairs.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing analysis, I recommend:

1. That the Department of State play a leading role in providing sophisticated guidance for the management of U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
2. That INR take primary staff responsibility for energizing Department efforts and coordinating Department inputs in this interdepartmental process.
3. That for this purpose INR be exempted from the 5% cut.
4. That for this purpose INR be permitted to recruit, by outside hire if necessary, the additional skills and experience it requires, on a case by case basis.
5. That to support these activities and to carry out the President's injunction to improve intelligence analysis, INR next year be enlarged along the lines of the Management Survey's recommendations as spelled out in our FY '73 budget submission—if necessary going to the NSCIC to get slots assigned to State at the expense of other intelligence agencies.
6. That you establish a net assessments group somewhere in the Department to collaborate with INR in capitalizing on the experience we are now gaining in this approach to policy planning and to assist INR in its work with the NSC Net Assessments Group.

248. Editorial Note

The President's memorandum on the "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community" (Document 242) directed the staffs of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to make appropriate revisions in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives no later than December 1, 1971. On December 1 Kenneth Dam, Assistant Director of OMB, forwarded the revised versions of NSCIDs numbers 1 through 8 to Henry Kissinger, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. He noted in his covering memorandum that the revisions were the product of a tripartite joint effort and accommodated "to the greatest extent possible" the views and suggestions of the Departments of Defense and State. (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973) Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff forwarded the revised NSCIDs to Kissinger under cover of a December 2 memorandum in which he noted that the Departments of Defense and State still had concerns about the revised NSCIDs; Marshall also raised a concern of his own. (Ibid.)

Under cover of a February 11, 1972, memorandum, Dam forwarded newly revised NSCIDs to Kissinger. After noting that NSCIDs numbers 2, 7, and 8 had not been changed since December 1, he explained the revisions made in NSCIDs numbers 1 and 3 through 6 and appended relevant memoranda from the Departments of State and Defense and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (Ibid.) Marshall forwarded the revised NSCIDs to Kissinger under cover of a February 11 memorandum in which he recommended two final revisions, which Kissinger accepted. (Ibid.)

The revised NSCIDs became effective February 17: #1. "Basic Duties and Responsibilities," #2. "Coordination of Overt Collection Activities," #3. "Coordination of Intelligence Production," #4. "The Defector Program," #5. "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," #6. "Signals Intelligence," #7. "Critical Intelligence Communications," and #8. "Photographic Interpretation." (Ibid.)

249. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community

REFERENCE

The President's Memorandum of 5 November 1971[2]

In referent memorandum you requested that I submit to you within thirty days plans for the appropriate delegation of my current authority for the management of the Central Intelligence Agency and for increased staff support in my new role as outlined in that memorandum.

I attach hereto a copy of the kind of delegation of authority to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence which would seem to be in keeping with your directive.[3] When General Cushman's replacement is sufficiently indoctrinated, I will sign such a paper for him. You are of course familiar with the concerns Senator Stennis has about this delegation. The action vests in the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence all of the authorities necessary for managing and directing the plans, programs, and day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, including certification of the expenditure of confidential funds. In fact, the only significant authority not delegated is the extraordinary authority, as set forth in Section 102c of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to terminate the services of employees in the national interest, which my General Counsel advises I may not delegate. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence may, of course, exercise this unique authority when he is Acting Director of Central Intelligence.

I am also submitting herewith a tentative organization chart,[4] setting forth our thoughts about how to organize for the new role you have given me. I will plan to build on the small staff which heretofore

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to Shultz and Anderson. Odeen and Marshall forwarded Helms' memorandum to Kissinger under a December 14 covering memorandum that stated: "The general direction Helms' plan takes appears adequate and appropriate. Andy Marshall will continue to monitor the staffing for Helms' new role. All appears to be going well so far." A notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. (Ibid.)

[2] Document 242.

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] Attached but not printed.

has been helping me with various intelligence community responsibilities and which will form the nucleus for the expanded structure. As you will see from the chart, I am planning to set up a staff the elements of which will be focused on the several objectives and tasks outlined in referent memorandum, along the following lines. A community comptroller's office will be established, supported by a staff which will maintain year-round contact with the management of the various programs which comprise the U.S. intelligence effort. This office will assist me in drawing up the consolidated intelligence program budget and will provide the essential staff support for the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee. This office will perform all the usual functions of planning, programming and budgeting for the over-all program. Another section, which will work very closely with the comptroller's office, will be concerned with planning and program evaluation to assist in reaching decisions on the optimum makeup of our foreign intelligence program and in looking ahead to future needs. This will include an element which will monitor and evaluate the community's research and development program to insure that it is properly focused and in support of the objectives of the total intelligence effort. In this section I would expect to have performed the detailed analysis and evaluation of programs from which to make decisions on the most effective combinations to produce the intelligence required. The third component of the staff will serve the dual function of acting as the contact point for the evaluations of the community product stemming from the National Security Council Intelligence Committee and the Net Assessment Group, and examining ways and means to improve the community's production capability. Through this component I would expect not only to monitor community performance with respect to individual intelligence tasks, but also to examine the various intelligence organizations to see where their procedures and methods might be improved. In all this, the essential goal will be to improve the quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product. These, together with the expanded United States Intelligence Board and its important subcommittees, should provide the structure needed to discharge my broadened community responsibilities.

The present estimate is that this increased staff will be on the order of 80 professional and clerical personnel. They will be drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency, from various elements in the community and, in a few cases, from the outside.

Dick

250. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:12–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSC Intelligence Committee Meeting (NSCIC)

The first meeting of the NSCIC was held this afternoon.[2] It was devoted to a generalized discussion of what the Committee would attempt to do, and how it would operate. In brief, it was agreed that, consistent with the President's directive establishing the Committee, it would attempt to "give direction and guidance on National substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products" from the point of view of the policy maker/consumer. Each agency was asked to provide a list of those intelligence requirements which should be accorded highest priority, as well as identify those intelligence activities which are of marginal importance to it. This exercise is to be completed in about 10 days, with the next Committee meeting to take place in approximately two weeks.[3]

There was also some discussion of the desirability of identifying "tactical intelligence" (that is, intelligence utilized by the military commanders in the field) and keeping it outside the intelligence budget, i.e., in the military services budget as it has been in the past. Dick Helms indicated that Senator Ellender was pressing hard for this procedure so that the consolidated intelligence program budget would not look so large. There was a general expression of agreement in principle to this approach. Henry asked Defense for a paper describing its conclusions on how to deal with some of the tactical intelligence programs.

It is obviously too early to judge how useful a contribution this new Committee can make. It could provide the Department with a forum, which it has to some extent lacked in the past, for expressing our views on requirements which we have as well as identifying areas of

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 US. Secret. Drafted by Weiss on December 3, cleared by Cline, and forwarded to Rogers on December 4. The date and time of the meeting are from Kissinger's Record of Schedule, December 3. (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) For another record of the same meeting, see Document 251.

[2] Although the memorandum is dated December 4, the meeting actually took place on the afternoon of December 3.

[3] The NSCIC did not meet again in 1971 or 1972.

negligible interest. In any event, I have instructed INR and S/PC to handle this matter on the most restricted basis possible, consistent with an active State participation in this Committee. Until we learn more about its operation and utility, I think it sensible to keep those in State who are involved, to a minimum.

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251. Minutes of Meeting[1]

Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:12–3:35 p.m.

NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State—John N. Irwin, II
Ray Cline
Seymour Weiss
Defense—David Packard
Dr. Albert C. Hall
J. Fred Buzhardt
JCS—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
V/Adm. John P. Weinel
CIA—Richard Helms
Thomas Parrott
Justice—John N. Mitchell
NSC Staff—Philip A. Odeen
Andrew Marshall
Jeanne W. Davis

Mr. Kissinger: This group has been given the task of providing direction and guidance on the substantive requirements for intelligence and for an evaluation of intelligence products from the point of view of the consumer. I believe there is a lot of preliminary work that needs to be done, and I propose that this be undertaken by a Working Group chaired by a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, in his new capacity. All the agencies here would be represented. This group would consider what work needs to be done. Budgetary questions will be handled in other groups.

We have also created within the NSC staff the Net Assessment Group which Andy Marshall will direct. Some of the issues, of course, will be brought to this group for an overall look. Our principal purpose today is to see if anyone has any other ideas. I suggest that each

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a December 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) For another record of the same meeting, see Document 250.

agency prepare a statement of what they believe our intelligence requirements should be. If we can have those in ten days, we would plan to meet again in about two weeks. We can look at the requirements and make them the charter for the Working Group. After that has been done and the Working Group commences its operations, this group could meet again in about two months.[2] I see no need for this group to meet too frequently. Is that a reasonable approach?

Mr. Helms: Indeed it is. This group need not meet too frequently. At its first substantive meeting, however, it might consider what the government needs in the way of intelligence and what we can do without.

Mr. Kissinger: You all want to give up countries, not intelligence.

Mr. Helms: We can bring suggestions and have them accepted or not accepted. All the right people are in this group and each has a vote.

Mr. Kissinger: I suggest at the next meeting each agency be prepared to state what they think is dispensable. That would be important to determine. There may be no consensus, but that in itself is good to know.

Mr. Packard: I think that's an oversimplification, but it is an issue that we should address. We can't just make a list of things, but there are certain things which should be brought up.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We obviously can't decide at the next meeting that X number of assets are no longer needed, but we should look at categories. Tactical intelligence, for example, needs looking at. The Working Group can address these issues systematically.

Mr. Packard: They can prepare a plan of action—what needs to be done.

Mr. Kissinger: Both for requirements and for things that might be changed.

Mr. Cline: Are you speaking in terms of subjects or programs?

Mr. Kissinger: I mean what it is we need to know about each part of the world.

Mr. Cline: We've got a lot of material on that. But, after agreeing what we want to know about Pakistan, for example, we have to consider whether we want it badly enough to expend the necessary funds and resources.

Mr. Kissinger: We will develop a work program at our next session.

Mr. Helms: There are several references in the paper to tactical intelligence. Senator Ellender wants to get tactical intelligence out of this machinery. He considers it an embarrassment on the Hill, since it in-

[2] The NSCIC did not meet again in 1971 or 1972.

creases the size of the intelligence budget and the Congress can't do anything about it. He wants to put it back in the Services.

Mr. Packard: That's what we want, too.

Mr. Kissinger: That is certainly a subject to be discussed. I have no fixed view on it.

Adm. Moorer: But the general approach, with its centralized control in Washington, zeroes in on tactical intelligence. It simply won't work. Field commanders need real-time intelligence, and centralization in Washington just means trouble. We went through this same thing on logistics in Vietnam, and it took us two years to get the responsibility back to the field where it belonged. You create a real danger to combat readiness when you degrade tactical intelligence.

Mr. Kissinger: But this plan doesn't move tactical intelligence closer to Washington.

Adm. Moorer: There are some moves in that direction.

Mr. Packard: What about the Sosus system—is that tactical intelligence or not? That should be left to the Services.

Mr. Cline: That's a warning system.

Mr. Kissinger: We believe tactical intelligence should be in the hands of the people who use it. One argument for this organization is that it will help avoid some duplication in the name of tactical intelligence. This doesn't have to be done here.

Mr. Packard: There are some issues that should be addressed. For example, we have two different groups in Japan and one in the Philippines, all trying to get tactical intelligence on Cambodia.

Mr. Kissinger: We want to find some mechanism to examine the question. I am told some of these recce missions I approve every month are new tracks. I can't define the existing tracks and I don't know the reasons for each track. I look for some special situation. I am told some of these requirements were established in the fifties and that no one receives them regularly. I don't know if that's true.

Adm. Moorer: It's not exactly true. I had started all commands on a detailed review of each track with a view to reducing them. This work is almost finished. Then we will come to the point of judging the risks of changes—whether we can accept the risk of overlooking some vital intelligence.

Mr. Kissinger: I remember when the EC–121 was shot down,[3] we considered reviewing all the tracks, but it was never done on an independent basis. (to Moorer) Let's get your report, including some gross judgments on the number of tracks, the reasons for them, etc. Then we can make some political judgments.

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[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIX, Japan and Korea.

Mr. Packard: Our intelligence mission around the perimeter of the Soviet Union was largely in support of our bomber mission. In the last two years we have greatly increased our capability through COMINT and ELINT satellites. We've also increased our photographic ability. We should consider whether the satellites can replace some of our flights.

Adm. Moorer: [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] I also want to take a strong position on the question of operational control of platforms. NSA is a technical outfit—they can't control the platforms. These aircraft have other missions—air-sea rescue, some defense, etc. NSA should have SIGINT operational control but not of the platform.

Mr. Packard: You're talking about the idea of a National Cryptological Command.

Adm. Moorer: I'm just taking advantage of the presence of everyone here to express my views. There is some evidence in the paper that you're talking about NSA command of the whole operation.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's plan to meet again in two weeks. Let's try to have your papers in by a week from Monday (December 13) on your view of the requirements, what areas of possible duplication we should look into, the relation of tactical intelligence. I see no reason why tactical intelligence can't be broken out of the budget.

Mr. Mitchell: I agree.

Mr. Helms: The Senate is starting to get up tight about this. We'll have a bad enough time without forcing more dollars into the intelligence basket.

Mr. Kissinger: Since we're all here, do we have a late report on Mrs. Gandhi's speech? For the Paks to attack four airfields at dusk doesn't look like a general Pakistan attack.

Mr. Helms: I agree, but it's what Mrs. Gandhi is hanging her hat on. It's just an excuse.

Mr. Kissinger: That's too irrational. I hate to think what India would do without their tradition of non-violence!

Mr. Cline: The Indians hit back about 15 minutes after the Pak air attacks on the airfields were reported. That's a pretty fast reaction.

252. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Comptroller (Moot) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Establishment of a Central Security Service

Background

By his 5 November 1971 memorandum on organization and management of the intelligence community,[2] the President directed the establishment of a consolidated cryptologic command. This memorandum was subsequently amplified and clarified by the 1 December re-draft of National Security Council Directive No. 6.[3] The Directive creates a Central Security Service (CSS),[4] under the Secretary of Defense, to conduct all DoD SIGINT collection operations.

A number of different options to accomplish this purpose were considered, the more important of which were:

1. Create a command organization at NSA Headquarters to supervise the SIGINT and COMSEC operations of the military departments and the commands. This involves minimum change to present arrangements.
2. Consolidate all DoD SIGINT and COMSEC organizations and dedicated SIGINT mobile collection platforms into a single cryptologic service. Of the options considered, this involves the greatest degree of change.
3. Consolidate SIGINT and COMSEC monitoring operations, as a Central Security Service, under a single operational chain of command, while preserving departmental administrative command, logistic, training, readiness and support responsibilities for their SIGINT and COMSEC organizations. Leave command organizations of dedicated

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971. Secret. Hall forwarded the draft memorandum to Packard under cover of a December 8 memorandum in which he stated that the draft memorandum was prepared by his staff and edited by Cooke and himself. Hall also sent a copy to Haig on December 8, who forwarded it to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 229, Defense, Vol. XIV Nov–Dec 71)

[2] Document 242.

[3] A copy is attached to Marshall's December 2 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973) NSCID 6 was reissued on February 17, 1972.

[4] This was not our choice of titles; we would have preferred "Cryptologic Support Service," if given the option. [Footnote in the source text.]

SIGINT mobile platforms as is, but make the operation of these platforms subject to CSS mission control.[5]

Of the above, we recommend Option 3 as the most feasible way of carrying out the purposes of the President's directive within the existing framework of the DoD organization and command structure. There is one overriding issue between ourselves and OMB and that is the definition of operational control as it appears in draft NSCID 6. OMB would have it include total control of the SIGINT activities and the platforms, with extremely limited delegation of operational control by NSA under emergency conditions. Our position is that a non-dedicated platform should be controlled normally by the appropriate military commander and that under certain emergency circumstances control of the SIGINT assets should be delegated to the tactical commander. We have not yet fully resolved this point with the OMB and NSC staffs. We are working on it.

Concept

Under this concept, a Central Security Service (CSS) will be established under the Director, NSA, who would concurrently be designated as the Chief, CSS. As he does in his capacity as DIRNSA, the Chief, CSS would report directly to you. The Services and the JCS have recommended that the Chief, CSS report to you through the JCS. We feel that a direct reporting relationship to you is the proper one, for reasons, which appear to us to be compelling. Your executive agent responsibilities for national SIGINT transcend those of the Chiefs or DoD alone. The CSS must serve as your operating arm for those responsibilities. The recommended relationship parallels the existing DIRNSA–SECDEF relationship as well as that now existing between DIRNSA and the SCA's. It would be contrary to sound management principals for DIRNSA to report directly to you in one capacity and report through an intermediary in another as Chief of the CSS.

For the purpose of direction, control, and conduct of their operations, all SIGINT and COMSEC monitoring organizations and units of the military departments and the commands would be designated as subordinate elements of the CSS, while retaining their departmental identity for administrative command, logistics (including COMSEC logistics), training, readiness, support, and wartime expansion. Under this arrangement, the chiefs of the military department SIGINT organizations would concurrently be designated as chiefs of their re-

[5] Mission control is defined as the authoritative direction of operations, by tasking, target assignment, and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed and reported. [Footnote in the source text.]

spective Service elements of the CSS, but the tasking channel would run directly from the Chief, CSS to individual operating activities, much as it does now from DIRNSA to present COMINT intercept stations of the Services.

Under its chief and a two star deputy, the CSS would be responsible for conducting all DoD SIGINT and COMSEC monitoring operations, including the provision of direct service and direct support to operating commanders, as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Specific provision would be made for military commanders in the field to put overriding tasking on CSS units in satisfaction of emergency requirements, or, where essential, to conduct their own emergency SIGINT operations in satisfaction of emergency situation requirements.

The Chief, CSS would have authority to exercise mission control (operational and technical control) over CSS subordinate elements, to direct short-term shifts of manpower among elements as the situation requires, to establish the mission requirements for SIGINT mobile platforms not under the CSS, and to prepare concurrent/fitness efficiency reports on the commanders of CSS subordinate elements.

This concept is somewhat similar to that of a unified command. The Chief, CSS has operational responsibility and authority and control over his subordinate elements in very much the same sense as does the commander of a unified command over his components; the parent departments retain administrative and logistic responsibility in both cases.

Impact on Current Arrangements and Procedures

Establishment of a CSS will have its strongest operational impact in the field of ELINT operations, which will come under single operational control and management, in contrast to the present fragmented ELINT structure. COMSEC monitoring also passes from the military departments to the CSS operational structure, with administrative and logistic COMSEC functions staying in the departments. The provision of direct support units becomes the responsibility of the Chief, CSS, supplanting the individual military departments.

Essentially, there is no change in the process for submitting and responding to national SIGINT requirements, and in the tasking of SIGINT units to respond to these requirements, except that the CSS now becomes the vehicle for tasking and response, via a strengthened chain of direction and control. We do propose to introduce specific provisions for the CSS to respond to emergency requirements of the DoD at any level of command on an override basis. As regards fiscal control procedures, DIRNSA will need to exercise a somewhat closer management over current year resources of the military departments than he now does. This can be accomplished within your current policy on intelligence resource management.

Similarly, little if any change is anticipated in training, logistics, and other functions of a non-operations nature.

We envisage a more active role for NSA in ELINT RDT&E, both as coordinator and participant.

In personnel management, we have provided that the Chief, CSS, submit concurrent fitness/efficiency reports on the commanders of his subordinate elements. This will enable him to appraise their effectiveness in accomplishing the operational portion of their mission, and is totally in consonance with his position as director of DoD SIGINT operations.

Anticipated Improvements

Establishment of a CSS as proposed herein is expected to produce significant benefits in management of SIGINT, particularly ELINT. A far more coherent ELINT effort is expected to result in more efficient ELINT operations, tangible savings in resources, and a more responsive output.

Finally, the creation of a CSS, having a military organizational relationship with its operating elements and the power to evaluate performance of the commanders of those elements, will correct an anomaly of long standing, in that it will provide an organizational structure which is in proper consonance with operational responsibility.

Proposed Implementing Directive

We propose that the directive provisions covering the CSS be ultimately incorporated in a comprehensive directive covering the National Security Agency, the CSS, and the functions of both, replacing the current NSA charter. However, for the purpose of the immediate review of specific directive provisions to establish the CSS within the time limit set by the President, a draft directive for this purpose, and embodying the concepts expressed herein, is attached at Tab "A."[6]

Schedule for Implementation

As provided in the implementation paragraphs of Tab "A," we propose that the directive become effective on publication, to meet the President's desire for an effective issuance by 1 January. However, the CSS should not be established until you have approved a time-phased implementation plan for this purpose, as prescribed by the NSCID. Accordingly, our proposed directive charges DIRNSA to prepare and submit such a plan for your approval, and delays establishment of the CSS until you approve the plan.

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[6] Attached but not printed.

I recommend that you approve the concepts and proposals in this memorandum and approve in principal the draft directive at Tab "A."

Robert C. Moot[7]

[7] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

253. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

JCSM–546–71 Washington, December 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Department of Defense Organizational Change—Central Security Service (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) (Comptroller), dated 6 December 1971,[2] subject as above, which requested review, coordination, and comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposed plan, and supporting rationale, for consolidation of Defense signal intelligence (SIGINT) activities.[3] The plan, if implemented, would establish a Central Security Service (CSS).

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in certain of the organizational concepts and command relationships described in the draft DOD directive nor in certain of the rationale supporting these proposals, as outlined in the draft memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, for the following reasons:

a. It is believed that the intent of the President's directive[4] is to establish an organization to provide a cryptologic support service rather than to establish a unified or specified command in the accepted sense of that term. The intent is believed to be placement under one organization of the separate SIGINT collections reserved for the individual

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0197, 350.09 SIGINT 1971. Secret.

[2] Not found.

[3] See Document 252.

[4] Document 242.

Service cryptologic agencies (SCAs). The SCAs would in essence be components of this organization. It is considered that there was no intent to transfer military operational control of the collection platforms, installations, and personnel currently assigned to unified and specified commands. This control should be retained by the commanders of the unified and specified commands in their respective theaters.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the organizational alternative proposed in the draft DOD directive which would have the Chief, CSS, report directly to the Secretary of Defense. In order to insure appropriate responsiveness to military requirements, the Chief, CSS, must be required to report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, it is recommended that the CSS be established under the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA). DIRNSA as Chief, CSS, would report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as DIRNSA, he would report directly to the Secretary of Defense. This alternative would not include the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command on nonmilitary SIGINT matters, yet it would provide for their guidance on matters which directly affect military requirements, capabilities, and operations. Implementation will neither denigrate nor dilute the purpose or intent of the Presidential directive. Rather, it will serve to strengthen the integrity and posture of the US cryptologic structure. The preponderance of US SIGINT effort is directed toward military needs and, as such, should be subject to prudent guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. One of the stated objectives in the President's memorandum is, "The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of . . . military . . . policies of the US Government and the planning for the conduct of military operations by US Forces." Placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly in the chain of command for military matters will provide a ready mechanism for the rapid and orderly transition from peacetime to crisis or combat conditions when required. The organizational and structural nucleus of SIGINT capable military forces must be retained and must be readily available to insure immediate responsiveness to the direct support requirements of all military commanders.

d. The functions of the CSS should be restricted to SIGINT control, defined as follows: "The authoritative direction of SIGINT operations by tasking, and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported." No activity other than communications intelligence and electronic intelligence (ELINT) should be incorporated within this organization, since these were the only two functions addressed in the Presidential memorandum. Communications security (COMSEC) matters are not considered to be within the scope of the proposed directive.

e. The CSS should not be responsible for "conducting" all SIGINT operations. Specifically, collection normally should be performed by the SCAs under SIGINT control of the CSS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that establishment of the CSS will have its strongest operational impact in the field of ELINT operations. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree that this reorganization will result in a "far more coherent ELINT effort, more efficient ELINT operation, and a more responsive output." The nature of noncommunications electromagnetic radiation activities requires that certain detection and intercept activities be integrated, or, as a minimum, be in direct-dedicated support to weapon systems and/or decision making requirements of operational commanders. Reaction time alone dictates this requirement. Removing these vital activities from the operational control of an operational commander will seriously inhibit his combat readiness.

3. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft charter directive, and their comments and recommendations are contained in Appendices A and B hereto.[5] A line-out/line-in version is presented in Appendix A, and a clear version is contained in Appendix B.

4. (S) The recommended changes to the draft DOD directive reflect the issues discussed above and provide a viable organization responsive to both national and military SIGINT requirements.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer

[5] Appendices A and B are attached but not printed.

254. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, December 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Central Security Service

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971. Secret. The memorandum was prepared in Hall's office but does not include drafting information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Packard saw it.

In commenting on the proposed plan to establish the Central Security Service,[2] the Military Departments and DIA support the JCS views and objections. However, of the Departments, Air Force finds the concept the most objectionable, Navy supports completely the JCS position, and Army is the least vocal in their objections. In fact, Mr. Froehlke does not concur with the Army staff concerning placing the JCS in the chain of command between the CSS and SecDef.

NSA does not attempt to do a rewrite of the proposed Directive, but enunciates certain principles with which they assert the draft Directive is not consistent. In a nutshell, NSA would prefer to form a National Security System under DIRNSA, comprised of the NSA, the SCAs, and all other SIGINT activities and functions. DIRNSA would then respond to all requirements, and would meet the needs of military commanders as he (DIRNSA) determines to be the most effective means. He would maintain close liaison with the JCS and subordinate commanders, but any decision regarding the use of any SIGINT resources would be made by DIRNSA, as the single manager.

The major issues surfaced by the JCS, DIA and the Services involve the chain of command, direct support, mobile platform control, ELINT, and COMSEC monitoring. A rack-out of these issues is listed below:

A. *Chain of Command.* Except for Mr. Froehlke, the JCS, DIA and the Services strongly urge that the Chief, Central Security Service report to SecDef *through the JCS* to insure responsiveness to military requirements and to provide for rapid and orderly transition from peacetime to crisis or combat conditions. With this command structure JCS could also measure the military effectiveness of the CSS. Navy pointed out the need for centralized military direction to avoid *Pueblo*-type incidents.[3]

B. *Direct Support.* Directly related to their desire to place the JCS in the chain of command over the CSS is the Services' fear that direct support will not be responsive to or available for their requirements. Air Force, recognizing that COMINT is the single most important source of intelligence, believes that the CSS structure would, instead of bringing the COMINT producer and the principal consumers closer together, actually reduce the interface between the cryptologic community and the military authorities, thereby reducing responsiveness to the needs of tactical commanders. Navy emphasized that direct support is essential to a military commander's successful prosecution of his mission, but agreed that technical control is best exercised by a central cryptologic authority.

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[2] See Document 252.

[3] See *Foreign Relations,* 1964–1968, volume XXIX, Part I, Korea, Documents 212–331.

C. *Mobile Platform Control.* The Air Force urges that the Chief, CSS *recommend to the JCS and appropriate military departments* (vice *specify*) deployment, scheduling and mission profiles of mobile SIGINT collection platforms. The JCS and Navy recognize that the Chief, CSS will exercise SIGINT control of these platforms, but agree with the Air Force that deployments, etc. should be only in the form of recommendations. As reasons, the Air Force cites operational constraints and basing requirements and capabilities, while the Navy mentions functions of command and peculiarities of Navy operations.

D. *ELINT.* Quoted herewith is the JCS view:[4]

"The CSS should not be responsible for 'conducting' all SIGINT operations. Specifically, collection normally should be performed by the SCAs under SIGINT control of the CSS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that establishment of the CSS will have its strongest operational impact in the field of ELINT operations. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree that this reorganization will result in a 'far more coherent ELINT effort, more efficient ELINT operation, and a more responsive output.' The nature of noncommunications electromagnetic radiation activities requires that certain detection and intercept activities be integrated, or, as a minimum, be in direct-dedicated support to weapon systems and/or decision making requirements of operational commanders. Reaction time alone dictates this requirement. Removing these vital activities from the operational control of an operational commander will seriously inhibit his combat readiness."

In addition, Air Force supplies a background paper on Service requirements for ELINT which recommends divorcing COMINT thinking from ELINT thinking in view of the completely different content, use, and interested audience for the two products.

Army, on the other hand, offers no comments, since Army employs ELINT resources only within its Service cryptologic agency.

E. *COMSEC Monitoring.* JCS, DIA, and the Services recommend deletion of any mention of COMSEC monitoring activities, primarily because the President's memo of 5 November[5] addressed only COMINT and ELINT. Also COMSEC monitoring is an integral part of Operations Security (OPSEC), which is a military commander's responsibility. This is a point well taken; however, none of the Services comment on the fact that the SIGINT direct support unit resources actually perform the COMSEC monitoring activity as well. The Navy pointed out that NSA must provide COMSEC advice to the military departments. NSA makes no comment on COMSEC.

F. *Title.* DIA would prefer "Defense Cryptologic Service" or "Defense Security Service" since the CSS is intended to be predominantly associated with military activities and staffed overwhelmingly by

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[4] See Document 253.

[5] Document 242.

military personnel. No mention is made of the CSS national SIGINT collection responsibility.

In summary, the JCS, DIA, Army, Navy and Air Force try to accommodate the establishment of the Central Security Service with the least change possible in the current manner in which the SCAs do business within their departments, and by insuring strong military (JCS) control over all CSS activities. NSA would prefer to take over everything, do the job, and perhaps report to the President, if he so directs. Except for NSA, no one wants to think SIGINT—it is still COMINT and ELINT.

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255. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, December 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSCID #6 and Establishment of Central Security Service

Key issues have been

—JCS desire that new SIGINT command or service report through them.

—Arrangements for the control of SIGINT activities and platforms as between the new service and local military commanders.

Surprisingly there has been little overt reaction to any change in the review and control of programming and resource planning. This is expected to be central in the new ASD(I) office. OMB has been waiting for Al Hall's charter to be agreed upon within DOD to see how adequately this aspect of reorganization will be handled. They expect, and Al expects, that what can be done will be done.

The situation is still evolving. Roger Jones believes that

—The JCS will give up on the reporting issue, there is no support elsewhere for this position.

—The operational control problem will be solved as the specifics of the arrangements are spelled out and compromised upon.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

Moot wants to put off any final considerations by Laird of the issues until after the holidays. He believes that by that time an essentially fully agreed position can be presented to Laird. Jones believes this will be the outcome.

I think we should wait until after the holidays and review the situation again at that time.

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256. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, December 16, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Notes on the First Meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, December 13, 1971 (1430)

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Bronson Tweedy—Chairman

NSC Staff
Mr. Andrew Marshall

State Dept.
Dr. Ray Cline, Mr. Seymour Weiss

Defense Dept.
Dr. Albert Hall (ASD/I), Vice Admiral John Weinel (J–5/JCS), Lt. General Donald V. Bennett (DIA)

Justice Dept.
Mr. Robert C. Mardian

CIA
Dr. E.W. Proctor, Mr. Carl E. Duckett, Mr. John W. Huizenga

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Richard Curl (State Dept)
Capt. James S. Brunson, USN (J–5)
Mr. Paul Walsh (DDI/CIA)
Mr. T. Parrot (NIPE Staff)
Mr. W.E. Seidel (NIPE Staff)

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSCIC–NSCIC Working Group (1971–1974). Secret. The minutes were drafted in CIA on December 16. Tweedy forwarded a copy to Cline under cover of a December 17 memorandum. (Ibid.)

Mr. Tweedy opened the meeting with a review of the NSCIC meeting of 3 December.[2] Particular attention was directed to three items.

1. Dr. Kissinger's request that each NSCIC member prepare a statement of his organization's requirements for intelligence.
2. The feedback from Consumer Product Evaluation and the mechanisms and processes to achieve it.
3. The question of tactical intelligence.

Mr. Tweedy directed the group's attention to the first two items and asked Mr. Marshall to open the discussion and provide the group with his views.

Mr. Marshall stated that the initial problem was to devise some systematic method of arriving at consumer needs. He pointed out that consumer need can be (1) a broad area related not only to an expression of the country and subject involved but also to an expression of the policy problems associated with the need, (2) some idea of how the consumer would like the intelligence to be presented in terms of outline or format, and (3) the depth of analysis required.

Mr. Marshall also pointed out that one may want to consider not only current needs of consumers but also the expectations with respect to policy problems and needs over the next four or five years.

Mr. Marshall concluded this discussion of consumer needs by stating that he had no fixed views with respect to the manner in which consumer needs were to be reported and monitored. He felt that there were two basic approaches, the first a systematic cataloging of needs by consumer with some expression of the consumer's view of the relative importance, and second, an approach which selected specific needs and provided a detailed treatment.

With respect to product evaluation, Mr. Marshall discussed the subject briefly as it related to the needs question and noted that a detailed study of the production function and how it worked might be of considerable use.

The discussion which followed dealt with different aspects of the consumer need and product evaluation problem.

Dr. Hall asked if a definitive statement of the need input could be structured. He suggested a review of product output with respect to specific need, and/or postulating two or three changing situations with respect to need with an attempt to measure the impact of the intelligence apparatus directed against the change.

Mr. Tweedy remarked that one approach might be by type of product such as NIE's with specific consumer feedback as to the change desired.

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[2] Document 251.

Mr. Huizenga said that a system already exists to solicit identification of gaps and new areas of effort desired in the NIE's. He pointed out that DIA and INR also had such mechanisms. Mr. Huizenga also mentioned that the Military NIE's had been restructured considerably in the past year in response to consumer requests. He suggested that this NIE output should be reviewed in terms of how well it met consumer needs.

Mr. Tweedy observed that the Presidential memo[3] indicated some dissatisfaction with the intelligence product and stated that one would hope the group could devise a process to specifically identify areas of dissatisfaction.

Dr. Proctor suggested that the body of NIE's and NSSM responses was a good place to start, analyzing them for both strong points and shortcomings.

Mr. Huizenga proposed that Mr. Marshall might find it useful to make a survey of dissatisfaction in specific product cases.

Mr. Marshall said that in general much of the criticism dealt with a lack of depth in the response and analysis. He indicated as an example, the Soviet decision making analysis approach.

Admiral Weinel stated that the group ought to be specific in identifying the consumer, particularly with respect to echelon. He suggested that NSCIC consumer needs did not relate to third and fourth echelon staff officers but did relate to the Department Secretaries as an example. Admiral Weinel noted that lower echelons had a tendency to inflate needs considerably.

Mr. Tweedy said that he would also include the echelon immediately below the Secretary. For example, the Assistant Secretaries.

Mr. Cline said he had spent 30 years in intelligence attempting to determine what consumers wanted. He noted that merely asking a consumer, "What do you want?" is of little or no value. Mr. Cline suggested that the entire problem of consumer need and product response and evaluation should be built around a case method which would not only offer a problem-oriented capability but would also result in a body of experience and precedents for dealing with specific problems. Mr. Cline suggested that the group recommend to NSCIC the use of this problem-oriented approach as opposed to an abstract process which merely classified the types of needs and products.

Mr. Duckett felt that a matrix might be constructed with evaluations based upon (1) product type, (2) geographic orientation, (3) subject orientation, and so forth. In this manner, Mr. Duckett noted, one could find the highest degree of dissatisfaction in such product type areas as

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[3] Document 242.

current intelligence, weapons system intelligence, political intelligence, etc. The same could be done for the other variables in the matrix. Mr. Dickett said he believed one had to pick the problem areas first in such an approach and gave the example of the India-Pakistan problem.

General Bennett stated that product evaluation should deal with outputs related to the validity of the evidence and the validity of the analysis. They should, he urged, contain definitive statements—"I don't like this because—." He noted the needs of feedback in the case of the JSOP and short term objectives (six months).

Dr. Hall pointed out that the Defense effort had a primary interest in future consumer needs and the intelligence capability to cope with those needs.

Mr. Marshall suggested that the group review current efforts in the community dealing with consumer needs such as (a) the draft DCID 1/2 on Objectives and Priorities, and (b) Lloyd Belt's Project Alpha.

Mr. Weiss suggested an exercise which pulled together community requirements and described (1) what they are, (2) how obtained, (3) whose they are and, (4) what is done with them?

Mr. Cline inquired if each consumer represented on the group was going to submit an expression of his needs. He stated that the State Department was preparing such a needs list along with an expression of its dissatisfaction with the response to date.

Mr. Tweedy proposed that, all consumers on the group submit such an expression of their needs. It was agreed.

Mr. Tweedy also requested that the producers input some aids as to what it is they wish to see critiqued and evaluated. It was agreed.

(Admiral Weinel and Dr. Hall were obliged to leave at 1540 hours and were not present for the remainder of the meeting.)

Mr. Tweedy turned to the Tactical Intelligence problem and distributed a memorandum to the Working Group (see attachment A)[4] for their consideration.

Mr. Weiss noted that the memo appeared to leave no role to the NSCIC in dealing with tactical intelligence. He stated that there was a feeling on the part of NSC policy makers that tactical intelligence has escaped from any control. Tactical intelligence, he said, is felt to be a competing activity relative to national intelligence and should be subject to some broader purview such as the NSCIC. Mr. Weiss stated that this was not a desire on the part of any policy maker to directly control tactical intelligence but merely a desire to look at the problem. Mr. Weiss indicated that he believed this was the view expressed by

[4] Attached but not printed.

Mr. Kissinger at the 3 December meeting. Mr. Marshall agreed to this view.

Mr. Cline suggested that a requirement ought to be added to the memo requesting the Secretary of Defense to present a review of the entire tactical intelligence program to the NSCIC.

Mr. Tweedy offered the view that the group propose that NSCIC request the Secretary of Defense to make tactical intelligence judgments available to NSCIC.

Both Messrs. Cline and Weiss agreed that their principal would like to be informed on the tactical intelligence effort and its rationales.

Mr. Tweedy, in preparing to adjourn, reiterated, (1) Consumer Need Statements were to be submitted before January 17, 1972, and (2) the producer members would submit information on current requirement systems and their desires with respect to product evaluation before January 17, 1972.

Dr. Proctor suggested that the group also solicit consumer need inputs from Commerce and Treasury. Mr. Tweedy said this was desirable but, not before the group had organized its own effort.

Mr. Marshall agreed to communicate with Mr. Tweedy on Mr. Kissinger's plans for an NSCIC meeting. It was agreed that the Working Group would meet as soon as possible following Mr. Marshall's return to Washington on January 17, 1972.

The meeting was adjourned at 1630.

WE Seidel

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257. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, December 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Establishment of a Unified National Cryptologic Command (The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service)

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971. Secret. The memorandum was coordinated with Cooke and General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr.

By his 5 November 1971 memorandum on organization and management of the intelligence community,[2] the President directed the establishment of a unified national cryptologic command under the Director, National Security Agency, and the corresponding revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives including No. 6 on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).[3] In consultation with the staff, Office of Management and Budget, who are responsible for incorporating basic policy changes in the revised National Security Council Intelligence Directives, we have agreed that the President's desires can be accomplished by the establishment of the Central Security Service.

There are still some areas of disagreement between your staff and that of OMB in regard to, (1) the extent to which SIGINT-related equipment integral to weapons systems is to be included in SIGINT operations and, (2) the manner in which a unified National Cryptologic Command is to be achieved. This disagreement stems from an apparently strong OMB concern that there will not be a truly unified direction of *all* SIGINT operations, which they believe is essential if cost savings are to accrue. We believe that our approach is currently the most feasible and practicable.

Under this concept, a Central Security Service (CSS) will be established under the Director, NSA, who would concurrently be designated as the Chief, CSS. As he does in his capacity as Director, NSA, the Chief, CSS would report directly to you.

For the purpose of direction, control and conduct of their SIGINT operations, all SIGINT organizations and units of the military departments and the commands would be designated as subordinate elements of the CSS, while retaining their departmental identity for administrative and logistic support.

Under its chief and a two star deputy, the CSS would be responsible for conducting assigned SIGINT collection, processing and other SIGINT operations. Military commanders will retain normal command responsibility for providing and operating primary mobile SIGINT collection platforms, but the Chief, CSS, will have clear, unambiguous authority to specify (not recommend) the deployment and scheduling for such platforms, subject to the review and supervision of higher authority.

The Director, NSA, will be the program manager for *all* SIGINT resources, except for that equipment which is integrally a part of a weapons system. Establishment of the CSS leads to the strengthening of the functions of RDT&E, procurement and training.

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[2] Document 242.

[3] See Document 248.

This concept closely follows the structure of the unified combatant commands in the Department of Defense, in that the Chief, CSS exercises operational control over his components, but the parent military department retains administrative and logistic support. In this fashion it is expected to optimize flexibility of the management of his operational resources. In regard to mobile SIGINT collection platforms, these play the role of "supporting forces"; that is, they respond to the SIGINT direction of the Chief, CSS, but the platform operating procedures remain the responsibility of the parent military Service.

Additionally, the directive makes provision for appropriate approval by the JRC and the 40 Committee of sensitive missions.

However, there are two major ways in which this concept for the unified SIGINT organization differs from that of a unified combatant command. First, the Chief, CSS, reports directly to you, rather than through the JCS. This is necessarily so, since you are the Executive Agent for the national SIGINT program, the NSA/CSS is your operating arm for this responsibility, and your responsibilities transcend those of the JCS. A second significant point is that the same individual, in his dual capacities as Chief, CSS and Director, NSA fuses the authority of operational control and resource management, thus creating a management structure for multi-Service operations which will be as strong as any such other structure within the DoD. From a practical standpoint it would be unworkable to have the same man report directly to you as Director, NSA and report to you through the JCS as Chief, CSS.

The new directive will have its strongest impact in the field of ELINT operations, which will come under a single manager, in contrast to the present fragmented ELINT structure.

Essentially, there is no change in the process for submitting and responding to national SIGINT requirements, and in the tasking of SIGINT units to respond to these requirements, except that the CSS now becomes the vehicle for tasking and response, via a strengthened chain of direction and control. I do propose to introduce specific provisions for the CSS to respond to emergency requirements of the DoD at any level of command on an override basis, and this problem will be addressed in the implementing plan.

On 6 December, a concept for a Central Security Service was circulated for comment to the JCS, DIA, NSA, and the military departments.[4] With the exception of those from Mr. Froehlke and the NSA, all responses urged that the Chief, CSS report to you *through the JCS* to

[4] See Document 252.

insure responsiveness to military requirements and to provide rapid and orderly transition from peacetime to wartime. In their opinion, such a reporting channel would also insure positive direct support, the dilution of which the Services fear under any other arrangement. For the reasons outlined above, the reporting channel must run from Chief, CSS, to you. Provisions for adequate support are made in the proposed directive.

Control over SIGINT mobile platforms and the conduct of certain ELINT operations were also major issues raised.

The JCS, DIA, and the Services believe that the Chief, CSS, should only make recommendations for the deployment and use of SIGINT mobile platforms. To satisfy fully the intent of the President's memorandum, the Chief, CSS, would have to be in a position to control collection resources across the board. The directive, as written, provides the Chief, CSS with SIGINT operational control but requires him to issue movement requirements through appropriate military channels and leaves command and operation of the platforms with the military commanders.

Also, as a result of the military Services logical opposition to including Communication Security monitoring activities under the authority of the CSS, this feature has been removed from the proposed directive. Existing NSA COMSEC authority is not changed.

The contents of the proposed Directive, which set forth the responsibilities of Vice Admiral Gayler in his dual role as Director, National Security Agency and Chief, CSS, have been staffed informally with the Chairman, JCS, and Director, National Security Agency.

Attached at Tab "A" for your signature is the proposed DoD Directive to accomplish the establishment of an effective "unified cryptologic command."[5]

As provided in the implementation paragraphs of Tab "A," I propose that the directive become effective on publication, to meet the President's desire for an effective issuance by 1 January. However, the full establishment of the CSS will require the preparation and execution of a time-phased implementation plan, provision for which is made in the redraft of NSCID No. 6. Accordingly, this proposed directive charges Director, National Security Agency to prepare and submit such a plan for your approval.

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[5] Reference is to DOD Directive 5100.20, December 23, attached but not printed.

Attached at Tab "B" for your signature is a memorandum to the President outlining your action taken in response to his 5 November memorandum.[6]

Attached at Tab "C" for your signature is a memorandum to Vice Admiral Gayler elaborating on conceptual guidance for him to follow in preparing his plan for the establishment of the Central Security Service.[7]

Albert C. Hall

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[6] Tab B is attached but not printed. In his December 23 memorandum to the President, Laird stated that, in addition to signing the directive establishing a unified SIGINT collection organization, he planned to issue implementing directives for the Office of Defense Investigations (see Document 259) and the consolidated Defense Mapping Agency before the end of the year. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. II) Laird's memorandum and directive establishing the Defense Mapping Agency, dated January 1, 1972, are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 74 45, Signer's Copies January 1972.

[7] Not printed; signed by Laird and dated December 23.

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258. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

JCSM–565–71 Washington, December 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to the draft DOD directive on the above subject.[2]

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the new draft DOD directive[3] concerning the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Security Service (CSS) and can accept the directive with the following understandings:

a. There is no intent to transfer military operational control of the collection platforms, installations, and personnel currently assigned to the unified and specified commands. This control will be retained by

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it.

[2] See Document 252.

[3] See Document 257.

the commanders of the unified and specified commands in their respective theaters. Removing these vital resources from the operational control of the operational commanders would seriously limit their combat readiness and effectiveness.

b. It is intended that military resources within the CSS will be subordinate to the Chief, CSS, for all matters involving SIGINT operations but will remain a part of their parent Service for all other matters. These resources would not become components of a unified or specified command in the military sense of such commands.

c. It is intended that provisions will remain in effect to provide for the delegation of SIGINT control (tasking authority) over assets required for the direct support of military commanders to the commanders being supported. Areas of conflict between the Military Services and the Director, NSA, would be resolved by you.

d. It is intended that the present system for the control and approval of reconnaissance operations, which include SIGINT operations, will remain in effect.[4]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer

[4] Hall forwarded to Laird a proposed reply under cover of a December 30 memorandum in which he stated that "provision is made in the directive for handling three of the issues raised by the Chairman, and I believe these constitute no real obstacle. The fourth issue, that of whether the Service cryptologic agencies will be components of the CSS in a manner analogous to the components of a unified command, is not addressed explicitly in the directive" but "I believe this type of arrangement is essential if we are to be responsive to the intent of the President's memorandum." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971) See also Document 260.

259. Memorandum by Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, December 29, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Establishment of the Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

REFERENCES

(a) Presidential Memorandum dated November 5, 1971, subject: "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community"[2]
(b) SecDef Memorandum of November 10, 1971, subject: "DoD Organizational Changes"[3]
(c) DoD Directive 5200.26, February 17, 1971, subject: "Defense Investigative Program"[4]

By reference (a), the President directed establishment of a single office of Defense investigations. In reference (b), I directed the ASD(Comptroller) to develop a plan to accomplish this reorganization.

I have reviewed the plans presented by him and have decided to approve a time-phased course of action creating a Defense Investigative Service (DIS) as a separate Defense Agency reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. This will be accomplished in three phases:

—On 1 January 1972, the DIS will be established and will function initially as a planning group charged with making necessary arrangements to commence operations on 1 April 1972.

—On 1 April 1972 the case control staff functions of the Military Departments will be consolidated under the DIS, which will assume control of all Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) within the Department of Defense, tasking the Military Department investigative agencies for the field investigative effort. Investigators will remain with the Military Departments. On the same date, the DoD National Agency Check Center (DODNACC) and the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) will be incorporated in the DIS.

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74 083, 310.1 Oct 1971. No classification marking.

[2] Document 242.

[3] See footnote 4, Document 242.

[4] Not found.

—On 1 October 1972, all PSI field investigative resources will be transferred from the Military Departments to the DIS and investigators will be assigned directly to the DIS.

I will appoint a Director of the DIS.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will provide policy guidance and staff supervision for the DIS and is delegated responsibility under the provisions of reference (c) to direct, manage, and review the Defense Investigative Program.

Each Military Department will provide as soon as possible to the Director, DIS, five professional and two clerical personnel on a temporary basis to assist the Director in developing organizational structure, program plans, and operating procedures for the DIS. Direct liaison between the Director and appropriate officials designated by the Secretaries of the Military Departments is authorized to effect cross-servicing agreements for the permanent transfer of personnel to the DIS to proceed with the operations of the agency as set forth herein.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Director, DIS, through liaison with appropriate Military Department personnel, jointly, will ensure that effective performance of personnel security investigations continues during the 1 January–1 April transition period.

In the near future, I intend to appoint a Study Group with a view toward determining whether the DIS functions should be expanded to include counterintelligence and criminal investigation.

Effective 1 July 1972, the ASD(Comptroller) is assigned Program Manager responsibilities for the Counterintelligence and Investigative activities, now vested in the Director, DIA.

The ASD(Comptroller) will assist the Director, DIS, as necessary, and monitor the progress of implementing actions contained in this memorandum.

Melvin R. Laird

260. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (Cooke) to the Secretary of Defense's Military Assistant (Murphy)[1]

Washington, January 4, 1972.

Dan:

I have reservations about the Secretary signing Al Hall's proposed reply to the Chairman in response to the latter's request for clarification of the NSA/CSS directive.[2]

The directive papers over some issues that will surface when the implementation plan comes up for approval. One of these issues is precisely what is intended by paragraph VI A 3 of the new directive which states:

> Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the U.S. Government to respond most effectively to military and other SIGINT requirements. In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, he shall state movement requirements through appropriate channels to the military commanders, who shall retain responsibility for operational command of the vehicles.

It is quite likely that Noel Gayler's idea of what constitutes "SIGINT operational control" will conflict with the Chairman's concept of "operational command of the vehicles."

Furthermore, the Chairman raised the issue with respect to "collection platforms (not necessarily mobile) installations and personnel." The proposed reply deals with only "mobile collection platforms." It is silent with respect to "installations and personnel." I am certain this ambiguity will be interpreted differently by the Chiefs and by Noel Gayler.

In short, the detailed reply proposed will serve to shift the argument from what was meant by the directive to what was meant by the reply and tend to lock the Secretary in. This would serve the boss no useful purpose. He should preserve all his options at this time. I, therefore, suggest a short response—essentially the first sentence of the proposed reply.[3]

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197, 020 NSA 1971. Secret.

[2] See Document 258 and footnote 4 thereto.

[3] Laird followed Cooke's advice and replied to Moorer in a brief January 5 memorandum that "the general intent should be clear in the directive, and the details will be clarified by the implementation plan which I have asked the Director, NSA to prepare for my approval." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 74 045, Signer's Copies January 1972)

If he decides to go with the detailed proposed reply, there is a technical correction that should be made in the third paragraph. A specified command does not have components because it consists of elements of one Armed Force e.g., SAC. A unified command is composed of elements of two or more Services. Therefore, "specified" should be changed to "unified."

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261. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, January 12, 1972.

Dear Dick:

Our discussions of our mutual problems at the Friday ExCom luncheon were very helpful, and I want to follow up on the suggestion that you join us periodically at our intelligence breakfast meetings. We have these breakfast meetings each Friday at seven-thirty, and while other attendance varies somewhat with the subject, Don Bennett, Noel Gayler, Al Hall, and either Dave or I (and often both) have almost invariably attended. We don't use these meetings as decision meetings, but as a forum where a subject can be discussed informally and views exchanged. They have been most helpful in keeping us on all on the same wavelength.

I felt that you might join us, perhaps once a month, for a discussion on a particular subject in which you would be interested. We can arrange this at your convenience, and you can join in the discussion or just listen, as you feel appropriate. Al Hall runs these meetings, and will proceed along these lines if you have no objections.

On a related matter, I will soon approve the charter of our new office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,[2] and want to reaffirm to you that I regard one of his major responsibilities is to represent the Department of Defense in presenting our intelligence programs to you and to serve as a focal point for whatever support you need from us to meet the requirements that the President has asked you to

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 5, Folder 164, DOD. No classification marking.

[2] Document 262.

undertake. I am sure that by working closely with you we can eliminate the need for new staff echelons and still provide you with the reviews you may need to assure yourself of the validity and priority of our programs. I know Al Hall is eager to support you, and he certainly has my full backing.

Sincerely,

Mel

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262. Department of Defense Directive 5115.1[1]

Washington, January 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

REFS

(a) DoD Directive 5100.30, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," dated 2 December 1971[2]
(b) DoD Directive 5105.39, "Director of Net Assessment," dated 6 December 1971
(c) DoD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for the Management and Control of DoD Information Requirements," dated 2 June 1971

I. General

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., one of the authorized positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense is hereby designated Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) with responsibilities, functions, and authorities as prescribed herein.

II. Responsibilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) is the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the management of intelligence resources, programs, and activities, including those for intelligence, warning, reconnaissance, and other related areas which

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 020 Intelligence 1972. No classification marking.

[2] Copies of directives are maintained by the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Pentagon.

may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. His responsibility specifically includes equipment, systems, and activities in the above areas which are organic to military forces or units. He is also responsible for staff supervision of the intelligence aspects of command and control, as provided for in Reference (a).

III. Functions

Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) shall perform the following functions in his assigned field of responsibility.

A. Recommend objectives, priorities, plans, and planning guidance for intelligence resources.

B. Review proposed intelligence resource programs and recommend resource allocations to those programs.

C. Monitor approved intelligence resource programs and supervise their implementation.

D. In conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), formulate budget estimates for the intelligence portion of the DoD budget.

E. Establish requirements for intelligence support of all research and development programs of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.

F. Ensure that R&D project managers are provided intelligence information needed for effective direction of R&D programs.

G. Review the RDT&E intelligence programs of DoD; recommend funding levels and sources of funds for such programs.

H. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense RDT&E requirements and priorities for systems whose primary mission is intelligence and also for those systems for which intelligence should be a secondary mission.

I. Recommend policies for the management of intelligence operations, including operational requirements and priorities.

J. Coordinate intelligence activities within DoD and coordinate, as appropriate, intelligence programs for the DoD with other US Government entities.

K. Provide for DoD representation for international and interdepartmental intelligence organizations and activities.

L. Recommend appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of intelligence functions) which will provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical management of intelligence resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and contribute to improved military preparedness. Monitor and evaluate approved actions in these areas.

M. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense requirements and priorities for net threat assessments of US versus opposing foreign weapons systems. Provide for the development of terms of reference and the preparation of net threat assessments insuring the best available intelligence information is used by DoD Components in the process. Inform the Director of Net Assessment (Reference (b)) of the analyses and conclusions derived from such assessments.

N. Perform other functions as the Secretary of Defense assigns.

IV. Relationships

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) shall advise and develop recommendations for approval of the Secretary of Defense, or, as directed, act for the Secretary of Defense in the performance of the functions which are assigned herein or which may be otherwise assigned. In the performance of these functions, he shall:

A. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with DoD Components having collateral or related functions.

B. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DoD Components rather than unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.

C. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and advice with DoD Components as appropriate.

V. Authorities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), in the course of exercising staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

A. Issue instructions and one-time direction-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate for carrying out approved policies and for establishing management procedures for his assigned fields of responsibilities in accordance with DoD Directive 5025.1. Instructions to the Military Departments will be issued through the Secretaries of the departments or their designees.

B. Obtain such reports, information, and assistance from the Military Departments and other DoD Components, subject to the provisions of Reference (c), as may be necessary for the performance of his assigned responsibilities and functions.

C. Communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, and the Directors of Defense Agencies. Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of all communications with the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands which have strategic or military operational implications.

D. Arrange for DoD participation in those international and interdepartmental intelligence programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

E. Communicate directly with all government agencies participating with DoD in those interdepartmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.[3]

VI. Effective Date

This Directive is effective upon publication.

Melvin R. Laird

[3] In response to Laird's January 3 request for comments on the directive, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans stated in a January 7 memorandum that the "proposed ASD(I) charter surfaces once again the question of centralization. It seems to run counter to the changed environment of delegated authority which you brought to the DoD. It is a difficult balance in management to achieve, but I an convinced that overcentralization in the DoD can inhibit a feeling of real responsibility among the Service secretarial offices and the top military echelons. The personnel in supervisory positions today feel that they are sharing the burden of the complex DoD management problems and are conscientiously applying themselves to these problems. I have reservations that the wording of the charter does not adequately provide for meaningful participation by other members of the DoD intelligence structure." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 020 Intelligence 1972)

263. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, February 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Taking Stock

In your memorandum of February 3, 1972[2] you asked me to take stock of the programs and areas for which I am responsible, assessing past performance and projecting the probable future. Here are my thoughts on each of the questions which you put to me.

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 095, 020 DOD 1972. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it.

[2] Not printed. (Ibid.)

Key Issues During the Past Year

These were, in brief:

—The requirement to implement the President's directive of 5 November on intelligence reorganization.[3]

—The impact of the [*dollar amount not declassified*] Congressional reduction of DoD intelligence programs for FY 72, enacted late in the fiscal year.

—The need to improve our processes for intelligence resource allocation, and to bring the intelligence community into better interface in these processes.

Major Accomplishments

I believe our major accomplishments in intelligence over the past year were these:

—Prompt implementation of the President's directive on intelligence reorganization, particularly in regard to the complex area of Signals Intelligence. The conceptual structuring and planning for the new Central Security Service as the unified operating arm for U.S. SIGINT collection in the time prescribed was a major achievement which should bring about major management improvement and resource economies in this area.

—Our reduction, in the program review process, of the FY 73 intelligence program by some [*dollar amount not declassified*] from fiscal guidance to Congressional submission without loss of effectiveness, and our success in minimizing the combined effects on this program of (1) the carry forward of the FY 72 Congressional cuts, and (2) the additional [*dollar amount not declassified*] reduction directed by the President during budget review. Through these efforts, we have retained what I believe to be a sound and balanced DoD intelligence program at the requested levels of [*dollar amount not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] manpower spaces for FY 73. I should add that improvements in our program and budget review process were a material factor in these successes.

—For the first time this year, we extended intelligence's fiscal review to include tactical intelligence assets, not included in Program III. Through this review we reduced Service requests for tactical programs by [*dollar amount not declassified*] and, were able to be immediately responsive to the requirement in the President's memorandum for attention to the tactical intelligence area.

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[3] Document 242.

Major Objectives Not Achieved

We have fallen short of our goals in the following significant respects:

—*Credibility with Congress.* Congressional opinion still appears hostile. The Conference Report on the FY 72 Defense appropriation cited "a disenchantment with intelligence." From other statements, it would appear that influential members of Congress apply this blanket comment to both intelligence products and management of expenditures.

—*A 7-Year Intelligence Resource Plan.* You directed development of this plan in your original assignment of intelligence management responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) on 1 August 1969.[4] Congress noted the lack of progress last year. From my perspective, lack of progress seems attributable to (1) more pressing demands on staff manpower, (2) lack of an understanding as to how to develop a meaningful plan, and (3) the number of independent variables involved, including those not under DoD control.

