

Establishment of the Kissinger–Dobrynin Channel; Dialogue on the Middle East; and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, April 23–December 10, 1969

41. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Authorization for Next Step in Sisco–Dobrynin Talks

Sisco has revised his approach in the light of our comments and Barbour's recommendation that we go to the USSR first.

This is a lot closer to your position—let the USSR make the first big concessions and defer a confrontation with the Israelis until we can give them those concessions, if any, to consider.

Joe has a tentative appointment with Dobrynin Monday² but will, of course, delay until he hears from us. Now that we have moved him this far, I see no tactical reason to delay further once you are satisfied this is close enough to the President's view.

Recommendations:

1. That you send the attached memo to the President.³
2. That you at least authorize me to show Sisco informally, before he sees Dobrynin, contents of the draft NSDM⁴ I sent you earlier in the week if you feel it represents the President's views.⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks, April–June 1969. Secret; Nodis.

² Sisco met with Dobrynin on May 6; see footnote 2, Document 44.

³ Attached but not printed. In this May 3 memorandum, seen by the President, Kissinger described the principal changes decided at the NSC meeting on April 25, which included the following: "We would not, therefore, have one big consultation with Israel before giving our ideas to Dobrynin. Instead, Sisco would try pieces of our proposal out on Dobrynin first, and then—hopefully after negotiating the best possible Soviet response—he would bring Rabin up to date. This would give us a chance of avoiding one sharp Israeli reaction, while still keeping our promise to consult with them." Nixon initialed his approval for Kissinger to tell Rogers to proceed on the basis laid out in the memorandum. The minutes of the April 25 NSC meeting are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

⁴ Not found. Kissinger wrote the marginal comment, "Tell Sisco no NSDM because of sensitivities."

⁵ Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations.

42. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Llewellyn E. Thompson

My wife and I had the Dobrynins to dinner alone last night to show them our new house and to receive a mounted photograph of Kosygin which he had informed me he had been asked to transmit.

In an after dinner conversation with the Ambassador alone we discussed the strategic arms talks. He said that the Soviet leadership had been disturbed by the speculation in the American press to the effect that because of economic pressure the Soviet Government was eager for the talks to begin and that over a month ago he had been instructed not to raise the question of talks on his own initiative with anyone and had not done so. When I said I was optimistic that we could reach agreement he replied that he had thought so too but had changed his mind. He thought that as a result of the delay in starting the talks and the attempt to charge the Soviets with building for a first strike he thought that there was great suspicion and distrust in Moscow of our purposes.

I explained at some length the thoroughness of the review the U.S. Government was undertaking of the problem and Dobrynin said that he could understand this but indicated he had not convinced Moscow. In this connection he mentioned the leak of the Packard study which added to the difficulty and said that this was something that even he could not understand.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson on May 6. Copies were distributed to Rogers, Smith, Kissinger, Laird, and the Embassy in Moscow. On May 8, Kissinger sent Nixon a copy of this memorandum of conversation with a covering memorandum that reads: “I particularly draw your attention to the third paragraph on page 2 which indicates that Ambassador Thompson—under instructions—told Dobrynin that we ‘hoped to be in a position to discuss the matter of date and place’ for SALT before Secretary Rogers left for the Far East. This conversation took place *before* you had made your decision on how to proceed with SALT.” Kissinger’s covering memorandum and copy of the memorandum of conversation between Thompson and Dobrynin are stamped “the President has seen” and are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Thompson/Dobrynin.

He asked whether in the talks we would propose a reduction or a freeze, whether we would go for parity or insist upon superiority and how we would define strategic.

I began my reply by saying that the whole question of our position at the talks was under review and I could therefore only give him my personal views. I thought it would be foolish of both of us to go for parity in every category as this would probably amount to escalation since one of us in each case would have to destroy weapons or systems which would be difficult as a way to reach a first agreement, although reductions could be considered later. I did think that our position would be based on an overall balance between us.

I evaded answering his question on our definition of strategic weapons but did mention that in the case of airplanes this was very difficult. He observed that in the present situation airplanes were not very important.

On the matter of delay I said the Secretary had asked me to tell him that he hoped to be in a position to discuss the matter of date and place with him before he left on his trip the beginning of next week. Dobrynin expressed his hope this would be possible.

I tried to draw Dobrynin out on the Soviet position in the talks. He said he had been familiar with the position that had worked out for the previously proposed talks. He said this position laid down general principles and objectives but did not go into specifics. He explained that this would be done after the talks had opened and they had a better idea of what kind of agreement we had in mind. I had earlier mentioned that one reason for the considerable time we were taking to develop our position was that the President liked to have several options explored in depth. He said the Politburo did not normally operate in this way. Papers usually come to the Politburo in a form that enabled issues to be decided by a yes or no. Of course the members had to do a lot of homework on the agenda before the meeting. He said an agenda might have as many as sixty items on it. On a complicated issue like SALT the members could not be expected to form opinions on all the specific issues that might theoretically arise in the talks but the delegation could get instructions on these as they came up.

At one point Dobrynin asked if the problem of Communist China would affect our position in the talks. I said my guess was that we would have an open mind on this and would give careful consideration to any points they might wish to raise. I said he would be aware from the discussion in our press that one argument for an ABM system was that it would be useful against a Chinese attack even though such an attack in the foreseeable future would be irrational. He inquired when we thought the Chinese Communist would have ICBMs.

When I hesitated in replying he suggested not until in the 1970s and I said I thought this was our view.

One interesting remark by Dobrynin was that my job as Ambassador had been easier than his. I had only to convince the Secretary and the President of a given position. In his case although Brezhnev was the boss, even if he and Kosygin accepted his position, if the other members of the Politburo did not agree that position would not be adopted. Therefore on his trips to Moscow for consultation he had to talk to all of the Politburo members and convince a majority of them in order to put across his point of view. I pointed out that in the case of the President he had Congress to consider. He admitted that this was true but thought the President could prevail in most cases where it was important to him.

I started to raise the question of Vietnam but at this point the ladies came in and his wife insisted on their going home as the hour was late.

Before parting Dobrynin said he needed something to show that the Nixon Administration sincerely wanted to enter into an era of negotiation with the Soviet Union and in that connection even a small step in advance would help. It was for that reason he had raised with the Secretary the matter of their opening a consulate in San Francisco in return for one for us in Leningrad. I gathered he had done this without specific instruction to do so.

43. Editorial Note

During their conversation on May 5, 1969 (see Document 42), Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin also discussed "Suspected Advanced Weapons Related Facilities in China (SAWRF)." A memorandum of conversation of their meeting, with this subject title, was sent only to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. During this conversation with Dobrynin, Thompson informed him of the U.S. discovery of approximately 15 SAWRF along the Mongolian border in the neighborhood of the Chinese missile and atomic test range and asked whether the Soviet Ambassador was aware of their construction. Thompson described Dobrynin's response as follows:

"Dobrynin gave me the impression he had already heard of these installations as he did not seem at all surprised at my raising the subject. He asked how large they were. When I said I simply did not recall

what our estimate of size was he pressed me further and asked if they were around a mile long. I said my guess was that a quarter or eighth of a mile was more like it. He asked about width of the internal structure and I said I could only recall that they were narrow—perhaps about six feet. In reply to his question I said the orientation of the facilities appeared to be random. Dobrynin said he would get in touch with his Government about the matter.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80–M01044A, Box 1, Folder 12)

On May 20, Dobrynin gave Thompson a reply from Moscow about the SAWRF in China, which Thompson passed verbatim to Helms in a memorandum:

“Adjacent to the border of Mongolia there are in the construction stage several launching pads of semi-subterranean type. There are 28 launching pads there altogether. In the area of Peking and to the south of it there are several launching pad complexes of the same type under construction with direction of fire to the South East.” (Ibid.)

44. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting, May 6

In his talk with Dobrynin on Tuesday, Sisco presented part of our proposed preliminary Arab-Israeli agreement.² He told Dobrynin that we feel efforts should concentrate on an Israel-UAR settlement, but that this didn’t mean we were disregarding other aspects of the settlement. (Dobrynin said Moscow insisted that a UAR settlement could not be considered separately.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, Sisco–Dobrynin Talks, Part II, May 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.

² A summary of the May 6 Sisco–Dobrynin session was transmitted in telegram 71012 to Moscow, May 7. Included in this telegram is the partial text of the draft U.S. proposal that Sisco gave Dobrynin. (Ibid.)

Sisco said we wanted a joint document for which both the US and USSR would take the credit and the blame. He asked for an intensive effort and said he was willing to meet every day. Dobrynin had no problems with Sisco's procedural suggestions, but said he would have to check with Moscow.

Sisco explained the following US proposals: —a settlement would be based on the UN resolution,³ the settlement would be a package, a formal state of peace would exist, all claims or states of belligerency would end including terrorist raids, and the parties would agree to abide by the UN charter in settling future disputes. These are points 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 of our draft document; 4 and 5 deal with withdrawal and borders.

Dobrynin did not comment directly on any single item. He said Moscow would have to examine our entire document before giving a positive reply, and what Sisco had given him so far left out the key issues for the entire settlement—borders and withdrawal. Dobrynin felt that the US may have misunderstood the Soviet position on borders. They want withdrawal to pre-war lines, but have no objections if the parties want to change their borders. So far, the US document reflected the views of only one side—the Israelis—and if there is no more substance in our other points, Dobrynin thinks we will be back where we were two months ago.

Although Dobrynin seemed to be taking a harder line than usual towards our proposals, he may just have wanted to make it clear that the USSR will want to put its own ideas into the preliminary agreement instead of making minor changes in the US plan.

They are meeting again today (Thursday). I will have a fuller report on this meeting when you get back to Washington.⁴

On Wednesday, Sisco went over much the same ground with Rabin.⁵ Rabin feels that the points so far surfaced are generally negative, do not spell out what peace is, and contain no positive Arab obligation to peace. (Comment: Joe rebutted by pointing to a number of such obligations, including that to control the fedayeen.) He also felt that the entire approach demonstrated that the four power and two power talks are designed to avoid negotiations between the parties.

³ UN Resolution 242; see footnote 4, Document 2.

⁴ See Document 46.

⁵ Sisco met with Rabin on May 7. In telegram 71862 to Moscow, May 8, the Department reported on their discussion. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, Sisco–Dobrynin Talks, Part II, May 1969)

Sisco also briefed the British and French on the meeting with Dobrynin, and told them that we welcome their comments. Neither had any immediate reaction.

45. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 8, 1969, 12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

NPT and SALT

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

The Secretary

Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The Secretary asked Ambassador Dobrynin to stop in for a brief chat after his meeting with Mr. Sisco. The Secretary told the Ambassador that before his departure on the Far East trip² he wished to discuss with him his current thinking with regard to NPT and SALT.

NPT

The Secretary asked when the Soviets would be prepared to respond to our proposal for joint action in ratification of the Treaty. Dobrynin said that he had been informed by Moscow this morning that Ambassador Beam had been given some information by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov with regard to Soviet ratification plans.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Toon. On May 9, the Department sent telegram 73688 to Moscow summarizing Rogers' conversation with Dobrynin and added: "In view of this development and because we continue to feel that joint action is desirable from several points of view, we do not contemplate at this juncture any further move in ratification process." (Ibid.)

² Rogers left Washington on May 12 for a 17-day trip to the Far East to confer with Asian leaders. Rogers' press statement and details of his itinerary are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1969, pp. 433–434.

³ Beam met with Kuznetsov on the morning of May 8 and received the following oral statement: "In connection with the question posed by the American side concerning the desirability of a simultaneous ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I can inform you that the Soviet government has decided to approve the treaty and to transmit it to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for ratification. Of course, the completion of the process

Ambassador Dobrynin's understanding on the basis of the cable he received was that the Soviets now intended to begin the ratification process. Mr. Toon added that according to Ambassador Beam's reporting telegram, Kuznetsov had also said that his Government had not yet decided when the final act of ratification should take place.

The Secretary said that the President was interested in holding joint ceremonies both here and in Moscow which might be covered on world-wide television through a Telstar hookup. It was not the Secretary's intention to press the Soviets to fix a date now for such joint ceremonies, but he did feel if we could reach agreement in principle, leaving the date open, it would be helpful to us in our planning. It was the President's view that joint action by our two countries would give momentum to the NPT and might encourage reluctant non-nuclear countries to sign. Ambassador Dobrynin said he would report the Secretary's remarks to Moscow.

SALT

The Secretary told Dobrynin that he hoped to see him again immediately after his return from his Far East trip in order to discuss modalities for beginning the strategic arms talks, including date, place, and the level of negotiations. He wondered how soon after a specific proposal were put to Dobrynin his Government would be able to react. Dobrynin said that this was difficult for him to answer at this time, and indicated that it would be helpful now if the Secretary could give a more specific indication as to his own ideas on modalities, particularly timing. The Secretary said that on timing he was not really able to go beyond what he said before—i.e., early summer. With regard to place, the Secretary understood that Geneva had been suggested informally as a suitable location and he assumed that this would not give the Soviets a problem. Dobrynin said that the question of place, he felt, was secondary and while he could not give a definitive answer, he believed that Geneva might be an acceptable location. The important thing, however, was to fix an opening date and he would look forward to his talk with the Secretary when he returned from the Far East.

of ratification of the treaty by the Soviet Union will greatly depend on the accession to the treaty of countries possessing potential possibilities to produce nuclear weapons, especially the Federal Republic of Germany." Beam reported on his conversation with Kuznetsov in telegram 1963, May 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 366, Non-Proliferation Treaty April 1969–Mar 70)

46. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting, May 8

At their meeting on Thursday, Sisco presented more of our preliminary document, and Dobrynin again emphasized that no comment was possible until the Soviets have the complete document.²

Dobrynin said that if he were in Moscow he would recommend against a reply at this time. Moscow will have to consult with the Arabs, and the one-sided fragments presented so far in the US “striptease” would only bring a negative reaction from Cairo. Sisco said we have consulted with the Israelis.

Sisco gave Dobrynin the following points (at the previous meeting he gave him 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7):

8 and 9—Mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, territorial inviolability and political independence.

11—Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

12—The refugee settlement including an option for repatriation with an agreed ceiling on the number to be allowed into Israel. Dobrynin commented that it would be hard to put this contradiction into a document, but Sisco said this might be done with an informal understanding worked out by Jarring. Dobrynin also suggested that there be a specified time period for implementing the refugee solution.

13—The final accord would enter into force when signed by both parties. Dobrynin said the USSR envisaged implementation stretched over a period of time although the obligations would exist from the beginning.

Sisco confirmed that points 4, 5 and 10 and the preamble—which the US has not presented—deal with withdrawal, boundaries, and demilitarization.

Sisco briefed Argov on the above Thursday afternoon. Sisco's third and final meeting with Dobrynin in this round takes place Monday morning.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, Sisco–Dobrynin Talks, Part II, May 1969. Secret; Nodis.

² In telegram 72809 to Moscow, May 9, the Department provided a full account of the Sisco–Dobrynin session on May 8. (Ibid.)

Comment: So far, little Soviet reaction. It is interesting, however, that in New York last Thursday Malik said he hoped we had noted two important steps the USSR had taken toward us in the past week:

1. They have opened the door to border changes and delineation of permanent boundaries;
2. They circulated a public document (letter to U Thant) calling for observance of the cease-fire on the Suez Canal.

We will know more only when Moscow reacts to our full proposal. This will probably take several days following Sisco's Monday presentation.

47. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Talk, May 12

At their meeting on Monday, Sisco gave Dobrynin the rest of our preliminary agreement:²

Point 4. The parties would agree on secure and recognized boundaries, and Israel would agree that the former Egypt-Palestine border is not necessarily excluded as the future boundary. There would also be an agreed timetable. Sisco explained that in raising the possibility of withdrawal to pre-war borders this had something for the UAR, and the need to agree gave something to Israel.

Tied to this point is the question of Sharm al-Shaykh which Israel feels it needs to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open. Sisco told Dobrynin that this is a critical point to which the parties must find an answer. The US does not want to return to 1967 when Nasser broke commitments obtained by the US and closed the straits.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, Sisco–Dobrynin Talks, Part II, May 1969. Secret; Nodis.

² In telegram 75822 to Moscow, May 13, attached but not printed, the Department provided a full account of the meeting. Also attached but not printed is telegram 75035, May 12, which summarizes the meeting.

Point 5. The status of Gaza would be worked out among Israel, Jordan and the UAR under Jarring. Sisco said the three countries ought to be able to work out a satisfactory solution.

Point 10. The areas from which Israel withdraws would be demilitarized. Arrangements would be worked out under Jarring for demilitarization and guaranteeing freedom of navigation. Dobrynin said that it was unrealistic to demilitarize all areas vacated. He could not accept Sisco's idea that the greater the DMZ the more likely Israel would be to withdraw. Also one cannot talk about only one side's security.

The Preamble which calls for the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the need to establish a just and lasting peace, and negotiations under Jarring. Sisco explained that we see this as meaning that there must be direct negotiations at some point. Hypothetically, if both parties accept the US-Soviet document there would only be specific details to work out. Dobrynin asked about Jarring's role, and Sisco said the talks would be under his auspices and he would decide when direct and indirect negotiations would take place.

Sisco closed by reiterating that we are interested in a truly combined enterprise with the Soviets. He said we have no assurance Israel will accept the document, and its success or failure would depend on whether the USSR can get the UAR to make the necessary commitments and concessions. Even if negotiations begin, we and the Soviets would have to remain ready to help.

Dobrynin's preliminary impression was that the US had left out the most important question—withdrawal and boundaries. All of Israel's demands are clearly stated, but not points important to the Arabs. The UAR reaction will be negative. The USSR is trying to meet US and Israeli wishes, but has not gotten anything on boundaries in two months.

Dobrynin asked about the four-power talks in New York. Sisco answered that they should continue, but the primary emphasis should be in Washington. The talks in New York should concentrate on refugees and guarantees.

They agreed tentatively that their next meeting would be May 19 or 20.

Sisco briefed the British Tuesday and the French Wednesday afternoon.

48. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Dobrynin will be coming in to see me at 11:00 a.m., today. I suggest you ask Dwight to call us to your office at about 11:30.²

I will have gone over your Vietnam speech with him in some detail,³ so I suggested that you keep your meeting brief and tough, avoiding any discussion of the particulars of the speech. Nor do I think you should give him any opportunity for rebuttal remarks. If you fail to reply to his arguments, he will take it as acquiescence; if you do reply, you will be drawn into unnecessary disputation. I would *not* thank him for anything the Soviet Union did in Vietnam. Their contribution is too nebulous.

The following are suggested talking points:

—As you know, I will make a Vietnam speech tonight. The speech has been painstakingly prepared, and is the product of many months of intensive personal study and thought.

—The proposals I will make tonight set forth what I consider to be the general principles of a settlement that both sides can accept.

—If we can end this war, it will encourage friendly cooperation between our two countries. I am willing to move forward on a broad front including talks at the highest levels and expansion of trade. But an end of the war in Vietnam is the key.

—If we cannot end this war, we will continue to maintain as close relations with the Soviet Union as possible, but clearly the ending of the Vietnamese war will be our overriding concern.

—As Henry told you earlier, a failure to achieve a reasonable Vietnam settlement can only mean that we will have to take whatever steps are necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion. We are determined to end this war one way or another.

—We both know how this would affect relations between our two countries.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 2. Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² No record of this meeting has been found.

³ A text of Nixon's address to the nation on Vietnam is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 369–375.

49. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting, May 19

Sisco talked with Dobrynin both May 19 and 20. Moscow is still considering our formulations and, according to Dobrynin, discussing them with “people involved in the area” so little was accomplished. (Tab A)²

However, Dobrynin said an Egyptian would be in Moscow soon for consultation—Joe had the impression it might be Nasser but didn't ask. He asked for clarification on two points:

1. Dobrynin said a package settlement should cover all the countries, but so far only a UAR-Israel settlement had been discussed. He asked what we planned for Jordan. Sisco told him that we feel the best place to begin is with the UAR, but we doubt that an Egyptian settlement can be implemented without a Jordanian settlement. We are not trying for a separate UAR-Israel settlement, but cannot give specific ideas on a Jordan settlement now. [The Russians know the Egyptians will object to what they believe is our policy of trying to split them off from Jordan.]³

2. Dobrynin said the US has departed from the positions Secretary Rusk took when he met Gromyko in New York last fall. Moscow would be puzzled by this, and Dobrynin asked for an explanation. Sisco said he would review the record.

What is happening here is that Rusk, in talking with Gromyko and UAR Foreign Minister Riad last fall, was more specific on withdrawal. We have, for bargaining purposes, been less specific. The Russians in December must have told the UAR they thought they could produce US agreement to full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. They obviously sent Dobrynin back to find out whether we're just bargaining or have changed our substantive position, since they're now getting ready to talk with the Egyptians about our proposals. Sisco, in replying (Tab

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, Sisco–Dobrynin Talks, Part II, May 1969. Secret; Nodis.

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is telegram 79805 to Moscow, May 20.

³ Brackets in the source text.

C),⁴ simply said there was “no deviation” in principle “between general views expressed in the past and the present proposals. This will leave the Russians to conclude that our present formulation is not our last word if the Russians can produce the right concessions from the UAR.

Just for your background, Secretary Rusk saw Gromyko on October 6, 1968, but little that he said on the nature of an Arab-Israeli settlement was specific enough to conflict with our current proposals. The Soviets may be thinking more of Rusk’s “Seven Points” which he gave to Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad on November 2 and Gene Rostow gave to Dobrynin on November 8 (Tab B).⁵ Even these were just tossed off by Rusk in a conversation as illustrative and weren’t intended as a definitive statement of policy.

The main changes in our position as the Russians would see them are:

1. Rusk talked about Israeli withdrawal from the UAR to the old international border. We are still thinking along these lines, but as you know have avoided being that specific about a return to pre-war borders in talking with the Russians.

2. Rusk took the position, as we do now, that the refugees would have the option of returning to Israel, but we have now added restrictions by Israel such as an upper limit on the number of returnees.

3. Rusk suggested a non-removable international presence at Sharm el Sheikh. Our current position is that any arrangements must be worked out by the parties.

4. Rusk’s “Seven Points” were not intended as an exposition of our entire position and there was much less emphasis on peace than in our current proposal. This is not a change in our position but Dobrynin may feel it is.

It will probably be 2–3 weeks before we have a complete Russian response to our proposals.

Dobrynin said the USSR attaches importance to the talks, is prepared to continue, and will give us their comments but he couldn’t estimate when this would be.

Sisco told Dobrynin that the Israeli attitude towards the talks is negative, and it would help if we could get a positive Soviet reaction on the UAR attitude towards peace.

⁴ Attached but not printed at Tab C is telegram 80620 to Moscow, May 21, which provides a full account of the Sisco–Dobrynin session of May 20.

⁵ Attached but not printed at Tab B are telegram 269827 to Moscow, November 9, 1968; telegram 7544 from USUN, November 3, 1968; and a memorandum of conversation between former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gromyko, October 6, 1968.

Sisco also brought up the Suez Canal incidents, and told Dobrynin that although the situation seemed to be cooling, we were concerned with the Israeli attitude and their message to the UAR that they could not accept a continuation of the incidents.

50. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

Memorandum to the President on Soviet Developments—Comment on our Policy

Attached, pursuant to your instruction, is a memorandum to the President on Soviet developments (Tab A).

In this general connection, I understand that the President at the May 21 NSC meeting² made a series of negative decisions on East-West trade issues. I have only been intermittently involved in the preparatory work for the NSC meeting, so that I am not familiar with the factors and considerations that led up to this rather major decision in the area of East-West relations.

But I consider it unfortunate that the Executive appears to have surrendered a flexible instrument of policy vis-à-vis the East. I have never believed that our trade (and cultural) policies will have more than marginal impact on the evolution of Soviet policy. On the other hand, I find it surprising that we should want to let the Soviets (and, for that matter, the North Koreans and North Vietnamese) control our policy toward all the Communist states of Eastern Europe. I believe that the policy of treating different Communists differently, if pursued without

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive.

² A NSC meeting on U.S. trade policy toward Communist countries was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:26 to 11:30 a.m. on May 21. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found. On May 28, National Security Decision Memorandum 15 on East-West trade was issued as a result of this meeting. For NSDM 15, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance; International Development; Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 299.

illusion and grandiose expectations, is a wise one. But there is little, if anything, that we can do in practice to implement it if we deprive ourselves of just about the only instrument we have for doing so.

If the intention is to hold out lush vistas of trade as an incentive for the Soviets to cross the threshold of “sufficient progress” it is doubtful that we will be successful. The Soviets are unlikely to consider the potential economic benefits of sufficient interest to warrant political concessions; and since our present policy supports their own efforts to rebuild a monolith in Eastern Europe, they will hardly be inclined to pay us in order to get us to give it up.

More fundamentally, I find disturbing the apparent decision, as I understand it, to withhold a “generous” Eastern trade policy until there is “sufficient progress” in our “overall relations” with the Communists.

It seems to me that this implies a concept of our relations with the Soviets that can lead us into serious difficulty. The notion that there is some definable threshold between insufficient and sufficient progress—between confrontation and negotiation—is unrealistic. The prospect is for a highly mixed relationship with elements of both. The attached paper attempts to sketch some of the reasons why this is so.

If we think of our relations with the Soviets in terms of milestones and thresholds, we run the risk of arbitrarily proclaiming great new eras of cooperation—much as President Johnson did for subjective reasons of his own in connection with the most marginal housekeeping agreements or with a summit of the most dubious achievement—when in fact little that was fundamental had changed. We should not forget President Eisenhower’s experience with his speech of April 16, 1953,³ in which he established certain litmus paper tests for Soviet good behavior. After the Soviets had met some of them (like the Austrian peace treaty) it nevertheless turned out that we were small, if any, distance farther along in improving “overall relations.”

In sum, rather than conditioning our minds and hopes to a vision of a relationship with the Soviets that is moving in one consistent direction of progress, we should anticipate that SALT and pepper will mark these relations for a long time to come. If the past is any guide at all, the landmarks we are likely to pass will not be ones of progress in overall relations as much as lines we draw in our own imagination for reasons and purposes and at moments of our own choosing. And the path along which these kinds of landmarks are posted is likely to lead to disillusionment or worse.

³ Eisenhower’s address, “The Chance For Peace,” was delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. (*Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179–188)

Tab A

Memorandum for President Nixon⁴

Washington, May 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

The View from Moscow

If one had to summarize the view from Moscow in a word, it would be “uncertainty.” Whether considering their internal situation or surveying the external scene, the Soviet leaders must see a number of problems and issues that are increasingly difficult and complex. Even if the collective leadership were disposed to be more decisive, which it is not, there are too many variables that impinge on their calculations and over which they have only limited control and influence.

A case might be made that the several pressures and uncertainties with which Soviet leaders must cope may dispose them to seek quiescence in their relations with us. Yet, for the most part these pressures cut several ways, leading the Soviets into policy lines that impede improved relations with us.

China

This problem is at the center of Soviet preoccupation because it affects almost every other area of decision. The build-up which the Soviets have made in the Far East will, by the end of this year, have created stronger ground forces than the USSR has in Eastern Europe; this has been and will be extremely costly, especially as the Russians create tactical nuclear capabilities along the China border. This is an entirely new aspect to the traditional squeeze on Soviet military-economic resources, and one which Moscow should logically want to alleviate.

Yet the Soviets find it difficult to cope with the China problem. The results of the Chinese party congress offer little hope for the future, if Lin Piao⁵ actually does succeed Mao. Moreover, any forceful move greatly complicates the situation in Europe, in the international communist movement, and above all, would seem to call for a much more stabilized relationship with the US and the West in general.

⁴ Secret. Kissinger sent this memorandum to Nixon on May 24, suggesting that the paper “points up the many conflicting strands in current Soviet behavior.” A note on Kissinger’s covering memorandum reads, “9/15, Ret[urned] and no indication that Pres has seen.”

⁵ Lin Pao was Minister of Defense of the People’s Republic of China and Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee (Politburo).

There are significant barriers, however, to moving very far in this direction.

Eastern Europe

The Soviets would prefer a tight, cohesive, ideologically orthodox Warsaw Pact. But the two recent “summit” meetings exposed once again the enormous problems of recreating such an alliance, without provoking the gravest crises; meanwhile, Rumania remains determined to create an independent position, and receives aid and comfort from Tito, whose relations with Moscow are deteriorating.

Much the same applies to the international communist movement, which will gather in Moscow on May 29 to prepare for the grand conclave of June 5. The Soviets would like, of course, to lay down a new “general line” on major issues—the imperialist threat, the Chinese, the “Brezhnev doctrine,”⁶ the character of the international movement, etc. But sharp clear positions are almost certain to provoke a showdown with the dissident parties. So the result is likely to be a compromise which will settle very little.

And in the background is Czechoslovakia. The situation there is, of course, improved from the Soviet viewpoint. But they are not out of the woods by any means. To the extent that Husak⁷ seeks to conciliate Moscow and consolidate his own position, he courts popular resistance. Yet if and as he succeeds, his strong personality and sharp nationalist sentiments may confront Moscow with yet further problems.

The net result is that the Soviets are reluctant to see a significant relaxation of tension in Europe, despite propaganda exercises such as the Budapest Appeal,⁸ since they are concerned that the centrifugal forces already at work might be accelerated.

Western Europe

At the same time, the Soviets recognize the attraction of “détente” politics in the West, and still intend to play this line. The uncertainties created by de Gaulle’s withdrawal,⁹ however, probably have upset all

⁶ The Brezhnev Doctrine applied in the West to the Soviet justification for its occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In a speech on November 11, 1968, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev declared that a threat to Socialist rule in any state of the East European bloc constituted a threat to all and therefore “must engage the attention of all the Socialist states.”

⁷ Gustáv Husák was First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party.

⁸ Warsaw Pact nations issued the Budapest Appeal on March 17, calling for cooperation among all European countries and a conference on European security. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 106–108.

⁹ French President Charles de Gaulle resigned in April 1969.

Soviet calculations. They have already evidenced some concern over possible departures from the Gaullist line by Pompidou.¹⁰

The principal Soviet concern, however, is whether the political weight of Bonn does not automatically gain as de Gaulle leaves the scene. Relations with Bonn, in any case, have been ambiguous. The Soviets are tempted to promote a “dialogue,” especially while the SPD is in the Grand Coalition, and even open up the Berlin question. Recent trade overtures and agreements with German industry also point in this direction. Any extensive dialogue, however, creates problems for Moscow’s relations with East Germany and Poland. Moreover, the NPT issue is a source of tensions between Bonn and Moscow. While the Soviets have now decided to start the ratification process, they will still withhold the final steps until the Germans sign, which probably means after the German elections. Thus, the issue may become acrimonious and an issue in German politics in which the Soviets will try to involve themselves. It may also complicate relations with us.

Middle East

On the Middle East, the Soviets have recognized the explosiveness of the situation and the need for a breathing spell; hence their interest in the four-power discussions and their fairly flexible approach. But the question remains whether they believe a breather is all that is necessary, or that a more durable settlement is required. In the latter case, they would have to consider the cost to their position in the Arab World of trying to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. It is unlikely that they have faced the hard decisions on the Middle East, since they do not seem to share our concern over the recent deterioration of the situation.

Vietnam

A similar ambiguity seems to characterize the Soviet position on Vietnam. In Paris they have been stonewalling and of no visible help in the talks. Recently, however, there were some signs—in remarks by Kosygin to Beam—that they might again take a more active role in private talks; perhaps this was conveyed to Le Duc Tho¹¹ when Kosygin saw him.

The Soviets are probably still basically of two minds on Vietnam, however. On the one hand, they could see the virtue in further stalling, in expectation that domestic pressures in the US will force new concessions in Paris. On the other hand, they may recognize that Vietnam

¹⁰ George Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle as President of France in April 1969.

¹¹ Le Duc Tho was a member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Special Adviser to the DRV Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam.

casts a shadow over relations with the US and may stand in the way of proceeding on other issues. The Soviets may also be concerned that the lack of progress in Paris vindicates the Chinese criticism and reduces Moscow's influence in Hanoi. But Vietnam is still a critical issue over which the Soviets have limited leverage and no compelling incentive to exert pressures on North Vietnam.

The US

Apparently, the uncertainties over Vietnam and the Middle East are reinforced by doubts over relations with the US. The Soviets have been notably patient about the SALT talks and fairly calm in their criticism of the US ABM decision. They have also been moderately positive in evaluating the new American administration. And Brezhnev in his keynote speech on May Day seemed restrained.

At the same time, the Soviets may have suspicions that the US is improving its military position and attaching "preconditions" to arms control talks.

SALT

That there is a greater uncertainty seems to be reflected in evidence of a debate over military affairs. The military seem to be arguing among themselves over weapons programs, including ABMs, and with the civilians over who should have the last word on professional military decisions. Civilian control is almost certainly not in danger, but concessions to military pleading, say for new weapons programs, may affect the political leaders' attitude toward SALT.

Internal Pressures

These issues have been sharpened by the need to begin preparations for the new Five Year Plan (1971–75). The Soviets are not facing an acute economic crisis; nor are they faced with simple choices of guns versus butter. The problems are more complex. The main one is how to increase the rate of investment for future growth, which is almost certain to decline further if investment rates are not increased.

Eventually, enough political leaders may conclude that they should cut into the military pie, which is probably exactly what the marshals fear and are trying to head off in their contentious articles of late.

While it can be argued that economic pressures push the Soviets in the direction of a *détente* with the United States, social dissidence and internal unrest draw the Soviet leaders into an increasingly repressive, authoritarian mode of behavior. Some very ugly features of the Soviet leadership are more and more apparent. Historically, such trends in internal affairs are linked to a more defensive but militant attitude toward the outside world.

The Outlook

All of the foregoing does not add up to a crisis. Nor does it suggest a more belligerent, forward policy abroad. Probably the leadership will continue to manage, rather than solve, its principal problems, and do so in the businesslike fashion which has characterized the collective in Moscow since they assumed power.

From our standpoint, this may offer some opportunities. If the Soviet leaders seem to be temporizing and are rather uncertain, then there may be room for the US to influence decisions, especially on the critical issues—the Middle East, Vietnam, and disarmament.

From the standpoint of the Kremlin, however, there may be those who are impatient with a leadership which seems increasingly tired. A change at the top, before the party congress next spring could be one outcome. Another could be the development of a new “general line” after the Communist conference, which is the next major landmark which should provide us with considerable material for a better view of Moscow’s foreign policy direction.

51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Kosygin’s Reply to Your Letter of March 26²

Kosygin’s letter—handed to Ambassador Beam by Gromyko in Kosygin’s absence (he is in Afghanistan) today—is on the whole calm and unideological in tone.³ It is clear that the Soviet leaders want to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 765, Presidential Correspondence, Kosygin. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Nixon wrote “A very shrewd and very depressingly hard line letter. There is *no* conciliation in it except style!” on the first page of the memorandum.

² Nixon’s letter to Kosygin is Document 28.

³ In *Multiple Exposure* (p. 221), Beam describes the letter: “An interesting feature was that the reply raised the later, much-publicized issue of ‘linkage.’ Apparently answering some earlier Kissinger remarks about the crucial importance of finding solutions for Vietnam and arms control, Kosygin’s letter declared it would be inadvisable to make the solution of one problem depend upon the solution of another, since this procedure might postpone a general improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations or of the international situation as a whole, and could create a vicious circle.”

maintain a dialogue with you and that they remain interested in keeping our relations on an even keel.

However, while the tone is civil and constructive, I detect no substantive concessions. But none were to be expected in this general sort of communication, just as your own letter contained general considerations rather than specific new offers of substance.

As was to have been expected, Kosygin argues against linking various issues too closely, although he recognizes a certain interrelationship. In principle, this is not too different from your position, and I see no need for arguing this issue further with the Soviets. We should simply continue to apply our conception in practice.