—*Compartmentation and Classification of Intelligence.* In your memorandum of 1 August 1969 you tasked the ASD(A) to see what could be done about over-compartmentation and over-classification of intelligence. Over the next two years, substantially no progress was made. This has primarily been due to the position of USIB and the DCI, who have responsibility for this area. DIA proposals to the USIB to relax compartmentation of imagery have not been seriously considered. A series of leaks of sensitive intelligence has also tended to harden Executive Office views against any relaxation of controls.

—*Intelligence Career Development.* DoD intelligence career opportunity, both military and civilian, continues to be unsatisfactory in comparison to other career areas, except in the case of National Security Agency, which appears to have enhanced the effect of special legislation with an enlightened personnel policy. Even here, however, CIA policy is in advance of NSA. White House staff statements to the media, promising improvements related to the 5 November directive, have so far not been accompanied by corresponding initiatives for performance.

Key Issues and Problems Over the Next Five Years

There are several of these; they include both substantive problems and management issues.

Substantive Problems

—*Crisis Management.* We need to tune the intelligence system better to give clear and prompt warning of impending major international

[4] Document 193.

crises and to provide timely intelligence needed for decisions on crisis abatement and solution.

—*SALT.* Verification of any strategic arms limitation agreement will almost certainly depend on intelligence means. Any further SALT talks will continue to require highly responsive intelligence inputs. For both aspects, we must work to bring the intelligence system to peak effectiveness.

—*R&D.* We have two problems in regard to R&D—intelligence support to our weapons RDT&E, and better R&D for intelligence itself. I believe that we can improve the first by better control of intelligence operations and products, tailoring these more closely to the real needs of the R&D community. In regard to intelligence RDT&E, the requirement is for better planning and closer supervision to insure that we focus on those new systems and technologies which are most applicable to the genuine needs of intelligence for improved performance.

—*Improving Relevance of Intelligence Products.* We can't afford to continue intelligence operations which result in products we don't really need or can get along without. Our needs for finished intelligence depend on our basic national security posture; we must realign production (and its associated collection and processing) more closely to the needs of this posture. This means stopping or cutting back some programs, regardless of their traditional position, and moving the resources into what we need most.

Management Problems

—*Keeping A Balanced And Adequate Intelligence Program.* This is going to be our hardest job. Costs—both manpower and technical—are going on up. Congress continues to believe that intelligence is both inefficient and ineffective, and that we can stand more cuts. In point of fact, however, our projected fiscal level for FY 73 brings key programs to minimum levels of investment at which they can remain effective. Further cuts would necessitate stopping some of these programs, and would badly unbalance our overall program. Another factor of fiscal pressure will be the emergence of large new intelligence systems. If cost increases continue, the procurement and operating costs of these systems are almost surely to be higher than we are now projecting. Absorbing increased costs under the probable tight ceiling on overall intelligence resources would be very difficult, since flexibility for tradeoffs will be largely eliminated by previous reductions.

If we are to preserve a sound and adequate intelligence effort, I believe we must progress in the following specific ways:

—Convince Congress that the levels we request for intelligence are necessary and that we are using intelligence resources effectively and successfully.

—Use technology to lessen dependence on manpower.

—Upgrade the quality of the intelligence manpower force, particularly production analysts. Career incentive is the key to this problem.

—Get a better understanding of the relationship between intelligence investment and the usefulness of intelligence products.

—Improve the usefulness of national intelligence resources to tactical forces and make fuller use of tactical intelligence resources for national needs.

—*The continuing problem of over-compartmentation.* Unless they are eased (which seems unlikely), the limitations which this problem places on the use of intelligence will continue to be a source of complaint from key customers. I do not plan much emphasis on this problem now, however.

—*Interface with the DCI.* The strengthened role of the DCI raises questions of his future relationship with the DoD resource allocation process, access to information, participation in resource decisions, etc. A lengthy period of adjustment in this new relationship appears in prospect, and substantial effort in my office will be needed.

How Could We Improve Our Capability or Chances to Deal With the Outstanding Problems

I think our posture of DoD intelligence organization—present and intended—provides a sound base for attack on these problems. In regard to my own situation, I believe that I have the necessary authority and means to move forward.

I am taking the problem of credibility with Congress as a personal assignment. I regard this problem as pivotal to our success in continuing to get the intelligence resources we need. Our objective will be to convince Congress that:

1. You do, in fact, have a focal point for the management of DoD intelligence.

2. Your office is indeed cutting out or reducing efforts that are marginally productive.

3. Your office is providing leadership to develop new means of intelligence collection and analysis to meet the needs of the coming decade.

Albert Hall

264. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 16, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Attorney General
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

NSCIC Working Group Proposed Studies

The NSCIC Working Group has proposed two product evaluation projects. One is a study of intelligence support in political-military crises, beginning with a case study of the India/Pakistan crisis. The other is a study of intelligence support of the NSSM process.

I recommend that we approve the two studies. They will be directed by Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff. In order for these studies to be carried out, access to data and to individuals for interviews will be crucial. All Departments and Agencies will, I am sure, give full support. There will also be a requirement for assistance in manning the study efforts.

Both these studies, and others like them, focus mainly upon the performance of the Intelligence Community in supporting high level decision makers. Some lessons regarding the formulation and expression of needs may result. But these studies may not help us very much in better expressing our needs. Therefore, I urge the Working Group to continue its efforts to design a work program that will assist us in all of our tasks.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973. Secret.

265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, February 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

Staffing of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

Based upon experience since my appointment in November and a review of functions of the office to implement my Charter,[2] I have developed some convictions about the staff efforts that have priority and the staffing levels and qualifications required to conduct them. This memorandum summarizes the situation as I see it.

In addition to certain management functions which are implicit in the establishment of the ASD(I) office and which will be discussed below, there are two which derive from the President's policy stated in his 5 November 1971 memorandum.[3] The first of these is the matter of DoD coordination with the DCI on intelligence matters. I believe that this will require particular care if it is to be done effectively. There should be a focal point for DoD support to the DCI and his staff, if your management of DoD intelligence resources is to remain unambiguous.

The second function deriving from the President's memorandum, which is new and which I believe it is necessary to address explicitly, is the matter of necessary staff support for the OSD representation on the NSCIC. The purpose of NSCIC is to provide a means of objectively evaluating the intelligence product from the point of the consumer rather than that of the producer, and although this function is not new, a case can be made that it has not been carried out very effectively. I believe this function could be strengthened by conducting studies on the use that intelligence has served in specific situations, and as you know, I have proposed such a study of crisis situations. While such studies should be few in number, they must be professionally carried out if we are to learn lessons that we can use.

In addition to the above two activities related to the Presidential memorandum, the following functions are to be undertaken in my office to fulfill the role which you have assigned it.

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 020 Intelligence 1972. No classification marking.

[2] The Charter is Document 262.

[3] Document 242.

1) Net Threat Assessment

Your decision to highlight the function of Net Assessment and your assignment of the role of Net Threat Assessment to my office will require a few highly competent people assigned to this endeavor. We should, from this office, develop policies and methods of thinking to insure that the intelligence community involves itself in net threat assessments to a far greater extent and more competently than it now does. My staff should review what is being done in this area now, determine what effort is needed and its priority, and encourage the development of this capability broadly in the intelligence community. This will require sponsoring directly certain studies which would serve as models to be followed elsewhere. If we are successful in carrying out this function, we should be able to provide you with more meaningful estimates, support other elements of DoD involved in making *net assessments,* improve the quality of intelligence support to the R&D community, and uncover intelligence needs and hopefully do something about them.

2) Warning and the WWMCCS Council

The DoD Directive 5100.30[4] provides that the ASD(I) will be a member of this council and be responsible for the function of warning. To contribute to this vital need, a continuing review of current requirements and existing system capabilities is needed. We have a number of Defense systems now involved in this role, some essential and some which appear to be less so. Some of the systems may require modifications to improve their timeliness or reduce their vulnerability.

In addition to the above new functions, there are several functions which need to be strengthened that have existed in one form or another, either in my office or elsewhere in OSD. The three most important follow:

1) Technical Evaluation

I believe that our intelligence product, our collection resources, and our analytical capability need to be reviewed much more thoroughly. We need to review the intelligence product provided by DIA and NSA to satisfy ourselves that they conform to the highest standards of professionalism. We should determine which of our collection resources are providing the most important information, and if other resources may no longer be essential.

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[4] "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," December 2, 1971; see footnote 2, Document 262.

2) R&D Reviews

I believe that the R&D effort in our intelligence programs needs to be reviewed particularly carefully to insure that we foresee our needs and work on projects which will lead to operational systems. Two general objectives, for example, which may be particularly important, are to find means to strengthen our tactical forces with better intelligence support and to find means by which we can improve our capability to foresee and handle crises. Dr. Foster has agreed that this function of R&D reviews should be carried out in my office and we, in turn, should support his need to have an overall review of the DoD R&D program.

3) Congressional Relations

It seems clear that substantially greater effort must be placed on this function by my office than heretofore. The underlying reasons are an apparent congressional suspicion of our intelligence efforts and the different role of DCI to Congress. To remedy this situation, we need to develop (and coordinate) principal and supporting testimony to appropriate congressional committees that convinces them that the different components of the intelligence budget are in balance and directly relatable to tangible intelligence needs.

The following is a summary of the personnel requirements to carry out the functions described above.

	GS–16 & above PL–313	*General Officers*	*GS–15 & below*	*Military 06 & below*	*Admin. Support*	*Total*
Required	10	2	14	15	25	67
Allocated	4	1	6	8	11	30
On-Board	3	1	6*	7	12	29

*Plus two on loan from NSA

Albert Hall[5]

[5] Printed from a copy that indicates Hall signed the original.

266. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Net Assessments

I. Issues for Discussion

You and I should meet soon to discuss a number of issues arising out of the NSC Net Assessment Program:

—The nature of net assessments.
—The functions of the NSC Net Assessment Program.
—The program I favor.
—The appropriate division of labor between your Program Analysis Staff and the Net Assessment Group.
—The appropriate strategy to follow in carrying out the program.

II. The Nature of Net Assessments

It is important that we be clear as to just what kinds of net assessments you want. You have a number of options from which you can choose:

—Traditional intelligence reporting which focuses on the intentions and capabilities of other countries.
—The more recent work of systems analysis which tends primarily to compare systems in terms of cost and effectiveness, and to define problems rather narrowly (using the technique of suboptimization).
—The NSSM studies which try to measure various military balances of power (as in the NATO Central Region) by assessing the outcome of hypothetical military engagements.
—More extended analyses which look not only at current balances, but also at the competition itself, the competitiveness of the U.S., and the factors that influence our standing as well as other nations' perceptions of the future status of the great powers.

My own view is that, while all of these efforts should go forward, your net assessment staff should focus on the development of the fourth option—the more extended analyses. You will find a further discussion of this issue at Tab A.

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973. Top Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on page 1 of the memorandum, "I want to see Marshall soonest." Haig wrote, "Coleman, schedule Tues or Wed, send to *Andy*." The tabs are attached, but not printed.

III. The Functions of the NSC Net Assessment Program

If you agree that the NSC should foster the more extended analyses, a second issue concerns the functions that we should establish for ourselves. Here again, there is a range of possibilities:

—Monitoring of net assessments performed in other parts of the government, but mostly in OSD.

—Setting intellectual standards for this new and developing area of analysis.

—Improving the product by encouraging the development of needed methodology and providing critical feedback to suppliers of important data inputs, especially the intelligence community.

—Producing net assessments on selected key problems through a small high quality program based on interagency working groups.

—Providing you in streamlined, well organized and indexed form summaries of the most up-to-date net assessment work.

Depending upon my ability to acquire suitable staff and office space, I believe that we should perform all five functions.

IV. Current Plans

Currently, because my staff resources are virtually non-existent, I cannot say that we actually have a net assessment program underway. You have indicated, in any event, that you may wish to indicate the nature and types of assessments that we should undertake. You will find a listing of possible assessments at Tab B. We need to select from this menu.

My own preference is to proceed with three major endeavors:

—A general survey of the scope and quality of net assessment work currently available or underway, and an evaluation of the organizations that do it. A start on this project is already being made by Pat Parker acting as consultant to Al Hall in OSD.

—A major study of the comparative efficiency with which the U.S. and the USSR produce, maintain, and develop major military capabilities. This study should test the hypothesis that the U.S. is becoming an excessively high-cost producer of military capabilities; it should also explore the ability of the two powers to mobilize for more intense competition.

—A net assessment of the strategic nuclear balance and the perceptions of it by various international actors.

These three studies are discussed further at Tabs C, D, and E.

V. The Division of Labor

In conducting studies of this character, it is clear that my work has the potential of overlapping with that of Phil Odeen. I am eager not only to avoid a duplication of effort within the NSC staff, but also to prevent our making redundant demands on the intelligence community, DOD and State.

Since there is more than enough for all of us to do, we should have no trouble in working out a reasonable division of labor. I propose that Phil and I deal with the issue on a case-by-case basis in a way that gives you maximum support. At some point, however, you may want to give a more general definition of our respective responsibilities.

VI. Strategy of Implementation

There are several issues concerned with implementing a serious net assessment program which you need to resolve:

—Pat Parker's appointment as my deputy for net assessments is still up in the air. It simply cannot be left there much longer.[2] One way or another, I need a decision on his future.

—My own view is that the production of really innovative net assessments will require a long-term and sustained intellectual effort. I am inclined, therefore, to invest the bulk of our resources in studies whose payoffs will come a year or more in the future. You may have a different preference.

—Since net assessments will require new analytical techniques, affect important bureaucratic interests, and cause controversies, it is important that some independent, innovative and relatively objective centers of analysis exist. There may be some role for the Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs) in this new area; another possibility is to promote several assessment groups within industry (as the intelligence community has done with Earshot and Westwing). The role of the NSC effort may have to be confined to persuading others of the need to sustain existing capabilities and the creation of new analysis assets. But some NSC contracting may be essential.

—I have mentioned to you that State and DOD were starting net assessment efforts of their own. State has now dropped its program as the result of recent personnel cuts and is confining itself to liaison with whatever we do at the NSC. DOD, by contrast, is embarking on a major, three-level effort.

- A program in DDR&E devoted to assessment of the technical threat and focused on U.S.-Soviet R&D programs.
- A new effort under Al Hall, the ASD/Intelligence, directed toward an assessment of U.S. and Soviet weapon systems performance.
- A project reporting directly to Laird on overall force comparisons between the U.S. and USSR.

In part, the DOD interest is natural; but it is also defensive and intended to preempt the NSC net assessment effort. Exactly how we should deal with these programs is an interesting issue. I believe that we should try very hard to establish a cooperative relationship with the DOD staff and attempt, at least initially, to influence their work through informal persuasion rather than official direction. The general survey suggested above can probably be accomplished without a for-

[2] Kissinger put a question mark in the margin next to this sentence.

mal directive. You may prefer another approach. To the extent that official direction does become necessary in connection with our studies, it may be useful to differentiate the net assessment process from the NSSM process by the issuance of especially designated National Security Assessment Memoranda (NSAMs). You may also wish to issue a NSDM establishing the charter of the NSC Net Assessment Group.[3]

[3] Marshall sent Kissinger a follow-up memorandum on March 21 in which he noted that "some decisions are needed" and restated the net assessment program listed under "IV. Current Plans" in his March 15 memorandum. At the top of page 1 of the March 21 memorandum is written, "AM says issues settled orally 31 March 72." (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973)

267. Aide-Mémoire From the Director, National Security Agency (Gayler) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, March 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

NSA Plan for a Central Security Service

As possibly useful background in your discussions with Defense and the Congress I want to outline the status of actions relating to the formation of a Central Security Service (CSS).

As requested by Mr. Laird, I submitted on 1 February an organization plan for the CSS. Mr. Laird sent the proposal to the JCS for comment. After much intensive study and discussion, including several conversations between the Chiefs and myself, and some revisions to the original proposal,[2] the Chairman yesterday notified SecDef of JCS concurrence in the plan. It is now with him for approval.

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 12, Folder 386, NSA/Central Security Service. Secret; Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

[2] In a February 29 memorandum Hall notified Laird that Gayler's plan for the establishment of CSS was received on February 1 and referred for comments to the JCS, the military departments, and selected offices within Laird's staff. "In general, reactions to the plan to date are negative. On 18 February, the JCS recommended the plan be returned to Admiral Gayler for rework, and this morning his revised plan was received." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 020 NSA 1972)

The plan provides for:

• a unitary SIGINT system, with centralized management and decentralized or centralized operations, pragmatically decided;
• functional division of responsibilities among NSA, CSS, and the Service Cryptologic Agencies;
• mission and staff responsibilities to be assigned on a nonduplicating basis: NSA to manage, task, and produce; CSS to operate; SCA's to provide men, equipment, and facilities which constitute the CSS;
• a joint staff serving the Chief, CSS; staff functions absorbed largely from previous SCA operations staffs;
• added emphasis to serving specific needs of the tactical military commanders;
• improved system-wide coordination of planning and programming, logistics, RDT&E, and specialized SIGINT communications;
• improved system-wide coordination of both military and civilian career programs;
• improved system-wide coordination of cryptologic training;
• added attention to system design and operations research;
• procedures for improved dialogue between SIGINT producers and SIGINT users.

The CSS will consist largely of the present field operating stations of the SCA's. The CSS Chief and his staff will direct field operating elements authoritatively. Advantages accrue from consolidation of various staffs into the Joint Staff of the CSS, improved interface between the SIGINT system and its users, and a better potential to zero in on the specialized needs of the military commander.

I have attached for reference a copy of the Executive Summary to the Plan as originally proposed.[3]

Warm regard

Noel
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

[3] Not attached.

268. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Report on Intelligence Activities

When we last met, you asked for a report on my activities related to intelligence. This memorandum supplies that report.

It also recommends several actions:

—As chairman of the NSCIC that you task Helms to prepare and submit to the NSCIC a draft statement of his view of major political, military, and economic trends affecting the world environment over the next five years. Such a draft would provide the NSCIC with a starting point from which it might produce a statement of top level decision makers' needs. It might also be useful as a basis for preparation of the President's 1973 foreign policy statement. A memorandum from you to Helms is attached at Tab A.[2]

—That an effort be made, under my direction, to prepare a classified statement which you might issue giving your views as to major trends in the world environment and the major policy issues likely to concern top level U.S. decision makers. A proposal on how a draft for your consideration could be prepared is included.

Background

I assume that my basic objective is to get you and your staff better, more useful intelligence. I am attempting to do so by working toward the development of a long term program of improvement in intelligence products through:

—Efforts to make sure that the implementation of the President's intelligence reorganization by the DCI adequately reflects concern for product improvement.

—Participation in NSCIC Working Group activities, in particular the direction of NSCIC studies.

—Efforts unilaterally to obtain for you and the NSC Staff improved intelligence products.

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[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Log Numbered Series, 1971–1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote the following message to Marshall on page 1: "See my notes. I also want to discuss ASAP." The memorandum was returned to Marshall through Haig who initialed it.

[2] Document 269.

The underlying causes of the numerous deficiencies in intelligence products you and I perceive cannot be overcome in the short term. Within current intelligence capabilities, selected product areas can be made more responsive through improved communication of your needs and critical review of products, with feedback to the analysts. But to obtain major improvements across the board will require significant changes in intelligence community programs and practices. Key problem areas are:

—Overload of analysis resources. The budget allocation for intelligence analysis is probably too low as compared with the collection budget. Since intelligence is a free good to consumers, the response of the producers is to emphasize volume output at the expense of quality.

—Career incentives for analysts are insufficient to attract and hold good people.

—Training in intelligence analysis is limited and ineffective. Essentially intelligence analysis is in the craft guild stage—people are trained through apprenticeship.

—There is almost no research and development on new analysis methodologies within the intelligence community.

Current Activities

Monitoring the Reorganization Implementation

Let me express my concern to you about the pace of the implementation. Helms has been proceeding very slowly and cautiously. There appears to have been a decided shift in responsiveness to the President's goals in the period from mid-December to mid-January. In mid-December things seemed to be moving along fairly well. In mid-January the view of Helms's people changed to "tell us what is wrong and we will change it," rather than one of "we see the President's objectives, we are looking for opportunities to improve and are taking action." The process of creating the staff to support Helms in his new duties slowed appreciably. Also, the goals as to staff size and activities were reduced. For example, the part of the new staff devoted to product improvement, which had been advertised in December as having ten people, is now more likely to have four or five people. Even now the final TO&E of the group is not established.

I have supplied you with a memorandum to Helms asking for a six month progress report on May 5. When we have his reply, we can decide how best to proceed toward the President's goals. Until recently Helms has had some basis for holding back. Since the first of the year he has had no Deputy at CIA, although that post has now been filled. Packard left and the relationship of Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense is a key one. Rush has been fully on board only a relatively short time. But basically the problems lie elsewhere. In my judgment we probably will have to put some pressure on Helms to get more rapid progress toward the President's goals.

NSCIC Activities

I have begun two series of studies that you authorized as Chairman of the NSCIC:

—Studies of intelligence support to high level decision makers in times of political/military crises, and
—Studies of intelligence support to the NSSM process.

Two of these studies are now underway, one on the Indo/Pak crisis, the other intelligence support to NSSM–69 (Asian strategy).[3] The Indo/Pak crisis study should be available in preliminary form by early May, and the NSSM–69 study by the middle of May. I plan to start additional studies on other crises and NSSMs as resources become available.

Thus far I have been unable to get the NSCIC Working Group to focus on what appears to me to be its primary and most important task—that is, to prepare materials that would assist the NSCIC in formulating and issuing useful guidance as to the intelligence needs of high level decision makers. To move the system, I think it would be important to attempt to provide the intelligence community with a picture of the emerging trends in the world situation, as seen by you and the NSCIC, and the major policy problems that may result. Actions are recommended below.

Communicating Your Own and NSC Staff Needs[4]

The following efforts have been undertaken:

—Review of the new DCI guidance as to national intelligence objectives and priorities. Helms sent this document to you for comment. A memorandum from you to Helms is being prepared.
—Interviews of NSC staff as to perceived quality of intelligence in their areas. When finished I will write them up in a form that will permit feedback to the intelligence community.
—Organized occasional meetings of NSC staff with intelligence community representatives. For example, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland and Soviet analysts, and Odeen et al with National Estimates staff to review plans for the next series of Soviet military NIEs.
—Initiated a preliminary study by CIA and DIA of Soviet perceptions of U.S. forces, military programs, and activities. What do the Soviets notice and react to most strongly?

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[3] NSSM 69, "U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia," July 14, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–159–161, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 69.

[4] Kissinger wrote the following note adjacent to this section: "One of my troubles is that I may not know what my needs are. But let us discuss immediately. I am very interested in psychology of foreign leaders. I once set a psychiatrist to work on it."

How Best to Help you in the Future?

I propose to continue to try to:

—Communicate your needs.
—Review and criticize selected intelligence products.

To do a good job on the first function I need to know more about your views as to your needs. I am preparing my own views as to what is wrong with some of the products. You will receive soon a memorandum on those views and a questionaire eliciting your views.

I am reviewing a special SS–9 study produced by CIA, at your request, as a follow-on to my work for you in early 1970. I did not report to you on this product, which was finished in September 1971, although some of Phil Odeen's people made use of some of the results. The study did not meet the goals set for it. It is now under critical review by a panel of people from DIA, CIA, NSA, and INR. I will chair a review meeting next week to get their assessment and produce proposals on how best to continue this effort.

Recommendations

Since the NSCIC Working Group seems unwilling to address the problem of how best to supply guidance to the intelligence community, I recommend that the two following measures be taken:

—As chairman of the NSCIC, you task Helms to draft, for NSCIC consideration, comment, and revision a document, comparable in scope and size to the President's Foreign Policy Statement, that gives his views as to the major political, military, and economic trends affecting the world environment of importance to national policy. This draft to be available in September for NSCIC consideration and comment.[5]

—A draft be prepared expressing both your own views as to the changing world environment and the attendant U.S. policy issues top level decision makers will be concerned with over the foreseeable future. This statement to take as its basis the current version of the President's Foreign Policy Statement.

The draft prepared by Helms, if it can be revised to be acceptable to you, could then be issued as NSCIC guidance to the intelligence community and used in preparing the President's Foreign Policy Statement for 1973. If it is unacceptable, you will become aware of the divergences that exist between your judgments as to the world environment over the next five years and those of the DCI and his staff. We will then have a very concrete basis for demanding improvements in the intelligence product, and even changes in the allocation of intelligence resources.

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[5] Kissinger wrote in the margin next to this paragraph, "That's really *very* ambitious."

The draft of a statement by you would complement the DCI effort because it would focus primarily upon the policy issues likely to engage the attention of top level U.S. decision makers in the future. I would propose to borrow a young State Department officer, Robert Crane, to prepare the NSC draft. If the effort fails the draft can be discarded.

I therefore recommend that:[6]

—You sign the attached memorandum to Helms asking him to draft a report to the NSCIC giving his views as to future trends in the world environment.

—That I undertake to have prepared a draft of a statement by you of trends in the world environment and major policy issues facing the U.S.

I plan to ask for a few special studies by the intelligence community, with the objective of producing some interesting material for you, as well as offering an opportunity, through critical review of study drafts, to make the community more aware of the quality of product we would like to have. The following is a list of possible topics, please indicate your preferences:[7]

—Soviet Military and Political Strategy toward its Southern Asia Arc (Iran to Japan).

—Soviet capabilities for flexible and discriminating use of strategic forces.

—Soviet Nuclear Technology as related to possible comprehensive test ban issues.

—Soviet Naval missiles.

[6] Neither option is marked.

[7] None of the topics is marked.

269. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, April 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Report on Implementation of President's Reorganization of Intelligence Community

Will you please prepare by May 5, 1972, a report of the progress achieved so far in implementing the reorganization of the intelligence community and of steps taken to achieve the President's major objectives as stated in his memorandum of November 5, 1971.[2]

In particular the report should cover actions and progress toward:

—Preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.
—Related measures to achieve a more efficient use of resources.
—Development of a comprehensive program focused upon improving the intelligence process and product.

In addition, I would appreciate your views on the major issues which should occupy your attention during the next six months in the areas of:

—More efficient use of resources.
—Improved quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence product.
—Development of an increased and restructured personal staff to support you in your new responsibilities.

Henry A. Kissinger

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 7, HAK Administrative and Staff Files—Memoranda Dispatched from WB, Sept. 1971–1974. Secret. Drafted by Marshall. On April 14 Helms forwarded the memorandum to Tweedy with the following comment on the routing slip: "I don't know whether this is cause and effect yesterday, or the clanking machinery of the bureaucracy clanking." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 4, Folder 2, I–23, Intelligence Community Reorganization)

[2] Document 242.

270. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report on Economic Intelligence

In June 1971 you asked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to study U.S. economic intelligence. The Board believes economic intelligence has not received sufficient attention since World War II, a reflection of the economic dominance of the U.S. and the priority granted political and military matters. The underlying situation has changed drastically in recent years and the U.S. can no longer afford to neglect economic intelligence in their view.

The Board recommends that:

—Economic intelligence should be treated as an essential element of national security.

—The DCI take the lead in developing a broad new concept of economic intelligence, and see that collection priorities and intelligence resource allocations be altered accordingly.

—A review of the quality and quantity of economic representation and reporting abroad be undertaken.

—The Council on International Economic Policy develop procedures to provide information and assistance to business and commercial organizations.

—Treasury and Commerce should consider establishing intelligence offices or bureaus.

The Board's report has been sent for comment to State, Treasury, Commerce, DCI, OMB, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy. All agree with the Board's general diagnosis of the increased importance of economic intelligence and the less than adequate attention given to it in the past. Measures are being taken to improve the situation.

For the moment the Board is, I believe, satisfied by the progress being made. The newly created NSC Intelligence Committee Working Group is surveying current developments in the economic intelligence area. I will report any important findings to you.

Attached as Tab A is the full report should you care to read it.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensitive; Noforn. Sent for information. Drafted by Marshall. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] Tab A is attached but not printed. Copies of the agency comments on the PFIAB report and Marshall's April 18 memorandum discussing the report are ibid.

271. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 4, 1972.

SUBJECT

Report on Implementation of President's Reorganization of Intelligence Community

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of 13 April 1972[2]

1. Since my first, 30-day, progress report to the President of 5 December last,[3] I have been concentrating on the following areas in connection with the President's original charge to me concerning the intelligence community:

a. Build-up and reorganization of personal staff to get the essential work done;

b. After the initial meeting of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC),[4] to launch its working group and begin a program to focus upon improving the intelligence process and product;

c. To organize the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) and establish an IRAC working group to assist and advise me in the preparation of the consolidated intelligence program budget;

d. To establish the necessary procedures with the balance of the intelligence community to obtain the information I need to carry out the President's directive.

2. Let me give you a more detailed account of what has been involved in the four areas listed above:

a. Although the process is not entirely complete, I am satisfied that I have now restructured my personal staff to provide the necessary support. Some attention has been given to getting fresh blood into it, and diversifying its capabilities by adding qualified people from CIA, DIA and NSA. The Community Comptroller Group, for example, which has the main responsibility for supporting me in the preparation of the consolidated program budget, is headed up by the former Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting of CIA and he is

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. II. Top Secret.

[2] Document 269.

[3] Document 249.

[4] Documents 250 and 251.

assisted by the former DIA Comptroller and the former Chief of Staff at DIA. A senior officer from NSA on loan from Admiral Gayler also has been added. This staff as a whole, organized as I outlined in my progress report to the President of 5 December last, is now in a position to assist me in the various tasks set forth in the 5 November directive.[5] With few exceptions, additional people will be added only as I see the work load absolutely requires it. The staff includes individuals whose primary responsibility is to maintain contact throughout the community with individual program managers and their staffs and to participate on a fairly intimate basis in their planning and budgetary reviews and cycles.

b. After the initial meeting of the NSCIC, a working group was set up, chaired by my representative as you requested, my deputy for intelligence community affairs. This group, as you know, has now met several times and is drawing up a work program designed to improve the intelligence product and to provide guidance and comment on the production process of the community. As a result, a series of studies has already been produced providing an inventory of activities in the community in various substantive areas. These have included narcotics, economic reporting, the community's production resources and others. These are intended to assist the working group in deciding what studies need to be undertaken. Studies are under way on the community's performance during the recent Indo-Pakistan crisis and on the intelligence annexes to the National Security Study Memoranda, and preliminary work is being done on a study of regular intelligence publications, their need, quality, duplication, etc. In view of the objectives of NSCIC, the working group has been established and is being maintained at quite a senior level. Membership includes the head of the Net Assessment Group of your staff; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; a representative of the Under Secretary of State's office; a representative of the Attorney General; the Director, J–5 (Plans and Policy) of the JCS representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, DIA; the Director of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State; the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates and the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, and Science and Technology of CIA.

c. After an organizational meeting of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, a working group was set up chaired by my representative, the chief of my Community Comptroller Group. A program is being developed by the working group to identify major issues in the intelligence community, whose solution will have important impact on national intelligence program resources (money and manpower) and on substantive product. The aim, for now, is to identify

[5] Document 242.

issues whose solution can affect the preparation of the FY 1974 consolidated program budget and also for immediately succeeding years. A series of issues are now under study under various community auspices and they include the review of various aspects of the world-wide atomic energy detection system, programs and sensors devoted to missile re-entry, peripheral air reconnaissance, reconnaissance drones, warning systems, deep space collection and others.

d. An essential preliminary step to increased involvement in supervision of the community has been the setting up of procedures and the arrival at understandings with the other members of the community. As I find it will be essential for me and my staff to follow closely the planning, programming and budgetary cycles of all the programs in the national effort, I have concentrated on participating in these and identifying the information needed to formulate judgments on the program as a whole. I see this as being an evolutionary process for quite a considerable period, as we all learn from experience what will work, what is essential and what is superfluous. There is no quick way of achieving this and my concern is that the experimental period also produce results. As you might imagine, much of this has to do with working out arrangements with the Department of Defense, specifically with the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. We have already come a good way but it will take at least the passage of a full annual programming and budgetary cycle before we can evaluate the result. Another aspect of this is my appearance before the appropriate subcommittees of the Senate and the House to explain and defend the national intelligence program for FY 1973. I have prepared a presentation which relates intelligence substance and product to the whole program, and which explains how the individual pieces combine to produce the necessary intelligence and how they must be interrelated. I shall be appearing before Senator Ellender on 5 May but the date for my presentation before Chairman Mahon has not yet been fixed.

3. Insofar as I can look forward over the next six months, I anticipate my emphasis will be on refinement of what is presently being done. In the field of resources, I am anxious to see how the studies now under way come out and what lessons can be learned from them. I am very conscious of the fact that the study of major issues, involving large expenditures and sizable manpower, takes time to complete and requires experienced and qualified people to work on. Because of this necessarily heavy investment in time and valuable manpower, I am continually seeking ways to achieve comparable results, in which both I and the community can have confidence, on a more economical and timely basis. It is too early to say how successful this effort will be but I am convinced we must move in this direction if we are to develop an effective and continual system of cross program analysis. In the area of intelligence product improvement, the NSCIC working group will

continue its present efforts, with particular emphasis on devising means, for your consideration, by which senior consumers of intelligence at the policy level can provide the community with the type of guidance and comment it needs before it undertakes any substantial revision of the product. There is still much experimental work to be done in this area and if we come up with ideas, I shall be grateful for your views and assistance. Finally, and as I reported earlier in this paper, I believe the restructuring of my personal staff has largely been completed. I would merely emphasize that my views on the makeup of the staff remain flexible and I am quite prepared to modify it as need and experience seem to dictate.

Dick

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272. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, May 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Issues Arising from the Presidential Intelligence Reorganization

You will recall our recent discussion of the several issues on external participation in the DoD planning and review cycle for intelligence programs[2] which have arisen since the President's memorandum of 5 November.[3] The attached memorandum to Dick Helms[4] represents the essence of the approach I discussed with you. It has been coordinated with Bob Moot and Gardiner Tucker and includes their suggestions. The issues that I see are the following:

Dissemination of the Fiscal Guidance. This is essentially an internal DoD planning document, but it is part of the data base needed by the DCI if he is to play a meaningful role in program review. I, therefore,

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 350.09 (March–Dec) 1972. Secret.

[2] The discussion followed an April 24 memorandum from Hall to Laird concerning "Issues Arising from the Presidential Intelligence Reorganization." Hall's memorandum and an April 27 memorandum commenting on it from Moot to Pursley (which Pursley forwarded to Laird) are ibid.

[3] Document 242.

[4] Document 276.

propose that we send the intelligence fiscal guidance document to him, for information, and make no other outside dissemination.

Program Managers' Review. In the past, OMB and DCI staffs have attended some of these reviews. I propose that this practice not be continued, as the reviews are internal and preliminary in character and are too early a forum for debate with outsiders. They are designed to assist the program managers and should be limited to this purpose. The DCI staff can be expected to object to this position. If the DCI, himself, objects strongly, we could fall back from this position.

POMs and Other Preliminary Documentation. I recommend that we do not release these or other subordinate documentation not reflecting your decisions outside the DoD, and that we not fall back from this position.

The CDIP Review and the PDM on Intelligence. The DCI requires an input from us as the basis for the DoD portion of his National Intelligence Program Memorandum, which is his recommendation to the President on all national intelligence programs, and which he submits to the President via OMB. Because of the timing, he cannot wait for your DoD budget submission to the President, but must use the earlier PDM as input. If he is to do so, he should participate in the CDIP review which develops the PDM, in order to understand its rationale. A more important reason for his participation is that he is required by the President to review all of the intelligence programs, and this forum permits him to do this. Finally, his assistance is valuable in assessing the substantive effects on intelligence of the resource issues we will address.

I propose, however, that the OMB not participate in this review if the DCI staff participates. We may have to fall back on this issue with OMB, but I believe it is the conceptually proper stand to take.

Budget Review. This is OMB's traditional arena, and OMB has a staff responsibility to the President for review of the resulting DoD budget submission. On the other hand, since the major resource issues should have been resolved during the CDIP review, there is no need for DCI participation in the fiscally-oriented budget review process. Our position should be that OMB should be the sole external participant in that review.

Role of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). The DCI has developed a concept paper for the IRAC which does not enmesh that body in the DoD intelligence resource planning and review cycle. From this standpoint, the concept is acceptable, and I propose to tell the DCI so.

Review of the Special Air Force and Navy Programs. The proposed memorandum states (without making it an issue) that we will handle *all* DoD intelligence programs, including the Air Force and Navy spe-

cial programs, in the same way in the budget cycle. This means that fiscal guidance will be issued to the special intelligence programs, these programs will be considered during the CDIP review, and decisions involving these programs will be included in the Program Decision Memorandum. I believe that this is the only feasible way of managing our DoD intelligence program in its entirety, but it leaves untreated the role of the ExCom. The issue may not be raised by Dick Helms, but it is likely to be raised by the managers of the special programs when this year's CDIP review is initiated. A possible answer could be that, if the program manager is concerned about an issue, he could request the Deputy Secretary of Defense to consider it in the ExCom arena before the PDM is signed by the Secretary of Defense. In any case, I recommend that we proceed in a common way for all programs.

I will appreciate receiving your guidance on the memorandum to Dick Helms. You may wish (1) to alter some part of the memorandum, (2) to have me send it without a commitment on your part, or (3) to sign it yourself.

Albert Hall

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273. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, May 18, 1972.

One department which particularly needs a housecleaning is the CIA. The problem in the CIA is muscle-bound bureaucracy which has completely paralyzed its brain and the other is the fact that its personnel, just like the personnel in State, is primarily Ivy League and the Georgetown set rather than the type of people that we get into the services and the FBI.

I want a study made immediately as to how many people in CIA could be removed by Presidential action. I assume that they have themselves frozen in just as is the case with State. If that is the case I want action begun immediately, through Weinberger, for a reduction in force of all positions in the CIA in the executive groups of 50 percent. This reduction in force should be accomplished by the end of the year so

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Personal Files, Box 4, Memoranda from the President, 1969–1974, Memos—May 1972. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Malek.

that we can then move to get in some better people. Of course, the reduction in force should be accomplished solely on the ground of its being necessary for budget reasons, but you will both know the real reason and I want some action to deal with the problem.

In another area of recruiting I want you to quit recruiting from any of the Ivy League schools or any other universities where either the university president or the university faculties have taken action condemning our efforts to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. We are totally justified in doing this anyway because the government simply has too many Ivy League people in relationship to the percentage of Ivy League graduates compared with the total number of college graduates in the country.

In filling our needs I want you to give first priority to those schools who have presidents or faculty members who have wired us or written us their support of what we have done in Vietnam. Have the mail checked very carefully to see which ones these are. After you get past those you can then go to other schools in the Midwest, in the South, and even possibly some in the far West (not, of course, including Stanford or Cal) where we would have a better chance to come up with people who would be on our side. Retired military people are also good for this purpose.

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274. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Anderson)[1]

Washington, May 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Human Source Intelligence

One of our major requirements in the intelligence field is to obtain better and more timely information on the doctrine, strategy, plans and intentions of so-called "hard" target countries. Human source collection is one of the few ways to acquire such information.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 276, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Board drafted the memorandum for the President at his request following his meeting with the Board on May 5. (Memorandum from Latimer to Haig, May 12; ibid.)

Accordingly, I would like the Board to study the full capabilities of the U.S. Government in the field of human source collection and related activities in order to advise me whether the prospects for procuring this intelligence can be improved and, if so, how.

Because of the special sensitivity of this method of collection, the study is to be conducted exclusively by the Board with assistance from appropriate consultants as deemed necessary by the Board.

Your report, with its recommendations, should be transmitted to me alone, through my Assistant for National Security Affairs.

I recognize that, in order to conduct this study properly, the Board will have to receive the total cooperation of the senior intelligence officials of the government and that the Board will require full access to the most sensitive kinds of information and documentary data. So that they may be clear as to my interest in this effort, you are authorized to show this memorandum, with appropriate caveats, to the officials involved.

Richard Nixon

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275. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman)[1]

Washington, May 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

Overview of the FBI's Domestic Collection of Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Counterespionage

As you know, we had several exchanges with John Mitchell while he was Attorney General about the possibility of putting the overview of certain internal security programs under the NSC. However, we were unable to reach a final agreement as to which programs could best be conducted under the aegis of the NSC.

It occurs to me that now might be a good time to consider taking steps both to improve our counterintelligence and counterespionage

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 7, HAK Administrative and Staff Files—Memoranda Dispatched from WB, Sept. 1971–1974. Confidential. Sent for action.

programs and to improve coordination and cooperation between the FBI and CIA. One step might be to add an FBI representative to the new NSC Intelligence Committee which would then add to its responsibilities the overseeing of the FBI's counterintelligence and counterespionage activities. It would also make certain that there is an effective FBI program for the collection of foreign intelligence domestically. The NSCIC would also be in a position to ensure full coordination between the Bureau and the Agency in these matters.

I would appreciate having your views on this suggestion.

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276. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, June 5, 1972.

Dear Dick:

In the six months that my office has been established, we have had a number of discussions relating to how the intelligence activities within the Department of Defense may be more systematically managed and how we can be responsive to the intent of the President's memorandum of 5 November 1971.[2] These discussions have been held with your staff, with the intelligence program managers in Defense, with those other elements of the Department of Defense that are responsible for our planning and budget preparation, and with the Secretary. As a result of these considerations, I would like to put forth how I believe it would be feasible for us to proceed to handle the intelligence planning and budgetary actions of the Department of Defense in a better way and how I see these actions supporting your responsibility as DCI. If you feel that the plan meets your needs, I will discuss it with OMB as well, since, as you know, the staff there has views in this area. In any case, I hope you will review it as a proposal, and although it has had a good deal of consideration here, it could well benefit from your suggestions.

I have structured the plan around certain key events which are related to the DoD planning, programming and budgeting cycle;

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 350.09 (March–Dec) 1972. Secret.

[2] Document 242.

however, there are other actions, since they are dominantly yours and fall outside the DoD cycle, that I will discuss in the same context.

1. *Planning Guidance for the Forthcoming Five-Year Program.* It is customary in the DoD plan for policy, force planning and fiscal guidance to be issued in the January–February time frame for the five fiscal year period beginning approximately eighteen months later. My office is responsible for recommendations to the Secretary regarding this guidance within the intelligence area, and Systems Analysis is responsible for recommendations regarding the overall force planning and fiscal guidance for the DoD program. In past years, guidance in the intelligence area has been largely limited to fiscal guidance, whereas other DoD programs have been receiving increasingly substantive policy and planning guidance. This year, for the first time, the Secretary included substantive guidance along with the fiscal recommendations and intends to strengthen this effort next year. In preparing fiscal recommendations and substantive guidance to be issued during the planning cycle, the Secretary will consider the problems and trends in DoD, including the planning guidance that I understand you will issue about three months preceding this time frame. The Secretary's guidance covers all four DoD intelligence programs. I will provide you or your staff with the guidance issued, and will welcome the identification of any problems you perceive.

2. *The Program Cycle.* During the spring, it is DoD procedure for the Service Secretaries, having received SecDef fiscal and substantive guidance, to analyze their forces and to prepare for OSD review Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) reflecting their proposed programs for the next five fiscal years. During this time frame, the DoD intelligence program managers analyze their programs and submit POMs for OSD review. While these POMs must implement the guidance, the program managers are encouraged also to identify issues which lie outside the fiscal and substantive guidance they have received. The program manager reviews are held as internal proceedings, primarily for the assistance of the program managers. Although there has been participation in the past from outside DoD, I believe that these analyses should in the future be conducted without outside participation, in keeping with their internal character. The subsequent Program Objective Memoranda will also be treated as internal and given internal dissemination only.

3. *Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program Review Conducted in the July–August Time Frame.* This review, which I will continue to lead, is the substantive review in preparation of the Program Decision Memorandum approved by the Secretary of Defense. I plan to review all four DoD intelligence programs at this time. The product of this review will be an Intelligence and Security Issue Paper presenting a broad range of alternatives on major issues. This Issue Paper will go to the

Secretary for his decisions. I propose that your office submit options for incorporation in the Issue Paper. The Secretary's decisions will be recorded in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) in early August. A copy will be provided to your office. I suggest that this could be the basis for the DoD input to the preparation of your National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM).

4. *Budget Review to Prepare Program Budget Decision.* Beginning in October it is customary for the Comptroller to chair a budget review leading to preparation of the Program Budget Decisions for the first fiscal year of the five year program. Ideally, there should be a minimum of substantive issues at this point, and the bulk of the effort directed toward insuring that the smaller questions are settled and the budget is accurate. This review will continue to be chaired by the Comptroller, and on intelligence matters, my staff will be represented. The only other representative outside DoD would be OMB, which customarily reviews the situation at this point. I will provide you with the PBD (Program Budget Decision) which reflects the Secretary's decision on intelligence matters. I will at the same time solicit your comments and observations on the PBD, for consideration by the Secretary. Occasionally, there are last minute issues which are important, and this did occur last December. I would propose to handle these questions as we did those. When a real-time decision is required for the budget, I would proceed to take the action necessary, but not implement the actions until the matter was reviewed carefully—and I would, of course, seek your advice.

Finally, in December there is a final NSC meeting on the Defense budget which treats all unresolved issues, including Intelligence. Your inputs to this meeting will also be solicited.

I will be happy to discuss this subject with you when you wish.

Sincerely,

Harold G. Bowen, Jr.[3]

[3] Printed from a copy that indicates Deputy Assistant Secretary Harold G. Bowen, Jr., signed for Hall.

277. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (Tweedy) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, June 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Al Hall's Letter of 5 June[2]

1. Hal Bowen penned a note to me to a copy of Hall's letter to you. The note mentions that although Hall is currently away, the letter has his approval and that it is "our response to your letter of 21 April." To refresh your memory, I am attaching a copy of the 21 April letter I sent Hall, together with the proposed operating plan on which John Clarke and I briefed you before its dispatch to Hall.[3] I merely mention this background because it typifies the thrust of Hall's letter, which is that it is *not* a response to mine (there is no reference to it anywhere) and it reads as if the ASDI office has finally got around to drafting a proposal for cooperation with the DCI, as if no other water had flowed under the bridge since November last. You will note, as my letter says, that considerable care was taken to consult with Hall's office (and the DoD Comptroller's) during the formulation of the operating plan and these offices had seen the final text before I sent it to Hall. I do not mean by this that Hall had to accept what his subordinates and another office had generally found workable, but he was given a detailed proposal which clearly had as its base what we conceived to be the DCI's needs to discharge his community responsibility. None of this is so much as acknowledged in Hall's letter.

2. I do not know specifically what has happened since 21 April. Shortly thereafter, we heard from Bowen's staff that Hall was going to consult Laird on our proposal. I can only assume that he hardly asked Laird to read the letter and the attachment in detail, but that he had suggested perhaps that the proposal needed some tightening up and that he would deal with the matter. Perhaps it happened that way or perhaps Laird gave Hall much more detailed and exact instructions. I do not know, but I do know that if this latest letter is taken literally we are back on square one and at a time when the reality of our working with Hall's office and the program managers is a totally different thing.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 4, Folder 2, I–23, Intelligence Community Reorganization. Secret.

[2] Document 276.

[3] Neither is attached.

What Hall's letter basically does is to pay lip service to the need for Defense to work closely with the DCI and to assist him in carrying out what he has been told to do. The thrust is that the ASDI and the Secretary will do all the work, make the decisions and do a spot of coordinating with the DCI at a few symbolic milestones during the course of the planning cycle. For example, in paragraph 1 of Hall's letter he talks about fiscal guidance. Fiscal guidance is what basically drives the whole Defense program. The letter states that you or your staff will be provided with the guidance issued and the identification of any problems you perceive will be welcome. This is a meaningless gesture. If you do not participate in the philosophy and the planning assumptions which lie in back of the recommended fiscal guidance, your comment on it after it is issued will be largely a waste of time. It is a fact, for example, and we learned it after the event, that the recommended fiscal guidance for 1974 had options in it which would have delayed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. These options, of course, were not taken up, but if they had been and the guidance issued by Laird, your attempts to change it would have resulted in a mess at best because the guidance goes out immediately to every last nook and cranny of DoD and the overseas commands. In other words, fiscal guidance, when issued, is not constructed to be modified.

3. It is tempting to recommend to you that we ignore this letter, as ours have been in the past, and continue on with the Defense intelligence community at the merry and satisfactory clip that now prevails. Unfortunately, this letter is too specific to be ignored and, more importantly, it appears to reflect a state of mind which needs to be disabused. Although I have not fully thought the program through, I am not inclined to suggest that you, or I, send him a reply. What is needed, it seems to me, is a discussion with him which attempts to impress on him, once and for all, what the realities of your responsibilities are and what you conclude you require to discharge them. I think emphasis must be placed on the fact that what we are talking about are national programs, which, for quite practical reasons, have been placed under the Secretary of Defense's auspices and whose product is designed to serve the President and the National Security policy structure; that they are not in Defense primarily to serve the military's needs, although they are important, and that what you have been asked to supervise is no part of any military force structure. In other words, if the logistic and budgetary problems were tolerable, this whole program would be in civilian hands, probably your own. Such a conversation might smoke out what the problem is, i.e., whether it is Laird or Hall, or a combination of both; in any event it would make quite clear how you view your role and what you believe you must do to fulfill the combination of instructions and expectations you have received from the executive and legislative branches. In an ideal world, I would like to

conduct this conversation myself—but I really wonder if that is the effective way to do it. The alternative and the one I presently favor is for you to do it either alone with Hall, or with Bowen and me present.

4. Perhaps the above can serve as background for discussion before we decide on tactics.

Bronson Tweedy[4]

[4] Printed from a copy that indicates Tweedy signed the original.

278. Memorandum From Thomas Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, June 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

FBI Participation in NSC Intelligence Committee

John Ehrlichman has responded (Tab A)[2] to your memorandum of 29 May (Tab B)[3] asking for his view on adding an FBI representative to the NSC Intelligence Committee. Your memorandum also suggested that the NSC Intelligence Committee: oversee the FBI's counterintelligence and counterespionage activities; make certain that there is an effective FBI program for the collection of foreign intelligence domestically; and ensure full coordination between the Bureau and CIA in these matters.

In his memorandum to you, John Ehrlichman agrees with the idea of inviting an FBI representative to participate in the NSC Intelligence Committee in order to improve coordination and cooperation between the CIA and the FBI.

He believes, however, that it should be made clear that the oversight responsibility of the Intelligence Committee extends only to the

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 242, FBI, Vol. IV, 26 June 1970–27 July 1973. No classification marking. Sent for action.

[2] Ehrlichman's memorandum of June 10 is attached but not printed.

[3] Document 275.

cooperation and coordination aspects of the CIA and FBI counterintelligence and counterespionage activities and not to the activities themselves.[4] This, he says, will ensure the fullest participation by both.

Ehrlichman also suggests that David Young sit in on meetings of the Intelligence Committee which deal with these matters since he has been doing some work in this area.

It is clear from Ehrlichman's memo that he does not want HAK overseeing FBI activities now that there is a new leadership in the Bureau. Nevertheless, his agreement that HAK oversee coordination between CIA and the FBI leaves plenty of room to make sure that there is some improvement in that whole area.

Our next step probably ought to be to put the subject of FBI–CIA coordination in counterintelligence and counterespionage on the agenda of an NSC Intelligence Committee meeting and ask Acting Director Gray to bring along an FBI representative to the meeting. Russ Ash, Andy Marshall and I should be able to provide HAK with some talking points for such a meeting.

Recommendation

That Andy Marshall, in coordination with Russ and myself, prepare an item for the Intelligence Committee on this subject.[5]

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[4] David Young, who drafted Ehrlichman's response to Haig, told Ehrlichman that "he was not so sure the Committee should have such broad oversight responsibilities" as Haig envisioned in his May 29 memorandum and therefore he had drafted the response "to make it clear that the FBI's participation should be limited to improving *coordination* and *cooperation* between the FBI and the CIA in the described areas." (Memorandum to Ehrlichman, June 1; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, David R. Young, Subject Files, Box 3, NSC Intelligence Committee)

[5] Haig checked the approve option.

279. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Accumulated Intelligence Issues

This memorandum summarizes some intelligence issues that have accumulated over the last couple of months. These include:

—You owe Helms a reply to his request that you review DCID 1/2, the DCI's current effort to provide guidance to the intelligence community as to national intelligence objectives and priorities.

—Helms has responded to your request for a six month progress report on the implementation of the President's intelligence reorganization. You may want to comment on Helms' report. Before addressing these and other issues it will be useful to:

—Summarize what has been happening in the intelligence area since my last report to you.

—Raise the question as to the best strategy for:

- Effectively carrying out the President's reorganization.
- Getting you a better product.

What Has Been Happening

My assessment of progress in implementing the President's reorganization is the same as I gave you in my memorandum of April 13.[2]

—Slow progress because of a cautious and limited approach to implementing the President's directive.

—Considerable resistance and defensiveness on the part of CIA to efforts to evaluate past performance, or to suggestions as to ways in which intelligence products might be improved. (I have attached your copy of my April 13 memorandum at Tab C. It has some marginal notes and an indication that you wanted to discuss it with me.)

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Kissinger wrote on the first page: "Andy—Please see me. Dick [Campbell of the NSC Staff] *before* that I want to reread this memo plus attachments." The memorandum has four covering notes, three of them undated, which include the following comments: Jonathan Howe of the NSC staff wrote Haig, "If we intend to take Helms on, it may be preferable to discuss these issues with him orally"; Haig wrote Kissinger, "We should meet with Helms and avoid paper donnybrook"; Haig told Campbell on July 10 to "set up meeting *next* week"; Campbell later wrote Marshall that he had been holding Marshall's memorandum "for the meeting we were going to have between you and HAK which never came off."

[2] Document 268.

Intelligence Reorganization

Helms' response to your request (see Tab D) for a six month progress report on the implementation of the President's intelligence reorganization is at Tab E.[3] It is a misleading statement of the state of affairs. While it describes steps taken, it does not assess the progress made in achieving the President's goals. Indeed, not much progress has been achieved. Some of the steps have been more limited than portrayed. For example:

—Helms' staff has been restructured, but there are few additional people to assist him carrying out his new responsibilities.

—The only substantial work accomplished by the NSCIC Working Group likely to be useful to the NSCIC, are the studies I have directed on intelligence support of the Indo/Pak crisis and NSSM–69.

—There appears to be no intention to develop the comprehensive product improvement program asked for in the President's memorandum. The attitude is that if after laborious study some defects in intelligence products are exposed, then appropriate changes will be made. In other words, there is no initiative coming from Helms to improve the product.

Helms is still working out his approach to the preparation of a consolidated intelligence budget. At the moment the plan is that he will merely collect together the DOD, CIA, and other budget components and present them, along with a National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM). The latter will be modeled after McNamara's DPM's. It will set a context for program decisions, present the rationale for FY–74 intelligence program decisions, and perhaps raise outstanding issues. It will be available in mid-October. Helms will also issue planning guidance to the community in December. Attached at Tab F is the current outline of Helms' planning guidance.[4] It will attempt to describe the future political-military-economic environment of the U.S. 1975–80, highlight key policy issues in that time period, major intelligence problems, and give appropriate planning guidance to major program managers. Both of these documents will offer an opportunity for comment and guidance to the community. Both should be reviewed by the NSCIC after they are issued, perhaps before, and Helms would resist the latter. Helms will, in fact, be doing what I urged you to ask him to do in my April 13 memorandum.

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[3] Tabs D and E are printed as Documents 269 and 271.

[4] Attached but not printed.

NSCIC Working Group Activities

The product evaluation work of the NSCIC Working Group is moving forward, though too slowly to suit me. The Indo/Pak crisis study is finished[5] and the NSSM–69 essentially done. Additional studies in these two series will be started soon. There has been a lot of foot-dragging on the part of Helms' representative and the CIA members. Despite prodding by me there has been almost no progress in developing a program of work to assist the NSCIC to carry out its other main functions—giving guidance as to substantive intelligence needs to the community. I have some proposals as to what to do about this below. Later this year, as indicated above, Helms' NIPM and planning guidance will offer opportunities to give guidance. Although intelligence people say they want guidance from users, they really like the current situation that keeps outsiders out of their business.

What is the Best Strategy

Before recommending specific near-term actions, I want to raise the question: what is to be our basic strategy dealing with Helms and the intelligence community for the rest of this year? Al Haig and I discussed this recently. The conclusions I drew were:

—Assume Helms will retire the end of next March at age 60.
—Major showdown unwise and likely to be unproductive.
—Pressure should be continued in key areas so as to keep things moving; e.g., NSCIC Working Group product evaluation studies, asking Helms to present NIPM and planning guidance document to NSCIC for comment, etc.
—Make known your views as the important characteristics of the new DCI.
—Stockpile ideas as to specific actions the new DCI might take to achieve the President's goals.[6]

Can we discuss the details of your preferred strategy sometime soon?

Specific Actions

Response to Request to Review DCID 1/2

You owe Helms a reply to his February 24, 1972 request for your reactions to DCID 1/2 which purportedly describes U.S. intelligence objectives and priorities. A proposed memorandum for you to Helms is at Tab A. Helms' request and a copy of DCID 1/2 are at Tab G.[7]

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[5] See Document 286 and footnote 2 thereto.

[6] Neither the agree nor disagree option is checked.

[7] Tabs A and G are attached but not printed.

DCID 1/2 is supposed to provide guidance for resource allocation decisions to managers in the intelligence community. He invited guidance from you with respect to the 71 objectives, nine sub-objectives, and the numerical priorities (running from one to eight) attached to each objective in each of 116 countries. Specifically, he asked:

—How well the listed objectives reflect White House and NSC requirements.
—How appropriate you find the assigned priorities.
—What suggestions you have for adding or deleting objectives and changing priorities.

In his letter, Helms indicates that since the other relevant agencies participated in the statement and review of the priorities, he already has their approval of the document and thus is asking only you to comment. It is doubtful, however, that the other principals in the NSCIC were ever involved in the process or even knew about it; consequently, the subject of intelligence priorities, if properly formulated, could be profitably discussed in the NSCIC in the future.

Unfortunately, DCID 1/2 does not fill the bill. I have reviewed the document and elicited comments on it from other members of the NSC Staff. While the responses have varied in detail, I think it is fair to say that all of us agree on one point: whatever the utility of this document to the intelligence community, it is so sweeping and general in character, so divorced from any consideration of how resources will be allocated, and so devoid of explicit issues and choices, that neither you nor the NSCIC could possibly review it, much less respond to it, with any meaningful guidance.