On specific issues, Kosygin's most important points are

—continued relaxation on SALT, with a bare reference simply stating that they await our views. He failed to pick up your suggestion that he give you any substantive views he may have. This bland posture is probably due (1) to their desire not to seem too eager and (2) their wanting to watch the outcome of our domestic debates to see whether we might be forced into unilateral "restraint";

—a rather more demanding position on South Vietnam, with, in effect, a proposition that we get rid of Thieu and set up a "temporary" coalition. On the other hand, Kosygin makes no demands for US troop withdrawals, as Zorin has been doing in talks with Lodge. Kosygin offers to "facilitate" a political settlement but this seems to be contingent on the changes in South Vietnam he asks for. I see nothing particularly hopeful in this;

—on the Middle East, Kosygin supports the present US-Soviet talks and the four-power conversations in New York but offers no change in substance. (Gromyko told Beam they are studying Sisco's recent suggestions.) As was to be anticipated he urges you to use influence on Israel. He maintains the position that arms control in the Middle East must await a political settlement;

—on Berlin, he insists that the FRG is to blame for any trouble but picks up your suggestion to exchange views on improving the situation; while we might explore the matter in a low key to Dobrynin, I doubt that this is a good time to rush into any full-scale talks. Following the German election, we might raise the issue with the new government in Bonn and then consider whether and how to follow up with Moscow;

—on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet ratification until then. He asks us to press the Germans and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by Soviet definition, Israel);

—he takes pro forma exception to the comments in your letter to Czechoslovakia;

—on China, Beam had orally told Kosygin that we did not seek to exploit Sino-Soviet difficulties; Gromyko now replies that they will not exploit our troubles with China either and, rather enigmatically, suggests that in general US-Soviet relations should be based on long-range considerations and on a whole range of factors, rather than just China.

I believe that this exchange of letters has served your purpose of putting on record your basic approach to our relations with the Soviet Union and that for the moment nothing is to be gained by pursuing it further. Other channels are open on pending issues.

A translation of Kosygin's letter is at Tab A; for your reference, your letter of March 26 and Beam's oral presentation of April 22 are at Tabs B and C respectively.⁴

Since we gave the NATO allies the gist of your letter of March 26, I believe we should give them a very brief account of the reply. If you agree, I will ask the State Department to have Ambassador Cleveland inform the Permanent Representatives by means of the text at Tab D.⁵

*Recommendation:*⁶

1. That no written reply be made to Kosygin's letter.
2. That I inform Dobrynin that you have read Kosygin's letter, that you believe we should now pursue matters of common interest through existing channels, that you do not plan at this time to make a written reply.
3. That you approve the text at Tab D for use at NATO to inform the allies of Kosygin's letter.

Tab A

Letter From Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Kosygin to President Nixon⁷

Moscow, May 27, 1969.

Dear Mr. President:

I and my colleagues have attentively familiarized ourselves with your message, and also the additional considerations conveyed by Ambassador Beam.

⁴ Beam's oral presentation is Document 39.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ President Nixon initialed his approval of recommendations 1–3.

⁷ Secret; Nodis.

We have received with satisfaction confirmation by you of the idea of the necessity of entering into an era of negotiations and of readiness to examine any possible path for the settlement of international problems, in particular of those which are connected with the danger of a clash and of conflicts.

This accords with our opinion, already expressed earlier to you, on the importance of achieving a situation in which negotiations would serve first of all to avert conflicts, and not to seek for ways out of them after peace and international security have been placed in jeopardy.

Such a task is completely feasible if our two countries with their resources and influence will act in the direction of maintaining and consolidating peace, with due consideration of each other's fundamental interests and without setting themselves against third countries. At the same time it is important not to permit anyone to exert pernicious influence on Soviet-American relations.

The achievement of mutual understanding in this matter is all the more necessary since our countries must take into account the character and degree of influence on the international situation also of other forces. From this point of view much that can be done now, given mutual desire, and setting aside complicating (kon yunturnye) questions, may turn out with the passage of time either to be fully unattainable or of much more difficult and complex.

As far as can be judged by your statements, in principle we have with you a common understanding in this regard. It is a matter now, perhaps, of embarking on the practical realization of such an understanding, on a search for ways and means of resolving concrete problems which burden international relations at the present time and are fraught with great dangers for the future.

In this regard, it seems to us, that, taking into account the complexity of each of these problems by itself, it is hardly worthwhile to attempt somehow to link one with another. Although it is indisputable that progress in solving each problem taken individually would facilitate the solving also of other problems, it would be unjustified in our view to draw from this a conclusion about the advisability of making the solution of one problem dependent on the solution of any other problem or of postponing in general their examination until there is some sort of general improvement in Soviet-American relations or in the international situation as a whole. Such a posing of the question would inevitably lead to the emergence of a vicious circle and would in no way facilitate the solving of problems which have become ripe for this.

We have already transmitted to you through Ambassador Dobrynin our observations on a number of international problems and on questions of Soviet-American bilateral relations. In connection with

your message we would like in addition to express the following thoughts.

(1) As facts show, the situation in the Near East is becoming more and more exacerbated by virtue of the *continuity* lack of settlement of the conflict in this region. Without going into a detailed discussion of this question here, with which our representatives are now occupied, I would only like to emphasize our conviction that in the working out of any plans for a Near Eastern settlement, the strict observance of the main principle is necessary—aggression must not be rewarded. Without this there can be no firm and lasting peace in the Near East.

As we understand it, the Government of the USA assesses seriously the situation which has been created, and therefore we hope that it will devote efforts to exert the necessary influence on Israel, which stubbornly does not wish to take a realistic position and which ignores the dangerous consequences of its annexationist course.

For our part, we intend to continue, in the framework of a bilateral Soviet-American exchange of views and of the consultations of the representatives of the four powers in New York, to use every opportunity to secure real progress in the matter of a just settlement of the Near Eastern conflict in conformity with the November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution.⁸

As regards the question raised by you about limiting outside military assistance to countries of the Near East, in principle we advocate the limitation of an unnecessary arms race in the Near East and we assume that appropriate steps in this direction would not contradict the interests of countries of this region. We believe that this question could be examined on a practical plane after the realization of a political settlement, including the withdrawal by Israel of its troops from occupied Arab territories.

(2) It causes regret and concern to us that real progress in the direction of a political settlement in Vietnam still has not been noted in the negotiations in Paris.

The Soviet Union, just as earlier, is ready to facilitate such a settlement. However, I will say frankly: the American side itself is complicating the possibility of rendering this assistance by its obviously unrealistic position in such a fundamental question as the question of the South Vietnamese Government. If one admits the hopelessness of a military way to the solution of the Vietnam problem and one expresses the desire to stop the armed conflict, then it would seem self-evident that the present Administration in Saigon must give way to a government which reflects the actual disposition of political forces in

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 2.

South Vietnam. Together with the question of creating in South Vietnam a temporary coalition government is, without question, a decisive one. It has now become completely obvious already that if one strives for a halt in the war in Vietnam then it is impossible to continue to bank on the present Saigon Administration.

(3) We fully share the view on the necessity of averting crises and of eliminating threats to peace in Europe. In this connection we attach special importance to the understanding with the Soviet Government, expressed earlier by you Mr. President, that the foundations of the post-war system in Europe should not be changed, inasmuch as this could cause great upheavals and the danger of a clash among great powers.

For our part, we are not interested in the creation of tension in Europe, including West Berlin. If such tensions emerges from time to time, then the responsibility for it is borne by those forces in Western Germany which oppose the foundations of the post-war system in Europe, which attempt to undermine these foundations, and in particular which come out with totally unjustified claims with respect to West Berlin. There are no objections from our side to an exchange of opinions proposed by you concerning ways of improving the present unsatisfactory situation with West Berlin.

We, Mr. President, are not at all against an improvement also of Soviet-West German relations. And the practical steps which have been undertaken by us in this direction are obviously known to you. Unfortunately, however, in the FRG the understanding still has not apparently matured that its relations with other countries, including those with the USSR, cannot be developed apart from the general foreign policy course of Bonn. And the fact that this course still is based on these which are contrary to the goals of strengthening European security and world peace is confirmed in particular by the attitude of the FRG toward the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, it is precisely the stubborn refusal of Western Germany to accede to the treaty—with whatever contrived pretext it fortifies itself—which greatly impedes its entry into force. We hope that the United States is using its influence in order to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty by the FRG and by a number of other countries allied with the USA. As regards the ratification of the treaty by the Soviet Union, the matter is not up to us (to za nami delo nye stanet).

(4) With regard to concrete times for the beginning of talks on the limitation and curtailment of strategic—both offensive as well as defensive—armaments, we await your views on this matter.

(5) We take note of your assurances, Mr. President, that you fully understand our concern about our security and that the USA does not want to complicate the relations of the USSR with its neighbors—both Communist as well as with others. In light of your assurances,

the mention in your message of events in Czechoslovakia is all the more incomprehensible. As we have already noted earlier, these events concern first of all Czechoslovakia itself, and also its relations with other participating states of the Warsaw Pact and their security, including the security of the USSR, and they do not in any way affect the state interests of the USA.

In conclusion, I would like once again to stress our readiness to develop relations with the USA in a constructive plane on the basis of mutual confidence and frankness. In this connection, we consider useful the practice which has developed of a confidential exchange of views on topical international problems and on questions of Soviet-American relations. In this regard we agree with you, Mr. President, that in different situations—depending on the character of the questions and on other considerations—one must apply different forms and utilize various channels for such an exchange of views.

With respect,

A. Kosygin

52. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman)¹

Washington, June 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Comment on Suggested Invitation to Khrushchev

I am afraid Bill Safire is being optimistic when he calculates that his suggestion has one chance in a hundred of working out.² I do not

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 709, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. II. No classification marking. Sent for information. Drafted by Lesh on June 2. Sent under a covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger signed the memorandum; an invitation to Khrushchev was apparently never issued.

² On May 28, William Safire, speechwriter to President Nixon, sent the following message to Haldeman and Ehrlichman: "Here is a far-out thought with a chance in a hundred of working out. We are planning some kind of reunion celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Kitchen Conference on July 24. What about approaching the Soviet[s] about inviting Khrushchev? Not so wild as it sounds—they might just go along if it suits their interests." (Ibid.)

think there is any chance that the Soviets would permit Khrushchev to come to the US for a reunion of the participants of the 1959 “Kitchen Debate,”³ and in fact I recommended against sending an invitation, for the following reasons:

1. Khrushchev is close to being an un-person in the USSR. In a great advance over past Soviet practices, he is still alive and is fed and housed in comfort. But he is a political pariah, allowed one brief and closely guarded public appearance each November to vote in his local district elections. Knowing Khrushchev’s penchant for oratory, the Soviets would never permit him to travel abroad, especially to the US.

2. Furthermore, since Khrushchev was deposed by a coup in 1964, it would be diplomatically unwise either to ask the current Kremlin leaders—who were his deposers—to let him come to Washington, or to circumvent them by asking Khrushchev directly. (As you may know, the present leaders have bridled at previous attempts by prominent Americans to contact Khrushchev.)

In general I recommend that you place the major emphasis in your plans on the tenth anniversary of the first US national exhibit in Moscow and the President’s trip to the Soviet Union, rather than on the “Kitchen Debate” per se. While we look back on the episode with a certain nostalgia, the Soviets do not regard the Nixon–Khrushchev encounter as one of the high points in Soviet-American relations. In fact the “Kitchen Debate” was associated in the past with a strong anti-Nixon line in the Soviet press—now conveniently forgotten. Because of these overtones, the Soviets might not even let Ambassador Dobrynin participate unless we characterize the occasion as commemorating the President’s trip as a whole (rather than only the “Kitchen Debate”).

³ Nixon attended the American Exhibition in Moscow in July 1959. During a stop in the model kitchen at the Exhibition, Nixon and Khrushchev had an impromptu debate, over the relative merits of each nation’s economic system. Nixon’s description of the “Kitchen Debate” is in *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pp. 208–209.

53. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting, June 9

The Soviets have not completed their reply to our paper,² but Monday's Sisco–Dobrynin meeting³ confirmed that the Soviets are having serious talks with the Egyptians about it.

Dobrynin said that the UAR has made a devastating critique of our proposals. The Soviets are, however, still in the middle of intensive discussions with the Arabs, with Gromyko, Semenov—Sisco's Soviet equivalent—and Semyushchin—who was here helping Dobrynin—arriving in Cairo on Tuesday. Dobrynin hoped he could give us the Soviet response by the end of June or perhaps even by June 20.

There was a general discussion of the four power talks in New York in the course of which Dobrynin said that Moscow is interested in a joint communiqué if the text is good but otherwise sees no need for it. Apparently they don't regard it as vital to their talks with the UAR. Dobrynin asked if the US is interested in a recess after the communiqué is issued, but Sisco gave him a non-committal answer.

Sisco briefed Dobrynin in general terms on the Israeli and Jordanian reaction to the peace efforts.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks, April–June 1969. Secret; Nodis.

² Reference is to "A Preliminary Document Which is Suggested Be Used By The Governments of Israel and the UAR Under Ambassador Jarring's Auspices as a Basis for Concluding a Final Binding Accord Between Them on a Just and Lasting Peace in Accordance with Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967," which Sisco advanced in installments beginning May 6 in talks with Dobrynin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI) Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

³ In telegram 93698 to Moscow, June 10, the Department provided a summary of the Sisco–Dobrynin meeting of June 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks, April–June 1969)

54. **Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers¹**

No. 452

Washington, June 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

USSR–MIDDLE EAST: Gromyko Probably in Cairo to Clear New Soviet Position for US–USSR Talks on Middle East

A Soviet Embassy source in Washington has intimated that Gromyko's visit to Cairo which began June 10 is connected with the Sisco–Dobrynin discussions on the Arab-Israeli settlement problem and that it will enable the Soviets to make a new presentation to the US in the near future. There is other good evidence as well that this is the main purpose of Gromyko's trip. Although the evidence is sketchy regarding the extent of Moscow's optimism, it seems likely that Moscow in sending Gromyko was confident that the consultations would produce a useful position which the Soviets could take in Washington, and that the trip does not signify Soviet consternation over a totally negative UAR attitude toward further Soviet settlement talks with the West.

Purpose of the Trip. Egyptian media have noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo called on Nasser on May 17 and on UAR Foreign Minister Riad on May 10 and 19 to discuss the US-Soviet and the Four Power talks on the Middle East, and there is every reason to believe that such consultations have continued since then. The authoritative Cairo newspaper *Al Ahram* on June 10 stated that Gromyko was coming to Cairo for "important political talks on the Middle East crisis," and a Western wire service on June 11 cited "officials" as saying that Gromyko briefed Riad June 10 on the US-Soviet and Four Power talks. It is also noteworthy that the four other Soviet officials who accompanied Gromyko to Cairo are all Middle East experts from the USSR Foreign Ministry. The group includes Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, who has been extensively involved in international discussions since 1967 relating to the Jarring mission, and Deputy Near East Division Chief Semyoshkin, who was in Washington on temporary duty from March to May to take part in the Sisco–Dobrynin talks.

Moscow Reasonably Sure Gromyko Will Succeed. From recent indications the Soviets appear to want and expect the US-Soviet and Four Power discussions on the Middle East to continue. Our estimate is that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL USSR 7. Secret; Limdis.

Moscow in recent weeks succeeded in obtaining through the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo assurances that Nasser—perhaps grudgingly—recognized the utility of ongoing great power efforts, regardless of his expectations as to the outcome, and that Nasser conceded that the Soviets would need periodically to take a fresh approach. The Soviet Embassy source in Washington, in linking the Gromyko trip to the Sisco-Dobrynin talks, went further, saying that the US had given the Soviets a statement of US views, to which the Soviets were preparing a reply. If so, the purpose of Gromyko's trip would be to clear the new Soviet stand with the Egyptians.

The Cairo press has indicated UAR displeasure over the position taken by the US in the US-Soviet discussions on the Middle East. It seems likely that the Egyptians would not agree with any Soviet proposal to take the US position as a point of departure for working out a new Soviet stand. On the other hand, the Egyptian authorities would have trouble defending the view with Gromyko that the Soviets should reject US views out of hand and should only reiterate existing Soviet positions, as this obviously would end the US-Soviet discussions. Soviet-Egyptian differences undoubtedly exist, since otherwise Gromyko's trip would be unnecessary. But these differences probably concern how far the Soviets should go toward US views in their next presentation in the Washington discussions, and not whether the Soviets should take any fresh position at all. As long as Gromyko is able to obtain Egyptian acquiescence on a new Soviet position for use with the Americans which will contain enough movement to keep the bilateral talks going, Moscow would probably consider the trip a success.

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, June 12, 1969, 2346Z.

96244/Todel 2840. 1. Dobrynin saw Secretary afternoon June 11 prior to his departure Moscow on urgent consultation orders. Secretary raised Viet-Nam with Dobrynin stressing our disappointment that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 177, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Meetings, May–June 1969, State Nodis Cables/Habib Calls. Secret; Nodis; Paris Meetings/Plus. Drafted by Toon, cleared by Walsh, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Moscow and Saigon.

there had been no progress in Paris in beginning private talks by the GVN and NLF on political issues. Secretary reminded Dobrynin of his conversation in March when he made clear that private talks on political issues could be bilaterally between GVN and NLF or in four-power forum.² Our only reservation was with regard to private talks between US and NLF which we could not accept. This remained our position and Secretary hoped that the Soviets would do what they could to get talks underway.

2. Dobrynin said that he understood position of NLF (which he referred to throughout conversation as Provisional Revolutionary Government) to be that there could be no discussion with GVN unless Saigon prepared to agree to coalition government beforehand. Secretary told Dobrynin that if NLF position was that precondition to talks was removal of Thieu and Ky, this was totally unacceptable. As President had made clear, composition of Saigon Government must be determined by electoral process, and Secretary saw no reason why arrangements for elections including appropriate supervision could not be proper subjects for discussion in Paris in private talks, either bilaterally or with four. Secretary could not understand how composition of possible coalition government could be fixed before views of electorate known. Dobrynin rejoined that in NLF view free choice impossible in presence foreign military forces and while Saigon committed to continuation of war. Secretary said if NLF felt this way, adequate guarantees free elections could be discussed in Paris, and he saw no reason why Soviets themselves could not play role in supervisory process. Dobrynin reiterated NLF position on coalition government and said that NLF felt strongly that Thieu and Ky knew their political future depended on continued presence of US forces and continuation of war, and it was for this reason that they were opposed to commitment to coalition. Secretary firmly rejected this thesis and said that, if other side genuinely interested in peace, moves to replace US forces could be reciprocated by North Vietnamese, and Soviets and their allies could move to get Paris talks off dead center. Secretary reminded Dobrynin of past indications from Zorin and Oberemko to US counterparts in Paris of NLF willingness to discuss questions relating to political settlement in Viet-Nam and said that other side seemed to be raising new and unacceptable preconditions for such discussions.

Rogers

² See Document 25.

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, June 11, 1969

Dobrynin had requested the appointment to inform me that he had been recalled to Moscow for consultations. Dobrynin opened the conversation by saying that he had been impressed by the deliberateness and precision of the Administration. We had moved one step at a time towards first establishing a general atmosphere, then into the Middle East talks, then beginning some discussion on Vietnam and only when the main outlines were set did we offer to have the SALT talks. We had not been stampeded at any point. He had reported accordingly to his government. He said the Soviet Union preferred to deal with careful planners since they were much more predictable.

Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam. I told him that we were following a very careful policy. We had our moves for the next few months fully worked out. I reminded him of what the President had said when we gave him an advance copy of the Vietnam speech. He should not be confused by the many statements that he heard. We were not interfering with much that was being said. But the President reserved the final decision on essential items. Dobrynin replied that he had noticed that we moved on about the schedule we had given him a month ago.

Dobrynin then asked about our ideas for settling the war in Vietnam. He inquired especially on our views on a coalition government. I said that he and I were both realists. He knew very well that in order to bring about a coalition government we would have to smash the present structure of the Saigon Government while the NLF remained intact. This would guarantee an NLF victory sooner or later. We would never accept that. We would agree to a fair political contest—not to what the President had called a disguised defeat.

Dobrynin made no effort to defend Hanoi's position. He replied that Hanoi was very difficult. He said I could be sure that the Soviet Union had transmitted our discussion of April and added a recom-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. Kissinger prepared a memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin on June 11, an identical copy of which he sent to Rogers on June 24. The June 11 memorandum of conversation is a less complete version of this memorandum sent to Nixon. (Ibid.)

mentation. However, Hanoi believed that they knew their own requirements better than the Soviet Union. I said, on the other hand, the Soviet Union supplied 85% of the military equipment. Dobrynin asked whether we wanted the Soviet Union to give Hanoi an ultimatum. I said it was not for me to tell the Soviet Union how to conduct its relations with its allies. I said that we were determined to have the war ended one way or another. Hanoi was attempting to break down the President's public support. It was too much to ask us to hold still for that. I added that what we needed was some strategic help, not just negotiating devices for settling particular problems as has been the case until now. Dobrynin, who was very subdued, said I could be sure that they are looking into the question.

Dobrynin then asked me about US-Soviet relations in general. I said that while some gradual progress was possible even during the Vietnam war, a really massive change depended on the settlement of the Vietnam war. Dobrynin said we always seem to link things. I replied that as a student of Marxism he must believe in the importance of objective factors. It was an objective fact that Hanoi was trying to undermine the President. It was an objective fact that we had to look to every avenue for a solution. Dobrynin then said supposing the war were settled, how would you go about improving relations.

I called his attention to the President's offer of increased trade and I also suggested the possibility of a summit meeting. I said that they could count on the same careful preparation for a summit meeting that characterized all the President's efforts. One possibility would be to have a meeting at which the major issues were discussed together with a precise agenda for dealing with them, to be followed by periodic meetings to resolve them. In this way we might reach a stage in which war between the two major nuclear countries would become unthinkable, and other countries which might be emerging could not disturb the peace of the world. I added this should help the Soviets with some of their allies. Dobrynin said that they had no problem with any of their allies. I replied that China was still a Soviet ally. Dobrynin emphatically said China is not an ally; it is our chief security problem. He was very intrigued by the suggestion of a summit meeting and I added that there was no prospect of it without a settlement of the Vietnam war.

Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East. He said the Soviet Union was very interested in a settlement—Sisco was always speaking in the abstract about secure and recognized borders. The Soviet Union was perfectly willing to discuss a rectification of the borders even if it did not promise to agree right away. Gromyko was in Cairo to try to see how much give there was in the Egyptian position. I said that if Vietnam were settled, we could certainly give more top level attention to the Middle East.

Dobrynin returned to the theme of US-Soviet relations and asked what he could tell his principals when he returned. I said that everything depended on the war in Vietnam. If the war were ended, he could say that there was no limit to what might be accomplished. You would like to be remembered as a President who ensured a permanent peace and a qualitative change in international relations. Dobrynin asked whether we were expecting a change in the Moscow leadership. I replied that we had no intention of playing domestic politics in the Kremlin. Dobrynin said: "Don't believe your Soviet experts; they understand nothing."

Dobrynin then asked whether I might be willing to come to Moscow sometime very quietly to explain your thinking to Kosygin and Brezhnev. I told Dobrynin that this would have to be discussed with you but that if it were for the right issue, you would almost certainly entertain the proposition.²

² This paragraph was omitted from Kissinger's June 11 memorandum of conversation.

57. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Moscow (Beam)¹

Washington, June 16, 1969.

Dear Jake:

I appreciated your letter of June 2.² I will of course be interested in anything of substance that might develop in connection with Humphrey's visit. Your ideas for handling the visit strike me as just right.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. III. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt on June 7. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was sent to the Department of State for dispatch on June 16.

² Beam wrote Kissinger to tell him about an upcoming visit to the Soviet Union of former Vice President Hubert Humphrey. (Ibid.)

³ Beam stated his ideas as follows: "I shall try to meet him on arrival and perhaps arrange a small luncheon party with his hosts. I imagine that the Soviets will try to keep him out of our clutches and that it would not be appropriate for me to insist that I accompany him in his talks, since he is a private citizen. I shall try to get hold of him to get some briefing before his departure. He will doubtless stop by the State Department and it will be interesting to see how he plans to handle the ABM question. I hope he will remain fairly well committed on Vietnam." (Ibid.)

Your point about seeing the top Foreign Ministry officials from time to time is well taken and it should certainly be possible to supply you with material to take up with them. As you know, and as I mentioned to Boris Klosson⁴ when he stopped in last week, we would like to see more of our business with the Soviets done at your end. We are giving this some thought and it may be that in connection with SALT something along these lines will develop.

I have read your telegrams with interest and was especially impressed with your recent analyses of the Soviet leadership picture. Your judgment on that subject from time to time will be most helpful here. And, of course, whenever you have comments on how we are handling our relations with your hosts, I will value them.

With warmest regards,

Henry A. Kissinger⁵

⁴ On June 3, at 4 p.m., Kissinger met with Klosson, who was on his way to Moscow to become Minister-Counselor. Talking points prepared by Sonnenfeldt for that meeting are *ibid.*, Vol. II.

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the original.

58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, June 18, 1969, 0031Z.

99315. 1. Soviet Chargé Tcherniakov called at his request on the Secretary afternoon June 17 to deliver what is in effect the Soviet counter-proposal² to US formulations on Middle East settlement provided to the Soviets last month in Sisco–Dobrynin talks.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, June 1969. Secret; Nodis; NoFORN. Drafted by Atherton on June 17; cleared in substance by Sisco, Walsh, and Swank; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, USINT Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and USUN.

² The oral statements made by Tcherniakov and the official U.S. Government translation of the Soviet text on the “Basic Provisions” of a Middle East settlement are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

³ For a summary of the nine exploratory discussions held between Sisco and Dobrynin March–April, see Document 38.

2. In preliminary comments, Tcherniakov said Soviet Government had considered US proposals contained in draft preliminary accord and accompanying oral comments by Sisco as well as views exchanged in US-Soviet and four power meetings. Soviet Government, guided by desire to secure just and lasting peace in Middle East on basis of Security Council Resolution 242, had prepared new plan for peaceful political settlement of Middle East problem.

3. We are giving new Soviet document urgent and detailed study. Our tentative impression, however, is that it represents very little movement and consists largely of a recasting of December 30 Soviet plan⁴ plus some modifications given to Sisco orally by Dobrynin, including specifically provision for deposit with UN of agreed and irrevocable document or documents covering all aspects of a settlement before Israeli withdrawal begins. Soviet document does not provide for direct negotiations between parties at any stage, does not include specific affirmation of establishment of state of peace and calls for complete withdrawal by Israel to pre-June 5, 1967 lines with all its neighbors. In prepared oral statement commenting on this document Tcherniakov noted among other things that on the whole it reflects Soviet views and that, if agreement is reached with USG, Soviets will need to obtain final consent from Arab side.

4. Following foregoing presentation, Tcherniakov said he was instructed to propose that venue of US-Soviet talks be moved to Moscow. Secretary said we would study Soviet document carefully. Re moving bilaterals to Moscow, Secretary noted that we had earlier informed Dobrynin we might be willing to hold some of talks there. We would consider this suggestion and give Soviets our reply after we had completed study of document Tcherniakov had delivered.

Rogers

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 1.

59. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, June 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Comment on Arthur Burns' Report on Sino-Soviet Feelings

Dr. Burns' report of his conversation with a Soviet economist (Tab A)² simply confirms what we have long known: that the Soviets are terribly uneasy about their potentially explosive dispute with Red China, and are pathologically suspicious of anything that smacks of Sino-American collusion.

We know that the Soviets are in a nervous state of mind, but they apparently feel they need security more than they need friends—one piece of evidence being their brutal suppression of nascent liberalism in Czechoslovakia.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IV. Limited Official Use. Sent for information.

² Tab A is attached but not printed. On June 13, Burns wrote a memorandum to President Nixon describing his luncheon meeting with Anatoly Shapiro, a Russian economist at the Institute of World Economics in Moscow. Burns reported Shapiro's fears about the U.S. attitude toward Sino-Soviet differences as follows: "If [Shapiro] is really right that the Russians are fearful that sentiment in this country, including that of our government, is favorable to the Chinese Communists, this would suggest that the Russians are in a nervous state of mind and that they feel they need friends. All this is highly speculative on my part, and I'm merely passing on what I learned for what little it may be worth."

60. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Soviet Counterproposal on the Middle East

The two documents the Soviet Chargé gave Rogers June 17 are at Tab A.² One is the actual Soviet counterproposal; the other is the oral explanation he made. At Tab B³ is our document for comparison. Sisco is working up a memo⁴ for the President on where we go now, but here are my first thoughts.

You should know that Sisco has told Rabin we have the Soviet reply but will not be in a position to give it to him until we have our position on it thoroughly worked out. State, if asked by the press, will say we have a reply but refuse to comment on it.

I. *Analysis of the Soviet paper* shows some movement but not a great deal:

A. *On the positive side:*

1. *Phasing.* It reaffirms the idea of a package settlement—all elements of the settlement to be agreed before Israeli withdrawal begins. There is some slight movement in that previously *after* Israeli withdrawal the agreement went into effect with the signing of a document, although preliminary documents were deposited with the UN before withdrawal. Now, the final, signed document is to be deposited *before* withdrawal begins, and will be binding and irrevocable immediately.

2. *Nature of agreement.* It talks about “a final and mutually binding understanding”—closer to what Israel wants than the Soviet December 30 plan’s “time schedule for withdrawal” and “agreed plan” for implementing the UN Resolution. It also accepts a document signed by the parties.

3. *UN forces.* The previous Soviet position was never clearly spelled out, but they are now willing to put UN troops in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh on a fairly extended basis. Previously the troops seemed destined

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, June 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. The memorandum bears the handwritten comment, “HAK has seen, 7/7.”

² Attached but not printed; see footnote 2, Document 58.

³ Tab B is the document cited in footnote 2, Document 53.

⁴ See Document 63.

to stay only during the withdrawal itself. They also include a long proposal for making the UN force less vulnerable to expulsion (although they talk only of a temporary period of “up to 5 years” after which the UN forces could be thrown out on several months’ notice).

4. *Recognition of Israel.* The Arabs would “respect and recognize Israel’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence . . . and right to live in peace in secure and recognized borders without being subjected to threats or use of force.”⁵ This would, of course, be mutual and doesn’t represent much change in the official Soviet position of the past twenty years, but it may indicate that they think they can get the Arabs to agree to this. The December 30 Soviet document did refer to “appropriate documents concerning” sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the current version is much more explicit.

5. *Waterways.* It affirms Israeli passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, though it does not provide for any concrete means of enforcing this other than the UN force at Sharm el-Sheikh.

6. The Soviets have used our language in a few places where it doesn’t hurt them.

B. On the negative side:

1. *Direct negotiations.* The Soviets have done their best to exclude direct negotiations. They refer to “contacts through Jarring” while we called for “representatives to meet promptly” under him. The Soviets have repeated, almost verbatim, a long section from their December 30 plan which is, in effect, a formula for getting a final agreement without the kind of negotiations the Israelis insist on.

2. *Peace.* The Soviets cut our proposal for acknowledgment by both sides that a formal state of peace exists. This is important to the Israelis. More specifically, they have eliminated the Arab obligation to control the fedayeen. They also dropped our effort to end Arab sanctions against Israel.

3. *Borders.* The Israelis would withdraw to pre-war lines. This is now a “premise” from which the parties would work rather than the immutable fact of December 30. But it still turns aside our effort to create a situation for border changes to be negotiated. It concentrates on working out the timetable for Israeli withdrawal. Because of their position on withdrawal, the Soviets have not made any attempt to address the question of special arrangements for Jerusalem.

4. *Gaza* would apparently revert to UAR control. There would be a UN force and “the situation in this area which existed in May of 1967 shall be restored.”

⁵ Ellipsis in the source text.

5. *Refugees*. Israel would carry out the “decisions of the UN” on the refugees. This presumably means unrestricted repatriation. This rejects our efforts to restrict return.

6. *Demilitarized zones*. It provides for small ones (not the whole Sinai) on both sides of the border (which Israel rejects).

7. The Syrians and withdrawal from the Golan Heights have been included in the settlement, but the Soviets are still ambiguous on this. In some places they are talking only about the Arabs who agree to a settlement.

II. Reflections on the Soviet position:

A. It leaves open the possibility that the Soviets are happy with the present no-peace, no-war situation.

B. It leaves unanswered our basic question whether the Soviets and UAR are willing to pay any serious price for Israeli withdrawal.

C. It leaves enough room for further talk to keep the discussion going (Sisco says “barely enough”).

D. It may reflect the view that our talks help modestly in stabilizing the situation in the Near East so the Soviets want to keep them going for whatever damping effect they have without any real intent to press the Arabs any further.

E. However, this is still just the first round, and we cannot assume with certainty that there is no further give in the Soviet position.

III. The impasse that remains is that:

A. The Soviets and UAR still refuse to negotiate with Israel on the basis that all occupied territory is negotiable. They are not going to state more forthrightly their willingness to make peace in this document (both have said more elsewhere) until we tell them we are not trying to parlay Israel’s conquests into a permanently expanded map of Israel.

B. The Israelis want significant changes in their borders at key places. They believe peace with Nasser is impossible and even if he said he wanted peace, they would doubt him and still want their own control over key spots. They want to be left alone with the Egyptians so that the Egyptians will have to face up to the realities of Israeli power and accept Israeli terms.

C. In short, the Arab governments are willing to recognize Israel in its pre-war borders but not yet to sign off on the Palestine issue for the Palestinians. Because the Israelis believe they will still be under attack, they aren’t willing to settle for pre-war borders.

IV. The issues now posed for us are:

A. Should we break off the talks with the Russians?

1. Yes.

- a. Their response shows very little give on points crucial to us.
- b. We don't want to play into their hands. If they're just trying to string the talks along to keep the no-peace no-war situation alive but safer, we have no interest in playing that game.
- c. Breaking off might shake them up.

2. No.

- a. Their response isn't all bad.
- b. We couldn't have expected them to go too much further in this first exchange.
- c. Hard bargaining so far has brought them a long way from their position six months ago. We owe it to ourselves to keep at it.

B. Should we go back to the Russians with revisions to their document to try to improve it somewhat before we consult Israel?

1. The argument against is that the Russians probably won't give much more until we get specific about territories.

2. The argument for is that their paper doesn't give us much to work with in approaching the Israelis. The Israelis will just regard the present response as clear vindication of their argument that the Soviets (and Arabs) don't want peace. We have to make at least one more try with Moscow before tackling them.

C. Shall we go ahead now and state our position on borders?

1. Yes.

a. It's essential to further movement. It is plain from Dobrynin's comments to you and from the USSR reply, that the Soviets are not likely even to consider serious concessions until we are willing to break down and state a concrete position on borders.

b. We don't really agree with Israel's territorial ambitions (as we understand them), so why should we bear the stigma of holding out for them.

c. We do want to move this situation closer to a settlement. We can hold out for awhile longer—hard to say exactly how long—but there's little question that prolongation of the current impasse works against us.

2. No.

a. We have no indication that the UAR is ready to sound convincing enough on its desire for peace to give us what we need to persuade the Israelis to state a firm position on borders. The USSR in New York and Egyptians privately have said they are willing to end twenty years of war but their formal response is not enough for the Israelis (if, indeed, anything would satisfy them).

b. There's no reason why we should give in first. Nasser lost the war and until he is willing to make peace without obvious purpose of evasion, there is no reason why we should pay any price to get his territory back for him.

D. If we state a position, should it be Israel's or ours?

1. We could go to the Israelis now and tell them it's time for them to be specific about borders.

a. The argument against this is that the Israelis are adamant in saying they won't surface their position until the Arabs sit down to negotiate. We have very little chance of beating them down on this.

b. The argument for is that the time has come to make a real try to find out what the UAR will pay to get its land back and Israel either has to go along or bear the onus for blocking a reasonable effort—an onus we will share.

2. If they won't agree, we could go ahead and surface our own position for bargaining purposes. Roughly this might be return to the old international border; Gaza under UN administration for a transition period (with the idea of its going to Jordan); UN presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, perhaps with joint patrols; demilitarization, perhaps to the Mitla pass with a token area on the Israeli side.

a. The argument against this is that we will not be speaking for Israel.

b. The argument for is that we will at least get away from the stigma of supporting what most people regard as unreasonable Israeli demands. Telling the Israelis we were going ahead might—though the odds are probably against it—smoke out an Israeli position.

E. Should we lay aside this document for the moment and try a different tack? One possibility is to say quite straightforwardly to the Soviets: We are prepared to press on Israel the territorial settlement outlined above *provided* the Soviets can deliver the Arabs for direct negotiations with a clear-cut statement of their willingness to make peace and control the fedayeen. We can't guarantee a positive Israeli response, but if they will try in Cairo, we will try in Jerusalem. If they don't want to try, we will stick to our present formulation.

1. The argument against this is that Russians don't negotiate this way. This gives away our hand too easily.

2. The argument for is that we won't get anywhere until we get down to the territorial question. This might be a way of doing it without committing ourselves formally to a territorial position.

V. *My tentative recommendation* is that we:

A. Try one more round with the current paper, giving the Russians a counter document revised to put some of our language on peace back in.

B. Only then consider stating a position on territories, but if we feel it necessary to discuss boundaries at the end of this next round, do it first via the alternative stated above (IV–E).

61. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, June 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

Diplomatic Exploitation of the Sino-Soviet Schism—Comment on Pat Buchanan's Suggestions

Pat Buchanan has relayed a suggestion that the US recognize Albania and promote West German contact with Communist China, as a means of making the Soviets nervous over a possible US/Chinese deal. He suggests that this might lead the Soviets to offer us something in return for our agreement to continue to cooperate in isolating China. (Tab A)²

I basically agree with attempts to play off the Chinese Communists against the Soviets in an effort to extract concessions from or influence actions by the Soviets. Any effort of this kind, however, is replete with complexities.

The specific moves Pat suggested pose such problems:

1. *Recognition of Albania*—Our problem here is that the Albanians could well react to any US initiative with loud and public vituperation. When we took the small step two years ago of allowing Americans to travel to Albania, the Albanian Government reacted with shrill hostility and announced that they would not allow Americans in. Since then, Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev doctrine may have made them somewhat less inclined to slam doors in the face of contacts, but Chinese pressure and their own desire to maintain the pose of anti-imperialist purity might serve to make them turn down any US initiative. The proposed initiative would risk a scolding from the Albanians, and would make our friends nervous, without creating the appearance of a Sino-US deal.

2. *Increased West German trade and diplomatic contact with China*—The FedRep already competes with Japan as the biggest exporter to China. It has reasons of its own (the East German question) for not wanting diplomatic contact. To have the desired effect on the Russians

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Soviet Affairs. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon wrote "I agree" in the upper righthand corner of the first page.

² Tab A, a June 13 memorandum from Buchanan to the President passing on these suggestions from "a George Washington University professor in the Sino-Soviet Department," is attached but not printed.

we would openly have to urge the Germans to take this action. This would be inconsistent with our current UN policy and could trigger a general swing toward recognition of Communist China.

It would in turn prejudice our relations with the Republic of China and with serious repercussions throughout Asia.

There may well be opportunities to profit from rising Sino-Soviet tensions. We are looking seriously at the possibilities. The problems cited above make clear how delicate an operation it would have to be. We should need to be very clear as to precisely what we want from the Soviets—or the Chinese—and how our course of action would relate to them and to the other countries which would be affected.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 1, 1969, 0035Z.

108202. For Ambassador.

1. Purpose of this message is to bring you up to date re our current thinking on how to handle next steps in US-Soviet bilaterals on Middle East. Soviets, as you know, have proposed we move talks to Moscow. We believe there are political and psychological as well as practical advantages in maintaining pattern of Soviets talking to us in Washington, and therefore do not favor change of venue.

2. On other hand, when Soviets agreed to open talks here, we said we would keep open mind about having some discussions in Moscow. Our thinking, therefore, is to tell Soviets that in response to their proposal USG is prepared to send Asst Sec Sisco to Moscow for few days to hold a round of talks with FonMin officials prior resuming discussions with Dobrynin here. Subject your views, Sisco would hope at minimum to see Gromyko and Semenov and, of course, Dobrynin.

3. In Moscow talks Sisco would have three main aims in mind: (a) To have broad-ranging general discussion in which he would explain in depth rationale and basic principles underlying our approach

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, June 1969. Secret; Priority; Nodis; NoFORN. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Swank and Hornblow, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.

to Arab-Israel settlement. From such an exchange he would hope we might also get better feel of Soviet intentions and strategy, although we realize difficulties this poses. (b) To engage Soviets in brief discussion of Middle East arms control problem. While Soviet response is probably predictable, we believe that for the record this subject should not be omitted in such a general exchange with Soviet Government. (c) To present our counter suggestions to Soviets' June 17 document² and explain in detail rationale behind it.

4. Sisco, accompanied by Atherton (NEA) and Walter Smith (INR), would hope to depart Washington Monday, July 7, stopping for consultations with British and French July 8 and 9 and arriving Moscow July 10. He would plan remain in Moscow through Monday, July 14, leaving following day for direct return to Washington.

5. Foregoing plan has been cleared by Secretary, but awaiting final White House approval, and you should make no approach to Soviets at this time. Meanwhile would appreciate soonest your comments on proposed schedule and substantive approach outlined above as well as your suggestions re how publicity should be handled if trip materializes. Our own thinking is that best way to minimize undue speculation and expectations is for announcement to be made along following lines: When U.S.-Soviet talks began in Washington, it was agreed that there might be some talks in Moscow as well. Assistant Secretary Sisco is now proceeding to Moscow for brief round of talks as part of continuing U.S.-Soviet discussions on Middle East. He will stop in London and Paris for consultation with British and French Governments enroute and will return to Washington in about one week's time.

Rogers

² See footnote 2, Document 58.

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Middle East—Reply to Soviet Counterproposal

The attached memo from Secretary Rogers² seeks your approval of Joe Sisco's going to Moscow to present our counter to the Soviet counterproposal on the draft framework for a UAR-Israel settlement.

It is our judgment that we should not break off these talks now. While the Soviet response contains less than we had hoped, it does offer some refinements to work with. We may want to give them a negative reaction for effect, but on balance it seems worth trying another round.

If you share this judgment, the attached proposal contains two principal issues for your decision:

1. *How to handle our position on the Israel-UAR border.* In our first document, we left this to be negotiated by the parties, with the proviso that the pre-war border was not excluded as a solution. The Secretary's proposal would have us go back to the Soviets with substantially the same position, but this time with a fallback position we could use as bait to get them to be more forthcoming on direct negotiations and the substance of a peaceful relationship between Israel and the UAR.

The fallback position proposed is that Israel would agree on returning to the pre-war border "assuming agreement on the establishment of demilitarized zones and on practical arrangements for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran." This formulation is designed to leave room for an Israeli position at Sharm al-Shaikh short of permanent annexation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A July 2 covering memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger reads, "Here is the Sisco memo you said you would try to get the President to focus on in Florida." On July 12, Haig sent both Saunders' and this memorandum to Saunders with the following explanation: "As you know, this memorandum was handled over the telephone by Henry with the President and as a result, per the President's instructions, Henry told Sisco he could proceed with the trip to Moscow to present our counter to the Soviet counterproposal with the provision that he could not modify our position beyond a few verbal changes. Specifically the fall-back position was not approved."

² Attached but not printed.

The arguments for authorizing the fallback position are:

a. Until we change our position on territories, we can not expect significant movement from the Arabs, and hence the Soviets, on direct negotiations, peace and binding commitments—the subjects most important to the Israelis. Since the situation is becoming rapidly worse (this is subject to debate), we have to do all we can to achieve a settlement.

b. We are going to have to come out eventually for the pre-war border between Israel and the UAR, at least in principle.

—The chances for a lasting peace are poor if the Israelis keep part of the UAR.

—The last four US Presidents have guaranteed territorial integrity in the Near East on the basis of the 1948 lines. They may have been thinking mainly of Israel, but the guarantee applies equally to Egypt (and Jordan).

c. If we do not try to bring Israel along on the territorial question, our prestige and influence in the Arab world will be hurt badly. Even if we fail in the attempt we might insulate ourselves from some of the consequences by trying.

The arguments against authorizing the fallback position now are:

a. It is too early in our talks with the Russians to give away our trump card. If we judge that the pressure for a settlement is greater on them than on us, they—not we—should be making the first concessions.

b. We have to be extremely careful about getting too far ahead of the Israelis. They say that they must have a position at Sharm al-Shaikh and overland access to it. Whether we accept that view or not, we have to deal with it as the position of the party holding the upper hand on the ground. Even though the proposed fallback is drafted to leave room for what we see as the Israeli position, if we are going to become Israel's lawyer we want to be more certain than we are now that they will buy this.

c. At the least, this attempt would further increase strains in our relations with Israel. They reacted strongly to our previous mention that the pre-war border was not excluded.

Conclusion. I do not believe we should play our trump card on this round. I could see telling Sisco to come back with a candid assessment of what this fallback might buy. But I would not at this stage give him authority to commit us in any way to the fallback language. That puts us too far ahead of Israel and gives away our position without any return. I think the Russians—not we—should be setting the bait. (Although I do not presume to speak for them, I gather that the fallback proposal is included largely under pressure from Charlie Yost and that Richardson and Sisco are not enthusiastic about it.)

Recommendation: That we *not* authorize State to commit us to the fallback language now but tell Sisco to put himself in a position to give us his estimate of what this would buy.

Approve

End the above sentence before “but”

Sisco may use the fallback

2. *Whether to send Joe Sisco to Moscow.* Secretary Rogers recommends a brief visit to deliver our counter-draft, to talk with Soviet officials other than Dobrynin and to brief Ambassador Beam. The Russians have asked us to resume the talks in Moscow. He would stop in London and Paris on the way.

Arguments for:

a. The principal argument, in my view, is to give us a chance to get behind Dobrynin and try to get some sense of how much give there is in the Soviet position.

b. A quick trip by Sisco would meet the Russians part way without, in my view, costing us very much.

c. This would provide a chance to brief our embassy in Moscow, which now has very little depth on the Mid-East.

Arguments against:

a. Even a quick trip would put the spotlight on Moscow and increase Soviet stature in the Near East. We have no reason to run to them. The Israelis are making this argument vigorously.

b. The Israelis will be even less happy with talks in Moscow than in Washington. They regard the USSR as their prime enemy, and they have no representation there.

c. The Soviets may not be satisfied by a quick trip.

Conclusion: The one argument that appeals to me is making a try at seeing what the Soviet position behind Dobrynin looks like. We may not learn much at all, but talking to three or four specialists might give us a more three-dimensional picture than we get from Dobrynin alone.

Recommendation: That you authorize Sisco to go to Moscow as proposed.

Approve

Disapprove

There are some lesser changes in our paper of which you might wish to be aware, though I do not believe they require your approval:

1. In the preamble and other places we have adopted some *Soviet wording* where it does not alter our substantive position.

2. We have agreed substantially to the Soviet concept of a *timetable* for withdrawal to go into effect under UN supervision after final agreement on overall terms. The difference between us and the Soviets on this point has been that they have tried to use the “timetable” idea to avoid direct negotiations. We have now accepted this part of their plan, but only in the context of negotiations.

3. While not closing off options for the future of *Gaza*, we have mentioned UN administration as a choice. Although this is to be decided by the parties, the Israelis are likely to object to anything specific we say about a solution.

4. We have included a reference to clearing the *Suez Canal*, as withdrawal proceeds. The Israelis could object in that this conceivably could open the canal before the other parts of the agreement became absolutely final. But we feel that once Israeli troops pull away from the Canal, the UAR will be free to do what it wants anyway.

5. We have slightly altered our position on *demilitarized zones*. Our original position was that all of Sinai would be a DMZ and all details would be worked out by the parties. We have now left an opening for Egyptian troops along the Canal itself—this would put them only a few miles closer to Israel—and have defined more clearly our concept of administration in the DMZ’s—the return of Egyptian civil administration.

6. On the *refugees* we have changed our position from calling for an upper limit on the total number of repatriates to calling for an annual limit. In theory this leaves the way open for the eventual repatriation of all the refugees and so will be less pleasing to the Israelis and more pleasing to the Arabs, although it will satisfy neither. Our guess is that so few refugees will want to live in Israel that a limit is unnecessary.

The document holds the line on the points we feel are vital:

1. Our plan still calls for a settlement negotiated directly between the parties.

2. We are still talking about peace and binding commitments.

3. We are still calling for irrevocable guarantees of navigation satisfactory to the Israelis.

4. We are still calling for a commitment to end terrorism, whether government or private.

5. We still call for Arab recognition of Israeli sovereignty.

6. We are still trying to work out a UAR-Israel settlement first, although acknowledging that we will have to have a Jordan settlement before the UAR settlement becomes effective. The Soviet paper specifically kept the door open for an overall Arab-Israeli settlement which we shy away from because it includes the Syrians who are still talking about destroying Israel and have rejected all of the peace efforts of the past two years.

64. National Security Study Memorandum 63¹

Washington, July 3, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences

The President has directed a study of the policy choices confronting the United States as a result of the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry and the current Soviet efforts to isolate Communist China.

The study should consider the broad implications of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on the U.S., Soviet, Communist Chinese triangle and focus specifically on alternate U.S. policy options in the event of military clashes between the Soviet Union and Communist China.²

The study should also examine alternative policy approaches in the event of continued intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict short of a military clash.

The President has directed that the paper be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by August 15.³

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-155, NSSM Files, NSSM 63. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Since the outbreak of Sino-Soviet military clashes along the Ussuri River, the CIA and DIA provided periodic intelligence updates of continued hostilities. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 93-T01468R, Box 2-4)

³ A draft study was submitted on September 3 and discussed at a meeting of the WSAG on September 4. The final version was completed on November 10; see Document 101.

65. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Gromyko's Foreign Policy Speech

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke at length to the semi-annual session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow today. We have a TASS summary but no verbatim text yet.²

From the summary, it appears that Gromyko's language was temperate and on the whole positive as regards relations with the US. In terms of content, however, I can detect no advance on such matters as the Middle East, Vietnam, Europe and arms control.

Gromyko mentions Romania several times in the context of its membership in the Warsaw Pact and the socialist camp, along with the other bloc countries. In effect, he reaffirms the "Brezhnev doctrine" albeit in less provocative words than the original formulation last year.

The pre-occupation with China is very prominent; his words are a mixture of threats to "rebuff" provocations and expressions of interest in better relations in the long term.

On SALT, he carefully describes the forthcoming talks as an exchange of views rather than negotiations; he does not refer to an opening date. (There are indications that we may get a response fairly soon and that it will be in terms of early or mid-August.) He also notes what you have said about a well-prepared summit but leaves it at that.

All told, in my judgment, this speech leaves Soviet policy where it has been; but the temperate tone on relations with us and, especially, on arms talks will probably be cited—as the Soviets undoubtedly intended it to be—by Administration opponents as justifying "restraint" on our part.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Soviet Affairs. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Another copy is *ibid.*, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. III.

² A full text of Gromyko's speech is in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 21, August 6, 1969, pp. 6–10.

Whatever the Soviets' real view of your Romanian visit,³ Gromyko shows no direct reaction, beyond, of course, affirming the essence of the "Brezhnev doctrine."

Ron Ziegler and the State Department spokesman will say, if they are asked for comment, that we have seen the accounts of Gromyko's speech and that as far as US-Soviet relations are concerned you and the Secretary of State have previously stated our attitude.

Attached is the summary of the Gromyko speech (Tab A).⁴

³ Nixon visited Romania August 2–3, the first trip of a U.S. President to a Communist East European nation. In *White House Years*, Kissinger describes the Soviet response to Nixon's decision, which was announced on June 28, as follows: "The Soviets also reacted—in a manner that made clear they understood the significance of the visit. The planned attendance of Brezhnev and Kosygin at the rescheduled Romanian party conference was canceled." (p. 157)

⁴ Tab A, an extensive summary of the speech as taken from the TASS International Services in English, July 10, is attached but not printed.

66. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Gromyko's Review of Current Soviet Foreign Policy

1. The key to Gromyko's address of 10 July² lies in the classified instruction³ cabled over his signature to Soviet embassies around the world four weeks earlier. That lengthy document announced that

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R015080R, Box 12, Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. Sent under a July 16 covering memorandum to Rogers in which Helms explained, "Herewith is a copy of a paper written at White House request for an analysis of Gromyko's address to the Supreme Soviet on 10 July. I think you will find it useful."

² See footnote 2, Document 65.

³ Helms explained in his covering memorandum that "This 'instruction' was disseminated by CIA as CSDB–312/01562–69 of 24 June 1969. If you have not read this Soviet Circular Telegram, I would strongly suggest that you do so. Signed by Gromyko himself, it contains many interesting points on current Soviet foreign policy." On June 24, Haig sent the circular telegram to Kissinger under a cover memorandum that read:

Moscow intended to give new priority to the struggle against China, modifying other policies to achieve the isolation of Peking. This theme is of course not sounded in the speech to the Supreme Soviet, but its implications run through the entire review.

2. The secret document is explicit on the point that the USSR has no hopes of improving relations with the present Chinese leadership. Whereas Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet that Moscow stands ready to negotiate the questions disputed between the two states, the document states that “such proposals will most likely prove basically unacceptable to the present leadership of the CPR” but will be useful in their effects on the Chinese people and foreign Communists. The real task is to deny Peking friends and allies in the socialist camp, among the imperialists, and around the Chinese periphery in Asia.

3. In this regard, primary attention is given to the US. The secret document reflects the usual ambivalence about US policy: its imperialist interventions must be rebuffed, but sober elements may yet prevail in Washington. The new element is the fear that the US will find a way to use the Sino-Soviet rivalry against Moscow. While US public statements maintain an “apparently neutral line” on Sino-Soviet relations, after the Ussuri clashes “the idea of the usefulness of pressure on the USSR from two flanks—NATO and China—is ever more clearly discernible.” The document draws the conclusions that, to head this off, it is necessary in current policy “to manifest restraint, moderation, and flexibility in relations with the US, to refrain from complications with her which are not dictated by our important national interests.” This conclusion is worked out in a number of ways in Gromyko’s subsequent formal address.

The General Line toward the US

4. In comparison to earlier set speeches of this sort, Gromyko balances professions of desire for good relations with the US with relatively little stress on the dark sides of American policy. His acknowledgment of “deep class differences” is more than offset by approving references to President Nixon’s statement on an era of negotiations and

“I recommend that you read every page of the document . . . Quick reading confirms the extremely concerned state of mind of the Soviets with respect to the Chicom threat. It also confirms a strong suspicion on their part that we should, if we have not already started to, exploit the differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The report, together with others that we have picked up, simply confirms that a concerted effort on our part to at least threaten efforts at rapprochement with the Chicoms would be of the greatest concern to the Soviets. It is interesting to note that the Soviets have surmised that the best environment for their problem with the Chicoms is a détente situation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V) (Ellipsis in the original)

even to a “well-prepared summit meeting,” the first such Soviet reference since the Inauguration. Criticism of the US role in the Middle East and Vietnam is mild; in the TASS summary,⁴ designed to emphasize the points intended for foreign audiences, most of the negative remarks about Vietnam are eliminated. In both these cases, the Soviet version of linkage—that a change in US policy would contribute to the settlement of other questions—is briefly and moderately put.

Arms Control

5. The secret document is silent on this subject. To the Supreme Soviet, however, Gromyko endorses strategic arms limitations and says the USSR is preparing to negotiate this matter with the US. He rejects Chinese charges that this amounts to engaging in deception and gives several arguments which may be designed as much to win over waverers in the USSR as to affect debate in the US. One is that military superiority is unattainable because of the action-reaction phenomenon between the two military machines, and a second is the burden of spiraling costs. A third, which is much more novel in Soviet parlance, is that the requirements for quick reaction are placing the decision to go to war beyond human control and into the tubes and tapes of the computers.

6. The Foreign Minister’s presentation on the NPT, a comprehensive test ban, and the seabeds treaty breaks no new ground. In the arms control discussion, however, he sweeps off the boards a number of long-standing Soviet proposals having to do with nuclear weapons, such as non-first use and liquidation of nuclear armaments. All such matters, he says, can be settled only with the participation of all nuclear powers—“and I mean all.” Since he knows that the prospect of Chinese agreement is zero, this signifies the practical abandonment of such schemes.

Western Europe

7. The secret document makes two points about this region. First, the danger of Sino-West German collusion is second only to that of Sino-American cooperation against the USSR. Second, the socialist camp will have to content itself with temporary, partial solutions, to European problems, “actually putting on ice” more acute problems which cannot be agitated without upsetting NATO. These ideas are expressed, in the Supreme Soviet speech, in a rather forth-coming attitude toward West Germany and a vague proposal for four-power talks on West Berlin, unaccompanied by the usual list of pre-conditions. With respect to Bonn, the standard criticisms are condensed and put in rel-

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 65.

atively calm tones, and the FRG is encouraged to continue its efforts to negotiate with Moscow on the renunciation of the use of force. The proposal on West Berlin seems to invite Bonn and the Western Allies to believe that, if the Federal Republic will refrain from political activities in the city, access will be undisturbed and perhaps even improved. The tone of these passages is consistent with the implication in the secret document that the USSR, for larger reasons of policy, intends no new Berlin crises for the indefinite future. Gromyko's speech is in fact being read in this manner in both Germanies; Bonn officials are anxious to investigate the negotiating possibilities, while Pankow betrays anxiety by largely ignoring these passages in its commentary on the speech. At any rate, it appears that East Germany's more far-reaching ambitions to undermine the present status of West Berlin have been decisively set aside.

Asia

8. In the light of his strictures before the Supreme Soviet about the Chinese threat, Gromyko's claim that the USSR's proposal for a collective security system in Asia is not directed against any particular country has a hollow ring. The anti-Chinese thrust of the secret document belies this assertion altogether, although it nowhere mentions the proposal. Gromyko adds no further details, even about the countries whose participation is envisaged; at one point he speaks of "all Asian states" and at another of "all interested states." It seems clear that Moscow has no expectation whatsoever of Chinese participation. It probably believes that, while the obstacles to formal action cannot be overcome, the USSR has much to gain, particularly in the post-Vietnam environment, simply from launching a concept which permits it to pose as the champion of collective security against unnamed threats. The scheme is probably also designed to preempt any US proposals for new collective organizations in the wake of a settlement in Vietnam.

Eastern Europe

9. The secret document expresses a surprising amount of concern about the role of China in the USSR's troubles in Eastern Europe. The public speech briefly refers to this and omits the conventional charges that the US and West Germany are fomenting counter-revolution in this area. The absence of even indirect attacks upon Romania reflects a Soviet decision to swallow the displeasure which Moscow finds in the US President's forthcoming visit to Bucharest. Gromyko repeats the essence of the "Brezhnev doctrine," but in a way which smacks more of defensive justification than any intent to apply it anew. He is somewhat more explicit than previous spokesmen in delimiting the sphere in which the doctrine is applicable, stating that the Warsaw Pact "will

never permit anyone to encroach on the security of its signatories and on the socialist gains in these countries." This formulation seemingly excludes Yugoslavia, a point which the USSR has never before clarified to Belgrade's satisfaction. A brief and amiable passage acknowledges the socialist character of Yugoslavia but, lest Belgrade's behavior be sanctioned as an example to other Eastern Europeans, notes that Soviet relations with that country "are not always smooth."

The Middle East

10. Gromyko's mention of the Middle East offers nothing new, and stresses again Moscow's position that Israeli occupation of Arab territory is the obstacle to a political settlement. Nevertheless, Gromyko does not indicate any extreme concern about the Arab-Israeli situation and—unlike last year—he does not threaten Israel with the consequences of failure to fulfill the Security Council resolution of November, 1967. Moreover, Gromyko notes that Israeli withdrawal must be accompanied by Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist, thus publicly recording a recent change in the Soviet position. Less authoritative spokesmen often continue to support withdrawal as a unilateral first step toward a settlement.

Conclusion

11. It would be easy to overstress the degree to which the struggle with China is affecting various aspects of Soviet policy. While this impact is evident in current Soviet documents and behavior, there is no sign of a consequent willingness to give up important Soviet interests. Indeed, many aspects of the USSR's rivalry with the US are embedded in third areas—Vietnam, the Middle East, Central Europe—where the USSR is not free to call the shots and cannot propose major compromises without risking the loss of influence. Within these limits, however, it seems clear that the China problem has now reached a degree of intensity which is moving Soviet policy onto an altered course. This course is intended to avoid unnecessary conflict with others and to make sure that states which cannot be corralled into an anti-Chinese front at least do not work parallel to or in collusion with Peking against the Soviet Union.

67. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 14, 1969, 2205Z.

3463. For President and Secretary from Sisco.

1. Capping a two and one half hour July 14 meeting in which assessments of present developments in the Middle East and current positions on specific elements of settlement were reviewed systematically, Gromyko asked that a message be sent to President Nixon that "Soviet intentions to make progress are very serious. We hope that we are not mistaken in believing our intentions are the same as the USG and of President Nixon personally. We trust that you will convey not only the words of our position but the sense of our policy. The Soviet government seeks common language" with the U.S. This was preceded by a general statement that if we could make progress or resolve the Middle Eastern question it would have a positive effect on other issues (unnamed) and on U.S.–USSR relations. This was the only time in the conversation that Gromyko went in any way beyond the Middle East.

2. I have been in a number of meetings with Gromyko over the last decade. There are two Gromykos: the dour and the affable. Today we saw the affable Gromyko in action. He was warm, he was relaxed, he smiled, he joked, and at no time made even a faintly threatening sound. At same time he was serious and chose his words carefully. He inquired several times regarding our specific reaction to the Soviet proposal of June 17,² and whether I had brought with me a counterproposal. He underscored that USSR is ready to try "to narrow the gap" in further discussions between now and mid-September when GA opens.

3. Meeting was held across the table, with four representatives present on each side. (U.S.—Sisco, Amb. Beam, Atherton, Smith; USSR—Gromyko, Vinogradov, Yakushin, Korniyenko.) Gromyko listened for most part but in opening statement, frequent responses to my presentation and concluding statement noted above, he struck three themes: (A) USSR serious about wanting settlement, and U.S. and Soviets together have opportunity bring peace to Middle East; (B) Generalities are fine as far as they go, but we need get down to specifics,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. On July 15, Saunders sent Kissinger this telegram under a covering memorandum that briefly summarized the meeting between Sisco and Gromyko. (Ibid.)

² See Document 58.

leaving as little unfinished business as possible for parties to deal with; and (C) USG hides too much behind Israeli “stubbornness.”

4. Gromyko made point of appearing flexible, several times correcting interpreter to soften formulation of a particular point. In addition, during discussion of Suez Canal and refugee aspect of settlement, while maintaining basic Soviet position, he hinted that differences could be resolved. On two fundamental issues which I stressed, however, namely need for Arab commitment to direct negotiations at some stage and to specific Arab obligations flowing from establishment of state of peace, he revealed no discernible give, but seemed more than anything else to be seeking to avoid coming to grips with issues themselves.

5. On specific points, following emerged from Gromyko:

A. He gave no explicit clue as to how serious they view violence in Middle East and risks involved; this might have been deliberate or inadvertent;

B. He adhered to Soviet notion which tends to equate end of belligerency with peace;

C. He would not be drawn out on mood and views he found in Cairo during recent trip;

D. He did not make any pitch for total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories;

E. Re arms limitations, he said in a seemingly apologetic tone that “unfortunately” a U.S.–USSR exchange of views on the subject is “excluded” as long as Israeli forces occupy Arab territory.

F. He defended reference in Soviet proposal to Constantinople Convention of 1888 by saying that under convention UAR would have no basis for stopping Israeli ships in absence of state of belligerency, and there would be specific agreement in package settlement ending belligerency; he also insisted there would be no threat of Israeli ships being denied passage;

G. He dodged, without closing any doors, our view on refugees that a nation of two and one half million cannot be expected to take back over million refugees. He volunteered comment that the UN resolution did not require every refugee to go to Israel and added the whole matter, including modalities, required further discussion between us.

H. On direct negotiations, he is obviously looking for a way to finesse it. He made no real defense of Arab position on this point and said somewhat lamely there are a number of different ways for the parties to negotiate.

6. I made comprehensive presentation of U.S. approach to a settlement, taking as basic theme President’s statement of February 17 to

Dobrynin³ that it would be the height of folly to let parties directly involved in the ME conflict bring about a confrontation between Moscow and Washington. Noting Gromyko's call in his July 10 speech to Supreme Soviet for USG to be more realistic,⁴ I described realities of situation as we see them along following lines. I said USG neither could nor would seek Israeli relinquishment of occupied territories to conditions of insecurity. If Israel appeared stubborn, it was result of suspicion based on historical memories and experience; Arabs for 20 years had said they wanted to destroy Israel.

7. Alternatives today were limited to three: (A) status quo, which we did not like but could live with if we had to, could continue;⁵ or (C) there would be negotiated settlement. We strongly favor the latter. While USG agreed that acquisition of territory by war was an anachronism and unrealistic in today's world, it was also unrealistic for UAR not to face up to need for coexistence with Israel. Israel is in occupation with Arab territory as result of military success involving what to Israelis was major national sacrifice. Israel would not give away, or permit others to give away, its victory for nothing. We disagreed with those in Israel who sought territory as price of victory; our aim was to convince Israel to settle for peace and security. If Israel was to be convinced, however, peace and security must be firm, specific, and credible.

8. Finally, I drove home that if USSR could not produce UAR on specific obligations to peace and to direct negotiations at some stage under Jarring's auspices, we could not hope to produce Tel Aviv on withdrawal. I made clear that we recognize our responsibility vis-à-vis Israel on withdrawal but said our capacity in this respect would be decisively influenced by Soviet ability to get UAR undertakings on peace and negotiations.

9. Tomorrow we meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov. We intend: (A) to make a detailed and specific review of Soviet proposal, pointing out the advances and deficiencies; (B) present our written counterproposal with a full explanation of it; and (C) stress points

³ See Document 14.

⁴ Gromyko made the following statements about the Middle East in his July 10 speech to the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet: "The situation in the Middle East greatly affects the world situation as a whole. It would be a short-sighted policy to repose hopes, as they do in Israel, in military superiority. The surest way would be to solve the problem on the basis of withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied areas and simultaneous recognition of the right of all Middle Eastern states, including Israel, to independent national existence, and the establishment of a lasting peace in this important area. The Soviet Union considers that all opportunities should be used for adjusting the situation in the Middle East. Any delay is dangerous and does harm to all." (*The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 21, August 6, 1969, pp. 5–6)

⁵ A handwritten "B?" appears in the margin.

which we consider fundamental. I see no reason at this point to consider fall-back language on withdrawal in absence specific movement by Soviets on peace and negotiations. Our counterproposal remains within confines of our proposal of last May. I will hint and only hint at some possible more specific formulation on withdrawal if Soviets can provide us with quid pro quo we are asking for on peace and negotiations.

10. Gromyko said he would be available for another meeting if we thought it desirable after detailed talks with Vinogradov. We have left this open for time being; a short windup session with him on Wednesday might be worthwhile. Soviets will need a good deal of time to analyze our counterproposal, and they will want to discuss it with the UAR at some stage. This could take two or three weeks; or they might wait to discuss our counterproposal with Nasser when he is in Moscow in August.

11. On basis present tentative plans, I will leave here Thursday,⁶ fly to Stockholm to brief Jarring on Moscow talks, and be home Friday evening.

Beam

⁶July 17.

68. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–9–69

Washington, July 17, 1969.

CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

This paper responds to certain specific questions concerning US-Soviet relations posed by DIA on behalf of the Commander in Chief,

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R1012A, NIEs and SNIIEs. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred by all members of the USIB, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

Pacific. A more comprehensive survey of the principal factors which underlie the USSR's foreign policies and its international aims and intentions was issued earlier this year (NIE 11-69, "Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet Policy," dated 27 February 1969,² Secret, Controlled Dissem).

That estimate concluded that, short of major changes in the Soviet system at home, the outlook is for chronic tensions in Soviet-American relations. It also concluded that Soviet policy toward the US would probably be characterized by cautious opportunism and limited pressures, perhaps with some increased watchfulness against the development of uncontrolled risks. We retain our belief in the validity of both of these basic judgments. At the same time, we note the development of increased Soviet alarm over the future course of relations with Communist China. This alarm is likely at least for a time to have an important impact on Soviet foreign policy overall; specifically, it tends to encourage a somewhat more forthcoming Soviet attitude toward relations with the US and toward particular issues affecting the relationship.

I. The USSR's Basic Stance Toward The US

1. Soviet hostility toward the US and the West in general was born with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. It was nourished by US participation in the Allied military interventions which followed, and sustained through the 1920's and 1930's by the continuing struggle against "class enemies" at home and abroad. It diminished during World War II, but then reached a high point of sorts in the early 1950's, during the last few years of Stalin.

2. With Stalin's death, official attitudes were tempered somewhat. Under Khrushchev, the notion of capitalist encirclement was discarded. Limited contacts with the outside world, including the US, were permitted, and the line toward the West began to fluctuate in intensity and assume a notably ambivalent tone. The US was still evil, but "sober" elements in it were capable, in effect, of good; the US remained the hostile leader of the imperialists, but it was not necessarily seeking war; the USSR was still duty bound to defeat or convert the US, but world peace could somehow be assured if only the two countries could get together. And policies toward the US began to reflect the same kind of confusing mixture, ranging in mood and content from the urgent and provocative to the relaxed and conciliatory.

3. Khrushchev's more conservative successors have sought greater consistency and have tightened and toughened the approach. They emphasize that, as a dangerous and devious adversary, the US is

² Document 21.

to be both distrusted and despised. Nevertheless, they continue to maintain that it is desirable for the two powers to keep lines open to one another and, like Khrushchev, they still hold out the hope that mutual hostility and suspicion might some day decline.

4. The current attitudes of the Soviet leaders are, of course, conditioned by a general set of ideas, many of them ideologically predetermined. Marxist-Leninist dogma affects the way in which these men analyze the problems that confront them and, in general, influences their manner of regarding themselves, their society, and the world at large. It reinforces their feelings of distrust and hostility toward the US and severely limits their ability to approach mutual problems in a flexible mood. Moreover, the Soviet leaders now believe themselves for a variety of reasons to be on the ideological defensive; this has generated a mood of “fearful conservatism” which is likely to affect the tone of Soviet-American relations adversely for some time to come.

5. But despite the undeniable effects of doctrine, nonideological considerations are playing an increasingly important role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policies. The USSR tends to behave more as a world power than as the center of the world revolution. Thus the Soviets are inclined to establish international priorities in accordance with a more traditional view of Russian security interests and a more realistic view of the possibilities for expanding their influence. The USSR remains a thrusting and ambitious power, concerned to enlarge its world position. But it tempers its ambitions with estimates of opportunity and controls its hostility with measurements of power and risk. These opportunity/risk calculations are illustrated by the USSR’s conduct in three areas which have figured prominently in Soviet-American contention in recent years: Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East.

6. *Korea.* Moscow has for some time sought to win North Korea to a pro-Soviet stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This has involved fairly frequent visits to Pyongyang by top Soviet leaders and a substantial Soviet military aid program.³ It has not, however, caught the Soviets up in any direct support of adventurous North Korean tactics against the ROK and against the US. On the contrary, we believe that the Soviets have counseled Pyongyang to proceed with caution. Provocative North Korean behavior not only raises the risk of war on the USSR’s doorstep, but complicates Soviet policies toward the US, Japan, and China. In any event, Pyongyang’s relations with the USSR remain somewhat strained, and Pyongyang’s aspirations vis-à-vis the South are not of prime importance to the USSR.

³ Soviet military aid to North Korea since 1956 has amounted to an estimated \$770–\$800 million. (The figures here and in footnotes to paragraphs 8 and 9 represent actual or estimated Soviet list prices.) [Footnote in the source text.]

7. There have been reports of Soviet collusion with Pyongyang in the seizure of the *Pueblo* and the shutdown of the American EC-121. We do not find these reports convincing.⁴ Such behavior would be contrary to general Soviet interests, as described above. It would also seem, in view of the large scale Soviet intelligence collection effort in international waters and air space, contrary to particular Soviet interests as well. We have, in any case, reviewed the evidence specifically concerning the USSR's attitudes and policies toward these incidents and have concluded not only that Moscow was not involved in planning them but that it witnessed both affairs with some considerable discomfiture and apprehension. The text of an official classified Soviet Party report on Brezhnev's speech to the April 1968 plenum of the Central Committee, for example, does not indicate that Moscow had prior knowledge of North Korean intentions to seize the *Pueblo*. It clearly shows that the Soviet leaders were concerned about the possibility of a forcible US reaction and had advised the leadership in Pyongyang "to exercise restraint, not to give the Americans grounds for expanding the provocation, and to settle the incident by political means."