The immediate and ostensible issue is how to respond to the Helms' request for guidance. The more fundamental and serious issue is how to extract from the DCI a document, or series of issues, that will present you and the NSCIC with an appropriate basis for effective response and provision of guidance as to your priorities and needs. As I have indicated, DCID 1/2 and its supplements do not perform that function. They simply serve up a smorgasbord of objectives, with something for everyone on the tray. It may be that DCID 1/2 is of some use within the intelligence community, but even that is open to doubt.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me that you have a choice from among three basic replies to Helms:

—A bland thank-you note.
—A rather more skeptical response which asks what difference this listing will make, and question how priorities can be productively discussed independently of resource allocations.
—An even more pointed reply which indicates that you are puzzled by the document and requests that he provide you and the NSCIC

with specific issues and/or documents better designed to allow discussion and issuance of guidance as to intelligence needs.

Recommendations

I believe that you should exercise the third option. As matters now stand, the NSCIC Working Group—with its heavy representation from the intelligence community—simply is not developing a comprehensive and interesting set of issues for consideration by the principals. In particular there is little underway that will assist the NSCIC in what is its principal task—guidance to the community as to intelligence needs.

The burden of developing issues is being placed entirely on the consumers, whereas in my view the DCI should be taking some initiative in presenting specific substantive reports, and issues to the NSCIC, and devising ways that make it as easy as possible for the NSCIC to give him guidance as to what is needed. There is nothing equivalent to consumer or market research undertaken by the intelligence community. They show almost no real effort to understand what the consumers need.

Helms should be asked to:

—Prepare a more suitable document that you and the other NSCIC members could more easily and fruitfully respond to later this year.

—Explore additional ways in which the provision of guidance from the top level consumers could be facilitated.

—Present the National Intelligence Program Memorandum and the Planning Guidance, you understand he is preparing, to the NSCIC for comment at an appropriate time.

The attached memorandum at Tab A makes these points. I recommend that you sign it.[8]

Response to Helms' Six-Month Progress Report

Earlier in this memorandum I characterized the nature of Helms' report:

—Covers steps taken but does not assess progress.

—Illustrates slow pace envisaged by Helms; e.g., indicates that assuming of new budgeting and programming responsibility as an "evolutionary process."

—Makes product improvement measures a delayed response to the results of NSCIC Working Group studies and subsequent NSCIC guidance, rather than the DCI assuming a major responsibility to produce some initiatives in this area.

[8] Neither the agree nor disagree option is checked.

While there is no requirement for a response to Helms' report, you may want to remind him of the responsibility laid on him in the President's memorandum to prepare a comprehensive program of product improvement. Such a reminder may:

—Put more steam behind the few efforts underway in the newly created Product Review part of his staff to study the current allocation of intelligence analysis resources, the career problems of analysts, etc.

—Cause him to increase the size of that part of his staff, which is small. It now consists of three people.

There is almost no R&D on intelligence analysis supported by the intelligence community. There is plenty of room for a display of initiative on his part. Prodding may not produce results, but can do no harm.

At Tab B is a memorandum noting Helms' responsibility for a major role in product improvement and asking him to tell you in more detail what could be done.[9]

I recommend that you sign the memorandum.[10]

[9] Attached but not printed.

[10] Neither the agree nor disagree option is checked.

280. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the Executive Director—Comptroller (Colby)[1]

Washington, August 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Presidential Letter

Dear Bill:

1. I am delighted to see that you share my view that we need to get a Presidential letter to Ambassadors instructing them to give our representatives in the field greater support and to discontinue the practice (which some of the Ambassadors actively pursue) of actually placing

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–M00165A, Box 21, Folder 446, State/Letters to All Ambassadors. Secret.

unnecessary impediments in our way.[2] I touched on this in talking to Ken Dam, I have briefed the PFIAB full secretariat along these lines, I have given Gordon Gray a specific suggestion along these lines, and I have mentioned it to the DCI whose reaction was that I was perhaps being overly optimistic. He certainly is in favor of a try.

2. With respect to your draft, I really do not believe it serves the purpose. I am afraid that any Ambassador reading it would see it as a further order from the President to bear down on CIA and to call for more direct participation and control in what we do. I think much of the language in your draft would be useful in impressing Ambassadors with the importance of the collection of national intelligence, but I would be interested in seeing such a letter define more clearly the fact that much of our activity in many countries overseas is so-called "third country" operations. This could be spelled out in more definitive terms since I know at least two or three Ambassadors who would not understand it otherwise.

3. I have taken another look at the roger channel message which went out on December 17, 1969 as a Top Secret supplement[3] to the President's letter to Ambassadors of December 9, 1969. That message was the best we could get from the Department at the time. What we need now, I believe, is a shorter, simpler Presidential communication which stresses the importance of national intelligence collection, makes clear that the President must look primarily to the Director of Central Intelligence and his overseas representatives for this intelligence, and reminds Ambassadors that their full support and that of their missions is essential to the accomplishment of this national task. The one specific item which should be covered would be the "third country" operational item mentioned above. Normally, Ambassadors are quite content with our internal operations which support their local interests but take a dim view of our maintaining additional personnel in order to do our counter-intelligence work and our Soviet, ChiCom, Satellite and related activities both within and beyond the host country. This is the area on which the State Department has been zeroing in in an effort to get us to lay it all out in black and white and in great detail for the Ambassadors. I do not believe that it would serve our best interests to accede to this kind of enlargement of State and Ambassadorial direct interest in the details of our operational activities.

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[2] In an August 8 memorandum to Karamessines, Colby reported that he suggested to Helms "the possibility of a Presidential letter to Ambassadors to obtain their full support of the intelligence effort," and Helms "indicated interest in the idea." (Ibid.) Colby attached a draft of the letter, which he viewed as a counterpart to President Nixon's December 9, 1969, letter to Ambassadors (Document 310).

[3] Document 311.

4. We made a copy of your draft letter and will see if we can come up with something that incorporates some of the thrust of your proposal as well as some of the thrust of my augmentation above.

Tom

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281. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, August 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

Lunch with Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff

At Sonnenfeldt's suggestion I had lunch with him today at the Federal City Club and we covered the following topics:

1. To my question as to how many of our TDCS reports he sees, Sonnenfeldt replied that he read all such reports that we slug for the White House. He added that he discusses the most important ones with Kissinger and also writes summaries of a series of reports dealing with a particular subject for Kissinger's attention. He explained that Tom Latimer also makes a selection from our TDCS reports for Kissinger on a daily basis.

2. Sonnenfeldt is responsible to Kissinger for keeping up on the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe and Soviet activities elsewhere in the world. As to the value of the CS reporting, he was high in his praise of our coverage of the West German political scene, Japanese/Soviet relations, and he noted an improvement in the Eastern European coverage. He implied that Kissinger shared his opinion and added that Kissinger finds our reporting more useful than the usual National Intelligence Estimate. He commented that, as Kissinger has come to know personally and negotiate directly with the Soviet leadership and other world leaders, he has naturally come to be less rather than more dependent on the estimates except where they deal with complex technical subjects.

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–00037, Subject Files, Box 8, Folder 7, U.S.–6, NSC, 1972. Secret; Eyes Only.

3. To my question as to how we could be sure that very important reports from completely reliable sources were brought to his attention and to Kissinger's, he admitted that in the mass of work he has to do he might fail to see the significance of such a report and suggested that I call him directly when we receive such a document.

4. He suggested we have lunch from time to time in the future.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

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282. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, September 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

HAK's Intelligence Needs

You and I should get together again soon to review strategy toward the intelligence community. I have been proceeding down the course we discussed in our last meeting. In addition I would like your reactions to some views of HAK's needs sketched below.

Unless we can supply the intelligence community with clearer guidance as to HAK's intelligence needs, it will not be possible to get him improved products. I am now trying to put together a picture of those needs. For example, I am putting together his views of the changing nature of the world environment, the nature of top level decision-making, the role of key leaders, etc. I have attempted to characterize the nature of his day to day problems.

Diagnosis

My understanding is that Henry does not read much of the material put out by the intelligence community. There is a good flow of current intelligence material to him, and the NSC staff/Sit Room daily

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Marshall, Andrew, Vol. II. Top Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote on the first page: "Andy we still need to get together, hopefully Tues or Wed next week."

report gives him a very useful product. Most of the rest of the intelligence output is less satisfactory. Most reports are too long, given the time pressures he is under. Latimer provides good summaries for them.[2] But most of the output is not focused on his real needs, and the analysis in many cases is mediocre. Moreover there are numerous presentational problems. Some products are written using a kind of Delphic writing; the aim is to be not caught out rather than to clearly communicate with the reader.

What sorts of things, then, does HAK need? I suggest the following:[3]

—Solid, factual daily news.

—Specialized material that would help him in the tactical management of people and of situations; for example, personality studies of foreign leaders, information on the major players and the state of play in the decisionmaking processes of a foreign government, etc.

—In depth studies on key problem areas, governments and nations, that provide new insights into the likely evolution of the Soviet missile programs, the decision processes of foreign governments, the context within which foreign leaders operate and decide, etc.

The material he is getting is satisfactory in terms of the daily reporting, but it is not helping with the really big issues. For example, the intelligence community has not yet supplied, in my opinion, a well researched, thoughtful analysis of Soviet SALT policy. Nor is it helped with the tactical problems HAK has; for example, by supplying first rate studies of the decisionmaking processes or behavior patterns of governments he and the President are trying to influence, etc. The level of the analysis of governments and of political leaders is pretty much at a journalistic level. The U.S. intelligence organizations do not often supply kinds of expertise, kinds of judgments that he cannot obtain elsewhere, or produce out of his own experience.

What are the Community's Problems in Perceiving and Responding to HAK's Needs?

First, I believe they do not perceive the nature of the game that Henry and the President are engaged in. Moreover, they do not take account of the alternative sources of information available to Henry and the President through their contacts with ambassadors, with our embassies, etc.[4] They have not undertaken a diagnosis of their comparative advantage:—what is it that they can do better than anyone else for Henry and the President? They tend to vacillate between acting as universal pundits and supplying fragmented details.

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[2] Haig put a check in the margin next to this sentence.

[3] Haig put a check in the margin next to each of the three items that follow.

[4] Haig put a question mark in the margin next to this sentence.

The community does not appear to be reacting to the changing world environment as HAK perceives it, nor to the changing focus of top level problems. However urgent the continuing need for good intelligence on Soviet-Chinese military forces, the need for political and economic intelligence will increase relatively. The kind of world that HAK believes we are moving into requires more complex political maneuvering and skillful balancing in games with three, four, five and more players. Information on friends and allies will be as valuable as that on the Soviets in many situations. In the economic area (where I feel Henry should be more interested than he is) there will be recurring currency and trade issues, and looming in the future is the energy and raw materials crisis. This will have an impact not only on the U.S., but on our allies. It may be a major factor in determining their behavior in the international area.

What I am Doing About it

Henry says that he cannot tell me what he wants and needs, but can recognize it when he sees it. In part my strategy is to produce experimental products of possible interest to him. I have something going in the following areas:

—Sample products using a new way of communicating uncertainties in intelligence judgments and estimates. A set of products giving numerical betting odds with regard to specific events in the Mid East (produced by DIA) should be available in about four to six weeks.

—Psychiatric personality studies of leading foreign leaders tailored more specifically to his needs. He expressed interest in products of this type.

I made a partially successful effort (April 1970–September 1971) to get CIA to produce an in depth study of the evolution of the SS–9 program. The objective was to pioneer a new type of intelligence analysis that would give us more insight into the multiple interest groups and organizations influencing that program. I have never surfaced it for Henry because it did not fully succeed. I will try to produce studies with similar objectives, as soon as the CIA has on board some new people with appropriate backgrounds.

I will call you soon. Let's try to cover:

—Strategy vis-à-vis the community.

—Your views on HAK's needs and diagnosis of the major problems in the community's products.

—Your ideas as to useful areas for experimental products.[5]

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[5] Haig wrote below this sentence: "Good, let's try."

283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, October 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

DoD/DCI Relationships

You will recall that under the provisions of President Nixon's 5 November 1971 memorandum directing changes in national intelligence management,[2] Dick Helms' intelligence community-wide responsibilities were given special emphasis.

In their efforts to respond to that memorandum, Dick's intelligence community staff has made efforts to participate in all stages of the Intelligence Planning-Programming-Budgeting cycle. I believed at the time that the appropriate role of the DCI with respect to Defense intelligence resources should be primarily one of aggregate advisorship, but with full participation in the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program Review which preceded the development of the Intelligence PDM. I discussed these matters in April and May with Gardiner Tucker and Bob Moot. They shared my views and I also discussed those views with you. On the basis of that discussion, I sent a letter coordinated with Mr. Moot and Dr. Tucker to Dick Helms which formalized the Defense position with regard to DCI participation in DoD intelligence PPBS activities. The letter is attached.[3]

Recently Bronson Tweedy, Dick's assistant for community matters, again raised the question of DCI participation in the form of a specific request to participate in our forthcoming FY 74 budget hearings. When I advised him that I did not believe DCI participation to be appropriate or in accordance with the policy we had discussed, Bronson indicated that Dick might raise the issue with you.

I believe the existing DoD/DCI arrangements have been and remain appropriate. They provide the DCI with full opportunity to review and comment on DoD intelligence matters. They also preserve the internal DoD character of the PPBS in the important areas of POM preparation and budget development. I recommend that we maintain the arrangements originally briefed to you.

Albert Hall

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, 350.09 (March–Dec). Secret. Copies were sent to Rush and Moot. A note on the memorandum reads: "OBE—29 Dec 72."

[2] Document 242.

[3] Document 276.

284. Editorial Note

Following President Nixon's re-election on November 7, 1972, the President and his closest advisers turned their attention to replacing key administration officials for the second term. During a dinner discussion with President's Assistants H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman on November 9, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger raised the possibility of replacing Director of Central Intelligence Helms with James Schlesinger, then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The next day Haldeman reported the discussion to the President, who responded that replacing Helms with Schlesinger was a "very good idea." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

On November 20 the President met with Helms, told him he was going to make a change at CIA, and offered him an ambassadorship. According to Haldeman's diary entry for November 20, "Helms lobbied for Iran, P responded very favorably and agreed to hold Iran open until Helms decides whether he wants it or not. He urged Helms to take it." Helms "pushed" William Colby or Thomas Karamessines as his successor. (Ibid.) The next day Helms sent the President a memorandum again urging consideration of the two men and providing detailed information on their careers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Confidential Files, Subject Files, FG 6–2) That same day the President met with Schlesinger. According to Haldeman's diary entry for November 21, "P made him the pitch on wanting him to consider CIA, asked him how he would go about it. Schlesinger had some ideas. Agreed with P's view that it needed to be changed and that the DIA was even worse, and that the Director of Central Intelligence should exercise overall control of both but does not now." Haldeman noted further that Schlesinger "obviously wants the CIA job and is perfectly willing to leave the AEC. He did suggest holding it until March, when Helms becomes sixty and would logically retire, which would also give him time to get cleaned up at the AEC." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

On November 22 the President had Haldeman call Helms "to tell him we want to make the change in March when he reaches sixty, but we want to make the announcement earlier, and that we'll keep Iran open for him." However, on November 28 the President indicated he wanted "Helms to move sooner, rather than waiting till March if he will." That same day Helms told Haldeman that "he would be delighted to take the Iran post." (Ibid.) The President appointed Schlesinger Director of Central Intelligence on December 21. He was confirmed by the Senate on January 23, 1973, and was sworn in on February 2, the same day that Helms resigned. Helms was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 8 and presented his credentials on April 5. He served as Ambassador to Iran until December 27, 1977.

285. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, November 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

State/CIA Relations

Alex Johnson met on November 13, 1972 with Ray Cline, Dick Davies, Tony Ross, Rodger Davies, Bob Beaudry, Ed Peck and the undersigned,[2] to consider means by which the Department could gain more adequate notification than it now receives on certain CIA clandestine collection activities. Recent Agency attempts to persuade diplomats of the Governments of Yugoslavia and Turkey to report to CIA on third country targets, which were the subject of protest by these Governments, had not, to the Department's knowledge, been coordinated either with affected Ambassadors or in Washington.[3] A previous uncoordinated collection activity in Port Louis had already been made the subject of representations by the Department to CIA.[4] Alex said that he had already raised the Yugoslav and Turkish incidents with Dick Helms, and expressed State's concerns.

The discussion confirmed that notification on such activities was spotty; that on occasion notification was made to Alex; that on sensitive activities in communist countries notification was often made through EUR; that in some other areas notification had been made to the Department or an overseas mission; but that there was no pattern indicating a) consistent notification; or b) notification through established channels.

The concerns expressed on notification centered not on a desire to know specific details but on the general scope of programs, though it was noted that in the case of certain foreign individuals advance notice should be provided on any planned approach. The discussion disclosed that much of the Department's concerns had to do with activities directed toward third countries, regarding which notification was

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, State/CIA Relations, 1970–1972. Secret. Drafted by William McAfee, Deputy Director, Directorate for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] Richard Davies, Rodger Davies, and Claude Ross were Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State. Robert Beaudry and Edward Peck were Johnson's Special Assistants.

[3] Cline discussed this incident in an October 31 memorandum to Johnson. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, State/CIA Relations, 1970–1972)

[4] McAfee discussed this incident in an August 18 memorandum for the files and a September 11 memorandum to James Gardner (INR). (Ibid.)

frequently not made to an Ambassador since his host government was usually not directly concerned. It was agreed that an operation, for example, against the USSR, conducted through a third country source involved political sensitivity for the third country as well as for the USSR.

In a letter of 17 July 1972[5] Dick Helms confirmed to the Deputy Secretary an understanding concerning notification to State on clandestine activities indicating that consultation would normally be arranged with or through the State Department representative on USIB. In order to insure that one central point in State is in a position to monitor the range of CIA activity coordinated with the Department, it was agreed that if policy bureaus are apprised by the Agency of sensitive clandestine collection activities, they are to advise INR, normally through DDC, of the essential information on the projected activity.

It was agreed that Ray Cline would discuss with Dick Helms the Department's concerns on matters such as the Turkish and Yugoslav incidents, pointing to the agreement reached last summer in the exchange of correspondence on NSCID 5, which called for notification to the Department normally through the State member of USIB. Ray will discuss with Dick the Department's desire to be notified of broad programs and of approaches to sensitive individuals and will seek to establish which type of activity should be discussed with the Department, which with the Ambassador and which with both.

[5] A copy of the letter is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–00037, Box 9, Folder 2, US–7, State 1972.

286. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, November 15, 1972.

NSCIC CONSIDERATION OF WORKING GROUP CASE STUDY ON INDIA–PAKISTAN CRISIS

Henry Kissinger's office has asked for your comments on the NSCIC Working Group's Case Study of the India–Pakistan Crisis of 1971.[2] The recommended response is attached (Tab A).[3]

This case study is the first of several planned by the Working Group to illuminate problems in the relationship between the Intelligence Community and its prime consumers. The study was prepared in the spring of 1972 by a three-man team from CIA, DIA and INR under the supervision of Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff. Curtis Jones, Director of INR's Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, served as team leader. The team examined CIA, DOD and State files and a summary of WSAG minutes, and interviewed some of the policy makers directly concerned with the India-Pakistan crisis.

The study reaches conclusions about the performance of the Intelligence Community and poses issues related to these conclusions. It does not examine how policy makers used the Community's products or offer recommendations for action. The key conclusions are:

1. Most intelligence products are produced by a single agency but the products of different agencies are often very similar. Only National Intelligence Estimates (NIE or SNIE) and items in the daily Current Intelligence Bulletin published by CIA are coordinated.

Issue: What is the optimum mix of coordination with timeliness and responsiveness to departmental needs?

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files: NSCIC–NSCIC Working Group, 1971–1974. Secret. Drafted by Berry and concurred in by Kux and Laingen.

[2] "Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India–Pakistan Crisis of 1971," June 15, 1972. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK) Kissinger asked for comments on the study in anticipation of a meeting of the NSC Intelligence Committee on November 29, which would have been the committee's second meeting and first since December 3, 1971, but the meeting did not take place. Marshall's agenda for the meeting, dated November 27, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 301, Intelligence Committee, 1971–74.

[3] Attached but not printed.

2. Some intelligence collection was very timely, pertinent and accurate, but for some periods, places and topics there were no satisfactory collection facilities.

Issue: What collection capabilities ought to be maintained for use in possible contingencies of this regional crisis kind?

3. Many intelligence estimates and judgments were impressively correct. On other points the Community was silent, wrong, or contradictory. Some correct key judgments were expressed once and not repeated even though much of the Community still considered them valid. A clandestine report relating to Indian intentions was presented to the NSC early in December in unevaluated or uncoordinated forms and policy makers could have formed the erroneous view that the Community accepted the report without reservation.

Issue: How can the Community most effectively keep policy makers aware of its current coordinated positions?

4. Members of the Community reported to policy makers voluminously and, for the most part, separately. Caution, volume, brevity and variations caused by agency requirements muffled the Community's message, but the Community members had no way of knowing whether an intelligence finding reached any individual policy maker or whether he understood and accepted it.

Issue: Through what channel and in what format or volume can the Community most effectively communicate with policy makers and, in critical cases, get some feedback on the usefulness of reporting?

5. INR, CIA and DIA often lacked information on policy sessions and high level exchanges with other countries. Generally these intelligence producers felt isolated from policy makers and usually they had to decide for themselves what intelligence might be relevant to policy making. Some comments and actions by policy makers indicated the latter were not aware of intelligence judgments or not persuaded by them.

Issue: Can intelligence effectively support policy making if intelligence producers are not informed on the nature and basis of policy problems?

The Chairman of the NSCIC Working Group, in forwarding the Case Study to NSCIC, reported that the Working Group will make a detailed analysis of lessons learned in this study and recommend improved procedures. To facilitate this process he also suggested that after NSCIC members had reviewed this study the Committee might seek to bring the lessons and issues more sharply into focus and discuss some implications for the interface between policy makers and the Community. He highlighted three problem areas in which NSCIC might consider giving guidance to the Community:

1) how policy makers tell the Community what their intelligence needs are;
2) how the Community tells policy makers what its judgments are;
3) how well the Community's response satisfies policy needs.

The Working Group Chairman also suggested some specific measures or questions that NSCIC might consider, much along the lines of our listing of key conclusions above. Would a focal point for developing, coordinating and transmitting consumer needs provide a satisfactory balance between the usefulness of formal statements of intelligence needs and requirements for rapid response? How can top priority intelligence data and judgments be flagged so that they come to the personal attention of key top officials during a crisis? What kinds or forms of intelligence are wanted by consumers during crises? For example, should raw intelligence be provided or should it always be supplemented by intelligence evaluation or comment? Are more frequent NIE's or other forms of coordinated intelligence desired? Should intelligence briefings normally be either coordinated or multi-agency? Should the Community periodically restate judgments that remain valid?

The team that conducted this case study had difficulty in determining how intelligence reached top decision makers, what intelligence reached them, and what impact it had. The study could therefore not reach firm conclusions on the effectiveness of the Community's performance or on the changes most likely to make it responsive and effective. The Working Group Chairman has suggested that NSCIC members may wish to consider planning a real-time study of the handling and use of intelligence at the NSC level during an actual crisis.

All of these problems, questions and issues ought to come before NSCIC in some fashion, as well as the more extensive exposition and voluminous detail contained in the Case Study itself. We do not, however, know that any NSCIC member intends to press for resolution of any of these specific issues within the NSCIC at this time. In view of the Chairman's statement that the Working Group will undertake a detailed analysis and recommend improved procedures, it is not necessary for NSCIC to settle these detailed questions now.

We recommend that NSCIC take note of the Chairman's statement and ask the Working Group to continue its exploration of these issues and of ways to deal with them, of course bringing to NSCIC any proposals requiring decision at that level. The Working Group is unique in combining a wide range of consumer and producer interests and it is a most appropriate body to examine the complications of present arrangements and the implications of changes. Indeed, it may be found that the Working Group itself can perform a useful planning function

in emerging crises to help ensure better interaction between policy makers and the Intelligence Community.

Nonetheless, NSCIC exists to provide high level consumer guidance to the Intelligence Community and the purpose of Working Group studies and proposals is to evoke such guidance. If NSCIC members have firm and clear views on any of the questions raised by this Case Study, the next NSCIC meeting will provide an opportunity for expressing them.

Recommendation

1. That you sign the attached memorandum for Mr. Kissinger.

2. That INR prepare a briefing for you on this Case Study and on the intelligence issues it raises, to be scheduled once a date is set for the next NSCIC meeting.[4]

[4] Neither option is marked.

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287. Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Net Assessment Group, The Next Four Years

The purpose of this memorandum is to give you my views as to appropriate goals for the next four years and important near-term actions you should take. Net Assessment Group responsibilities fall into two relatively separable areas:

—Conducting national net assessment studies.
—Improving intelligence community performance, through:

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 825, Andrew Marshall, Vol. II. Top Secret; Codeword; Handle via Byeman Talent Keyhole Channels Only. The memorandum is marked "Outside System." Sent for information. The tabs are attached but not printed.

—Monitoring the implementation of the President's reorganization of November 5, 1971.
—Staff support to you as chairman of the NSCIC.
—Direct efforts to obtain improved products for you and the NSC staff.

Background

The establishment of a national *net assessment* process and the initiation of work on the first of our studies has been delayed by Laird's sharp resistance over the past few months. We are prepared to start discussions with DOD, State, and other agencies as soon as we are directed to do so. These discussions should:

—Establish an NSC view of the nature and scope of national net assessments.
—Define procedures for carrying out national net assessments.

Candidates for the initial net assessments have been developed, in particular:

—A study of the comparative economies of U.S. and Soviet military establishments aimed at clarifying the question: —Are we pricing ourselves out of the continuing military competition with the Soviets?
—A study of the national security implications of the energy crisis.

Major problems in net assessment are:

—Lack of generally accepted definition of net assessment.
—Lack of clearly defined methodology.
—Diminishing credibility of the national net assessment effort as time passes and none are produced.

The solution to these problems is to get started soon on national net assessment.

The intelligence area has been more active. The first year under the President's reorganization directed on November 5, 1971 is now behind us. For the first time Helms has produced a consolidated budget, called the National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM).[2] He will soon produce a Planning Guidance document. The NSC Intelligence Committee Working Group has underway eight studies of the performance and product of the intelligence community. I have taken a number of initiatives to improve the products coming to you and the NSC staff.

[2] See Documents 242 and 288.

Major problems, however, are:

—The slow pace of improvement in intelligence community management in dealing with persistent problems, e.g., no long-range planning, marginally effective budgeting systems, etc.

—Lack of drive to improve intelligence products, to develop a product improvement program, or to become more sensitive to consumer needs.

Net Assessment: Goals and Actions

Major goals of the net assessment effort over the next four years are:

—Firmly establishing a national net assessment process directed from the NSC staff.

—Producing a number of high quality studies that will:

—Raise issues requiring national level attention.

—Clarify the appropriate scope and nature of national level net assessments.

—Demonstrate methodologies for doing net assessments.

Our preliminary view is that net assessments should focus upon the diagnosis of problems or opportunities in some aspect of national security. The analysis in most cases will emphasize comparisons with Soviet capabilities and programs, and will be comprehensive, including non-military factors not normally considered in past forms of analysis. At Tab A is a more complete discussion of the opportunities and goals we perceive for net assessment.

Near-term actions you should consider are:

—Issuance of the NSSM now awaiting your signature creating an ad hoc group to proceed with the definition of the national net assessment process.

—Initiation of national net assessment of:

—The comparative economics of U.S. and Soviet military establishments.

—National Security implications of the energy crisis.

Intelligence: Goals and Actions

Major goals with regard to the intelligence community management and intelligence product are:

—Improved intelligence community management, especially as regards budgeting and program planning.

—Development of the NSCIC into an effective source of guidance on top level decisionmakers' intelligence needs and a source of critical evaluation and feedback on the quality of intelligence products.

—Instituting within the intelligence community continuing programs for improvement of intelligence products, e.g., programs for R&D on improved intelligence analysis methods, for product quality

control, for consumer and market research, for training in analysis and management, etc.

Near-term actions for you to take are:

—Should Helms be replaced now or asked to retire on his 60th birthday in the Spring, an early meeting with the new DCI should be arranged. The meeting should focus on your views concerning current and future intelligence needs, improving communication between top level intelligence consumers and intelligence producers, etc. I will provide talking points.

—Meet with the NSCIC to discuss the first completed study of intelligence community performance (during the Indo/Pak Crisis),[3] to review the NSCIC Working Group's efforts to date, and to direct a review of appropriate portions of Helms' National Intelligence Program Memorandum and Planning Guidance.

—Request the DCI to report on progress in implementing the President's reorganization after the first of the year. It should present a basis for guidance from you as to the priorities attached to the President's stated goals for the reorganization.

—Communicate your views of the quality of intelligence products you and your staff receive and how well they are focussed on your needs. Helms in the past has taken your and the President's comments literally; largely favorable words from you have made it difficult to get across some deficiencies in the products. I will prepare a summary of the views of your staff on the intelligence materials they receive for transmittal to the DCI under your signature after the first of the year.

At Tab B is a more complete diagnosis of current problems, description of goals for the next four years, and set of near-term actions for you to take. I share, I believe, your doubts that the intelligence community bureaucracy can even routinely produce the high quality intelligence analysis you would find satisfactory. But they can do a lot better than they are now doing.

Early next year you and I should discuss goals and priorities, and a general strategy for dealing with the intelligence community.

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[3] See Document 286 and footnote 2 thereto.

288. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, November 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

NSCIC Consideration of National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM)

It is not clear what action the NSCIC is expected to take on the National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM), which Dick Helms recently submitted to the President through the Office of Management and Budget. Dick provided a copy to you for your information.[2] I was consulted by his staff in the course of its preparation.

In any case I believe that it is appropriate for the NSCIC to review the NIPM. We felt from the beginning of the intelligence reorganization that NSCIC should receive concrete intelligence program proposals as well as illuminating case studies like the India–Pakistan crisis report[3] as a basis for formulating realistic policy guidance to the intelligence community.

Background of NIPM

The NIPM is the first document of its kind. It incorporates all programs that are considered by Helms to be a part of the "national" intelligence budget proposals for FY–1974.

You will recall that one of the responsibilities given to the DCI by the President's intelligence directive of 5 November 1971[4] was the preparation of a "consolidated intelligence program budget," which was to be presented to the President through OMB. As Helms makes clear in his first NIPM, the program and budget processes of the government have not as yet, at least, been modified in a way that would enable the DCI to prepare a true "consolidated budget." The Department of Defense, which programs most of the assets for national intelligence activities, has continued to follow procedures which Helms characterizes as "uneven and largely input-oriented and are preoccupied with fiscal levels rather than performance and output." During the past year Helms and his staff have established closer contact with intelligence program managers in

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSCIC Documents, 1972–1974. Top Secret; Ruff; Zarf; Umbra; Handle via [*codewords not declassified*] Byeman Talent Keyhole Comint Channels Jointly. Drafted by Cline and Richard Curl (INR/DDC).

[2] Helms forwarded a copy to Irwin on October 18. (Ibid.)

[3] See Document 286 and footnote 2 thereto.

[4] Document 242.

Defense, but have not been able to conduct the reviews and assessments necessary for detailed budget recommendations. One obstacle to consolidated budget review has been the difficulty of dealing with resources which affect national intelligence programs but which are not a part of those programs. For example, the DCI himself has deferred to the Secretary of Defense on proposals for "tactical intelligence" in support of military commanders; yet, as the NIPM shows, the line between "national" and "tactical" is sometimes fuzzy, and resource issues in one area can materially affect those in the other.

In spite of these limitations on the DCI's program and budget role, the NIPM is a useful and well presented first effort to bring together a descriptive analysis of all national intelligence programs. While it does not contain sufficient information for policy judgments on particular intelligence projects or expenditures, it does provide an excellent overview of proposed allocations of effort, areas where changes are taking place or are desirable, and key issues requiring resolution in the future.

Highlights

The NIPM is summarized in the first 12 pages. The programs are then analyzed from the standpoint of substantive goals or targets, functions of the intelligence community, and resources management.

[*4 paragraphs (18 lines) of source text not declassified*]

Helms favors a hold-the-line proposal—that is, maintaining the overall fiscal size of the intelligence program as being adequate to fulfill the national intelligence mission for the next several years, except perhaps for costs resulting from legislative pay increases. The effect of such a holding-the-line policy would result in a forced absorption of over [*dollar amount not declassified*] annually, due primarily to inflation.

The proposed Defense Intelligence Program is [*dollar amount not declassified*] below the FY–1973 level, resulting largely from a transfer of certain activities (e.g., mapping, Advanced Range Instrumentation Ships) into non-intelligence programs. Helms points out that some of these activities, such as the instrumentation ships, will continue to be needed for intelligence collection.

The CIA program request is [*dollar amount not declassified*] the FY–73 program, resulting mainly from expanded clandestine agent and covert action operations, support to narcotics control, R&D, and modest enhancement of production, communications and processing capabilities.

Helms states that the strengthening of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is an important operating goal in the National Intelligence Program.

When addressing the subject of sources, Helms concludes that a number of technical collection projects, including the near-real-time photographic system scheduled to begin operation in October 1976, are so

essential for SAL and other monitoring of Soviet strategic special weapons programs that their capabilities should not be degraded or their dates of availability delayed.

Helms also emphasizes the continued importance of human source collection not only to meet the needs for political, economic, and narcotics intelligence but also to supply information on strategic weapons. He states that "one of the most prolific sources of intelligence is the Foreign Service, which is quite properly not included in the National Intelligence Program." In stressing the need to avoid using the CIA Clandestine Service to collect information about host governments which should be collected instead by the Foreign Service, Helms suggests that more effort should be given to assigning specific responsibilities to the two services, perhaps at the mission level, to improve efficiency. He expresses the need for qualitative strengthening of the Defense Attaché system, where he finds "no world-wide professionalism comparable to that found in the Foreign Service or in CIA's Clandestine Service."

Helms asks for critical review of several Defense programs, including certain aspects [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in which there are new and costly system proposals. He strongly questions the value of an expensive radar system, [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

Helms also calls special attention to the costs and growing demands for information processing in the community, including the costs of processing information from advanced collection projects, particularly photographic and SIGINT overhead systems. Helms proposes IRAC studies of this as well as several other intelligence resource areas.

Talking Points

You may wish to say the following when the NIPM is discussed:

1. The NIPM is a useful document, providing an overview of intelligence program requests for FY–1974 and also identifying issues which in the future should receive coordinated attention both from policy makers and the intelligence community.

2. We believe this is the kind of document that should be reviewed by NSCIC. It is an indispensable tool for NSCIC to employ in formulating guidance on consumer needs. These needs have to be expressed in the context of the entire intelligence community program and in the light of concrete proposals for specific systems and projects.

3. We agree generally on the objective of holding the line in the overall cost of the intelligence program, at least until it becomes clear that inflation is driving the program below the threshold of minimum assurance of national security. For the next few years, in the face of tight budgets and inflation, we will need to give greater attention to cross-program adjustments, such as between collection and production and between various targets.

4. We agree that intelligence objectives need to be better articulated. We believe that improved statements of objectives should be based on more thorough assessment of the existing and potential usefulness of individual intelligence systems as well as on changes in substantive emphasis at the decision-making levels.

5. The NIPM calls attention to manpower costs, which comprise about half of the budget devoted to the US intelligence effort. Substantial manpower cuts have been made over the last ten years. We must continue our efforts to make additional cuts and especially to keep overseas presence to a minimum essential level.

6. Beyond the question of manpower, we agree on the need for more intensive study of other key resource issues outlined by Dick Helms, such as the levels of effort to be devoted to various kinds of satellite surveillance. State would welcome the chance to participate in preparing detailed analytical studies of this kind.

7. We note that decisions about national reconnaissance programs of great significance in relation to the feasibility of international negotiations and agreements (SAL I, e.g.) are made by an Executive Committee (EXCOM) without any representation from the State Department.[5] State Department views on priorities to be attached to various elements of the reconnaissance program ought to be useful in EXCOM deliberations and State believes it should be asked to provide a representative for this group.

[5] SAL is in reference to the Strategic Arms Limitation talks.

289. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Hall) to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, December 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

National Security Agency/Central Security Service Organization Plan

In your memorandum of 14 April 1972[2] on the above subject, you directed me to conduct an in-depth review, with the participation by the JCS, to assess the adequacy of the NSA/CSS organization plan to respond to the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commanders. This review, which included team visits to EUCOM and PACOM, has been completed.[3]

You asked six specific questions in your memorandum of 14 April 1972. The observations of the review team relative to these questions are summarized at Tab "A." The team's full report is at Tab "B." The JCS comments, which concurred in the team's recommendations, are at Tab "C."[4]

While there are further actions needed, I believe that DIRNSA, with my support, is moving to take these actions. I do not believe that further guidance from you is needed now. We will continue to follow the implementation of the CSS, and if additional Sec Def action is needed I will provide you with recommendations.

Albert Hall

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 094, 020 NSA 1972. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it.

[2] Not found.

[3] In an October 17 memorandum to Laird, Hall requested a postponement of the review until April 1973 because his staff had learned through interviews with senior officials of the CSS headquarters staff that "the CSS organization is evolving, but it is not yet fully operational. The headquarters staff is currently about 60% manned in the key areas, and the major staff effort at this time is being devoted to aligning missions and functions and establishing staff policies and procedures with the NSA organization and with the CSS operating elements overseas. In the field, military commanders are just beginning to get acquainted with the CSS area headquarters organizations." Laird commented that this "would seem all the more reason to have early review." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: RG 330, FRC 330 77 094, 020 NSA 1972)

[4] Tabs B and C are attached but not printed.

Tab A

1. Is the new system improving SIGINT support to local commanders?

Military commanders are generally satisfied with the peacetime support they are receiving. However, they do not yet recognize any distinction between NSA and CSS and do not attribute improved SIGINT support to creation of the CSS. They believe that the quality and timeliness of support has improved during the past year, mostly as a result of the creation of a number of new Cryptologic Support Groups (CSGs), which had been planned before CSS was established, and to expansion of National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC) capabilities.

2. Should responsibility for SIGINT tasking control be delegated to lower echelons to improve responsiveness to local commanders' needs?

Military commands are convinced that tasking authority over direct support elements must be vested in the commander they support during exercises, contingencies and wartime.

3. Have personnel savings been made from combining and/or eliminating staffs?

NSA/CSS indicates some savings have been made, but the actual numbers are not yet known.

4. Should additional tasking authority be transferred from NSA to CSS?

No SIGINT tasking authority has yet been transferred to CSS.

5. Is it feasible to collocate the headquarters operational elements of the SCAs, CSS and NSA?

It is desirable and feasible to collocate the headquarters. However, the availability of space at Fort Meade is the determinant.

6. Is dual hatting of senior NSA officials to CSS positions effective?

Commands in the field have noted no effect of dual hatting and hold no opinion on the question. SCA commanders view the dual hatting concept as having thus far proved ineffective and believe that it has complicated organizational relationships.

290. Transcript of a Memorandum to the President's Assistant (Haldeman) Dictated by President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 27, 1972.

[Omitted here is the first part of the memorandum.]

I am attaching to this memorandum a very good memorandum I received from Ehrlichman[2] on the intelligence community. Schlesinger's report[3] is brilliant, and must be implemented in a number of directions.

Here, however, you have a very delicate responsibility. What you must do is to convince Henry of the necessity of my appointing Schlesinger as the top White House man responsible for reorganizing the intelligence community and in charge of intelligence activities. It's of course going to be in Henry's shop, but Schlesinger must be the man in charge.

I say this for a number of reasons, of which the following are the most important:

1) The Congress is particularly jealous of its authority in the intelligence field. If they got the impression that the President has turned all intelligence activities over to Kissinger all hell will break loose. If on the other hand I name the new Director of CIA Schlesinger as my top assistant for intelligence activities we can get it by the Congress.

2) Henry simply doesn't have the time to spend which is needed, to spend on this project which is needed. The fact that I have been bugging him and Haig for over 3 years to get intelligence reorganized with no success whatever proves that point. For example, just read Schlesinger's report of 2 years ago and note it has not been implemented in any respect and you can see what the problem is.

3) Henry cannot move in this field [unclear], due to his very close contact with Haig. Haig with all of his superior qualities is after all a part of the present system.

4) Hanging over this whole intelligence question is FIAB. It is a prestigious group, but instead of really being independent, being an independent advisory group, it really represents various segments of the status quo in the intelligence community. FIAB will vigorously oppose many of the attempts to reorganize intelligence.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 828–6. No classification marking. The President dictated the memorandum in the Oval Office sometime between 10:12 and 10:44 a.m. The editors transcribed the portion of Nixon's remarks printed here specifically for this volume. A copy of the memorandum has not been found. Nixon's verbal instructions for punctuation and paragraphing have not been transcribed.

[2] Not found.

[3] Printed as the second attachment to Document 229.

With all these problems, you can see that it's going to take some pretty skillful management. I am now suggesting that you sit down at a time when everybody is in a very congenial frame of mind with Kissinger and with Ehrlichman and also with Schlesinger. The four of you then should have it out with regard to how this intelligence problem should be handled. In the meantime Ehrlichman's recommendation that Ash conduct an independent study with regard to the management side of intelligence is right on the mark. Let's get that going immediately. Once Ash has his teeth dug into this thing, he should also sit in with the rest of you and develop a recommendation for me on the intelligence matter.

There is one weakness in the Schlesinger memorandum which I want you to have corrected in your discussions. He [unclear] points out that we have to get rid of the overlapping, etc., and particularly to cut down on the enormous expenditures of the Defense Department for intelligence. On the other hand he does not emphasize as much as I would like the need to improve *quality* as well as reduce *quantity* of top intelligence people in the CIA itself. The CIA, like the State Department, is basically a liberal establishment bureaucracy. I want the personnel there cut in at least half—no, at least by 35 to 40 percent—and I want a definite improvement in so far as attitudes of those in CIA with regard to our foreign policy. There are some very good men there, but the great majority are the old [unclear] Georgetown crowd. [The last few words before the tape ends are unintelligible.]

Managing the Department of State

291. Editorial Note

Documentation on participation of the Department of State and Secretary of State Rogers in the National Security Council system is in the chapter on the NSC system. Included is documentation on Rogers' relationships with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and on the views and concerns expressed both in the White House and the Department of State about the functioning of the NSC system and the respective roles of the two agencies in shaping foreign policy. Documentation on foreign economic policy, including the Department of State's conflict with the Department of Commerce over control of U.S. foreign economic and commercial functions, is in the chapter on foreign economic policy. For documentation on the President's efforts to restructure the foreign assistance program, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Documents 1–147.

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292. Memorandum From the Counselor-Designate (Pedersen) to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers[1]

Washington, December 30, 1968.

RE

Executive Leadership of Department

A number of studies over recent years have advocated designating the number three man in the Department as either "Executive" Under Secretary or "Permanent" Under Secretary. They recommend appointing a career officer to the position, and giving him full responsibility for the management of the Department, both in administration and in the execution of policy decisions. The concept is that the Secretary has so many responsibilities to the President, with foreign diplomats, in decision making, and in crises that he cannot "run"

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 8. Confidential.

the Department; similarly that the job has become so large that the Under Secretary must be a true alter-ego and therefore does not have time to run the Department either.

The Herter Committee made such a recommendation in 1962 and the Foreign Service Association, under new and younger leadership, did so also in a report in 1968.[2] Legislation would be required to establish such a title (and the supporters of such a change favor it); the function could, however, be bestowed without legislation.

Three main motivations are involved in the recommendations for an "Executive" Under Secretary: (a) A feeling that the Department has not been adequately "managed" either from an administrative or substantive point of view and is therefore not fully responsive to policy decisions, (b) a feeling that the Department does not adequately exercise its policy authority over operational activities of other agencies abroad, specifically AID and military assistance, but also USIA and others, and (c) a desire to further continuity and stability in policy and administrative practices at the professional level.

In spite of the persistence of such views, successive Secretaries of State have not adopted such recommendations. Politically-appointed Under Secretaries such as Ball and Dillon have exercised varying degrees of control over the operations of the Department, partly determined by their own personalities and partly by the nature of responsibility the Secretary was prepared to assign to them; professional diplomats have been given influential advisory but not really executive roles. Rusk's own view is that the secret to effective operation of the Department is delegation of authority (essentially to the Assistant Secretary level), and he does not favor an "Executive" Under Secretary.

After reading a great deal of the literature, my own view is that while it is correct that there is a need for better administration and execution of decisions in the Department, the designation of responsibility for the operation of the Department to one man at the third level would cause more problems than it would solve. If fully executed in accordance with the recommendations, the office would in my view have too much authority vis-à-vis the Secretary and political leadership; it would also centralize too many functions in one man, who in effect would have to filter and be responsible for all activities and functions of the Department before they reached the Secretary. To administer the Department, to recommend and execute policy decisions, and to supervise and coordinate the foreign policy activities of other agencies are immense and disparate tasks.

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[2] For text of the American Foreign Service Association report, "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," see *Foreign Service Journal,* vol. 45, no. 11, part II, November 1968.

On the other hand there are now seven people at Under and Deputy Under Secretary level (including ACDA, AID and Peace Corps), and fourteen at Assistant Secretary level, plus probably a dozen detached people, who report directly to the Secretary of State. While most (not all) of these people need to have direct access to the Secretary, the Secretary does need effective intermediate screening and executive assistance procedures. The Under and Deputy Under Secretary positions are, of course, intended for such functions. I believe that, with the right delegation of responsibilities to these positions (and the right people in them), the present system can be made to work effectively and responsively to the decisions of the President and Secretary, at the same time meeting the criticisms leveled at the current situation.

Top level policy and executive responsibilities might be allocated as follows (present and altered organization sheets attached):[3]

Recommendations

1. Under Secretary. The Under Secretary should be a real alter-ego of the Secretary. He should take on some of the Secretary's conference responsibilities. He should receive many ambassadors. He should participate in policy decisions and he should undertake special responsibilities (e.g. Biafra).

2. Under Secretary for Economic (or Political) Affairs (title is optional under the law). This Under Secretary should have as his primary assignment responsibility for supervision and general direction of economic and military assistance programs as given to the Department by law. Primary coordination point within the Department on AID, Peace Corps, USIA matters. Supervision of the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Supervision of "non-operational" bureaus: Public Affairs, INR, Policy Planning Council, and of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

3. Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. This Deputy Under Secretary should have as his primary assignment responsibility for supervising the "operating" bureaus of the Department and for assuring "execution" by them of decisions made by the Secretary and President: African Affairs, European Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, International Organization Affairs, Legal Adviser, and International Scientific and Technological Affairs, and of Politico-Military Affairs.

4. Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. This Deputy Under Secretary should have responsibilities as at present: Security and Consular Affairs, Administrative Offices and Programs, Director General of Foreign Service, plus Inspector General of Foreign Assistance (presently attached directly to the Secretary).

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[3] Attached but not printed.

5. Auxiliary Positions. Protocol, Congressional Relations, Ambassadors at Large, the Counsellor, and the Executive Secretariat to report directly to the Secretary/Under Secretary. Ambassadors at Large to be appointed as needed and given responsibility for a specific task, e.g. Biafra, Israeli-Arab settlement. The Counsellor can supervise the Executive Secretariat, as you suggested, if you would like an extra substantive review of recommendations coming to you; if so it should be in the nature of independent advice, not line authority. The Counsellor could also supervise Policy Planning (which he formerly directed), although I have suggested above that it might be placed under the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who will be responsible for forward planning of operational programs such as economic and military assistance.

6. Methods of Operation. Maximum delegation of authority of decision to Assistant Secretaries within their areas of responsibility. Access to Secretary by Assistant Secretaries to be retained fully i.e., Deputy Under Secretaries to be a review point but not a decision point on policies. For example, policy memoranda from operating bureaus would come "through" the Deputy Under Secretary, who might comment on them, but would not require his concurrence or his resolving differences between bureaus. The Under Secretaries would work with you as a team in an inner cabinet and would meet with you regularly for that purpose. (The heads of ACDA, AID, Peace Corps, and USIA should also be included with this group at regular intervals.)

Comment: There might be a number of modifications of detail in how such an approach would be organized. I have not talked to anyone yet, and there may be technical or personnel problems of which I am not aware.

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293. Memorandum From President-Elect Nixon to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers[1]

Washington, January 7, 1969.

At the beginning of a new Administration I believe that an analysis of the qualifications of all of our Ambassadors abroad, career as well

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Rogers Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Printed from an unsigned copy.

as non-career, should be made. While the great majority of career men will probably be retained in their present posts, the beginning of a new Administration is a good time to move some of the dead wood out and to move some of the unqualified men from one post to a less sensitive one.

In my travels abroad I have, of course, seen the usual number of political appointees who weren't qualified for the job they held, but I have also seen a number of career men who were pretty inadequate and who should be replaced.

I think a very hard-headed analysis should be made just as soon as we take over on January 20 so that any changes can be made within the first two or three months that we are in office. If we delay beyond that point we will be subject to the charge of being vindictive, personal or political. Changes at this time, of course, will be expected.

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294. Editorial Note

Documentation on Presidential appointments to ambassadorships and top positions in the Department of State can be found in several files. Most of the material deals with appointments of specific individuals to specific positions rather than the general process of Presidential appointments. Especially valuable for ambassadorial appointments are the files of President's Assistant Peter Flanigan, who played a key role in the White House appointment process for ambassadors. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files) Flanigan's material is contained in several folders in boxes 12–14: PMF—Special Ambassador Files; Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda; Ambassadors Miscellaneous; Ruth Farkas; and Special Files. Complementing Flanigan's files in the Nixon Presidential Materials, though not as rich in relevant material, are several other files, including: 1) NSC Files, Agency Files, Department of State; 2) White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, FO 2 (for ambassadorial appointments) and PE 2 (for more general material on appointments); and 3) White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FO 2 (for ambassadorial appointments). Also very useful are H. R. Haldeman's diaries, which are available on compact disc. (*The Haldeman Diaries: Complete Multimedia Edition*)

In addition to the Nixon Presidential Materials, the files of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson at the National Archives (RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695) and the papers of Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson at the Library

of Congress provide helpful material on appointments. Johnson's notes of his telephone conversations during 1969 ("Telcons, personal") include many conversations regarding appointments both to ambassadorships and to positions in the Department of State. Richardson's papers include some memoranda (Box 83, "Ambassadorial Assignments") and a considerable number of "telcons" (Box 104) concerning appointments during 1969 and the first half of 1970. For example, there are notes of more than 30 of Richardson's telephone conversations concerning the appointment of Ray Cline as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and notes of at least 8 of his conversations concerning the appointment of William Macomber as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

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295. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers and the Under Secretary of State-Designate (Richardson)[1]

Washington, January 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Two Administrative Suggestions

You undoubtedly will want to take your time looking at a variety of matters concerning the personnel structure of the Department of State. Almost everyone agrees that many improvements can be made. There are two specific items that deserve immediate attention, though, and I wanted you to have my suggestions on these.

I.

First, I have long since joined the chorus of critics of the promotion system. The last promotion boards, for example, failed to promote a number of people I regard as outstanding, several of whom are likely to leave the State Department as a result. At the same time, there has never been a Secretary or an Under Secretary who did not feel that the top ranks of the Foreign Service were full of names of men not good enough to be used in the Department's most responsible jobs. At least there were obviously better men at lower ranks.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 8. No classification marking.

Only belatedly has it occurred to me that the Secretary and Under Secretary have no business complaining about the choices made by the promotion boards if they don't take the trouble to name the officers who are to sit on these boards. For some time now the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration has appointed the promotion boards, although he has no good way of knowing the type of substantive officer the Department needs. He's in a very different line of work. By picking the selection boards he plays a major role in deciding who will be promoted—a role that should be played by the men ultimately responsible for the quality of the Department's output (the Secretary and the Under Secretary). Moreover, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration often cannot pull good enough men from their daily assignments even to perform this job, which is crucial to the health of the Service. You can and should.

Most Foreign Service officers would like nothing better than to respond wholeheartedly to the policy guidance of the President's appointees. Unfortunately they must now also reckon on the career implications of their relations with senior men in the Service—some of whom have different ideas than you have about either substance or, more likely, style of operations. If you appoint the promotion boards, the built-in conflict is reduced if not resolved.

In short, the promotion system should reflect substantive operators' views of the type of men they need and the only way this can be done is by your picking the men who will do the promoting. I would ask the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to come up with a long list of possible names from which the Under Secretary could choose after consulting with the Secretary. This may seem like a lot of your time invested in a minor matter but the matter is not minor. The whole character of our foreign policy is affected by the decisions we make as to who gets ahead in the Foreign Service.

You should be careful to keep in a low key your presentation to the Foreign Service of any such change in the method of choosing the promotion boards. A good deal of reverence is paid (for example, by the recent report of the American Foreign Service Association),[2] to the notion that the Foreign Service should be almost entirely self-regulating. I couldn't disagree more and I think the results prove my case. But I would anticipate some reactions that the politicians were trying to destroy the purity of the career service. The whole notion that there is something "pure" about these decisions being made by the senior administrative officer of the Department, who is also appointed by the President, seems ridiculous to me.

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[2] See footnote 2, Document 292.

II.

Second, the American Foreign Service Association recommended some time ago that we create an ombudsman to process the complaints of any of our people dissatisfied with the treatment they have received at the hands of our administrative machinery. Rightly or wrongly, a deep-seated suspicion of the honorableness of the Administrative area has been with us for some time and remains, as even a superficial investigation will confirm. People feel they are treated shabbily and have no recourse.

I would have gone ahead and set up an ombudsman procedure in the last few months, but I was concerned that it would look like a political move made in light of the election. The fears inevitably created by any change in administration would make such an action particularly desirable from your point of view. It would give just the right signal to the personnel of the Department and to the public at large. Moreover, congressional pressures in this direction (most recently evidenced by the Ervin bill) are building up at a fairly good pace. By taking this step on your own you can help control developments.

I have done some thinking on how I would handle the ombudsman proposal. Attaching these responsibilities to the Legal Adviser's Office makes the most sense. The Legal Adviser already represents a moral force in the Department. He is never subject to the pressures that a career officer can feel even when he is appointed Assistant Secretary. The Legal Adviser has had and, I assume, will continue to have good access to both of you. Whether he would want to appoint a special man to this responsibility or give it to one of his present assistants isn't crucial. What is, is that there be a more formal and adequate grievance recourse than we now have.[3]

[3] At a February 16 meeting with Richardson, Katzenbach reemphasized the points made in this memorandum and made a number of additional recommendations, primarily concerning personnel policies. Among other things he advised Richardson to "identify really able young people and get them on the fast track," encourage more interchanges between State and CIA, and, above all, start matching the personnel structure to the jobs. He also stated that the Policy Planning Council "has never been really effective" and was a waste of taxpayers' money and that the Seventh Floor needed more staff, so long as the staff "doesn't try to push itself into line operations—so long as not layering." (Richardson, Notes of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 89, Chronological File)

296. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Counsel (Ehrlichman)[1]

Washington, February 1, 1969.

At an early date next week, I would like for you to have a visit with Bill Rogers with regard to the announcements of Ambassadors. I believe our appointments at State up to this time have been good, but we are catching hell from a great number of our friends for our failure to put RN people in positions in the State Department except for Rogers, while all of the other appointments are considered to be either State Department careerists or at best pro-Rockefeller types.[2] This does not concern me because I think Rogers will control the situation, but it does pose potential political problems for the future. We can cure it, or at least substantially cool it, by announcing in the near future a number of ambassadorial appointments. What is particularly important is that the blatant Johnson political appointees in ambassadorial posts must be removed immediately. I want Carter Burgess, Bill Costello who wrote a vicious book which was considered by legal experts to be libelous against RN, and approximately 16 others of this type to be removed just as quickly as possible. If we do not have replacements for them, let their Deputies stay there in charge until we get replacements for them.

I learned yesterday that this Administration has been the slowest of any new Administration in history in making ambassadorial appointments (other than simply transferring careerists around). We must move on this this week or we are going to have a very difficult situation developed among some of RN's closest friends and supporters, both in Congress and outside.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 9, EX FO 2. No classification marking.

[2] In his diary entry for February 1, Haldeman wrote the following: "Session in afternoon with K[issinger] and Harlow, mainly about ambassadors and key appointments. [President] upset by press reports that he's not changing people, especially in State. Ordered me to have resignations of all non-career ambassadors and all LBJ political appointees on his desk Monday. Said he'll write them and 'accept resignation with pleasure.' Feels we haven't done enough to get in good new people that are ours. He's right. Problem is need to deal with Democratic Congress, and P isn't tough enough with his Cabinet officers. Won't *make* them fire incumbents and/or take our political recommendations. Ehrlichman now in charge of this, we'll see how he can produce." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

297. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, February 11, 1969.

We have laid on a staff meeting for you in your conference room at 9:30 this morning. It will include the ranking offers in ACDA, USIA and the Peace Corps and all officials in the Department and AID through Assistant Secretary level.[2]

I have not asked them to make reports around the room as has usually been the case in this meeting, on the assumption that you would want to raise a few points yourself this time.

I would suggest that you might cover the following matters:

1. *Organization of the Department*

Explain a) that Mr. Richardson will be your alter ego and exercise the major responsibility of the Department for the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities abroad;

b) that Mr. Johnson will have primary responsibility for coordination and supervision of day-to-day operations of the functional and geographical bureaus;

c) that a Deputy Under Secretary will be appointed for Economic Affairs who will have primary responsibility for the coordination of economic assistance and the economic functions of the Department;

d) that I will be an adviser to you on major foreign policy problems and give general guidance to the Executive Secretariat; and

e) that you intend to rely heavily on your Assistant Secretaries and will look to them to exercise extensive authority within their respective jurisdictions.

2. *NSC Machinery*

Attached is the memorandum from you that we have now started to use on preparation of NSC materials.[3] You might want to elaborate on the NSC a little, as some of them (and certainly their staffs) may still be concerned. I would recommend that you emphasize there are two different processes. First, their roles in the NSC channel of stating

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, Chron File. No classification marking.

[2] According to Rogers' Appointment Book, the staff meeting began shortly after 9:30 a.m.; his next appointment was not until 10:15 a.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers Appointment Books)

[3] Not attached.

as clearly and honestly as possible to the President the alternative courses of action he could follow on a given problem that would be consistent with U.S. interests. Second, the preparation by them as a State Department matter of a recommendation to you as to the policy position you should take among these alternatives in the NSC, stating the judgments for and against this and other alternatives as clearly as possible.[4]

3. *General Relations with the White House*

There are numerous requests coming from various members of the NSC staff to the Department for information and studies. While we should be as cooperative as possible we also want to keep the system under control. You might tell the Assistant Secretaries that we do want to be cooperative but (a) that Mr. Kissinger has made clear to us that nothing is a formal request unless it has been conveyed by him to the Secretary, Under Secretaries or Ambassador Pedersen, and (b) a request that all information to be transmitted to Mr. Kissinger should be sent out through S/S. If the Assistant Secretaries feel they are being overloaded they should let you know.