8. *Vietnam*. The role played by the USSR in the Vietnam war since 1965 is a more striking and more important example of Soviet opportunity/risk calculations. The opportunity was, by extensive material support to Hanoi, to help bring about a serious reverse for the US and at the same time to contest Chinese influence in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.⁵ The risk was not only of a possible armed encounter with the US in the area but also of a radical deterioration of relations with the US generally, a development which might bring unacceptable costs and risks at other points of confrontation. Throughout the Vietnam war the Soviets have walked a careful line. They have given material and political support to Hanoi in ways which they believed would minimize the likelihood of dangerous US responses. While until the

⁴ We have examined the statement on this subject of the Czechoslovak defector, General Jan Sejna, and find it wanting. Sejna was for a time a valuable source of information on the Czechoslovak armed forces and the Warsaw Pact, but his remarks about the *Pueblo* seizure—especially those which have appeared recently in the public press—are in our view highly suspect. His account, for example, of a purported meeting in Prague in May 1967 with Soviet Defense Minister Grechko—during which Grechko is said to have discussed Soviet plans for the seizure of an American intelligence collection vessel—is almost certainly inaccurate. During extended questioning, he had given no hint that any such crucial meeting with Grechko had taken place. In any case, the best available evidence is that Grechko did not visit Prague at all during April, May, or June 1967. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam began on a large scale in 1965 and since then has totaled an estimated \$1.4 billion. It reached a peak level in 1967—about \$500 million—but declined in 1968 (after the suspension of US bombing) to about \$290 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

opening of the Paris talks they adopted a sharply hostile tone toward the US, they also refrained from provoking any crises elsewhere and were willing to pursue negotiations with the US on such issues as NPT. Since the Paris talks began, they have adopted a tone which evidences their hope of persuading the US that concessions to Hanoi would have a beneficial effect on the negotiations of other Soviet-American issues.

9. *The Middle East.* For the last dozen years or so the Soviets have regarded the Middle East as an area of confrontation with the Western Powers, in particular the US, but they also probably saw it as an area offering much more of opportunity than of risk. Their ties with and material support to the radical Arab states were aimed at using these states as instruments to undermine Western influence in the area.⁶ The likelihood of any direct encounter with the US seemed slight. With the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and the humiliating defeat of their clients, the Soviets appear to have acquired a sharpened sense of the risks of their policy. Even now, however, they probably are less concerned about the likelihood of direct confrontation with the US than they are that their considerable investment and influence will be jeopardized either by new Arab-Israeli hostilities or by untoward political developments within the Arab states, especially Egypt. Their moves to work with the US diplomatically are an attempt to contain these risks, though they clearly do not intend to abandon the competition for influence in the area.

II. Recent Developments Affecting the Relationship

10. The USSR's calculations of opportunity and risk, its general concerns about its position as a world power, and even its apprehensions about the security of the Soviet homeland, have been greatly complicated by the leadership's growing preoccupation with the problem of China. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the Soviet leaders now see China as their most pressing international problem and are beginning to tailor their policies on other issues accordingly. They have begun publicly to suggest the need for some form of collective security arrangement in Asia, largely, apparently, in order to contain China. And they have, in addition, taken the position that, because of

⁶ Since 1955, the USSR has poured, or has promised to pour, into the area some \$2.5 billion in economic assistance and roughly \$2.9 billion in military aid. Of these amounts, the three principal radical Arab states—the UAR, Syria, and Iraq—have received or been promised over half (some \$1.4 billion) of the economic aid and over 80 percent (\$2.4 billion) of the military aid. Most of the balance has gone to Iran, Turkey, Yemen, the Sudan, and Algeria. All figures are as of 1 July 1969. [Footnote in the source text.]

the China problem, the USSR should generally seek to avoid provoking unnecessary difficulties with the US.

11. The Soviets do not, of course, contemplate any sacrifice of essential positions or any renunciation of traditional doctrines; they continue to view the US as basically their strongest adversary; indeed, they fear that the US might someday come to work against Soviet interests in collusion with China. But they clearly now believe that hostility toward the US and the West should be muted, at least as long as relations with the Chinese remain so tense.

12. The Soviet attitude toward the new administration in the US remains generally circumspect. Provocative acts and statements have for the most part been avoided. There have been standard denunciations of US policies and continuing attacks on “warmongers” in the US establishment, but the President has been praised as well as criticized (though not harshly by name), and it has been said that there are reasonable men in the US who seek peace. Propaganda has on the whole suggested a wait-and-see attitude, perhaps even a mildly optimistic assessment of prospects for an improvement in the relationship.

13. Indeed, despite their many reasons for sober concern about their position vis-à-vis the US, the Soviets seem now to regard this relationship in a cautiously optimistic light. Their relative military strength, especially in strategic weapons, has greatly improved over the past six or seven years. Their influence in certain important countries of the Third World has grown, and fear of Soviet aggressiveness has been declining, even—despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia—in Western Europe. During the same period, the Soviets have seen domestic stability in the US tested by disorders and severe political discord, and have observed increasing signs of public disenchantment with the scope of the US role in international affairs.

14. The USSR has also showed a relatively restrained approach to Western Europe. We do not think that the current campaign for European security signals Moscow’s intention to abandon previous positions. On the contrary, the Soviets are at least as anxious as ever to gain recognition of the status quo, i.e., the division of Germany and the existence of a legitimate Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. But they do not now seem disposed to stress the more controversial aspects of their position, nor do they appear ready to dramatize their views through provocative acts, as for example, in Berlin. At the same time, they no longer emphasize the notion that the US should stand clear of an all-European settlement.

15. The strongest and most emotional language used by the Soviets is now directed against China, not the US and the other Western powers. This shift in the intensity of feeling about foreign adversaries seems to have been reflected in the USSR’s apparently increasing willingness

to discuss specific issues with the US. Thus, though the Soviet view of the US–USSR strategic relationship is overriding. Moscow’s current pre-occupation with China has probably had some bearing on its attitude toward the desirability of talks on strategic arms control. Indeed, problems with China may have encouraged the Soviets to look upon arms control measures with growing interest, seeing in them a means to reduce tensions with the US and to bring additional pressures to bear on Peking.

16. In the field of strategic armaments, the Soviets now must ponder the effects of an arms control agreement in view of their improved position. None of the courses open to them can be wholly appealing. An effort to surpass, or even to keep pace with the US in the development and deployment of advanced weapons systems would require continued high expenditures, perpetuate the resource squeeze on the civilian economy, and perhaps divert funds from other military programs. And in the process, Moscow could have no assurance that it would be able to compete successfully with US technological prowess. On the other hand, a Soviet decision *not* to try to keep pace with the US seems highly unlikely; such a course would surrender many of the fruits of past investment and allow the political perils of strategic inferiority—as the Soviets conceive of them—to re-emerge. Yet a decision to seek serious arms control measures would not be easily reached. The Soviet leaders are ambitious, opportunistic, and suspicious men. They are unlikely to conclude that a strategic arms agreement is acceptable unless they are convinced that achieving and maintaining a superior position is not feasible in the future, and that the national interest could be served by a sort of strategic stabilization. On neither count does it seem likely that all the leaders would reach full agreement.

17. Nevertheless, it is still our belief that the Soviets have strong reasons—perhaps stronger than ever before—to consider carefully the whole problem of strategic arms control. In the interim since our last estimates concerning this subject, we have seen nothing which would alter this judgment.⁷ On the contrary, the USSR’s approach to the problem so far this year tends to confirm it. The Soviets have not concealed their suspicions of US motives. Nor have they hidden their discontent with certain US attitudes and statements, in particular US suggestions that there should be a linkage between arms control and other, broader issues. But they have also sought to appear patient about the timing of arms control talks and have tried to convince the US that they have retained a sober—though not eager—interest in the negotiation of an agreement.

⁷ See NIE 11–68–68, “The Soviet Approach to Arms Control,” dated 7 November 1968, Secret, Controlled Dissem, and NIE 11–69, “Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet Policy,” dated 27 February 1969, Secret, Controlled Dissem. [Footnote in the source text.]

69. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Complete Wrapup on Sisco in Moscow

In a nutshell, I would characterize Joe's talks in Moscow as they appear from his reports as friendly and businesslike with a good deal more substantive discussion than was possible with Dobrynin here. Since the Soviets are holding their response to our latest formulation² until they have studied it further, we cannot claim to have made any important substantive headway. However, it looks to me like a useful exercise.

The principal tactical issue to come out of it is Gromyko's effort at the end to have the discussions continue in Moscow. Joe finessed that and said we will be glad to receive the Soviet response to our latest formulation anywhere and then we can arrange how to discuss it.

Attached is a full collection of his reports:

- Tab A: His introductory meeting with Gromyko
- Tab B: His first substantive meeting—July 15
- Tab C: His second substantive meeting—July 15
- Tab D: His reflections at the end of the first day
- Tab E: His third substantive meeting—July 16
- Tab F: His farewell call on Gromyko—July 17
- Tab G: His talk with Jarring in Stockholm³

A résumé of the main points covered at these meetings follows:

Gromyko–Sisco—July 14 (Tab A)

Gromyko, in an affable mood, stressed the Soviet desire for peace and sent an oral message to that effect to the President. Gromyko also

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks, April–June 1969. Secret; Nodis. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² The text of the U.S. counterproposal to the Soviet June 17 Middle East position, delivered by Sisco to Gromyko on July 15, is in telegram 3485 from Moscow, July 15. Saunders attached a copy of it, but not as part of Tabs A–G summarized below. It is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

³ Tab A is telegram 3463 from Moscow, July 14; Tab B is telegram 3501 from Moscow, July 15; Tab C is telegram 3503 from Moscow, July 16; Tab D is telegram 3500 from Moscow, July 15; Tab E are telegrams 3546 and 3547 from Moscow, July 16; Tab F is telegram 3566 from Moscow, July 17; Tab G is telegram 2045 from Stockholm, July 18; all attached but not printed.

said it was time to get down to specifics, and that we hide too much behind Israeli stubbornness. In the course of the meeting, Gromyko hinted that differences on refugees and the Suez Canal could be resolved, but showed no give on direct negotiations and Arab obligations flowing from a state of peace. Sisco feels the Soviets are looking for a way to finesse the direct negotiations problem. Sisco sees no need to reconsider using the fall back language on withdrawal at this point.

First and Second Substantive Meetings—July 15 (Tabs B and C)

Sisco presented our revised paper with a detailed explanation in two meetings on Tuesday with Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov. Vinogradov confined himself mainly to questions designed to clarify our position, but which revealed little new about Soviet views.

Vinogradov did, however, say that the proposals show a considerable amount of work has been done by the US. He asked when we would be ready to show them a paper on Jordan and suggested that we might want to take the public position that the US and USSR are now working on a joint paper rather than trading counter proposals. Sisco was non-committal on both suggestions.

At the End of the First Day—Sisco's Reflections (Tab D)

1. The Soviets seem to feel the Arabs are on weak ground in trying to avoid direct negotiations, but the Soviets themselves did not give on the issue.

2. The Soviets might welcome neutral language on some key points that we turn over to Jarring because they are having problems with the Egyptians just as we are having problems with the Israelis.

3. They seem intrigued by our annual quota formulation on refugee repatriation.

4. The decision not to move the talks permanently to Moscow was very right. The Soviets are interested in giving themselves the image of peacemaker in the Middle East.

Third Substantive Meeting—July 16 (Tab E)

After lunch on Wednesday, Vinogradov made a more detailed reply to our paper and to some of our comments on their paper.

1. In listing principles and setting up procedures, the USSR has already made it clear that it is talking about peace. [Comment: Our trouble is that this is largely a negative definition, and the Israelis want a positive definition.]⁴

⁴ All brackets in the source text.

2. US procedures for achieving peace seem inadequate. [Comment: This is because we want to leave much more to the parties than the Soviets do.]

3. The Soviets want a multilateral document, not the UAR-Israel document we keep giving them, i.e., one including Jordan as well. (Even they are content to leave Syria aside.) Sisco explained again that all we are doing is attacking the UAR-Israel problem first.

4. The long section on peace-keeping was included in the Soviet document only because they feel this problem is bound to arise. They are not particularly concerned about when it is addressed.

5. They are disappointed that we won't apply the inadmissibility of conquest to Gaza by agreeing that it should return to its pre-War status. Sisco explained that Gaza has never had a final status, that we have to recognize the Israelis are occupying it now, and that we want Jordan to have a voice in the final decision.

6. The Soviets don't understand why we insist on navigation guarantees from the Egyptians when a Security Council guarantee would be both easier to get and worth more to the Israelis. Sisco said we had no problems with a Security Council guarantee, but we felt an Egyptian guarantee was also necessary.

Sisco again proposed that we take the effort to find US-Soviet agreement as far as we can, and where we can't agree, use neutral language which leaves a solution to Jarring and the parties.

Vinogradov closed the meeting by saying he is pleased that we are now working on a common document instead of exchanging counter proposals. Sisco said he could not make this characterization yet.

Second Gromyko–Sisco—July 17 (Tab F)

Only three interesting new points emerged in Sisco's final meeting with Gromyko on Thursday.

1. Gromyko felt our paper shows greater flexibility.
2. The Soviets may not give us another counter-proposal, but may decide instead to go over the two latest papers with us orally.
3. Gromyko suggested continuing the talks in Moscow.

Sisco–Jarring (Tab G)

This was mainly a briefing session. Sisco feels Jarring shares his view that the Soviets are not going to push Cairo hard in the immediate future and that they will try to chip away at our position between now and the opening of the UN General Assembly.

You need not read all the attached cables. I suggest you do look at the two Gromyko conversations (Tabs A and F) and Sisco's reflections (Tab D). If you want the flavor of some of the Sisco–Vinogradov talk, I suggest Tab E, which is more Vinogradov than Sisco.

70. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Tripartite Initiative with the USSR on Berlin and Related Problems and Gromyko's Remarks Concerning the City

Recommendations:

I recommend that you approve instructions to our Embassy in Bonn to seek quadripartite agreement on revised talking points to be made to the Soviet Government by the three Western Ambassadors. The points in summary would be:

(a) We have noted Gromyko's remarks concerning Berlin² and we intend to study them together with the British, French and Germans.

(b) Meanwhile, the Federal Republic of Germany would like to remove points of friction with the GDR and discuss with it problems concerning railroad matters, inland waterways and post and telecommunications. We believe that such talks would be useful.

(c) The Federal Government might be willing to make certain compromises concerning its activities in West Berlin if this would promote a constructive Soviet and East German response.

I recommend that we instruct our Embassy in Bonn to initiate quadripartite consultations in the Bonn Group and submit agreed recommendations to governments on the response to be made to that portion of Gromyko's speech which deals with Berlin.

Discussion:

At the NATO meeting last April³ the German Foreign Minister proposed that the Three Western Powers approach the Soviet Government and, after reaffirming Four Power responsibility for Berlin access, state that the Federal Republic was prepared to talk with the East German

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Berlin, Vol. I. Secret. A copy is also *ibid.*, Box 341, Subject Files, Kissinger/Nixon Memoranda. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but on July 22, Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum that recommended his approval of Rogers' proposed *démarche* to the Soviets. On August 5, Kissinger initialed approval for Nixon. (*Ibid.*) Two days later, Ambassador Beam met Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Moscow to deliver the text of Beam's oral statement; printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

² See footnote 2, Document 65.

³ The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Washington April 10–11.

Government on the traffic of persons, goods, and communications between East and West Germany “including Berlin.” In subsequent consultations the Three Powers and the Federal Republic agreed on the text of talking points to be made to the Soviets. Direct reference to access to Berlin was eliminated at French insistence.

The initiative with the Soviets has not yet been taken. The French and apparently now the British concur in it. We might be inclined to delay an action which the Soviets could mistakenly think was connected with other current US-Soviet conversations. The German Government has, however, urged that we agree to move ahead.

Meanwhile, in his speech of July 10, Gromyko stated that if the Three Powers are interested, the Soviet Union is willing “to exchange views as to how complications concerning West Berlin can be prevented now and in the future.” The German Government considers that the proposed tripartite initiative is more urgent than ever in the light of Gromyko’s remarks. If we temporize the Germans will suspect that we are unwilling to act in their interest lest it jeopardize US-Soviet bilateral relations. We wish to prevent this and to do so before Chancellor Kiesinger visits you on August 7 and 8.⁴

Insofar as Gromyko’s remarks on Berlin are concerned, I believe that we should study them unilaterally and in consultation with the British, French and Germans before we decide on a response. I do not rule out the possibility of agreeing to quadripartite talks concerning Berlin, but I believe that we should first be sure of the objectives which we would seek.

A telegram incorporating these proposed instructions is enclosed.⁵

WPR

⁴ Kurt Kiesinger, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, made an official visit to Washington August 7–9.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

71. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, July 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

The International Communist Conference

The conference which convened in Moscow on June 5 was not at all what Khrushchev had in mind when he began pressing for it in 1963–64. He clearly wanted to ostracize the Chinese and restore Soviet authority in a disintegrating international organization. While most parties at that time shared his ideological aversion to Peking's policies there was a growing apprehension over the self-proclaimed Soviet right to "excommunicate" any one. This remained the underlying issue in the intervening years.

The project lay dormant, after Khrushchev's removal, until late 1966; some of the Soviet difficulties, however, were eased by the Vietnam war and the ostensible Soviet willingness to cooperate with China in Hanoi's defense,² and secondly, by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China which dismayed most of China's communist allies, such as the Japanese party.

Brezhnev began to press for a new conference to reassess the world situation, disavowing any intention of driving the Chinese out of the international communist ranks. It took a full year, until February 1968, however, to organize even a "consultative meeting," which convened in Budapest.

The Cubans refused to attend, and at the meeting there was a major confrontation with Romania. The Soviet high priest of ideological orthodoxy, Mikhail Suslov, laid down a tough line, and launched a major attack on China. The Romanians, led by Paul Niculescu-Mizil, countered in defense of the Chinese, and when attacked by the Syrians walked out.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Soviet Affairs. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. On June 27, Sonnenfeldt forwarded Kissinger a memorandum from the Department of State on the International Communist Conference. Three days later, Haig notified Sonnenfeldt that Kissinger wanted a memorandum on the International Communist Conference for his signature to the President. On July 18, Sonnenfeldt provided a draft of memorandum similar to the version prepared by the Department. (Ibid.)

² Nixon underlined this sentence up to this point.

Nevertheless, agreement was reached on a projected date of late 1968 and a single agenda item, the struggle against imperialism.

A permanent preparatory commission began sitting in Budapest. Subsequently, 88 parties were invited to participate in this work, but only 44 attended, and Romania was among the absentees.

By the time of the second preparatory meeting in June 1968, the Czech crisis was approaching a climax. There was strong opposition against proceeding with a conference until the Czech affair had been resolved. The Soviets accepted a postponement until November 1968 and had to settle for another “preparatory” meeting to discuss the final date.

The Czech invasion and the Soviet justification of “limited sovereignty”³ created a brand new issue. At the November meeting, a number of parties insisted on a further postponement because of the Soviet invasion and the draft document was scrapped, to be replaced by a new one drawn up by a small working group. It was clear that a major issue was whether the Soviets could obtain an endorsement of their rationale for intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The last round of the preparatory meeting (May 23–June 5) witnessed a frantic struggle. About 450 amendments were presented to the main document, only about 45 were accepted. Romania sponsored about 100 amendments. By the time the meeting opened, the main document had been greatly watered down.

Victory or Defeat?

From the Soviet viewpoint the conference produced mixed results. It was by no means an unqualified victory. On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders regarded it as a defeat.

The fact that 75 communist parties did finally convene in Moscow after six years of wrangling, and remained for thirteen debates, with no walkouts, was a victory of sorts. To achieve this, however, meant repeated retreats and compromises, until in the end it was clearly a case of obtaining agreement to the lowest common denominator to avoid an open schism.

Moreover, 14 parties, including the Romanians and Italians, refused to accept the final document without reservation.⁴ Four ruling parties were absent: China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania; the Yugoslavs were also absent; and the Cubans did not sign the final document, since they participated as “observers” only. India was the

³ Nixon bracketed “limited sovereignty,” a phrase used in the Brezhnev doctrine.

⁴ Nixon underlined this sentence.

only Asian party other than Mongolia to attend.⁵ Those attending and agreeing without qualification represented only one third of the Communists throughout the world.

In this sense it was a pyrrhic victory. The conference was in effect a rump session, compared to 1957 and 1960. And on the question of the legitimacy of Soviet authority as the pre-eminent party, nothing was gained. While the Soviet leaders did not expect to restore the role of “leading party,” abandoned by Khrushchev, in their heart of hearts this is what they believe. They sought to demonstrate this by convening a conference that no one really wanted. An objective observer would have to conclude that the 1969 conference marked a further stage in the decline of Soviet authority over its communist colleagues abroad.

China

Even in their most optimistic moments the Soviet leaders could not have expected any formal action to outlaw the Chinese party, despite the dismay over China’s radical internal policies. By prior agreement the Soviets had conceded that the Chinese issue would not be raised. Nevertheless, Brezhnev launched a major attack on the Chinese in a bitter and lengthy diatribe delivered to the second session of the conference. For the first time, he dwelt on the Chinese military threat to the USSR, and went a long way toward ultimate condemnation of the Chinese as not merely renegades but open enemies of the Soviet state.⁶

The Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, had apparently been given the text or main points of Brezhnev’s speech on the preceding day and had threatened to walk out and return to Bucharest, where he would summon the Central Committee to support his action. There was a tense confrontation, but the Soviets outmaneuvered him by claiming he would look foolish if he returned home and Brezhnev did not give the speech as intended. So Ceausescu decided to wait and present a rebuttal. In fact, the China problem was first raised by Paraguay, and then elaborated on by Gomulka, before Brezhnev’s major speech. Ceausescu made an appeal against further criticism, but about 55 parties spoke against China, thus giving the USSR fairly strong support.

On this issue, then, the Soviet leaders have reason for some satisfaction. They did not get approval of an edict of excommunication, but

⁵ Nixon underlined this sentence.

⁶ “China’s foreign policy has, in effect, departed from proletarian internationalism and shed the socialist class content . . . these days the spearhead of Peking’s foreign policy is aimed chiefly against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.” [Footnote and ellipsis in the source text.]

did not try to. They did receive a significant degree of support, even though the limitation on their power to impose their position was clearly demonstrated.

Czechoslovakia

It is possible that had the Soviets remained silent on China, they might have escaped without a direct airing of the Czech invasion. Once the China question was broached, the dissidents were free to discuss the Czech invasion. Several delegations attacked the Soviets directly, but most remained silent and very few spoke in support. Husak had appealed to the conference before it opened to avoid the issue, but this was disregarded after the attack on China by Brezhnev.

On this issue, the final document is highly equivocal. Without mentioning Czechoslovakia, it discusses the limited sovereignty, or Brezhnev doctrine.⁷ By not endorsing it as such, the conference in effect repudiated it.⁸ Indeed, the document is so general and ambiguous that the Romanians are now quoting it in defense of their own independent course and the President's visit.

The Effect on Soviet Policy

It seems increasingly obvious that once the conference had been convened the Soviet leaders felt free to chart their own policy course without much regard to the actual proceedings or the final agreed documents. Indeed, Brezhnev's speech is the real Soviet position, and not the agreed statement on anti-imperialist struggle. In this regard, the Soviet position is more conservative and restrained. Brezhnev was much stronger on the themes of preventing a new war and conducting a policy of "peaceful coexistence"⁹ than the conference statement, which had to be amended to conciliate militants such as the Cubans.

The follow-up speech of Gromyko suggests that what was agreed to in Moscow will have no great influence on Soviet policy, at least in the sense of forcing it into more "revolutionary" lines. Both Brezhnev and Gromyko went well beyond the conference consensus in crediting the good intentions of the US and other "sober-minded" elements in the West. Thus, one could conclude that all Moscow really wanted was a dramatic forum to attack the Chinese leaders, and once having done so, are returning to the practical business of foreign policy.

⁷ Nixon underlined the second half of this sentence.

⁸ Nixon underlined this sentence.

⁹ Nixon underlined this sentence up to this point.

72. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**¹

Moscow, August 11, 1969, 1502Z.

4174. For the Secretary and Henry Kissinger.

1. At the moment the conduct of our relations with the USSR seem to have reached a marking-time stage. Despite the more positive tone of Gromyko's July 10 speech,² we have had no reply on SALT, the Middle East discussions are in a mechanical phase (we are receiving piecemeal the Soviet commentary on our counterproposals),³ Soviet positions on Vietnam and Laos remain stationary, and the delay in Dobrynin's return has slowed things down, either by design or by the accident of his illness.

2. Some of the causes are understandable. The Soviets doubtless wished to study Senate testimony on the ABM and make their own evaluation of the President's world tour⁴ as well as the Kiesinger visit to the US.⁵ Furthermore it is vacation time with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny currently out of Moscow, although the round of official visits to and from the USSR continues apace.

3. There may be other factors which one can only surmise. From the standpoint of Soviet reaction, the US may perhaps have been too successful with its recent accomplishments which put us ahead of them. Apollo 11⁶ and the favorable world response to the President's tour come to mind. With respect to the latter, it is not only the President's trip to Romania that may have caused concern but also the extension of the tour (including the Secretary's travels)⁷ into areas where the Soviets are trying to stake out a position for themselves through Brezhnev's Asian security proposal.⁸ Our firm support of the Thieu government has not made the Soviet's task in Vietnam any easier.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² For a summary, see Document 65.

³ See Document 67.

⁴ President Nixon's round-the-world trip from July 26–August 3 included stops in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, South Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Romania, and England. For selected documentation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 25, 1969, pp. 141–176.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 70.

⁶ On July 20, three Apollo 11 astronauts became the first men to walk on the moon.

⁷ Rogers made a trip to Asia and the Pacific July 29–August 10.

⁸ According to a June 27 research memorandum prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "In his speech to the international communist conference in Moscow, Brezhnev declared that the USSR was 'putting on the agenda the task of creating

4. Added to these are Soviet preoccupations with China (with respect to which our own statements and attitudes are being carefully watched) and with Eastern Europe, especially as the anniversary of the Czech invasion approaches. Finally there is always the German question and our relationship to it which will be examined in terms of Kissinger's talks in Washington, and may be reflected in the Soviet reply to the tripartite soundings on Berlin.

5. I have received no formal signs of Soviet displeasure with US but recent visitors and several of my colleagues have. To a greater degree than is perhaps shown in the written report, Kosygin closely questioned Hubert Humphrey⁹ about the Nixon administration's intentions and sincerity, at least this is the indication Mr. Humphrey gave me when he was here. Arthur Goldberg was treated to the refrain that the USSR is looking to the US for deeds rather than words in the development of relations. As duly reported, Soviet officials have commented unfavorably to my German, Austrian and Indonesian colleagues about the President's Bucharest stay. Finally American businessmen have received expressions of dissatisfaction and disappointment that there has been no relaxation in our trade policies.

6. I hesitate to go further in characterizing the current state of our relations but mention the above to call attention to trends which may produce significant reactions. Perhaps the Soviets will charge Dobrynin on his return with presenting a clearer picture.

7. By way of exploring procedures which in themselves may be revealing, I have had in mind sounding out Kuznetsov on schedules for the conduct of pending and continuing talks. I can always adduce the Secretary's future order of business as a reason, but should this approach make us appear over-eager for negotiations, I shall desist.

Beam

a system of collective security in Asia.' " The memorandum went on to say that "Although Brezhnev did not elaborate further, his proposal raises the possibility of a significant shift in Soviet policy in Asia, both in terms of Soviet attitudes toward regional cooperation on a non-ideological basis, and as a response to Peking's policies in Asia aimed at isolating and containing China." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 9, President's Daily Briefs, July 1–July 30, 1969)

⁹ See Document 57.

73. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11/13–69

Washington, August 12, 1969.

THE USSR AND CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the general course of Sino–Soviet relations over the next three years.

Conclusions

A. Sino-Soviet relations, which have been tense and hostile for many years, have deteriorated even further since the armed clashes on the Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect for improvement in the relationship, and partly for this reason, no likelihood that the fragments of the world Communist movement will be pieced together.

B. For the first time, it is reasonable to ask whether a major Sino-Soviet war could break out in the near future. The potential for such a war clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chiefly the emerging Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that the most propitious time for an attack is soon, rather than several years hence. At the same time, the attendant military and political uncertainties might also weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.

C. We do not look for a deliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. Nor do we believe the Soviets would wish to become involved in a prolonged, large-scale conflict. While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict. In any case, a climate of high tension, marked by periodic clashes along the border, is likely to obtain. The scale of fighting may

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R1012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred by all members of the USIB, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. This NIE was included with materials for a meeting of the National Security Council's Review Group on November 20; see Document 101. This NIE superseded NIE 11–12–66; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXX, China, Document 223.

occasionally be greater than heretofore, and might even involve punitive cross-border raids by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, escalation is an ever present possibility.

D. In the light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to “contain” the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its relations with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face stiff competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence in Asia.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate: Political Background, the Military Dimension, Prospects, Impact of the Dispute Elsewhere in the World, and Annex of Territorial Claims.]

74. Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council¹

San Clemente, August 14, 1969, 9:39 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Korea and a briefing by Helms on China.]

The President: We have always assumed that the Chinese are hard liners and the Soviets are more reasonable. But I think this is open to question. Look at what actually happened. Can we sustain this judgement?

Director Helms: No. The facts don't support it.

The President: Ceausescu² says that the Soviets are tougher and more aggressive than the Chinese. We must look at China on a long term basis. This must be very closely held. We must look at it in a bilateral context. China can't stay permanently isolated. To me, China

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 312, Meetings, National Security Council. These minutes were revised by Haig and contain his handwritten changes. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary, which also indicates that Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Lincoln, Wheeler, Richardson, Helms, Halperin, Haig, Lynn, Holdridge, and Green attended the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Nixon's notes on this meeting are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 25.

² Nicolae Ceausescu was the President of Romania.

uses the dispute with Russia for internal use. But to me the Soviets are more aggressive.

Director Helms: Border incidents don't prove anything, but the Soviets have moved from 15 up to 30 divisions to China's border. They now have 3 new missile sites with a range of 500 miles along the border. The Soviets fear they will soon lose their first strike capability vis-à-vis China.

The President: We must recall the Brezhnev doctrine and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets continue to move forward and act aggressively when progress is threatened. They are a tough group. We should relook at our own estimates. They may have a "knock them off now" policy developing with respect to China.

Now, in terms of our role, I am not sure if it is in our long term interest to let the Soviets knock them off. We must think through whether it is a safer world with China down, or should we look to keeping China strong? These are rhetorical questions. The Asians fear the Soviets first, and don't want a collective security arrangement. They question this. They don't want the Soviets as their protector. We must look at China after Vietnam.

Director Helms: I think the Soviets are doing well. They are very active in Europe and also in the Middle East. They talk softer but act much tougher. The Chinese have been stalling.

Secretary Rogers: No one at State would favor a Soviet takeover of China. They also feel that the Chinese threat is greatly overemphasized. This may suggest an aggressive Soviet attitude but I am not certain.

Assistant Secretary Green: China is still feared by the Asians. It is their principal fear. They want us to remain but they might accept the Soviets as an alternative.

The President: I don't want to overdraw this, but these countries don't want the Soviets in.

Assistant Secretary Green: The Soviets are certainly probably tempted to surgically remove the Chinese nuclear threat.

(The meeting ended at 12:10 P.M.)

75. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Semyenov–Beam Meetings, July 31, August 8 and 11

The Soviets gave Ambassador Beam their comments on our counter proposals² in meetings on July 31 and August 8 and 11. (You have already seen a memo on the July 31 meeting.) From the three meetings the following points emerge:

1. The Soviets want to hold the bilateral talks in Moscow. Beam did what he could to discourage this, but—especially with Dobrynin “ill”—we still have the problem of how to bring the action back to Washington. The Soviets don't appear likely to give up easily and have arranged still another Middle East meeting with Beam.

2. The Soviets are doing their best to appear reasonable and forthcoming. Possible explanations for this are:

—They are genuinely interested in a settlement.

—It is useful to them with the Arabs to keep the talks going whether there is any practical result or not.

—They are trying to convince us that talks in Moscow can be more useful than talks in Washington.

3. We seem to have agreed—or nearly agreed—language on several points:

—They accept the general principles in the preamble, but they want a settlement between Israel and all the Arabs, not just the UAR. They also shy away from our language where it implies direct negotiations.

—They accept our definition of the kind of guarantees and conditions which will accompany a settlement except that they feel there is no need to include a reference to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. (This is not really an Arab-Israeli issue. Interference in the area is mainly in the domestic affairs of our Arab friends by the Soviets' Arab friends.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, 7/69–10/69. Secret; Nodis.

² See footnote 2, Document 69.

—In some instance, they agree with what we say but disagree with the emphasis. For example, they have no objection to our references to a cessation of belligerency but they feel we have unnecessarily emphasized the point. On the other hand, they feel we should be explicit about the Arabs having no obligations in a settlement if the Israelis don't fulfill their obligations. (These differences are only cosmetic as far as we and the Russians are concerned, but they are important for both of us in trying to bring along our clients.)

4. Despite all this, there are important differences remaining:

—They are still pressing for their specific plan for implementing withdrawal rather than our vaguer formulation. (The real problem here is that their plan would eliminate the direct negotiations the Israelis feel are essential.)

—They still don't like our position on borders. (Our fallback position—return to the old UAR-Israel border—would meet their needs, but presenting this depends on their being more forthcoming on Arab post-settlement obligations.)

—The Egyptians are concerned—unduly in our view—about the Suez Canal. The Soviets say Nasser thinks we are plotting to take it away from him, but he may want our language changed so that he will have some legal basis for closing the canal if the Israelis don't behave.

—The Soviets don't appear able to modify their position that DMZ's must be in Israel as well as the UAR. I suspect that this is because the Arabs are taking as stiff a line with Moscow for this position as the Israelis are with us against it.

—They still want Gaza returned to the UAR, although Semyenov said he was talking about Arab administration, not sovereignty.

—The Soviets are not willing to give Israel the kind of guarantees in the Strait of Tiran that the Israelis are demanding, although they do admit this is an international waterway. They will go as far as the great power guarantees with a UN force that Israel got in 1957 and lost in 1967. They seem to feel that gaining consent from Nasser for a UN force was a victory.

—They did not accept our refugee formula, but say they now recognize that Israel's special concerns have to be taken into account. They want the refugee solution to be left to the parties to work out through Jarring. (This is an advance over their previous position that Israel would have to abide by the UN resolutions, i.e. let all the refugees return to Israel.)

Now that we have their full reply, Joe Sisco will review and return our comments in a week or two, trying to nudge us ahead on a few points. This has been useful in getting a more precise view of the Soviet position.

Beam's reports are at Tab A.³ Our paper is at Tab B⁴ for reference.

³ Attached but not printed are telegram 3946 from Moscow, July 31, in which the Embassy reported on Beam's talk with Semyenov, and telegram 3435 from Moscow, August 1, containing Semyenov's comments to Beam.

⁴ Attached but not printed; see footnote 2, Document 69.

76. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Contingencies

The two options being examined for the contingency of major Sino-Soviet hostilities should be subjected to much more rigorous examination and debate. As things now stand, the first approach—strict impartiality—seems likely to break down completely in the execution, and the second,—shading toward China—could have major consequences in our relations with the USSR.

Impartiality

This exists only in theory. In practice, the US will have to make choices which will have the net effect of a distinct sympathy for one or the other side.

Consider the following problems:

—do we continue bilateral and four-power Middle East talks with the USSR? if strict impartiality means business as usual, we should continue them; but this will be subject to the interpretation that we are condoning Soviet "aggression";

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Holdridge. A covering memorandum from Hyland to Kissinger reads, "The attached memo (Tab A) represents a highly personal and apparently minority view of our choices in the event of major hostilities between Russia and China. Still, you might find it worth reading before the interagency paper is submitted next week." Kissinger's handwritten comment on the cover memorandum reads, "Note to Hyland: 1st class paper. Thanks. HK."

—would we start or continue SALT? if we did the Soviets and most of informed opinion in the world (and in China) would see it as favorable to the USSR; if we refused to talk this would be a clear retaliation, not impartiality;

—would we continue negotiations on a seabeds disarmament treaty?

—consider a UN resolution condemning the USSR (introduced by Albania); could we abstain? Moscow would be overjoyed; could we vote against the USSR and be impartial, etc.?

The point is, that in an effort to be truly impartial, we would probably wind up clearly supporting the USSR, unless we were prepared to take specific actions to indicate our disapproval, which would then amount to support to China. Indeed, trying to be even-handed and impartial or neutral once China has been attacked by major force is clearly tantamount to supporting the USSR.

Even if all of the specific problems could be miraculously sorted out, the world at large and domestic opinion is going to scrutinize our position and conclude that we favor one side.

One way out of this dilemma could be not to adopt an avowed policy of impartiality but one of enlightened self-interest, regulating our reactions, statements, and actions to the actual situation. As many have pointed out a Sino-Soviet war, for a limited period and if limited in scope, is by no means a disaster for the US. It might just be the way to an early Vietnam settlement. It might also be a “solution” to the China nuclear problem.

In any case, it is worth considering the option of being mildly pro-Soviet, trying at the same time to be mildly pro-Chinese, depending on the scope and duration of hostilities.

In other words, instead of measuring our various actions against the criteria of impartiality or neutrality, to measure each against the national objectives of the United States, which are in the process of being defined in the NSSM-63 study.²

Partiality Toward China

This variant does not seem to be very well thought through. Two reasons have been advanced:

—we will incline toward China to extract some Soviet concessions;
—we will incline toward China to prevent a shift in the Asian “balance” (the argument apparently being that a major defeat of China would result in Soviet predominance).

² See Document 64. The first draft of the NSSM 63 study entitled “U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences” was considered by an interdepartmental ad hoc group on September 3 and was discussed at a WSAG meeting on September 4, and at a NSC Review Group meeting on September 25. The final version of NSSM 63 was completed on November 10.

The notion of extracting Soviet concessions, once major hostilities have begun, is extremely naive.³ The Soviets are not going to attack China in some quixotic mood. If they take this drastic step, they will be fully and totally committed to pursue it to the end. They are already working up deep racial and political emotions in Russia. The Soviet leaders believe we should share their concern about China, and expect, at the least, sympathy and understanding of whatever actions they might take. They will almost certainly regard American gestures to China as sheer hypocrisy.

If this argument is even close to the mark, then the Soviet reaction to our slight partially toward China is likely to be massively hostile. They might not be able or want to do anything about it at the time, but it will poison Soviet-American relations for a very long time.

The notion of supporting China to some small degree because of the effect on the Asian balance is rather fatuous. Only a slight knowledge of history suggests that foreign conquest of China is not very likely (the Soviets are not so inexperienced as to believe they can conquer China). A quick "victory" simply is not in the cards. The alternative of a long, inconclusive struggle is another problem, but it need not be decided in any contingency plan at this moment.

If the Soviet blow brings down the present regime, this would not be a great disaster. A replacement would have to be anti-Soviet to come to power. The alternative of a pro-Soviet faction surfacing in Peking after an attack is too remote to be discussed; even if the Soviets could find such Chinese leaders, their tenure in China would be brief, and their authority would not extend beyond a few provinces.

The idea that we can build up political credit with the Chinese leaders by displaying our sympathies is not very convincing. If we were serious in this regard we should take actions to forestall a Soviet strike, which the Chinese could claim we have full knowledge of (cf. press reports of such a strike in all US papers on August 28).⁴

If the strike does occur, the only way to gain a real credit in Peking would be a straightforward anti-Soviet campaign. Anything short of this will probably be regarded by the Chinese as a charade. Indeed, the Chinese could already conclude that we know of Soviet intentions and are colluding with them. If and when it becomes public knowledge that the Soviets did in fact mention to us a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, the Chinese will simply write us off as Moscow's tacit ally.

³ This is not to say that the Soviets would not pay some price in advance to prevent a more accommodating US policy toward China. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ See, for example, Chalmers M. Roberts, "Russia Reported Eyeing Strikes at China A-Sites," *Washington Post*, August 28, 1971, p. A-1.

In sum, there is a considerable danger that by trying to be slightly sympathetic towards Peking we will court a massive over-reaction from the USSR and still accomplish very little in the eyes of this or any other Chinese leadership.

77. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

San Clemente, September 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Contingency Plan in the Event of Sino-Soviet Hostility

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Kissinger, Chairman
The Attorney General
State—U. Alexis Johnson
Defense—G. Warren Nutter
CIA—Vice Admiral Nels Johnson
NSC Staff—Helmut Sonnenfeldt; John H. Holdridge

Summary of Conclusions²

1. The section on Vietnam should be strengthened. A legal study of the implications of a Soviet blockade of the China Mainland was needed. Additional studies on neutrality and the potential effect on the U.S.-Soviet relationship were required.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. No classification marking.

² A draft of the response to NSSM 63, on "U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences," was the chief item on the agenda for this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 9/4/69, Sino-Soviet)

³ Holdridge raised this issue in talking points he prepared for Kissinger on September 3. Holdridge pointed out that, "There is a question of balance (which of course is controlled by the paper's purpose and assumptions). Two U.S. responses to a Sino-Soviet conflict are dealt with at some length—(1) a carefully studied attitude of impartiality and (2) a slight bias in favor of the Chinese. A third alternative—a policy of bias in favor of the Soviets—is suggested, but rejected. Would it be useful to consider this alternative?" (Ibid.)

2. A U.S. position of impartiality would have the practical consequences of helping the Soviets. In such circumstances we might try to get something from the Soviets.

3. With regard to the U.S. public position in the UN or elsewhere, we could not condone a nuclear exchange. If we wanted to quiet things down, we must say so. For the U.S. to ask for a ceasefire without at the same time condemning the Soviets would appear to the Chinese as “collusion.” With such a condemnation, however, it was acceptable to ask for a ceasefire.

4. The draft should be refined to reflect two alternatives: a situation in which major hostilities were in progress, and a situation in which the Soviets launched a surgical strike against Chinese nuclear centers. A surgical strike would probably lead to greater hostilities, but for the purpose of the paper this distinction should be made.

5. Section four—what to do to deter—was most pertinent and urgent.

78. Editorial Note

On September 11, 1969, from 10:17 a.m. to 12:24 p.m., the National Security Council met in the Cabinet room to discuss the Middle East. The day before this meeting, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum to serve as “an analysis of the major issues which may become obscured amidst all of the negotiating detail you will hear at the NSC meeting.” After summarizing the intricate web of Middle Eastern issues, Kissinger related them to the larger U.S.-Soviet agenda as follows:

“There are several possible ways to relate this with other issues on the US-USSR agenda:

“1. If we were going to press Israel to accept unpalatable measures, we might expect the Soviets to press Nasser to accept some equally unpalatable terms.

“2. If the terms are going to be harder for Israel than for the UAR to accept, then we might look to other areas for compensating Soviet pressure on their clients such as the North Vietnamese. Another possibility would be some sort of understanding about the limits of Soviet imperialistic ambitions in the Mid-East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean.

“Whether the Soviets will respond depends heavily on how they view their situation in the area. It is common for us to assume that time

helps them and hurts us, but there are enough disadvantages in this situation and advantages in a settlement to give us some leverage. With a settlement, they could pursue their interests without risk of war, get their fleet into the Indian Ocean and still have enough tension points like the Persian Gulf to exploit. The balance is fine enough however that they might cooperate with us in pressing a reasonable proposal on the Arabs. They apparently judge that pressing our present proposals would cost them too much in Cairo. Given this delicate a balance and our inability to press the Israelis beyond certain limits, it may be that on this issue we are negotiating in a relatively narrow field." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-024, NSC Meetings 9/11/69)

At the beginning of the NSC meeting on September 11, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, who had been in Moscow July 14–17, presented his impressions of the Soviet position:

"I came away from Moscow judging: Soviets want to continue dialogue with US for both Mid-East and general reasons. Question is how Soviets view the area: If area undergoing increasing radicalization, does Moscow view this as in USSR interest?

"US-USSR agreements in talks on the following:

- "—Israel and UAR would sign same agreement.
- "—Recognition of Israel's right to exist.
- "—Freedom of passage through Tiran. On Suez, USSR has qualified by reference to Constantinople Convention of 1888.
- "—Execution of agreement would await agreement on total package—UAR, Israel and possible Jordan.
- "—We have agreed on the principle of demilitarization.

"Soviet plan:

- "1. Israeli withdrawal 40 miles.
- "2. Opening Canal.
- "3. Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines and Gaza Strip.
- "4. Demilitarization of Negev–Sinai border. Seem willing to accept only token demilitarization on Israeli side.
- "5. Irrevocable UN force at Sharm al-Shaikh.

"Position US has taken:

- "1. Within context of agreement, Israeli withdrawal to 'secure and recognized border' to be defined by parties. We 'do not exclude' pre-war border.
- "2. Demilitarization of entire Sinai.
- "3. Options for Sharm al-Shaikh. Let parties negotiate. Kept open Israeli presence.
- "4. Ultimately, sovereignty of Gaza would have to be determined by Jordan, UAR, Israel."

After a brief discussion of Israeli views and British and French attitudes, President Nixon asked, "What does the USSR want?" Sisco responded as follows:

"1. They want to continue talks as a deterrent in the Mid-East.

"2. As long as they talk, this is a demonstration to Arabs that they are trying to help.

"3. Be responsive to Nixon 'era of negotiations.'

"Rogers: They think they have brought Arabs farther than we have brought Israelis.

"President: Don't Soviets know Arabs will be beaten in another war. 'If they get screwed again, they won't have another Glassboro to bail them out?'

"Helms: They really want to get down to Persian Gulf.

"President: In 1967, Soviets looked unready to help Arabs. If this happened again, Soviets don't want to be in that position. Do they really believe—given that fact—that they consider this worth a US–USSR confrontation? Do they think this is about the best they can get now? They want talks to continue, but a settlement?

"Sisco: They want settlement on own terms. Soviets want Nasser as their own tool. They haven't wanted to press him.

"President: How is USSR doing in Mid-East? Not bad—some weak reeds but still not bad.

"Sisco: We have interest in stable peace. Less clear USSR sees this as its interest.

"President: USSR can have influence while situation simmers. Does anybody think US as its friend? June war a tremendous victory for Israel and USSR. From their viewpoint why change the situation. Does Moscow think they're going to have confrontation with US over Israel? 'You know damn well we're not and they know it.' Do you think they want a deal?

"Sisco: Not a deal that would cost Moscow much.

"President: We're the honest brokers here.

"Rogers: Could have a settlement that would continue exploitable tension. Meanwhile, they have isolated us from world community.

"President: 'Israel's puppet.'

"Richardson: One aspect in which USSR might want real settlement. Present situation continued strengthens fedayeen, weakens Nasser. Soviets less able to deliver if fedayeen come out on top, Soviets less able to deliver Arab demands which would then be not just return of territory but destruction of Israel.

"President: Agree but if fedayeen prevail, they too would keep situation stirred up. Soviets have to have some reason to want to settle; what is it?

“Rogers: If war broke out again, their clients would lose. Our hope is that they want to avoid a war.

“Helms: USSR wants to open Canal to get into Persian Gulf.

“Yost: On balance, USSR wants settlement but not going to jeopardize their influence. They could even shift support to fedayeen and try to ride that wave.

“What concerns me is extent to which we are in trouble with moderate Arabs. Soviets without lifting a finger are profiting.

“Formula asking Arabs at outset to come to direct negotiations is a non-starter.

“Situation is weakening moderate regimes and not increasing Israel’s security. Even Moroccans and Tunisians getting worried about US position—has not gone very far yet.

“Kissinger: Soviets may have interest in Israel-UAR settlement because continued occupation of Sinai demonstrates USSR impotence. They want naval access to Persian Gulf. Plenty of tension will remain. They may see their opportunity in transitional regimens in Arabian Peninsula. I can see Soviet gains from a settlement.

“Problem of concentrating on UAR-Israel settlement is that our friend, Hussein, comes off worse than Nasser.”

Before turning to the domestic implications of the administration’s Middle East policy, President Nixon made the following remarks:

“I don’t want to save the face of the USSR; they aren’t trying to help us anywhere. I don’t see why we should help them. That doesn’t mean all their interests are different from ours. In developing our position, let’s not give them a chance to claim credit for getting everything back for the Arabs. Mistake ‘allow them to look too good.’” (Ibid.) The minutes of this meeting are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

79. Editorial Note

On September 17, 1969, the Washington Special Actions Group met to discuss revisions to NSSM 63 on “U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.” Minutes of this meeting are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 32. The following actions were agreed: “(a) re-do section on reconnaissance capability; (b) strengthen section on Soviet blockade of China with special emphasis on U.S. military responses should the Soviets deny access to Hong Kong or interfere with U.S. shipping on the high seas; (c) take

another look at the operational consequences of ‘partiality’ or ‘impartiality,’ especially in the light of U.S. actions that can be taken in NVN; (d) delete section on civil defense.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

Additional revisions to NSSM 63 were considered at a meeting of the National Security Council’s Review Group on September 25. The paper was “to be revised to spell out the consequences of policy choices in three situations: (a) continued Sino-Soviet tension but no hostilities; (b) active U.S. effort to deter hostilities; (c) hostilities [with] one-shot strike or protracted conflict.” Minutes of this Review Group meeting are in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 36.

U.S. policy toward Sino-Soviet hostilities was also on the agenda for the Washington Special Actions Group meeting on September 29, but the conflict was discussed only briefly. According to the minutes of this meeting, “Kissinger was called out of the meeting but paused long enough to respond to a question from [William] Cargo [Director for Plan Coordination, Policy Planning Council, Department of State] pertaining to the Sino-Soviet study and its relationship to the NSSM 63 Report. Cargo said that the two efforts were distinctively different, especially in their time frames. He questioned the real utility of developing a detailed analysis, in the NSSM 63 Report, of the contingency involving an escalating crisis or rapid deterioration of the overall Sino-Soviet situation. Kissinger deferred to Cargo’s judgment on how the problem should be approached but requested that neither paper neglect to examine the relationship between courses of action and their probable outcome.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

NSSM 63 was revised again on October 17. The summary portion on “U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences” reads as follows:

“This paper considers the policy options posed for the United States by the Sino-Soviet dispute on the assumption that the dispute continues to be fought out in terms of an essentially political rivalry on the present pattern; analyzes the nature of the interrelationships between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and examines in general terms the problems and opportunities for the United States which would result from major hostilities between the Soviet Union and China. (The immediate short-range options in the event of Sino-Soviet war are the subject of a separate contingency study.)

“Options

“Three broad strategies are considered.

Option A would have the effect of supporting Communist China, the weaker of the two contestants, and would probably take the form of making various unreciprocated gestures towards China, such as endorsing Peking's border claims, while, at the same time, displaying reluctance to engage in negotiations with the USSR, e.g., on SALT. Pursuit of this strategy might result in some long-term improvement in the U.S.-Chinese relationship and it might also help prolong the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the Soviet reaction would be strong and adverse. The Soviets would probably pursue an intensified policy of attempting to detach Western Europe from the U.S., win over Asian countries, particularly Japan, strengthen their hold over Eastern Europe, and step up their own military program.

Option B would have the effect of supporting the Soviet Union, the stronger contestant, and would take the form of maintaining our present posture towards China without change, while we adopted a generally softer line towards the USSR. It could result in a more accommodating Soviet attitude on some of the major issues between us and in the general Soviet posture, but it might have the effect of making the USSR more difficult to deal with and more ready to take preemptive action against the Chinese. It would damage the chances of an improvement in our relations with China.

Option C would be one of overt neutrality and could be applied in one of two ways.

Option C. 1. would involve our taking no action which might be construed as favoring one contestant or the other. Accordingly, we should make no effort to develop our relations with Communist China and, at the same time, avoid trying to arrive at understandings with the USSR. Such a policy would reduce to a minimum the dangers of U.S. involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but would hamper pursuit of our own interests, vis-à-vis both China and the USSR.

Option C. 2. would involve maintenance of a policy of neutrality, while we pursued our own long-term interests towards both China and the USSR, without undue regard to the interpretation either side might put on our actions. In implementing this policy, we should attempt to develop our relations with China, while continuing our basic support of the GRC on Taiwan, and simultaneously seek to negotiate with the USSR on the important issues between us. This option would have the advantage of leaving us free to try to work out a satisfactory relationship with each of the contestants, but it would be difficult to pursue, since it calls for constant awareness of how each of them reacted to it.

"The Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.

"The Soviets almost certainly see their relationship with China as the most compelling problem in foreign affairs now confronting them.

Short of a conceivable Soviet decision to strike militarily against China, it can be anticipated that Moscow will persist in efforts to strengthen its military position along the border with China, to develop improved relations with both Communist and non-Communist countries on the Chinese periphery, to shore up its overall security position (particularly in Eastern Europe), to diminish Chinese influence in other Communist countries, to protect its political gains in the Middle East, and to establish a generally less hostile relationship with the West.

“The character of Soviet policy could change if Moscow comes to believe that the Chinese are on the way to breaking out of their largely self-inflicted isolation, and most especially if this seemed to be happening in a way that foreshadowed a real and far-reaching Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. In this event, the Soviets might well see a need to strengthen further their general military position; they might feel greater compulsion to strike militarily at China; and they might adopt a more hostile attitude toward the U.S. Alternatively, the Soviets might decide that a serious effort to improve relations with the U.S., even at the expense of concessions on specific issues, was more likely to serve their interests.

“It seems probable that the Chinese, for their part, also now regard the USSR as their most immediate and threatening adversary. They seem determined to give no ground in the quarrel, in spite of their obvious military weakness vis-à-vis the USSR. Since many of the handicaps which encumber Chinese foreign policy are of their own making, the way to greater international maneuverability is open to them—if they choose to use it. It is possible, therefore, that Peking might at some point come to see that it would be better served in the struggle with the Soviets by a more flexible posture. This could, even in the near term, lead the Chinese to seek improved relations with third countries and a somewhat less hostile relationship with the U.S. Peking recognizes its own military weakness in facing the Soviet Union and it is most unlikely that the Chinese will launch a military attack against the USSR. Nevertheless, the Chinese can be expected to react violently against any Soviet attack on Chinese territory.

“The triangular relationship between the U.S., the USSR, and China is, of course, an unequal one: U.S. and Soviet interests intersect in many parts of the world, whereas our problems with China lie mainly in Asia. For the foreseeable future, the views of Peking and Moscow as to how the world should be organized are likely to remain incompatible with ours. Thus, until a fundamental and far-reaching change takes place in China or in the USSR, the resolution of critical differences we have with either is unlikely. Nevertheless, there is today some convergence of interest between us and the USSR in the various parts of the world where our interests interact, arising mainly from our mutual desire to avoid a nuclear war. There is less convergence

between U.S. and Chinese interests. Broadly, however, each of the three powers wants to avoid collusion between the other two or any dramatic expansion of the power of either adversary at the expense of that of the other.

“Growing dissidence between the USSR and China has limited both countries in the pursuit of policies basically antagonistic to U.S. interests; this is the most important benefit which assumes to the U.S. from Sino-Soviet rivalry. Beyond this, the dispute has, in a positive sense, heightened Soviet interest in developing a less abrasive relationship with the U.S. and it may at some point lead China in the same direction.

“Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming
Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities

“A change in the degree of tension between the Soviets and Chinese is a more likely prospect than a change in kind. The latter is, however, now well within the realm of the possible. There are two ways in which major hostilities might develop:

- “(1) through inadvertent escalation, and
- “(2) by deliberate resort to military force on a large scale.

“Given the calculus of military power only the USSR would be likely to see advantage in the second course.

“The impact of major Sino-Soviet hostilities on U.S. interests could vary significantly depending upon the nature and duration of the hostilities, the general posture of the U.S. toward the two sides, and the outcome of the war. The course and outcome of such hostilities are highly unpredictable.

“Major Sino-Soviet hostilities which did not directly involve third countries (other than Mongolia) and were fought only with conventional weapons would not necessarily be disadvantageous to us. During such a war, the U.S. could expect (1) a drastic reduction in the capability of the USSR and China to pursue policies inimical to U.S. interests elsewhere, (2) a drastic reduction in assistance to Hanoi thereby eventually enhancing the prospect for political settlement in Viet-Nam, and (3) improved relations with third countries anxious to strengthen their own security in an uncertain situation. However, if third countries in Asia or in Europe were to be drawn in on one side or the other, if wars of opportunity should break out as a result (e.g., between North and South Korea), or if nuclear weapons were used in the conflict, serious dangers and problems for the U.S. would arise.

“The general posture of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union and China at the time major hostilities broke out between them—and during the conflict—could affect U.S. ability to maximize advantages and minimize risks. If we clearly supported one side in the conflict, we

would be unable to gain advantages in relations with the other and we would have difficulties with third countries not adopting the same partisan attitude. A U.S. posture of neutrality in the dispute would provide maximum flexibility in dealings with third countries and might encourage both Moscow and Peking to make concessions to ensure that the U.S. not become involved in their quarrel, since both would fear U.S. support of the other.

“The outcome of a Sino-Soviet war could have important policy implications for the U.S. If the Mao-Lin regime survived in control of China as it now exists, its prestige would be enhanced and China would probably be a more formidable opponent of U.S. interests in Asia. If the Soviets succeeded in creating puppet regimes in the Chinese border provinces, Peking might become more interested in improving relations with the U.S., but a triumphant USSR would be more difficult to deal with and Soviet influence in Asia would be enhanced to a degree and in ways inimical to our interests. If the Mao-Lin regime should be ousted as a result of the war, China might be fragmented and civil war might follow. The U.S. would then face the question of whether it should not attempt to counter Soviet efforts to gain predominant influence over more than just the border areas.

“The net balance of the advantages and disadvantages to the United States cannot be foreseen, but the possibilities that nuclear weapons might be used, that other countries might be drawn into the war, and that the outcome might shift the balance of power against us, are sufficiently great to make an escalation of hostilities something we should seek to avoid and to raise the question whether there are possible actions we could take to minimize the chances of a major Sino-Soviet military conflict.

“We have little ability to influence directly either Moscow or Peking on the question of relations with the other, since neither regards this as a question in which we have a legitimate interest. Even so, the U.S. could make it clear that it would not welcome a major Sino-Soviet conflict and believed dangerous international complications would ensue. Even if such a position did not reinforce councils of caution in Moscow and Peking, it should serve U.S. purposes in relations with third countries.

“In making contingency preparations if major Sino-Soviet hostilities seemed imminent, care should be taken to avoid creating the impression that we were preparing to take military advantage of either Peking or Moscow since this could contribute to the explosiveness of the situation.” (Ibid.)

80. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting, 18 September

Joe Sisco saw Dobrynin yesterday. I will attach his detailed report as soon as we get it, but in his summary cable (Tab A),² he reports the following:

1. The Soviets are now largely ready to buy the language on peace in point 3 of our proposal (Tab B)³ with the exception of the commitment to control the Arab terrorists. They also want to consolidate points 3 and 12. (*Comment*: Consolidation, even without changing the substance, would lessen the overall emphasis on an Arab commitment to peace, and, of course, dropping the commitment to control the fedayeen would eliminate one crucial element and give the Israelis “proof” that the Arabs just want to get their land back and then go on with the war.)

2. On direct negotiations Dobrynin took the position that the question is difficult and should not be raised now. Sisco has the impression that the question is not closed. (*Comment*: The Soviets could, of course, be hoping to postpone the question indefinitely.)

3. The Soviets still seem flexible on refugees and asked how many Arabs would come under our annual quota proposal.

4. Dobrynin understands our desire to keep all the options on security arrangements open for the parties, but he rejected an Israeli presence at Sharm el-Shaikh.

5. Dobrynin made his usual plea for withdrawal to pre-war lines.

6. Sisco told Dobrynin that we believe that an Arab commitment to direct negotiations at some stage is the key to further movement and that the Soviets must get out in front of the Egyptians just as we are out in front of the Israelis.

They will probably meet again in New York on Monday.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 339, Subject Files, Kissinger/Sisco. Secret; Nodis.

² Tab A is telegram 3084 from USUN, September 19; attached but not printed.

³ Tab B is the June 26 U.S. statement on “Fundamental Principles”; attached but not printed.

Comment:

1. Joe Sisco feels this represents some progress—or at least flexibility for further progress. The fact remains that we are still working around the fringes of the two main issues—peace and security.

2. We are still missing the key ingredient: How much would the Russians press Nasser if we agreed to press Israel on boundaries? Joe's proposal for probing is within the context of his talks. Other less formal probes are possible.

3. In short, yesterday's talk does not really take us anywhere new.

81. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/USMC/4

New York, September 22, 1969, 10–11 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September, 1969

U.S. Participants

Secretary William P. Rogers
Ambassador Charles W. Yost
Mr. Gerard Smith
Mr. Richard F. Pedersen
Assistant Secretary Martin J. Hillenbrand
Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary Samuel DePalma
Deputy Assistant Secretary Emory C. Swank
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R. Participants

Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey A. Gromyko
Ambassador Yakov A. Malik
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Ambassador Lev I. Mendelevich
Mr. Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor of Embassy in Washington
Mr. Valentin M. Falin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yevgeniy D. Pyrlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Drafted by Krimer and approved by Brown on September 24. On September 17, Sonnenfeldt drafted a letter for Kissinger that Nixon could send to Rogers covering talking points for his upcoming meetings with Gromyko. A covering note reads: “Ed does not have a copy of this letter in his file—nor is it in Dr. K's chron. I don't believe it was ever sent out.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VII)

SALT

Following a private talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko Secretary Rogers stated that Mr. Gromyko had expressed the wish to be able to talk to us in confidence on this subject. The Secretary had assured Mr. Gromyko that what he had to say would be kept confidential within the limitations of our free press. The Secretary then introduced Mr. Gerard Smith as the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and pointed out Mr. Smith's particular interest in this subject.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he recognized the importance of this problem; it was under thorough study in the Soviet Union and, he assumed, in the United States as well. The Soviet Union would soon reply to the last U.S. proposals concerning the time and place for preliminary discussions and would also inform us of the composition of the Soviet delegation. The reply will, of course, be positive, since the desirability of holding arms limitation talks follows logically from the position of the Soviet Government.

The Secretary took this occasion to indicate to Mr. Gromyko that our review of the situation in Helsinki had shown that it would be difficult for us to hold the talks there. We would consider Vienna or Geneva to be more suitable for the purpose; we were also receptive to the suggestion of holding the talks in two places on an alternating basis, for example three months in one place to be followed by a like period in another. We did not, however, suggest that Washington and Moscow would be suitable for this purpose.

Ambassador Dobrynin recalled that at the early stages the possibility of preliminary procedural talks in Washington and Moscow has been mentioned.

The Secretary said that in view of the delay which had occurred he did not think it advisable for the preliminary discussions to be held in Moscow or in Washington. As for a permanent site for the talks, we would be happy to consider Soviet suggestions; we were not inflexible and were willing to talk about where the meetings should be held.

Mr. Gromyko repeated once again that for the time being the problem was under study by the Soviet Government and asked not to be prodded into replying to the United States proposal, since such prodding, especially in public, would neither speed nor slow the Soviet reply.

The Secretary replied that we had not intended to prod the Soviet Government into replying, but that we had indicated to the press that we were willing to start the discussions; we were, however, quite relaxed in our position.

Berlin

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that some time ago the United States Government had proposed an exchange of views with the Soviet Government on ways of improving the situation relating to West Berlin. He also thought the present situation there was not normal as a result of certain steps taken by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. There was no need at this time to delve deeply into the history of this problem, since this would merely prolong discussion needlessly. In principle he agreed that it would be useful to conduct an exchange of views on this problem between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, but wanted to inquire as to what the U.S. Government had in mind with respect to the results of such an exchange of views. Did the United States intend to have these results reflected in a formal document, as was customary in international practice, or did we merely want to improve the situation *de facto* on the basis of mutual example; in other words, what did we conceive as possible ways of reflecting the results of the future exchange of views. He suggested that if the Secretary was not ready to reply at the present moment, he might give the problem some thought and return to it at the time of their next meeting on Friday. If this was acceptable, he did want to take this opportunity to suggest Moscow as the place for holding this exchange of opinions.

The Secretary said that he understood that East Germany and West Germany had already entered into discussions on possible ways of improving relations between them, especially with respect to transportation, communications and similar matters. We would be glad if these discussions resulted in better relations between East Germany and West Germany. As for the question of Berlin, both East Berlin and West Berlin, the Secretary believed this to be of concern to the Four Powers and thought that any discussions for improving the situation there should include all four.

Mr. Gromyko emphasized that his remarks were intended to deal with the situation in West Berlin and not with the situation in Germany in general. This did indeed touch upon the interests of the other allies. Some time ago, however, the United States had raised the question of conducting an exchange of views between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States; today the Secretary talked about Berlin in terms of the Four Powers. Did this mean that we were withdrawing our suggestion for bilateral discussions? He was simply asking this question in an attempt to understand the Secretary's thinking on the subject and not in order to raise any objections.

The Secretary replied that he thought any discussions concerning the future of Berlin would have to include the other two powers. He would be happy to talk about how this could be brought about. In this connection, however, he was not quite sure what Mr. Gromyko had in

mind as to the objectives that might be achieved in talks. The Soviet reply had not been entirely clear to us and we wondered what their ideas were.

Mr. Gromyko said that this was precisely the question he was addressing to the Secretary as representative of the Government which had proposed these discussions. It was he who was asking for clarification. What did the Secretary consider to be the best way of reflecting the results of such an exchange of views? He repeated his earlier suggestion that if the Secretary needed time to consult on this problem, they could return to it at their next meeting. If the Secretary's thinking was in terms of Four Power talks, he did not object in principle and would consider it useful to discuss ways of putting the machinery for such an exchange in motion. He thought this was something both sides should have a chance to consider and return to it later.

The Secretary agreed that this was a good suggestion and said he would be willing to discuss it further next Friday.²

Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand remarked that the specific form of any possible agreement, that is, whether it should be a written document or a de facto improvement, would, no doubt, depend upon the course of the discussions and could be considered as we went along.

Mr. Gromyko said that whether the talks were held on a bilateral or on a Four Power basis, inasmuch as communications to and from West Berlin passed through the territory of the German Democratic Republic, his Government would, of course, have to be in consultation with the Government of the GDR. He was just mentioning this "by the way," as it were.

The Secretary agreed to return to this question next Friday.

Middle East

The Secretary said that he and Foreign Minister Gromyko had already had some preliminary discussions on the Middle East, in which the position of each Government had been set forth, and now wanted to talk about what could be done to move the matter forward a bit. He knew that we could not resolve the matter tonight or for some time to come. He wanted to suggest that Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary Sisco get together again starting tomorrow to examine the U.S. document submitted in July,³ in order to identify areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. He and the Foreign Minister could discuss it further on Friday. When we came to points which we could not resolve, the points of agreement and disagreement might be passed

² September 26.

³ See Document 67.

on to Jarring to see if negotiations between the parties could eliminate the areas of difficulty.

Mr. Gromyko replied he did not mind; the Ambassador would be ready to start working tomorrow. The Soviet Government was doing everything it could to facilitate a solution of the Middle East problem. He thought that unfortunately Israel was not doing anything to make a solution possible. He also thought the United States was underestimating its possibilities with respect to its ability to influence Israel.

The Secretary remarked that they had discussed the matter earlier. The Foreign Minister had originally said he did not think we were doing enough to influence Israel; now he had put it in a more friendly manner—that we were underestimating our possibilities in that direction. He did think it was urgent to move toward a solution of the Middle East problem and it would be good if Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary Sisco could work out something that could be used by a four-power meeting in mid-October. He did not think there was any other way to proceed at present and was glad to see that the Foreign Minister was willing to try.

Soviet Proposals to UN General Assembly

Foreign Minister Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to the proposals he had laid before the UN General Assembly. These consisted of two main parts. The first concerns a ban on chemical and biological weapons.⁴ This was not a matter of special interest to the Soviet Union alone, but he thought it was in the interests of all powers and states. He would like to have the Secretary study the proposal and approach it objectively to see if some common language could be worked out. The second proposal concerned the maintenance of peace and international security.⁵ Although the second proposal was worded in very general language, it did contain some specific provisions. In a word, he wanted to ask the Secretary to study it and he would be very glad if we could find some common language. If our

⁴ On September 19, in an address before the UN General Assembly, Gromyko proposed an international convention that would prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and of their destruction. For a full text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 457–459.

⁵ In his speech at a plenary meeting of the 24th session of the UN General Assembly on September 19, Gromyko introduced a proposal for "The Strengthening of International Security." A text of Gromyko's speech in which he made this proposal is in United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7–14. Gromyko's proposal, which was placed on the agenda for the UN General Assembly, is *ibid.*, *Annexes*, Agenda Item 103, Document A/7654 and A/7903, pp. 1–6. International reaction to Gromyko's proposal was tepid. See, for example, Richard Holloran, "Nations Show Little Interest in Pact on A-Arms," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1969, p. 10.

two powers could do anything to lessen international tensions, a great deal would have been accomplished. He thought this was indeed possible.

With respect to the first proposal the Secretary inquired of Mr. Smith if he did not think that this was a matter for the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. Mr. Smith said that would normally be the case. The Secretary went on to say that we were in accord with the objectives stated, but that he, too, was of the opinion that this was a matter normally to be taken up in Geneva. As for the second proposal, he would give it some attention.

Mr. Gromyko said that he did not know what was “normal” with respect to submitting such proposals. There was nothing in the UN Charter to direct any particular approach. He thought the “shortest” way was to lay the proposals directly before the General Assembly. He would like to speed a resolution of this problem, since the passage of time would make its solution more difficult. That was the only consideration the USSR had in putting the matter before the General Assembly.

The Secretary said maybe he had used the wrong word. He felt the CBW issue could be handled more quickly in Geneva. In the GA the proposals were likely to develop into a propaganda exercise.

Mr. Gromyko said that in fact the proposal was already before the Geneva Committee. In any case, he appreciated the Secretary’s remarks.

U.S.–U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement

Foreign Minister Gromyko inquired if the Secretary thought it would be possible to work out a maritime agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. His country had such agreements with many other nations; in spite of the fact that both our countries were maritime powers there was no specific maritime agreement between us. Ambassador Dobrynin amplified that what they had in mind was an agreement providing for port facilities, entry of merchant vessels and similar questions. Mr. Gromyko said that it would be desirable for our two countries to work out an agreement regulating the question of receiving each other’s merchant ships. He was not talking about a trade agreement at this time.

The Secretary replied that he thought we would indeed be very interested in this matter and promised to reply in detail on Friday. He thought that anything we could do in the way of such agreements would be helpful for both our countries.

NPT

The Secretary inquired as to the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and asked if the Soviet Union was ready to proceed with simultaneous ratification and deposit of the Treaty.

Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that his Government had

started the process of ratification. The Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Supreme Soviet had considered the Treaty and had recommended that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet take final action on it. The Treaty was now before the Presidium for this final act in the ratification process.

The Secretary said that we had completed all necessary steps short of actual ratification. We felt it would be useful if U.S. and Soviet ratification and deposit of the Treaty took place simultaneously. Putting these final acts on international television would send the Treaty off to a good start.

Mr. Gromyko said his Government would consider this possibility and take appropriate measures to move ratification along. In this connection he wanted to inquire as to the position of the Government of the FRG with respect to accession to the NPT. He had discussed this question with FRG Foreign Minister Brandt. Mr. Brandt had told him he thought the new Government of the FRG, to be formed after the German elections, would take action to sign and ratify the Treaty.

The Secretary said he believed that if the United States and the Soviet Union ratified the NPT, other Governments, including that of the FRG, would do so also. If, on the other hand, our two countries were to continue to hold back, there was the danger that others would lose interest.

Mr. Gromyko said that in his talk with Mr. Brandt the latter had not referred to Soviet ratification as a condition for FRG accession to the Treaty. In any case, he thought the FRG must understand that the NPT was not a matter to be played with, and suggested that the Secretary and he remain in touch to speed completion of ratification and deposit.

The Secretary agreed and remarked that it would be particularly desirable if the Treaty were ratified by both countries before the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began, in order to spur progress in the direction of control over nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko said that this argument had some "reason."

82. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, September 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Kosygin's Mission to Peking

Very little is known of the origins or purposes of Kosygin's visit to Peking.² Judging from the characterization of the talks by both sides—"frank" (Chinese) and "useful" (Soviets)—there was no significant movement toward an accommodation.

The fact that the talks were held against a background of sharply-rising border tensions does suggest, however, that each side had an interest in attempting to check what seemed to be a gathering momentum toward large and more serious clashes.

The initiative apparently came from the Soviets, perhaps using the Romanians or North Vietnamese as intermediaries. The Soviets may have seen an advantage in appearing to take the lead in trying to reach an understanding, whether the Chinese agreed to the meeting or not. Should hostilities ensue, the Soviets would thus be in a position to present themselves as the aggrieved party. At the same time, the actual Soviet motive may have been to put on the record for Chinese benefit their refusal to tolerate a protracted border conflict. This is the line they took in recent letters to other Communist parties. It may not necessarily reflect a Soviet decision to escalate, but rather an effort to pressure and deter the Chinese.