4. *Broad Prospective of Foreign Policy*

You might note that in your first message to the Department[5] you called special attention to the agencies of the Department (AID and the Peace Corps) and to those closely associated with us (ACDA and USIA). You might observe that as modern foreign policy is composed not just of government to government diplomacy but of a vast web of relationships—military, economic, scientific, cultural and informational you feel that all of them must be fully integrated into our foreign policy. Accordingly, you intend to include personnel and ideas from all of these agencies fully within your own deliberations, and you encourage them to participate with the rest of the Department.

5. *Young People*

In a similar vein you might point out that you are very much interested in improving the reputation and reality of the Department's

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[4] In talking points Pedersen first prepared for the staff meeting on January 22, the day on which it was originally scheduled, he devoted half his memorandum to "NSC Machinery." He stated that the Department of State was being given "the key role" in the NSC policymaking process "in particular through being asked to chair NSC interdepartmental committees charged with presenting such policy alternatives to the President." He also emphasized that "the President has reaffirmed the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas, and for the supervision and direction of economic assistance, military assistance and sales programs." (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73D443, Miscellaneous Hold)

[5] For text of the message, January 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 10, 1969, pp. 125–126.

relationships with young people, both inside and outside the building. Your comment about new ideas in your first statement to the Department was therefore a real one and you look to them as Assistant Secretaries to encourage young people to express their views. You will rely on the Assistant Secretaries to sit down and evaluate such views but you believe the young, the impatient and even rebellious should be assured they can have their views considered and evaluated on their merits. Whenever a young person feels that his views should be transmitted to the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary should permit this to be done. You will also be taking further institutional steps in this area, on which you are not yet fully decided.

6. *Country Directors*

Partly as a general policy and partly also to encourage the younger people, you want the Assistant Secretaries to feel free to bring with them to appointments with you their Country Directors or other responsible officers as they choose. As the counterparts of the Ambassadors overseas, you expect to look to the Country Directors for much advice and you hope to have a chance to meet them as rapidly as possible as the occasions permit.

Richard F. Pedersen[6]

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

298. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 14, 1969.

Jim Linen also leaned hard on the fact that Graham Martin was now "in pasture" as Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. He says that Martin fell out of favor because of his opposition to McNamara's positions and because he was not in step with some of the State Department's Asia hands.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President's Personal Files, RN Memos, 1968–Dec 1969, #1 Feb '69. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.

I have great personal confidence in Graham Martin and believe he should be brought back into the foreign service. I think he would be an excellent appointment for Tokyo, Bonn or Pakistan if he would accept one of these. If you think well of this suggestion put this in the form of a memo from me to Rogers. My purpose here, among others, is not to let the State Department play its usual game of promoting their favorites and kicking out those who may disagree with their policies from time to time.[2]

[2] Nixon appointed Martin Ambassador to Italy in September 1969. He served until February 1973 and then in June 1973 was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam.

299. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and Representative Louis Wyman[1]

Washington, March 20, 1969.

Wyman was calling for 2 reasons:

1. *Ruth Farkas,* who has all kinds of degrees; much-travelled; great deal of civic work (then read from her résumé); requested that if it came to ELR for him to look at her file in connection with her desire to be appointed an ambassador; she would be great. ELR said he would. Wyman then said that if the President is going to put women into any of these posts, she is interested, because of her years of travel, in Australia; Wyman added that he realized Australia was a plum and ELR responded that it was also a difficult post. Wyman said that if in our judgment it can't be Australia, that Denmark would be excellent if we looked at her background.[2]

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons. No classification marking. Drafted on March 22. Wyman was a Republican Representative from New Hampshire.

[2] Farkas was nominated that summer as Ambassador to Costa Rica but was not appointed to the position. (Memorandum from Richardson to Rogers, July 17; ibid., Box CL 2, Personnel-General File; and Memorandum from Flanigan to Harlow, November 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files, Box 14, Special Files) In May 1973 Farkas became Ambassador to Luxembourg.

ELR then said that Wyman was entitled to know the following, on a purely personal-communication basis from him to Wyman: that we are trying to operate within a mandate which includes on the one side a general directive from RMN that he wants to reduce overall the total number of non-career appointments; meanwhile, we get from the WH a considerable number of names they say, in effect, that want taken care of. We spend a great deal of time on the phone talking about where to fit them in, competing claims, which posts to career, etc. The question of who are among the non-career people who get into this process depends on names coming to us from the WH. If we were to say Farkas sounds marvelous, in effect, she would be treated as a career appointment because she wouldn't be on the WH list. As a practical matter, it is necessary for her friends to get her on the WH list. If we get the name from there, we can do business.[3]

Wyman said that he hadn't understood this; what did ELR mean, get her on the WH list—who through? ELR said that we deal with Flanigan.

Wyman said he had understood she had already come over, that that was why he called ELR, and asked if it had not yet come over. ELR said it was a question of competing claims—that he was being very candid with Wyman—say, they have 40 people, but RMN says appoint 25: you could be 26th on the list, too bad. We have a certain amount of room to consider who would fit well where and we obviously would squawk if they asked us to appoint anyone who wasn't qualified. ELR reiterated that he would appreciate it if, in whatever Wyman does at the WH, to do it without referring to this information. He then said that WRH had seen Mrs. Farkas and was impressed by her.

Wyman ended the conversation by saying that if ELR ever needed anything on the Hill to let him know.

(*Note:* Wyman never mentioned a second matter, as he said in his opening sentence; perhaps both concerned Farkas.)

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[3] In his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power,* U. Alexis Johnson discussed how he and Richardson screened the political candidates for ambassadorships sent to them by Flanigan. After interviewing them separately, Johnson and Richardson compared notes and, for those who "passed," discussed what posts might be best. They then negotiated their preferences with Flanigan. "We did not have to accept all of them, but we certainly could not reject them en masse either, since the President clearly wanted them. Besides many distinguished ambassadors have been political." This crop of candidates, however, surprised Johnson by "how dense they were." (pp. 519–520)

300. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Flanigan) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, April 8, 1969.

The President has indicated an interest in having more of the experienced, younger members of the Foreign Service Organization appointed to ambassadorships. He feels that benefits would accrue both to the service, in terms of moving its able members who are not yet ambassadors up the ladder faster, and to the country, in terms of having young, seasoned, and energetic representatives abroad. Would you please make every effort to suggest some of these members of the Organization for ambassadorial posts.[2]

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 83, Ambassadorial Assignments. No classification marking.

[2] In a March 17 memorandum to Hastings, Haldeman had indicated that the President wanted the names of the five most outstanding young men in the Department: "people in the 25 to 40 year of age group who have demonstrated loyalty, exceptional management ability, and initiative." (Ibid., Box CL 2, Personnel—General File)

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301. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, April 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

A Seventh Floor Planning and Coordination Staff[2]

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 102, Seventh-floor Staff. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.

[2] A Seventh Floor planning and coordination staff was first proposed to Richardson by two members of his office, Jonathan Moore and Arthur Hartman. Moore forwarded the proposal to Richardson under cover of a lengthy explanatory memorandum, March 1, in which he stated that their "basic pitch" was "to improve analytical, evaluative and coordinational staffing of the Seventh Floor" through "better organization of existing resources" and thus without creating a larger bureaucracy. "A strong feature of the plan is that it would establish an integrated staff in place of a system of fragmented, uncoordinated, and even competing staff elements. This is so, even though small personal staffs would still remain for each of the principal officers on the Seventh Floor." (Ibid.) Richardson discussed the proposal with Rogers and on April 2 circulated a draft for comment to Johnson, Samuels, Rimestad, and Pedersen. (Memorandum from Richardson, April 2; ibid., Box CL 2, Chron File)

The Problem:—The Secretary of State, in directing the conduct of foreign policy and advising the President on foreign policy issues, should be in a position to take into account all relevant global, functional, and long-range considerations. The Secretary's principal Seventh Floor associates, to the extent that they exercise comparable functions, should be in a similar position. They should be able to draw on the resources of a compact staff for analysis and advice not subject to the understandable—and even desirable—parochialism of the regional bureaus. Similarly, they need a centralized organ for substantive follow-up and monitoring of action decisions. As matters stand, the Secretary of State and his principal associates lack the staff back-up necessary to meet these requirements.

The NSC staff has the function of seeing to it that all pertinent points of view—not that of any one Department or combination of Departments—are systematically brought to bear on major national security issues requiring Presidential decisions.

Within the Department of State, the regional Assistant Secretaries, with the assistance of their deputies and the regional Interdepartmental Group secretary, are able to ensure that recommendations coming up from a country director or ambassador are reviewed in the light of policies applicable to the region as a whole.

The Seventh Floor should have a capability which meets broader geographic and more complex functional problems. A regional or functional bureau's recommendations to the Secretary with respect to a matter affecting its own interests should be looked at from other perspectives. Politico-military recommendations should be considered in the light of their economic implications. Before an immediate operational decision is taken, its longer-range aspects should be examined.

The revitalized NSC system, meanwhile, has placed increased responsibility on the Department, notably the Assistant Secretaries, for coordinating the definition of policy issues and options within the Executive Branch. This in turn calls upon the Seventh Floor to provide effective policy guidance and review for the bureaus with respect to NSC projects from the standpoint of Seventh Floor interests.

The closest we now get to the kind of across-the-board substantive staff backup required for these purposes is through the Policy Planning Council and the staff of the Under Secretaries Committee (formerly the SIG staff). In fact, however, the deliberations of the Policy Planning Council all too seldom affect operational decisions, and the role of the Under Secretaries Committee staff extends only to matters referred to the Committee by the NSC.

The Proposal:—Having now had the chance to observe the operations of the Department for a couple of months and to talk to a good many people, I believe that the Policy Planning Council and the Un-

der Secretaries Committee staff should be modified and brought into a direct relationship to each other as elements of a Planning and Coordination Staff, which would have the following functions:

1. To assist the principal officers of the Department in reviewing and coordinating bureau recommendations, not only within their own framework, but also from the perspective of other regions, other functions, and longer time spans.
2. To assist the principal officers in guiding the Department's participation in the NSC system through: (a) the substantive review of NSC/IG papers; (b) preparation for meetings of the NSC, NSC Review Group, and NSC Under Secretaries Committee; and (c) monitoring the follow-up of NSC decisions.
3. To carry out planning and program analysis activities transcending bureau lines—a function which would also back up and tie in with Departmental research programs.

Modification of the Policy Planning Council, which is an integral element of this proposal, will encounter the objection that it involves a symbolic lessening of the importance State attaches to policy planning. The short answer, I believe, is that it would make policy planning more relevant—and thus more important—by taking it out of limbo and relating it directly to the Department's on-going responsibilities.

The Staff:—Under a Staff Director with rank equivalent to an Assistant Secretary, the new staff would serve as a collective resource for all of the principal Seventh Floor officers. It would not insert itself in the line of authority between Seventh Floor officers and Assistant Secretaries. Nor would it take on bureau functions for itself. Much of its work, rather, would involve coordination among the bureaus and obtaining a hearing for other viewpoints in the Department outside the regional bureaus.

The staff should be composed of high caliber officers of broad-gauge abilities, who can handle both short-range operational problems and longer-range program planning and analysis. Their number should, for the present, be limited to about seventeen in all, including the Staff Director.[3] The staff would be made up of two groups. One would include five officers with expertise in each of the geographical regions, one for politico-military affairs, one for economic assistance, two system analysts, one economist, and one political or social scientist.

This permanent group should be supplemented by a separate but connected group of about five Senior Policy Planning Advisers drawn in part from the academic community and research institutions. Those drawn from outside the Department should serve for at least one year.

[3] This would be three less than the total number of slots now allotted to the Policy Planning Council (15) and the Under Secretaries Committee (5). [Footnote in the source text.]

The senior advisers would undertake particular planning or program evaluation projects. Their role, in general, would be to challenge established points of view, develop new ideas on how to solve difficult programs, and serve as a communications link with academic specialists in foreign affairs.

The Staff Role:—Ideally, the Staff Director should be the Department's representative on the NSC Review Group. This is desirable given the staff's responsibilities in assisting the principal officers in guiding the Department's participation in the NSC system—through briefings for the Secretary and the Under Secretary prior to NSC meetings, maintaining close liaison with the NSC/IGs and ad hoc groups, reviewing the output of these groups, and absorbing the functions of the staff of the Under Secretaries Committee.

In carrying out its functions, the proposed staff would not compete or overlap with S/S, the other collective, common staff service on the Seventh Floor. S/S would continue to handle informational and administrative aspects of the NSC system. In addition, S/S would see to it that the new staff received all appropriate material going to the Secretary and Under Secretaries. INR and J/PM would remain as sources to be drawn upon by the Seventh Floor and would continue to operate as bureaus.

In a word, the staff would supplement, but not supplant, the bureaus. Its aim would simply be to assure that the Seventh Floor will have available on important issues the full spectrum of responsible advice the Department has to offer. It would not be a "layer" between the Assistant Secretaries and the Seventh Floor. It would receive lateral distribution of papers destined for Seventh Floor principals, but would not "clear" such papers.

A similar restraint should be observed in its monitoring or follow-up function. In many cases, this would be manifested only in providing assurances to the principals that necessary actions were being taken; in other words, it would exercise a watching brief.[4]

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[4] On July 3 Rogers announced the formation of the new Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC) and the designation of William I. Cargo as its Staff Director. He indicated that the Policy Planning Council's functions would be "amalgamated into and given special identity within the new staff" and policy planning would thereby gain "more impact on continuing operational decisions." For text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin,* July 28, 1969, pp. 74–75. In an October 13 memorandum, Cargo notified his staff that henceforth S/PC would be responsible for coordinating NSC action assignments within the Department. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, S/PC Organization) Cargo discussed his activities and experiences as Staff Director for 4 years in his memoir, *Wherever the Road Leads.* (pp. 636–691) He noted that Richardson was a strong supporter of S/PC but that Richardson's successor as Under Secretary, John Irwin, who took office in September 1970, "seemed to have little interest in policy planning" and thus "the relationship of S/PC to the top of the State Department changed rather radically with Richardson's departure." (pp. 647–649)

302. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Rimestad) and all Assistant Secretaries and Bureau Chiefs[1]

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Personnel Policy

This Administration is committed to a thorough reexamination of the foreign affairs establishment with a view toward a more effective use of the unique human resources found there. We desire to examine the size, shape, functions and purposes of the career services, to review the processes for selection, promotion and assignment of personnel, and to develop comprehensive policy objectives for our personnel system. We hope to build upon the initiatives in these directions already undertaken by the Department and to undertake long-range planning efforts designed to achieve these objectives. In this undertakings we intend to seek the participation of all those affected, directly or indirectly.

As first steps, we wish, among other things, to:

1. Identify younger officers of exceptional ability from within the career service and to move these officers into positions of higher responsibility.

2. Promote an even greater interchange of talent among geographic and functional areas of expertise within the Department.

3. Expand interchange among the several foreign affairs agencies, State, AID, USIA, ACDA and the Peace Corps.

4. Increase the opportunities for career officers to move temporarily into other disciplines—business, universities, foundations and the like—without loss of career contact with the foreign service system.

5. Bring into the Department selected individuals of exceptional talent from outside the career system.

I hope to meet with you along with members of my staff and representatives of the personnel system in the near future to discuss these and related matters. Included in your preparation for this discussion should be consideration of the following points:

1. The requirements for improvement in country, regional and functional expertise in your bureau or area, i.e., an overall projection of your personnel needs in view of the above objectives.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 1. No classification marking.

2. The problems, if any, from your point of view in carrying out the above objectives.

3. Your recommendations as to how best to implement each of the above objectives in your bureau or area.

Working together, with the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration coordinating the process, we can, I feel sure, achieve these objectives in a balanced and orderly fashion.[2]

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[2] On May 21, 1970, Richardson forwarded to Haldeman a statement entitled "Reform at the Department of State: A Progress Report" that Haldeman had requested. According to the report, among the steps initiated by the Nixon administration were the following: 1) "career personnel have been encouraged to participate in exchange programs with business, foundations, the academic world, [and] Congressional committee staffs"; 2) "over 400 career officers have been detailed to other Federal agencies to broaden their managerial experience"; 3) steps have been taken "to elevate younger officers of exceptional ability into positions of higher responsibility"; 4) a greater interchange of talent is being promoted among geographic and functional areas of the Department"; and 5) "vigorous new men" have been introduced into policy-making positions, including "fifty-five new noncareer employees in executive and senior level positions," 32 new noncareer ambassadors, and 51 new career ambassadors. (Ibid., ORG 2)

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303. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman)[1]

Washington, June 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Staff Cuts Abroad

In connection with the question of reducing the number of U.S. government personnel overseas, I have reviewed the following:

1. Your memo of April 18 to Bob Mayo[2] regarding the President's desire to:

a. Reduce employment in Japan, the Philippines, India, Germany, and England by amounts varying between 50 and 66⅔ percent.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Overseas Government Personnel. Confidential.

[2] A copy is ibid., NSC Files, Haig Special File, Box 1006, Suspense.

b. With regard to U.S.I.A., "abolish television news units abroad and retain only libraries."

c. Cut MAAGs and "other military units" by 50 percent.

d. In Italy, "reduce the number of political counselors from eight to one and reduce the staff economists to one."

2. BOB's answer to your memo of April 13.[3]

3. Under Secretary Richardson's reply to your memo of April 17 regarding the general applicability of the personnel reduction techniques employed during "Operation Topsy" in Brazil.[4]

BOB and Elliot Richardson have raised some questions about the validity of any selective approach to personnel cuts. As I see it, their most important points are:

1. Cuts in the areas indicated by the President should be undertaken as a part of a systematic effort to reduce all types of U.S. government employment abroad. Such an effort would recommend cuts in the number of employees reporting to Ambassadors from all agencies, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and perhaps U.S. forces. When all of these categories are included, U.S. government employment abroad totals roughly 1.5 million of which only 5,000 are American employees of the Foreign Service carried on the State Department rolls and only 2,000 are foreign service officers.

2. Substantial personnel reduction efforts have already been made. As a result, civilian employment in countries outside Southeast Asia will have dropped to 106,426 on September 30, 1969 as compared with 112,237 on June 30, 1967 (over the same period employment in Southeast Asia rose from 83,317 to 103,761). Much of this reduction is due to the "BALPA" program which cut the number of employees reporting to Ambassadors from 49,000 to 41,000.[5] The six countries mentioned by the President were among these subjected to intensive review under "BALPA." Personnel cuts in the six countries averaged 20 percent. By way of comparison, the cut in Brazil under Ambassador Tuthill's "Operation Topsy," which took

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[3] A copy of Mayo's April 25 response to Ehrlichman's April 18 memorandum is ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Overseas Government Personnel.

[4] Richardson's May 1 memorandum is ibid. Operation Topsy was an exercise instituted in 1967 by John Tuthill, Ambassador to Brazil, to trim U.S. programs and reduce U.S. personnel in Brazil.

[5] BALPA was initiated by a January 18, 1968, memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze in which President Johnson directed that, as part of his program for dealing with the balance of payments problem, the number of American personnel overseas under the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic missions (except for Vietnam) be reduced by 10 percent and that "very large U.S. missions" undergo bigger reductions." For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–69,* Book I, pp. 34–35. Documentation on BALPA is in the Department of State, O/MS—Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, BALPA Subject Files, 1968.

place at the same time as the "BALPA" exercise and received considerable favorable publicity, was only 16 percent.

3. A number of studies are now taking place which have overseas manpower implications. They include studies of troop commitments in Europe, our foreign base structure and the organization of military groups in Latin America, Europe and Korea. All such efforts should be closely coordinated.

4. It was possible to make the "BALPA" cuts while leaving most of the services and programs of our missions abroad intact. On the other hand, future cuts may involve eliminating whole programs of lesser priority. According to Elliot Richardson this implies that future cuts will have to be planned in Washington, where program decisions can be made on the basis of interagency consultations.

I believe these points are well taken. I also concur with Elliot Richardson's recommendation that what is needed now is a strong mandate from the President to pursue personnel reduction activities vigorously and the establishment of a mechanism with authority to initiate studies or require of agencies phased reduction plans. One way of emphasizing the President's commitment to a streamlined presence abroad would be to appoint a "Blue Ribbon Commission" to study our overseas programs and make recommendations on personnel cuts. However, an "in-house" effort, which worked with a minimum of publicity, would probably give faster and more effective results.

The Presidential mandate envisaged by Elliot Richardson could appropriately be given in the form of a National Security Study Memorandum which would direct that one of the arrangements below be set up to make recommendations to the President on personnel reductions:

1. An interagency group under the Chairmanship of Elliot Richardson which would include representation from all agencies with employees abroad.
2. A State/BOB/DOD/NSC task force under the direction of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Such a task force could be required to consult with other agencies, with Ambassadors and military commanders in the field and with the NSC staff as appropriate.
3. An NSC-led task force.

The following considerations are relevant:

1. A group which included all agencies represented abroad would probably be too unwieldy although it would increase the agencies' sense of being given a fair hearing.
2. State, BOB and DOD already have considerable experience in designing personnel reduction schemes.
3. An NSC-led effort would clearly be identified as a Presidential effort. A State-chaired effort under Richardson can work well also. It would have the advantage that the department most concerned with overseas activities would play a leading role. It would have the disadvantage that other agencies might want a State-chaired effort. On

balance, I would prefer a White House-run effort chaired either by you, Mayo or me.

In accordance with the above, I would suggest the following:

1. Insure that the President is fully informed regarding the results of the earlier "BALPA" and "Topsy" exercises.
2. Inform the President of the current views of State and BOB on personnel reductions.
3. Seek the President's concurrence in the implementation of a general and systematic approach to overseas personnel cuts which would consider the political, budgetary and balance of payment repercussion of such cuts as well as their program implication.
4. Discuss the alternative organizational arrangements for studying and implementing personnel reductions with Bob Mayo and Elliot Richardson.

If you agree, I will prepare a memorandum for the President outlining the issues and suggesting that an appropriate National Security Study Memorandum be issued. I would also be happy to discuss this matter with you further.

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304. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, June 16, 1969.

I am not satisfied with the progress that has been made with regard to the cuts in personnel. Before the Inauguration I ordered a one-third cut in USIA, AID, military personnel except in combat zones like Vietnam and Korea and Western Europe. Nothing whatever has been done to carry this out except paper work. I want you to put a man on it, perhaps Butterfield, and to give me a report in a week as to what has happened. I do not consider anything more important that I will be doing from an administrative standpoint than this. I know that everybody on the staff disagrees with my approach here but this is something I feel very strongly about and I want action on it immediately. I shall expect a report on my desk by Monday of next week.[2] As

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Butterfield Files, Box 8, Memoranda Received. No classification marking. The President wrote "Re: Personnel Cuts" at the top of the memorandum.

[2] The President underlined the last 10 words of this sentence.

a matter of fact, I don't want a report, I simply want to know what has been done to carry out my directives that a one-third cut is to be made in personnel in these areas in every mission abroad. I think the only way to do it is for a directive signed by me to each of the agencies ordering such a cut. You are going to get strong resistance from Shakespeare, Hannah, Rogers and also from Defense on this. But I know what I am talking about and even if I didn't I have such strong feelings about it I have made the decision and I want it carried out immediately.[3]

[3] Haldeman forwarded the memorandum to Butterfield under cover of a June 17 memorandum in which he asked Butterfield to check with Flanigan, Ehrlichman, and anyone else involved, pull together a status report, and "lay out a plan of action to get the President's directives carried out. This is going to be tough but he is deadly serious about the necessity of getting it done and done quickly." Butterfield forwarded a 9-page status report and action plan to the President on June 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Butterfield Files, Box 1, Alexander Butterfield (June 1969))

305. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and Representative Wayne Hays[1]

Washington, July 15, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion of the possible appointment of Arthur Ross to a position in the Department of State.]

ELR said on another subject, when he gets a little better informed about the problems of the administration of the Foreign Service, he would like to come up and see Hays. Said he's chairman of the Board, has spent a fair amount of time trying to get familiarized with it, including a review of the various proposals contained in the legislation which Hays introduced.[2] Mentioned we now have a new Director Gen—John Burns.

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons. No classification marking. Hays (D–Ohio) was Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization.

[2] For information on the Hays bill, H.R. 6277, which was passed by the House in September 1965 but failed of enactment in the Senate, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 38 and footnote 4 thereto.

Hays immediately told ELR not to waste his time coming up to see him—won't handle any bills or hold hearings on it unless we get it through the Senate first. Went into a long harangue about how hard he'd worked on the other legislation, getting it through the House, only to have it die in the Senate, where Pell[3] really tied it up (because he didn't like the selecting out thing). If we get it thru the Senate, then he might be willing to consider it. ELR said he'd read the history of that legislation—but said that we didn't have in mind any legislation at least at this point; said he wanted to understand the whole situation better before doing anything—and would simply like to get Hays' views of the problems and opportunities.

Hays said he'd be glad to see him any time—said he had made his own position clear to Bill Macomber about legislation on this subject; he's fed up with the Senate doing things like that—said the staff of the FRC[4] was sympathetic to his position and the bill's position, but couldn't get it through Pell.

ELR reiterated that we don't have any legislation in mind right now—maybe by the first of the year, we might have some suggestions that ought to be embodied in legislation, but certainly now we had no such thoughts.

Hays reiterated that he'd sit down any time w/ELR.

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[3] Senator Claiborne Pell (D–Rhode Island).

[4] Reference is to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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306. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen)[1]

Washington, July 25, 1969, 1349Z.

Tosec 48/123315. Subject: Reduction in Overseas Personnel.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 4–1. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewster on July 24, cleared by Findley Burns and Brown, and approved by Richardson.

1. State 123273, July 24, 1969,[2] contains Kissinger's July 21 directive on overseas personnel reduction[3] and a brief explanation of how we plan to conduct the exercise, but I thought that you would want to have additional details both for your own information and in order to answer questions which will no doubt be put to you by the Ambassadors and others as you go along.

2. The principal points in the directive are that it: (a) requires a 10% reduction in directly hired overseas American civilians and certain American overseas military which will total approximately 14,900 military and 5,100 civilians; (b) each Agency with overseas personnel "will be required to meet the 10% quota and reductions will be made on a country-by-country basis, insofar as practicable"; (c) civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam will be cut by more than 10%; (d) account should be taken of "national security priorities and special local problems, without prejudice to the objective of 10% for each agency"; and (e) the reductions do not apply to "US military forces committed to NATO or in Berlin or essential to their support, to forces stationed in Korea or Viet-Nam, or to units stationed elsewhere in Southeast Asia that are directly engaged in related military operations."

3. Although the Under Secretary's Committee to which responsibility has been assigned for planning the reductions will meet to resolve disputes and to make the final report, much of the actual work will be carried out by a Working Group of the Committee chaired by Findley Burns and on which State, DOD, CIA, USIA, AID, BOB and the NSC Staff are represented and by a State staff reporting directly to me headed by Robert Brewster.

4. Primary responsibility to make the reductions will rest with the agencies themselves. As I see the process working, the agencies will in late August inform the Working Group of their proposed reductions. Where these reductions affect either policy objectives or the responsibilities of the Chiefs of Mission they will be reviewed by the Department's regional Assistant Secretaries who will in many cases wish to consult the respective Ambassadors regarding them. While I have not informed the other agencies of this, I am meeting July 28 with our regional Assistant Secretaries and certain other Departmental officials to ask them to identify 10 or 12 major "target areas": countries such as India, Germany, the Philippines, Thailand, etc., where we may wish to press agencies to take larger than 10% reduction.

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[2] Not printed. (Ibid.)

[3] Printed in *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 25.

5. I have asked John Burns, Director General-designate, to direct and coordinate the reduction in the State Department's overseas operation. I would think that, given the brevity of the September 30 deadline, the regional geographic bureaus and other Departmental offices will have to take the initiative and propose reductions in State personnel and clear these with Ambassadors.[4]

6. I would expect that some of our Ambassadors and other US officials as well will have questions regarding the reduction. Three questions I would anticipate are the following: (a) "Why is there another reduction abroad after the BALPA (Balance of Payments Reduction Program) exercise carried out by the last Administration?" I suggest that in reply you outline frankly the President's personal and continuing concern at the size of the American presence abroad and emphasize that this current directive had its origin in the President's firmly-held view that there were too many Americans abroad. (b) "Are Ambassadors going to be given a chance to make our recommendations on where cuts should be made?" The September 30 deadline is so short we do not have time to seek Ambassadors' recommendations on specific reductions as was done in the last Administration's BALPA exercise. All Ambassadors will, however, have an opportunity to comment on the proposed State reductions, and they will be consulted on other agencies' proposed reductions by State Assistant Secretaries as need arises. I would also think that Ambassadors in the "target" countries would be asked their views and recommendations by our Assistant Secretaries. (c) "What will Department do with the people who will be returning to Washington as a result of this exercise?" There is no easy answer to this one. I have asked John Burns to study the problem urgently, including the question of whether some type of special legislation is required. I think the most you can say at this juncture is that we are very aware of this problem, are studying it on an urgent basis, and will advise the field as soon as we have some answers.

Richardson

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[4] In a November 7 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that, in response to the directive, reductions had been agreed upon of 5,777 directly-hired American civilian employees, 1,408 directly-hired local employees, and 14,937 overseas military personnel. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 372, Presidential Directive on Reduction of U.S. Personnel Overseas) In a November 26 press release, the White House announced that a review conducted by the Department of State of its overseas offices in connection with the directive had resulted in a decision to restructure its consular posts. Nineteen consular posts slated for closing were listed. (Ibid.) Documentation on further overseas personnel reductions (OPRED) is ibid.; and also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 4–1.

307. Memorandum From the Executive Assistant (Hastings) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, August 13, 1969.

RE

Harry Dent

I had a little ol' southern lullaby chat with Harry Dent last night. Off the record and all that, his observations may be summarized as follows:

1. The President is very down on this Department and is continuously peppering his chats with his confidants with barbs aimed here. He stated in a recent staff meeting that the entire Department of State had opposed his trip but that he brought off a great success despite State's opposition. HAK was at his side during this conversation, smiling broadly.

I noted, with a similar clandestine tone, that with the President's permission you had briefed our senior officers on the President's views about his trip[2] and that this presentation was very well received. I also noted that you had made a strong pitch re cooperation with Presidential objectives, once set, and re an aggressively cooperative and forthcoming approach toward implementation of Presidential policies, once made.

I also pointed out that the President's impression of total State opposition to the trip wasn't fair or accurate. While there may have been some instances of backsliding, cooperation on the whole had been there. We speculated then as to the source (or at least one source) of the President's impression.

2. Dent indicated that the President, Rogers Morton and he had all made pitches at the Camp David cabinet meeting re the need for more loyal Nixon men in high office. Why hadn't WPR ever gotten the message that by not making greater changes and by not bringing in more new loyalists, he was simply ensuring HAK dominance? Dent thought that the HAK situation would be intolerable to Secretary Rogers. Nixon needed greater confidence in the Department as a whole and more new faces was a strong step in that direction.

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box CL 2, Personnel—General File. Confidential; Eyes Only.

[2] Reference to Nixon's July 26–August 3 around-the-world trip.

Dent was taking a lot of flak about Nixon's sell-out on his promise to clean house here. This flak, which also hits Morton and surely gets to the President, tended only to reinforce Nixon's aversion to the Department as is.

I promised to get to Dent a little fact sheet on our turnover, our new faces, our non-career ambassadors (including Strausz-Hupe) and our redemption of Nixon's pledge by our personnel reform efforts. He said that he and Rogers Morton could use this to rebut the flak.

3. Reports on you personally continued to be very high, "even from HAK staff members."

WRH

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308. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President's Assistant (Flanigan)[1]

Washington, September 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relative Proportions of Career and Non-Career Ambassadors

For your information the material that follows updates my memorandum to you of May 29[2] on the above subject:

1. Appointments made by President Nixon as of September 10:

	Career	*Percent*	*Non-Career*	*Percent*
Announced	39	62	24	38
Total[3]	45	62.5	27	37.5

Note: Thee figures show that as we approach the end of this year's round of Ambassadorial appointments, we are settling in towards roughly a five to three ratio as between career and non-career ap-

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box CL 2, Chron File. Confidential; Limdis. Annexes A, B, and C are not attached.

[2] A copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files, Box 13, Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda.

[3] In addition to the 63 appointments already announced, this group includes nine nominations currently in the clearances process. Complete lists of the President's career and non-career appointments are attached at Annexes A and B respectively. Note that these figures include only country ambassadors; representation to international bodies (e.g., NATO, OAS) are not included. [Footnote in the source text.]

pointments. The limited number of appointments which we foresee as occurring during the balance of 1969 (e.g. for Guinea, Malawi, Sweden, Uganda and Venezuela) are probably not going to alter the present ratio of about 63 percent to 37 percent by more than a percentage point or two, one way or the other.

2. *Holdovers from Previous Administration (as of September 10):*

Career	*Percent*	*Non-Career*	*Percent*
27	84	5	16

Note: All Ambassadors who have been or will be replaced by new appointments included in No. 1 above (including those still unannounced) have been excluded from this count. Except as noted in Annex C, most of the 32 remaining holdovers counted here seem likely to stay on through the rest of this calendar year.

3. *Total (1 and 2 combined):*

Career	*Percent*	*Non-Career*	*Percent*
72	69	32	31

Note: This puts the present total proportion of career officers somewhat above average by comparison with the records of the preceding three administrations.[4] For convenience, I repeat here material in my earlier memorandum, showing the records of these three administrations based on the two dates (on a January 1 and July 1 basis) for each which establish its high and low water marks for the proportion of career appointments:

	Total Posts	*Career*	*Percent*	*Non-Career*	*Percent*
Eisenhower—1/1/59	76	53	70	23	30
7/1/55	69	38	55	31	45
Kennedy—7/1/61	93	69	74	24	26
7/1/62	92	59	64	33	36
Johnson—7/1/65	104	78	75	26	25
1/1/69	108	68	63	40	37

Elliot L. Richardson[5]

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[4] John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service from 1966 to 1969, later wrote in his memoir, *Safir,* pp. 195–198, that he thought "for a general average of what the ratio should be, I would say that 75% career and 25% [non-career] is about right." Steeves had substantial misgivings about the impact of non-career appointments on career officers in the Foreign Service, but he also believed that non-career appointees had an "important place. Not only do we need the leavening influence from outside disciplines, but specific skills have to be sought outside the Foreign Service."

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

309. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

Organizational Changes for Latin America

You have stated you want to make significant organizational changes for handling Latin American affairs in the bureaucracy. I believe it would be desirable to announce this intention in your October 31 speech.[2]

State has so far confined its thinking on reorganization to upgrading the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary. They believe they may need to seek legislation for this. They have not considered any steps relating to administration of development assistance, or to the problem of interagency coordination.

You have indicated your desire to up-grade that post to Under Secretary. I agree that this would be preferable to Deputy Under Secretary. This step will probably also require legislation, however, especially to clarify the designation of the No. 3 spot in the top echelon as well as the relationship to other top positions. I believe it would therefore be desirable to inform State now of your decision and instruct them to begin to draw up plans to implement it.

Some additional steps you may wish to consider or have staffed by the agencies to achieve more comprehensive change and greater efficiency, and for possible inclusion in the speech are:

1. *A new or additional title for the new Under Secretary*—e.g., Coordinator of Western Hemisphere Affairs—to replace the current title of

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, Department of State, Vol. IV, 10–1–69. Confidential. Sent for action. Vaky forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under cover of an October 21 memorandum in which he stated that he had not discussed any of the measures with State and that no one in State was "doing anything." Vaky commented further that 1) "State opposes an Under Secretary position, because that complicates their top echelon organization"; 2) State would "most likely oppose the inclusion of Canada in the new area"; and 3) AID would be "very opposed to an organizational change for aid to Latin America." (Ibid.)

[2] In his remarks on October 31 at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association the President announced that he was "directing a major reorganization and upgrading of the United States Government structure for dealing with Western Hemisphere affairs," including preparation of a legislative request "raising the rank of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Under Secretary—thus giving the hemisphere special representation." For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969,* pp. 893–901.

Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. This title could probably be granted immediately while legislation is pending to elevate the rank to Under Secretary. You could thus announce on October 31 that you are designating the Assistant Secretary as Coordinator and that you are seeking legislation to elevate his rank to Under Secretary.

2. *Inclusion of the Office of Canadian Affairs in the Under Secretary's jurisdiction.* This could be done administratively.

3. *A new organizational arrangement for administering Western Hemisphere development assistance, separate from AID.* This would be a bold step. It would signify your intention to give our programs new directions, new style and new people. It would permit more flexibility in carrying out aid programs for Latin America. There are two basic organizational options:

Option A: Establish a new autonomous agency within State—The Western Hemisphere Development Agency—independent of AID. This could be done quickly by Executive Order. The agency could be headed by a new Administrator for Western Hemisphere Development with Assistant Secretary rank, who would be responsible directly to the Under Secretary for the Western Hemisphere.

(Under this option the organization and lines of authority would be neater; the new Under Secretary would have two senior deputies: an Assistant Secretary, equivalent to the present position, for traditional State functions; and the Administrator, with equivalent rank, for development assistance matters.)

Option B: Establish a new agency or corporation outside of State, with policy guidance from the new Under Secretary. This option would probably require new legislation. (Rockefeller recommends a corporation—the Institute for Western Hemisphere Development—under a new aid agency in the Executive Office of the President.)[3]

Action to implement the first two steps could be started immediately and announced in your October 31 speech. If you agree, State should be directed to work with the Budget Bureau to prepare the necessary directives.

The third step—a new aid organization for Latin America—is more complex and requires further staffing. However, you do not need to decide on the details of a specific organizational pattern now. The issue for the speech is whether you should announce your intention to establish a new and separate organization for aid to the hemisphere. I suggest that the Budget Bureau, which has responsibility and compe-

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[3] The recommendation was included in Nelson Rockefeller's *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas; The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

tence in the area of organizational management, be directed to do a quick study of possible new organizational arrangements for aid to Latin America, taking into account the views of the relevant agencies. You can then decide whether you want to take action on a new arrangement immediately, or direct the Peterson Commission to recommend a new organization for aid to Latin America in its report.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A directing implementing actions to establish a new Under Secretary position and title for Western Hemisphere affairs, and inclusion of Canada in his jurisdiction.[4]

2. That you authorize me to initiate a quick staff study on a new organizational arrangement for aid to the Western Hemisphere.

Approve[5]

Disapprove

See Me

3. That you authorize reference to these measures in your October 31 speech.

Approve[6]

Disapprove

See Me

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[4] Signed by the President and dated October 27. Nixon instructed Rogers to prepare, in coordination with BOB, any necessary directive for his signature and any necessary legislation. (Ibid.) Attached but not printed.

[5] The President checked this option. In an October 27 memorandum to Rogers, Robert Mayo (BOB), and John Hannah (AID), Kissinger indicated that the President wanted BOB, in coordination with State and AID, to prepare by October 29 a staff study "analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a new agency, separate from AID, to administer U.S. development assistance to Western Hemisphere nations." (Ibid.)

[6] The President checked this option.

310. Letter From President Nixon to All United States Ambassadors Abroad[1]

Washington, December 9, 1969.

Dear —:

Your mission as American Ambassador to—is of the utmost significance to our country and to me personally. I wish you every success in this endeavor.

I attach the greatest importance to my Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our relations with other countries. As the personal representative of the President of the United States, you share these responsibilities in the country to which you are accredited.

You will, of course, report to me through and normally[2] receive your instructions from the Secretary of State who has responsibility not only for the activities of the Department of State but also for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of United States Government activities overseas.

I believe that all possible measures should be taken to improve and tighten the processes of foreign policy implementation abroad. I know I can count on your full support in directing the activities of all elements of the United States Mission to achieve this objective. To assure you and all concerned that you have my full personal backing, I want to make the following comments on your own authority and responsibilities.

As Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission, you have full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all of its elements. You will exercise this mandate not only by provid-

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 10, Ex FO 2. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy. The letter was initially drafted in the Department of State and forwarded to the President by Richardson under cover of a May 21 memorandum, following which the letter underwent revisions. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May–Dec 1969) It superseded President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors dated May 29, 1961. For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1961–1963, volume XXV. Members of the Johnson administration proposed sending such a letter on several occasions, but none was sent while Johnson was President. (Ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 130)

[2] During a telephone conversation with Halperin on August 26, Johnson stated that he had spoken the previous day with Kissinger about the letter to Ambassadors and that the only problem raised by the President "was his ability to communicate directly with ambassadors if he wanted to do so." Therefore Johnson suggested adding the word "normally" so it would read: "You will, of course, report to me through and normally receive your instructions from the Secretary of State." (Notes on Telephone Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

ing policy leadership and guidance, but also by assuring positive program direction to the end that all United States activities in—are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated so that they will make a maximum contribution to United States interests in that country as well as to our regional and international objectives.

I am concerned that the size of our representation abroad be related to a stringent appraisal of policy and program requirements and that the number of personnel of all agencies be kept at the very minimum necessary to meet our objectives. I shall expect you to maintain a continuing personal concern on this matter and to inform the Secretary of State when you believe that the staff of any agency or program is excessive.

I shall expect you to assure the highest standards of personal conduct by all United States personnel, civilian or military; you have authority to take any corrective action which in your judgment is necessary.

You have, of course, the right to be kept informed, to the extent you deem necessary, of all the information or recommendations reported by any element of the Mission. The Secretary of State and I have made it clear that we will welcome the opportunity to consider alternative policies and courses of actions before making final decisions. When you or other members of your Mission believe such alternatives merit consideration, we encourage your putting them forward along with your own recommendations.

I will reserve for myself, as Commander-in-Chief, direct authority over the military chain of command to United States military forces under the command of a United States area military commander, and over such other military activities as I elect, as Commander-in-Chief, to conduct through military channels.

However, I will expect you and the military commanders concerned to maintain close relations with each other, to keep each other currently informed on matters of mutual interest and in general to cooperate in carrying out our national policy. If differences of view not capable of resolution in the field should arise, I will expect you to keep me informed through the Secretary of State.

I deeply believe, as I said in my Inaugural Address,[3] that forces now are converging that may make possible the realization of many of man's deepest aspirations. If "the times are on the side of peace," I also deeply believe that you, and the dedicated personnel of the Foreign

[3] For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969,* pp. 1–4.

Service and the other departments and agencies who comprise the staff of your Mission, will insure that we take maximum advantage of the opportunities that are so clearly before us.[4]

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

[4] Under cover of a February 18, 1970, memorandum, Kissinger forwarded to the President highlights of ambassadorial replies to the December 9 letter and an outline of issues they raised. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 288, State, Ambassador's Replies to Your December 9 Letter)

311. Circular Airgram From the Department of State[1]

CA–6693 Washington, December 17, 1969.

REF: Roger channel. For the Ambassador.

1. The President's letter of December 9, 1969,[2] setting out the authority and responsibilities of the American Ambassador of course applies fully to the CIA Station as it does to other elements making up the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. To make it possible for you to discharge your responsibility for direction and coordination, your Chief of Station has been instructed by his headquarters to insure that you are sufficiently informed of covert action projects and espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs to enable you to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.

2. You may expect the Chief of Station, among other things, to review with you the covert action programs, such as psychological war-

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–M00165A, State/Letters to all Ambassadors. Top Secret. Drafted by Sidney Buford (INR/DDC) on December 16, cleared by Gleysteen, Karamessines and Cline and Coerr, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Helms had informed Johnson in a May 7 memorandum, that after reviewing a draft of the Presidential letter that was eventually sent to Ambassadors on December 9, he was willing to concur in the letter on the understanding that a classified Roger Channel message would be sent as a codicil to the Presidential letter. The message was designed to make clear to Ambassadors that they were not expected to be cognizant of the sensitive details of clandestine operations and communications of CIA, while also assuring Ambassadors that Station Chiefs would continue to keep them "appropriately informed of covert action projects and clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence programs," especially those involving "high policy sensitivity." (Ibid.)

[2] Document 310.

fare, black and grey propaganda, political action and economic action being carried out pursuant to directives approved at the Washington level. Similarly he will present his clandestine intelligence programs in terms of their scientific, political, technical and military information objectives, carried on against approved intelligence community requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. He will also review his clandestine counter-intelligence programs to acquire knowledge of other intelligence organizations, to manipulate some members of these to U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counter-intelligence activities, as well as by espionage, about Communist parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop a higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.

3. Many of the activities of your CIA station involve sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques which the Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory responsibility to safeguard. As a general rule, you will not be expected to be cognizant of operational details (such as agent identities) and communications involved in the work of the CIA. In certain cases you may need to know these. For example, you should normally know the identity of any person with whom you have official dealings who may also have a covert or clandestine relationship with CIA. However, in some cases judgment with respect to disclosing source identities and sensitive techniques may ultimately have to be made in Washington. Your Chief of Station has been directed that if he is in serious doubt about passing on these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of State.

4. Apart from the question of sources and techniques, it is recognized that differences of view may arise as to whether an operation should be undertaken or continued. When such differences cannot be resolved locally, they should also be referred to Washington preferably by CIA channels, unless you wish to communicate your position privately to the Department in which case the Roger channel is available.

5. This message has been seen and concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Rogers

312. Editorial Note

On January 14, 1970, William Macomber, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, gave an address on "Management Strategy: A Program for the Seventies" to Department of State and other foreign affairs personnel. "We are an organization which has traditionally been comfortable with policymaking and with negotiating and promoting that policy abroad," Macomber stated, but "we have tended to be intuitive in nature, weak in planning, and unenthusiastic about management." While "Presidents have continued to look to us as their principal staff arm in forging a national policy" and "have continued to expect this Department to ensure that our complex and wide-ranging governmental activities abroad are coordinated and carried out in a manner consistent with the policies they have determined," we "have not been as systematic, competent, and aggressive as we should have been in meeting these responsibilities." Macomber then proposed a series of solutions to the Department's managerial shortcomings, with an emphasis on reforming personnel policies. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin,* February 2, 1970, pages 130–141; and *Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State,* pages 587–605.

Following Macomber's address, the Department set up 13 task forces to study the Department's managerial problems and come up with recommendations for reform. Each task force was chaired by an experienced Department officer and composed of about 20 members drawn from within the Department and Foreign Service with a mixture of officers from the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and other federal agencies. The 13 task forces were assigned the following topics, respectively: 1. career management and assignment policies under function specialization; 2. performance appraisal and promotion policies; 3. personnel requirements and resources; 4. personnel training for the Department of State; 5. personnel perquisites: nonsalary compensations and allowances; 6. recruitment and employment; 7. stimulation of creativity; 8. role of the Country Director; 9. openness in the foreign affairs community; 10. reorganization of the Foreign Service Institute; 11. roles and functions of diplomatic missions; 12. management evaluation system; and 13. management tools. In a July 20 memorandum for Secretary of State Rogers, Macomber highlighted the task force effort in case Rogers might want to bring it to the President's attention. (Document 321)

The task forces drafted initial reports that were reviewed during the summer of 1970 by Department employees in Washington and diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad and then revised in light of the feedback. For examples of feedback, see Documents 322–325.

The 13 final reports containing some 500 recommendations together with a summary report were assembled in a single volume entitled *Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State.* Macomber transmitted the 610-page volume to Secretary of State Rogers on November 20, 1970; it was released to the public in December. Rogers directed that work begin immediately on carrying out the task force recommendations and approved an implementation plan. On December 8 the Department released a summary statement of action planned on the task force recommendations, which is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* December 28, 1970, pages 795–802. Documentation on the work of the task forces, in addition to the documents printed in this chapter, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394. See also Document 120 for excerpts concerning the NSC system from reports produced by the task force on management tools.

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313. Memorandum From W. Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 14, 1970.

HAK:

Attached at Tab A is a copy of a speech by Bill Macomber on State's management strategy for the 1970's.[2] It was sent to you by Under Secretary Richardson. An acknowledgement to Richardson is at Tab B.[3]

I do not believe the speech is worth more than a quick skim.

The speech begins by admitting that State has failed, but must learn how to succeed, in its mission to "manage and orchestrate the overall spectrum of our Nation's activities abroad."

I frankly do not find much in the speech to indicate the radical reform I believe necessary for State to do so. In general, on the key

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 2, Chron File. No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: "Action OBE". Kissinger wrote at the top of page 1: "Good paper Tony."

[2] See Document 312.

[3] Attached but not printed.

difficult issues such as promotion policies and what to do about the top-heavy structure of the Service, Macomber says nothing very new and attempts to make everyone happy.

Some points worth noting:

—He emphasizes the need for greater competence and effort in trade promotion. State is apparently going to try hard to keep this away from Commerce.

—Macomber rejects the idea of a Permanent Under Secretary, but hopes there will always be an FSO in either the Under Secretary or Deputy Under Secretary position.

—Macomber states that the Under Secretaries Committee and IG's present State with "an important opportunity to strengthen through our performance the constructive leadership role we covet as, of course, does the fact that the ranking departmental executive on the National Security Council is the Secretary of State."

—Macomber believes that use of the CASP—The Country Analysis Strategy Paper prepared annually on every country in Latin America—principle can be expanded to a regional wide concept and can serve as a further management tool for establishing priorities on a region-wide basis. It will also, he notes, help State prepare its important annual posture statement.

At Tab C is a paper I wrote for Phil Heymann—Katzenbach's senior assistant—which gave some initial thoughts on how to destroy the State Department as we know and love it.[4] You said that you would like to see it some day when I mentioned it at Key Biscayne. The basic thrust is that we should open up the Foreign Service and try to get away from our patterned ways of doing things. Some of Macomber's points move (slowly) in this direction:

—He states that there should be a greater, constant number of people entering into the Foreign Service at the higher grades every year—but also says that this should be deferred until more Foreign Service Reserve Officers are integrated.

—He calls for less reporting and more thought by our officers abroad.

—He lists some (un-Draconian) measures to get more senior officers to retire.

But Macomber also states what I believe to be the greatest myth about the Foreign Service—that it is a "profession" in which one acquires diplomatic skills. He lists, for example, these "core" skills on page 6. But these skills are obtained in equal measure by, and necessary for the success of, many people in other fields. It is the belief that long years of service in the Foreign Service, and only that, can train

[4] Not attached.

one to be an effective political counselor, DCM, or Ambassador which makes the members of the Foreign Service so resistant to, and even contemptuous of, the idea of bringing in more outsiders to serve in our posts abroad.

T.L.[5]

[5] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

314. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Chairman Thomas E. "Doc" Morgan, Congressman E. Ross Adair and Congressman Wayne L. Hays (House Foreign Affairs Committee), February 17, 1970, 4 p.m.

I. Purpose

To obtain support for the Administration's proposal to establish an Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; in Congressman Hays' case, the most that probably can be achieved is his agreement not to block the bill in his Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations.

II. Background

A. You are publicly committed to the Under Secretary proposal in your October 31 speech.[2] On December 20 the Department of State transmitted legislation to Congress which has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank Church (S. 3347). On December 22 your statement in support of the legislation was released to the press.[3] Your commitment to this proposal will be cited again in the foreign policy statement going to the Congress on Wednesday.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 11. No classification marking.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 309.

[3] For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969,* pp. 1039–1040.

[4] For text of the President's statement on Latin America in his first annual report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, see ibid., pp. 133–140.

B. This meeting was requested by Congressman Hays, who during Congressional consultations prior to transmittal, indicated his adamant opposition to the proposed legislation. Chairman Morgan and Congressman Adair appear to have no strenuous objections to the Under Secretary bill.

C. Congressman Hays has long been a supporter of our European alliances and is a Member of the NATO Parliamentary Group (American section). He generally shares your views concerning the need for reorganizing and shaping-up the Department of State, a position that may strike a responsive cord with him. Concerning the Under Secretary bill, Hays has indicated his intention to "go slow" with hearings and is not at all impressed with the Rockefeller Report findings of the need for a special Under Secretary for Latin America.[5]

It is reported that Senator Church, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs approves of the Under Secretary bill and will schedule hearings on it.

III. Summary

The following is a summary of Hays' position and counterarguments prepared by Dr. Kissinger's office (Viron P. Vaky).

A. Congressman Hays will probably argue:

—Latins do not deserve this special treatment.

—If we do it for the Latins we ought to do it for Europeans who are staunch allies; we should not downgrade other parts of the world.

—It will probably result in proliferation of super-grades, cost more money and ruin administrative symmetry.

B. Points for you to emphasize:

—Proposal is an integral part of your Latin America policy.

—It is meant to make that policy more effective.

—It is meant to demonstrate sincerity of our interest in region and the special nature of our relationship.

—It will have great and favorable psychological impact on Latins; and it will enhance our ability to establish more cooperative relations.

—It will improve bureaucratic efficiency and implementation of policy.

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[5] In a February 17 memorandum to Timmons, Harlow commented that the legislation had "gone to Wayne Hays' sub-committee, where he was run a stiletto through its heart. Governor Rockefeller considers this one of the major recommendations to the President following his Latin American trip, and the White House has recommended this new post. State decries it, and Rogers has refused openly to support it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11) For the Rockefeller report, see footnote 3, Document 309.

—Rockefeller Report made strong case for "one window" and need for upgrading key official dealing with area.

—Latins received announcement of proposal extremely well; they will watch for follow-up.

—It was also well received in U.S.

—Proposal has not aroused criticism from other areas; no evidence that they feel downgraded.

IV. Talking Points

The following is a list of talking points recommended by Dr. Kissinger's office (Viron P. Vaky):

A. Your proposal to reorganize and upgrade the bureaucratic structure for dealing with Inter-American affairs is an integral part of your overall policy. It is intended to make that policy more effective, and to:

1. Improve the bureaucratic implementation of policy:

a. Our Latin American policy has suffered from bureaucratic problems, particularly the diffusion of authority and proliferation of agencies dealing in foreign affairs. The result is often procrastination and confusion that sometimes delays decisions for months.

b. One of the persistent complaints found by Governor Rockefeller on his trip was that the Latins did not have one place in Washington where they could get their concerns considered. They were frustrated and sometimes humiliated by being referred from one office to another without finding anyone to make a decision.

c. The Rockefeller Report makes a strong case that reorganization was essential to make policy implementation more effective.

d. You concluded accordingly that it was necessary (1) to upgrade the authority and stature of the key position dealing with inter-American affairs, and (2) to provide one focal point for coordinating government activities in the region, speeding decision and lessening our reaction time.

e. You thus believe it important to have "one window."

2. Demonstrate our interest in Latin America and make it easier to achieve construction relationships:

a. You considered it important to give evidence of the "special relationship" we have historically had with the region.

b. This measure will have great psychological impact on the Latin Americans and we will benefit thereby. The Latins operate very much in personal terms; therefore giving greater stature and rank to the key position in the decision-making structure that deals with Latin America is an important element in dealing with them.

c. We will thus be able to establish a greater sense of vitality, openness and effectiveness in our relations with the leaders and people of the nations of the hemisphere.

B. Your announcement in your October 31 speech that intended to propose this measure was extremely well received in Latin America, and highly praised. The proposal has considerable significance to the

Latins. They will now watch for follow-up as a test of the credibility of our policy.

C. The proposal was also well received in the United States. It was endorsed by the Council for Latin America, composed of representatives of major U.S. companies doing business in Latin America.

D. There have been no adverse reactions from other parts of the world. Generally other countries—and especially Europe—understand the special treatment and gesture we have given the Latins and why. There is no evidence that they feel downgraded. To establish similar rank positions for the other areas, of course, would be self-defeating in terms of the objective of demonstrating the "special relationship" concept for Latin America.

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315. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 18, 1970.

I sat in on a Presidential meeting Tuesday[2] with House Foreign Affairs Chairman "Doc" Morgan and Representatives Wayne Hays and Ross Adair. Congressman Hays had requested the meeting and is opposed to the creation of the new post of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

His arguments are that our friends in Europe would be insulted by the new Latin American status position; that there are only three "honest" heads of state in all Latin America, and that a new State Department bureaucracy would be created.

Hays is the subcommittee chairman handling the proposal. He is strongly pro-Europe and, in fact, is current President of the European-American Inter-parliamentarian Union. Hays inferred he would go along with the measure if there would also be an Under Secretary for Europe.

The President outlined the reasons for his recommendation, but Hays was unmoved. Morgan and Adair were not as vocal but are cool

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy. A copy was sent to Harlow.

[2] The meeting on February 17 lasted from 4:15 to 5 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) See Document 314 for a briefing memorandum for the meeting.

to the Under Secretary concept. The President said the Administration would take another look at the measure with the possibility of finding an appropriate title other than Under Secretary might be acceptable.

We now have three courses to follow: (1) move the bill through the Senate first and apply pressures on the House committee later; (2) propose an Under Secretary for European Affairs and make our deal with Hays; or (3) think up a new title with less status than Under Secretary. Deputy Under Secretary? Associate Under Secretary? Director of Western Hemisphere Affairs?[3]

Our office will be happy to move in the direction you think best.

[3] In a March 13 briefing memorandum to Kissinger for his upcoming meeting with Richardson, Vaky stated "you might tell him that the President did OK a Congressional strategy concentrating on the bill in the Senate now, and then focussing on the House where Wayne Hays will be the big problem." (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, Jan 1970–March 1970) Richardson testified in favor of the bill on March 18, the first day of hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. For text of Richardson's statement to the subcommittee, see Department of State *Bulletin,* April 13, 1970, pp. 498–499. S. 3347 was not enacted.

316. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms[1]

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Art Hartman

At a lunch with Arthur Hartman of State on Monday, March 16 the following emerged:

1. I would describe Hartman as an entirely serious foreign service type with superior intelligence accompanied by some propensity for modesty and humility. He is Dep/Dir for Coordination for William I. Cargo's Planning & Coordination Staff—17 strong.

2. On OPRED he stated that this was very much the President's personal crusade, that he had a strong belief that bureaucracy must be pruned continually or it will spread like crab grass. A book which had

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDO Files, Job 79–01440A, Box 8, Folder 1, US–7, State, 1970. Eyes Only.

impressed Nixon very much is Peter Drucker's *The Age of Discontinuity* which has trenchant observations on the evils of bureaucracy.

He said the President sometimes exhibited impatience as when he finally ordered by phone a 33% reduction at Clark Field in the Philippines. He stated that the President on his European visit had unfortunately gone to several large Embassies where the Ambassadors had ordered a full turn out including dependents; and this had given Nixon the idea that there were enormous numbers of Americans *everywhere,* particularly in Embassies.