The Chinese motive is a question, since so far they have been quite consistent in rejecting third party intervention or direct Soviet appeals. The Chinese willingness to receive Kosygin could reflect the more flexible Chinese diplomacy which seems to have been developing in recent months. However, the Chinese would not wish to appear to be resistant to Kosygin's visit, especially since third parties in the Communist world were apparently involved, and would want to appear at least as "reasonable" as the Soviets. In their public treatment they took

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret. The memorandum is stamped "October 6" and bears the handwritten comment "ret'd." as well as a large check mark in the upper righthand corner.

² According to a DIA Intelligence Summary of September 12, Kosygin met with Chou En-lai in Peking on September 11, a visit that lasted only 5 hours before the Soviet Premier returned to Moscow. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 93-T01468R, Box 3, Sino-Soviet Border, August–December 1969)

pains to minimize its significance by stating that Kosygin was merely “on his way home” and that Chou En-lai met him at Peking airport.

US Interests

Until we learn more of the content of the Peking discussion, it is uncertain how our own interests might be affected:

—there is nothing thus far, however, that suggests a new Sino-Soviet diplomatic offensive on Vietnam;

—there is nothing to suggest a narrowing of Sino-Soviet differences on fundamental problems;

—it is at least possible, that the failure of a personal encounter may actually worsen relations;

—sudden moves of this sort do point, however, to the caution which the US should exercise in basing its own actions solely on expected developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute; much of this relationship is still shrouded from us.

Tab A

Intelligence Analysis

Washington, undated.

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE KOSYGIN–CHOU MEETING

There are few facts about the origin of the Kosygin–Chou meeting on 11 September, and none at all about its content or results.³

Clearly it was arranged on short notice. When Kosygin left Hanoi, TASS announced that he had departed for Moscow. He made a brief stop at Calcutta and got as far as Dushanbe, in Soviet Central Asia, when his plane altered course and headed for Irkutsk. There it was met by a flight from Moscow which, after a brief stop, headed on for Peking.

³ On September 12, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent information obtained from “an extremely sensitive source” about the Kosygin–Chou En-lai meeting to Helms, Rogers, and Mitchell. According to the FBI source, “both Kosygin and Chou feel it would not be in the best interest of either country to terminate the Vietnam conflict at this time. Both feel that the Vietnam conflict is keeping the United States tied up in that area and that it is bleeding the economy of the United States to support South Vietnam.” On September 17, a senior CIA analyst informed the Deputy Director of Current Intelligence of his “grave reservations about the accuracy and value of this [FBI] report.” Discrediting the origin of the FBI report and its substance, the analyst concluded that “we do not think that the Sino-Soviet relationship is of the kind that would have allowed either side to discuss future plans on Vietnam as this report alleges.” Apparently, the FBI information was discounted in the writing of the attached CIA analysis. An official routing slip to Helms from the Deputy DCI of September 18 reads as follows: “This came in over the weekend—as the contents are nothing really new I did not think it necessary to bother you.” (Ibid., Job 80–R015080R, Box 12, Soviet)

The Soviets were the first to announce the meeting, saying the two sides “openly set forth their positions and held a conversation useful to both sides.” The Chinese statement, coming a few hours later, was even more terse, saying simply that “frank talks were held” and revealing that the meeting took place at the airport.

Since the meeting, on 11 September, our monitoring has picked up no anti-Chinese polemics in the Soviet press and radio. The same is true for the Chinese radio, but two anti-Soviet press articles appeared on 11 September.

Possible Explanations:

There are several possible explanations for the unexpected and dramatic meeting. One is that the Chinese, well aware of the continuing Soviet build-up along their borders and apprehensive over the increasing speculation that Moscow intended to conduct a preemptive strike against their advanced weapons facilities, asked for the meeting in an effort to calm down their bellicose neighbor. This scenario seems highly unlikely, however. First reports indicate that Chinese propaganda against the Soviets is continuing even after the meeting. Had the Chinese proposed the talks and shown signs of apprehensiveness or fear, the Soviets would have demanded an end to such propaganda as a precondition to any easing of tension. Moreover, the Chinese communiqué on the meeting made it clear that Kosygin was treated with minimum respect during his brief visit—he never even left the airport. This is hardly the kind of treatment he would have received if the Chinese had pressed for the meeting in order to arrange some sort of accommodation with Moscow.

Another possibility is that the Soviets pressed for the meeting in order to present the Chinese with some sort of ultimatum regarding the border. Although Moscow has recently issued stern warnings to Peking through their propaganda media, this explanation for the meeting also seems unlikely. The Soviets would hardly have to send their premier to the Chinese capital to deliver such an ultimatum. Had this been their intention they could have effectively achieved their purpose by calling in the Chinese chargé in Moscow and reading the riot act to him. Furthermore, Kosygin’s abrupt reversal of his flight plans in order to reach the Chinese capital seems a rather humiliating prelude to the issuance of some sort of “final warning.”

Still another possibility is that the meeting was not directly related to bilateral relations between the two countries but concerned Vietnam. The Chinese may have informed the North Vietnamese that they were cutting off all Soviet arms shipments to Hanoi, for example, and the Vietnamese might have then urged Kosygin to travel to Peking to iron this problem out. Or Hanoi, pointing to Ho Chi Minh’s “will,” might have again urged the two parties to attempt to compose their differ-

ences. However, the North Vietnamese have been urging the two sides to do exactly this for years—with no effect. There is nothing in the present situation which would suggest that such advice would now fall on fertile soil. Moreover, when in the past the Chinese have created difficulties over Soviet arms shipments it has been the North Vietnamese themselves who have taken the initiative in straightening things out—clear indication that Hanoi recognizes that it, rather than Moscow, can apply leverage on Peking in this matter.

Yet another possibility is that a large-scale, but unannounced incident recently occurred somewhere along the Sino-Soviet border—an incident of such gravity that it required direct talks between the two premiers. This scenario would help explain the suddenness of the meeting in Peking, but it would not fit the pattern of previous major incidents occurring in the past year. Both sides have immediately publicized such incidents, and at this juncture neither side would have much motivation to conceal a new clash. Furthermore, a major clash would in all likelihood be reflected in some manner in communications intelligence, and this has not occurred.

It seems most likely that the initiative in calling for the meeting came from the Soviet Union. The Soviets probably believe:

(1) that the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute has reached a dangerous stage. It is hurting them on several fronts. The Chinese, they believe, are trying to “bleed them white” along the border. At the same time, the Soviets are being put at a disadvantage politically because their enemies and their allies as well believe them to be off-balance and on the defensive because of their preoccupation with the Chinese.

(2) Kosygin could have gone to Peking either to issue a last direct warning to the Chinese to cease and desist or face the consequences. We think it more likely that, though he may have talked in uncompromising terms to the Chinese, he was trying to discover whether there was a way to bring the conflict down from its present risky level. The hiatus in propaganda, particularly if it should continue, would point in this direction.

(3) Kosygin may also have proposed further discussions, perhaps including the issue of frontiers. He would, in this case, have made it plain that there can be talk of reducing the potential for border clashes but there can be no question of ceding territory.

(4) Whether an easing of the conflict results from the meeting, the Soviets by sending their premier to Peking will have shown the rest of the world that they were willing to go the last mile toward seeking a solution.

In view of Soviet unease over reports of a preemptive strike, it is possible that Kosygin’s sole purpose was to reassure the Chinese. We think it unlikely that this was the main element in Kosygin’s visit. It is more likely that he sought, at one and the same time, to indicate to the Chinese that they were not under imminent threat of devastating attack but could expect a strong reaction if there were further trouble on the border.

83. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

Bill Rogers' Conversation with Gromyko

On the basis of the summary of the talk in the attached telegram (Tab A),² it does not appear that important new ground was broken. Most significant perhaps was Gromyko's assertion that following earlier Soviet optimism about US-Soviet relations, our subsequent decisions on ABM and MIRV³ had raised "some doubts" in Moscow. This has come to be a standard Soviet theme, although other Soviet spokesmen have tended to cite our China policy and the Romanian trip⁴ as sources of Soviet "doubts." I think Bill did well to cite the Soviets own testing of the SS-9 and of new ABMs. But I think we need to do more to make clear to the Soviets that our major problem with them is their support of Hanoi's stonewalling.

Basically, I think we need not be particularly concerned about Soviet professions of "doubts" about us because of our defense program. Moscow is well aware of the debates in this country. They realize that our strategic program has stood still while theirs has progressed rapidly. Comments like those by Gromyko are chiefly designed to provide arguments for our critics and to put us on the defensive. The major obstacle to SALT indeed may be not that we are building up our forces but that we are not. Thus the Soviets may feel they have little to gain from talks.

On specific subjects, the following points are worth noting:

1. *SALT*. Gromyko intimated that the Soviets might soon propose "preliminary" talks. This presumably refers to talks about such things as an agenda and other modalities. It is hard to say whether this cau-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information.

² Tab A is telegram 3165 from USUN, September 23, summarizing Rogers' talk with Gromyko on September 22; the memorandum of conversation is Document 81.

³ At a news conference on March 14, Nixon announced his decision to move forward with the ABM program, which included a Safeguard system, a modified version of Lyndon B. Johnson's Sentinel system. Safeguard called for 12 separate sites for area missile defense, 19 radars, and several hundred interceptor missiles. The Nixon administration also decided to continue MIRV testing. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 208–216)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 65.

tion is due to problems of decision-making in Moscow or reflects a Soviet judgment that we are, or should be, more eager about SALT than they. In any case, we should probably accept preliminary talks, if the Soviets propose them and I will make sure that the Under Secretaries Committee of the NSC, which is charged with backstopping SALT, will prepare the necessary contingency papers for your review.

2. *Berlin*. Gromyko showed some interest in bilateral talks with us. You had hinted at this possibility in your letter to Kosygin last April.⁵ The Soviets undoubtedly sense a good deal of Western interest in talking about Berlin, especially in the SPD and FDP in Germany which may form the next government in Bonn. In fact, even if one could make a case that the Soviets might be interested in a *modus vivendi*, there are no signs that they will be prepared to buck the GDR's continued interest in keeping the situation unsettled. Negotiations, whether bilateral US-Soviet or four power are therefore likely to encounter a rigid Soviet-GDR position, while we, especially if Brandt became Chancellor, would be under pressure from our allies to come up with "constructive" proposals. And in Berlin our negotiating position is weak; the other side holds all the cards. We thus have no interest in pushing Berlin negotiations at this time, although we will undoubtedly come under pressure to do so and may in the end have to go along.

3. *Middle East*. Gromyko clearly showed interest in continuing US-Soviet contacts and these have been going forward in New York on the basis of the documents exchanged during the summer. He stressed the "urgency" of the subject, an attitude that is at least to some degree genuine in view of Soviet anxiety over the possibility of new full-scale hostilities in which they might again have to confront the awkward choices of how to bail out their defeated clients. Presumably with Mrs. Meir's visit⁶ in mind, Gromyko urged the greater use of our influence in Israel. Despite Gromyko's assurance that the Soviets would do everything possible toward a settlement, it remains quite doubtful that their definition of a settlement corresponds to ours.

4. *NPT*. Gromyko seemed not to foreclose the possibility of joint US-Soviet ratification as we have repeatedly proposed. The Soviets will presumably decide on their course after the German election of September 28. (Brandt told Gromyko that the FRG will sign if the SPD wins the election. I think if the SPD leads the next coalition, this will be the case.) I understand that people at State are thinking of a major ceremony with full TV coverage in the event the Soviets agree to joint ratification, and Bill apparently discussed this possibility with

⁵ See Document 28. On April 22, Beam presented Nixon's letter to Kosygin.

⁶ Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir visited Washington September 25–27.

Gromyko and UK Foreign Secretary Stewart. I think this kind of exercise would carry overtones of “condominium” and we would do well to avoid excessive atmospherics.

5. *Bilateral*. Gromyko again expressed interest in an agreement to permit Soviet merchant ships to put into US ports. This subject is under review and in principle probably should be decided favorably. But we will want to time any decision carefully so that it fits into our overall policy.

All told, I do not believe that the conversation warrants the optimistic interpretation that appeared on the front page of the *Washington Post* of September 24⁷ which was based on US backgrounding in New York.⁸

⁷ *The Washington Post* carried a cover story entitled “U.S.-Soviets Talks Buoy Americans,” by Chalmers Roberts.

⁸ At the bottom of the page, Nixon wrote: “K (eyes only) It may become in our interest for the Israeli to heat things up in the Mideast—The *Soviet* could be more embarrassed by this than we would be.”

84. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Talk With Dobrynin

We were asked to do a talking paper. As always, one can speculate endlessly on why Dobrynin wants to see you; on the issues that amount to anything, you know better than I what you want to tell him. For what it’s worth, so you might prepare your thoughts, following are some guesses about what he wants to talk about:

1. *Gromyko Coming Down to see the President*. There may be something of an Alphonse-and-Gaston game, with the Soviets waiting to be invited and we waiting to get a request. If Dobrynin fences around on this subject, I suggest you cut it short and agree to an appointment

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Secret; Nodis.

(assuming the President is prepared to see him). Bear in mind that Gromyko is supposed to leave Wednesday, October 1, to go to Canada for a couple of days and thence directly home. One further angle: you had better settle the text of any announcement or press comment so that we don't get into the ridiculous hassle that Brandt had last year as to who requested the interview. I will spare you now any speculation as to what Gromyko may want to say to the President, but you might ask Dobrynin.

2. *Vietnam*. You know my views.

3. *SALT*. Doubtful that he would want or need to see you if the Soviets have fresh word on this. If there is a complicated or tricky procedural proposal, take note of it and promise an answer later. If he has some substantive question to raise, play it by ear.

4. *Berlin*. Very unlikely reason or topic. If it comes up, you might ask him why we should have talks at all. (Remember the President proposed talks in his Berlin speech² and in his letter to Kosygin in April.)³

5. *China*. He may have some message on this, perhaps relating to the talk of a Soviet pre-emptive strike. If he does, you could expound our declaratory policy.

6. *Soviet "Doubts" About the President's Intentions*. This involves our China policy, the Romanian trip and our defense budget.

7. *NPT ratification*. They may be ready to move. Rogers told them we would have a big ceremony. I doubt that we should.

² See footnote 7, Document 13.

³ Document 28.

85. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1969, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. Forwarded by Kissinger to the President under an October 1 covering memorandum that summarized the conversation. (Ibid.)

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came to see me at his request. I let him wait for a week but agreed to a brief appointment on Saturday afternoon.

After an exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin remarked that his Minister regretted not having had an opportunity for a longer chat with me. Had Gromyko been able to visit Washington, Dobrynin would have given a luncheon for him and me at the Soviet Embassy. The absence of a visit to Washington made Gromyko's trip somewhat unusual. I said I regretted that his Foreign Minister did not come to Washington, as I would have enjoyed talking to him, and was sorry his schedule was so crowded. Dobrynin replied that the difficulty was the absence of a meeting with the President, which had been a standard procedure during previous visits to the General Assembly. I told him that in order to keep ourselves from being swamped we had adopted the rule that no Foreign Minister would see the President in Washington. In any event, there had never been a formal request. Dobrynin said he was not aware that there were such fine questions of protocol.

Dobrynin then remarked that his Minister had asked him to inquire whether in negotiating the Berlin issue we had any preference as to forum. Specifically, did we care whether it was discussed in a four-power or two-power forum? While the Soviet Union was willing to speak in a four-power forum, it was also prepared to have two-power discussions. I told him that four-power discussions seemed to be quite acceptable. If there was any different inclination on the part of the President, I would let him know.

Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and said that the meeting in New York had been very constructive. Gromyko hoped that he would be able to come to a preliminary agreement with the Secretary of State before his departure on Wednesday. He asked for intercession of the White House in expediting this agreement. I replied that since matters seemed to be in train on the diplomatic level, there was no need for White House intervention. I added that Dobrynin should understand our elemental position. We had made several communications to the Soviet Union on Vietnam to which they had never replied. While this did not inhibit normal diplomatic relations, it made it very difficult for the White House to go beyond what normally occurred on the diplomatic level.

At this point, the President called.² When the conversation was completed, I commented that the President had called me at a provi-

² According to Kissinger's October 1 covering memorandum, he and Nixon had prearranged the telephone call.

dential moment because it enabled me to tell the President directly what was being discussed. To us Vietnam was the critical issue. We were quite prepared to discuss other subjects, but the Soviet Union should not expect any special treatment until Vietnam was solved. They should also have no illusions about the seriousness with which we took Hanoi's attempt to undermine the domestic position of the President. Dobrynin asked me whether there was any hope for a coalition government. I replied that we had covered the subject at great length previously and that I could add nothing. It was a pity that all our efforts to negotiate had failed. The President had told me in his call that the train had just left the station and was now headed down the track. Dobrynin responded that he hoped it was an airplane and not a train and would leave some maneuvering room. I said the President chooses his words very carefully and that I was sure he meant train.

Dobrynin then asked what our problem had been in the past. I said that every negotiation turned into a discussion on our readiness to accept the 10 points.³ We could not negotiate in a forum of ultimatums. Dobrynin said that my own conversations with the Vietnamese seemed to have gone rather well. I asked him what he meant. He said Hanoi had told Moscow that they had been very impressed by my presentation and thought I understood Vietnamese conditions very well. I replied that if this were true the next move was up to them.

Dobrynin then engaged in a lengthy exposition to the effect that the Soviet Union, for its own reasons, was interested in peace in Vietnam and had in the past often been helpful. I countered that we had no illusions about Soviet help in the past. It had been considerably in the interest of Hanoi and had been largely tactical. Dobrynin said that he wanted to assure me of Moscow's continued interest in improved relations with the U.S., but it was getting very difficult to convince Moscow of our goodwill. There had been no real progress on any subject. For example, we could have been more generous on trade liberalization. I said the most important issue was Vietnam. As soon as Vietnam was out of the way and especially if the Russians took an understanding attitude, we would go further. Dobrynin smiled and said that I had an unusual ability to link things together. I told him that we had hoped to have a reply on SALT. Dobrynin said there would be a reply in due course but did not give any indication as to when.

Dobrynin returned to the subject of Soviet interest in improving relations with us. I said we reciprocated this feeling, especially after Vietnam was out of the way.

³ The delegation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam presented a Ten-Point Peace Program at the Paris Peace Talks on May 8, 1969. The text of this program is in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1968–1969*, pp. 249–252.

86. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 27, 1969, 4:40 p.m.

Mr. Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when this call came in. He said he had an interesting conversation with Dobrynin.² He came in with two stupid questions: (1) whether we want to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral, and (2) he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and the President get together before Gromyko leaves on Wednesday³ (K interjected here he thinks the State people have practically given away our position). K told D his call was providential—as far as the White House is concerned, we have no great incentives; D owes us an answer to the question given him in May and another in the conversation K had with him in April. As far as we are concerned, the train has left the station. The Soviets have a choice of believing the President or the *New York Times* and K, if he could advise him, would recommend that they believe the President.

D said one other thing—he knew of K's meeting in Paris.⁴ K asked him what he knew. D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversation they had had and they thought something might come of it. K said if it does, they will have to make the move. We are not going to make the move, to which D didn't really respond. D said there are a lot of arguments in the Soviet Union, and they feel we are not willing to move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general. D did not mention SALT, but mentioned trade, for example. K told him that the President had told D, and K had told D, that we are going very far on trade, but we aren't going to let Communist countries supported by the Soviet Union chop us out. K said he had been very tough with D—he didn't give an inch.

K told the President he didn't think we should move very fast on the Middle East. P said the point is we can't deliver. K said that is not

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. A covering memorandum indicates that it was sent to Howe, Haig, and Lake.

² See Document 85.

³ Gromyko left New York on Wednesday, October 1, where he attended the United States General Assembly and held U.S.-Soviet ministerial discussions with Rogers on September 22, 26, and 30; see Documents 81 and 87, and footnote 1, Document 85.

⁴ Kissinger met secretly with North Vietnamese officials Xuan Thuy and Mai Van Bo in Paris on August 4. Kissinger's memorandum to Nixon about his conversation is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 106.

what they are asking. They want us to agree to a piece of paper for Jar-ring to deliver. K said they aren't anxious to get something in the Middle East—their problems with the Egyptians must be very serious. He wanted us to be very forthcoming.

P wanted to know D's attitude. K said they want major improvements in relations with us. He said they always run into trouble. He was asked in Moscow what advance has been made, and he couldn't answer. K told him he could have said "the SALT talks." D said there will be a positive answer pretty soon, but he didn't say any more about it. K said he doesn't believe the U.S. should be in a pleading position on it. He thinks we could play it the other way. If we go the hard route, and can keep them quiet, that is what we want. P said he is keenly aware that we don't want to take the hard route and make them mad. He asked K, "You have no doubt but that he is reminded of the fact we are going the hard route?" K said yes; he had been very tough on him. D has asked what K thought of the Sino-Soviet problem. K had said the Soviets have a big geopolitical problem that no death is going to solve. D had asked K whether he thought they (the Soviets) were going to attack the Chinese. K had replied that, as a historian, he thought the Soviets were considering it.

D had said something about Romania⁵—he asked who thought of it. K had replied that every fundamental decision here is made by the President, and he wasn't going to give D a checklist of who made the various proposals.

D had asked whether we had any response from the Chinese on the change in travel restrictions. K had replied that D knew as well as he that the Chinese move in very complicated ways (which didn't really give an answer to his question). K said he had been personally much more aloof with D than before.

P asked what had been said about Vietnam. K told him D had said we may not believe it, but the Soviets have a real interest in ending this war, but for different reasons than ours. K told him we have no evidence of this. K said D had said they had been helpful on the shape of the table, to which K replied that they were helpful to Hanoi on that. K gave no encouragement here, and wasn't really very pleasant. He had reminded D that we have a problem—there can be no movement until they show us.

The President said, "The summit and trade they can have, but I'll be damned if they can get the Middle East, etc." K said he doesn't see what we gain by going to a fall-back position on the Middle East. His

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 65.

instinct for handling this, would be for Rogers to tell Gromyko we will give our answer to Dobrynin in about two weeks.

K said he thinks D came to see him to let him know they knew about K's Paris meeting, and to fix an invitation for Gromyko to see the President. D had said in all previous administrations Gromyko had been received by the President. K told D that Gromyko hadn't asked for a meeting. K told the President if Gromyko asks for a meeting, formally, the President will have to see him, but if he doesn't, K doesn't think we should invite him. K said D came back to this two or three times—(Gromyko would love to have an invitation). K further doesn't think we should encourage him to ask for an appointment.

K said to the President on the Middle East, it would help us if we didn't do anything right now—it could be done in about 10 days to 2 weeks between Sisco and Dobrynin. K said he didn't know whether Rogers will make a formal proposition—he hadn't been in touch with K. P said waiting makes sense.

P said the papers had made a big thing about Gromyko getting a warmer reception than he.⁶ The reason is obvious—all the Middle East had to be silent to him; we have nothing to offer the Africans; and we didn't mention Latin America. He said he felt it was foolish to go up there. K said he didn't think the President got a cool reception; he couldn't count on the newspapers giving such a distorted picture. The President said we said things not calculated to get a warm reception.

Getting back to D and Vietnam, P asked K whether he saw much movement. K's response was that the fact that D told him about his Paris conversation, and that Hanoi considers that the most useful conversation they have had, he (K) considers positive. D had said in watching the President's news conference, it was clear the President isn't going to make any major concessions, and that it was useful to get this on the table. K thinks we will get a move within the next month.

P mentioned the demonstrations coming up on October 15. He said the Democratic National Chairman had been meeting with the doves, at the same time of his press conference, to make Vietnam a political issue. P said he didn't hit this hard with Haldeman, but he feels the real attack should be on them. K agreed, saying they got us into the war. P said our people have to start fighting harder. K said the press conference was essential and extremely helpful. He thinks events of the last two or three weeks show the long route cannot possibly work. The President agreed, especially with our 60,000-man withdrawal, reduction of the draft by 50,000 and Ho Chi Minh's death. The doves

⁶ On September 18, Nixon addressed the 24th Session General Assembly of the United Nations. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 724–731.

and the public are making it impossible to happen. He asked K, if in his planning, he could pick this up so that we make the tough move before the 15th of October. K said yes. P said he had been wondering if we shouldn't—he doesn't want to appear to be making the tough move after the 15th just because of the rioting at home. K said there is a problem, however—if Hanoi takes us seriously, and they wouldn't have told Moscow if they weren't taking it seriously, we shouldn't confuse them. If we want them to make the move, we should give them time—two weeks. His only worry is that if we went ahead with the tough move before the 15th—and there is a 10% chance Hanoi might want to move, if we hit them before they have a chance to make the move, it will look as if we tricked them. He said the President might want to consider another press conference before the 15th or a television report, saying “these people (demonstrators, etc.) are dividing the country and making it impossible to settle the problem on a reasonable basis.” P said he would just as soon have them demonstrate against the plan. If we went ahead and moved, the country is going to take a dimmer view after the move than before. P would like to nip it before the first demonstration, because there will be another one on November 15. P reminded that Laird had said for three months after we do this, it will have relatively high public support. K said as an assistant, he had to give P the dark side. He suggested again the possibility of P going on television before the demonstration—possibly around Oct 10.

P said okay; they had had an interesting day; and he would see K on Monday. If Rogers calls, P will try to cool off that thing. K said Rogers can be generally positive but defer an answer for two weeks.

87. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, September 27, 1969, 1817Z.

Secto 68/3276. Discussion of Middle East at Rogers–Gromyko meeting September 26.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 292, Agency Files, Rogers Bilateral Talks at UN, 9/15/69–10/7/69. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Moscow, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. On September 29, Nixon received this telegram as part of the President's Daily Brief. (Ibid., Box 11, President's Daily Briefs)

1. Secretary met alone with Gromyko last evening for about 45 minutes before dinner and about one hour and fifteen minutes after dinner.

2. In conversation before dinner Gromyko opened conversation by asking what Mrs. Meir agreed to about the Middle East. Secretary responded that Mrs. Meir did not agree to do anything: that she was very firm in her position that Arabs must make it completely clear that they intend to seek a lasting peace with Israel and to renounce their previously stated goal of eventual destruction of Israel. Gromyko said he was certain this could be accomplished but that he thought the United States should do more to make Israel agree to responsible terms. Secretary explained that we are not in a position to force Israel to accept a settlement. Secretary then asked Gromyko if Soviet Union in a position to force Arabs to do things against their will. Gromyko replied with a smile, "well, we can bring them along some."

3. Gromyko inquired about Rhodes formula² and whether Mrs. Meir had shown any interest in such a procedure. Secretary stated that the United States felt that it might provide a way of getting more active negotiations underway and that Mrs. Meir did not oppose suggestion when it was discussed with her. Secretary pointed out, however, that Mrs. Meir said she would want to know more about framework for negotiations before agreeing to formula.

4. Gromyko then mentioned that Riad had told him he thought Rhodes formula might provide a way of getting negotiations started and he knew Riad had talked to Secretary about this possibility.

5. Secretary then suggested to Gromyko that Amb. Dobrynin and Sisco meet beginning Monday³ to attempt to agree on a document dealing with the UAR-Israeli aspects of the settlement. Purpose of meeting would be to work toward a common Soviet-U.S. position paper on basis of following elements: (1) a binding commitment to a durable and permanent peace; (2) acceptance of principle of choice for refugees based on an annual quota to be repatriated and an understanding on an overall limitation; (3) freedom of passage through straits of Tehran [*Tiran*] and Suez; (4) parties would be expected to negotiate on basis all options open on following items—(a) security arrangements in Sharm El-Shaikh; (b) final disposition of Gaza, and (c) arrangements of

² Reference is to the negotiation of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states January–March 1949. The negotiations took place at Rhodes with Ralph Bunche serving as UN Acting Mediator. The negotiations involved separate meetings on substantive items between Bunche and each delegation until discussions reached an advanced stage, whereupon joint informal meetings were held.

³ September 29.

demilitarized zones; (d) it would be understood that Soviet Union and United States would encourage parties to negotiate on (a), (b) and (c) on basis of Rhodes formula and under auspices of Jarring.

6. Gromyko asked Secretary how he thought the matter should proceed from that point on. Secretary said that if this procedure could be agreed upon between Soviet Union and United States it would then be forwarded to four powers for their consideration at a meeting toward end of October and that thereafter four powers would attempt to arrange for beginning of negotiations based on Rhodes formula sometime in November, Gromyko agreed that this an acceptable procedure seriously to consider.

7. Gromyko then asked questions on specific issues. He asked if proposal Secretary made suggested that border between Egypt and Israel would be pre-1967 border. Secretary said he not in a position to make that commitment but thought something along those lines might be worked out, assuming Sharm El-Shaikh issue and other aspects above could be satisfactorily resolved. Gromyko then repeated Soviet position on Sharm El-Shaikh to which Secretary replied that he thought that was a matter which should be thoroughly discussed in negotiations between the parties.

8. Gromyko also asked reasons for our opposition to reference to Constantinople convention. Secretary set forth our reasoning stating that he saw no reason to make reference to another document in agreement and, furthermore, it might be construed to be an indirect way of giving UAR unilateral right to close canal to Israel at any time it thought it might be in interest of their national defense. Gromyko said he had worked matter out very carefully with UAR and that express language in the treaty provides there could be no discrimination. He felt that it provided a stronger basis for assurance to Israel than otherwise. Secretary told Gromyko we could exchange views on legal aspects but if Soviet position was that Israel could have free passage through Suez Canal on same basis as all other nationals without any possibility of discrimination he felt sure a formulation could be worked out.

9. Gromyko raised refugee question again and a fairly extended discussion took place with a suggested ceiling of 100,000 over a ten year period. Secretary under impression that from standpoint of Soviet Union they felt some solution could be worked out along those lines although this was not explicitly stated.

10. When Gromyko raised the question, Secretary indicated that subject of West Bank also a matter that should be left open to negotiation between Israel and Jordan. Gromyko did not oppose the suggestion.

11. Secretary said that it position of United States that Jerusalem should be a united city and that question of her sovereignty should be a matter of negotiations between parties at a later date. Secretary

indicated that Israel's position was that it would be unwilling to relinquish all or any part of its claimed sovereignty over Jerusalem.

12. Secretary told Gromyko that discussion they were having was of a tentative nature and that no final agreement could be reached between Soviet Union and United States until matter reduced to writing so that there could be no possible misunderstanding between them. Secretary pointed out that in interest of our future relations it is quite important that before any agreement is reached that we clearly understand exactly what is involved. Gromyko said that he agreed with that and would be pleased to meet with Secretary again before he leaves New York with idea of discussing in specific detail the suggested course of action.

Rogers

88. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China

In the last two months, the increase in Sino-Soviet tensions has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China's nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions. These probes have varied in character from point-blank questioning of our reaction to provocative musings by Soviets over what they might be forced to do against the Chinese, including the use of nuclear weapons. Some of these contacts have featured adamant denials that the Soviets were planning any military moves—thereby keeping the entire issue alive. (Secretary Rogers' Memorandum on this subject is at Tab A.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. This memorandum was sent as an enclosure to an October 23 memorandum on items to discuss with Elliot Richardson; see footnote 4 below.

Our contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is well along, and NSC consideration of a basic policy paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute is scheduled for October 8.²

Meanwhile, I am concerned about our response to these probes. The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy, and our reactions could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.

A related issue is the shifting Soviet attitude on Chinese representation in the UN. We have had two indications that the Soviets, in an effort to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN through indirection, are dangling the prospect before us of cooperation on the representation issue. Gromyko, in his UN speech, of course failed to mention Peking's admission for the first time.³

I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.

The principal gain in making our position clear would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-term, but they may be none the less real. Behavior of Chinese Communist diplomats in recent months strongly suggests the existence of a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao's doctrinal views, which might wish to put US/Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to ask the Department of State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance to be used with the USSR and others, deploring reports of a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.⁴

² See Document 79.

³ Gromyko's speech before the UN General Assembly on September 19 mentioned all Socialist countries except the People's Republic of China and also avoided the issue of UN membership for the PRC. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7–14)

⁴ Nixon initiated the approve option and added: "Base it on 'reports which have come here—etc.'" On October 23 Kissinger apparently asked Richardson to "prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance for deploring reports on a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China" based on Nixon's comments on this paper.

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, September 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities

Soviet Embassy Second Secretary Davydov brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities in a Washington luncheon conversation with a Department officer on August 18. I am enclosing the memorandum of conversation⁵ which details the rationale for such a move which he adduced in asking what the United States reaction might be.

Davydov's conversation was unusual for the length of the argument that he presented for such a Soviet course of action. None of the other occasional references to the idea in talks with Soviets which have come to our attention have spelled out such a justification.

—In late March or early April Kosygin's son-in-law Gvishiani and Professor Artsimovich who were visiting in Boston reportedly said that the USSR would have to destroy Communist China's nuclear arsenal. They seemed to be soliciting the reaction of the American to whom they were speaking.

—Italian Communist Rossana Rossanda has claimed that, in July, the Italian Communist leadership received a message from Moscow asking how the Italians would react if, in self-defense, the Soviet Union were forced to make a preventive strike against Chinese missile and atomic installations. On the basis of past experience, Rossanda is not to be taken too literally as a reporter, and a more accurate version of her information may be contained in a Finnish Communist account of the consultations in Moscow at the World Communist Conference in June. According to this report, a Soviet leader then asserted that the USSR had a capability to deal China an immediate mortal blow (presumably more than just a strike at nuclear facilities), but did not wish to do something so "un-Leninist," except as an extreme defensive measure.

—In June the science editor of *Izvestia's* Sunday supplement asked an American Embassy officer in Moscow what the American reaction

⁵ Attached but not printed.

to a possible Soviet attack (nature of the blow not specified) on China might be. The same Russian has avoided the subject more recently, and in response to the American's latest query two weeks ago, the editor merely said that the USSR was trying to better its relations with China. In July Sidney Liu of *Newsweek* was asked by Delyusin of the Soviet Institute of Asian and African Affairs what he thought the Chinese popular reaction would be to a major Soviet attack on China (the nature of the attack was not otherwise defined in the report).

—A Soviet communication to foreign Communist parties in early August left an impression of great concern over the future of Sino-Soviet relations, but neither of the two accounts of the message that we have indicates that it discussed such specific courses of action as a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

—Finally, the most recent Soviet statement on the subject was by Southeast Asia Chief Kapitsa of the Foreign Ministry who insisted to a Canadian newsman that a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear targets was "unthinkable" and that the very idea was an invention of the Western press.

It is extremely unlikely that Davydov would be privy to top-level Soviet discussions on this matter, much less any decisions taken. Rather, it is likely that he has been given the job of getting as much information as he can on American attitudes on the China issue, and his questioning about the strike hypothesis was in the context of trying to elicit discussion of American views of Sino-Soviet relations. The idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear targets is one which has been mentioned in the United States press and talked about among diplomats and newsmen in Washington. Moreover, Davydov had been asked—at a meeting with Congressional interns a few days before the above cited luncheon—what he thought the United States attitude ought to be in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, and thus would have had occasion to have thought through some of the argumentation he used in the memorandum.

What emerges clearly from the foregoing evidence—as well as from Soviet leaders' speeches, from Moscow's propaganda, and from clandestine source reports on Soviet diplomatic anxieties—is an obvious sense of Soviet concern over troubles with China and of great interest in how others view Sino-Soviet tensions. What remains doubtful is whether the Soviets have ordered their officials systematically to canvass for reactions to a specific potential course of action—attack on Chinese nuclear targets. Nevertheless, the Department has considered the possibility that Davydov's conversation might have been the first move in such a probing operation, and, with that in view, has alerted key American posts abroad to be certain to report analogous conversations. The only response so far was from the American Embassy in

Rome. A Soviet First Secretary told Italian officials he foresaw new and more serious incidents; he was not reported to have sought reactions and there was no reference in the report to the idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

In the absence of a cluster of such reports in a relatively short time, it would appear that Davydov's recent conversation, as well as the remarks in Boston five months ago, are curiosities rather than signals. It is certain that Moscow remains preoccupied with its Chinese problem, and the Kremlin is probably reviewing all of its options. Thus the possibility of a Soviet strike at Chinese nuclear facilities cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, my advisers and I do not believe such a move to be probable. The Soviets would have to weigh the risk of triggering an all-out war with China, a war for which the Soviets are not likely to believe themselves yet well prepared despite their buildup since 1965. Moreover, they would not be sure of getting the entire inventory of Chinese bombs, and would in any case face the prospect that the Chinese would most likely rebuild their nuclear arsenal with renewed determination.