Hartman said many Ambassadors were no help in the reduction business; he cited Graham Martin as a glaring example of empire building. He cited Saigon as being virtually dishonest with their figures purposely leaving out Tonsanut Airbase.

Comment: Hartman and some of his colleagues may find the President's bent for reduction (if indeed this allegation is accurate) an excellent vehicle for State purists to put the squeeze on agencies satellited on to State overseas.

3. Hartman acknowledged that most of his difficulties with Under Secretaries Committee papers were caused by his State colleagues who were opaque to the interests and positions of other government agencies. He stated that they still did not have an agreed statement on the Dutch request for Nuclear Subs for the President (6 months old) and Laird now wanted to dissociate the Pentagon from whatever went forward from Richardson.

[Omitted here are brief notes on several miscellaneous items.]

Peter Jessup[2]

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

317. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Letter from Turner Shelton

Attached is a memorandum I have received from Turner Shelton with whom you are acquainted. Shelton makes the following comments about State Department and Foreign Service personnel:

—It is impossible to convert or to re-educate members of the Foreign Service who retain strong emotional ties to former Presidents or former Administrations.

—There is a professional elitism in the Foreign Service which tends to delude its members into believing that they have a charter to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs. This is further complicated when they also harbor allegiance to previous Presidents.

—There is a general lack of responsiveness in the Department of State in implementing directives and instructions from the White House and a deficiency in personal loyalty to you.

—The State Department system rewards conformity and discourages those who have the courage to break new ground, thus resulting in a general void of originality and forcefulness.

—The Foreign Service is inbred, opposes the infusion of new blood and tends to dominate key posts to permeate its power.

Shelton recommends a measured review of key State Department posts with the objective of replacing those personnel who do not support your policies. This would offer the additional benefit of encouraging less influential Foreign Service officers who already share your views.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings, April–May 1970. Confidential; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Turner Shelton worked in USIA and the Department of State during the 1950s and 1960s. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations he served in the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs and as Counselor of the legation in Budapest and Counsul General in Nassau. By 1968 he had left the Department. In October 1970 Nixon appointed him Ambassador to Nicaragua, a post he held until August 1975.

[2] The President wrote the following comments below: "He's right, of course. K—, 1) See if we can get Shelton assigned to a personnel post in State—Make some discreet inquiries on this point—He might know what post matters—2) Also—discuss this matter (without revealing the source) with Richardson—See if he has any ideas as to how we could shake up the place—3) Get from Shelton and others the names of F.S.O. men who *do* share my views & then have Flanigan push them *hard*." Briefing memoranda prepared by Kennedy and Haig for Kissinger's weekly meetings with Richardson on

Attachment

Memorandum From Turner Shelton to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[3]

Washington, April 6, 1970.

In response to your request, I am submitting a few thoughts and comments regarding certain personnel of the Department of State. These comments include both Departmental and Foreign Service personnel.

From my discussions with ranking officials of the Department of State, I gather the impression that the philosophical approach toward a change of personnel is to believe that Departmental and Foreign Service Officers can be "converted" to the Nixon philosophy of Foreign Affairs and that employees should, therefore, be "brought along," hopefully to a new way of thinking rather than being removed or shifted.

While this may well be true in the case of those who have no particular emotional or political loyalty to former administrations, I seriously doubt that it is a valid concept in connection with a considerable number of employees who have strong emotional ties to former Presidents and former Administrations. There is evidence of disloyalty to President Nixon by some who resent both his policies as a President and as an individual. I do not believe that these particular people can be either "converted" or "brought along."

In addition to their active dislike of the President, certain individuals strongly believe that both the formulation and implementation of foreign policy should be carried out solely by a "professional elite" and since they are the "professional elite," they tend to seriously resent the role of the President and his principal personal advisors in the formulation of foreign policy. While this is obviously an attitude which can, at least to a degree, be expected among a group of professional practitioners, it becomes particularly difficult to manage when their personal loyalties lie in the direction of other administrations. What I

May 21, May 28, and June 12 included the following item: "Ask Under Secretary Richardson what actions he would recommend be taken to place more persons in key State Department positions who share the Nixon outlook on foreign policy. Also ask him if he has any suggestions as to how we can reward those Foreign Service Officers who have the imagination and forcefulness to break new ground." Shelton's letter and the President's comments were attached. There is no indication on the memoranda as to whether Kissinger raised the issue.

[3] No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.

am attempting to say is that the professional Foreign Service tends to be directed too much toward the carrying out of its own concept of "valid" foreign policy objectives and protecting its own vested interests rather than devoting its energies to implementing in a professional manner foreign policy objectives formulated by the President.

There is, in my opinion, a lack of responsiveness to the wishes of the President and a continuing effort on the part of some to delay and indeed to alter, however subtly, the directives and instructions of the White House. This negative attitude toward the President and his policy becomes more fully understandable if one considers actual examples of those who are in positions of authority. A number of the Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State have no particular political ties of any kind, however, the fact that they have reached their positions of prestige and status in the Foreign Service hierarchy under former Administrations tends to make them have a sense of nostalgic regard for these former Presidents and other officials which undoubtedly affects their general attitude. They feel that they have reached their present positions as Assistant Secretaries not as a result of the personal recognition of their abilities by President Nixon but merely as a deserved move up the ladder of the "system." Since they constitute the "system" they obviously do not feel a degree of personal loyalty to the President, which in my opinion, would be highly desirable.

There is a tendency on the part of many members of the department to tend to personalize their loyalties and obligations to former Presidents, Secretaries of State and ranking officials of the Foreign Service who have been identified over the past years with their successful rise within the "system" which they represent rather than be responsive to the present President.

One of the principal criticisms of the Department of State including the Foreign Service, is that it suffers from a lack of originality and tends to be timid. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the "system" rewards conformity and hesitates to accept those who have the courage to break new ground. While it is obvious that decision making must be approached with caution, the result of the "institutionalized" pressures of the "system" goes beyond caution and results in a Department which is too often lacking in courage and forcefulness.

Like all elite groups, the Foreign Service is in-bred and possesses a built-in opposition to those who do not belong to "the group." It should be noted that lateral entrants to the Foreign Service are viewed with a considerable degree of nonacceptance whereas the infusion of individuals with new ideas, approaches and attitudes would undoubtedly contribute greatly to an increased flexibility and improved vitality of the entire Foreign Service.

More important perhaps than even the Assistant Secretaries themselves are their Deputies and Country Directors who carry out the day-

to-day functions of the Department and who are privy to the highly sensitive information which flows into the Department of State. Some examples of these Deputy Assistant Secretaries might be useful to illustrate some of the problems of the Department. One Deputy Assistant Secretary was personally sponsored by a former well known official whose approaches to foreign policy are extremely inconsistent with those of President Nixon. Another Deputy Assistant Secretary was for years, in effect, the "hatchet man" for a high ranking departmental official who is an avowed adversary of the President. In the ambassadorial category, a present Chief of Mission to a sensitive East European post is a former departmental official, said to be an avowed liberal Democrat and very closely associated with one of the Department's former officials who openly and publicly opposed President Nixon. Another Ambassador, recently appointed to a key Near Eastern country was a well known protege and confidante of members of a former President's immediate staff. Another Ambassador, who has remained on in the Far East, was also closely allied with the same Administration and rose rapidly from a Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Information Agency to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to Deputy Chief of Mission and then to Ambassador.

These illustrations are given for the sole purpose of showing how key positions are retained by those who may find it difficult to transfer their allegiance to a President whose approach to foreign policies is very considerably different from a President or Secretary of State to whom they had a very strong emotional attachment. It is important to remember that this type of individual has undoubtedly developed a set of attitudes toward both domestic and foreign policies which are basically incompatible with those of President Nixon.

This letter is not intended to be a blanket condemnation of the Foreign Service or of Departmental officers. The Department, both in its domestic and Foreign Service possesses some very knowledgable and indeed brilliant individuals—men and women who deeply interested in foreign affairs and dedicated to the welfare of the United States. This type of individual can be depended upon to faithfully execute the foreign policy of the President of the United States and is completely loyal to the person and office of the President.

These men and women are a significant national asset. Unfortunately, however, there are a number of persons who are emotionally involved with other political personalities and who basically and fundamentally disagree with the President in both foreign and domestic matters. It would seem advisable to reappraise the positions presently occupied by these individuals and to possibly utilize their talents elsewhere.

The necessary changes in personnel to achieve a department responsive to the President would not have to include actions which would embarrass the President with charges of "dismantling the State

Department" nor would these changes have to be carried out in a way calculated to alienate the foreign affairs structure. They can be achieved with finesse but the changes must be approached in a practical manner which demonstrates firmness and a willingness to act in the interests of the President rather than engaging in philosophical hand-wringing which recognizes the problem but which hesitates to confront the problem and deal with it expeditiously. Effective action would encourage those who support the President and his policies, tend to revitalize the foreign affairs community and will, at least to a degree, create an atmosphere which would be uncongenial to those who thrive on the "system" for the "system's sake," instead of devoting their time and energy to implementing the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

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318. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Urban Affairs (Moynihan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 28, 1970.

The enclosed was drafted by a Nixon man over in the State Department who has just returned from Europe. My impression is not dissimilar, although admittedly my data base is pretty thin.

If you would like to talk about this further, I would be glad to do so.

D

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[2]

Washington, undated.

Problem

1. The mood of the Foreign Service officers in our Embassies abroad approaches that of semi-rebellion.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1050, Staff Files, Staff Memos, Moynihan, Daniel P. No classification marking. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

[2] A typed notation on the memorandum reads: "Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Elliot Richardson."

2. Their hostility is not directed towards the foreign policy, which they overwhelmingly support but rather of the Nixon domestic program.

3. This hostility is reflected in questions about "Southern Strategy," Carswell, Agnew civil rights, etc.

Recommendation

1. A White House staffer or a State Department official with White House background (or perhaps someone like Arthur Fletcher) should address at least some of the bigger embassies (i.e. London, Bonn, Moscow, Rome, Paris).

2. It should be on off the record closed session with ample time for questions and discussion. It should not be a canned presentation.

3. Particular emphasis should be given to the Nixon program for combatting poverty, i.e., income strategy, and Nixon programs such as the family assistance program and the Philadelphia plan. Facts such as the Nixon appointment of more Negroes at the policy level (i.e. confirmation by Senate) than any other Administration.

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319. Editorial Note

On the morning of June 6, 1970, Under Secretary of State Eliot Richardson telephoned U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to tell him he "had a rather startling piece of information—the President called me over yesterday afternoon to tell me he is bringing [Robert] Finch into the White House as Counselor and wanted me to take Finch's place as Secretary of HEW. I had to respond very promptly." Richardson's move to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was to be "announced at noon." The news left Johnson "speechless." (Notes of telephone conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

Richardson resigned as Under Secretary on June 23. During June and July a number of candidates were given serious consideration as his replacement. For a time President Nixon favored his assistant Peter Flanigan, and Flanigan himself liked the idea, but in mid-August the President and Secretary of State Rogers settled on John N. Irwin II. Irwin's selection was announced August 19, and he entered on duty September 21. On October 14 he assumed the Chairmanship of the Under Secretaries Committee. Irwin served as Under Secretary of State

and then Deputy Secretary of State (the position was retitled in July 1972) until February 1, 1973. Documentation on the selection of Richardson's successor is in *The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition,* and in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11.

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320. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Assistant (Haldeman)[1]

Washington, July 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Turner Shelton's List of State Department Personnel

Pursuant to the President's direction[2] I asked Turner Shelton to prepare a list of individuals assigned to the Department of State whose loyalty to the President is questionable. Turner spent this weekend preparing the attached summary[3] in which he lists those key State personnel whom he considers to be disloyal to this administration and also includes some comments on specific bureaus which need overhaul. These include State Department's: Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs as well as Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Shelton is very high on Bill Macomber but highlights his judgment that Macomber lacks the necessary contacts with the White House.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under a covering memorandum in which Haig advised Kissinger "not to go on record for or against this report." A note on the covering memorandum indicates Kissinger asked Haig to sign the memorandum for him, which Haig did.

[2] In a May 14 memorandum Haldeman informed Kissinger that the President wanted him to make sure "we get Shelton's list of who our friends and opponents are in the Foreign Service." (Ibid., White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, FO 2)

[3] Attached but not printed is a 7-page memorandum, July 13, that, according to Haig's covering memorandum to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), was an "edited version of the Shelton report." See the attachment to Document 317, which is Sheldon's original letter.

Shelton also lists those individuals who he thinks are particularly loyal to the President and enumerates a group of individuals outside the government who he believes should be considered for future foreign affairs assignments, consultation or advice.[4] Finally, Shelton points out that his report was confined to Department of State personnel and has volunteered to do a similar summary for Frank Shakesphere if desired. Shelton has formerly served with that agency.

[4] Under cover of a July 19 memorandum, Haig forwarded to Haldeman three lists "for use in discussions with Deputy Under Secretary Macomber": 1) "people who should be removed from key positions"; 2) "people who are favorable to the Administration and should be considered for appointment to key positions"; 3) "people who are presently outside government but who would make excellent consultants or appointments." The names on each list were the same as those on each of Shelton's lists, but none of Shelton's comments were included. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3) Haig forwarded the same lists to Kissinger together with other material on personnel problems in the Department of State under cover of a November 25, 1970, memorandum in which he commented that Shelton's list "includes a full range of bad guys and good guys, with which I am not in full agreement and is provided only for your background." (Ibid.)

321. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, July 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Task Forces

You might wish to make the following points with respect to the task force effort the next time you see the President.

1. You are convinced that one of the most significant contributions the Administration could make would be to leave a much strengthened State Department, far better equipped than it is now to meet the changing and increasingly complex foreign policy challenges this country will face in the remaining decades of this century. If the Adminis-

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, July 1970. No classification marking. Drafted by Macomber. Printed from an unsigned copy.

tration can do this it will be of far more lasting significance than how we handle a great many problems the headlines focus on each day.

2. You have launched a unique effort to accomplish this. Instead of carrying out a reform and modernization effort in the usual way, i.e. by a "meat-ax" approach from the top—which is the way McNamara proceeded in the Defense Department and which is the traditional way to reform a large bureaucracy—you have decided that the best way to proceed is to turn the State Department-Foreign Service professionals loose on reforming and upgrading themselves. Your theory is that, if they will approach this with open minds, and if they will honestly look at all the real and alleged shortcomings which have been ascribed to them, they can do a better job in gearing up the Department than any group of outsiders.[2]

3. To the extent this effort needs to rely on the work of outside study commissions, there are already a series of excellent such reports in existence. We have never suffered from not having enough outside suggestions. Our problem has been when good suggestions have been made, the Department has been very reluctant to adopt them.

4. In order to get on with this effort you have set up thirteen task forces manned by 250 professionals, made up mostly from the State Department and the Foreign Service but also drawing on others in the foreign affairs community. They have been asked to look at all the suggestions that a change-resistant establishment had pushed side over the years, refine these or develop new proposals, and come up with an action program designed to modernize the State Department's way of doing business.

5. The thirteen task forces have now submitted draft reports which make 468 recommendations for improvements. These run the gamut from the installation of improved substantive management tools to the improved recruiting of FSO–8s. The reports are now being reviewed for omissions and inconsistencies and are being exposed in a series of seminars in the building to those who were not on the task forces. Our Embassies abroad have also been asked to comment. When these consultations, here and abroad, are completed, the task force studies will be put in final form, an overview paper will be drafted, a listing of all the recommendations will be finalized and a schedule for implementation

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[2] In his book *The Angels' Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy,* Macomber expressed his satisfaction with the decision to use active duty Department of State and Foreign Service personnel rather than "experts." "Their product, while uneven, was remarkably perceptive and constructive. It also benefited from the insider's license to be critical. They said things which needed to be said and which, coming from insiders, were far less resented than they would have otherwise been," and "much easier to implement, than identical criticism and recommendations from outsiders." (New York: Stein and Day, 1975, p. 200)

of these recommendations will be put into effect. A number of recommendations can be implemented promptly. Others will take longer.

6. The task forces are not recommending any new Presidential directives designed to strengthen the role and authority of the State Department. The theory is that in the long run the role of the Department can only be strengthened by improving its capabilities and performance and that a stronger leadership role for the Department should be earned rather than accorded to it by Presidential fiat.

7. Finally, many people say a great bureaucracy cannot reform itself. You think it can and, if this effort is pulled off successfully, it can well be one of the lasting ornaments of this Administration.

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322. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Japan (Sneider) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)[1]

Washington, August 12, 1970.

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you in your capacity as the representative of that corporate body which produced the Task Force recommendations on the management of foreign affairs. I have now had an opportunity to read through most of these reports and feel very strongly that the tremendous effort that has gone into preparing them deserves recognition from the field. While one could argue about some details, for my money it is the best set of recommendations on reorganization of the Service and the Department that has yet been produced and a clear demonstration that in-house reorganization plans are far more realistic and understanding of the needs of the Service than anything that can be done from the outside. The Task Force reports testify to the fact that we are still a very vital and dynamic Service with powers of self-criticism and self-analysis.

For what value they may be, I would like to add a few comments, largely in support of the recommendations in the report. One theme that runs through practically all the Task Force reports impressed me

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force Files, August 14 thru 31, 1970. Official–Informal; Unclassified. Commentary on the task force reports from Ambassadors and other Embassy officials in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere is ibid.

particularly, namely: that there is recognition throughout of the changing character of both our international responsibilities and of the personnel now entering the Foreign Service field. After being away from the field for four years, I have been constantly impressed in Tokyo by the changes during this period both in the nature of the work we must perform and the type of people we are now attracting into the Service. The younger officers are truly a very different generation and a different breed. While some of us old timers might squirm occasionally, recalling the "good old days," it is incumbent upon us to face up to this reality. The alternative, which I have seen too often, is for these younger officers to fly the coop. The abler ones have really no difficulty in finding responsible and much better paying jobs and we just have to dig in and fight to retain these people. The key factors in holding the abler, younger officers seem to be a well-ordered personnel structure, as recommended, sufficient scope in every assignment to challenge their imagination and initiative (too much layering in an Embassy hurts), and a more democratic—freer interchange between all levels (the use of titles can be a two-way barrier in Embassies). What this adds up to is an endorsement of the basic thrust of the Task Force reports. On specifics, the new promotion and retirement systems recommended make particularly good sense to me.

On the subject of Embassy organization, my limited experience as DCM in Tokyo leads me to two primary conclusions. First, a major organizational problem remains with integrating the non-State agencies—and there are a flock of these in Tokyo. Secondly, I would heartily endorse the recommendations on defining the DCM's responsibilities, while still leaving scope for the Ambassador's individual tastes. The DCM position is perhaps the most amorphous and undefined role in the Embassy—ranging very greatly from post to post.

Finally, while I do not think that anyone would disagree with the need for stronger managerial tools and training, there is a danger of overemphasis in this direction. I hope that, in recognizing that foreign affairs is big business and needs effective management, we do not lose sight of the need for men with that unusual combination of perception, courage, wisdom and diplomatic skills that make the best of our Service. Inevitably, we are faced with making judgments and policy recommendations on the basis of less than complete data, judgments that often need the wisdom of experience and instinct. Yet, all this—I must assume—can be encompassed in the management basket, if we do not get too automated.

All the very best.

Sincerely,

Dick
Minister

323. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)[1]

Washington, August 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Task Force Reports

As you are aware, a number of the Task Forces' recommendations relate directly to the organization and operations of the regional bureaus. I have therefore encouraged the officers of EUR to submit comments on those recommendations. A number of the more cogent of these comments I attach for your consideration and that of the Task Forces in their further work.[2]

While I believe that the points made represent reasonable criticisms or suggestions, I would not personally press them all with the same vigor. They are, however, worth bringing to your attention as representing the views of a group of officers in EUR who have read, given thought to, and discussed among themselves the various Task Force reports.

Having read the Task Force reports myself and having attended various discussion sessions arranged by you, I could not help but be struck by the sheer mass of the reports and the breadth of the subjects covered. At the present stage, it is difficult to come to grips with the various recommendations except in a diffuse way. The next step, which I know you have under way, must necessarily involve the development of a single comprehensible and internally consistent program which focuses on the main problems. The Task Forces have done an admirable job in pinpointing many of the problem areas which presently confront us. However, they were unfortunately too compartmentalized to develop logically consistent remedies for the problems identified. Consequently, while many of the specific recommendations would, if adopted, represent much needed improvements, others are ill-advised and should be revised or discarded.

In very broad terms, the Task Forces address themselves to two fundamental questions: (1) How can the State Department and the Foreign Service be organized to meet the needs of U.S. foreign policy? and

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, August 14 thru 31, 1970. Unclassified.

[2] Attached but not printed.

(2) What type of personnel does a modern Foreign Service require? If we can devise acceptable answers to these two questions in logical, coherent form within a comprehensive conceptual framework, we will have made a giant step forward.

If we were to try to isolate the one most characteristic feature of the Foreign Service today it would be the deep feeling of dissatisfaction with the present personnel system. This, of course, refers not only to method of assignment (which is only a small part of the picture) but also to every other aspect of personnel administration. If this feeling is well-founded, first order of business should be a thorough reform of the personnel system. Some of the elements of an improved personnel system might be the following:

(1) The establishment of a stable personnel system which would avoid the uncertainty and inequities created by the constant changes of the past two decades. Even a less than ideal system, consistently administered, would permit both individuals and personnel administrators to plan ahead rationally;
(2) Inventory of personnel and positions;
(3) Careful screening of young Foreign Service Officers;
(4) Promotions geared to grade requirements;
(5) Humanization of the selection out of time and grade provisions so that they are used to eliminate those guilty of incompetence or malfeasance and not to correct personnel imbalances created by incompetent planning;
(6) Improvement of the efficiency report system; and
(7) Assignment aimed at developing human talent.

As I pointed out at one of your discussion meetings, a consideration troubling me in trying to appraise the relevant Task Force reports is the unproved assumption that there are really enough "interesting" jobs in the Foreign Service and the Department of State to meet the requirements of a Foreign Service of some 3000-plus officers for such jobs. A mere inventory of available positions will not answer the question as to how many of these are actually of a type which will meet the need, on which young officers now seem to place so much stress, for challenging and responsible positions at all stages of a Foreign Service career.

The cone system, I know, with its introduction of varying recruitment criteria for the different cones, is supposed to take care of at least part of this problem, but I am not sure that it will entirely. I am personally confronted with a steady stream of officers at all levels who want a line job within one of the EUR country directorates, and I would imagine that the other regional assistant secretaries find themselves in the same position. The fact is that only a small percentage of officers can actually be accommodated on country desks or in functional positions, mainly economic, within the regional bureaus or the E area. What happens to the others is part of the problem of finding constructive and challenging work for all.

The foregoing remarks are not meant in criticism of the Task Force enterprise, which has certainly been one of the best things that has happened around the Department in many years. I shall look forward to the product of the group charged with pulling together the various Task Force reports into a comprehensive whole. I should then hope to have further comments on specific proposals for change which might be sponsored by this group.

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324. Letter From the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)[1]

Washington, August 24, 1970.

Dear Mr. Macomber:

In response to your invitation for "openness" and the Department-wide review and discussions on the Task Force studies, the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies welcomes the opportunity to discuss with you on Wednesday some problems on the status of women.[2]

We are delighted with the appointment just made of Elizabeth J. Harper as chairman of the Department of State's Women's Program Committee. As she forms her Committee and draws up plans, we look forward to working with and through her in improving the status and employment opportunities of women in the Department.

The Ad Hoc Committee, formed in mid-July specifically to examine the Task Force reports for their implications and effect on the status of women, believes it must act independently of Miss Harper to assure your immediate consideration of our recommendations.

We present in an enclosure (A)[3] a review we have made of the four Task Force studies (I, II, IV, and VI) which have particular significance

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking. Copies were sent to State, USIA, AID, AFSA, and JFSOC.

[2] The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and its successor, the Women's Action Organization, and the more general issue of women in the Department of State during the early 1970s are treated in detail in Homer L. Calkin, *Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 131–160.

[3] Not attached.

to equal employment opportunities for women and their career development.

We make several recommendations chief among them being:

1. That the reports of the Task Forces be reviewed at once from the point of view of their inpact on the role of women in the foreign affairs agencies and necessary revisions made.
2. That a special Task Force be convened immediately to carry out this thorough-going review and revision.

Because the reports were made generally available only in mid-July, and because our group did not have or attempt to command the resources of the Task Forces themselves, our review is not comprehensive. We have, however, singled out certain major points which serve to illustrate the need for immediate discussion, clarification, or revision.

We are sure you will share our surprise at the marked minority position of women in the Foreign Service and the apparent inequities in their assignment and promotion as illustrated in Enclosure B. For example, men constitute 95.3 percent of the total Foreign Service Officer ranks; women, 4.7 percent. While the intake of women officers was approximately 10 percent of the total five years ago, this rate has dropped in the past two years to 7 percent. Out of 307 top positions (Ambassador, DCM, and Consul General) only two were held by women as reflected in May, 1970 statistics.

We believe that if the inequities which now appear to exist are to be redressed a conscious effort on the part of the Department must be made now while the Department-wide Task Force review is underway. We believe explicit language must be used in the Task Force studies which will embody the Department's action plan for the '70's.

In short, just as the Department believes that its course for the '70's must be set by the Task Forces and cannot be delayed, we believe equally strongly that the course for women must be set concurrently.

We look forward to our meeting with you.

Sincerely yours,

Jean Joyce
Ruth Mosley
Mary S. Olmsted
Idris M. Rossell
Eleanor W. Savage

Enclosure B

Washington, August 21, 1970.

SOME BASIC DATA ON WOMEN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

I. Relative Number of Women, July 1, 1970 (O/EP data)

	Men		Women	
Total FSO Strength	No.	%	No.	%
3248	3,096	95.3	152	4.7

II. Relative Number of Women in Incoming Classes (BEX data)

	Total	Men	Women	% Women
FY 1969	89	83	6	7
FY 1970	102	95	7	7

III. Women in Top Career Assignments (May 1970 Foreign Service List)

	No. of Positions	Women Incumbents
Ambassador	124	2
DCM	117	0
Consul-General	66	0

Further, according to the best information available to us, recent personnel shifts have resulted in only 3 women counselors at any overseas post:

1 woman political counselor (Athens)
1 woman commercial counselor (Rome)
1 woman economic counselor (Mexico City)

In the Department, only 1 woman FSO is holding the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and no woman is serving as Country Director (one FSR serves as an Assistant Administrator).

IV. Relative Promotion of Men and Women FSO's—4-Year Summary 1967–70 (Computation based on O/EP data)

Class	Number and Percent Promoted in 4-year Period			
	Men	Women	% Men	% Women
CA	—	—	—	—
CM	6	0	3.0	0.0
FSO–1	31	2	2.4	11.0

Class	Number and Percent Promoted in 4-year Period			
	Men	Women	% Men	% Women
FSO–2	130	2	7.4	3.6
FSO–3	230	7	9.0	6.0
FSO–4	340	21	14.3	9.2
FSO–5	477	21	23.5	22.3
FSO–6	651	25	41.1	22.3
FSO–7	288	34	27.6	41.4
	2,153	112		

325. Memorandum for the Files[1]

Washington, August 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies

At a meeting with Mr. Macomber today the "Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies" stressed the need for the Department to consider some problems on the status of women. Referring to their letter of August 24, 1970, to Mr. Macomber,[2] representatives of the group stressed the following principal matters:

1) Need to recruit more and better female officers;

2) Need to train a larger number of female officers;

3) Need to strengthen promotion, assignment, and utilization policies as they affect women to minimize discrimination; and

4) Need to amend the individual Task Force reports to reflect more directly the Department's efforts to strengthen personnel and management policies toward women in the foreign affairs agencies.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking. Drafted by Howard P. Mace, Deputy Director General of the Foreign Service.

[2] Document 324.

Mr. Macomber, supporting the ladies' basic thesis, made the following points:

1) The ladies should make specific, broad-gauged suggestions for changes in Task Force reports to Task Force Chairmen;[3]

2) Many improvements in personnel policies can readily be made to improve the utilization and development of the talents of female employees;

3) The possibilities of assigning lady officers, including senior FSSOs, to the Inspection Corps, would be explored;

4) Increasing the use of women on Selection Boards and Panels would be investigated; and

5) Miss Harper would work directly with the Ad Hoc Committee on these matters.

HPM
Deputy Director General

[3] The Ad Hoc Women's Committee held a Department-wide open forum on September 2 to consider recommendations on the status of women for the Task Force Reports, and then forwarded a 16-page proposal for additions and changes to the reports under cover of a September 8 memorandum to Christopher Petrow of Macomber's office. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs)

326. Memorandum From Mary S. Olmsted of the Ad Hoc Women's Committee, Department of State to Chris Petrow of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration[1]

Washington, October 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Our Recommendations re Task Force Reports

Thank you for the time and trouble you went to in making our views known to the chairmen of the Task Forces about the role and

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking.

status of women in the Department and the Foreign Service, and for your memorandum of September 30 reporting their actions.[2]

We were glad to see that certain of our proposals were incorporated into the reports. We were disappointed, however, that some of the Task Forces did not take up some of the basic recommendations which we believe must be adopted to assure full utilization of the resources of women over the 1970's. We were particularly disappointed that Task Force I did not accept any of our recommendations in this important area of career management and assignments. Some of the other Task Forces appear to have underestimated the problems faced by women in the Department and the Foreign Service. They also apparently underestimated the discontent now existing among women in the foreign affairs agencies as well as its possibilities for adversely affecting the efficiency and harmony of the Foreign Service. We hope that this lack of understanding can be rectified by a strong statement, in the covering report, on the future role of women in the Services.

We are making these views known to Mr. Macomber.[3]

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[2] Not found.

[3] The second paragraph of the memorandum was included in Olmsted's October 6 letter to Macomber. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of The Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs)

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327. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, October 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Military Representation Abroad Action Memorandum

In January 1970, at the suggestion of PM, Under Secretary Richardson asked the Interdepartmental Political Military Group (IPMG) to prepare a study for the Under Secretaries Committee on the role of the military in the overseas diplomatic missions. The study was one of a

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 US. Confidential. Sent through Johnson who initialed the memorandum. Drafted by Thomas Pickering (PM).

number of on-going actions resulting from the Overseas Personnel Reductions (OPRED) ordered by the President. We have now reached a point in this study process where we should brief you and solicit your views on how best to proceed. What follows is a brief explanation of the purpose of the study, issues which have been settled, and the one outstanding issue which is unresolved.

Under Secretary Richardson, in his directive ordering the study, indicated that we should examine specifically the possibility of reorganizing the military representation in the overseas diplomatic mission as a single section, parallel to the political or economic sections, headed by a senior military officer reporting directly to the Ambassador. In the course of the IPMG study, in which DOD/ISA and JCS have played an active role, we have resolved a number of subsidiary issues including a realignment of military communications channels in the diplomatic mission, administrative support arrangements more closely integrated with the Embassy, and a means for implementing any reorganization proposals through the regional interdepartmental groups on a phased and orderly basis. The IPMG, however, has not resolved the major outstanding problem—the type of organizational arrangements to be instituted for the military.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain firmly convinced that no change is warranted in the present Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Defense Attaché Sections of our Embassies. They believe that MAAG and Attaché offices perform separate, unrelated, and unblendable functions which must, in order to carry out our military responsibilities overseas, remain as separate organizations. They believe any attempt to provide for unified control under the Ambassador of these and other overseas military bodies—mapping missions, ship repair units, medical research detachments and similar bodies would be unworkable and severely impinge upon the ability of these officers and men to do their assigned tasks.

The Department of State staff believes that a single military section would provide the Ambassador with a new tool better to perform the military aspects of his overseas mission for the President. Part of this belief is based on the need for enhanced and more simplified means of staying in touch with and exerting control over the military elements of the mission in so far as this is required to carry out the Ambassador's foreign policy mandate from the President. Another factor, is the encouragement of the military through a single section to provide broader gauge officers to carry out a more broadly conceived role for the military overseas. The Nixon Doctrine, we believe, will require more military-to-military advice and consultation with our close allies overseas. The increasing role of the military in many overseas governments requires a well-rounded U.S. military officer to improve and maintain across-the-board contacts for the Ambassador. Single military sections

have worked well in Jordan, the United Kingdom, and in other areas where attachés have handled some or all of the military assistance duties. In many other countries, military assistance officers do contribute in important ways to representational contacts with foreign military officers and to our intelligence reporting.

Meshed with the problem of the apparent impasse at the IPMG level on the organization of the military is the leftover question of the future of MAAGs in Belgium, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. The decision by the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee that these MAAGs should be abolished in countries in Europe in which we no longer have military assistance programs has brought a strong reclama from the Secretary of Defense.[2] The USC decision envisaged the future settlement of the organizational problem of their disestablishment and the assumption of any necessary remaining duties within the Embassy in the on-going IPMG study discussed above.

Before moving to the Under Secretaries Committee to discuss the IPMG report on this subject, we need to have a review of the problem with you. We have at least one pending Defense Department suggestion on how to proceed further to raise with you as well as a number of interrelated problems which we believe could be best handled in a discussion session. (The Department of Defense has suggested a traveling joint State–Defense study mission visit a number of posts where there may be problems, possibly including the European Embassies mentioned above. We are reluctant to proceed along these lines until we have your own views.)

Recommendation

That you agree to meet with Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Hartman, and myself at an early convenient time for a briefing on and discussion of these issues.[3]

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[2] Haig briefed Kissinger on this "interdepartmental brawl" in a July 31 memorandum and then expressed his own strong opposition to abolishing the four MAAGs in an August 28 memorandum to Kissinger. Both are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 225, Dept of Defense, Vol. VIII.

[3] Irwin approved a meeting for November 16 at 11 a.m.

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to the President's Assistant (Flanigan)[1]

Washington, December 29, 1970.

Peter:

Here is the "percentage chart" you asked me for the other day.

William B. Macomber, Jr.

Attachment

Washington, undated.

COMPARISON OF CHIEFS OF MISSION APPOINTMENTS

	Career	*Per Cent*	*Non-Career*	*Per Cent*
Eisenhower	146	68%	68	32%
Kennedy	73	61%	47	39%
Johnson	89	60%	59	40%
Nixon	66	69%	30	31%

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan, Box 13, Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda. No classification marking. In a January 19, 1971, follow-up memorandum to Flanigan Macomber stated: "the percentage chart figures on career and non-career Chiefs of Mission in the last four Administrations reflect the total number of Ambassadors appointed during each of these Administrations. Thus, if a non-career Ambassador was replaced after brief service by another non-career person the figures would reflect two non-career appointments and a resultant distortion in the percentage figures. I think a 70%–30% split in career appointees at post is just about right, and that is where we are at the moment." (Ibid.)

329. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts[1]

Washington, January 19, 1971, 1600Z.

8959. For Chief of Mission from Deputy Under Secretary Macomber. Subject: Implementation of Task Force Recommendations on the Roles and Functions of Diplomatic Missions.

To assure systematic and timely implementation of the management reforms proposed by the Task Forces, an action program was submitted to the Secretary along with the reports of the thirteen task forces.[2] The Secretary has now approved the action program below and has asked me to assume responsibility for carrying it out.

Of major importance are those recommendations concerning the role, function, and structure of our diplomatic missions. Recommendations on the missions were submitted not only by Task Force XI on the role and function of diplomatic missions, but also by Task Force VII on creativity, and Task Force IX on openness.

Their recommendations are aimed at three principal objectives:

1. To strengthen the executive direction of the mission and enhance its overall organization and program management.
2. To promote creativity and openness within missions.
3. To stimulate openness and closer contact with the host country and with the visitors from the United States.

These recommendations are summarized in the following sections. Each summary concludes with a paragraph requesting specific action by the missions.[3]

Mission Organization and Management

Task Force XI (Diplomatic Missions) reemphasizes the paramount roles of the Ambassador and suggests various management reforms to give him better control over the activities of his mission and greater organizational flexibility in meeting problems. These reforms are also intended to provide better communication throughout the mission and more thorough consideration of creative and innovative views.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, ORG 8 Task Force Recommendations. Unclassified. Drafted by Robert Foulton, Chief of the Management Staff in Macomber's office, and approved by Macomber.

[2] See Document 312.

[3] Regarding responses from the missions see Document 312; and National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, March 1971. Ambassador to Nepal Carol Laise's response is Document 332.

Task Force XI gives high priority to an improved system of Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA), resembling but going beyond the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) procedure used successfully by the Interdepartmental Group of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA/IG). PARA's basic intent is to analyze U.S. interests and policy objectives more systematically, with the aim both of (a) sharpening policy definition and guidance and (b) providing a more logical method for the allocation of resources (money and people) by all agencies.

Such a system would provide both the Department and the chief of mission with sound concepts and procedures for guiding and controlling all programs and functions at a mission. The Department is now considering how best to implement these recommendations and will keep the missions informed of its findings.

Task Force XI's remaining recommendations on organization and management of missions are related to the PARA system, but are not dependent on it. While it does not call for a dismantling of the traditional mission organization, Task Force XI does encourage chiefs of mission to cut across established jurisdictional lines by establishing either ad hoc or standing groups to meet short-term or continuing management problems. It finds the standard Country Team to be deficient as a management tool and underscores the utility of greater organizational flexibility both in solving problems and in stimulating creativity.

In urging that the executive section of missions be strengthened, Task Force XI recommends the formation of management systems (1) to deal specifically with the need for coordination of information collection and reporting and (2) to focus on policy formulation and related resource allocation problems. Illustrations of such systems are provided.[4]

While mindful that no precise blueprint can be applied to every mission, the Department is in fundamental agreement with the mannagement objectives set forth by Task Force XI.

Action Suggested: In considering the recommendations relating to organization and management, numbers 420 through 425, and 499 on the attached list, you would be aided by a review of the rationale and conclusions given in Task Force XI's report on diplomatic missions (pages 451–459 of *Diplomacy for the 70's*). After reviewing this material and related aspects of the task force reports on creativity and openness, you are urged to consider how these principles can best be applied, taking into account the size, nature and functional requirements of your particular mission.

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[4] Not further identified.

By March 15, 1971, I would appreciate your report on the results of this examination, giving us your judgment of how far we might go in refining the organization of the mission to achieve the intended purposes.

Creativity and Openness in the Mission

Task Force VII (Creativity) concludes that the climate in many of our missions is not altogether hospitable to creative thinking. It finds that creativity is inhibited by "an almost feudal quality" in the relationship between senior officers and the lower ranks in the mission. It appeals for a "democratization" of personal relationships within the mission, adding that the principal factor in attaining it will be the personal style of the chief of mission himself. Task Force VII also believes that greater use of ad hoc task forces would stimulate freer expression of views among the diverse units and agencies of the mission and would give younger officers greater opportunity to participate and be heard.

In dealing with creativity and openness, the recommendations of Task Force XI (Diplomatic Missions) parallel and sustain those of Task Force VII. Task Force XI calls attention to the impatience of younger officers with "antiquated rules of protocol and behavior" and emphasizes the importance of creating an atmosphere in which the chief of mission and his ranking staff members open themselves to ideas from below and, in turn, encourage those they direct to look beyond the narrow confines of their job descriptions. It recommends the use of informal discussion groups in the mission, preferably self-administered so as to give participants a sense of freedom and spontaneity.

Task Force IX also sees the "hierarchical attitudes" of the Foreign Service as limiting openness and calls for measures for the promotion and transmission—in and out—of ideas, viewpoints and criticisms." (Pages 3911–3 of *Diplomacy for the 70's.*)

We are in fundamental agreement with the task forces that more democratic working relationships within the missions can induce creativity and openness. But like the task forces, we are mindful that there are no universally applicable formulas for achieving this. Above all we recognize that, since chiefs of missions must have wide latitude in the management of their missions, the effectiveness of missions could suffer if rigid rules governing relationships among their personnel were imposed on them.

We believe that the best way of carrying out the task force recommendations lies in the preparation of specific guidelines for the chief of mission. Although these guidelines would be drawn up within the Department, they should reflect fully the views of the missions themselves.

Action Suggested: The missions are asked to review carefully the relevant passages of the reports of Task Forces VII, IX, and XI. We would appreciate by March 15 your reactions to task force recommenda-

tions 426 through 429 and your recommendations for the proposed guidelines.

Openness Outside the Mission

Task Force IX (Openness) finds that "conditions of service abroad encourage clannishness." This group decided that greater efforts were needed to expose mission personnel to sources of influence which might previously have been neglected. Among these sources would be not only representatives of a broad spectrum of the population of the country to which the employee is assigned, but also U.S. visitors who can bring to the mission a greater understanding of and sensitivity to the U.S. domestic scene.

We call particular attention to the recommendations concerning reporting. Task Force IX concludes that too much of an officer's time is devoted to the reporting of particular events at the expense of broader and more frequent contacts. Task Force XIII (Management Tools) also stresses this theme, recommending that "spot" reporting be reduced in favor of a few well developed analytical pieces. Task Force VII recommends the appointment of a special study group to "recommend measures for the paper flow." The problem of the quantity and type of field reporting is a familiar one for the Department. While we can claim some progress in our efforts to streamline and rationalize the reporting function, we are still not fully satisfied with current practices. We will be most interested in your comments on recommendation 436.

Action Suggested: I would be grateful if by March 15, 1971, you could report on the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement recommendations 430 through 436.

I recognize that the criticisms and suggestions that you are being asked to deal with may not, in every case, be applicable to your mission. Where you find one or more of them to be inapplicable, and believe no significant improvements are needed in the areas they deal with, please say so. But before reaching such a conclusion, I ask that in each instance you bear in mind that the criticisms and suggestions we are dealing with are not the work of "outsiders" but rather of experienced "insiders" drawn from all ranks of the Foreign Service and the Department.

Many thanks for your cooperation.

Action Program

The schedule of actions to implement the recommendations of the 13 Task Forces on Management Reforms listed below is divided into the following three categories:

Category I—Recommendations approved for implementation.

Category II—Recommendations requiring further study—decisions to be made within 90 days.

Category III—Recommendations requiring further study—decisions to be made within 180 days.

Missions

420. Ambassadors should adapt their line organizations to the nature of their particular missions and the requirements laid on it. II

421. In many posts, the role of the DCM should broadened to make him the equivalent of a corporation executive vice-president in charge of operations and coordination. The DCM would then become the operation director of a PARA system. II

422. In missions with large operational programs, it may be necessary to augment the supervisory role of the Ambassador and DCM with another officer in an executive/management capacity. This officer could be a "counselor for management" an "executive secretary" or a lower ranking officer. II

424. Except for small missions, management systems should be established to (a) improve the collection and reporting of information and (b) provide adequate analysis and policy formulation to support a PARA system. II

425. In larger missions, consideration should be given to the formation of three management coordination groups: (a) information collection and reporting group, (b) policy and budget group, and (c) operations group. II

426. It is recommended that the Department give active consideration to measures for significantly democratizing the personal relationships in the mission. III

427. Ambassadors should seek greater openness and participation through less rigid compartmentalization. II

428. In our missions abroad, the Deputy Chief of Mission should see as an integral part of his management function the promotion and transmission—in and out—of ideas, positive viewpoints and criticisms. II

429. Encourage cross-mission communication at all levels and the consideration of creative views from all levels and sections. This can only be accomplished through impetus from the top. The executive section must make clear that this effort has its continuing interest. II

430. Ambassadors should insure that greater use of U.S. visitors is made. For example, Congressional travelers and other VIP's should be asked to participate in give-and-take exchanges with selected cross sections of a mission. II

431. Visiting Congressmen should be asked to brief a mission on domestic developments. II

432. Embassy officers should be given, on a regular basis, the opportunity to act as escort or control officer for important visitors. II

433. Sufficient funds should be made available for travel and language improvement so that local contacts will be as widespread and useful as possible. II

436. Reduce reporting in favor of fewer, more perceptive analyses. If these analyses are indeed to improve in quality they must derive from broader contacts outside the Embassy. The aim should be to assure that a minimum of one quarter of a substantive officer's time is devoted to out of the office contact and travel. III

499. Attaché reporting should be more closely coordinated with other mission intelligence through the operation of a reporting committee. III

Recommendations 423, 434, 435 have not been assigned to missions.

Rogers

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330. Editorial Note

During 1971 women employed by the foreign affairs agencies continued to press for reforms, especially concerning the effect of marriage on their rights, opportunities, and employment conditions. At an Open Meeting on Marriage held on January 20, 1971, Department spokesmen, including Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Macomber, exchanged views with women of the foreign affairs agencies on the regulations affecting married women employees. In a January 29 follow-up letter to Macomber, Mary Olmsted, President of the Women's Action Organization, welcomed Macomber's statement that it was time to start making marriage not incompatible with a women's career. She included an 11-point summary of the organization's understanding of what was said at the meeting (printed in Calkin, *Women in the Department of State,* pages 272–273) and highlighted additional concerns not covered fully or at all at the meeting. The letter and further correspondence with Macomber is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs.

In airgram CA–3745, August 11, 1971, the Department of State transmitted to all diplomatic and consular posts a policy statement on the effect of marriage on the rights, opportunities, and employment conditions of women employed by the Department, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. The airgram reported that the three agencies were "continuing to review their regulations to assure that marriage and a career are compatible for those

women who desire both, and that women with dependents will have equal opportunities for service abroad if they so desire." The airgram then specified the policies adopted by the three agencies:

"1) Recruitment literature has been rewritten to eliminate any reference to considerations based on sex or marital status.

"2) Women applicants are not being questioned regarding their marital status or intention to marry.

"3) Women with dependents are being considered for appointment and assignment in the foreign affairs agencies.

"4) A woman who was required to resign from the Foreign Service because of marriage will be given opportunities for reentry into the Foreign Service at a class commensurate with her qualifications, if there is a need for her services and if she meets current conditions of employment.

"5) Women in the foreign affairs agencies who wish to continue their careers after marriage can do so if they continue to accept all conditions of employment without reservation, including availability for world wide service. Equality in application of the regulations means that—

"(a) A Foreign Service employee marrying a national of another country will be assigned to the U.S. so that the spouse may apply for U.S. citizenship (Uniform State/AID/USIA Regulations, 3 FAM 629, *Marriage of Employees*).

"(b) If two Foreign Service employees marry and both wish to continue working, each may retain regular status if each continues to be available for world wide assignment. The foreign affairs agencies will make every effort to assign both husband and wife to the same post in positions appropriate to their class levels and qualifications. If such assignments are not feasible the husband and wife may be assigned positions at different posts, or one or the other of the couple will be granted leave without pay for the duration of one full tour of duty. The couple will be consulted on the alternatives.

"(c) The fact that a woman is married, or intends to marry will not be considered a factor in her availability for assignment overseas unless she declares that she is no longer available for assignment world wide.

"6) A woman employee who marries while in service abroad and wishes to convert from Regular to Resident status in order to continue her employment at the post may apply to do so.

"7) A woman employee who must remain in the United States after marriage may be considered for transfer to an appropriate personnel category, such as FSRU/FAS.

"8) Women employees in the foreign affairs agencies who as a result of marriage were converted from Regular to Resident appointments are being asked whether they wish to convert back to their regular status as world wide available employees.

"9) The fact that a woman is married or intends to marry, or any comment thereon, shall not be included in any part of her performance evaluation and shall in no way prejudice her eligibility for promotion.

"10) A post differential is paid to a regular employee of the Foreign Service residing with his or her spouse when both have been determined to be career employees of the United States Government. A post differential is also paid to a regular employee living with his or her spouse who is not employed by the United States Government (Subject to 031.3 Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Affairs) which appeared in TL–SR 209, April 18, 1971).

"11) A woman employee's marriage or intent to marry will not affect her consideration for a long term training program (Uniform State/USIA Regulations, 3 FAM 817, on Continued Service Agreements apply)." (Ibid., MR: Special—Women Employees/Wives)

In September the Department of State established a full-time Office of Women's Affairs and named Gadys P. Rogers as the Deputy Under Secretary of Management's Special Assistant for Women's Affairs. In a December 15 memorandum to Macomber, Rogers reported on "Where the Department Stands with Respect to Improving the Status of Women." Three weeks later, on January 4, 1972, she forwarded to Macomber a 7-page year-end report on the status of the Department's "Women's Program" and its accomplishments during 1971. Both reports and additional documentation on the status of women employed by the Department are ibid.

Also during 1971 calls were sounded for reforms in the treatment of Foreign Service wives, which were instituted during 1972. See Documents 338 and 341. Additional documentation on the issue is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 374, MR: Special—Policy on Role of Wives.

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331. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, February 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Defense Sections

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 8. Confidential.

I have heard informally that Mr. Packard has passed down to the JCS and ISA for review our draft message on the establishment of Defense Sections in Embassies which you sent him under cover of your letter of February 9, 1971.[2]

As expected the reactions at these levels are strongly negative. Essentially the position is that things are just fine the way they are, and in any case why should the State Department meddle in what is essentially Defense business. As it was described to me, most of the "Colonels" working on the subject have very little idea of the functions of Embassies, the responsibilities of Ambassadors, or the role of the State Department in foreign relations.

Our problems in dealing with this question stem from two sources:

(1) A deeply ingrained suspicion that the State Department is out to corral the military and ultimately to control their activities overseas; and

(2) The military, at least at this level, have never accepted the President's letters to Ambassadors, which they regard as the product of an "end-run" by the State Department. In their view the Ambassador is a State Department functionary, and there is no reason why the military overseas should be under the Ambassador's jurisdiction.

This preliminary reading reinforces my own view that if we are to make any headway with this project it is not going to be through the normal processes of "staffing out" the proposal. It is going to have to be handled at your level with Mr. Packard, and it is at this level that we are going to have to convey the conviction that this reorganization is as much in the military interest as ours, that the present system is far from satisfactory, that an Ambassador represents the President and not just the Department of State, and that the President's letter establishing this principle is not just a passing phenomenon that will "go away." I believe it would be worthwhile sometime when you see Mr. Packard to mention again your desire to talk this project over with him before he becomes the prisoner of negative recommendations developed at the staff level in Defense.[3]

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[2] The draft message and February 9 letter are attached but not printed. The draft message established within each mission, as soon as feasible, "a single Defense Section, in which responsibility is centralized for all functions which are usually performed by uniformed military members of Embassy or mission staff, under a single, appropriately ranked military officer. The Section Chief would be responsible for supervision and coordination of all functions normally handled by military personnel, including representation, reporting (including Defense Attaché reporting), liaison with host government military, advice to Ambassador on military affairs, liaison between Embassy and U.S. commanders in areas under Ambassador's jurisdiction, and the like. As appropriate the Defense Section would handle military sales matters, overflight clearances, military visits, and other similar subjects which are usually carried forward in military-to-military channels."

[3] Packard informed Johnson in a February 23 letter that "the Department of Defense continues to support retention of MAAGs and Attaché offices as organizationally separate entities with existing command and administrative relationships." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 8)

332. Letter From the Ambassador to Nepal (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)[1]

Kathmandu, March 11, 1971.

Dear Bill:

In response to your recent circular telegram (State 8959),[2] we have subjected ourselves to critical self-examination on the basis of the relevant Task Force recommendations and related material, and have come up with the attached comments.[3] The exercise was extremely worthwhile in and of itself, and opened our eyes to improvements that can be made in our own management, even though it has not produced many original recommendations of general applicability. On the whole, I honestly believe that we are committed to the kind of flexible, situation-oriented mission structure, characterized by openness and creativity, that the Task Force recommendations are trying to bring about. Of course, there are shortcomings which we continuously try to spot and correct, but our commitment and executive policy are in harmony with the Task Force objectives. Being a small mission is certainly a great advantage; complex institutional arrangements are needed in a large organization to endow it with at least some of the advantages of smallness, but when applied to a small organization which doesn't need them in the first place, they are at best redundant, more likely, positively harmful. We are staying loose and I think are effectively responsive to changing requirements.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I should like to reaffirm a couple of basic philosophical points in this covering letter. The first relates to the concept of low profile. I think this is a good concept as long as it is considered a *policy,* and I commend the fact that it is so described here and there in the various Task Forces. But "low profile" makes no sense at all as an *objective,* as a goal to be pursued in its own right. If we start confusing ends and means and elevate the low profile concept from a means to an end in itself, we shall almost certainly go beyond a healthy pruning of what we have done in the world in the post-war years toward the destruction or undoing of much of the good which we have achieved.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, March 1971. Unclassified; Official–Informal. Carol Laise served as Ambassador to Nepal from 1966 to 1973.

[2] Document 329.

[3] Attached but not printed.

My second point relates to the chronic contradictions between what is real in the field and what is real in Washington. Our aid policies provide classic illustrations of this endemic impediment to effective foreign policies; you know better than I how the need to cater to Congressional and other demands for oversimplified formulas and box scores has repeatedly forced us to act in the field in ways that are plain foolish in the context of local conditions. Every previous reorganization of the Foreign Service and the State Department has involved at least some such straitjacketing of operations in the field. The hope this time, one which I fully share, is that we can achieve major improvements without suffering much of this kind of damage, because this reorganization is being done from within, by the professionals themselves. Even professionals, however, can mesmerize themselves with their own generalizations, particularly if they have been steeped for a while in the hothouse atmosphere of Washington; so even the present effort requires constant attention from its leaders to keep it honest and pragmatic rather than theological. In the final analysis, there are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors. No set of rules is a substitute for executive talent.

The situation we face in Nepal illustrates the necessity for utmost pragmatism in Washington if we are to be able to pursue our real interests here effectively and economically. The atmosphere is totally alien to Washington. This is an oral, familial society; institutions do exist and ostensibly they have policies, but it is the personal and familial relations that determine what happens. Economic development inputs simply don't work if they are done "by the numbers," strictly according to made-in-Washington global rules. There are other similar examples, (for example, local employee staffing patterns), that confront every element of this Mission to some degree or other. They all underscore the fact that if the U.S. Government has any interest at all in maintaining a presence in Nepal—and I am prepared to argue, in detail, the case that it does—then Washington should give its people here maximum freedom to determine how that interest should be pursued, within some reasonable total allocation of resources. This is only one aspect of the delegation of authority that is needed to stimulate and nurture creativity and innovation, a question that is considered at greater length in the attached paper.

Please forgive the hortatory tone of these remarks. I really think you and your colleagues are doing a tremendous job, and am moved to write the foregoing thoughts out of a sense of hope, not despair. At the same time, parallel developments, notably the directions AID reorganization seem to be taking, are most disturbing in the local context and in the context of the responsibilities laid on the Ambassador for insuring that our activities serve our national interest in any given country. I appreciate the way the Chiefs of Mission in the field have

been consulted regarding the Task Force reports, but there has been no comparable effort that I know of to involve us similarly in the thinking going on in the task forces reorganizing aid and weighing future institutional shapes and relationships for economic development. Is there any way of wiring us into this process, systematically, before it is too late?

Finally, I would like to express thanks for the opportunity given us to participate in this management reform process, which in itself is contributing to improved management within this Mission.

Sincerely,

Carol

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333. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, March 29, 1971.

Dear Mel:

My attention has been drawn to a number of recent instances where senior DOD officials have engaged in conversations with foreign officials on sensitive questions which were either directly inconsistent or at least subtly at variance with current U.S. foreign policy. I am sure you are aware of the cases I have in mind, as some of our concerns have already been communicated to your staff.

My purpose in writing you is not to belabor the incidents of the recent past but to look to the future in an effort to avert situations which could further embarrass the United States in our overseas relations. With this in mind I propose that the following procedures be instituted forthwith:

1. That DOD Directive 5000.7, as most recently revised on December 10, 1970,[2] be scrupulously adhered to in seeking formal State Department clearance for visits to special areas by General or Flag officers and civilians of the rank of GS–16 or above. To minimize any misunderstanding, requests for the concurrence of this Department of

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71. Secret.

[2] Copies of directives are maintained by the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Pentagon.

visits by personnel of this rank, as provided for in DOD Directive 5000.7, should be made in writing to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. This procedure should equally apply for proposed senior level visits to those countries cited in DOD Directive 5000.7 where notification only to the Department is required.

2. That in circumstances where the senior officer will, or may be expected to, engage in substantive discussions with foreign officials or be exposed to local information media the officer in question will be briefed by this Department in advance of his departure from Washington. (If time or space problems make it infeasible to fulfill this requirement, we propose in paragraph 3 below the alternative formula of a briefing by our appropriate diplomatic posts.) Furthermore, briefing materials prepared in DOD involving foreign policy or politico-military considerations should be coordinated with the Department of State to insure that the materials in question are consistent with established policy. We will also provide any supplementary briefing materials that may be appropriate.

3. In those circumstances where a senior DOD official contemplates discussions with foreign officials where issues of U.S. foreign policy may be anticipated to arise I recommend that we leave to the discretion of our Ambassador the utility of having a member of our mission staff in attendance. In those cases where we judge it advisable, the visiting DOD official will be briefed on his arrival by our local diplomatic mission. In such instances we would so advise DOD in giving our concurrence to specific visit requests as outlined in paragraph 1 above. In proposing this procedure, let me emphasize that our Embassies are at the disposal of visiting DOD officials, and I am confident that our diplomatic missions can, and will, provide useful supplemental guidance to support your senior proposal.

In addition to the foregoing, if you considered it desirable we would be prepared to make an officer from the Department of State available to accompany senior DOD officials abroad in selective instances. I would appreciate your views on this suggestion.

I am convinced that immediate adoption of points 1–3 above will materially strengthen our objective to have our foreign policy articulated in a consistent and coordinated manner by senior officials of the Executive Branch.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

334. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, April 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Reorganization of 7th Floor

In response to the Task Forces' recommendation, Messrs. Irwin, Johnson, Samuels, Eliot, Pedersen, Cargo and myself have examined the current 7th Floor organization. We wish to propose to you certain changes, based on some fundamental management concepts. None of the changes are intended to alter or impede in any way your present operational style.

The two fundamental principles that we would like to emphasize are (a) the collegiate approach to management, under your and the Under Secretary's direction and control, with the Under Secretary acting on your behalf, and (b) aggressive 7th Floor leadership of the Department and of the foreign affairs community through the use of modern management techniques of planning and evaluation.

Recommendations

1. We (except for the Under Secretary) strongly urge that the Under Secretary be given the title of Deputy Secretary to provide clearer evidence of his responsibilities, not only as your alter ego but as your principal deputy. The new title would also symbolize your reliance on the Deputy Secretary for insuring coordination of foreign affairs activities, including guidance to the Department and to other agencies in the allocation of resources. It should be noted that the second man in the new domestic departments will have the title of Deputy Secretary. This fact has led OMB to suggest that we also request a title change for the Department's Under Secretary.