The National Intelligence Estimate of August 12, 1969⁶ on the Sino-Soviet dispute notes that a conventional air strike aimed at destroying China's missile and nuclear facilities might be the most attractive military option available to Moscow, if the Soviets believed that they could do this without getting involved in a prolonged and full-scale war. The National Intelligence Estimate did not think it likely that the Kremlin would reach this conclusion, but felt that there was some chance that it would. Considering all of the military, political, economic, foreign policy, and ideological implications of any such Soviet attack, the Department's analysts judge that the chances of this particular course of action are still substantially less than fifty-fifty and that Sino-Soviet conflict, if it does occur, might more likely result from escalation of border clashes. That assessment seems reasonable to me.

WPR

⁶ Document 73.

89. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 30, 1969, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-USSR Talks as of Mid-Day, Tuesday, September 30

Since things may move quickly in the next twenty-four hours, here is a wrapup of *where we stand just prior to Secretary Rogers' final meeting with Gromyko*. Sisco has the sense this afternoon that the Soviets may try to reach some sort of agreement in tonight's meeting and press Sisco and Dobrynin into midnight session to hammer something out. Gromyko leaves tomorrow (Wednesday) afternoon.

On the basis of this morning's meeting, Joe says Dobrynin seems to be playing with the idea of a shorter document trading Rhodes-type talks for something like Joe's new formula—subject to agreement on Gaza, Sharm al-Shaikh and demilitarization, the UAR-Israel boundary would be the pre-war line. Joe understands your instruction not to go all the way while Mrs. Meir is here—but the Secretary might ask reconsideration if he felt he had something worthwhile.

Joe's present document might thus drop suddenly into history. But as background and in case it does not, here is a *rundown on where the Sisco-Dobrynin talks stand*:

On 23 September, Dobrynin provided the clearest reading yet of the Soviet position (Tab A)² in the course of a point by point review of our July document (Tab B).³ He gave the impression that the Soviets are ready to clear out some of the underbrush by reaching agreement on the wording of less important points, but there was little movement on the more difficult issues.

Summarized below is the discussion on each of the points in our July document:

1. *Direct talks*. The reference in the last preambular paragraph to the parties "convening under the auspices of Jarring" is still unac-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on October 3.

² Tab A is telegram 3217 from USUN, September 24; attached but not printed.

³ Tab B is the Joint U.S.-USSR Draft of Fundamental Principles, the U.S. counter-proposal to the Soviet June 17 Middle East position, delivered by Sisco to Gromyko on July 15; attached but not printed.

ceptable to the Soviets. We interpret this to mean direct negotiations at some stage, leaving it to Jarring to determine how and when to get the parties together. Dobrynin said the Soviets do not bar eventual direct talks but could not commit the USSR now. [Comment: Later developments suggest they would give on Rhodes-type talks now in return for a US position on Washington to the pre-war line.]⁴

2. *Phasing withdrawal*. Dobrynin is still pushing mildly for a two-stage withdrawal, which would permit clearing of the Canal to begin early. (Point 1)

3. *Canal clearing*. Dobrynin wanted nothing in the document about using of the facilities of the UN to clear the Suez Canal since this restricts the UAR's sovereignty of choice. [Comment: We can drop that.]

4. *Timing effective date of agreement*. Dobrynin continued to press the distinction between de jure and de facto peace so as to create points both at the beginning and at the end of withdrawal when positive steps toward peace could be identified. It was agreed that a further effort would be made to find language that would not get tangled up with the legal status of peace and would meet the problem of Egyptian and Israelis mutual suspicions. (Point 3)

5. *Fedayeen*. Dobrynin wanted to drop the Arab obligation to control the fedayeen. Joe resisted but agreed it might be moved elsewhere in the document. (Point 3)

6. *Boundaries*. Sisco restated and maintained our position without change, and suggested going back to it at a later stage. Our fallback was not revealed. (Point 4)

7. *Demilitarized zones*. Dobrynin said we were close to agreement. After indicating that the Soviets want some demilitarized area on the Israeli side of the boundary, he agreed to think over Sisco's proposal of merely saying that DMZ's will be established and leaving it to the parties to agree upon the area. (Point 5)

8. *Gaza*. The Soviets still want language which specifically calls for the presence of UN forces under the auspices of the Security Council with Arab sovereignty acknowledged. Sisco noted that this will be a point of major difficulty with Israel because there is a serious issue of security involved. Dobrynin said that specific reference to Israel working out the disposition of Gaza with the Jordan and the UAR under Jarring auspices was redundant and raises problems. Sisco agreed to consider taking out the reference to the three countries, but no more. (Point 6)

⁴ All brackets in the source text.

9. *Sharm al-Shaikh*. The Soviets continued to object to our position that the parties would agree upon security arrangements. The USSR and the UAR are prepared to accept the presence of UN forces, guaranteed by the Security Council for a fixed period, but the continuing presence of Israeli troops was unacceptable. Sisco said we do not disagree with the idea of a UN guarantee, but the idea of a UN force is unacceptable to Israel. He suggested that the best solution was to come up with neutral language that will allow the parties to work something out when they begin talking. (Point 7)

10. *Canal*. Sisco made it clear to Dobrynin that any reference to the Constantinople Convention on the Suez Canal is unacceptable to us. It was agreed to refer the matter back to Secretary Rogers and Gromyko. (Point 8)

11. *Refugees*. Dobrynin said Gromyko was not very keen on our suggestion of 10,000 as an annual quota. We suggested that this be left to Jarring to work out with the parties and that the reference to refugees be limited to Israel assuming the obligations of the UN with respect to refugees. Sisco insisted that there was no way to duck the question of some sort of limitation. (Point 9)

12. *Obligations of peace*. There was no problem on points 10 (disputes to be settled peacefully); 11 (agreement to respect and recognize each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability, political independence and the right to live in peace without acts of force); 12 (definition of agreement to terminate all claims on states of belligerency); 13 (deposition of final accord with the UN); and 14 (final agreement submitted for endorsement by the four permanent members in the Security Council).

Secretary Rogers met again with Gromyko on September 26 against the background of the Sisco–Dobrynin session and Mrs. Meir's visit. (Tab C)⁵ It was agreed that, if Sisco and Dobrynin could agree on a document, an acceptable timetable might be to have it approved by the four powers toward the end of October hopefully for the beginning of Rhodes-type negotiations sometime in November, after the Israeli election.

Gromyko then probed our position on several specific issues.

—He asked if Secretary Rogers' proposal for continuing discussion suggested that the border between Israel and Egypt would be the pre-1967 border. Secretary Rogers indicated he could not make that commitment, but thought that something along those lines could be worked out, assuming that the Sharm al-Shaikh issue and other aspects could be satisfactorily resolved.

⁵ Tab C is telegram 3276 from USUN, September 27; attached but not printed.

—A fairly extended discussion took place over the refugee issue. Secretary Rogers has the impression that some sort of ceiling can be worked out, although this was not explicitly stated.

Gromyko did not oppose the suggestion that the subject of the West Bank was a matter that should be left open to negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

90. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Swank) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Beam)¹

Washington, September 30, 1969.

Dear Jake:

The Secretary has not yet had an opportunity to record all the details of his private conversations with Gromyko before and after the dinner at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on September 26; and under the pressure of business, I fear that he may not have a chance to do so. The part of the conversation which focused on the Middle East has been reported,² but other topics such as Berlin, China, etc., were also discussed. I want in this letter to give you something of the flavor of the conversation on these points as conveyed to a small group of us by the Secretary on September 27.

The Secretary said that Gromyko had expressed considerable concern regarding the power of the “military-industrial complex” in the United States. He questioned whether this complex is interested in arms control and disarmament, and he also reiterated the doubts he had earlier expressed as to the intentions of the Administration given the latter’s policy on ABM’s and MIRV. The Secretary said that he patiently explained to Gromyko that firms engaged in the manufacture of munitions and other military equipment can easily switch to production of other products needed in the civilian economy. He said he also sought to underline the genuine interest of the Administration in opening SALT without further delay. Gromyko replied that he would transmit these observations “to the Central Committee,” but the Secretary

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Official-*Informal*. Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Llewellyn Thompson and Dubs.

² See Document 87.

seemed uncertain whether he had succeeded in dissipating Gromyko's pat Marxist theses about monopoly capital.

The subject of China also arose, apparently at Gromyko's initiative. He said that he was gratified to know from the statements of high officials that the US Government does not wish to see an aggravation of the Sino-Soviet conflict and does not seek to exploit this conflict for its own purposes. Nonetheless, he observed that other actions and statements of the US side raise suspicions that the US Government in fact seeks advantage from the dispute. The Secretary asked Gromyko to provide specific examples of such actions and statements. Gromyko furnished no examples, perhaps because he did not wish to pursue what could easily have developed into a rather contentious conversation.

On Berlin and the possibility of quadripartite talks, the Secretary sought to elicit some clarification of the opaque Soviet response to the recent tripartite *démarche*.³ As in the earlier discussion of Berlin on September 22,⁴ Gromyko dealt in generalities rather than specifics and contributed nothing new. Marty had a separate conversation with Falin at the dinner which he has reported separately.⁵

The possibility of Gromyko's meeting the President during his US stay was not broached by either side.

The Secretary appeared to enjoy both of his sessions with Gromyko (a third focusing on the Middle East is scheduled for this evening), and he commented to us that they had got on a first-name basis. Marty and I believe that while the meetings were not very productive on substance (with the possible exception of the Middle East), they succeeded in permitting the two men to get to know each other. Given the apparent Soviet uncertainties concerning the policies and attitudes of the Administration, the development of this relationship is in itself useful

³ For the September 12 Soviet response to the August 7 tripartite *démarche*, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972. In a September 26 covering memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized the main points as follows: "Talks would be limited to the four powers and would concern West Berlin; the question must be approached from the standpoint of European security, and the sovereignty and legitimate interests of East Germany; it is impossible not to take into account that West Berlin's lines of communication are 'along the lines of communication of the GDR;' a normalization of relations between the GDR and Bonn proceed from the basis of 'international law,' and the principles of the Bucharest and Budapest declarations of the Warsaw Pact (i.e., recognition of East Germany, inviolability of borders, etc.)."

⁴ See Document 81. For the Berlin section of that memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–76*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

⁵ Reference is to Valentin M. Falin, head of the Third European Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. No record of their conversation has been found.

and could in the long run be most productive. The atmosphere of both dinners was relaxed and cordial.

I hope that Peggy and you had a nice leave.

Sincerely,

Emory C. Swank⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

91. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

US-USSR Middle East Negotiations in New York

Secretary Rogers and Gromyko failed to make progress toward coming up with a common document during their final meeting in New York. The Soviet strategy now appears to be to get a commitment to total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza to the pre-war lines in return for their agreeing to Rhodes type negotiations (interpreted the Arab way) and peace after Israeli withdrawal has been completed and without an explicit commitment to control the fedayeen. Secretary Rogers does not believe that this is a satisfactory deal and has therefore held basically to our present position and did not put our fallback position on the table. The talks will now shift back to Washington with Joe Sisco and Dobrynin picking them up again next week.

Summarized below is where we stand with the Soviets on the major points after the negotiations in New York:

1. The Soviets will accept the *Rhodes formula* if we will be more specific on the *UAR border*. Secretary Rogers avoided being more spe-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, July–October 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. Attached but not printed are telegram 3324 from USUN, October 1, providing an account of the Rogers–Gromyko talk of September 30, and telegram 3322 from USUN, October 1, providing an account of the Sisco–Dobrynin talk of September 30.

cific on the borders because of disagreement on a number of other points in the package. On the Rhodes formula, the Secretary made clear that we are not insisting on a joint meeting of the parties at the outset and that it was advantageous not to be too precise on the details so that both parties can justify it. Gromyko had a different set of facts than ours on the Rhodes formula. While he started out by insisting that there should be an understanding between us on what it means, he seemed to be pressing this less after Secretary Rogers had explained the advantages of ambiguity.

2. We and the Soviets agree on the principle of cessation of war and the establishment of a state of peace. The Soviets, however, continue to insist that a juridical state of peace can come only after all Israeli withdrawals are completed. This is consistent with the longstanding Arab view. The Israelis, on the other hand, refuse to withdraw an inch until peace is established and all elements of the package in force.

3. The Soviets are still also insisting on a reference to the Constantinople Convention with the language concerning freedom of passage through the *Suez Canal*.

4. On *Gaza*, the Soviets want a clear-cut statement of Arab sovereignty, total withdrawal of Israeli forces, the establishment of a UN force, and reinstatement of the UAR administration that existed before the war. We stuck to our position that all options on the ultimate status of Gaza must be kept open, leaving the concerned parties to work out a solution.

5. A preliminary understanding has been reached by Joe Sisco and Dobrynin to drop any reference to *refugees*. The Soviets can not agree that the principle of choice to refugees should be balanced by an annual quota.

6. The Soviets still hold the view that the UN force should be established in *Sharm el-Sheikh*. Secretary Rogers maintained that practical security arrangements in Sharm el-Sheikh, the establishment of demilitarized zones, and the final disposition of Gaza must be negotiated with the parties on the basis of the Rhodes formula.

7. We and the Soviets have been agreed for some time on Arab recognition of Israel's right to live in peace.

Conclusion: The long and short of this is that we may move toward a much shorter document containing only the key elements. That would leave the tough issues for negotiation, which would suit Israel. Our work would be cut out for us, but we would at least be working in a negotiating context.²

² This portion of the paragraph is highlighted.

92. Editorial Note

On October 7, 1969, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent President Nixon a paper entitled, "The Modern World, A Single 'Strategic Theater,'" dated September 29, 1969. The paper was written by Fritz Kraemer, whom Kissinger described as "an acquaintance of mine." Kissinger's covering memorandum explained that, "Although I do not agree with its every last word, it does define the problem we face—the generally deteriorating strategic position of the United States during the past decade." The paper, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 39, was read with great interest by Nixon, who wrote numerous marginal comments. Next to the section on U.S.-Soviet relations, Nixon wrote "good analysis." The section examines the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as follows:

"You will not expect in this sketch any analysis of the complex issue of US/USSR relations. But one comment deserves to be made in the general context I have chosen: The Soviets are developing some genuine fear of Red China and its intractable leaders. They might, therefore, feel impelled by self-restraint to seek a *genuine* Kremlin/Washington détente, and even make certain concessions to the US as a conceivable future ally, semi-ally or at least friendly 'neutral' in a Soviet-Chinese confrontation. The entire Soviet assessment, however, of the weight and value of the United States as a friend or foe, will depend very largely on their considering us either strong-willed or else weak in purpose and resolve. The realists in the Kremlin may now be 'taking our measure,' and a US yielding, and reluctant to act on all fronts, will appear less interesting and important to them as a factor in the international power struggle than a super power obviously able *and* willing to use its strength." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 397, Subject Files, A Strategic Overview)

On October 14, 1969, Special Assistant to the President Kenneth Cole returned Kissinger's memorandum and the strategic overview paper under a covering note that read: "Please note that the President wants you to send this, together with a note from the President to Secretary Laird, Secretary Rogers and Attorney General Mitchell. They should be asked to comment on it and have their comments to the President within a two-week period, due date November 6." Kissinger sent copies of the paper with the President's instruction for their comments on October 16. In addition, on October 22, Kissinger sent Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms a copy of the Kraemer paper. (*Ibid.*) No record of comments from the four recipients of the strategic overview essay has been found.

93. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1969, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Dobrynin opened the conversation by handing the President a brief announcement suggesting November 17th as the opening of the SALT talks, and suggesting Helsinki as the place. The President asked why Helsinki—he preferred Vienna. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that it did not make a great deal of difference to the Soviet Union, but since Helsinki had been proposed as one of the places by the Secretary of State in June, they decided to go along with that. The President said the Secretary of State had been under instructions to point out the difficulties of Helsinki. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that all the Secretary of State had said to Gromyko was, “to hell with ‘Sinki,” which is not a diplomatic suggestion. If the United States preferred some other place, this should not be too difficult.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what they meant by preliminary discussion. He replied that this meant only the first phase of the discussions, and had no particular significance. But Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that one possible way of handling it would be by beginning in Helsinki and then moving on to Vienna. Dr. Kissinger pointed out to the Ambassador that we had to consult some Allies, but that there seemed to be no insuperable difficulties.

The President then said it would be dangerous if the talks were only a series of platitudes. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that there

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. On October 17, at 4:40 p.m., Dobrynin called Kissinger to arrange a meeting to deliver to Nixon a message from Moscow regarding SALT and U.S.-Soviet relations. According to a transcript of their conversation, “K asked if Dobrynin had requested this [meeting] through the State Department. D said no, he has spoken only to K. K said then he would keep it that way.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Records, 1969–1972, Chronological File) On October 18, Kissinger sent Nixon summary talking points in which he stressed that “*Your basic purpose* will be to keep the Soviets concerned about what we might do around November 1. You should also make clear that, whether or not they agree to SALT, unless there is real progress in Vietnam, US-Soviet relations will continue to be adversely affected.” The summary talking points and longer attached briefing paper are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1.

would be specific suggestions, depending on the range of our proposals, and they would probably be put in the form of several options.

The Ambassador then said that President Podgorny paid close attention to good relationships with the United States, and valued this private contact that had been established, but they wanted the President to hear directly their view of international relations. The Ambassador then read the attached Aide Mémoire to the President. After he was through reading the Aide Mémoire, the President pulled out a yellow pad, handed it to Dobrynin and said, "you'd better take some notes," and began to speak almost uninterruptedly for half an hour.

The President began by saying to Dobrynin, "you have been candid, and I will be equally so. I, too, am disappointed in US-Soviet relations. I am today, in office for nine months. The babies should have been born; instead, there have been several miscarriages. I recognize that the future of my country and of the world depends on the success the Soviet Union has in bringing us closer together. We have not done well. Let me point out why."

Middle East. The President pointed out that Sisco and Gromyko, and Sisco and Dobrynin, have talked, but the Soviets have been taking a hard position based on total withdrawal without asking a similar sacrifice from the UAR. The President pointed out that the Soviet client had lost the war, had lost the territory, and was in no position to be extremely aggressive. Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the President was suggesting that total withdrawal was no longer acceptable, and why a UN force was not adequate. The President said that in light of the experience with the other UN force, one would have to understand and take account of the Israeli position. We are not intransigent, the President added, and you must not be. If you are willing to press your client, we may be able to make some suggestions to Israel. Ambassador Dobrynin began to argue and the President cut him off by saying these were technical issues which should be discussed with Sisco.

Turning to *trade, European security and Berlin*, the President said that these could be dealt with later at a very high level, if we can make a breakthrough somewhere. The Ambassador asked, "how do we make a breakthrough?"

The President ignored him and turned to *China*. He said, "Look to the future of Asia—what will Asia be 25 years from now? China will be in a position of immense power and we cannot have it without communication. Anything we have done or are doing with respect to China is in no sense designed to embarrass the Soviet Union. On the contrary, China and the United States cannot tolerate a situation to develop where we are enemies, anymore than we want to be permanent enemies of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we expect to make moves in trade and exchange of persons and eventually in diplomacy. As the Ambassador has said

himself, there are enough blocs in the world without contributing to another one. He repeated this was not directed against the Soviet Union. Within 10 years, China will be a nuclear power, capable of terrorizing many other countries. The time is running out when the Soviet Union and the United States can build a different kind of world. The only beneficiary, then, of U.S.-Soviet disagreement over Vietnam is China. And, therefore, this is the last opportunity to settle these disputes.

The President then turned to Vietnam. He said that prior to the bombing halt, "which you are aware will be one year old on November 1st," Ambassadors Bohlen, Thompson and Harriman had pointed out that the Soviet Union could do nothing as long as the United States was bombing a fellow Socialist country, and that it would be very active afterwards. The bombing halt was agreed to and the Soviet Union has done nothing.

Of course, the President said, we now had an oblong table to the attainment of which the Soviet Union contributed something, but the U.S. did not consider that a great achievement. All conciliatory moves for the past year had been made by the United States. The President enumerated them.

The President said he therefore had concluded that maybe the Soviet Union did not want to end the war in Vietnam. They may think that they can break the President; they may believe that the U.S. domestic situation is unmanageable; they may think that the war in Vietnam costs the Soviet Union only a small amount of money and costs the U.S. a great many lives. The President did not propose to argue with the Soviet assessment. As a great power, it had the right to take its position. On the other hand, the Ambassador had to understand the following: the Soviet Union would be stuck with the President for the next three years and three months, and the President would keep in mind what was being done right now. If the Soviet Union would not help us to get peace, the U.S. would have to pursue its own methods for bringing the war to an end. It could not allow a talk-fight strategy without taking action.

The President said he hoped that the Ambassador would understand that such measures would not be directed against the Soviet Union, but would be in the U.S. interest of achieving peace. The U.S. recognized that a settlement must reflect the real situation. It recognized the right of all Vietnamese to participate in the political process. But up to now, there had been a complete refusal of North Vietnam to make its own proposals in order to have any serious discussion.

The President pointed out that all the Ambassador had done was to repeat the same tired old slogans that the North Vietnamese had made already six months ago, and which he knew very well could lead nowhere. It was time to get discussions started. The humiliation of a defeat was absolutely unacceptable. The President recognized that the Soviet

leaders were tough and courageous, but so was he. He told Ambassador Dobrynin that he hoped that he would not mind this serious talk.

President Nixon said he did not believe much in personal diplomacy, and he recognized that the Ambassador was a strong defender of the interests of his own country. The President pointed out that if the Soviet Union found it possible to do something in Vietnam, and the Vietnam war ended, the U.S. might do something dramatic to improve Soviet-U.S. relations, indeed something more dramatic than they could now imagine. But until then, real progress would be difficult.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether this meant that there could be no progress. The President replied that progress was possible, but it would have to be confined essentially to what was attainable in diplomatic channels. He said that he was very happy to have Ambassador Dobrynin use the channel through Dr. Kissinger, and he would be prepared to talk to the Ambassador personally. He reiterated that the war could drag on, in which case the U.S. would find its own way to bring it to an end. There was no sense repeating the proposals of the last six months. However, he said, in the meantime, while the situation continued, we could all keep our tone down and talk correctly to each other. It would help, and would lay the basis for further progress, perhaps later on when conditions were more propitious.

The President said that the whole world wanted us to get together. He too wanted nothing so much as to have his Administration remembered as a watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations, but we would not hold still for being “diddled” to death in Vietnam.²

Tab A³

Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

While in Moscow [I] had meetings with the Soviet leaders in the course of which we discussed questions of relations between the USSR and the US.

² Nixon provides a detailed account of this conversation in his *Memoirs*, pp. 405–407. He concludes with the following description: “Kissinger came back in after he had seen Dobrynin to his car. ‘I wager that no one has ever talked to him that way in his entire career!’ he said. ‘It was extraordinary! No President has ever laid it on the line to them like that.’”

³ No classification marking.

The President is aware of the importance with which Soviet-American relations are viewed by our side and of the significance attached to them in Moscow. Enough time has now passed since the inauguration of the new administration in the United States to permit an evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations in the light of the exchange of opinion that has since taken place between our Governments, as well as of the events that have occurred in the world.

I am instructed to frankly inform the President that Moscow is not satisfied with the present state of relations between the USSR and the US. One gets the impression that the American side, while declaring in general words that it is ready to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union, evades, in fact, concrete discussion of a whole number of major questions, such as measures to be taken to ensure that allied agreements reflecting the results of World War II and outlining steps for securing peace be put into life; greater coordination of our actions aimed at settling in practice the Middle East conflict, as well as certain concrete questions of bilateral Soviet-American relations, in particular, that of trade. Moreover, in a number of cases the American side has taken steps which obviously run counter to the declarations in favor of improving relations between our countries. All this cannot but alert us and, in any case, cannot contribute to better trust which is so necessary for relations between our Governments if we are indeed to make progress in removing the abnormalities that have piled up in our relations in the past, and in settling major international issues fraught with dangerous crises.

With this in mind the Soviet Government decided to outline for the President its considerations on a number of concrete questions.

2. [*sic*] It is known, for example, that the Soviet Government has expressed readiness to follow the path that would facilitate doing away with the existing military blocks and groupings which, without doubt, would make a most positive impact on the world situation. Unfortunately, one has to conclude that those statements have not met a positive response from the US Government. On the contrary, it is noted in Moscow that the activity of NATO is now on the increase.

Or take, for instance, the question of drawing a line through the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe and fixing the situation that has developed there. We on our part have always expressed readiness and proposed concrete ways for a just settlement of the questions involved, with due regard to the existing realities. The American side, however, acts contrary to the obligations assumed by the United States under the Allied agreements. Why could not the US, together with the USSR as great powers and allies in the past war, make necessary efforts at last in that important field?

The Soviet side stands prepared now to start an exchange of views with the US also on the question of West Berlin. Such an exchange of

views, in our opinion, can be useful if both sides are guided by the aim of contributing to a relaxation of tension in Europe and of preventing in the future frictions and complications dangerous for the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe.

3. It is also known that the US and the USSR have long been conducting an exchange of views on Middle East settlement. We would like to say with all frankness, however, that, in our opinion, there has been no significant progress in this matter so far, while the situation in the Middle East in the meantime, far from getting normalized, is further deteriorating. In our deep conviction, such a course of events in no small degree is due to the failure on the part of the US to make adequate efforts to bring to an end the present arrogant behaviour of Israel which deliberately aggravates the situation and is wrecking a settlement.

Moscow would like to hope that the President will give this question all due attention and that appropriate steps will be taken from the American side to put an end to Israel's obstructionism which would pave the way toward achieving a just settlement in the Middle East.

4. In Moscow development of events around Vietnam is being watched closely as before.

The Soviet Union, as in the past, is interested in a speediest peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict through negotiations and on the basis of respect for the rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people. We can responsibly state that the position of our Vietnamese friends is the same.

I would like to recall in this connection a concrete program of just and peaceful settlement, put forward by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, and to emphasize, too, that the stubborn resistance of the American side to the creation of a coalition government in South Vietnam which would be based on the actual pattern of political forces there cannot but evoke questions as to the actual meaning of statements about the US desire to end the war in Vietnam and to achieve a political settlement of that conflict. These questions also arise in view of the fact that parallel to the Paris Peace Talks the US is conducting wide preparations for continuing the war in Vietnam.

Due note has been taken in Moscow, of course, of the hints by the American representatives about possible use by the United States of some "alternate" methods of solving the Vietnam question. Such hints cannot be regarded in any other way but as a rather open threat addressed to the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

If that is so Moscow feels that the President should be frankly told that the method of solving the Vietnam question through the use

of military force is not only without perspective, but also extremely dangerous.

We hope that the United States will soberly weigh all factors connected with the continuation of the Vietnam conflict and will show a constructive approach to its solution through negotiation, on the basis of recognition of the unalienable right of the Vietnamese people to solve their matters by themselves and of withdrawal of the American troops from Vietnam.

5. Some time back due note was taken in Moscow of the assurances by American leaders to the effect that the United States was not interested in any aggravation of conflict between the Ch.P.R. and the USSR and did not have any intention to use Soviet-Chinese relations to the detriment of the Soviet Union. We, on our part, assured the President that we did not have any intention, either, to make use of difficulties in the relations between the USA and the Ch.P.R. Those American assurances were received in Moscow as a sign of sober realization by the US Government that it would be unrealistic to stake on the use of the problem of Soviet-Chinese relations for bringing pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union and for getting one-sided concessions from us.

If someone in the United States is tempted to make profit from Soviet-Chinese relations at the Soviet Union's expense, and there are some signs of that, then we would like to frankly warn in advance that such line of conduct, if pursued, can lead to a very grave miscalculation and is in no way consistent with the goal of better relations between the US and the USSR.

6. In conclusion I would like to say that the Soviet leaders who attach great significance to improving relations with the United States, would like to know the President's own opinion on the above mentioned questions, as well as on concrete steps which the American side would be ready to take in that direction.

I would also like to tell the President that the Soviet leaders continue to attach great importance not only to official but also to the existing unofficial contacts with him for a confidential exchange of opinion on questions of mutual interest.

94. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 20, 1969, 8:25 p.m.

P said in the meeting tomorrow with “him.”² He would like for K to give him that message. Then if the Vietnam thing is raised (try to get it raised) the P wants K to shake his head and say “I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but he is out of control. Mr. Ambassador, as you know, I am very close to the President, and you don’t know this man—he’s been through more than any of the rest of us put together. He’s made up his mind and unless there’s some movement,” just shake your head and walk out. He’s probably right now figuring out what was said. K said he might type up everything the P said on a plain slip of paper. The P said that was fine, and K should put in whatever he wanted. Say since he gave us his notes he’s entitled to my notes.³ The P said he’ll say “What does this mean? Are you threatening me?” And K should say “Please now, Mr. Ambassador, the President isn’t threatening you. He just wants a little movement.” K said if they ignore what you said this afternoon, they either believe that your freedom of action is so circumscribed that you can’t do anything or Hanoi is out of control. The P said he thinks it’s the latter; “As I said, I’m here for three years.”

The P asked if K could trust Joe Alsop⁴ enough to show him that. [Don’t know what “that” refers to.]⁵ K asked what he should do with it. The P said nothing, but he’s got to know. K said let me think about it. The P said, he didn’t know; he probably would have to print it. K said yes, at the right moment he would have to print it. K said he had looked over Alsop’s notes after he left; his notes say our Government is for the speediest conclusion of the peace negotiations. He says on the basis of giving the people free choice. In the next paragraph, he lists all the garbage they’ve been saying all along.

The P said the second draft (number 10) was better than the first. Said he’s dictated a few little things. The P said when we get through with this we’ve got to lay it on the line, put that flag around us and

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Dobrynin and Kissinger met briefly on October 21; see footnote 2, Document 95.

³ See Document 95.

⁴ Alsop was a syndicated columnist.

⁵ Brackets in the source text.

let the people scream. K said well, they're going to scream anyway. The so-called moderates can't be placated. The P agreed.

The P said he would think Laird would understand this, but he guesses not. And Rogers doesn't understand it at all. K said well, you've been on the international scene most of your political life. The P interrupted, saying all of his political life. The P listed the part he played in international politics since the beginning of his political career, then said "I know those bastards—they don't know me. This is something that the world doesn't understand. They're going to find out something different." The P said he wanted K to tell the people there that the President feels it vitally important that the tone of PR be that the P comes out fighting—fighting on Haynsworth⁶, on the domestic program . . . K said he would convey that Wednesday because there is no meeting tomorrow.⁷ The P said there must be something. K said, well he had a meeting with Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. The P said Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Harlow, Klein, Ziegler, Buchanan—put that line out hard and tough. Hit it for all it's worth. K said he thought everybody was looking for some lead—we need some demonstration of strength right here.

The P said on the Rogers thing, he doesn't think K ought to handle it with a phone call—he should go over there and talk to him. He should say the President has referred it to him, but with these instructions. Say the President is aware of how we don't want this going around him—we want to go right to him. And we don't want this to go out until Sunday, Sunday for the Monday papers.

⁶ Clement F. Haynsworth of South Carolina was nominated by Nixon for the Supreme Court in August 1969. Civil rights organizations labeled Haynsworth a racist, and Democratic members of the Senate Judiciary Committee also charged him with conflict of interest in cases that had involved litigants who were customers in a company in which Haynsworth owned stock. Despite the controversies, Nixon refused to withdraw his nomination; on November 21, the Senate rejected Haynsworth's nomination.

⁷ Ellipsis in the source text.

95. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)**¹

Washington, October 21, 1969, 3:15 p.m.

Dobrynin wanted to check a few things on the notes K sent him.² K said they were hastily done and apologized for it. D said it only deals with the last one. K agreed and asked if D wanted him to send the notes on the other. D said there was no hurry—at K's convenience. K said when he looked at his notes, he forgot the reduction in military activity. D noticed and said that the notes kept saying "they, they, they." K said "they" refers to D's leaders. D pointed out another instance where it said "on the other hand, the Ambassador." K said that was also directed to D's leaders. K said he had no doubt about D's understanding—this was true all the way through—the reference to D's leaders. D said this was his impression. On page 2, line 3 it mentions the Soviet people. K again said this should be "leaders." K said the President was talking about himself. D said he mentioned himself and gave the name of three leaders. K said D's notes were better than his. D said the President mentioned Bohlen, Thompson, Harriman and [omission in the source text], not D specifically. K said that was correct, but why didn't D put it in. K said he would correct his notes. Then in paragraph 3, D said the President mentioned that he was very happy to see the Ambassador. D understood that he was happy rather to meet with Dobrynin, not through K. K said D misunderstood that. K had an occasion to talk with the President this morning—what he said was "that channel should be if the problem got solved." D said—that now K and he really have nothing to discuss unless D has something to say. K said that was supposed to mean on important matters. D's impression was that the President didn't specifically limit D and K unless they felt it

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke briefly on the telephone at 9:15 a.m. that morning. According to a transcript of their conversation: "The Ambassador said he just returned from New York. K said jokingly, we turn our backs and you run off to the nightclubs of New York. Dobrynin said he was just trying to follow the example of his good friend. K said he would like to come to see the Ambassador for about 5 minutes. D said fine, he would expect him in about 15 minutes." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Kissinger apparently gave Dobrynin an unrevised version of Document 93 at this meeting. The unrevised notes with Kissinger's changes are attached to a covering memo that reads: "Handed in a plain envelope to Ambassador Dobrynin as an aide mémoire. The copy given to him had no classification marked on it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1)

would be useful. It sounded like there was a limitation. K said that was not the intention. K explained that D could see the President on something very important and if the other thing were settled, quite frequently. K talked with the P after D was in. The Pres. is very agreeable to keep this channel open. D said as it is here, he may have to go the other way from now on but would like to go on with K. K said that was up to D but it should read through Dr. Kissinger and the Pres. would be prepared to talk to D if he had something specific and important.

They decided that they coincided on specifics although D said he had more details. D said he had made the call and should be hearing back tomorrow and would report the answer.

96. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Dobrynin's Message

Taken as a whole, Dobrynin's presentation² was a rather standard Soviet indictment, although moderate in tone. Most of the points in the Soviet complaint against us have recently been made by other Soviet officials and in the Soviet press. It may well be that this is how the Soviet leaders in fact see our conduct; and they are partly correct: we have by and large kept aloof and held our ground on such issues as the Middle East (Golda Meir to the contrary notwithstanding) and Europe. But we have probably not done as well as we should in communicating to the Soviets that *their* behavior in Vietnam stands in the way of better relations. Your presentation may help to get this message across more clearly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Part 1. Secret; Nodis.

² See Document 93.

I suspect Dobrynin's basic mission was to test the seriousness of the threat element in our current posture and to throw out enough inducements (SALT, Berlin, direct informal contact with you) to make it politically and psychologically difficult for you to play it rough over Vietnam.

Even though some of Dobrynin's points are valid in the sense that they reflect understanding of our cool attitude, many others are pure Soviet propaganda fare. I doubt that we need to pay attention to complaints about NATO or about our failure to act in accordance with World War II "obligations." By the same token, it is curious that certain of our alleged "sins" were omitted, e.g. our supposed arms buildup as reflected in the Safeguard decision.³ It may be that having agreed to SALT, the Soviets considered it inexpedient to get into polemics in this field.

Specific Points of Interest

1. *Vietnam.* The main point here is Soviet acknowledgement of our allusions to possible military actions. Their response was relatively mild ("shortsighted . . . extremely dangerous.")⁴ But there is no doubt they are concerned and your comments might just give them ammunition to use in Hanoi in lobbying for a more flexible position. The Soviets may argue in Hanoi that only a token concession—especially when magnified by our press—would be sufficient to dissuade us from drastic action or give us a pretext to back away from our warnings. We should probably find a way to signal that token concessions would be inadequate. In any event, it will be essential to continue backing up our verbal warnings with our present military moves.

On the substantive Vietnam issues, I could find nothing new in Dobrynin's presentation. He did repeat recent Soviet references to a "speedy"—he actually used "speediest"—peaceful settlement, and asserted that their Vietnamese friends favor this too. Even if that is so—and Pham Van Dong who just completed a visit to Moscow may have given the green light for use of the phrase—it gives us nothing to go on in the absence of concrete adjustments in the Communist position.

2. *Berlin.* The Soviets again agree to talks with us but give no indication whatever that these might lead to the improvements we seek. As you know, there has also recently been an offer by ourselves, the British and French, with FRG support, to talk to the Soviets. They agreed in much the same vague terms used in Dobrynin's text. I think we should not encourage the notion of bilateral US-Soviet talks on Berlin at this stage. The Soviets would use them to stir up suspicions

³ See footnote 3, Document 93.