The Under Secretary dissents from this recommendation feeling that no change in name is required for him to fulfill his functions, that he is reluctant to give up the tradition associated with the present name of the office, and that a change will simply cause confusion.

Regardless of title, we do recommend that the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) be responsible to you for the management of the Department's planning, evaluation and resources allocation processes,

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[1] Source: National Archives, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, 7th Floor Organization. No classification marking. Sent through U. Alexis Johnson.

and that the delegation of authority in these areas go through him to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

Approve (1) Title of Deputy Secretary[2]

or (2) Title of Under Secretary

Approve Recommendation

2. If you should approve the title of Deputy Secretary, then I would recommend that a new position at Level III entitled "The Permanent Under Secretary" be established in lieu of the present Under Secretary for Political Affairs. This change is recommended to reemphasize the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' position as the number three officer in the Department and to eliminate the confusion that the present title creates. Under normal circumstances, this position would be filled by a career officer whom we would consider the senior officer of the Foreign Service.

The Under Secretary has certain reservations about this recommendation. He feels that the new title would create new confusion with the present "Under Secretary" and that it could be interpreted as continuing the present imbalance between "political affairs" and "economic affairs" a balance which Recommendation 3 below is designed to redress.

Keep present title[3]

Change to new title

3. To reinforce Department leadership in economic matters, we recommend that a new position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs be established, assigning to it responsibility, within the Department, for: (1) coordination of foreign economic policies and programs, (2) representing the Department in your absence on the Board of the International Development Corporation and the International Development Institute, (3) chairing the Operations Group of the Council on International Economic Policy and (4) representing the Department in that Council in your absence. We recommend that these functions be assigned to the present Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs until such time as the position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs is established.[4]

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[2] Rogers initialed this option on May 18. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, approved July 13, 1972 (Public Law 92–352; 86 Stat. 490), created the position of Deputy Secretary of State to replace the Under Secretary of State.

[3] Rogers initialed this option on May 18.

[4] Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 created the permanent position of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the position of Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs was discontinued.

4. To give concrete support to the managerial role of the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) we recommend that the management functions (personnel, budget, evaluation and methods development), currently delegated directly to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, be delegated to him through the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary). We further recommend that the present title of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration be changed to Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Resource Allocation. This Deputy Under Secretary would exercise the Under Secretary's (Deputy Secretary's) responsibilities for allocation of the Department's resources, for evaluation of overseas programs and of the Department's domestic operations, for insuring that our new policy analysis and resource allocation system is operational and for providing management consulting services. He would also be available for other assignments as the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) may determine.[5]

5. OMB has urged us to reconsider our previous decision concerning the salary level of the Coordinator for Security Assistance. Our position to date has been that the responsibilities could be adequately and appropriately discharged by an officer at the Deputy Under Secretary level (Level IV). OMB maintains that in order to provide him with adequate "clout" he should be at the Under Secretary level (Level III). They also feel that this would be clear evidence of our desire to run an effective program. OMB also points out the Executive Directors of IDI, IDC and OPIC will be at Level III. Organizationally, we could live with another Level III officer although the rank might be somewhat overinflated. Regardless of the rank, the Coordinator would have supervisory responsibility for the new Economic Supporting Assistance Administration and for PM's activities in the military assistance area. The Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) would continue to be ultimately responsible within the Department for the general supervision of the security assistance program.

Approve Level III for Coordinator

Approve Level IV for Coordinator[6]

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[5] Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. In the margin he wrote: "Talk to me on this," which is crossed out. In returning the memorandum to Macomber, Eliot noted in his May 18 covering memorandum, which is attached, that Rogers wanted to talk to Macomber about Recommendation 4. The Department by administrative action changed the title of the position of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to Deputy Under Secretary for Management on July 12, 1971.

[6] Rogers initialed this option on May 18 but drew an arrow to indicate that he meant the other option, and this is confirmed in Eliot's covering memorandum.

6. To assist in linking resource allocation to policy analysis, in strengthening our long-range planning capability, in the coordination of foreign assistance programs, in the substantive support of the Under Secretaries Committee and the Operations Group of the CIEP, and in providing substantive staff analysis on issues raised with the seventh floor principals, we recommend that a policy analysis and resource allocation capability be added to and the economic analysis capabilities be strengthened in the Planning and Coordination Staff.[7]

7. To improve the Department's evaluation capability, we recommend that a Management Evaluation Group be created to evaluate the implementation of policies and programs both in the Department and overseas, including programs of other agencies for which you have a coordinating responsibility. Eventually, we would hope to amalgamate this Group with the Inspector General, Foreign Operations. This Group would report directly to the Under Secretary and where appropriate to the Secretary, although the Deputy Under Secretary for Management would be responsible for its day-to-day supervision (see recommendation 4).[8]

If you should approve the above recommendations, we will prepare the necessary implementing documents including the appropriate legislation for the establishment of new positions and for title changes. We believe that we should, at the same time, obtain legislative approval for some of the other appointment actions we have taken administratively. We should include in our legislative proposal specific authorization for Level IV appointment authority for the Executive Secretary, the Director General, the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, the Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs and the Coordinator for Oceanic Affairs.[9] We are requesting a Level IV position for the Director of PM in the Security Assistance legislation.

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[7] Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. Rogers announced the institution of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) system on July 6; see Document 336.

[8] Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. Rogers announced the formation of a new Management Evaluation Group on July 6; see Document 336.

[9] Rogers forwarded draft legislation to Shultz under cover of a July 31 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 10) Shultz responded in an October 28 letter to Macomber that OMB concurred with the proposals with the exception of Level IV appointment authority for several positions. (Ibid., Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, Seventh Floor Reorganization)

335. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Political Affairs (Peck) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, June 18, 1971.

Mr. Ambassador:

You may recall that you agreed to consider some thoughts on the subject of the Department's efforts to stay on top of what other agencies are doing in the field of foreign affairs. If my assumptions are correct, considerable improvement in our present situation is possible with the expenditure of relatively minimal—but relatively high level—effort.

Our coordination and control of what goes on must not be a reflection of narrow bureaucratic interests on our part. By the same token we are supposed to insure, to the extent practicable, that the actions of other agencies are equally consistent with our over-all policies. This can only be done if we know what is going on.

The Department's principal failing, it seems to me, is in the area of communication, itself the key to any effective effort to control and coordinate. We fail to remind our Embassies—and our desks—of what is expected of them, tell them how they are doing and what the problems are, and insure that they are keeping each other informed. These points are very closely inter-related, but a few examples may serve as illustrations of the general thesis.

Since the letter to the Ambassadors of December 9, 1969,[2] nothing has been done to refocus the attention of those concerned on the fact that it continues to be USG policy that the Ambassador is, indeed, in charge; this despite the long and growing list of transgressions (mostly by DOD; a few samples are attached). Our general policy seems to be to rely on other agencies to caution their own people, a highly questionable practice in terms of the observable results. Perhaps the most striking recent example was the *Westmoreland*/Ethiopia, *Enterprise*/Chile, homeporting/everywhere flap. The Secretary signed a letter of admonition to Mr. Laird,[3] urging him to set up a program designed to

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Memorandums of the Executive Secretariat, 1964–1976, Box 6, S/S–S Memos, April–Sept 1971, Vol. 3. Secret. Nicholas Platt (S/S) forwarded copies of the memorandum to James Dobbins (S/PC), Leonard Warren (PM), and William Berry (INR) under cover of a June 22 memorandum in which he indicated that Peck wanted their bureaus to look over the memorandum in anticipation of discussing it with them. (Ibid.)

[2] Document 310.

[3] Document 333.

lessen the possibility of further incidents of a similar nature, but to my knowledge none of our Embassies or desks (except for those directly involved) are even aware that there has been a series of serious problems or that we have tried to do anything about it. Under these circumstances, it would not be too surprising if the same sort of thing should happen again somewhere else.

In other and fairly frequent cases, where CAS and DOD appear to be the principal perpetrators, the crime consists of taking actions with a Chief of State, or the host government, without clearing with or even informing the Ambassador until after the fact, sometimes well after. The most recent examples involved [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Incidents of this nature generally result in a bleat from the Embassy concerned, followed by silence from this end. The problem appears to be at least partly the result of a lack of understanding by the Ambassador and/or members of his mission of the responsibilities with which the former is charged. To some extent, this may be caused by the relatively rapid personnel turnover and a failure to insure that new arrivals from other agencies are carefully instructed by us before they depart and carefully read in by the Ambassador when they get there.

A third category of problems stems from the tendency of many Ambassadors to take actions based on instructions received from military commands, or through attaché channels, without insuring that the Department is aware of what they have been asked to do. On occasion, the Embassies may even become involved in a struggle with the agency over the proposal in question, still without the knowledge of the Department. From a management point of view, this is almost as great an error as an approval.

As you no doubt are aware, the CIA has made good use of the lack of assertiveness that often occurs at the desk level. The technique involves casually mentioning a subject to an Ambassador and then telling the Department he has approved it. Neither party thought it was a very good idea at all—and neither one checked the other's views.

On the basis of the above, subjects with which you are quite familiar, I would like to make the following general recommendations. If you approve in principle, I propose to discuss the matter with S/PC, PM and INR, looking to them to generate the necessary paperwork. PM is already in basic agreement with this memo.

I. A letter (or a brief letter covering a memo) should be sent to each Ambassador, calling his attention—in general but unmistakable terms—to the fact that we have had a number of problems around the world of the kind mentioned above, requiring that specific steps be taken to improve and tighten control at the Embassy, and insure that the Department is kept better informed.

The letter should be signed by one of the principals and should, at the very least, indicate that the Secretary's wishes are behind it. Preferably, the Secretary would sign.

Approve[4]

Disapprove

Discuss

II. At the same time, the Secretary would address one of his full staff meetings on the subject, stressing the importance of the steps he wishes taken. The Assistant Secretaries should be instructed to insure that the people in their Bureaus are carefully advised as to what is to be done.

Approve

Disapprove[5]

Discuss

III. A meeting of all desk officers should be called, at which the same message would be put to them by a senior official (you can guess whom I have in mind). This would be in addition to the efforts by the Assistant Secretaries and would be intended to provide an indication of seventh floor interest. (JIG does not like this idea.)

IV. A program should be established to insure that all newly assigned Ambassadors, DCMs, Country Directors and Desk Officers are carefully instructed in their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis other agencies, in particular CIA and DOD. The briefings, to be given by S/PC and DDC on a regular and continuing basis, would point out the dangers and pitfalls and would draw on incidents in other countries as specific examples. The same general procedure should be followed by us with regard to individuals from those agencies prior to departure for posts abroad, and after they arrive.

Approve[6]

Disapprove

Discuss

Two final points. It is recognized that many of our officers do not need to be reminded of their authority; others will not make real use of

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[4] Johnson initialed his approval.

[5] Johnson initialed his approval and wrote in the margin: "This can be done at U staff mtg."

[6] Johnson initialed his approval.

it despite reminders. To the extent that those who fall between these extremes are moved to action, the purpose of this exercise will have been achieved. Further, there is no intention to get involved in a major confrontation with the other agencies. I would foresee a non-contentious series of papers and actions resulting from the deliberations.

ELP

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336. Editorial Note

In a press release issued on July 6, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers announced "a reorganization of the Department's top echelon—the 'Seventh Floor'—involving changes in the responsibilities of the Under Secretary and other key senior officials. At the same time, the Secretary announced the introduction of a new management system on the Seventh Floor and at the level of Assistant Secretaries which makes use of Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) and other modern management concepts. The Secretary also announced further extensive changes in the system of recruitment and administration of Foreign Service personnel." That same day the Department released the text of William Macomber's 180-day progress report on management reform in the Department, which spelled out in greater detail the changes approved by Rogers in Document 334 and other reforms recommended by the Department's task forces. The report noted that the reforms, "while wide-ranging and profound in their effect, do not constitute a drastic reorganization of the Department of State. Rather they are practical measures intended not to change the structure, which is basically sound, but to change attitudes and practices to make that structure work more effectively." For text of the press release and the report, see Department of State *Bulletin,* July 26, 1971, pages 103–109; copies are also in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, ORG 10, Management Improvement, 1971. Copies of the Department's Management Reform Bulletin, which appeared regularly during 1971 to keep Department personnel informed of changes, are ibid., Management Reform Bulletins. On January 26, 1972, Macomber delivered "an anniversary report" on the Department's management reform program. A copy is ibid., Manpower Utilization Report, July–December 1971; the report was also printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* February 14, 1972, pages 206–212. Documentation on implementing the task force recommendations is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394.

337. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, September 20, 1971.

Dear Alex:

I agree completely with the point made in your 2 August letter to me that all U.S. Government activities and organizations abroad coming under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Mission must be responsive to the direction and supervision of the Ambassador.[2] I also agree that the Ambassador must be kept fully informed of all activities having policy implications. As you know, applicable DOD directives and terms of reference governing the MAAG's clearly stipulate the status of the MAAG's in the U.S. Mission and the responsibilities of the Chief of the MAAG to the Ambassador. MAAG Chiefs are, of course, also responsible to the Secretary of Defense because of the responsibilities assigned to him by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. They are, as well, under the military command of the Commanders of the Unified Command to which the MAAG is assigned.

While I understand your desire "to ensure that the Chief of Mission has access to all communications to or originated by subordinate DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission," I believe the procedures you suggest to accomplish this objective are unnecessarily restrictive.[3] I suggest, instead, that communications procedures be modified to require that all significant messages having policy implications to or from subordinate in-country DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission include the applicable U.S. Embassy as an information addressee. I am sure you will agree that routine administrative and technical traffic concerning spare parts, personnel accounting, etc., can be exempted from this requirement. This would give full effect to the President's directive that Ambassadors have "the right to be kept informed . . . of all the information or recommendations reported by an element of the Mission,"[4]

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Confidential.

[2] In his August 2 letter, (ibid.) Johnson stated that he had "been struck over the past several months by the number of misunderstandings between individuals in the field assigned to Diplomatic Missions and Ambassadors over the position of these people in the Diplomatic Mission and their responsibilities to the Ambassador. Some of these cases involved contravention of relationships which were established by President Nixon's letter of December 9, 1969, to Chiefs of Mission" (Document 310).

[3] Johnson proposed dispatching a joint message that established procedures "to ensure that the Chief of Mission has access to all communications to or originated by subordinate DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1)

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

without vitiating the Secretary's statutory responsibilities for Military Assistance and Sales, or command relationships between the MAAG Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the Unified Commanders. Attached is a redraft of your proposed Joint State/Defense message which reflects these suggestions.[5]

We in the Department of Defense believe that the basic organizational relationships between the MAAG's, the DAO's, and our Diplomatic Missions are sound and have been working effectively for some years. I was, therefore, very concerned to learn that there have been misunderstandings between individuals assigned to Diplomatic Missions and their Ambassadors. I would appreciate it if you could send me the details of these incidents so that I can see that corrective action is taken.

Sincerely,

Dave

[5] Not printed.

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338. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel, Department of State (Thomas) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)[1]

Washington, October 20, 1971.

REFORM OF THE ROLE OF FOREIGN SERVICE WIVES

It has become increasingly clear in the past few years that a reform is urgently needed in the treatment of Foreign Service wives. No question before the Open Forum Panel has been more controversial; none has drawn consistently greater attendance at Panel meetings. Few problems have had a more negative effect on morale. The treatment of wives is repeatedly mentioned by resignees as one cause for leaving the Foreign Service.

The Task Forces, recognizing this problem, recommended that guidelines be established for the role of Foreign Service wives, intend-

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: Special—Policy on Role or Wives. No classification marking. Thomas was a Foreign Service officer who had served in several Latin American countries.

ing that the issue be given the closest scrutiny, and that a genuine reform be carried out. Management Reform Bulletin #20[2] is not a satisfactory response to that challenge. That document has been the cause of considerable commentary and controversy, almost all of it negative.

In fairness to the Foreign Service wives who drafted the guidelines, they never intended for them to be used as a Management Reform Bulletin. The guidelines do contain several controversial statements, and thus have served to stimulate discussion of the problem. However, as a statement of *official* State Department policy, MRB #20 is considered by a great many wives (and their husbands) to be highly objectionable. As a *reform* bulletin, it is woefully inadequate—it reforms nothing.

The modern Foreign Service wife is increasingly well educated, more inclined to have career interests of her own, and often unwilling to see her fulfillment solely in "wifely" pursuits. Conscious of her changing role in society, and of the progress her fellow women are making toward achieving equality and human dignity, she is unwilling to accept second class status or interference in her private life.

Yet while the world has changed, and while Foreign Service wives have changed, the Foreign Service too often appears wedded to 19th century attitudes towards wives. In too many cases, the Foreign Service wife is subjected to excessive demands on her time and energy; to pressure, bordering on harassment; to involvement in projects not of her own choosing; to unwarranted invasions of her private life; to unnecessary restrictions on her right to pursue her career or academic interests; to fears that the pursuit of her own interests will harm her husband's career; and perhaps worst of all, to a caste system which grants to wives of senior officers the right to dictate to the wives of employees of lesser rank.

These things do not occur at every post, nor do they affect every wife. On the contrary, most Foreign Service wives enjoy their tours abroad and enjoy taking part in their husbands' activities. However, the pattern of abuse is widespread enough to demand that vigorous steps be taken to bring these practices to a halt.

There will be those who argue that reforming the role of wives violates Foreign Service traditions. It is important to remember, however, that such a reform would be in keeping with a long-forgotten tradition established by Jefferson and Franklin: that the style of American diplomacy should conform to the ideals of our nation. Certainly our treatment of wives in the Foreign Service no longer conforms to our present concepts of democracy, equity and social justice. In fact, treatment of wives at some posts makes a Foreign Service career appear unattractive,

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[2] A copy is ibid.

and adversely affects our ability to recruit and hold the most talented personnel.

In the past year, a great deal has been accomplished to improve the lot of women employees of the Department. We firmly believe that at least as great an effort, involving nothing less than your strong personal intervention, is needed to redress the balance and give equal justice to the women who have married into the Foreign Service.

Several steps will be required to bring about these changes. By far the most important requirement is that a message be sent to the field which spells out the Department's new policy on wives. (A proposed airgram, drafted by Panel members and Foreign Service wives is attached.)[3] The message can be so cast that it supersedes MRB #20 without having to repudiate it openly. Such a message would not solve the problem—we have no such illusions. But it would be a signal to all concerned that drastic changes are called for, and that wives are free to lead their own lives without fear that their husband's careers will suffer. Such a message would be worthless, of course, without a commitment on the part of the Department to ensure that the changes are enforced.

We believe it would be a serious loss if the feelings of common effort and cooperation of our Foreign Service personnel and their wives were somehow lost. There appears little risk that the American traditions of good neighborliness, community spirit and service to their country will be undermined by this message. However, excessive caveats and amendments to a firm policy statement may be misinterpreted as loopholes which justify the continuation of undesirable practices. These practices, which you have characterized as feudal, are a greater threat to the spirit of cooperation than any message forbidding those practices could ever be.

We hope you will sign the attached airgram, and that you would be willing to "follow up" at some appropriate occasion with a few remarks, publicized in the *Newsletter,* which would emphasize the seriousness with which the Department views this question. We would also urge that changes be made in the Foreign Service regulations, efficiency reports, inspectors' reports, grievance procedures, protocol guidelines, etc., in order to bring them in line with the new policy. If you would like to discuss this further with us, we would be pleased to meet you at your convenience.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached airgram.

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[3] Not attached; see Document 341.

339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Department of State Task Force VII Committee (Petrow) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Macomber)[1]

Washington, December 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Findings of Task Force Chairmen

The following represents a consensus of the views of the Task Force Chairmen. It is a summary of their findings during their week-long inquiry in the Department and of their recommendations for the future.

I. Findings

A. The first and the most important thing to report is our satisfaction with the very large measure of progress which has been achieved in carrying out the recommendations of the task forces. This is a real tribute to your leadership; you can be proud of what has been accomplished to date. Ten years from now it is possible that we will look back on the establishment of the PARA and the new management evaluation organization as landmarks in the history of the Department, comparable in importance with the reorganization which resulted from the recommendations of the first Hoover Commission.

We also found that there had been major innovative accomplishments on the personnel side. The provision of more assured tenure for Classes 5 to 3, the junior threshold review procedure, the establishment of the Foreign Affairs Specialist Service (even though it is temporarily stymied in the courts), and the measures designed to bring about improved personnel management and are all important achievements. In short, this is an outstanding record, and one which we believe is inadequately understood and appreciated throughout the Service. It would probably have been even better if the budgetary stringencies resulting from the President's economic program had not intervened.

B. Our second major finding is that, although much still remains to be done in carrying out the recommendations of the task forces, the Department's ability to make further progress, particularly in the important fields of creativity and openness, is being seriously hindered

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Management Reform—Task Force Chairman's Meeting—Report. Confidential; Eyes Only. The 13 Task Force chairmen convened in Washington December 13–17 to be briefed on implementation of the Task Force recommendations and to provide their evaluation of the progress so far and their advice on handling outstanding issues. (Memorandum from Robert Steven to Macomber, October 8; ibid., MR: TF Chairmen's Meeting, December 13–17, 1971)

by a crisis of confidence among its personnel. Some of us were more alarmed about this than others, but all of us believe that it is the most serious problem facing management today. Many officers in the Department, including some occupying key positions, are experiencing agonizing doubts about the role of the Department and the Foreign Service in the management of our foreign affairs. They believe that the highest levels of administration there is a loss of faith in the discretion and discipline of the Service which has led to what appears to be a conscious decision to exclude the Department from more and more of the important work being done in the management of our foreign policy.

This loss of faith in the Department, which has been openly reported in the press, is attributed in part to the rash of press leaks, many of which the Department is suspected of being responsible for. Evidence of the Administration's decision to rely less and less on the Department is seen in such things as Ambassador David Kennedy's practice of negotiating important textile agreements with Asian countries without bringing FE or our embassies into his confidence, or the fact that Ambassador William Eberle, the President's Special Trade Representative, on at least one occasion dealt directly with foreign officials abroad without going through our Embassy. Nor surprisingly, all this has led to a defensive reaction on the part of many officers in the Department that the loss of faith in them is unjustified and that the Department has been inadequately supported and defended by it leaders.

The sense of malaise in the Department has been exacerbated by the turbulence caused by the labor management dispute and the attack against selection out which has culminated in the effort to block the confirmation of Howard Mace. The resulting decline of morale has had the effect of lessening officers' interests in and support for the reform program. People are discouraged about the future of the system and their place in it, and this has deprived them of the incentive to support further reforms. There is also some evidence that management's justifiable concern about leaks has damaged the climate for openness and creativity in the Department. Many officers feel that, because of the danger of leaks, the Department's leadership actually wishes to discourage independent thinking and discussion. If this feeling should become widespread, we believe that it could seriously damage the effectiveness of the Department. Needless to say, it would also block further progress in carrying out the task force recommendations on creativity and openness.

C. One of the principal purposes of the management reform program is to strengthen the role of the Department in the coordination of foreign policy. Our third major finding is that the ability of the Ambassador to carry out his responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government in the country to which he is assigned is being seri-

ously impaired by the constantly declining ratio of State Department personnel to personnel of other agencies abroad. The continued proliferation of representation abroad by other agencies has been accompanied by a significant reduction of State Department personnel resulting from the fact that, unlike the other agencies, the Department has been taking the BALPA and OPRED cuts across the board in the field. In some posts, the proportion of State Department personnel has fallen so low that the Ambassador finds it difficult to maintain control over the operations of other agencies. Our concern at this development was heightened by reports such as the one that the FBI was seeking to acquire an independent communications system for its representative in Beirut.

II. Recommendations

A. Looking ahead, we concluded that, before you could reasonably hope to give the reform program a new impetus, something would have to be done to deal with the crisis of confidence from which the Department is suffering. We had no particular remedies to propose beyond a frank discussion with the Secretary at his lunch for us: the primary responsibility for dealing with this problem lies with the Secretary.

B. Assuming that the Secretary succeeds in restoring a much needed sense of confidence in the Department, we believe that a good case can be made for creating some kind of permanent institution to assist you in mobilizing support within the Service for the management reform program and for backing you up in your often lonely and beleaguered fight to keep the program going. We have in mind a kind of blue ribbon advisory panel of Department and Foreign Service officers, preferably not drawn to any significant degree from among the task force chairmen. Such a group could not only lend you visible support, it could also serve as a channel of communication between you and the rank and file. This group could also serve as a source of new ideas. The Department, like the world outside, is constantly changing, and the agenda of reform is in need of periodic renewal. A permanent advisory panel on management reform could well act as the initiator of new proposals for reform.

We concluded that it would also be helpful in restoring and maintaining the program's momentum if you had a more effective mechanism for following through on decisions implementing task force recommendations than you now have. We think it might be desirable for you to have someone on your staff working full time on the reform program. Ideally, this should be an officer with sufficient rank to command access to senior departmental officers. This is in no way a reflection on Bob Stevens, who in the time he has available for task force work has been doing a most effective job.

C. Finally, we recommend that any future cuts in State Department personnel be taken, to the maximum possible extent, in Washington rather than in the field in order to prevent the further withering away of the Department's strength relative to that of other agencies in the field.

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340. Editorial Note

During a conversation in the Oval Office on January 18, 1972, President Nixon and George Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, both expressed concern about and criticism of the Department of State and Secretary of State Rogers' leadership. A selection of their comments, taken from different points of the conversation, appears below. The comments were made during a discussion of Senator Warren Magnuson's Export Expansion Bill, which proposed to transfer the commercial and economic responsibilities of the Foreign Service to the Department of Commerce. For excerpts from the discussion of the Magnuson Bill, see Document 380.

Shultz began by saying "I certainly have the feeling that the State Department is in a very fragile and serious state and it needs a, it needs a strong and fresh hand in there in the second term I think, 'cause it seems to me anyway—I'm not here or the expert on this—but it seems to me that you need a State Department that's good in order to do the work, and they have lots of talented people but they're not, just not being used and it's hard to get at them and use them effectively."

President Nixon then added that "the trouble with the State Department people is they lack guts, principle and, frankly, knowledge, in the fields that really amount to anything," and argued that the problem was only exacerbated by the fact that Rogers "just constantly defends the god-damned Department, and he says nothing is wrong. Well, the Department is not always right. The Department's in a hell of a shape." He continued: "The problem that we have here is that Bill has made a fatal error in terms of his own place as Secretary of State. He has pandered so much to be liked by his colleagues at the State Department that the State Department runs him rather than his running the State Department. He has pandered so much to be liked by the press that cover the State Department that the press runs him rather than [he] them. Now the net result of all this—if you were to ask people of the State Department and the people of the press who cover the State Department, 'Do you like Bill Rogers?' he'd get about 90 percent. If, on the other hand, you were to poll the country in terms, 'Do you know Rogers the Secretary of State—who he is—or, do you consider

him a strong Secretary of State?' you might get 30. Now, that's a tragedy, a tragedy 'cause the man's so able."

Later in the conversation, Nixon told Shultz that the "Kissinger operation, in view of my own lack of confidence in the State Department FSOs, has been indispensable to me, and of course very helpful." But he added that the Kissinger operation has also been "very detrimental to State and detrimental many times needlessly so," adding that "Henry says Bill is dumb—not smart. He is wrong. Bill is smart as hell. Bill is not a clown." Nixon also pointed out that while both he and Kissinger distrusted the State Department, what distinguished his views of the Department from that of Kissinger's was that Nixon had "much more suspicion of them and much more contempt for them than he has. He's one of them in a sense. He has great respect for their liberal background and training."

Schultz concluded by saying: "They don't realize that under [Rogers'] leadership, the Department has fallen into total disrepair and that is I think, that's the problem in the long run, and maybe it ought to be allowed to just disintegrate, but I think that if we don't have a State Department we have to invent one." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 650–12) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

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341. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts[1]

A–728 Washington, January 22, 1972, 9:05 a.m.

Subject: Policy on Wives of Foreign Service Employees. The Department believes that the tradition of husband and wife teams and of wives' participation in the representational activities of a post has been one of the major strengths of the Foreign Service. It is convinced that the great majority of married couples in the Foreign Service have welcomed this unique opportunity to work together and to contribute together towards the attainment of the objectives of the Service and of the U.S. Government.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PER 1. Joint message from State, AID, and USIA. Drafted on January 12 by the Open Forum Panel, Macomber, Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom, and Director General of the Foreign Service William Hall, concurred in by USIA and AID, and approved by Macomber. Unclassified.

If this tradition is to continue and be strengthened there must be a recognition that participation by a Foreign Service wife in the work of a post is a voluntary act of a private person, not a legal obligation which can be imposed by any Foreign Service official or his wife.

From its inception under Jefferson and Franklin, a basic principle of American diplomatic practice has been that our style of diplomacy must be representative of our way of life. In the past few years, rapid changes in American society have provided wider roles for women than were traditionally available. Women have gained increasing recognition of their right to be treated as individuals and to have personal and career interests in addition to their more traditional roles as wife or mother. If the Foreign Service is to remain representative of American society, and if its traditions are to be preserved and strengthened, the Foreign Service must adapt to these changing conditions. Recently these changes in American society have resulted in a growing attention to the role of a Foreign Service wife abroad. To some extent, this has been heightened by occasional but serious abuses in which requirements have been levied on some wives which are today considered unnecessary and demeaning.

The attached policy statement is designed to eliminate these occasional abuses which have occured in the past, and more importantly to permit wives to choose for themselves the roles they wish to follow. It is not intended to undermine the sense of cooperation, participation and community spirit abroad or the tradition of response by Foreign Service communities to special and emergency situations which arise. On the contrary, the Department believes that emphasizing the voluntary nature of wives' contributions will strengthen and enhance the traditions of cooperation and common purpose which have characterized Foreign Service life.

It should also be emphasized that this policy statement is in no way intended to criticize the past actions of any group of employees or their dependents, nor is it designed to pass judgment on the relative merits of various roles which Foreign Service wives may wish to play. The Foreign Service can benefit when wives follow the traditional role of Foreign Service wives, but it also can benefit when wives pursue other interests, be they academic, professional, family or avocational which are not in conflict with the appropriate conduct of diplomats in a foreign country.

Rogers

Attachment

POLICY ON WIVES OF FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The following is U.S. Government policy regarding wives of Foreign Service employees. This policy applies as well to male spouses and other dependents of Foreign Service employees. Copies of this instruction should be made available to all employees and their dependents. Ambassadors and Principal officers are asked to insure that this policy is observed and that all concerned understand the voluntary character of wives' participation on which it rests:

1. The wife of a Foreign Service employee who has accompanied her husband to a foreign post is a private individual; she is not a Government employee. The Foreign Service, therefore, has no right to levy any duties upon her. It can only require that she comport herself in a manner which will not reflect discredit on the United States.

2. Foreign Service Officers have broadly defined representational responsibilities overseas. These are an integral part of their job, and they are expected to lead generally active social lives. An officer is not relieved of such responsibilities if his wife chooses not to assist him in carrying them out. However, the U.S. Government has no right to insist that a wife assume representational burdens. Each wife must decide the extent to which she wants to participate as a partner in this aspect of her husband's job. She is free to follow her own interests (subject only to the laws and regulations of the host country and the U.S. Government).

3. Many wives may want to engage abroad, as they do at home, in charitable activities. In doing so they not only help others less fortunate than themselves, but often contribute favorably to the image of the U.S. abroad. However, a wife's participation in charitable activities must be truly voluntary. Which particular charity, if any, and the extent of her involvement is a decision for the wife alone to make.

This applies also to wives' participation in activities such as binational organizations, clubs and "in-house" social gatherings which are often worthwhile, contribute to morale and the effective functioning of the post, and thus benefit the Foreign Service. Many wives enjoy these activities, provided they are not viewed as requirements. Some do not and are not required to engage in them.

4. Although membership in a diplomatic community and the requirements of protocol inevitably involve considerations of rank and precedence in dealing with people outside the post, this does not grant to any wife authority over, or responsibility for, the wives of other employees. The American tradition of neighborliness, personal courtesy and mutual concern is the appropriate way to be helpful and friendly without assuming a superior-subordinate relationship.

5. Mention of wives' participation or lack thereof in the types of activities discussed in this instruction may not be made in performance evaluation reports, Inspectors' efficiency reports, or training evalua-

tions. Every rating and reviewing officer has the responsibility of insuring that employees' ratings are not affected by such considerations. However, should violations of this policy occur, remedial action will be taken.[2]

6. The Department, USIA, and AID are instituting careful review of their regulations and guidelines to insure that they conform with these principles. Posts are instructed to review their own programs and guidelines to insure conformity with this instruction. These Agencies are confident that this policy statement will receive the support and cooperation of all concerned. If violations do occur, every effort should be made to resolve them at post. However, if after such an effort is made, they cannot be resolved in the field, they should be brought to the attention of the Director General for the Department of State, Office of Personnel and Manpower for AID, and the Assistant Director for Personnel and Training for USIA. Complaints of abuse will be handled on a confidential basis.

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[2] In a June 20 memorandum to Macomber's Special Assistant, Robert Stevens, Olmsted questioned a recent note by Steven stating that comments on the performance of a Foreign Service officer's wife contained in a memorandum (not in the performance evaluation report itself) could be placed in an FSO's performance dossier. Olmsted called the practice "a travesty" on the official policy. (Ibid., Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394) In a June 26 memorandum to Macomber, Steven noted that during sessions with the Open Forum it was explicitly agreed that informal memoranda and letters concerning wives could appear in the official performance folders that went before selection panels, but in hindsight he thought Olmsted was probably right. He proposed a prohibition on all references to wives' activities, informal as well as formal, in official performance files, but Macomber did not sign and send forward a memorandum implementing the new policy. (Ibid.)

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342. Editorial Note

During a conversation between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers in the Oval Office on March 7, 1972, the following exchange took place:

Rogers: "I think I should say too that one of the problems I have now with diplomats is that they don't really think it counts. They don't—"

President: "Well we've got to change that, got to change that."

Rogers: "So they want to come to the White House—and you can see that in all the traffic—they say this doesn't make any difference what Rogers says or the State Department, and that's important because it hurts our ability to conduct foreign affairs." National Archives,

Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Rogers, March 7, 1972, Oval Office Conversation No. 679–15. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

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343. Editorial Note

In March 1972, the Department of State issued *United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State.* The 621-page volume, Secretary Rogers' second annual report to the Congress, sought to provide a comprehensive record of how U.S. foreign policy was implemented during 1971. Included was a chapter on management that focused on implementation of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation system:

"The long and difficult effort to develop a system for policy analysis and review, linking U.S. interests and objectives with available resources, culminated in 1971 in the establishment of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) system. Systems of this type are not new. The Department's problem has been to adapt the tools which such a system provides to the area of foreign policy, so much of which cannot be 'quantified' and so much of which depends on judgment and incomplete information. We believe, however, that we have the beginnings of such a system in PARA.

"During the year a number of specific PARA actions were taken:

"1. Under the aegis of the Secretary, the Under Secretary and other Department principals began to conduct a cycle of annual policy reviews for major areas of the world. The objective has been to look beyond current operational problems toward the general lines of policy we should follow over the next five years and the programs and activities required for the support of these policies.

"—Some of the reviews of the past year have been concerned with U.S.-Canadian relations, U.S. policy toward the Andean countries, the implications of U.S. energy policy for U.S. foreign relations over the next decade, U.S. relations with north Africa, and U.S. policy toward certain countries in East Asia and western Europe. These reviews have permitted the leadership of the Department to consider issues which might not normally have been brought to its attention. They also enabled the Assistant Secretaries to present their views on long-range policy issues to the Department's leadership in a more systematic manner. Increasingly, Ambassadors will be invited to participate to insure that the views of the Embassies and the country teams will be fully taken into account.

"—With the pattern now set, we expect in the coming months to achieve comprehensive coverage by the PARA system, improve our analytical techniques, relate policy objectives to the various resource allocation processes, and further develop regional and subregional policy frameworks within which the individual country PARA's will be formulated.

"2. The country PARA review system is based on an annual document prepared jointly by the Department and the Embassy's country team. After the paper has been reviewed at staff level by an informal interagency working group, it is referred to the Department's leadership. An 'issues' paper is prepared by the Secretary's Planning and Coordination staff, which becomes the agenda for the review session chaired by the Under Secretary or another of the Department's principals. The development of the 'issues' paper injects the 'adversary' role into the decision-making process, as recommended by the task forces on *Diplomacy for the 70's.* After the review session, a guidance memorandum is prepared establishing the Department's position. The PARA document is then reviewed by an assistant secretary level interdepartmental group which approves the U.S. Government position on the various issues raised. This interagency group is part of the National Security Council mechanism. If the agencies cannot reach agreement, the matter is referred to higher levels, such as the NSC Under Secretary's committee.

"—The PARA process provides the opportunity for cyclical reviews of bilateral, regional, and global issues, and establishes systematic and cumulative policy dialogues between the country team and the Washington agencies on major policy issues.

"—During the past year, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs completed another programming cycle, involving consideration of a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), a review of this document by the National Security Council (NSC) Interdepartmental Group for Latin America, and the adoption of policy positions and programs. The Bureau of African Affairs also completed a cycle of policy reviews and approval by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Both the Bureaus of European Affairs and East Asian Affairs prepared documents for a selected group of countries in these regions, as an initial step toward a comprehensive 1972 cycle.

"—A new programming system for security assistance was developed, designed to coordinate the Military Assistance and Supporting Assistance Programs and to relate them to U.S. interests and objectives.

"—These new developments were, of course, in addition to the existing programming processes of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program.

"3. In addition to the regional, functional, and country PARA process, the Department has established a formal series of special pol-

icy studies as requested by the Department's leadership. These special studies concern issues in such areas as U.S. policy in Asia, U.S. policy toward the enlarged European Community, the future scope and focus of educational and cultural policies and programs, international science and technology programs, and the prospective role and evolution of international economic organizations. After the completion of each study, a review session chaired by one of the Department's principals is held and a position is formulated on the issues raised.

"4. Each of the reviews, whether they concern bilateral, regional, or functional issues result in a decision-guidance memorandum, signed by the principal who chaired the review session. In some instances, these reviews also result in communications from the Secretary to the President, expressing his views on the examined issue.

"The specific details of the PARA process may undergo changes as the Department improves its techniques. However, the central objectives have been established and will continue to govern:

"In Washington:

"—To assist in the early identification of emerging issues and their orderly analysis and review.

"—To assist in linking policy and resources allocation, insuring that resource requirements are taken into consideration in decisions and that allocations are consonant with U.S. interests and their priorities.

"—To provide the supporting rationale and data base for the Department's funding and personnel requests in the budget/appropriation process.

"—To facilitate Department policy and resource allocation guidance for the overseas programs and operations of other agencies, especially in the foreign affairs area.

"—To support the Department's in-house policy planning process.

"In the field:

—To encourage country teams, under the Ambassador's leadership, to periodically reassess the U.S. role in the host country.

—To provide the basis for coordinated submission of foreign affairs programs and budgets by State and other agencies represented at a post, through a single integrated presentation of the proposed programs and activities, relating objectives and resource requirements." (Ibid., pages 387–390)

In connection with the implementation of PARA, Under Secretary of State Irwin established a series of policy study memoranda (PASMs) and a complementary series of decision memoranda (PADMs). Copies of PASM 1 through PASM 16, dated October 15, 1971, through December 12, 1972, are in the Department of State, S/S–I Files: Lot 82 D 126, PASMs. Copies of PADM 1 through 62, dated September 13, 1971, through March 6, 1973, are ibid., PADMs. The PADMs consist of memoranda from Irwin summarizing the conclusions of PARA reviews

conducted either of policies toward specific countries and regions or of the performance of bureaus. Files on PARA review meetings, including agendas, issue papers, background papers, and memoranda, are ibid., Lot 83 D 113. The Department also contracted with the Social Sciences Department of the Bendix Corporation to perform an evaluation of PARA. In July 1972 Bendix submitted its final report, entitled "PARA: Process, Problems and Potential." A copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF XIII, PARA. In his Annual Management Report for fiscal year 1972, submitted to the Office of Management and Budget on September 19, 1972, Deputy Under Secretary for Management Macomber called PARA "perhaps the most pervasive of the changes we have made in the way we do our work." He described the progress made in implementing the system and outlined "priority improvement projects" needed to refine and further develop PARA. (Ibid., Macomber Files: Lot 73 D 421, ORG 10) In *United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), which was presented to Congress on April 19, 1973, Rogers once again devoted a significant portion of his discussion of management to PARA, describing the results of the first PARA cycle as completed in 1972. (pages 229–233)

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344. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird[1]

Washington, May 18, 1972.

Dear Mel:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of instructions[2] that I have directed be sent to all of our diplomatic posts, clarifying the question of the responsibilities of our Ambassadors for the military components of our diplomatic missions overseas.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Pickering, Deputy Director of PM, on May 8 and redrafted by Johnson on May 15. Cleared by Springsteen, Moore, Green, Sisco, Meyer, and Nelson.

[2] Attached but not printed.

There has been some recent misunderstanding at the working levels of the Department of Defense, and among some of the personnel of our missions, about the relationship between Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Service Attachés and our Ambassadors. The fact that President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961,[3] regarding Ambassadorial responsibilities explicitly mentioned these military elements as subordinate to the Ambassadors, and that President Nixon's letter of December 9, 1969,[4] dealt with this subject in lesser detail seems to have led to the false conclusion on the part of some that there was a deliberate, though unstated, intent to change the traditional relationships.[5]

Having participated in the drafting of the President's letter of December 9, 1969, I know that the intent was quite the opposite and that it was felt that it was not necessary specifically to mention Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Service Attachés, because they were so clearly not "military forces under the command of the United States area military commander."

Apart from whatever channels of communication and responsibility DOD desires to establish with MAAGs with respect to DOD responsibilities, MAAGs, and similar elements of our diplomatic missions, are obviously so closely related to the conduct of our foreign relations that they must continue to be a part of our diplomatic missions and responsible to the Chiefs of Mission. This is also required by my own statutory responsibilities for providing "continuous supervision and general direction" of military assistance programs.

I would appreciate your bringing this letter to the attention of the concerned areas of the Department of Defense.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Bill

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[3] For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961,* pp. 1345–1347.

[4] Document 310.

[5] In a May 9 memorandum to Rogers, Spiers stated that "while we understand informally that there is some difference of view within the Department of Defense, one apparently increasingly predominant view does contend that the MAAGs are not subject to Ambassadorial control" and that the difference arises over the interpretation of Rogers' letter of December 9, 1969. Spiers added that "the issue has arisen enough times to as to make difficult State–Defense relations on a number of points, such as who sends instructions to the field on policy questions dealing with the MAAGs, what channels of communication are to be used, and whose clearance is required." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1)

345. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, June 2, 1972.

Dear Bill:

With regard to your letter of May 18,[2] I feel that the overall coordination between our departments concerning the functioning of the military elements of our diplomatic missions overseas is progressing well.

I further consider that the guidance contained in the President's letter of December 9, 1969 to the Ambassadors[3] is clear and is fully understood within the Department of Defense. The role of the Ambassador as the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission and the relationship between him and the various elements of his mission are clearly laid out in that letter and should not be the cause of any confusion either in Washington or overseas. I am pleased to note that the first responses from the ambassadors to your circular message indicate that relationships within the country teams are both amicable and effective.

As you mentioned in your letter, I continue to require a direct channel of communication and line of responsibility with the MAAGs and similar organizations in the missions in order to carry out my statutory responsibilities. I do not feel that this requirement conflicts with the authorities and responsibilities of the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions.

My staff will continue to coordinate closely with yours in these responsibilities of mutual concern. I would appreciate your bringing any specific problems in this regard to my attention. With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Melvin R. Laird

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Confidential.

[2] Document 344.

[3] Document 310.

346. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Macomber) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Richardson)[1]

Washington, September 20, 1972.

The Management Reform Task Forces which produced *Diplomacy for the '70's*[2] placed a great deal of emphasis on the need to stimulate creativity in the Department and Foreign Service, and to improve the atmosphere for openness in the foreign affairs community as a whole. Certain specific recommendations were identified as Action Program Items 464 through 474. For a variety of reasons, we have not been able to make as much progress in this area as in other areas of the Task Force recommendations.

All during 1971 members of my staff worked with the Public Affairs Bureau, with the Open Forum Panel, with S/PC, and other offices in an effort to develop new regulations and guidelines in the general area of expression of individual views both "in-house" and publicly. Some of these efforts were successful, i.e., the "Dissent Channel,"[3] and the Policy on Wives of Foreign Service employees. But in other important areas, we simply could not move. Bill Blair will recall much of the background of this, as P was centrally involved in much of the discussion.

I am writing to ask you to take another look at this concern of the Task Forces over the state of creativity and openness in the Department and Foreign Service. My hopes have been re-stimulated by the experience of EUR with its self-initiated series of EUROPOLICY papers, which permits individual employees to present new ideas to their colleagues in a responsible, disciplined, serious channel. We have seen four of these papers so far, all classified; I would expect that eventually EUR may come up with some worthwhile effort which may not need classification. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no leaks, no frivolous demands for "publication," and no strain on our resources. It seems to me that EUR on its own has implemented at least

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF IX, Openness. No classification marking. Drafted by Steven, and sent through S/S. A copy was sent to EUR. Printed from a copy that indicates Macomber signed the original.

[2] See Document 312.

[3] Procedures by which officers at posts abroad could submit dissenting views on policy to the Department were specified in Management Reform Bulletin No. 9, February 23, 1971; telegram 201473, November 4, 1971; and airgram A–3559, April 8, 1972. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF IX, Openness)

one of the Task Force recommendations which caused considerable concern last year, without provoking the dire results forecast in some quarters.

Please have the appropriate people in P get in touch with EUR's Policy Planning Staff, which is running this effort, to make an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages which might be expected if we applied the idea at the Department-wide level.[4] Unless there are overwhelming objections to this effort, I hope you can give me some recommendations perhaps by the end of October on where we might place responsibility for development and coordination of this and related programs suggested in Action Program items 464–474, and an idea of the resources we might need to commit in man-hours and money.[5]

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[4] Handwritten next to this sentence is "not done 1/31/73."

[5] Handwritten next to this sentence is "not done 1/31/73."

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347. Editorial Note

On the day of his re-election as President, November 7, 1972, Nixon had a long discussion with his Assistant H.R. Haldeman about changes in administration personnel for the second term. "His feeling is that he's ambivalent—to a degree at least—about Rogers, whether he will keep him or not, although he realizes that he shouldn't," Haldeman noted in his diary entry for November 7. "Doesn't really know what he wants to do at State, if he does let Rogers go." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Two days later Haldeman had dinner with John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger and, according to Haldeman's diary entry for November 9, "we went through the whole question of State and Defense and foreign policy with Henry. It comes down to his general agreement that we should go ahead with [Kenneth] Rush at the State Department, because you have to get a man who basically functions according to the orders he gets, as the P's man, rather than an independent Secretary of State." (Ibid.) Speaking of Rush during an Oval Office meeting with Kissinger on November 13, the President said: "I am going to tell him: I am going to take the responsibility for cleaning up that State Department and I want him to be my man." Just prior to that comment Nixon had asserted that his "one legacy is to ruin the foreign service. I mean ruin it—the old foreign service—and to build a new one. I'm going to do it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes,

Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November 13, 1972, Oval Office Conversation No. 814–3) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

In a November 14 meeting, the President told Haldeman that he wanted him to "talk to Rogers, make the point that the P is closest to him, but feels that anyone who's been in for four years should go like [Secretary of Housing and Urban Development] Romney, [Secretary of Transportation] Volpe and [Secretary of Defense] Laird." Haldeman was to tell Rogers that "it would be bad if you stayed and they didn't. It's best for you to finish in a blaze of glory with the Vietnam peace signing, and then you take the lead and move out. That we'd have problems with Romney and Volpe and we need your lead to do this." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman met with Rogers on November 16 and recorded in his diary that "Rogers obviously was shocked to be told that he was to leave, and he didn't say much more than that to me, except that he thought it was a bad way to handle it." Later that day Rogers met the President and Haldeman and "made a brief pitch about his concern on the appearance of his being fired, that it creates bad and unnecessary public opinion" and that "the P should have consulted him first and then decided." The three men then "discussed the organization of State if Rogers were to stay, and he basically made a pitch to stay on to June 1, so that he can clean up things that he was doing and not look like K[issinger] had forced him out."

Upon being told by Haldeman the next day, November 17, that Rogers "was going to stay on for a short time," Kissinger responded that it was "a disaster for the P and the country and unworkable for the Administration and our foreign policy. Our problem is not the foreign service, it's the Secretary and he operates independently of the White House, won't carry out orders and won't do the work, the preparation of his own materials. The Department is torn between their loyalty to the Secretary versus the White House." On the other hand, "if we had a Secretary we could work with, we could tell him what we want and it would get done." The President informed Haldeman later that day that he "should have a clear understanding [with Rogers] that he's to leave on June 1, but will say nothing prior to that." Furthermore, he should tell Rogers that "there will be a reorganization in the Department as in all others. The P will make the decisions regarding all appointments. The line of working control must be through the system." Regarding the foreign service, "we'll have to see what promotions we want to put through. The most important thing is loyalty" and "everybody has to work within the system." Haldeman noted in his diary that regarding Rogers' successor, Nixon "hasn't decided (but it will be Rush, of course.)" (Ibid.)

Haldeman met with Rogers at the latter's home on November 18 to pass along the President's message. "We need a clear understanding that

if you stay on, first, we have to go with the new organization now without delay," Haldeman told Rogers, "second, the President will make the appointments on his decision"; and "third, the Foreign Service promotions have got to be based first on loyalty, then on competence." Rogers "argued that the Foreign Service are very loyal to the P, especially now. They agree with his policies and his approach and he can win them over if he just takes a basically reasonable attitude toward them and not cut them off. Says he gives lip service to agreeing completely to the other conditions and says he feels he can work with them, even the staffing thing for a few months, but he definitely will leave, probably by June 1, maybe even by May 1." (Ibid.)

On November 21 the President met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush to discuss his prospective appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. According to Haldeman's diary, Nixon "reviewed the State Department situation, made the point that Rush may or may not move up to Secretary, and that would remain to be seen after Rogers leaves." Referring to William J. Casey, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission who was slated to become Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the President "explained the Casey role as the guy to tear up the Department. Rush's role is to back him and handle substantive matters. He said basically there'd be two purposes for Rush: one is substantive, that he should work on preparations for the European Security Conference, SALT, Vietnam, and so on; and second, is a cover for the beginning of the reorganization." Rush replied that he "recognized very much the P's views as to the problems at State, and totally agreed with the need to move in and clean it out. He expressed his view of Rogers as being a complete captive of the Foreign Service. That the problem with the Foreign Service is that what they want is to control foreign policy, and they aren't, and that makes them unhappy. The way they react reflects that unhappiness, which is what poses the problem for the P with them. The thing that they don't recognize is that it's not the business of the Foreign Service or the State Department to control foreign policy or to make the decisions, but rather to provide the P with the input and information so that he can do that. And then to insure that his policy decisions are carried out precisely." Haldeman noted that it was clear that Rush was "very pleased to take on this role and understands that if he goes at it right, he's got a chance to move up to Secretary." (Ibid.)

Rush entered on duty as Deputy Secretary of State on February 2, 1973, a day after Casey entered on duty as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and William J. Porter succeeded U. Alexis Johnson as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Rogers served until September 3, 1973, and was succeeded by Kissinger.

Foreign Economic Policy

348. Editorial Note

This compilation presents documentation on three issues: 1) the dispute during 1969 over whether the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations should be transferred to the Department of Commerce or remain in the White House; 2) the conflict between the Department of State and the Department of Commerce over control of U.S. foreign economic and commercial functions; and 3) the establishment in January 1971 of the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) in the Executive Office of the President. For comprehensive documentation on foreign economic policy, including the operation of the CIEP once it was established and the Nixon administration's efforts to restructure the foreign assistance program, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972; and ibid., volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972.

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349. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Administration of U.S. Trade Policy

Reports have reached me from usually reliable sources that: (1) The President has asked the Secretary of Commerce to handle U.S. trade policy; and (2) the President has asked the Secretary of Commerce to visit Europe in April to discuss trade matters as a follow-up to his own trip next week.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use.

Administration of U.S. trade policy is one of the major issues under consideration in the Trade Policy Study ordered by NSSM 16.[2] Precipitate decisions on the issue would undermine that Study.

In addition, designation of the Secretary of Commerce as our principle trade representative could seriously damage our relations with Europe. It would strongly imply a protective approach completely inconsistent with the President's statement on February 6[3] in favor of a liberal trade policy. It would be particularly disastrous in view of the decision to press for restrictions on textile imports.

I therefore recommend that you take any opportunity to suggest to the President that precipitate decision on the management of U.S. trade policy could undermine his own policy statements. Any decisions on this matter should await the NSC review of U.S. trade policy.

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 182.

[3] Reference is to Nixon's statement at his press conference on February 6; for text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969,* p. 74.

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353. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, March 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Status of Economic Officers in the Department of State

During my call with John Irwin the President brought up the role and status of economic officers in the Service.[2] He wanted us to consider steps to enhance the status of our economic officers in the Department and particularly abroad. From his various travels abroad he had the impression that Embassy economic officers were low on the totem pole. This was a serious mistake. He contrasted the relatively

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 1. No classification marking. Drafted by Richardson on March 14. Copies were sent to Rogers, Pedersen, Samuels, Greenwald, Rimestad, and Hastings.

[2] The President met with Richardson and Irwin from 4:22 to 5:05 p.m. on March 12. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

low estate of the Economic Counselor and other economic officers with the status and role of AID Administrators and other officials. In most cases the Economic Counselor has a much more important role than the AID Administrator and should at least be accorded the status and position given these AID officials.

I mentioned to the President that the American Foreign Service Association had made various recommendations for improving the economic side of the Department. We will be reviewing them and others so that we can come up in the near future with specific practical steps to improve and upgrade this area.[3]

ELR

[3] During a March 17 telephone conversation, Richardson discussed Nixon's views on upgrading State's economic role with Nathaniel Samuels, whom Nixon appointed Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on March 28. (Notes of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 100, Personal)

351. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting at 5:00 p.m. Today on the Future of STR

A Cabinet-level meeting has just been called for 5:00 p.m. today to decide whether the Office of the Special Trade Representative will continue independently within the White House. The alternatives are to give it to Commerce as proposed to the President by Secretary Stans and vigorously opposed by State and others; to give it to State, which doesn't want it; or to abolish it altogether with the Departments left to battle for supremacy in the trade policy field. (Attached is the first draft of the NSSM 16 options paper on the subject.)[2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use. Sent for action.

[2] The options paper is attached but not printed.

As I informed you in my memorandum of March 4,[3] vital substantive issues are involved in this ostensibly administrative question. The U.S. has traditionally viewed trade in a foreign policy framework, and hence State and the NSC staff, within the White House, have taken the lead. The creation of STR in 1962, however, was an effort—which has proved successful—to reconcile the foreign policy and domestic business viewpoints. Any further shift from our present organizational approach, especially toward Commerce Department control, would be interpreted abroad as a clear signal that the U.S. was going protectionist and would seriously endanger the credibility of the President's commitment to liberal trade policies.

Tremendous external pressures for a decision on the subject—mainly in favor of retaining an independent STR, and in response to Secretary Stans' attempted takeover—have developed in the past few weeks. Hence the earlier decision to await the result of our NSC trade study probably cannot be held.

Given the important foreign policy implications of the decision, particularly in view of the President's trip and the trade issues raised during it, the NSC should certainly be represented at today's meeting. (The meeting will be chaired by Ellsworth and attended by Stans, Richardson, Burns, Flanigan, and the Budget Bureau.) Ellsworth has agreed with his staff's recommendation that the NSC staff be invited but has limited the invitation to you personally.

Recommendation

That you attend the meeting at 5:00 p.m. personally, taking the position that STR should be continued as an independent agency within the White House; or

That you call Ellsworth and urge him to invite me to represent you at the meeting.[4]

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[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 186.

[4] A handwritten note at the top of page 1 reads: "Dr K did not attend meeting." Kissinger explained why in Document 352. Bergsten reported to Kissinger on the meeting in Document 353.

352. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 18, 1969.

HAK said he would not be attending the 5 p.m. meeting on STR. He felt he could be more useful if he didn't get involved in the matter personally; when it subsequently came to him for a recommendation to the President, he felt he could be more effective if he weren't present. He stated he couldn't sway Stans from his position even if he were present. HAK feels STR should stay in the White House and will so recommend to RMN; his major concern that it not end up in the Department which is principally concerned with domestic matters. He feels that if there is a strong point of view to either keep it in the White House or send it to State, he can make a helpful recommendation.

ELR replied that we only heard this morning just how far the matter had gone; agreed with how HAK proposed to handle it and stated that if it weren't to be kept in the White House, then it would be better in State than in Commerce.

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons. No classification marking.

353. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Future of STR

The participants in today's meeting on the future of STR[2] agreed to disagree. Secretary Stans' bid to move it into Commerce was supported

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy.

[2] See Documents 351 and 352.

only by Peter Flanigan, essentially on the administrative ground of reducing the number of independent White House agencies.[3] Budget supported State's proposal that STR remain independent. Ellsworth and I took no position. Burns and McCracken did not make the meeting. Stans reported that Hardin and Labor were willing for Commerce to carry the trade ball for the U.S. Most of the outside groups have come out for continuation of an independent STR.

Ellsworth and the Budget Bureau will now prepare a memorandum for Presidential decision.[4] The agencies agreed that the basic issue was whether trade policy should be conducted completely independent of the rest of our foreign policy (Stans' position) or was intimately related to foreign policy (Richardson's position, which I might add was presented quite effectively). Other important, but secondary, issues are:

1. Budget's view that the "leader agency" concept did not work in practice and hence argued for independent White House leadership.
2. State's view (which I share strongly) that foreign *and* domestic reaction to absorption of STR by Commerce would cast serious doubt on the President's commitment to a liberal trade policy.
3. State and Budget's view that the legislative history, if not the law itself, made the shift highly dubious on Congressional grounds.
4. Commerce and Flanigan's view that the number of independent White House agencies should be reduced.

Recommendation

That you recommend to the President at the earliest opportunity that STR be continued as an independent office within the White House.

If he were to decide that it should be lodged in an existing agency, that you recommend that it be given to State.

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[3] Richardson discussed the meeting with Rogers during a March 18 telephone conversation. According to Richardson, "everyone seemed to be against the move except Stans and PF." (Notes of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons)

[4] On March 19 Ellsworth sent the draft memorandum for Presidential decision to Richardson for his comments. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 16, NSC/Misc, March 1969) Richardson replied on March 22; see Document 355.

354. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the President's Assistant (Ellsworth)[1]

Washington, March 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR)

I regret Treasury's views have not been included heretofore on the matter of where STR should be located. Not only the broad policy issues are matters of great concern to us but the administration of much of it is our statutory responsibility.

Treasury strongly holds the opinion that the continuation of the responsibility of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations as a separate agency within the Executive Office of the President is of great importance to the furtherance of our liberal trade objectives.

—A liberal trade policy is fundamental to our broad financial objective of moving away from selective controls.

—Locating STR in any one agency would leave trade policy too exposed to the pressures concentrated in a department, be it State or Commerce.[2]

—The views of this Department and the views of other agencies are given more weight and balanced handling in the process of interdepartmental discussion on trade policy when the over-all responsibility is located in the Executive Office of the President.

David M. Kennedy[3]

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 56, OSD Files, FRC 56 74 7, Secretary's Memos/Correspondence, 1966–1970: White House, Jan–Aug 1969. Limited Office Use. Drafted by Petty. A copy was sent to Mayo.

[2] In a March 19 memorandum to the President, Paul McCracken, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, expressed his support for keeping STR in the Executive Office of the President. He argued, among other things, that Commerce had "often been unduly sensitive to industry pressures, especially from textiles," while State was "widely considered to be insufficiently responsive to our business interests." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative)

[3] Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

355. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, March 22, 1969, 2104Z.

WH 9440/44766. From the Under Secretary. I am sending you our redraft, cleared by Samuels, of the Presidential memorandum on STR[2] which we have just returned to Bob Ellsworth. If you can find the opportunity, I think it would be useful to discuss this with the President, together with Henry Kissinger if you wish, during your current trip.[3]

March 22, 1969.

Issue for Presidential Decision: Should the Office of the Special Trade Representative be retained within the Executive Office of the President or placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce?

Whether foreign trade policy should be separated from the rest of foreign relations is a principal issue of disagreement. State favors retention of the office in the White House, while Commerce wants it to be moved to its jurisdiction. Treasury[4] and the Budget Bureau have directly submitted views supporting retention.

The arguments are summarized below.

Arguments for placing STR under commerce:

(1) Foreign trade policy should be separated from other aspects of international relations and should be placed within the jurisdiction of a department where it will receive primary attention.

(2) The Commerce Department is the most logical Department for the STR because of the Department's involvement with export expansion, foreign investment and domestic industry.

(3) There is a general advantage in reducing the number of independent offices which in theory report directly to the President, but to which in fact he can give little, if any, attention.

Arguments for retaining STR within the Executive Office of the President:

(1) Removal of the STR function from the White House, where it has gained recognition and stature for adherence to a policy of reciprocal

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Confidential; Eyes Only. Rogers was with the President at San Clemente, California.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 353.

[3] No record of such a discussion has been found.

[4] See Document 354.

liberal trade, would be interpreted both in the US and abroad as indicating a retreat from this policy. This would be particularly true at a time when we shall be endeavoring to persuade foreign countries to agree to a voluntary restraint on textile exports to the United States. It also would tend to raise questions about the meaning of the President's position on trade policy stated in his recent press conferences and his trip to Europe.

(2) International trade policy is integrally related to our total monetary and financial, diplomatic, political and military effort, and is not separable for purposes of policy determination or negotiation. It would be difficult for a government department whose main responsibility necessarily lies in the domestic sphere to bring into consideration and focus the overall foreign policy considerations relating to trade.

(3) STR has no constituency of its own that limits its objectivity; it provides a mechanism for taking into account the diverse domestic and foreign policy interests that need to be weighed in determining the national interest; it gives trade policy and negotiations its full time; it has wide public and Congressional support; and it has a record of tough and effective negotiation.

(4) Congress recognized the need to have a representative independent of the regular departments to deal with trade matters. In 1962, the Senate Finance Committee noted: "The committee felt that the chairman, if he was chosen from one of the departments, would represent more the views of that department than the overall broader perspective represented by the Special Representative." This view was reaffirmed by Congressman Mills and Senator Long last fall in a conference committee executive session on trade legislation.

(5) The transfer from STR to Commerce would not reduce the burden on the White House. On the basis of past experience and the nature of the trade problem, frequent appeals from various agencies are likely. Ultimately a new STR would emerge within the President's official family.

Elliot Richardson.

356. Editorial Note

During a March 27, 1969, morning meeting with Secretary of Commerce Stans and the Chairman and the President of the National Association of Manufacturers, President Nixon "went on to talk about the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and to tell the visitors of his eventual plan to put that office into the Commerce Department 'out of the White House and away from State' . . . adding that there was a little too much Congressional opposition to the move to be able to do it now. He then looked at Secretary Stans and repeated his previously expressed wish that Maury do his best to name a good man for that office (if at all possible *before* he goes to Europe.)" (Memorandum by Butterfield for the President's File, March 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President's Office Files, Box 77, President's Meetings File) That afternoon the President discussed the question of the Special Trade Representative in a meeting with Bryce Harlow, H.R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, and Robert Mayo. According to Haldeman's brief notes, the President told Harlow: "Stans names the man[,] not State—but can't put it into the dept. Keep Rogers out of it. tell Stans." (Ibid., Haldeman Notes, Box 40)

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357. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

Chairman Mills' Views Regarding the Special Trade Representative

When the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Nathaniel Samuels, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Macomber, made his introductory call on Chairman Mills Thursday morning, the

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. No classification marking. Bergsten forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under an April 7 covering memorandum, in which he commented that "you might this ammunition useful in presenting the President's decision to Secretary Stans." (Ibid.)

Chairman took advantage of the opportunity to convey his strong conviction that it would be a grave mistake for the Administration to transfer the Office of the Special Trade Representative out of the White House.

In reviewing the background history, Mr. Mills emphasized his view that the unprecedented vote in support of the Trade Expansion Act in 1962 was directly related to the fact that the Administration had accepted the Congressional view that responsibility for trade policy be placed in the White House where the Special Trade Representative would have direct access to the President. That provision reflected the carefully considered view of Congress at that time and, in the Chairman's view, today. He added that the ranking minority member, John Byrnes of Wisconsin, feels as strongly as he does on the matter.

Aside from the critical issue of Congressional concern that trade matters not be relegated to a level where the influence of the Special Trade Representative would be submerged in the bureaucracy of one of the established Departments, the Chairman believes that it would be exceedingly difficult to get a first-rate man for this job unless it continues to be situated in the White House. In this connection he said he knows that the President would have no problem in getting George Champion to fill this position if the latter were assured that the Office would remain in the White House and that he would have direct access to the President as the situation required.

Mr. Mills said that he had discussed the matter with Secretary Stans and had informed him that he (Mills) "would not oppose" the transfer to Commerce, because he recognized the necessity of organizing the White House in accordance with the President's concepts. Stans told the Chairman that John Byrnes said he too would not oppose the transfer if Mr. Mills did not, but that Byrnes had been even more outspoken than the Chairman in his criticism of such a move. The Chairman explained at some length and with emphasis his view that although he could not oppose the transfer (for the reason cited above) the proposed move would be unfortunate and would have a decided impact on Congressional consideration of trade matters.

John P. Walsh

358. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

STR

Your decision to retain an independent STR has been applauded widely, in the press and in a flood of mail to you personally. It reassured numerous Congressmen, most of the business community, and most foreign governments of your commitment to freer trade.

There remained a great deal of uneasiness, however, over the real influence which STR will wield. The concern centers on the possibility that STR will be physically located in the Commerce Department, with the implication that the Special Representative would therefore be subordinate to the Secretary of Commerce.[2] (No other Executive Office of the President is housed in one of the Cabinet Departments.)

A decision to locate STR within Commerce could thus have the following undesirable effects:

1. The widespread kudos you have received for retaining an independent STR will disappear. Another massive campaign on the subject could well develop since the groups involved are all interested in substance rather than appearance.
2. Our trade legislation, both this year and in the future, will face increased difficulty on the Hill because of the widespread desire in Congress (including such key people as Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes) for STR leadership. Our legislative proposals will face enough problems without adding this one.
3. The foreign policy consequences which were avoided for the moment by the decision to retain STR will appear all over again. They would be even worse now because the protectionist image of Commerce has been greatly intensified by Secretary Stans' leadership on the textile issue, as Arthur Burns noted at the recent NSC meeting on trade.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use. Sent for action.

[2] In an April 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten discussed four factors that, he believed, appeared to undercut Nixon's decision to retain an independent STR: 1) Stans, not Nixon, offered the position to Carl Gilbert; 2) Nixon gave Stans the option of locating STR physically within Commerce; 3) Gilbert accepted the position without any conditions concerning direct access to the President or his relationship with other agencies; and 4) Gilbert had been excluded from Stans' private meetings with key foreigners during Stans' trade mission to Europe. For text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 197.

I can see very little substantive gain from locating STR within the Commerce building, and it seems that the major headaches listed above could be avoided by keeping STR in the Executive Offices of the President where it now is.

Recommendation

That STR remain physically, as well as legally, within the Executive Offices of the President.[3]

[3] In a May 21 memorandum Haldeman told Flanigan that the "President would like you to make clear to Secretary Stans that he does not want the office itself moved. As the Secretary knows, the President will look to Stans for overall supervision of this office, but he feels it should not be moved from its present location and that any attempt to do so would create serious problems on the Hill, among other things." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative)

359. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, October 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Commercial Attachés

Late last Thursday (October 23) I met with Secretaries Stans and Hardin[2] at the latter's request to discuss "attachés." Secretary Hardin opened by saying that he had had some discussions with the President about overseas staffing of agricultural attachés (presumably in connection with OPRED). He noted his satisfaction with the present arrangements regarding agricultural attachés (although he said that they might be more effective if they had a little more rank).

Secretary Hardin went on to say that the President had asked him to bring Secretary Stans and me together to take up the question of

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1. Confidential. Printed from an unsigned copy. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Eugene Braderman (E/CBA). Copies were sent to Macomber and Trezise.

[2] Reference is to Clifford Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture from January 1969 to December 1971.

whether commercial attachés should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. He then read from a follow-up memo addressed to him by John Whitaker (we have since learned he talked to the President on September 29[3] and the memo was dated September 30)[4] and I quote "Will you please discuss with Secretary Stans and Deputy Under Secretary of State Samuels the subject of placing overseas economic attachés under Commerce rather than State." He noted that while "economic attachés" was mentioned, it undoubtedly referred to commercial attachés. At this point he said his task was done and he turned the meeting over to Secretary Stans.

Secretary Stans emphasized once more his own concern for export promotion and expressed the view that perhaps we could make more progress if the commercial attachés were under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. He suggested that each of us assign someone to prepare a list of pros and cons that we might review together in about 10 days. I have asked Gene Braderman to do this for me. Because this is a sensitive question, Secretary Stans asked that as few people as possible be involved at this stage. However, this is an important issue for all of us.

[3] Hardin; John Whitaker, Secretary to the Cabinet; and Bryce Harlow met with the President from 4:40 to 5:25 p.m. on September 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[4] A copy of the memorandum has not been found.

360. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank (Kearns) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 18, 1969.

Dear Mr. President,

SUBJECT

Foreign Commerce Service

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, Jan 1970–March 1970. Personal and Confidential at the Request of the President. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The President wrote on page 1: "K, I completely agree with this analysis. Shake Samuels et al *hard* & get action. All they have done so far is to tinker with the status quo."

In response to your request for my views I submit the following:

Need

The magnitude of and opportunities in the international commerce of the United States demand that official government representation abroad must be equal or better *in ability* to that of other industrialized countries.

The commercial service representing the United States abroad should be professional in nature, permanent, experienced, knowledgeable, and oriented toward business.

The overseas posts should provide uniformity in the competence of commercial representation, especially in areas where there are significant established or potential markets.

Problem

With few exceptions, personnel assigned to commercial and economic representation is drawn from the foreign service and rarely has had any association with or knowledge of business.[2]

It is universally believed throughout the foreign service that there is no opportunity for advancement through the economic field.[3] Most foreign service officers look upon an appointment as a career ambassador as the ultimate goal. To achieve this goal requires competence in politics, the ability to avoid controversy, and association with persons of like belief.

With few exceptions, foreign service officers are unwilling to assume any "risk" or criticism, not uncommon when an officer actively assists in business development. An aggressive "commercial type" is at a severe disadvantage in selection board evaluation.[4]

Official commercial and economic officers are "directed" by the political officers of the Department of State, who have little or no real interest in U.S. business development.

Those assigned to commercial activities are typically at the lowest end of a foreign post's protocol list.

Official commercial representation varies drastically from post to post and from year to year, providing little in the host country when related to U.S. Government interest in any business or economic activity.

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[2] Nixon underlined several words in this sentence and wrote "correct" in the right-hand margin.

[3] Nixon underlined the first sentence of this paragraph and wrote "correct" next to it.

[4] Nixon wrote "correct" in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

Result

Universally American business does not "trust" the so-called commercial officers. Seldom is there a request for assistance. Frequently an international American company having a foreign subsidiary will request the commercial officers from countries other than the United States for assistance. The result is usually that the exported product comes from a subsidiary rather than from the parent company.

Commercial reporting of opportunities, economic and business developments is not uniform; it varies from place to place and time to time, severely reducing its usefulness and meaning.

Recommendation

After careful and intimate examination of this subject for twelve years, it is my considered judgment that the one way to achieve an effective foreign commercial service would be to reinstitute the practice terminated at the end of the Administration of President Hoover—that of a professional Trade Commissioner Corps. Capable people can be recruited, trained, indoctrinated, and led to provide truly effective service which would mean a very significant improvement in United States economic activity abroad. This commercial service should be a part of the Department of Commerce but under the over-all policy direction of the Ambassador in each post. There is ample precedence. The Treasury and Agriculture Departments have had independent representatives for some time.

Sincerely yours,

Henry

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361. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, February 27, 1970.

Mr. Secretary

You will note that the attached memorandum from Henry[2] assigns action on an important foreign economic policy matter to a working

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC Matters Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc, February 1970. No classification marking.

[2] The February 27 memorandum to Rogers, Laird and Stans directed preparation of an interagency paper setting forth options open to the President under Export Administration Act of 1969.

group headed by the Commerce Department and would have the working group report to Henry. This is an example of how far we will have to go if we are to put coordinating responsibility for foreign economic policy back in your hands.

TLE

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362. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Proposal to Realign Economic/Commercial Functions of the Departments of State and Commerce

As discussed with you on April 2[2] and pursuant to your comments on this subject at the August 12 Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs meeting in San Clemente, I have been examining the question of State/Commerce operating responsibilities in foreign economic/commercial activities.

My conclusions combined with (1) your experience and expressed wishes in this matter, (2) indications from the business community that a change is desirable, and (3) similar indications from Congressional leaders, lead me to recommend that we proceed with plans to implement Option "A" as described in detail in the attached paper.[3] This provides for transfer from State to Commerce of all Washington and overseas economic/commercial functions related to the Commerce

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Dept of Commerce, Vol. I, 1970. Official Use Only. Stans forwarded the unsigned draft memorandum to Kissinger under cover of an April 14 memorandum in which he noted that Nixon asked him to submit the proposal through Kissinger. Stans sent a copy of the proposal to Rogers the same day, explaining in his covering memorandum that he was considering recommending the changes and had forwarded the draft proposal to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE)

[2] Stans met with Kissinger from 11:03 a.m. to 12:02 p.m. on April 2. Haig and Under Secretary of Commerce Rocco Siciliano joined them for all but the last 2 minutes of the meeting. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[3] Attached but not printed is a 10-page paper entitled "Proposal to Realign Economic/Commercial Functions of the Departments of State and Commerce." It consists of four parts: I. "The Present Situation"; II. "History of Commerce Overseas Representation"; III. "The Problem"; and IV. "Options".

Department's activities (U.S. trade and investment, insurance, business practices, export finance, patents and industrial products and technology) while leaving in the State Department those international economic/commercial functions which relate to the activities of other departments of Government (e.g., Agriculture, Treasury, Transportation).

I am sure you appreciate that this is a controversial matter between State and Commerce and between their respective supporters in Congress and the public. As you also know, there have been a series of proposals, discussions, and representations on this subject—over the past ten years—between the Executive Branch and Congress and between the Federal Government and the business community. I am convinced that action, as recommended, to put our country's international activities on a more business-like basis would now be in the national interest.

I stand ready to provide any supporting detail that would be helpful in your consideration of this proposal.

Secretary of Commerce[4]

[4] Printed from an unsigned copy.

363. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Stans' Proposal to Transfer Responsibility for Foreign Economic Affairs to Department of Commerce[2]

I

Secretary Stans' proposal would divide responsibility for much of our foreign economic relations by transferring authority and functions

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Dept of Commerce, Vol. I, 1970. No classification marking. Rogers sent a copy to Stans under cover of a May 15 memorandum in which he sought to "underscore the strong feelings I hold on the subject. Simply stated, I could not efficiently advise on and carry out this nation's foreign policy if my authority and responsibility were fragmented in this manner you suggest." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE)

[2] Document 362.

from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce, both in Washington and in our missions abroad.

I strongly disagree.

There is a fundamental issue here. It concerns the ability of the Secretary of State to advise the President wisely on foreign policy and to conduct efficiently the nation's foreign affairs.

The fragmentation of authority and responsibility for foreign relations can only impair the capacity of the Secretary of State. If each Department or agency with an interest in particular aspects of foreign affairs—and they are numerous—were to be vested with responsibility for these matters, the shaping and management of the nation's foreign policy would be immensely more complicated and more cumbersome than is now the case.

II

Secretary Stans' specific suggestion for Washington is to take from the Department of State the functions and personnel dealing with foreign economic policy, leaving to State responsibility for political and diplomatic relations.

But economics *are* politics. Elliot Richardson and I have noted over the past 15 months that the problems coming to us are more often than not economic issues. They are always complex and contentious. I could not operate without a qualified and specialized economic staff. I need experts who both understand the economics of an issue and are able to judge its merits in the light of our total foreign policy objectives; who can evaluate the economic consequences of a proposed course of action as well as the political-military fall out; who can initiate new economic policies or suggest modifications that will achieve the ends sought by other agencies and yet reduce the foreign policy costs or enhance the foreign policy gains of an action.

There is of course a well articulated structure, culminating in the National Security Council, for coordinating foreign economic policy among the Washington agencies. The Department of Commerce has a voice and role in the coordination process, where its skills, experience, and points of view are regularly and fully reflected. I do not believe that the existing system precludes or limits in any way consideration of Commerce positions on foreign policy issues.

III

Secretary Stans also would transfer from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce responsibility for the economic/commercial staffs in our missions overseas.

The function of these staffs is to advance our foreign economic policy interests and to promote the general and specific interests of Amer-

ican business abroad. They can carry out their many and varied activities—including representation, negotiation, business services, export promotion—most efficiently as an integrated staff under single management, responsible to the Ambassador, and through him serving the whole complex of Washington agencies to whom they look for backstopping and guidance.

In respect of the commercial work abroad, the Department of Commerce has an important supporting role, and officers concerned specifically with trade promotion are in some cases drawn directly from Commerce.

But the work of the economic/commercial staff covers the whole spectrum of our economic relations with the host country. To transfer authority over these staffs to the Department of Commerce would make the task of our Ambassadors far more difficult than it already is, and deprive the Secretary of State of effective leadership in the conduct of a major element in our foreign relations.

Even to break out a part of these integrated teams would materially affect their efficiency and morale. We have inherited too much fragmentation in the field already. I certainly do not favor further fragmentation.

IV

The organization of our economic/commercial sections has been looked at in detail a number of times in response to the wish of the Department of Commerce to have more direct control over trade promotion activities. On each occasion the judgment has been that an integrated organization, responding to and through the Ambassador, is more effective and efficient.

It is pertinent to note that nearly every other major trading country organizes its foreign service as we do. The British were an exception with an independent commercial service under the Board of Trade but they have given it up in favor of unification; and the Canadians, who have long been reputed to have the best commercial service of all the principal trading nations, are changing to a unified foreign service. In both cases, the decision to unify was taken because a separate commercial service not only brought organizational inefficiencies but also because its existence caused Ambassadors and senior diplomatic officers to give insufficient attention to business interests.

V

The comments I have had from the business community have been pretty uniformly complimentary about the improvement in the performance of the Foreign Service over the past few years. But I agree that there may be more to be done. I am proposing to have a group of

businessmen take an outsider's look at a representative sample of our embassies and consulates and to give us recommendations for changes in the structure or emphasis of our economic/commercial work abroad. Also, as a part of Deputy Under Secretary Macomber's overall review of the Department and the Foreign Service, we are examining what should or might be done to create more attractive careers for our economic and commercial officers. The content of our review is indicated in the attached draft of a letter I propose to send to our Ambassadors on the trade promotion effort.[3]

William P. Rogers

[3] Attached but not printed.

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364. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Stans' Proposal to Transfer Responsibility for Foreign Economic Functions from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce

The memorandum at Tab I[2] summarizes and analyzes Secretary Stans' proposal to transfer all U.S. foreign economic and commercial functions, both overseas and in Washington, from State to Commerce, and Secretary Rogers' comments on them.[3] Stans wrote that he wishes to discuss the matter with you in detail, and his memorandum to the President is labeled "draft." The President had told him that the proposals should come through you.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings, April–May 1970. No classification marking. Sent for action.

[2] Tab I is attached but not printed.

[3] Documents 362 and 363.

The Stans request to gain complete control of these functions—and thus to deny the Secretary of State an economic, trade and investment policy role—is ludicrous. It would be like transferring the textile, export control, Hickenlooper, tariff preferences, and other trade policy problems completely to the domestic side of the White House and denying you a voice in them. (Stans proposes two "options," but the second—to have Commerce take over *all* foreign economic policy functions, including those relating to Agriculture, Treasury, etc.—is so extreme that even he does not propose it, and I see no need to bother the President with it.)

In fact, the President has often mentioned a desire to use trade policy *more* actively to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, which hardly argues for giving all responsibility to Commerce. However, the President has also mentioned on numerous occasions his desire to improve commercial functions *in our embassies overseas.* It is regarding these overseas arrangements (not the Washington backup) that Stans' arguments are the strongest and Rogers' the weakest.

However, any change even in this limited area deserves careful study by an impartial agency, competent to handle management and administrative questions as they relate to policy and implementation—the Budget Bureau, which in fact called me when they learned that the issue had arisen again, and indicated that they were prepared to make such a study.

The real question is whether even this proposition deserves study again, since it has been looked at so many times before. I think it does:

—The President is obviously concerned about the problem.

—No one could argue that State is doing a particularly masterful job in representing our commercial interests overseas.

—Agriculture and Treasury have their own foreign representation, and this causes no real problem for State or our Ambassadors overseas.

My own guess is that a Commerce-run commercial service would have people of generally lower quality but with greater motivation to pursue commercial problems, which might on balance be a beneficial tradeoff.

After his request for extended discussion on the proposals, Secretary Stans may consider it a brushoff to have a portion of his proposal rejected and the rest remanded to further study. However, I do not think that much progress can be made in substance by a discussion between you and Stans at this stage. You could hardly leave out State completely, and in fact Stans sent Rogers a copy of his "draft." A joint HAK/Commerce/State discussion would put you in a role of refereeing administrative questions, which—to say the least—would be unrewarding.

Recommendations

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I, proposing that Budget, with the assistance of State and Commerce, study the *overseas roles* of Commerce and State in handling our international commercial affairs.

Approve[4]

Disapprove, prefer to set up a meeting to discuss with Stans

Disapprove, prefer memorandum to the President rejecting proposals in entirety

2. If the President approves the recommendations at Tab I, that you sign the memorandum at Tab II to convey the decisions to the agencies.

[4] Kissinger initialed this option but wrote on page 1: "Pres. would prefer an ad hoc group I'm sure—maybe including businessmen. Won't want BOB. Let's redo. Get Lynn's view re mechanics. Also I want to discuss with Richardson."

365. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon[1]

Washington, May 25, 1970.

Following on our several discussions about the commercial attachés of the State Department, I prepared a memorandum a short time ago outlining a proposal whereby these individuals might be transferred to the Department of Commerce.[2] I sent a draft copy of that memorandum to Bill Rogers, but did not send one to you.

Bill's people misconstrued the situation and assumed that I had sent the memorandum to you, with the result that you have now received a reply to a document that you did not receive in the first place.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings, April–May 1970. No classification marking. Printed from a copy sent to Kissinger.

[2] Document 362.

I have since talked to Bill about this and suggested that instead of arguing this matter by correspondence, he and I sit down with three or four of our key people and try to work out a solution that will provide more effective commercial assistance overseas in our export and foreign investment programs.

He has agreed to this, so that there is nothing that you need do at this time, and I hope that we can work something out without troubling you further.[3]

Maurice H. Stans[4]

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[3] In a May 28 memorandum Kennedy informed Kissinger of Stans' agreement with Rogers and that "Bergsten feels this is not a White House matter and advises that you not raise it with Under Secretary Richardson." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings, April–May 1970)

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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366. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to John Campbell of the White House Staff[1]

Washington, July 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Stans' suggestion for a new Administration Committee on Foreign Economic Policy[2]

Secretary Stans has put his finger on a real problem in policy-making. The development of international economic policies has been one of the least well-organized segments of economic policy. This is in part due to the absence of relevant individuals on the National Scurity Council, which has formal responsibilities in the international area.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Houthaker Files, Box 30, Foreign Economic Policy—Ad Hoc Committee. No classification marking.

[2] No memorandum containing Stans' suggestion has been found.

An appropriate group to develop international economic policy would be those mentioned by Secretary Stans (the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture; the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers), plus the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Administrator of AID. I believe that it would be appropriate for the Secretary of the Treasury to chair this group. Subcommittee should include one on international monetary policy chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, and one on trade policy chaired by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. It would be desirable to prevent a proliferation of subcommittees to handle work now being done by such committees as the Volcker Group. (The Volcker Group has been doing a good job, and it should be continued in its present form.) As the new committee would be the summit of policy-making, agencies should be represented by the principals.

The proposed Committee for Foreign Economic Policy would be in line with the discussions which Director Shultz and I have had with the President regarding a number of economic committees based on the Troika, with additions.

Paul W. McCracken

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367. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, July 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Proposal for Foreign Economic Policy Council

Pursuant to your request to Mr. Eliot, there is enclosed a proposed memorandum to the President[2] recommending the establishment,

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Matters Files: Lot 73 D 288 Foreign Economic Policy Council. Secret. Drafted by C. W. Ruser and concurred in by Trezise (E). Sent through U. Alexis Johnson and S/S.

[2] Attached but not printed.

under your chairmanship, of a Council on Foreign Economic Policy. The memorandum has been reviewed by Mr. Samuels and has his concurrence.

We propose that the Council be presented as a new specialized mechanism within the NSC system. This would:

—subordinate the new Council to the NSC, preserving organizationally the President's option to hold NSC meetings on economic topics in lieu of Council meetings whenever desirable;

—underscore organizationally the principal argument for a State-chaired group, i.e., the fact that foreign economic policy is part and parcel of the conduct of foreign policy.

The proposed memorandum also envisages:

—that the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury for international monetary problems as provided for in the executive order establishing the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies[3] be left intact; the handling of foreign assistance issues would depend on decisions to be taken on the Peterson report;[4] and

—that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee which has been heavily involved in inter-agency coordination of foreign economic issues be given the role of a working group in relation to the Council.

Recommendation

That you sign the enclosed memorandum.[5]

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[3] E.O. 11269, February 14, 1966. For text, see 31 F.R. 2813.

[4] Documentation on the Peterson report and its implementation is in *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–72, Documents 128–136. See also Department of State *Bulletin,* April 6, 1970, pp. 447–467.

[5] In a July 24 memorandum Eliot informed Johnson that Tresize had reservations about the proposed memorandum to the President: 1) it would "cause quite a stir within the Cabinet, presumably triggering rebuttals in favor of other arrangements"; 2) "our problems in the foreign economic policy area are political and substantive rather than organizational"; 3) therefore State should first be sure the Ash Committee will recommend a new organization in the White House. Eliot reported that Samuels, however, believed there was nothing to lose by sending the memorandum now; should the Ash Committee recommend a new White House mechanism, it was desirable to go on record early against it. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Matters Files: Lot 73 D 288, Foreign Economic Policy Council) In a July 30 memorandum Eliot informed Cargo that Johnson recommended to Rogers that he not sign the proposal memorandum, but instead use it as background material for any future conversations with Nixon or Kissinger. (Ibid.)

368. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, July 30, 1970.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

A substantially increased integration of economic foreign policy with political and strategic foreign policy is of such importance to improving the country's diplomacy and world position that it would be desirable for you to discuss the matter with the President in San Clemente. This is particularly true as there are substantial tendencies to treat foreign economic policies in a different framework and because decisions will have to be made in the near future.

Substantially increased emphasis on economic (including trade and commercial) policy is also needed for the healthiest and most effective development of the Department and Foreign Service's contribution to the nation, as you have frequently urged. The more we can develop this concept the better will be our contribution to the nation, here and abroad.

What is needed, I believe, is three things: A close integration in the White House of foreign economic policy with political and strategic policy within the NSC system. An emphasis upon State Department leadership in developing interdepartmental policy recommendations short of the NSC, along the lines of the current NSC system. And an assignment of supervisory authority to the Department over the implementation of foreign assistance.

In April you recommended to the President[2] that in putting long-term development into a banking-type institution it be made subject to policy guidance and coordination with other assistance through a board chaired by the Secretary of State. A single security program would be established under State Department authority. A contingency fund, to include disaster and unforseen public order matters, would be appropriated to the President and assigned to you. You stressed that your chairmanship of the Bank Board would help assure firm coordination here and in our missions in the field and that it would be prefer-

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, Chron File. Confidential. Rogers initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

[2] For text of Rogers' April 17 memorandum to the President, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 133.

able to put such operational and supervisory authority in the State Department to putting it in the White House.

Whatever the exact details may ultimately be, and we do not know what is being proposed to the President, a system which keeps the operational and day-to-day policy supervision of foreign assistance programs under the Secretary of State will ensure the closest day-to-day integration of foreign economic and aid policy with other policy and help hasten the improvement of the economic capabilities of the Foreign Service as a whole, which will also benefit the government.

We also understand that the Ash Committee[3] may recommend establishment of new machinery in the White House for foreign economic policy outside the NSC machinery. I concur in the view that foreign economic policy should remain in the NSC itself, and believe the NSC staff should be augmented for that purpose if necessary. This also will help integrate economic policy rather than separate it.

Short of the NSC itself the leadership in developing policies and recommendations should be in the State Department for the same reasons as cited above. The preferable approach is through the economic Interdepartmental Group and the Under Secretaries Committee, where detailed matters can be ironed out within Presidential decisions as they now are. If a more specific high level structure were desired a second Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Under Secretary and in which Mr. Samuels would participate (as Mr. Johnson does in the present one) would be a good approach. It seems to me that a Council on Foreign Economic Policy, within the NSC system and chaired by you, would be somewhat awkward and would meet substantial resistance. If it were necessary to move in this direction it might be better to call it an NSC Sub-Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, chaired by the Secretary of State.

(International fiscal policy is separate from all this, having been handled for years under a National Advisory Council and the Secretary of the Treasury.)

The key elements, in short, regardless of the system, are to assure coordination in the White House of policy decisions on all foreign diplomatic, strategic and economic policy through a single NSC mechanism, and to establish in the Department of State day-to-day leadership in policy preparation and implementation through (a) our supervision of the administration of foreign aid and (b) our chairmanship of inter-departmental preparations of proposed foreign economic policies and of detailed elaborations following Presidential decisions.

RFP

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 370.

369. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Meeting with George Shultz and Henry Kissinger August 11, 1970, 11:00 a.m. (10 minutes)[2]

I. Purpose

Kissinger and Shultz will present a proposed organizational arrangement for handling foreign economic policy.

II. Background

On June 30, 1970 you approved a "Troika-plus" arrangement for economic policy generally. In the proposed system for foreign economic policy we plan to build on this arrangement. The Treasury Department, especially Paul Volcker, will play a coordinating role. The National Security Council will be fully represented.

The group itself will be assigned by several subgroups with interlocking membership. While some flexibility should be retained, we visualize the need for five at this time.

1. Committee on Monetary Policy and Balance of Payments
2. Committee on Commercial Policy
3. Committee on Export Promotion
4. Two parallel Committees dealing with Multilateral and Bilateral Economic Assistance

If you approve, Shultz will work it through the various affected Departments and prepare a formal memorandum for you and an implementing letter from you to the Secretary of the Treasury. Drafts of these are attached. See Tabs A and B.[3]

George Shultz[4]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 82, Memoranda for the President. No classification marking.

[2] The President's Daily Diary indicates that Nixon met with Shultz and Kissinger from 11:30 to 11:40 a.m. on August 11. Just prior to that meeting Nixon had met with Shultz for almost 50 minutes, with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Finch, and Harlow present for most of the meeting. The latter four departed by 11:30. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No record of discussion at either meeting has been found.

[3] Tab B is attached but not printed.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment[5]

Draft Memorandum to the President

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Organization for Foreign Economic Policy

Consistent with the memorandum to you of June 30 from George Shultz dealing with organization for economic policy in general, this memorandum proposes more specific organizational arrangements for foreign economic policy.

The proposed arrangements are designed to:

(1) Provide a clear top-level focus for the full range of foreign economic policy issues to assure these problems receive consistent, timely attention;
(2) Deal with foreign economic policies—trade, investment, balance of payments, aid, and financial—as a coherent whole;
(3) Achieve consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy;
(4) Maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives.

These goals would be achieved by building on the basic Troika framework, adding particularly State and National Security Council representation. The proposed arrangements would retain (but modify) some existing coordinating arrangements, supersede others, and fill gaps as necessary.

We would suggest that, if you agree, these arrangements could be set in motion by a letter from you to the Secretary of the Treasury and to other affected officials. The letter would establish the broad mandate for the proposed Foreign Economic Policy Group, set the membership,

[5] Confidential. The draft memorandum appears on blank paper, but another copy (from which the copy at Tab A was made) is on the letterhead of the Secretary of the Treasury and is attached to an August 10 memorandum from Flanigan to Shultz in which Flanigan commented that the "Treasury proposed organization" differed "in only one major respect" from his own proposal—"that difference puts management of the program in Treasury rather than in the White House." The benefit of Treasury's proposals, in Flanigan's view, was that staff already existed in Treasury, while outside of NSC and CEA staff did not exist in the White House. The major objection was in making Treasury "primus inter pares," which was a "difficult concept," especially for areas other than monetary, and one State in particular would find hard to accept. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Confidential Files, Subject Files, FO)

and ask Secretary Kennedy to assume Chairmanship and provide the principal staffing. A draft of such a letter is attached.[6]

Proposed Organizational Structure

Consistent with your decision to organize foreign economic policy around the basic Troika framework, supplemented by relevant additional agencies, the following arrangements are proposed for foreign economic policy:

(1) A top-level policy body would be established by you to be known as the "Foreign Economic Policy Group." The members of this Group would be the Troika agencies, to which would be added State, NSC, STR, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture. This membership would be supplemented by others as needed. A high-level member of your White House staff concerned with economic policy would be included.

This Group would be close in membership to the present National Advisory Council on International Finance, which has specific responsibilities in certain areas of international finance. Maintenance of the formal identity and continuity of the NAC would have some advantages in terms of legislative history and relationships. We would, therefore, contemplate that the Group could meet from time to time in that name, when dealing with matters that the Congress has specifically directed to the NAC (mainly issues concerning the multilateral financial institutions).

We would propose that the Secretary of the Treasury be Chairman of the new "Foreign Economic Policy Group," as he now is of the NAC. He is the official with the primary operating responsibilities in much of the area and has adequate staff. Accordingly, Treasury would be looked to to provide primary staff support and, working closely with the White House representative, would organize and coordinate needed staff support in other agencies.

Regular meetings would be contemplated with at least partly regular agenda to assure timely reports from subgroups.

(2) We contemplate that the top group would be assisted by several subgroups with interlocking membership, each dealing with an important phase of foreign economic policy. The Troika agencies, State, and the NSC would be represented on each of these groups, and your White House staff would be informed about and free to participate in their deliberations (and *should* participate in the more critical meetings).

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[6] Attached but not printed.

While some flexibility should be retained for fixing the number, composition, and mandate of these subgroups, we visualize the need for five at this time, along the following lines:

(a) A Committee on Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments, chaired by Treasury. This group would include the Federal Reserve. It would essentially carry forward the present working group on international monetary matters known as the Volcker Group.

(b) A Committee on Commercial Policy, chaired at least initially by CEA and including STR, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor as regular members. This Group would deal with critical trade matters, where the need for better coordination is particularly critical.

(c) A Committee on Export Promotion, chaired by Commerce, with STR, Agriculture, and Labor represented. This effort needs persistent high-level attention.

(d) Two parallel Committees dealing with Multilateral and Bilateral Economic Assistance. In the multilateral area, use can be made of the existing NAC "Alternates" group, chaired by Treasury; a decision on the bilateral assistance group will need to be integrated with your recommendations on the Peterson Report.

Conclusion

In shaping these recommendations, we have been particularly conscious of the need to assure a comprehensive view of foreign economic policy as a whole, while recognizing the links both to domestic economic policy and to foreign policy. We believe these objectives can be achieved by establishing close links between the Troika pattern and the State–NSC complex. Against the background of the Troika model, we visualize close and informal working relationships on the basis of a letter from you to the interested agencies as proposed above.

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370. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, August 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization (Ash Council),[2] 10:30 a.m., August 25, 1970

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 82, Memoranda for the President, Beginning Aug. 23, 1970. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:42 a.m. to 12:16 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

[2] The Ash Council was appointed by President Nixon on April 5, 1969, to review the organization of the Executive Branch. The Council proposed major changes in the

The President met with the following members of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization (Ash Council) at the Western White House this date:

Roy Ash
Walter Thayer
Fred Kappel
John Connally
Dick Paget
George Baker
Andrew Rouse

White House staff members attending the meeting were George Shultz, John Ehrlichman, Peter Flanigan, and Henry Kissinger.

The President pointed out the great contributions that the Council had made.

Shultz outlined his efforts with OMB to date. Among other things, he pointed out the problem of "coping" and making it meaningful.

The President said that bureaucracy has traditionally run governments rather than vice versa. This new structure should avoid that, particularly where the bureaucracy thinks, generally, differently from this Administration.

Ash said it was now time for the Council to retire, October 1 and 2, and for the OMB to take over its tasks. Nevertheless the President asked, and Ash agreed, to study the problem of the Civil Service.

Ash then stated the Council's recommendations:

Foreign Economic Policy

Clearly foreign economic policy is of utmost importance to the nation. And in the area of foreign trade the nation is losing its lead. To handle this problem the President must have adequate "equipment" in the structure of his office to deal with the problem; there must be a central point. The problems, large as they are, will grow larger and the structure must be put in place *now.*

Two characteristics of foreign economic policy decisions are (1) they have almost equal domestic and foreign implications, and (2) the decision involves trade-offs that must be made at the Presidential level. The Council considered the various alternatives (OMB, NSC, and others) and finally decided the best alternative was a restructured

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organization of the Executive Office of the President, including the establishment of OMB, that were instituted in Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, effective July 1, 1970. Documentation on the Council's activities is ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Executive Office Reorganization.

STR, plus a Cabinet-level council on *International* Economic Policy. This would be "alongside" the NSC and the Domestic Council. The restructured office would continue to be responsible for the operation of trade negotiations.

Regarding the Peterson Task Force recommendations for new agencies for AID and a coordinating council, the Ash Council recommends that this be subsumed in the International Economic Policy. Peterson is concerned that foreign aid might be subordinated to other factors. Nevertheless, the Council feels that aid is an integral part of the larger responsibilities of the International Economic Policy Council.

The President pointed out that in 1957 Foster Dulles expressed the same desire to centralize foreign economic policy outside of State. He pointed out the bureaucratic infighting that has historically been carried on regarding this subject. He then said he agreed on the need for a strong central authority to deal with the problem. The President finally said he would very seriously consider their recommendation. He would also like to have an organization competent to look down the road 25 years on international economic problems. But in looking at these future problems, realizing the increasing importance of economic relations internationally, the President sees a problem in splitting this off from the NSC. Dr. Kissinger said he saw no problem in the new council working with the NSC.

The President feels that one requirement is that the Council remain *small.* The Domestic Council is perhaps too large, while the NSC is more effective because it is kept small.[3]

Re IRA

All agreed that the proposed publication of the Ash Council's recommendations was a good idea.

However, Baker pointed out that in October or November Penn-Central might go under due to lack of cash flow. He urged that the Administration begin to prepare now for this possible development, perhaps by getting more strongly behind the bill currently before the Congress.

PMF
Assistant to the President

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[3] In his diary entry for August 25, Haldeman noted the following: "Long meeting with Ash Council was apparently productive. P[resident] had Shultz, E[hrlichman], and me in later and had decided to go Ash route on foreign economic policy organization. Will cause major problems with State and Rogers, but P told Shultz to go ahead and set it up as a White House function, look for a really good strong man to head it up, but don't announce it as a big change, just ease into it to minimize impact on State." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon's meeting with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Shultz lasted from 1:10 to 2:20 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

371. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Stans to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, September 8, 1970.

Dear Bill:

In trying to develop a focus for discussions between us regarding the improvement of commercial services in our embassies, I have developed the attached two papers. This letter explains the reasoning behind them.

I believe there is strong evidence that:

1. Other important nations place greater emphasis on trade, investment, and other commercial matters in the work of their embassies than does the United States.
2. There is a considerable volume of criticism by American businessmen of the quality of service and quality of personnel in our foreign commercial staffs overseas.

In our first meeting on this subject, we agreed that for the purpose of our discussions we would not attempt to take the time required to document fully these two points, and I hope that we can sustain this agreement.

In any event, it is our opinion in Commerce that major changes are desirable in order to provide the kind of service in our foreign representation that is warranted by the importance of international trade and investment to our balance of payments and to our entire domestic and international economic posture. It is our opinion that this should involve a much greater degree of participation on the part of the Department of Commerce, and a much greater degree of sincere cooperation between our two departments than is currently the case.

Our thinking on this subject has led us to consider two basic alternatives:

1. The transfer of the commercial representation including the commercial attachés (and possibly the economic attachés) to the Department of Commerce, and the development of new programs and procedures to strengthen their function and performance; or
2. A reordering of the priorities of the State Department to place commercial activities in the embassies at the highest level, as the British and other nations have obviously done, and thereupon developing the relationships between our two departments to carry out that determination.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE. No classification marking.

I have reviewed the series of proposals in your proposed letter to Ambassadors, attached to your memorandum to the President written some time ago,[2] and believe that they are inadequate to achieve the necessary improvements. My comments on them are in Memorandum A attached.[3]

Memorandum B attached[4] contains a series of proposals which outline what I believe to be a minimum basic understanding short of the transfer of the overseas commercial responsibilities to this Department that would resolve the problem. I submit them to you in all sincerity as a potential alternative solution for what we consider to be a very pressing and very substantial problem requiring major attention at this time.[5]

Sincerely,

Maury

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[2] Document 363.

[3] Comments on State Department Proposals With Reference to Foreign Commercial Activities; not printed. Macomber and Trezise advised Rogers in a September 24 memorandum that Stans had rejected virtually all the points made in the proposed letter to Ambassadors. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE)

[4] Memorandum B is attached but not printed; see Document 376 which lists Stans' 14 proposals.

[5] In a brief reply, September 26, Rogers stated that he had passed Stans' letter to Macomber and expected it would contribute to the ongoing consultations between Macomber and Under Secretary of Commerce Siciliano. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE) Rogers replied point by point to Stans' proposals in a letter sent 14 months later, on November 22, 1971; see Document 376.

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372. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz)[1]

Washington, September 10, 1970.

K: I take it you wanted to talk about that memo.

S: I wanted your reaction.

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Records, Chronological File. No classification marking. The conversation, which began at 4:50 p.m., appears to reference topics contained in Document 369.

K: I think if you want action on that and give it to the Secy. of State he will go with it and switch it to State. It's just not clear enough. If you want substance of what we are talking about you cannot avoid a fight. It may not be open but it will be real. The only thing that Bill is interested in is State Dept. status and you are wasting your breath on arguments. You have to make clear who is in charge. He will chair the Secretary's group. I wouldn't put in this that State, Treasury. I don't think State has the staff to do it. The only agency that could do staff work is Treasury and that's not good.

S: These are the Depts. that have the most people and greatest amount of potential.

K: You have to tell the President exactly what you recommend. You have to tell him other points of view. Unless you get yourself or whoever as chairman, you will be in an endless guerrilla war.

S: Suggest a change in the way it's written and I will attempt it.

K: I would do a memo with my recommendations. Two pages saying what it should be. Do other memo on why you have objected other possibilities. That will still give everyone a hearing.

S: You think that memo is too long.

K: I think it's too wishy-washy, to be impolite, in so far as what this group is supposed to do on the whole foreign economic strategy. Secondly, on the way the papers flow into the Cabinet level committee. You see, the big bureau departments like Cabinet level committees to gas around; since they control the action they can do it through the cables. Unless you create a focal point through which you can force the ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? on the key items, it's an endless battle. This is just too vague. "A working group ? ? ? ? ? ?" And then you give him 4 choices.

S: At that point that could be changed and a paragraph of arguments of putting it into EOB could be inserted.

K: And explain the chairman more fully and what the chairman should do.

S: If you want to make some notes on that I will appreciate it and I will work on it tonight.

373. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, October 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Committee on International Economic Policy

I. The Problem.

There is wide agreement (your own advisors, the Ash Council) that international economic policy is and will be of great importance and that we need an identified working group at the highest level to coordinate its development and execution.

The problem is to locate and staff this effort appropriately, bearing in mind the following objectives:

A. Provide a clear top-level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues to assure these problems receive consistent, timely attention.

B. Deal with international economic policies—trade, investment, balance of payments, aid, defense, and financial—as a coherent whole.

C. Achieve consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy.

D. Maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), Oct 70–31 July 71. No classification marking. Forwarded to the President by Shultz under an October 13 covering memorandum in which he stated he had discussed the proposal extensively with Kissinger, Ehrlichman, and Flanigan and believed they were "in general accord with it" but noted that they might have some additional comments. Shultz also wrote that he had also discussed it with Rogers, Kennedy, and Stans, who were "in accord except that Secretary Rogers feels very strongly that State should chair the proposed working group." (Ibid.)

In addition to his telephone conversation with Kissinger on September 10 (Document 372), Shultz met with Kissinger on September 11 from 6:54 to 7:25 p.m., with Kissinger, Ehrlichman, and others on September 14 from 6:52 to 7:42 p.m., with Kissinger on October 7 from 6:05 to 6:08 p.m. and 9:31 to 9:42 p.m., and with Kissinger and Ehrlichman on October 9 from 4:36 to 5:39 p.m., at which they could have discussed Shultz's proposed initiative and memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968 to 1976, Record of Schedule)

Trezise and Samuels wanted Rogers to propose to the President that he use the Under Secretaries Committee as a working group for the CIEP or, failing that, that State either chair the working group or provide the Executive Director. (Memorandum from Samuels to Rogers, October 13, and attached draft memorandum from Rogers to Nixon; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, E 1)

II. Alternatives.

There is general agreement on the principal Cabinet Departments involved: State, Treasury, and Commerce, with Agriculture and Labor also involved in certain respects.

The central questions are: where should responsibility for chairmanship and the direction of this effort be lodged; and how should the staff work of the Committee be directed and executed.

The Ash Council argued persuasively to you against locating central responsibility in one of the Cabinet Departments. They argued in favor of placing responsibility in the Executive Office, using a reconstituted STR to take advantage of the staff positions available there. It would direct work of a Council, almost comparable with the NSC or Domestic Council, chaired by the President. Such a high profile operation would also involve major staff responsibilities in the Executive Office.

An alternative approach follows certain principles you developed in subsequent discussion. These are:

—The Committee will be chaired by the President.

—Its designated membership will be small, with the extras involved in individual meetings severely restricted, on the NSC model.

—The effort will have a low profile.

—The tendency to build up an extensive staff in the Executive Office is to be resisted, with staff effort to be provided by the Departments and other existing staff units, sometimes on special assignment to the Committee.

III. Proposed Organization and Working Arrangements.

A. The Committee will be chaired by the President, and consist of the Secretary of State, of the Treasury, and of Commerce, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Additional attendance at meetings will be by invitation for specific agenda items.

You may wish to add the following, though it would enlarge the size of the group:

Secretary of Agriculture

Secretary of Labor

The Special Trade Representative[2]

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[2] None of the options is checked.

B. A working group will be established at the political appointee level, to help the Committee in its operations. It will act as the general secretariat for work of the Committee and be responsible for the staff work. Its responsibilities will include:

—Establish a work program, including topics, timing, and identification of individual assignments.
—Develop the agenda and supporting materials for the Committee.
—Review all papers going to the Committee.
—Establish Task Forces on special topics.
—Follow up on decisions reached, coordinating actions of the Government where that is necessary.
—Help develop a sense of direction, strategy and the relationship of the parts to the whole of this problem area.

The Chairman of the working group should have ready access to the President and should be able to initiate projects and call upon staff resources from throughout the Government to augment his own small staff.

State argues that it should chair this working group, largely on the grounds of primacy of interest, staff ability, and the importance of such recognition to its foreign policy role.

So far as I have found, State is alone in this view and all others argue that the chair should be in your Executive Office. The same arguments against any Cabinet Department chairing the main Committee are operative: need for the Presidential point of view, safeguard against over-emphasis on a particular department's concerns, reluctance of departments to take direction from one another and the primacy of other departments in certain areas, such as Treasury in the monetary field.

I recommend that the working group be chaired in the Executive Office.

C. Working subcommittee will be established initially as follows:

1. Committee on Trade Policy and Developments including State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, CEA, STR, OMB and NSC. This group would deal with critical trade matters, where the need for better coordination is particularly critical. The chair should be taken by

CEA

STR[3]

2. Committee on Monetary Policy, including balance of payments problems, chaired by Treasury with State, the Federal Reserve, CEA, OMB, NSC as members, with others on an ad hoc basis.

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[3] Neither option is checked.

3. Committee on Export Promotion, chaired by Commerce, with STR, Agriculture, Labor, and CEA as members. This effort needs persistent high-level attention.

4. Committee on Economic Assistance. Use can be made of the National Advisory Council insofar as multilateral aid is concerned, but a decision on the composition and chairmanship of this Committee will need to be integrated with your recommendations on the Peterson Report. The NSC must clearly have an important role in this Committee, and perhaps State should chair it.

George P. Shultz

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374. Memorandum by President Nixon[1]

Washington, January 18, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Executive Director of the Domestic Council
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

This memorandum establishes a Council on International Economic Policy. I will serve as Chairman with the addressees as Members.[2] In my absence, the Secretary of State will chair meetings of the Council.

The purposes of the Council are these:

1. Achieve consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 3, Ex FG. No classification marking. The memorandum was released on January 19 and printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971,* pp. 40–41.

[2] On August 9, 1971, the President made the Secretary of Defense a member following extended discussions that are highlighted in *Foreign Relations,*1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972, International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 49 and 61.

2. Provide a clear top level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues; deal with international economic policies—including trade, investment, balance of payments, finance—as a coherent whole; and consider the international economic aspects of essentially foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and defense, under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council.[3]

3. Maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives.

An Executive Director will be designated to help the Council in its operations.[4] He will organize the general secretariat of the Council and be responsible for the staff work. He will have ready access to the President and will initiate projects and call upon staff resources from throughout the Government to augment his own small staff. In collaboration with the members of the Council or designated individuals at the senior political appointee level and pursuant to the directions of the President, his responsibilities will include:

—Develop the agenda and supporting materials for Council meetings and review all papers going to the Council.

—Help develop a sense of direction, strategy and relationship of the parts to the whole of this problem area.

—Establish a work program, including topics, timing and identification of individual assignments and set up task groups on special topics.

An Operations Group will be established, similar to the present Under Secretaries Group but replacing the work of that Group insofar

[3] In a November 18, 1970 memorandum to Shultz, Kissinger stated that he fully concurred in the "basic thrust" of the draft directive setting up the CIEP but had "one substantive problem"—that "it be made clear that general policy guidance on defense and foreign aid will continue to be given by the National Security Council." At Kissinger's request the latter part of this paragraph was added. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), Oct 70–31 Jul 71)

[4] In February Nixon appointed Peter G. Peterson the first Executive Director with the title Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, a position he held until February 1972, when he replaced Stans as Secretary of Commerce. Flanigan succeeded Peterson as Executive Director. The possibility of moving Peterson to Commerce was considered as early as April 1971 so that Stans could become Chairman of the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President. (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) The decision was made in mid-November, according to Haldeman's diary, following a discussion on November 11 of the "Peterson problem and the fact that Peterson says a lot but concludes nothing." The President "said he felt we should never have set up the Peterson deal to begin with. We should have just put an economic man in the NSC and set up a division there. He thinks that it's essential now that we have to move Peterson out and put Flanigan in that role, and told me to talk with the Attorney General today about the necessity of doing that and getting Stans out quickly, so we can move Peterson to Commerce." (Ibid.)

as international economic policy is concerned. Its responsibilities will include:

—Follow up on decisions reached.
—Coordination of actions of the Government where that is necessary.
—Review of operating problems arising out of actions of other Governments or outstanding international economic developments.

The State Department will chair the Operations Group.

Standing or special subcommittees may be added from time to time. To the extent practical the Council shall bring within its structure those existing committees or groups presently dealing within the scope of the Council's work as set forth above.[5]

Richard Nixon

[5] In CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 3, April 8, Nixon provided detailed direction for the operation of the CIEP and established a Review Group to review papers for submission to the Council and to assign action to the Operations Group. For text of the memorandum and further documentation on the organization and operation of the CIEP, see *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Economic Policy, Document 61.

Additional documentation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218–219, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP). For a discussion of the respective responsibilities of the CIEP and NSC staffs, see Document 147.

375. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, January 26, 1971.

Per your request, I called Secretary Stans to inform him how HAK wanted to handle the bureaucratic issue between State and Commerce over our commercial representation abroad. You will recall that HAK wanted to send Stans' proposal[2] to State for comment and then put the package to the President.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Vol. II. No classification marking. Sent for information.

[2] Document 371.

Stans informed me that the issue had been overtaken by events. First, State and Commerce are negotiating on the Commerce proposals. Second, Haldeman has raised the issue with the President who indicated that he wants the matter referred to the new Peterson Council. Stans is relatively happy with the progress along these lines, and so there is no need for us to take any further action from our side.

Since I have always advocated that we stay out of the issue as much as possible, I jumped at the opportunity and replied that we would in fact do nothing. I presume that HAK is not so interested in getting involved in this issue that he would wish to perpetuate his role in it, after the chief protagonist has withdrawn his request "for counsel on how to handle it." (It is also clear that the protagonist goes various places for counsel.)[3]

[3] Haig wrote "OK" to Bergsten at the top of the memorandum.

376. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Commerce Stans[1]

Washington, November 22, 1971.

Dear Maury:

As you are aware, following our meeting in June a year ago on the subject of improving Executive Branch handling of U.S. international commercial activities, our two staffs have held extensive discussions in an effort to work out a program which could be agreed upon by our two departments. I understand that a series of meetings have taken place between Bill Macomber and Rocco Siciliano on this subject, and more recently Bill held a follow-on discussion with Jim Lynn.[2] Most recently both Jack Irwin and Bill Hall[3] have met with you at lunch to go over various aspects of the relations between our two departments. Phil Trezise and Harold Scott[4] have also been involved and are presently focussing on

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE. No classification marking.

[2] James T. Lynn, Under Secretary of Commerce.

[3] William O. Hall, Director General of the Foreign Service.

[4] Harold B. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director, Bureau of International Commerce.

following up the Cresap, McCormick and Paget survey on business attitudes, a copy of which you sent me on September 17, 1971.[5]

Our two departments have apparently not been able to come to an agreement. Phil Trezise and Harold Scott have tentatively agreed to undertake a joint review of the activities and responsibilities of commercial officers in our missions abroad. The review would draw on, but go considerably beyond the Cresap survey. Its goal would be to ensure that our priorities are correct and that we are doing the maximum to provide timely and effective assistance to the business community. I am heartily in favor of this approach and hope that we can push it forward rapidly. I am most interested in taking whatever steps are necessary and appropriate to improve the contribution of the Foreign Commercial Service to our foreign trade efforts.

Because of the continuing discussions between our representatives during this past year, I have not formally answered your letter of September 8, 1970[6] which set forth fourteen recommendations. However, because agreement has not yet been reached, and particularly in the light of the need to provide Administration comments on the Magnuson Bill, I wish to set out clearly for the record my position with respect to your fourteen points in the hope that this answer will help move us toward a conclusion.[7] Although I address each point individually, I propose to act, to the extent of our agreement, on the program as a whole. It is important that we project a coordinated and overall view of the new program.

My comments are as follows:

1. *The Secretary of State should announce publicly that commercial work is the most urgent work of the Foreign Service.*

Comment: I agree with you that commercial work is a very important task of the Foreign Service. I cannot agree that it is *the* most ur-

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[5] The report on "Business Attitudes Regarding United States International Commercial Services" was commissioned by the Commerce Department; the Department of State did not participate in the study. A copy of the report's recommendations is attached to a June 8 memorandum from Thomas Stern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Organization and Management, to Macomber. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, E—Bureau of Economic Affairs)

[6] Document 371.

[7] In a November 22 memorandum to Rogers recommending that he sign this letter, Irwin stated that efforts by Macomber and Trezise to work out an agreed program with Commerce had foundered because Stans had rejected the various compromises agreed to by his colleagues and seemed to want a formal reply from Rogers to his 14 points. Irwin also pointed out that the Magnuson Bill (S. 2754) would "accomplish much of what Stans has been seeking from the beginning, namely the transfer of the foreign commercial service from State to Commerce." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE)

gent work, although in some posts at some times it clearly may be. In the coming weeks and months, my colleagues and I will continue to emphasize publicly the importance the Department attaches to our foreign trade efforts. Perhaps a joint communication to our ambassadors in the field might be utilized to make known to them our personal interest in their efforts to support our foreign commercial goals. We will consult with you on the substance of such a communication.

2. *Appointment of five roving ambassadors nominated by and operating under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce.*

Comment: I believe that a convincing case has not been made for a permanent requirement for roving commercial ambassadors. They would tend to be redundant and to undercut the authority of our country ambassadors, who should be the most effective officials which this government has representing it abroad for commercial as well as other matters. This judgment does not apply to highly technical fields in which exceptions have been made for temporary periods or limited functions. The appointment of Ambassador Kennedy and the Pritzlaff Mission are recent examples.

In short, I am not opposed to the temporary appointment of a special ambassador when required for particular negotiations or to dramatize some initiative we might undertake in the commercial field, but I am unconvinced of the need for a standing commercial ambassador corps.

In any event, I would strongly object to having such ambassadors nominated by and operating under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce. As I indicated in my letter to you of May 15, 1970, and in the memorandum which I sent to the President,[8] the Secretary of State's authority and responsibility for the nation's foreign relations should not be fragmented or impaired in the manner you suggest.

3. *Commercial positions abroad should be elevated above the level of importance and prestige of all other functions.*

Comment: To some extent I have answered this point in my answer to your first point. I do agree, however, that the commercial function is an important one. I agree that the high responsibilities of commercial officers in overseas posts should be made clear. Their importance should be reflected in the rank and quality of officers assigned to such positions. Requirements will vary from post to post. Rather than getting bogged down, however, in a theoretical argument over which functions are more important in which posts, I suggest that Phil Trezise and

[8] See Document 363 and footnote 1 thereto.

Harold Scott review these positions on a case-by-case basis to determine what specific changes or improvements we should make.

4. *Increase number of commercial personnel, and subordinate economic functions to commercial.*

Comment: Commercial and economic functions were integrated as a consequence of the 1967 agreement between the Secretaries of Commerce and State. Embassy staffing generally reflects the parity of these functions. Where this is not the case, we should work cooperatively to make adjustments, but neither function should automatically be subordinated. The case-by-case review I have suggested in answer to point 3 above will tell us what specific adjustments should be made.

5. *Opportunity for commercial officers to become ambassadors; increase number of ambassadors with commercial experience; Secretary of Commerce should be consulted on State nominations of all Ambassadors and DCMs.*

Comment: I concur that commercial officers should be given the opportunity to become ambassadors. Obviously, there are posts to which the assignment of an ambassador with a commercial/economic background would be particularly appropriate. In support of this proposal, Bill Macomber wrote to Rocco Siciliano on August 14, 1970[9] stating that the Office of Personnel has been instructed to ensure that all commercial/economic officers be given the same consideration for assignment to ambassador and DCM positions as other officers in the Foreign Service. As you know, many outside ambassadorial appointees have strong commercial and business backgrounds. We will be most happy to discuss with you any specific recommendations for ambassadorial appointments which you would like to make at any time. I am sure that upon reflection you will agree that I could not possibly accept a veto power from Commerce or any other Department over my recommendations of Ambassadors to the President or over my assignments of Deputy Chiefs of Mission.

6. *Greater voice for Commerce in the selection and appointment of commercial officers.*

Comment: I agree that the Department of Commerce should have important participation in the selection and appointment of commercial officers. Commerce already enjoys an effective role in this process, to the extent of having a Department of Commerce personnel officer

[9] Not found.

assigned to our personnel office. We are quite agreeable to discussing this aspect further with you.

7. *Develop an overall program for increasing the effectiveness of overseas services to American business.*

Comment: I agree with you on this point, as well as with your observation that the personal leadership of our ambassadors is extremely important. The proposed State/Commerce study should provide the best means of identifying those areas in which our overseas missions may be deficient as well as recommendations for remedial or additional action.

8. *Rotational assignments for commercial officers with American industry. Recruitment of personnel with actual business experience.*

Comment: I agree with this proposal. We are developing a practical program to achieve this goal and hope to place commercial officers, through the President's Executive Interchange Program, in business firms with international interests. Foreign Service recruiting officers have recently begun to visit graduate schools of business to encourage candidates to enter the Foreign Service as commercial officers. Efforts have also been made, including advertisements in trade and professional journals, to attract qualified personnel with actual business experience. Here again the State/Commerce study should provide us with additional insight as to how these activities can be augmented.

9. *Rotational assignment at Commerce.*

Comment: There is no doubt in my mind that it would be most useful to seek to increase the number of rotational assignments with Commerce. The value of these assignments has been clearly established.

10. *Extended tours of duty for commercial officers.*

Comment: I agree that commercial assignments should be directed to assuring maximum operational effectiveness of officers involved. To this end, we have already extended the average length of tour in major posts. In the smaller, hardship posts long tours are often not practical for a variety of reasons. I am agreeable, in principle, to making exceptions to the length-of-tour limits in the interests of greater efficiency in the commercial field wherever such exceptions prove practical.

11. *Frequent meetings of ambassadors with American business and host government officials.*

Comment: I share your judgment regarding the importance of regular contacts with both the American business community and government officials. This is a point we could cover in the joint communication to the field I referred to under point 1 above.

12. *Regular regional commercial conferences, planned and chaired by Commerce.*

Comment: Regional economic/commercial conferences should continue, if possible at an increased pace, because they provide a forum for an essential exchange between Washington and the field. I believe that the planning, financing, and implementing of these conferences should be jointly shared by our departments. Depending on the circumstances, there may be a particular reason for a representative of one department rather than the other to chair the meeting. Logically, the senior official present should chair the meeting. I agree that ambassadors should participate in the conferences, and we shall encourage them to become more involved.

13. *Institutionalized State/Commerce relationship in Washington.*

Comment: Existing channels of communication between the two departments should be sufficient to carry out the consultation functions. The main points of contact are the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business. The respective heads of State's Office of Commercial Affairs and Business Activities (Bruce Ladd) and the Director of Commerce's Bureau of International Commerce (Bob Beshar) provide the ideal focus for continuing coordination. I believe the proposed joint State/Commerce study should address itself to the question of whether more formal contacts are necessary.

14. *Directors of U.S. Trade Centers should be transferred to the Department of Commerce.*

Comment: The Department of Commerce already has an effective voice in the selection of Trade Center Directors. Trade Centers, like other U.S. programs, must be responsible to the authority of the ambassadors in any given country. Little would be gained in diffusing that authority. Subject to this qualification, we are entirely willing to discuss further ways for Commerce to give more direct guidance for Trade Center operations, given their highly specialized nature, as well as any other practical improvements in these operations you would like to suggest.

You will note that we are in essential agreement on most of the fourteen points. Insofar as we are in agreement, we can and should proceed to early implementation of the indicated improvements, treating them as an integral part of an overall program to improve our handling of international commercial activities.

Jack Irwin told me that in his luncheon with you he took the liberty of suggesting that he be available to you at your convenience to discuss further your letter of September 8, 1970 and this answer. I am

happy to have him do so, and, of course, I am available. Jack, Bill Macomber and Phil Trezise will also be prepared to work on details with Jim Lynn and Harold Scott.

I trust that in this way we will be able to iron out any remaining differences between us.[10]

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

[10] Stans replied to Rogers in a December 23 letter that "the time has come for a Presidential decision that the strengthening and upgrading of U.S. commercial representation abroad be accomplished within the Executive Branch promptly and as a top priority project" and thus he had written the President urging that course of action (Document 377).

377. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon[1]

Washington, December 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

U.S. Foreign Commercial Services

This is a subject which we discussed early in your Administration. Since then, the report of the Williams Commission identifies it as a major problem: that our foreign policy and foreign representation give insufficient weight to our business interests overseas.

In this connection, I suggested in 1969 the advantages of transferring the commercial and economic functions of the Foreign Service to the Department of Commerce and you encouraged me to pursue the matter. Since then, the Departments of Commerce and State have discussed this and related matters extensively, but without agreement (Enclosure A).[2] In my judgment, satisfactory commercial representation can be achieved through the Foreign Service only if the State Department recognizes and announces publicly that, except in extraordinary cases, commercial work is its most urgent task. Anything less will not

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 3, Ex FG 999. Official Use Only.

[2] Documents 371 and 376.

accomplish the change of attitude needed in the Foreign Service. Our discussions with the State Department make it clear, however, that they will resist a shift in emphasis and a restructuring of the degree necessary, and that acceptable commercial representation abroad will be obtained only by new legislation or executive order.

Legislation to transfer the commercial and economic responsibilities of the Foreign Service to the Department of Commerce was recently introduced by Senator Magnuson in S. 2754. This bill would establish in the Department of Commerce an "International Commercial Service" to provide economic and commercial representation in our diplomatic missions throughout the world. The bill would also specifically authorize the Secretary of Commerce to engage in a broad range of export expansion activities.

In my judgment S. 2754 affords an attractive opportunity and vehicle for a Presidential decision to strengthen and upgrade our commercial services and representation abroad. I request your direction that the Administration support and testify favorably on S. 2754.

I.

During the past decade, we have witnessed the steady erosion of our position in world trade. This erosion has culminated in a projected trade deficit of perhaps as much as $2 billion for the current calendar year. The deterioration of our international competitive position is attributable to many reasons, but a significant factor is the inadequacy of our commercial representation abroad. Although we are the major trading nation in the world, we maintain overseas a smaller number of commercial and trade promotion personnel than do other nations, and we afford those commercial representatives roles of only minor importance and little prestige.

There is increasing and voluminous evidence that the U.S. business community lacks confidence in and respect for the Government's foreign commercial services. U.S. business needs and wants aggressive Government support overseas. The Williams Commission report confirms the need for an expanded and expert commercial service with increased status and importance. The National Export Expansion Council adopted a resolution in March urging the creation of a business-oriented Foreign Commerce Corps. The Ash Council made a similar recommendation last November, and a special study by Cresap, McCormick and Paget further documented the need for more effective foreign representation of U.S. business interests. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Asia supports the proposition and calls for an era of "economic diplomacy" for the United States.

Our foreign competitors have recognized—to their great competitive advantage—the primarily commercial responsibilities and func-

tions of their Foreign Service. For example, the Duncan Report on British Overseas Representation stated that "Commercial work is the most urgent task of (British) overseas representatives." The Duncan Report went on to state that "it seems right that it (commercial work) should absorb more of the Services resources than any other function." The views of our foreign competitors on the dignity and significance of their commercial representation contrast markedly to the inadequate position, training and background of U.S. Foreign Service commercial personnel. It is indeed ironic that as we enter a generation of peace in which competition between nations will take the form of commercial endeavor rather than cannon shot, the Department of Commerce, which is the agency primarily charged with important international trade and investment responsibilities, lacks an official overseas service.

Presidential support of S. 2754 or similar legislation would assure the strengthening and upgrading of U.S. commercial representation abroad. In a new era of trade negotiations and trade competition, I believe that this should be a matter of top priority.

II.

If you consider it inappropriate to support or propose legislation to create a foreign commercial service within the Commerce Department, or if in your judgment legislation of this sort would not be forthcoming from the Congress, I strongly urge that you direct by executive order the transfer of the commercial and economic functions of the Foreign Service to the Department of Commerce. There are direct precedents for this action in the creation of the Foreign Agriculture Service in 1954, and the earlier establishment of independent representation overseas for both the foreign aid program and the U.S. Information Agency. Detailed proposals and procedures for such a realignment of interdepartmental responsibilities have been submitted to Dr. Kissinger (Enclosure B).[3] None of these would affect the position of the Ambassador as the Chief of Mission in each country.

Announcement of a favorable decision on S. 2754 or the realignment of international commercial responsibilities would be dramatic proof of the trade expansionist thrust of the New Economic Policy. It would help revitalize the leadership and enthusiasm of the business community and offer a timely response to Congressional unrest caused by the present bleak trade outlook.

Maurice H. Stans

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[3] Document 362.

378. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, January 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

Secretary Stans' Memorandum of December 23, 1971

I refer to Secretary Stans' memorandum of December 23, 1971,[2] to you in which he renews his recommendation that the commercial and economic functions of the Foreign Service be supplanted by a Foreign Commercial Service within the Department of Commerce, and, accordingly, that the Administration support S. 2754, which was recently introduced by Senator Magnuson. For the following reasons, I continue strongly to oppose this recommendation:

1. Contrary to Secretary Stans' assertion that what he terms the "inadequacy of our commercial representation abroad" has been a significant factor in our trade deficit, it is my understanding that the major factors have been our domestic inflation and an over-valued dollar. With the corrections in the situation which you have now achieved, plus our immediate and longer-term efforts to negotiate certain changes in international trade policies, a major favorable shift in our trade balance should take place over the next few years.

2. The foregoing, of course, does not diminish the importance of our official USG commercial representation abroad and increasing its effectiveness wherever possible. In this I fully agree with Secretary Stans and, as in the past, am prepared to consider the assignment to appropriate positions abroad of any and all qualified nominees from the Department of Commerce whom Secretary Stans is able to furnish. I would also welcome whatever strengthening and improvement Secretary Stans is able to make in the Department of Commerce which, under our present arrangements, has the primary responsibility of "backstopping" all of our trade-promotion activities abroad, whether carried out by personnel specifically charged with this task or by Ambassadors, Consular Officers or other Foreign Service personnel. I look on the job not as being just that of specialized personnel but also that of the entire Foreign Service whenever and however appropriate. This is being reemphasized to all of our posts.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1 COM–STATE. No classification marking.

[2] Document 377.

3. In this connection, it is my belief that, however active our USG personnel should and must be as "salesmen" of US products abroad, the primary impetus must come from American business itself. The large firms who produce the major part of our exports normally have competent staffs dealing with their foreign business, and these firms generally deal with the Ambassador or DCM on broad policy matters. It is the smaller and medium-size American firms that rely more on our economic/commercial officers for advice and assistance. In this connection, I believe much more can be done than has been done in the past to encourage such firms to become more "export minded." It is my hope that the Department of Commerce can increase and make its efforts in this field in the United States even more effective. We will do all we can to support this effort through the Department in Washington and our missions overseas.

4. With respect to the "economic functions" abroad of the Foreign Service, which Secretary Stans proposes also be transferred to the Department of Commerce, it must be noted that the Foreign Service carries on a wide range of economic functions entirely outside the purview of the Department of Commerce. These involve a wide range of USG interests and activities, such as those of Labor, Transportation, Interior, Agriculture, Treasury, General Services Administration, Ex-Im Bank, OEP, AEC, CAB, FAA, etc. To attempt to differentiate those economic functions within the purview of the Department of Commerce from the wide range of other economic functions of the Foreign Service would be an impossible task and, in any event, to the degree that it could be accomplished would unquestionably bring about unnecessary duplication and inefficient and costly use of manpower.

5. Secretary Stans underlines the importance the British and other foreign competitors attach to their overseas commercial work, but he fails to note that the British moved from an independent commercial service under their Board of Trade to a unified foreign service under their Foreign Office, that is, in precisely the opposite direction from that advocated by Secretary Stans. The Canadians are now in the process of changing to a unified foreign service. In both cases the decision to unify was taken because a separate commercial service not only brought organizational inefficiencies, but also caused ambassadors and senior diplomatic officers to give insufficient attention to business interests. The United States itself deliberately moved from a fragmented to a unified service in 1939. In fact, nearly every other major trading country organizes its foreign commercial service as we do.

6. With respect to weight of effort, I might note that the Foreign Service now has 486 economic and commercial positions abroad as compared with 477 positions for all political or political related positions. Neither of these figures includes ambassadors, DCMs or

principal consular officers who in many posts devote the major part of their effort to economic/commercial matters.

7. I was not persuaded by the citations Secretary Stans gave in his memorandum in favor of his position for a separate overseas commercial service. The National Export Expansion Council is an organ created solely by the Department of Commerce, and its coordinator is the Director of the Commerce Department's Bureau of International Commerce. The independent consulting firm cited presumably is Cresap, McCormick and Paget which, under the direction of Townsend Hoopes, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs and then Under Secretary of the Air Force in the Johnson Administration, made a survey of the State Department's Foreign Service. This survey was contracted and paid for by the Department of Commerce without advance consultation with the Department of State. The Williams Commission's recommendation was that our commercial services be given greater status and importance, but *not* that these services be transferred to the Department of Commerce.

8. In spite of the large number of letters and other expressions of appreciation for assistance in economic/commercial matters we consistently receive from American business circles, I do not deny that there are cases of dissatisfaction. In our experience those cases arise primarily where there are competitive American interests involved, and thus the Foreign Service post is inhibited in promoting the interests of any particular American firm. This problem is inherent in our competitive economy and is often not present to the same degree among our foreign competitors, who are more likely to be able officially to promote the interests of a single "chosen instrument."

9. I am confident State and Commerce can work together closely and effectively under the present organization of the Foreign Service, and that the Secretary of Commerce and I can cooperate to ensure that we are doing the maximum to provide timely and effective assistance to the business community. Your intention to nominate Willis C. Armstrong—who is now President of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce—as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs should be of great value in this connection.

William P. Rogers

379. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the Operations Staff, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

Position on Proposed Export Expansion Act

On January 24 hearings will begin on the "Export Expansion Act of 1971." This bill, introduced by Senator Magnuson, proposes a number of measures to strengthen U.S. export performance. In so doing, it calls for additional measures to expand exports and casts doubt on the effectiveness of the Administration's own comprehensive export expansion efforts (including the August 15 package and subsequent trade and monetary agreements). The attached memorandum to Shultz (Tab A)[2] indicates that you consider the appropriate Administration position to be one of opposition to the Magnuson bill. State, OMB, and the CIEP staff also agree to this posture.

Major issue

There is, however, one major bureaucratic issue of which you should be aware. The Magnuson bill proposes to transfer responsibility for international commercial and economic matters from the Department of State to Commerce and create a new international commercial service in Commerce. Stans supports this measure. State (Tab B)[3] and OMB oppose.

We have been through this before. Although the proposed transfer would give more emphasis to commercial and economic matters and probably mean that better personnel could be recruited for export promotional activities, it would remove a major part of State's functions in the international economic field and give them to an agency which historically has taken a harder line on such issues. Because our relations with the Common Market, Canada, and Japan will have an increasingly large and sensitive economic component which will have important political implications, such a transfer at this time would be particularly risky in foreign policy terms. And, while State's line may frequently be too "soft" on such issues, in the next several months it will be preferable to start out with a "soft line," which could subsequently be

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Vol. V. No classification marking.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Tab B is printed as Document 378.

hardened by the other agencies, rather than for Commerce to push economic interests too hard at the outset and thus place you in the position of having to take on Commerce *and* Treasury in order to bring about a line more consistent with our foreign policy interests.

The memorandum for Shultz at Tab A indicates that you favor an Administration position opposing the Magnuson bill and that, on the specific question of the transfer of commercial and economic matters from State to Commerce, you favor retaining these functions in State.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to George Shultz at Tab A.[4]

[4] Kissinger did not sign the memorandum to Shultz and wrote at the top of Hormats' memorandum, "I want to stay out of this."

380. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz), and the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman)[1]

Washington, January 18, 1972.

[Omitted here is discussion of a number of issues, including the West Coast dock strike, the federal budget, and Peter Peterson's appointment to head the Department of Commerce.]

Shultz: Well I have one request for a position, that I sent you. But it has to do with the Magnuson Bill on export expansion, which we view as a bill that is not designed to go anywhere but to sort of mess around in the area. And we have been working with the agencies trying to get an administration position on it.

[Omitted here is Shultz's discussion of the first part of the Magnuson Bill, which, he said, "has all sorts of devices and gimmicks that would subsidize exports;" he indicated that OMB's position was to say

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation among Nixon, Shultz, and Ehrlichman, January 18, 1972, Oval Office, Conversation No. 650–12. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. The President met with Shultz and Ehrlichman in the Oval Office from 12:33 to 2:29 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

we have studies and negotiations under way concerning that part of the legislation and we should see what comes out of them before taking a position.]

Shultz: Second part has to do with a proposal in this bill to transfer out of the State Department all of the commercial business representational and diplomatic work and put it in the Commerce Department. This is a bill that Senator Magnuson has up and we have to testify, and the reason I'm bringing it up now is that the testimony is presumably scheduled to begin on Monday, so that it's right on us. Now, Secretary Stans, of course, is strongly in favor of it. Rogers, of course, is strongly against it.

Nixon: Unalterably opposed to it.

Shultz: My own feeling—

Nixon: My own feeling is that it ought to pass, but it's going to be a hell of a problem. It's a hell of a problem for me to go ahead and fight the Secretary of State on a matter of this sort of thing. Just hope to God that the Congress overrules them. State's been wrong on this for years. I don't know of one man, a soul that's worth a goddamn as an economic adviser. Not one. Not one at all.

Shultz: Well, I think our question is, what position should we take on the bill, since State and Commerce, among others, will be testifying. They will, we'll need a viewpoint.

Ehrlichman: Commerce will have the edge in Magnuson's committee, won't they?

Shultz: Well, I think that whatever position we take, if we were to take the position that we oppose it, nevertheless there will be a stream of witnesses and a design to develop the point that the State Department is not doing an adequate job of representing commercial interests, so I think there'll be a lot of pressure on State. Now our, my feeling—I'll tell you what I think, my view on the thing is, first of all that there is a real big problem in the State Department in the way this has been handled, and so the fact that State is going to get bloodied up a little bit in these hearings—

Nixon: Is good.

Shultz: —is good.

Nixon: That's right. That's what I—

Shultz: And that we should use the occasion through an internal effort similar to the one we did on intelligence to put a heavy pressure on State to change itself and in the process of conducting that effort not rule out the movement of or the restructuring in one way or another of not only how the commercial things are handled. Treasury of course has a big interest in this, and so on, so that we look at the way the U.S. represents itself in a given country as a mission, what the roles

of respective departments are. Well, if we say explicitly in our testimony that while we, while we would not favor the passage of this transfer now, that we, we want everybody to know that we are undertaking this examination because we do feel there are genuine problems there. That is sort of the way we have drafted it, but I know your feelings about it, I—

Nixon: You want me to say we're studying it then?

Ehrlichman: Rogers will want [unclear]

Shultz: He will agree to it. Stans won't. Stans wants to go gung-ho to change it.

Nixon: Well look, the way to go is to—Stans has to understand [unclear] the way to do it is to get yourself in a little, maybe position there. I'm surprised Rogers would agree to that. But then to push that damn committee to kick State in the ass. That's what has to be done. I totally disagree with State. I just want my position understood. Totally. They're dead wrong. They've always been wrong. The Department is totally inadequate in this field. So we begin with that. Now the question is, though, how do we accomplish it without breaking too much china in the cabinet. And the way you accomplish it basically is to let the Congress do the dirty work.

[Omitted here is further discussion between Nixon, Ehrlichman, and Shultz.]

Shultz: Well, we could, we could stake out an administration position in favor of that transfer.

Nixon: Well, I'll tell you, I'd like for you, let me put it this way, George, we have a difficult problem here as we have in all our relations with all of our [unclear] bosses, particularly here between State and Commerce. It's just tight as a pick. You know what my belief is. My belief is that I'd put the whole damn thing out of State and put it in Commerce or make them take them, Commerce attachés. However—so therefore lean strongly in that direction but do what's possible. See what I mean? We'll even have confrontation on the thing. If we can avoid it, fine. But if you've got to have one, I'll lean that way, I'll lean that way if we have to. But I guess you're going to have to have one.

Shultz: Well, the only way out of a major confrontation in the testimony is the device of a study, but the study needs to be positioned so that the, so that it's serious and so that the scope is such that it isn't just necessarily going to rubber stamp the current situation, and it's clear in the format of the study that that's the case.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: What do you think, John?

Ehrlichman: You say Rogers agrees with that. That surprises me.

Shultz: Well it does. I think Rogers sees that he's on the defensive and—

Nixon: I'll tell you one ally you've got there is Connally.

Shultz: Well Connally bought this approach. I talked it over with him before we—

Nixon: The study?

Shultz: The approach, yes the study.

Nixon: All right, study—have the study come up against State. Fair enough? Okay. And I'll back it.

Shultz: Okay. I would regard this [unclear exchange] in OMB if we were to do it internally, and I believe probably that's the best way to do it, as a very serious proposition. And we worked the intelligence community over very hard.

Nixon: All right, I know.

Shultz: And I think we can do that if we have your support.

Nixon: You're exactly right.[2]

[Omitted here is discussion of a number of other subjects, including Chile and Salvador Allende, the Department of Agriculture, the timber industry, tax legislation, declassification of government documents, narcotics interdiction, busing, several administration officials, and the Department of State (including comments that are in Document 340).]

[2] The Magnuson bill was not enacted. Stans resigned as Commerce Secretary in a January 17 letter to the President. His resignation would become effective February 15.

381. Editorial Note

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy held hearings on the organization of the Executive Branch for the conduct of foreign economic policy on June 20 and 22, July 25, August 2, and September 19, 1972. Testimony was provided by Secretary of State William Rogers and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub, Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations William D. Eberle and former Special Representative William Roth, former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon and former Under Secretary of the Treasury Robert Roosa, Harvard professor and former Deputy Special Assistant to the President Francis Bator, and Yale professor and former

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Cooper. Their testimony together with statements and memoranda submitted for the record were published as a committee print: *U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for the Organization of the Executive Branch* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

Following his testimony on June 20, Secretary Rogers informed President Nixon in a memorandum of the same date that, in response to questioning from several Democratic members, he had "assured the Committee that the Department was up-grading its economic functions" but took the position that, "in general, the Administration's foreign economic policy machinery was working well." (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164)

The Nixon Administration and War Powers Legislation

382. Excerpt From President Nixon's News Conference[1]

Washington, June 19, 1969, 7 p.m.

Presidential Powers

Q. Mr. President, what do you think of the Fulbright [Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee][2] proposal that would limit the Presidential power to act militarily in an emergency?

The President. Well, I understand the sentiment behind the proposal. When I was a Member of the Senate and a Member of the House, I will have to admit that I felt that there should be more consultation with the Senate, and that Presidents should not have unlimited power to commit this Nation, militarily as well as politically.

On the other hand, as I now assume the responsibilities of power, I, of course, see it from a different vantage point. And for a President of the United States to have his hands tied in a crisis in the fast-moving world in which we live would not be in the best interests of the United States.

As President, I intend to consult with the Senate, with Senator Fulbright and with his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee before taking any action whenever I can.

But look, for example, at President Eisenhower in 1958. He had to move very fast in order to save the situation in Lebanon.[3] There was no time to consult, and also it would have tipped off the enemy.

Look at President Johnson when he sent in airplanes to save the missionaries in the Congo in 1964.[4] He had to move fast. He had no time to consult.

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[1] Source: *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 478. The news conference was held in the East Room at the White House and was broadcast on radio and television.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] See "Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958," Items 172, 173, and 176. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] See "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64," Book II, Item 780 [2, 10, 16]. [Footnote in the source text.]

I don't think a President of the United States should be tied down by a commitment which will not allow him to take the action that needs to be taken to defend American interests and to defend American lives where there is no time to consult.

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383. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Abshire) to the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons)[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Zablocki Resolution

The Zablocki Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on August 12 approved a resolution concerning the war powers of the Congress and the President.[2] In view of the extensive support for legislative action related to the war-making powers, we consider it virtually a certainty that this Congress will pass some legislation on this subject. Despite the fact that the Subcommittee has accepted only one of the three suggestions pertaining to the final draft, but forwarded by the Administration, we believe this resolution is the most balanced and moderate that one could anticipate going out of the 91st Congress and that an Administration position in support of this amendment would enhance our opportunities to further improve upon it when it is considered by the Committee.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, Cooper–Church Amendment. No classification marking. The memorandum was sent to Timmons after August 12, 1970, and before August 22. Written in hand at the top of page 1 is: "Bill T. is sending me the Rehnquist memo. I to call him after I have read."

[2] Prior to approving the resolution, Representative Clement Zablocki's (D–Wisconsin) Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments held hearings from June 18 to August 5, 1970, on the respective roles of Congress and the President in exercising the war-making powers of the national government. The hearings were printed for use of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs under the title *Congress, the President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). The text of the resolution approved by the subcommittee on August 12 (H.J. Res. 1355) is ibid., p. vi.

We had earlier informally made three suggestions on the draft resolution to the Subcommittee:

1. We suggested that a requirement that the President convene Congress—if it were out of session—to receive his report should be deleted. This has been done.

2. We suggested that the resolution be made a concurrent rather than a joint resolution; if this were the case, the President would not be required either to sign or to veto the measure and it would not have the force of law. This suggestion was not adopted. We believe, however, that this should not in itself be considered sufficient reason to oppose the resolution, provided there are no strong objections to its substantive provisions.

3. We suggested that the section 1 enumeration of situations in which the President has authority to act without formal authorization of Congress should include defense of "vital interests" of the United States, as well as defense of "the United States and its citizens." This suggestion was not adopted. A change was made in section 2, however, which helps ameliorate this difficulty. The earlier draft of section 2 of the resolution stated that the President "should seek appropriate consultation" with Congress "when extraordinary and emergency circumstances exist." The resolution as reported out by the Subcommittee merely says that the President should seek appropriate consultation with the Congress "whenever feasible." Thus, the consultation requirement is no longer tied to any definition of the kinds of situations in which the President may act.

Despite this improvement, we think another effort should be made—in the full Committee—to insert in section 1 a "vital interest" provision. If this is not possible, we could endeavor to place in the legislative history the interpretation that section 1 is not exhaustive of situations in which Presidential power to act without formal authorization exists. The present language would not bar such a construction.

In our view, this resolution imposes no unreasonable or burdensome requirements upon the President. Given the broad consensus, in both Parties and in both Houses, that this Congress should and will enact legislation bearing on the war-making powers and the numerous and far-reaching proposals which have been introduced into the Congress, we think it would be to the advantage of the Administration to take a position in favor of this moderate proposal. By supporting this measure the Administration would draw off support from more restrictive legislative proposals which are under consideration. Once the moderate Leadership in Congress is in a position to point out that the Congress has in fact dealt with the issues involved, some votes may be siphoned off of closely contested amendments currently under

consideration in the Senate and from some of the controversial amendments scheduled to be introduced in the weeks to come.

Assistant Attorney-General Rehnquist is of the opinion that two further amendments should be sought:

1. Following Paragraph (3) of section 3 the following should be inserted before the words "the President shall submit": "the President shall promptly report such action to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate. In any case in which the President deems the reported action to be of sufficient significance, or in any case in which Congress, by concurrent resolution requests additional information," . . .[3]

2. Section 3(B) should be modified by striking all the words after "such action."

The Department of State sees more merit in the second than in the first of these suggestions, although we do not believe either change is necessary.[4]

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[3] Ellipses in the source text.

[4] On November 16, 1970, the House passed H.J. Res. 1355 by a 288–39 roll-call vote. It stated that whenever feasible the President should seek appropriate consultation with the Congress before involving U.S. armed forces in armed conflict and that such consultation should continue periodically during the conflict. It required the President to report to the Congress in writing whenever, without prior authorization by Congress, he acted to commit U.S. forces to armed conflict or to send combat-equipped troops to another nation or to substantially enlarge forces already in another nation. The Senate took no action on the measure, and it died at the end of the session.

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384. Memorandum From John Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

Talker for Javits Breakfast[2]

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[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 269, Memoranda of Conversation. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned.

[2] Kissinger had breakfast with Senator Javits from 9:10 to 9:50 a.m. on February 5. (Ibid., Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976 Record of Schedule) No record of the conversation has been found.

Senator Javits is most exercised by the following matters—arranged in order of their probable concern to the Senator:

[Omitted here is discussion of Laos and Cambodia.]

War Powers

—You may recall Javits' *Foreign Affairs* article of January 1970 in which he proposed:

1. Make Secretaries of State and Defense answerable to the Senate a la British Cabinet.
2. Vastly expand the staff of the SFRC to compete on even terms with the NSC.

—This week Javits introduced measures to accomplish no. 2.

—If the opportunity presents itself, you might gently discourage him from adding to Fulbright's personal staff (the real result of Javits' proposal).

—Javits plans on reintroducing his war powers Resolution which limits by law the President's powers by:

- Allowing only four instances where the President could use U.S. forces without Congressional authorization.
- In those four circumstances the Congress must authorize within thirty days or the President must cease hostilities immediately.

—This resolution is absolutely unacceptable and I recommend that you be firm in clearly indicating that the Administration will actively oppose it.

—I recommend further that you suggest the Zablocki Resolution (passed by the House) (see Tab A)[3] as an acceptable alternative.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, China, Chile, trade bill, and NATO.]

[3] Attached but not printed; see footnote 3, Document 383.

385. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Counsel (Dean) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

War Powers Legislation

As you know there are numerous bills pending in the Committees of House and Senate on the War Powers issue (Javits, Eagleton and Stennis, etc.).[2] Last year we were able to defuse the issue by aiding the Zablocki bill which did pass the House. This year all of the active bills go far in restricting Presidential powers and are all unacceptable.

The Neustadts, MacGregor Burns' and Steele Commagers who glorified the Presidency and its inalienable and admirable right to primacy from 1932 through 1968 are found today infesting the Capitol halls testifying that shackles must be forged.

The Indochina situation has infused wide support for these measures especially in the Senate. Preliminary soundings indicate the Javits or Stennis bills could pass in the Senate. Preliminary inquiries also indicate that there does not seem to be a basis for acceptable compromise on any of the Senate bills.

Secretary Rogers testified on May 14th opposing the bills and making an appeal to defer action beyond the passions of Vietnam.[3] Stennis has also made this suggestion.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 315, Congressional, Vol. 3. No classification marking. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] On March 8, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on S. 731 (later reintroduced as S. 2956), Senate Joint Resolution 18, and Senate Joint Resolution 59, concerning the division of war powers between Congress and the President. The hearings continued on March 9, 24, and 25, April 23 and 26, May 14, July 26 and 27, and October 6. During the course of the hearings the following legislation was introduced and referred to the Committee: S. 1880, introduced by Senator Bentson; Senate Joint Resolution 95, introduced by Senator Stennis; and House Joint Resolution 1, introduced by Representative Zablocki on January 22 and passed by the House by a voice vote on August 2. The hearings were printed for the use of the Foreign Relations Committee under the title *War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18 and S.J. Res. 59* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). Included was the text of each piece of proposed legislation referred to the committee.

[3] For text of Rogers' testimony, see ibid., pp. 485–547.

We now face potential defeat on this issue which could have immediate unpleasant results, as well as forcing a fundamental shift in Constitutional power toward the Legislative Branch.

If we decide to battle, it could be long and bitter, and the results are uncertain.

An alternative strategy, however, may be available in the bill proposed by Senator Beall (Tab A)[4] which would establish a bipartisan commission composed of Senators, House Members, Executive Branch officials, and private members appointed by the President, the Speaker, and the President of the Senate. It would investigate, study, and issue a report and recommendations "not later than January 1973." This approach would give our allies in the Senate something positive to champion, and if successful, it would defer the issue at least until the 1972 elections are over.

If this proposal is supported by the Administration, it is essential that *extreme* care be taken in selection of commission members and the commission staff.

List of options at Tab B.

Recommendations[5]

That the Administration support the Beall proposal and to that end Henry Kissinger, John Dean and Clark MacGregor be authorized to work with Beall to refine the draft bill.

That responsibility for selecting a list of nominees for your consideration for appointment to the commission and to the commission staff be given to Henry Kissinger, John Dean and Clark MacGregor.

Tab B

Washington, undated.

OPTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO ATTEMPT OF CONGRESS TO DEFINE PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS

I. *Presidential Statement.* The President could send to Congress a message outlining his views on the nature of the war powers and the respective role of Congress and the President in their exercise. Such a statement could indicate the manner in which the President intends to

[4] Tab A is attached but not printed.

[5] The President approved both recommendations.

respond to international situations involving the use or possible use of American armed forces.

A. *Advantages.*

1. Would enable the President to capture the initiative on the issue and strike a positive posture.

2. Would afford a highly publicized opportunity to restate the problem in realistic terms and draw attention to the vast complexity of the problems involved in seeking to define the war powers without reference to specific factual situations.

3. Would buy time during which efforts could be made to convince a Senate majority that legislation is unnecessary and/or inappropriate given the President's statement.

B. *Disadvantages.*

1. Would run the risk of locking the President in a position from which it would be embarrassing to extricate himself should it subsequently be necessary to do so.

2. The opposition could attempt to use the statement as a basis for drafting legislation freezing in law the "understanding" of the President regarding his own powers. Such a move would be difficult to thwart without creating the appearance of saying, "This is what I intend to do, but don't force me to do it."

3. The great difficulty with the war powers is that they are virtually incapable of definition and an attempt by Congress or the President to do so could generate unforeseen constitutional and practical problems of great magnitude.

II. *National Commission on the Transition to Peace.* The President could ask Congress to establish a national commission charged with studying the multitude of problems involved in readjusting to a peacetime situation including an examination of the procedures by which the United States should honor its national commitments in the future and a study of the existing emergency measures that can be repealed without jeopardizing national security. The commission could be modeled on the Marihuana Commission established by Congress. (A variation is found in the Beall proposal at Tab A.)

A. *Advantages*

1. Would convey Presidential interest in a serious study of these problems and suggest a posture of reasonableness.

2. Would buy time (at least a year) during which period the situation in Vietnam could improve to the point where pressure for Congressional action on the war powers would evaporate.

B. *Disadvantages.*

1. May be inadequate to stem the pressure for immediate action by Congress.

2. Would involve the risk of a report unfavorable to the position of the Administration. This would largely depend upon the type of individuals appointed to the Commission and their attitude toward the issues involved.

III. *Presidential Commission.* In order to expedite the process and to maximize Administration leverage, the President could establish by Executive Order a commission with duties identical to those outlined above.

A. *Advantages.*

1. Same as 2A above.

2. Greater control and speedier response.

B. *Disadvantages.*

1. Same as 2B above.

2. Appearance of whitewashing the problem and stalling action by Congress.

IV. *Open Battle.* The Administration could seek to line up sufficient votes in the House to defeat any war powers measure that may pass the Senate.

A. *Advantages.*

1. Would avoid the necessity for making any substantive concessions on the merits of the issue.

2. Could keep the issue in a political and/or partisan context if linked to an attempt on the part of the Democrats to embarrass the President and the doves to undermine the President's Vietnam policies.

B. *Disadvantages.*

1. Would run the risk that the issue might come to a vote prior to the demonstrated success of our Vietnam policy, a time not particularly opportune for the Administration.

2. Possibility of defeat in the House.

V. *Compromise.* The Administration could attempt to work out terms for a compromise resolution that defines the respective war powers in a manner that does not seriously jeopardize the ability of the Executive Branch to respond to threats to our national security.

A. *Advantages.*

1. Would defuse the issue and avoid a nasty struggle between Congress and the President.

2. A successful precedent exists in the Zablocki Resolution passed by the House last year.

B. *Disadvantages.*

1. Would pose a difficult task of definition.

2. Would run the risk of freezing Presidential powers in a contemporary context without regard to the constantly changing world situation.

3. Would raise a serious constitutional problem relating to the power of Congress to define by legislation powers of the President granted by the Constitution and not legitimately subject to restriction by Congress.

4. Recent attempts to elicit interest in the Senate for the Zablocki formula were unsuccessful.

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386. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Abshire) to the President's Counsel (Dean)[1]

Washington, August 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

H.J.Res.1 Concerning the War Powers of the Congress and the President

The Zablocki Resolution (H.J. Res.1) has only one operative provision.[2] The Resolution would require the President to report promptly to the Congress whenever, without prior specific congressional authorization, he commits military forces to armed conflict; he commits military forces equipped for combat to the territory of a foreign nation, except for deployments which relate solely to "supply, repair, or training of United States forces, or for humanitarian or other peaceful purposes"; or he substantially enlarges military forces already located in a foreign nation.

While we believe that it is unnecessary to enact a reporting requirement into law since Congress is promptly informed whenever the President uses the armed forces, the Department does not oppose enactment of the Zablocki Resolution. The Zablocki reporting provision is geared to a standard of "prompt" reporting, rather than a specific number of hours and, therefore, would not impose an unreasonable burden upon the Executive.

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 US. No classification marking. Drafted by Kristine Strachan (L) on July 30. Cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Carl Salans and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Harrison Symmes.

[2] For text of the resolution, passed by a voice vote on August 2, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *War Powers Legislation*, p. 862.

The remaining provisions of the Zablocki Resolution are either declaratory or "sense of Congress." For example, Section 2 states that it is the sense of Congress that the President should seek appropriate consultation with the Congress before involving the armed forces in armed conflict. On the basis of my communications with Mr. Lehman of the National Security Council, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State indicated in his testimony before the Zablocki Subcommittee on June 2, 1971 that the Administration had no objection to this provision.[3]

The Zablocki Resolution presents no constitutional problems because it avoids the pitfall of attempting in advance to define and allocate the respective war powers of the President and Congress. The Resolution is consistent with the statement of Secretary Rogers before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 14, 1971 in which he stated that the policy of this Administration is to support cooperative measures designed to improve coordination and consultation between Congress and the Executive in the area of the war powers.[4]

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[3] For text of John Stevenson's testimony, see House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 52–57.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 385.

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387. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 20, 1971, 12:07–2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Senator J. Glenn Beall
NSC Staff—John Lehman

Dr. Kissinger expressed his regret that Senator Beall's illness and the requirements of the President had forced the cancellation of several previously scheduled visits. He expressed his great appreciation

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 315, Congressional, Vol. 3. Marked Secret on p. 1 and For Official Use Only on pp. 2–3. Drafted by Lehman. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

for Senator Beall's firm support on issues of national security in the Senate.

Senator Beall stated that he would very much like to have Dr. Kissinger's reaction to his proposed bill to create a joint Congressional-Presidential Commission to study the question of War Powers. He stated that the question had cooled somewhat since he first drew up the bill but that he expected it to hot-up once again in January. His purpose in drawing up the bill was two-fold:

1. It would be a useful study to have done for its own sake to clear the air on a number of issues.
2. It would be an effective measure to counter the strong and unacceptable Javits Bill.

At this point, Beall noted that he had been a co-sponsor of the Javits Bill when he was in the House but had since seen the error of his ways.

Dr. Kissinger replied that he saw much merit in the Beall approach but at the present time he wanted to delay the issue and thought it wiser to wait in introducing it.

Beall agreed.

Dr. Kissinger then briefly reviewed the bill itself and suggested that we had some reservations about the organization and the mandate of the commission but that these were technical rather than fundamental.

Senator Beall replied that he would be happy to work with us at the proper time to incorporate our suggestions in his bill.

Dr. Kissinger noted in particular the danger that failure to give close attention to the commission membership and the staffing held. He noted with dismay a great increase in irresponsibility in the groves of academe. He noted, that in his day intellectuals were all vigorously anti-Congress and pro-Executive branch, a natural proclivity since the intellectual establishment is at heart anti-democratic and elitist. Now, however, with a Republican President, and Senator Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee leading the pro-Congress wing, the intellectual community has changed its position 180 degrees. Dr. Kissinger further noted that an important source of the problem was to be found among the staff of individual senators and committees, many of whom are frustrated FSO's (FSO's being a difficult enough problem when they're not frustrated). Senator Beall fully agreed with Dr. Kissinger's comment that it is ironic that even the Republicans are having a difficult time in adjusting to a pro-Executive stance now that they have possession of the White House; Republican senators especially seem to have an ingrained instinct to have at the President.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he agreed with some of Senator Javits' points and had discussed his bill at length with him. There is no

doubt, he stated, that this issue was a real problem, and that perhaps after '72 with a second term, the President himself might get behind a full reexamination of the question. Dr. Kissinger then noted that the Administration position and Senator Beall's were very close, and that after January, Senator Beall should work with Mr. Lehman to refine the proposed bill.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and other legislative issues.]

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388. Editorial Note

In a December 15, 1971, memorandum, John Lehman of the National Security Council staff briefed Henry Kissinger for his breakfast meeting the next day with Senator Jacob Javits, co-sponsor of the war powers bill introduced in the Senate on December 6 and unanimously voted out of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Committee on December 7. After noting that Javits had gained Senator John Stennis' co-sponsorship "for the small price of including a phrase permitting action to forestall imminent attack," Lehman commented that the bill was "wholly unacceptable" and was "almost identical to one which passed the Senate in 1956, but died in the House. We intend to fight and lose in the Senate, and kill it in the House or in extremis veto it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 315, Congressional, Vol. 3.) For text of the Javits–Stennis bill (S. 2956) as reported with amendments by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *War Powers Legislation,* pages iii–v.

The Javits–Stennis bill was a topic of discussion at a meeting on January 24, 1972, of the Legislative Interdepartmental Group, held at the White House and chaired by Alexander Haig. Assistant Secretary of State Abshire stated that "Zablocki thinks he can block this bill in the House and that we should work on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Lehman added that the strategy is to block it in the Zablocki Subcommittee." (Summary of conclusions, January 24; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 302, Legislative Interdepartmental Group)

The Legislative Interdepartmental Group again took up the Javits–Stennis bill at its meeting held at the White House on March 10, 1972. Charles Brower, Deputy Legal Adviser to the Department of State, "reported the outlook is grim. Senators Roth, Bennett, Childs and Ribicoff are prepared to co-sponsor and the bill is becoming a motherhood

issue. It may come to the floor within ten days. The leadership of the American Bar is opposed to it and Clark MacGregor has suggested trying to get it referred to the Judiciary Committee. The main problem is that no one wants to lead the fight against it. Scott won't do it and Allott won't lead the fight either. Goldwater and Tower are against it, but would not be helpful as leaders of the opposition." (Summary of conclusions, March 10; ibid.)

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389. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Relations (Korologos) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

War Powers Legislation

The Senate today, after three weeks of debate, passed a strong War Powers bill by a 68–16 vote. 40 Democrats were joined by 28 Republicans voting for the bill. Three Democrats joined 13 Republicans against it.

Background

1. The bill was introduced December 6, 1971, by Senator Javits, Senator Bentsen, Senator Eagleton, Senator Everett Jordan, Senator Spong, Senator Stennis and Senator Taft. (Tab A is a short analysis of the bill).[2]

2. Chief Administration allies against it were Senator Goldwater, Senator Dominick, Senator McGee, Senator Gurney and Senator Beall. (Democrats put great pressure on McGee to back off, but he stood fast.)

3. Our chief arguments against the bill were:

A. It raises serious constitutional questions.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 315, Congressional, Vol. 4. No classification marking. Marked "Red Tag." A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Sent through MacGregor.

[2] Tab A is attached but not printed; see Document 392 for a summary of the bill's provisions.

B. It would limit the President's ability to respond flexibly and quickly to emergencies, and create dangerous confusion at home and abroad in the event of attack.

C. It creates a serious erosion of credibility of the U.S. as a collective security partner in eyes of all allies, especially NATO.

D. We also conveyed a strong veto possibility.

Strategy

Since the Senate was bound and determined to pass "something" in the War Powers area to "vindicate" itself for allowing Vietnam to happen, there was little or no chance of beating the measure or of getting any pro-Administration amendments adopted.

Our strategy, therefore, amounted mainly to delay and to stimulate Senate debate (at the request of Doc Morgan of House Foreign Affairs), to show that there *was* controversy, that there *were* amendments to be offered, and that there was no unanimous approval of the ultimate Senate action.

The basic problem working against us was Stennis. He had become a co-sponsor and once Senators saw this, they began to follow him, saying that if Stennis was for it, it couldn't be that bad.

MacGregor and Korologos talked with Stennis (3/30/72) at great length about getting him to back off the bill and go for one of our options. However, he told us he was in too deep to back away, even though he was admittedly uncomfortable siding with Javits.

Nonetheless, we offered a series of amendments as follows:

1. Hruska/Ervin proposal to refer bill to Judiciary for 45 days of further study. Rejected, 26–60. (4/11/72)

2. Beall Amendment creating a commission to study the whole issue. Rejected, 23–56. (4/12/72)

3. Dominick Amendment substituting Zablocki bill (which would call on the President only to *report* troop commitments). Rejected, 22–56. (4/12/72)

4. Dominick Amendment providing that nothing in the bill would restrict the President's authority to conduct intelligence operations he deemed necessary to national security. Rejected, 29–49. (4/12/72)

5. Dominick Amendment providing that nothing in the act shall be construed to limit Presidential authority in implementation of U.N. Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States. Rejected, 24–53. (4/12/72)

6. McGee Amendment adding a new section to the bill calling for a National Commission on U.S. Foreign Policy, National Commitments and War Powers. Rejected, 19–57. (4/12/72)

7. Dominick Amendment permitting the President to retaliate with respect to armed attack on U.S. forces overseas in addition to being able to repel such attack. Rejected, 37–45. (4/13/72)

8. Buckley Amendment amending the U.N. participation act requiring Congressional approval before the President could permit U.N. to use U.S. Armed Forces for enforcement purposes. Rejected, 27–55. (4/13/72)

The Opposition also offered some interesting amendments:

1. Gravel Amendment to make the bill applicable to Vietnam (the proposal specifically excludes the Vietnam War). Rejected, 11–74. (4/11/72)

2. Gravel Amendment calling for immediate declaration of war against North Vietnam. Tabled, 78–7. (4/11/72)

3. Fulbright Amendment designed to avoid implication that Congress is giving negative or implicit sanction to continuing Vietnam War. Rejected, 28–56. (4/11/72)

4. Fulbright Amendment banning first use of nuclear weapons without Congressional approval. Rejected, 10–68. (4/12/72)

Summary

Our best chance of beating the bill is in the House, where Morgan has expressed strong opposition. The long debate, amendments, and parliamentary maneuvering in Senate should show the House that there is controversy and hopefully the bill will die in Committee.

MacGregor and Cook of Congressional Relations will begin immediately to work on House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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390. Editorial Note

During a conversation in the Oval Office on April 18, 1972, between President Nixon and Clark MacGregor, President's Counsel for Congressional Relations, the following exchange took place.

President: "You'd never know that the Senate could be so goddamned irresponsible. Look at that war powers debate. What they came up with, that monstrosity, why that can't become law. You know that."

MacGregor: "They know it too."

President: "It's terrible. And Republicans voted for the goddamned thing as well as Democrats. Where the hell is the responsibility in this country, Clark?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Between Nixon and MacGregor, April 18, 1972, Oval Office, Conversation No. 712–6) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

391. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon[1]

Washington, April 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

War Powers Legislation

A conference committee soon will consider two very different war powers bills:

(1) The Zablocki bill, a moderate sense of the Congress resolution which you have previously approved and which has passed the House twice, in 1970 by a vote of 288 to 39 and in 1971 by unanimous voice vote; and

(2) The Javits–Stennis bill, which recently passed the Senate 69 to 16 and which we have strongly opposed as being both unconstitutional and unwise.

The position of Congressman Zablocki is critical to the outcome of the conference and the further course of the legislation, since he has been its very ardent principal supporter in the House and is accorded deference on this issue by Chairman Morgan. Congressman Zablocki has indicated to us that he will fight for his own bill in the conference, but he believes that since the two bills are so far apart there is no hope that his bill will prevail. While Congressman Zablocki is proud of his particular bill, his fundamental interest is in seeing war powers legislation enacted. From discussions with him it seems apparent that in the absence of some indication of Administration willingness to accept something other than his bill he may well lead the House conferees to acceptance of a compromise version of the Javits–Stennis bill, including a legal definition of the President's war powers which would not be acceptable. If this were to occur, it is possible that the combined support of Senator Stennis and Congressmen Morgan and Zablocki for the conference report could generate enough votes in the House to override a veto (a vote to override would be a foregone conclusion in the Senate). Our best estimate is that this would come in September.

In order to avoid the possibility of such a significant adverse development, I strongly urge that we propose to Congressman Zablocki, strictly as a final fallback position, that the Administration could accept a resolution which expresses the sense of Congress, and therefore is not legally binding, and which incorporates some but not all of the

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, Vol. 6. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

language of the Javits–Stennis bill. After reviewing this possibility in detail with the Legal Adviser, I am satisfied that a resolution can be devised along these lines which should be acceptable, particularly as it would be only a sense of the Congress resolution.

It is far from certain, of course, that the Senate conferees will accept such a compromise. If they do not, however, the result would be a deadlocked conference and no war powers legislation, with the Administration in a very strong position with respect to this issue.

I believe it unlikely that Congressman Zablocki would be willing to extend himself as much as would be required to achieve the proposed compromise without an understanding that the resolution, if passed, would be accepted by the Administration. I therefore request your approval for this approach.

William P. Rogers

---

392. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, June 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

War Powers Legislation

The Javits–Stennis bill on war powers passed the Senate 68 to 16 despite our strong opposition on grounds of its being unconstitutional and unwise (Text at Tab A).[2] It provides:

1. The President can deploy U.S. forces in areas where hostilities are taking place or are threatened only under the following conditions:

a. To repel attack on U.S. territory; to retaliate for such an attack; or to forestall direct and imminent threat of such an attack.

b. To repel armed attack on U.S. forces outside the U.S.; or to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack.

c. To protect U.S. citizens while evacuating from a foreign country.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, Vol. 6. No classification marking. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Haig signed the memorandum for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

[2] Tabs A, B, and D are attached but not printed.

2. Congress may terminate all such Presidential actions by Act or Joint Resolution.

3. All such actions will be terminated after 30 days unless Congress takes positive action to extend such authority.

The Zablocki bill (Tab B) has twice passed the House with our tacit support. It is a moderate sense of the Congress resolution that provides that the President should consult with Congress before acting—if circumstances permit. If that is not possible then the President must report to Congress promptly. Justice, State and NSC agree that this bill presents no problem.

A conference committee will soon meet to reconcile the two bills. The Senate Conferees, Fulbright, Javits and Symington, backed by their wide vote margin will almost certainly not yield enough to make the bill acceptable. While Doc Morgan and Zablocki oppose the Senate version they do want a bill, and there is real danger that they will accept a compromise that you would still have to veto. Apart from the political disadvantages of vetoing a war-powers bill, it is quite possible that the Senate might override, and an outside possibility that the House might do the same.

Decision

We must now give the House conferees some clear signals and the options seem to be the following:

Option 1.

The Secretary of State recommends (Tab C)[3] that you approve telling Zablocki that you could accept the compromise resolution at Tab D as a final fallback position. It includes a specification of presidential war-powers and endorses a thirty-day cutoff, both from the Javits bill; but both merely sense of Congress and non-binding. It includes the requirement to report in writing taken from the Zablocki bill.

Pro

—Zablocki is critical to the outcome in the House. He is accorded deference on the issue by Morgan. He has said that he wants a bill of some kind. Whatever bill he brings back to the House will pass, and he could possibly muster enough to override a veto. He believes that the two bills are so far apart that there is no hope that his will prevail. If we show willingness to compromise he will be more likely to hold firm against the absolutely unacceptable elements of Javits.

—The Senate Conferees will be unlikely to accept any compromise that is only sense of Congress, thus hanging up the conference and precluding any bill—the best possible outcome.

---

[3] Document 391.

—If it is finally passed, the reporting requirement presents no real problem, and the remainder is sense of Congress and not binding.

Con

—Although not binding the President would be giving approval to a constitutional position that Justice and State agree is not valid and seeks on its face to curtail the powers of the Presidency.

—Final passage of such a bill would have the same adverse diplomatic impact abroad as the Javits bill.

—Although not legally binding, passage would erect formidable political constraints to observe the letter of the restrictive measures.

—Signalling compromise now weakens the Executive position of strong opposition and makes an ultimate veto a less credible threat.

Option 2.

Inform Zablocki that no compromise is acceptable if it includes a specification of the President's War Powers or a time limitation on their exercise.

Pro

—Will demonstrate that the Administration is determined and should stiffen the House Conferees.

—Makes veto threat credible and agreement in conference most unlikely.

—Does not compromise the President's constitutional prerogatives or the reliability of U.S. commitments to allies.

Con

—If Zablocki is told that there will be no compromise on those points, he may feel he is being used to prevent any bill from emerging and he *wants* a bill. He may therefore agree to the Javits formula as a last resort and work in the House for a 2/3 majority to override.

Recommendation

That you approve Option 2. Clark MacGregor and John Dean concur. Colson concurs also.[4]

---

[4] The President initialed Option 2. At a meeting of the Legislative Interdepartmental Group on July 7 Brower "asked about the Presidential decision not to support Congressman Zablocki's fallback position on War Powers." The group agreed that "State doesn't have to tell Zablocki of the President's decision immediately and may await a more opportune moment. A meeting of the President with Zablocki may eventually be necessary." (Summary of conclusions, July 7; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 302, Legislative Interdepartmental Group)

393. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers[1]

Washington, July 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

War Powers Legislation

The President has considered various approaches to the War Powers legislation now under consideration in the Congress and has decided that Congressman Clement Zablocki should be informed that any compromise on this legislation that includes a specification of the President's war powers or a time limitation on their exercise would be unacceptable. Would you please arrange to have Congressman Zablocki so informed.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, Vol. 6. No classification marking.

394. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Morgan)[1]

Washington, September 13, 1972.

Dear Doc:

I know that the House–Senate conference on the war powers bills will be meeting today and I want to take this opportunity to express to you my views on this important matter.

The House bill passed twice as H.J. Res. 1 and more recently as S. 2956[2] is fully consistent with our constitutional system of war

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 US. No classification marking. Drafted by Isabelle Mellenberg (L) and concurred in by Abshire and Stevenson.

[2] On August 14 the House, by a 344–13 roll-call vote, had passed a version of S. 2956 (the Javits–Stennis bill) that, following amendment by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, closely resembled H.J. Res. 1, passed on August 2, 1971, and H.J. Res. 1355, passed on November 16, 1970. For the provisions of the latter, see footnote 3, Document 383.

powers shared between the Congress and the President and could strengthen the cooperation between the two branches in the exercise of these powers.

It would be a mistake, however, for the Congress to go beyond the House bill to accept a concept which seeks to define the President's war powers or place a time limit on the emergency exercise of those powers. My own view on the Senate bill which embodies these concepts is that it is unconstitutional and unwise. I so expressed myself in testimony before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations on May 17, 1971,[3] and subsequent attempts to perfect this legislation have not answered my basic objections.

The Senate bill, for example, provides that the President may not sustain any military action including defense of the territory of the United States itself beyond a period of thirty days unless Congress expressly acts to authorize a continuation beyond that period or in certain other circumstances. Yet there is no doubt that under the Constitution the President has the authority to defend the territory of the United States for whatever period is required. The Senate bill is clearly unconstitutional.

The Senate bill attempts to spell out in detail all of those circumstances in which the President, in the absence of express congressional authorization, would be permitted to use our armed forces. But our system of checks and balances already allocates the war powers between the President and Congress. This allocation of powers is inherent in our constitutional system and has survived the test of time for nearly two centuries. I believe that any legislative attempt to alter our historic constitutional system, particularly in such a critical area, should be cast as an amendment to the Constitution rather than as a simple statute.

I strongly oppose any legislation which goes beyond the House bill.[4]

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

[3] Presumably a reference to Rogers' testimony on May 14; see footnote 3, Document 385.

[4] The legislation died in conference.

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