⁴ Ellipsis in source text.

among the Allies and to play us off against each other. I believe we would do best to keep this issue in the quadripartite forum for the moment and not to press too much ourselves. Since there may be a misunderstanding of our position in Moscow (you first raised the possibility of talks in your Berlin speech⁵ and then in your letter to Kosygin last March),⁶ we should probably tell the Soviets that we are not now interested in bilateral talks.

3. *China*. The Soviets again give vent to their underlying suspicion that we are trying to flirt with China in order to bring pressure on them. They warn us “in advance” that any such idea can lead to grave miscalculations and would interfere with the improvement of US-Soviet relations. You have already answered this point and I believe there is no advantage in giving the Soviets excessive reassurance. In any case we should not be diverted from our China policy.

4. *Middle East*. The Soviet text reflects current Soviet pessimism. We do not of course know how much trouble the Soviets have had with the Arabs over the Sisco talks. They may genuinely think we have not exerted enough pressure on Israel. It is doubtful that the impasse can be broken.

5. *Direct Contact with You*. Dobrynin’s final point was obviously intended to keep a direct line open to you. I think we can take this as a signal that for all their complaints and accusations, they remain interested in normal relations.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 23.

⁶ See Document 28.

97. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, October 21, 1969, 3:28–5:12 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin, Sino-Soviet Hostilities, and the Middle East

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman

State

U. Alexis Johnson

Martin Hillenbrand

William Cargo

Rodger Davies

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

Thomas H. Karamessines

JCS

Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff

Harold H. Saunders

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William G. Hyland

Col. Robert M. Behr

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. A briefing on Berlin contingency planning will be prepared for the President.

2. Unilateral and quadripartite plans for Berlin contingencies will be reviewed with special emphasis on establishing priorities among alternative courses of action.

3. A summary of recommended actions is needed for the Sino-Soviet Hostilities paper. When the summary is completed and minor revisions made within the body of the paper, it will stand approved by the WSAG. State is charged with keeping the paper current.

4. The Joint Staff will prepare a paper on rules of engagement for WSAG review.

5. The next WSAG meeting will be devoted to further review of the Middle East paper.

The Group then turned to the Sino-Soviet Hostilities paper.² Secretary Johnson said that, with the exception of a few minor changes which Cargo would cover with the Group, he considered the Sino-Soviet paper to be a finished product.³

Cargo then went over the recommended changes. (1) The paper will be modified to convey the idea that a Soviet “victory” over main-

² See Document 79.

³ On October 20, Behr sent Kissinger a memorandum written by John Holdridge about the NSSM 63 study: “This paper has met our needs for a fast survey of what U.S. reactions should be in the event that the Sino-Soviet dispute moved into a situation involving hostilities. At the time it was begun, the prospects of a clash between Moscow and Peking seemed greater than they are today—perhaps the Soviets were actively considering taking some form of action, but now have resolved not to do so, or to defer pending the outcome of the talks in Peking.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

land China does not imply acquisition and absolute control over Chinese territory—but, instead, an extension of Soviet influence over a compliant CPR government. (2) With respect to U.S. actions in Vietnam (as related to Sino-Soviet hostilities), the paper will avoid the impression that a U.S. blockade of Haiphong would serve as a retaliatory measure against a Soviet blockade of Hong Kong (although that may give the U.S. a pretext). The central idea should be that we will use a blockade on the basis of what it would do for us in Vietnam, independent of its relationship to a situation of Sino-Soviet hostilities.

Kissinger asked for a summary of recommended actions to be put at the front of the paper, and then wondered if the whole paper could be incorporated in the NSSM 63 report. Cargo agreed to provide a summary but demurred in the idea of integrating the paper with the NSSM 63 report, saying that consistency between the two would suffice. Kissinger agreed on the basis that Cargo would insure consistency on a continuing basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of Berlin contingency planning.]

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, October 29, 1969, 0123Z.

182821. Subject: Sisco–Dobrynin Meeting on ME October 28.

Summary: In his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin October 28, Sisco gave Dobrynin our language on Israel-UAR boundary question, stressing that it is contingent upon Soviet agreement to equally specific language on peace and to need for Rhodes-type negotiations between parties to work out details of a settlement including (a) security arrangements at Sharm al-Shaykh, (b) demilitarized zones and (c) security arrangements for and final disposition of Gaza. Sisco also emphasized that we were not presenting elements of a new US document but rather formulations designed to reflect common US-Soviet positions for inclusion in a joint document to be transmitted to Jarring

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, July–October 1969. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by W.B. Smith, cleared by Swank and Atherton, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Belgrade, Cairo, Jidda, London, USUN, Nicosia, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

through Four Powers. In putting forth these formulations, Sisco said that we are not prepared to negotiate them further with the Soviets in any substantial way. Dobrynin undertook to obtain Moscow's reaction, stating only as personal preliminary comment that he thought too many questions had been left open and that Moscow would want document to be more specific and detailed. End Summary.

1. Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Dobrynin held third session October 28 in their ME talks since US-Soviet ministerial discussions in New York in September.² Responding to Sisco's inquiry if Dobrynin had comments to make, latter said he would only reiterate instruction he received earlier and imparted to Secretary and Sisco last week: There would be no Soviet reaction to US proposal re nature of common document until US position clearer on borders and withdrawal. Sisco then voiced US concern re Lebanese situation, Syrian complicity and Soviets abetting anti-US campaign in Arab world (septel).

2. Sisco pointed out that US regards process which began in New York talks last month as one of devising joint US-Soviet document. Added he wished to emphasize and hoped Dobrynin would report explicitly to Moscow that we do not consider revised formulations which we have suggested to Soviets in last few weeks as elements of any new US document. What we have tried to do is basically to reflect what we hope is concrete US-Soviet understanding reached orally on particular points.

3. US July document³ is last US document that we intend to table, Sisco continued. Present effort is a mutual and common one of drawing up tentative joint US-Soviet document. What we are now recording are understandings or near understandings which have evolved in our discussions.

4. In New York we found common language for inclusion in Preamble on question of procedures for getting talks started between parties under Jarring's auspices. At first subsequent Washington meeting we suggested modified language to Soviets in attempt to reflect our common views on how to deal with questions of Tiran, Canal, and refugees. We also proposed a concept for dealing with what US-Soviet discussions have identified as central issues, namely: peace, withdrawal and boundaries, and practical security arrangements. As Dobrynin would recall, we said: If US and Soviets can reach agreement on specific peace language and on neutral formulations leaving to parties to work out (a) practical security arrangements in and around

² See Documents 81 and 85, and footnote 1, Document 91.

³ Document 67.

Sharm al-Shaykh, (b) arrangements for DMZ's, and (c) security arrangements for and disposition of Gaza, then US would be prepared to consider more specific language on boundary question.

5. At last Sisco–Dobrynin meeting,⁴ US proposed at Soviet suggestion a consolidated formulation of our peace point. At brief meeting last week of Secretary Rogers, Dobrynin, and Sisco it was agreed that Dobrynin and Sisco should try to approach this concept with concrete language on conditional basis. In one final effort to move things forward, we are prepared today to complete process of seeking common language for joint US–USSR document.

6. Sisco explained that we view following points which Sisco would now give Dobrynin as a package within a package. In other words, these points must stand or fall together as far as US is concerned. Sisco said that the first of the elements which the US considers to be linked is last paragraph of Preamble as it had been worked out jointly with Soviets in New York, and of which he had already given Dobrynin a copy.⁵

Begin text. Israel and the UAR, . . .⁶

Agree that their representatives under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring will follow the procedures the parties utilized at Rhodes in 1949 to work out without delay, starting on the basis of the following provisions, a final and reciprocally binding accord on ways of implementing Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 to establish a just and lasting peace. *End text.*

7. Sisco said the second element of the package within a package was the language on withdrawal which had also been worked out in New York. In giving copy of text to Dobrynin for reference, Sisco invited Dobrynin's attention to fact that all formulations being transmitted this session had following caption: "Contingent Draft for Possible Inclusion in a Joint US–USSR Working Paper."

Begin text. The parties, in reaching a final accord (contained in a final document or documents) on a package settlement on the basis of these Fundamental Principles, would determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory occupied during the conflict of 1967 to boundaries to be delineated in accordance with Point 3 as well as an agreed plan for interrelated fulfillment of all other provisions of Security Council Resolution 242. *End text.*

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 91.

⁵ U.S. formulations for a Joint US–USSR Working Paper, entitled "Fundamental Principles" was given to Dobrynin at this meeting on October 28.

⁶ Ellipsis in the source text.

8. Sisco said US had reviewed this point re withdrawal as well as Point 2 which he had worked out with Dobrynin in New York (USUN 3322)⁷ and which also dealt with withdrawal procedures. US was now dropping second point because we found it to be inconsistent with first point. Point 1 says parties would determine timetable and procedures for withdrawal, but old Point 2 spelled out some of timetable and some of procedure. We feel this should be left to parties, and omission of old Point 2 has additional advantage of avoiding whole problem of timing of withdrawal in relationship to other actions. Sisco added that Dobrynin would find Sisco's presentation at this session to be based on assumption that question should be avoided entirely of when peace and withdrawal are to happen in relation to each other. Sisco mentioned that he and Dobrynin could return to this subject at a later time.

9. Sisco explained that third element of package within package is consolidated US language on peace which Sisco gave Dobrynin Oct 17 (State 177075, para 14).⁸

10. Language on boundary question is fourth element. Sisco noted US July document used formula to effect that old international frontier was not excluded as secure boundary between UAR and Israel. Soviet response favored use of either of boundary language in Soviet June document⁹ or of US language but with deletion of phrase "not excluded." US has now devised counter formulation to reflect possible US-USSR consensus on boundary question, Sisco continued, which does two things: (A) it reflects view that former international boundary between Egypt and Palestine should become secure and recognized boundary between Israel and UAR; and (B) it reflects view that Israel should not be asked to withdraw to that boundary except in context of peace and agreement on establishment of DMZs, security arrangements which will make boundaries secure and will assure continued free navigation through Tiran, and agreement on Gaza.

11. Sisco presented boundary formulation. *Begin text.*

The parties would agree on the location of the secure and recognized boundary between them, which would be shown on a map or maps approved by the parties which would become part of the final accord. In the context of peace, including inter alia agreement between the parties on the establishment of demilitarized zones, on practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, and on practical security arrangements and final disposition of Gaza, the former international boundary between Egypt and the mandated territory of Pales-

⁷ See footnote 1, Document 91.

⁸ Not found.

⁹ Document 58.

tine would become the secure and recognized boundary between Israel and the UAR. *End text.*

12. Sisco explained that fifth and last item for package within package was formulation to reflect neutral language to which Sisco had been referring since July. Sisco emphasized that new language intended not to prejudice position of either side on these points. Although Dobrynin frequently said US position is one-sided, he would see we are not trying to prejudice size or location of DMZs or specify any particular type of security arrangements or options re disposition of Gaza. US not proposing use of UN facilities to police DMZs, neither are we ruling out UN facilities. We are trying to find neutral formulations which do not prejudice either side's position. Formulation makes clear that Israel's interest in Sharm al-Shaykh area is confined to practical question of assuring free navigation through Tiran. Formulation also reflects fact that Israel has legitimate security concern in Gaza and should have voice on matter, and this in turn is inseparable in our judgment from disposition of Gaza, where sovereignty has been in abeyance for 20 years.

13. Before presenting text, Sisco stressed that if US and Soviets can agree on common document and can get parties engaged in exchange of views, and if US and Soviets continue to press parties while process under Jarring is going on, we believe that more flexibility on these three issues (DMZs, Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza) and other subjects will develop in exchanges between parties. This will help US and USSR in trying to exercise influence on parties. Sisco added we do not envisage US and Soviet roles as ceasing with the drafting of our common document.

14. Sisco presented neutral language formulation. *Begin text.* For the purpose of ensuring the territorial inviolability of the parties and guaranteeing the security of the recognized boundary, the parties, following the procedures set forth in the last preambular paragraph of this document, would work out an agreement on:

(a) Zones to be demilitarized and procedures for ensuring their demilitarization;

(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh area to assure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran; and

(c) Practical security arrangements for and final disposition of Gaza. *End text.*

15. Sisco reiterated that items he had presented today constitute package within package and stand or fall together. US considers these formulations a fair compromise of Soviet and US positions as set forth in June Soviet document and July US document. Speaking candidly, Sisco stressed, we are not prepared to negotiate these points further in any substantial way.

16. As for rest of document, Sisco said, we gave Soviet side our proposed reflections of common positions on Tiran, Canal and refugees

on Oct 10. We have additional suggestion for dealing with the one point which both US and Soviets recognize cannot be left uncovered: interdependence of UAR and Jordan aspects. Sisco said this interdependence is particularly underscored by our discussion of refugee point. We think question of interrelationship can be taken care of by adding one simple paragraph to our non-substantive point on refugees of Oct 10. We believe that our paragraph makes clear that we are dealing with what Gromyko described well as horizontal and vertical package.

17. Sisco presented additional paragraph for refugee point. *Begin text.* It would be understood that the accord between the UAR and Israel would be paralleled by an accord between Jordan and Israel, which would include agreement on a just solution of the refugee problem. Implementation of both accords would begin only after agreement had been achieved on the entire package. *End text.*

18. Sisco observed that next point in common document as US envisages it would be language of US Point 11 in July document dealing with respect for sovereignty, on which US and Soviet sides have long been in agreement. This would be followed by old US Point 13 as amended. In NY discussions Sisco had suggested insertion of sentence on breach of final accord in language covering deposit of final accord with UN.

19. Sisco now presented text to show Dobrynin what this insertion looks like and also to reverse order of two of old sentences. *Begin text.* The final accord would be recorded in a document which is to be signed by the parties and immediately deposited with the UN. After the parties have deposited such a document, the Secretary General of the UN would be requested by the parties immediately to inform the Security Council and all UN Member States to that effect.

From the moment of deposit, the document would become binding on the parties and irrevocable, and implementation and observance by the parties of the provisions of the accord would begin. In the implementation of the final accord, it would be understood by the parties that their respective obligations would be reciprocal and interdependent. The final accord would provide that a material breach of that accord by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part until the breach shall be cured. *End text.*

20. Sisco said that final point in joint document remains for US side its old Point 14 re submission of final accord to UN Security Council for endorsement. We would like to suggest an amendment eliminating reference in this text to map or maps in view of new language on boundaries which Sisco had presented at this session. US does not consider reference to map as needed in final point. Moreover, since boundary language now specific, reference to map in final point could

be misleading and might even lead Arabs to wonder if we have something else in mind.

21. Sisco gave Dobrynin revised language for final point. *Begin text*. Both parties would agree that the final accord would be submitted to the Security Council for its endorsement. *End text*.

22. Sisco said this completed his presentation of language by which we had attempted to reflect joint US-Soviet views for possible inclusion in common document, based on procedures which he and Dobrynin had discussed re submission to four powers and then Jar-ring. Question of subsequent procedures could be discussed after we receive Soviet reaction.

23. Dobrynin referred to new US language on interrelationship between Jordan and UAR aspects. Voiced personal reaction that this provision should be placed in document as separate point at beginning or end. Sisco said he could accept this suggestion in principle. US side did not mean to infer that interrelationship is limited to refugee question.

24. Dobrynin requested clarification of Sisco's remark that US not prepared to negotiate the five elements of package within a package in a substantial way. Sisco replied that fact of the matter is US has now gone as far as it can substantively; rubber band had been stretched to fullest extent. Noted that US has engaged in no consultations with Israelis on this language.

25. Dobrynin raised issue of timing of peace in relation to withdrawal, noting it is point in which Gromyko is interested. Sisco explained that US approach is based on assumption that timing question should be set aside and worked out by parties.

26. When Dobrynin inquired re numbering of points, Sisco used occasion to strongly emphasize his earlier point that these additional US formulations do not constitute a US document. Dobrynin noted that although reference to map now deleted from penultimate point, US had retained it in new boundary language. Sisco said that reference to map in boundary provision is correct concept and should offer no substantive problem. Dobrynin recalled, as he read again through revised formulations received at this and preceding two sessions, that he had requested US clarification of term "interference" in Suez Canal provision. Sisco replied he could focus on this point at a subsequent meeting.

27. Sisco asked for Dobrynin's views on next steps in US-Soviet talks. Dobrynin remarked that joint paper which Sisco proposing seems rather different from what Soviets had in mind during New York talks. Gromyko had sought US clarifications and had said it difficult meanwhile to come to conclusion about next steps. Dobrynin added that we would now have rather short joint document which would leave

several important questions unclear, especially re peacekeeping. Question for Soviets is whether it wise to move with so many open formulations and throw entire ball back to Jarring. A basic judgment would have to be made, and Soviets might decide it wiser to try to clarify some of these open questions.

28. Sisco said again Soviets should expect no further substantive alterations. Sisco asked for Dobrynin's ideas about consultations by US and USSR with parties in area. Dobrynin said Soviets since opening of New York talks had given no texts to their Arab friends, although Gromyko gave oral briefings in New York. Sisco recalled there had been misunderstanding in this respect after his July talks in Moscow which we wanted to avoid this time. After July talks US was roundly criticized by Arab friends for holding off consultations re US document, pursuant to informal understanding between Sisco and Vinogradov. Dobrynin commented in passing that situation vis-à-vis UAR caused by this misunderstanding had made very poor impression in Moscow.

29. Newest formulations were an attempt to reflect a common US-Soviet approach, Sisco continued. As for US own position, we stand on our July document. As Sisco had already noted, we have not discussed formulations with Israelis. Before we can put proposals to Israel for consideration, we must have answer to question which Israelis will immediately ask: Does USSR accept this. We see no point in our trying to press this or that provision in Tel Aviv, Amman, or Cairo unless we know this reflects common approach. US and Soviets owe it to each other to know how other power intends to proceed with parties before other power proceeds.

30. Sisco added that US needs very specific indication from Soviets, as we have passed beyond point of fencing with each other, and as US not prepared to alter latest formulations in any substantial way. Sisco hoped Soviets would do us the courtesy of informing us ahead of time if Moscow decides to discuss formulations with Cairo. US had not decided whether to inform Arabs and Israelis about new formulations. There were three possibilities for Soviets, as for US: (a) to inform parties in general way, (b) to discuss texts with parties, and (c) to give no information at all to parties. Whatever course chosen, US and Soviets should avoid misunderstandings. No commentments [*sic*] made re consultation procedure either by Sisco or Dobrynin.

31. Next session tentatively scheduled for November 5.

Rogers

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 6, 1969, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

I began the conversation by saying that the President had wanted to make sure that Dobrynin understood the speech² properly: (1) the President wanted to point out the seriousness of the threat in case of escalation; (2) that Dobrynin should not be confused by the various arguments he had heard with respect to linkage—we considered linkage a fact and not a policy, and foreign policy was made in the White House and nowhere else; and (3) the President wanted to reiterate that we were in favor of major improvements in Soviet-US relations but not until considerable progress had been made on the Vietnam issue.

Dobrynin said with respect to the first question that they had made their point of view clear and that any escalation by us would have dangerous consequences. I told him that we had taken it into account and that anything we did would not be directed against the Soviet Union, they were the best judge of their own interests and would have to decide what to do when the time came.

With respect to the second point, he said he had no illusions about the linkage problem, and he saw not much point in repeating our well-known position. I said I just wanted to make sure that he understood and was not confused by the conflicting statements he read. I pointed to the *Izvestia* article, which had called attention to these statements. Dobrynin said *Izvestia* had only repeated what the factual situation was and had not made any editorial comments. I did not argue the point, in the belief that propaganda was one thing and their assessment of their policy was another.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation was held in Kissinger's office. Kissinger sent this memorandum of conversation to the President under a November 24 covering note. (Ibid.)

² On November 3, Nixon gave an address to the nation on Vietnam that was broadcast on national television. The address came to be known as the "silent majority speech," for Nixon's appeal for support for his policy from "the great silent majority of Americans" to counter the large-scale anti-Vietnam war demonstrations. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 901–909. For additional background information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 144.

With respect to the third point, Dobrynin said that his government was now beginning to understand the seriousness with which we took the position we had indicated, and had given up the illusion that they had held earlier in the year that major progress was possible even while the Vietnam war was going on. He added a little plaintively that he could not understand our attitude because the Soviet Union was not making trouble for us in Vietnam; they were not trying to embarrass us; but they could not get us out of a war into which we had gotten ourselves. I said I thought our position was clear, and there was no sense reiterating it.

Dobrynin told me that the NLF was looking at our position from the point of view that any election would be won by the government organizing it, and that we were trying to get at the conference table what we had failed to get on the battlefield. I said that we had specifically rejected such a proposition and that they knew very well that we were prepared to discuss with them how to organize the political process—they even knew how to do it.

I told Dobrynin I had been intrigued by a comment he had made the last time I had seen him; namely, that Hanoi had found the conversation with me constructive. What was it that they had considered constructive in that conversation? Dobrynin said that they found my attitude and my personality constructive—not the specific proposals which they thought repeated well-known themes.

The meeting ended with an understanding that we would meet again in about two weeks, the initiative to be left with Dobrynin.³

³ On November 6 at 4:35 pm, Kissinger and Rogers spoke on the telephone about this meeting: "K said he [Dobrynin] didn't have very much. He came in and talked about this linkage problem and I just said to him what the President had said before. K said he would write it up and send it to R. He told D that it is a fact of life that there is some relationship but it is conditional. Rogers felt that that was the way to play it. . . . Rogers said we have never laid down any conditions on SALT. On the other hand, if we are actually having confrontation in the Middle East, it would be difficult to engage in meetings with friendly atmosphere in Helsinki. K indicated that D had come in to get clarification in his own mind since something had been mentioned in *Time* magazine 6 months ago that K had that concept. Rogers said it might be helpful if he knew when K was having these meetings. K said he would call next time." (Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Records, 1969–1976, Telephone Conversations) (Ellipsis in source text)

100. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1969, at 3:15 p.m., the National Security Council met to discuss the upcoming preliminary round of strategic arms limitations talks, which opened in Helsinki on November 17. The minutes of the meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972.

After the NSC meeting, President Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum 33, which spelled out the US objectives as follows:

“The United States is prepared to discuss (a) limitations on all offensive and defensive weapons systems, and (b) proposals the Soviets may advance for the work program. The Delegation should make it clear that in accepting subjects for further discussion the United States is not thereby committed to the inclusion of any given measure of limitation in a final agreement either individually or in combination with others. The President will make the judgment on what limitations are acceptable, and he will do so in light of the criteria for strategic sufficiency set forth in NSDM 16, the evaluations of the Verification Panel, and other considerations he deems pertinent.” The full text of NSDM 33 is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972.

Issued June 24, NSDM 16 listed four criteria: “1) maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces; 2) maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis; 3) maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer; and 4) deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50) NSDM 16 is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972.

101. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1969, the final version of the response to National Security Study Memorandum 63 on Sino-Soviet differences was completed. The paper was discussed in previous drafts at meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group and Senior Review Group in September and October (see Documents 77, 79, and 97). The summary

of "Immediate US Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities," prepared by the Department of State's Policy Planning Council and printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 43, includes the following:

"The U.S. would publicly emphasize its impartiality and noninvolvement, urge both sides not to use nuclear weapons, call for negotiations and the restoration of peace, and take steps to avoid any provocative actions or accidental contact by US forces with belligerent forces. If hostilities were set off by the Soviets, the US would express its strong concern, and if nuclear weapons were used, strongly condemn their employment. These points would be made privately as well to both the Soviets and Chinese. We would not take the initiative to change our bilateral negotiating posture toward the Soviets significantly in the event of the conventional conflict, but if the Soviets employed nuclear weapons, we would at least suspend arms limitation talks.

"In the event of any conventional Sino-Soviet conflict, the US military readiness and reaction posture would be strengthened by selected command and alerting actions. Scheduled overseas military exercises would be reviewed for possible provocative risks and degradation of our military posture, and force demobilization and withdrawal programs would be selectively suspended pending further analysis of the impact of Sino-Soviet hostilities on the US global force posture. In the event nuclear weapons were employed, DEFCON status would be increased, NATO consultations initiated, advanced Civil Defense plans implemented, and selected Reserve and National Guard units recalled to active duty." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 411, National Security Council Contingency Plans)

On November 18, Roger Morris of the National Security Staff sent Kissinger a dissenting view on the NSSM 63 study. In this memorandum, printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 46, he argued:

"NSSM 63 seems to proceed from certain basic assumptions about the effect of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on US interests. I would argue those assumptions. In my view, the revised paper still: (a) overdraws the benefits of the dispute for the US, (b) omits significant side effects of Sino-Soviet hostility, (c) fails to probe the most likely form of a full-fledged Sino-Soviet war and (d) puts the fundamental policy choice to the President in the wrong terms." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Senior Review Group Meeting, Sino Soviet Differences, 11/20/69)

On November 20, the National Security Council's Review Group also discussed the study. Minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 47. The summary of decisions as reflected in the minutes read:

“1. The problem should be considered by the NSC even though there was no immediate operational decision to be made;

“2. For purposes of the NSC discussion, we would distinguish between neutrality on the Sino-Soviet dispute and neutrality in our relations with China and the USSR;

“3. The basic paper would be carefully reviewed by the NSC Staff and any proposed restatements would be discussed with the State representatives;

“4. Following this review, suggestions for handling the paper in the NSC would be discussed with the R[evue] G[rup] members early next week;

“5. If desired, the oral presentation for the NSC will be discussed with the State representatives;

“6. The considerations in the Defense Department supplementary paper will be brought before the NSC in some form or other.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes Originals 1969)

102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, November 20, 1969, 0016Z.

195006. USNATO deliver Engleberger 0830 Thursday, November 20 FYI and NoFORN (except as noted in para 4 below).

Subj: Soviet Approach on European Security Conference.

Memorandum below is unclassified and subject to revision upon review.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Buchanan and approved by Dubs, McGuire, Okun, Levitsky, and Springsteen. Repeated to Moscow, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. On November 21, the Department of State included in its submission to the President's Daily Brief the statement: "Ambassador Dobrynin has presented an informal aide-mémoire to Secretary Rogers on the question of a European Security Conference." (Ibid.) This telegram was attached to a memorandum describing the Soviet démarche from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger on December 23.

1. Ambassador Dobrynin asked for an appointment with Secretary on November 18. They met at 9 a.m. on November 19. Dobrynin then proceeded to summarize lengthy “informal oral statement,” text of which he later handed to secretary. Full text of statement follows:

“(1) Soviet Government proceeds from assumption that possibilities for holding all-European conference are now increasing. During time that passed since Bucharest Declaration by socialist countries, and especially since Budapest appeal,² the intentions of countries which sponsored proposals for all-European conference have become more clearly understood by other European countries. A number of wrong interpretations have been dropped which did not correspond to real position of socialist countries. Discussion of proposal for an all-European conference has become businesslike and is being focused on its agenda, possible results and body of participants. The well known initiative of Finland played positive role in this respect. Thus the question of preparation and convocation of all-European conference will now arise on a more practical plane.

“Socialist countries which proposed all-European conference have carefully analyzed existing points of view, considered the opinions expressed in course of bilateral contacts and have taken into account positions of interested states. In particular, they paid due attention to opinions regarding the necessity of thorough preparation for all-European conference, its possible participants and desirability to select for the discussion at the all-European conference such questions which would allow for a broad consensus in the present conditions in Europe, and regarding which all possible participants in the all-European conference would have sufficient degree of confidence as to their productive consideration at the conference itself.

“Having taken into account all above mentioned points, countries-signatories to Budapest appeal found it useful and timely to come out with new initiative to detail further steps for convening all-European conference and to provide answers to questions, which arose in the course of discussion with various countries of the proposal to convene the conference.

“(2) The Soviet Government is convinced that convening of all-European conference in near future would serve interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe as well as interests of all European and not only European states. It stands to reason that preparatory work

² Warsaw Pact nations issued the Budapest Appeal on March 17, 1969, calling for cooperation among all European countries and a conference on European security. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 106–108)

must be aimed at practical fulfillment of proposal for convening conference instead of being used as pretext for its delay or for raising various preliminary conditions. In opinion of countries-participants in Prague meeting, the all-European conference could take place in first half of 1970.

“As for place of conference, the states-signatories of the Prague statement hold the opinion that it could take place in Helsinki in view of the role played by Government of Finland in this matter.

“(3) Soviet Government fully shares view of states which believe that all-European conference must end in success—all the more so that it would be the first meeting of all European countries in the post-war years.

“In our opinion, two items suggested by Prague statement³ for inclusion in agenda of an all-European conference ‘on the assurance of European security and on the renunciation of use of force or threat of its use in mutual relations among states in Europe’ and ‘on expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties on equal terms aimed at developing political cooperation among European states’—can become subjects on which broad agreement can be reached, given sufficient good will of the parties. (*Comment*: Dobrynin handed the Secretary the text of these draft documents.)

“Discussion of first question mentioned above could, it is believed, result in signing of final document that would proclaim principle of renunciation of use of force or threat of its use in mutual relations among states in Europe. Adoption of such document would acutally mean proclamation of principle of renunciation of war in Europe which is of special significance in view of fact that it is on the European continent that the two most powerful military-political groupings confront each other with their military forces concentrated there in immediate proximity of each other. Establishment on regional basis of principle to renounce use of force or threat of its use is in keeping with provisions of UN Charter and serves their further development. Besides it should be borne in mind that not all of states concerned—future participants in the all-European conference—are members of the UN. It goes without saying that adoption of document on non-use of force by all-European conference would by no means affect commitments assumed by states-participants in all-European conference through existing multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements.

“Discussion of second question on agenda, which could also result in adoption of appropriate document, would allow movement

³ On October 30–31, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries met in Prague and adopted a declaration for an All-European Conference to be held in Helsinki in the first half of 1970.

forward toward normalization of relations among European states, prepare ground for consideration of concrete questions of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation among all European states and for removal of obstacles in the mentioned fields.

“An accord achieved on both mentioned questions would contribute to improvement of general political atmosphere in Europe and to growth of trust, would secure principles of peaceful coexistence and would pave way for future consideration of other problems of interest to European states, the solution of which would contribute to strengthening of European security and development of broad cooperation among all European states.

“We would like to make clear, that at all-European conference, as we see it, every state-participant will be given an opportunity to set forth its viewpoint on questions regarding the situation in Europe and means of strengthening peace and security on the European continent, as well as to give suggestions and considerations for development of peaceful cooperation among European countries. In other words, we have in mind that there will take place a free discussion at the conference, and that decisions will be taken on the two proposed concrete questions at the conclusion of the conference. We would like to emphasize the idea that working out agreed drafts of the possible final documents in consultations even before convocation of an all-European conference would guarantee the success of conference to a considerable extent.

“(4) As it follows from Prague statement, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries are prepared to consider any other proposals aimed at practical preparation for and ensuring the success of all-European conference.

“Sometimes an opinion is voiced to effect that questions advanced by socialist countries are allegedly not of major scale and that cardinal problems such as German problem should be introduced at all-European conference. We do not agree with such statements at all. Suggestions to effect that German problem or other problems be included in the agenda—and such problems are understood by the West in a specific way which is clearly unacceptable to the socialist countries—would only serve to complicate if not downright torpedo convocation or, at any rate, fruitful work of the conference. One cannot but take into consideration also that as far as German problem goes there is special responsibility of victorious powers in World War II who signed the Potsdam Agreement.⁴

⁴ Sonnenfeldt wrote “n.b., France did not sign” after this sentence.

“Nor do we agree with attempts to raise the question of West Berlin since this is a special question and it does not belong to the all-European conference.

“(5) Referring to questions which have been raised with me by U.S. officials as to attitude of Soviet Union toward U.S. participation in an all-European conference, we would like to make the following clarification.

“All-European conference is of a regional nature, open for participation by all interested European states, including, of course, the GDR on an equal footing with the FRG and on equal terms with other participants.⁵ With this qualification as to the body of participants the Soviet Government believes that the United States, if there is a wish on her part, can also take part in all-European conference, since it bears definite responsibility ensuing from Potsdam and other allied agreements in force for peaceful settlement in Europe. In setting forth our position as to agenda for the conference we took into account previous contacts with U.S. representatives and, in particular, the view expressed here to the effect that acute questions, especially those within the responsibility of the participants in the Potsdam Conference, be considered outside of the framework of the all-European conference. The items we propose to include in the agenda also correspond to suggestions by the American side that such questions be taken up at the conference which could productively be discussed and acted upon. We expect that further contacts will enable us together and for the benefit of the cause (sic) to discuss problems related to preparation and holding of an all-European conference.

“(6) We would like to express hope that U.S. Government will give its due attention to proposals advanced by states which signed Prague statement, and to considerations of USSR Government on this score, and on its part will make efforts toward preparation of convening and successful holding of all-European conference. Soviet Government would appreciate considerations and suggestions which U.S. Government may think useful to express in this connection.”⁶

⁵ Sonnenfeldt wrote “quid pro quo” in the margin.

⁶ Sonnenfeldt wrote “requests reply” after this sentence. In a December 23 memorandum to Kissinger about the Soviet *démarche*, Sonnenfeldt wrote, “In a sense, we gave our reply via the NATO Ministerial Communiqué and Declaration but, formally speaking, no reply has been made.” Sonnenfeldt provided the following suggestion: “On the substance of the matter, I think we should take the line that, as the Soviets themselves recognize, the real European issues are not amenable to solution by conference diplomacy and in any case involve only a specific number of states, not all of them. If the Europeans want a conference on the type of agenda the Soviets propose, let them have one, but without us.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI)

2. After Dobrynin finished his summary of oral statement, the Secretary asked how long the Soviet Government would envisage duration of proposed ESC. Ambassador replied conference need not be long at all if agreement can be reached on draft documents beforehand through bilateral discussions. Obviously if conference were to discuss substance of controversial issues it could last very long time. It would be Soviet hope, however, that agreement could be reached on draft documents prepared at Prague conference before ESC convenes. The USSR assumed, Dobrynin said, that NATO countries might have two or three other issues which they would like to raise at ESC; these could also be discussed through diplomatic channels ahead of time.

3. Draft documents handed Secretary noted in para (3) above are identical with texts transmitted in London's 9176. (Text being repeated to addressees who did not received London Embtel.)

4. For USNATO—at November 20 Polads discussion of Eastern European follow-up to Prague declaration, you may inform Allies of Dobrynin call on Secretary. You may also make oral summary of principal points which Dobrynin made.

Rogers

103. Memorandum for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, December 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret; Eyes Only.

1. Summary

In accordance with NSC 5502/1,² as revalidated on 10 November 1960, CIA sponsors a covert action program which supports media³ and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union.

[4 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

This paper recommends that the 303 Committee approve the continuation of the covert action program directed primarily at the Soviet intelligentsia and reaffirm the approval it has given in the past to the program generally and the individual projects specifically.

The total cost of this program is \$766,000. The program as a whole was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs on 21 October and 6 November 1969. The individual projects had been approved by the 303 Committee in 1967 and 1968.

2. Proposal

While these projects differ in their approach to the Soviet target, they share common objectives which provide the justification for continued support of their activities. The primary objective is to stimulate and sustain pressures for liberalization and change from within the Soviet Union. The neuralgic points of this disaffection—desire for personal and intellectual freedom, desire for improvement in the quality of life, and the persistence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and among the nationality groups in the Soviet Union—are the main issues exploited by these projects. A secondary objective is to enlighten important third-country elites, especially political leaders and the public-opinion shaping professions, about the repressive nature of the Soviet system and its imperialistic and self-aggrandizing foreign policy.

² Extracts from NSC 5502/1, "Statement on U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities," January 31, 1955, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Document 3.

³ The activities directed at the Soviet Union by Radio Liberty Committee and Free Europe, Inc., were approved by higher authority on 22 February 1969 and are, therefore, not treated in this paper. The Radio Liberty Committee, successor organization to the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, is composed of three major divisions: Radio Liberty which broadcasts via short wave to the Soviet Union 24 hours a day in 18 languages; a book publication and distribution program designed to provide Soviet citizens with books not normally accessible to the Soviet public; and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which produces research papers and publications targeted at the developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] [Footnote in the source text.]

Anticipating the persistence of these trends in the intellectual climate of the Soviet Union in the 1970's, there is long-range merit in continuing to encourage and support the publication and distribution of dissident literature and socio-political commentary on the broad current issues and the conditions of life in the Soviet Union, even though the regime will continue to repress dissidence. Operations aimed at influencing third-country elites are based on the assumption that U.S.-Soviet competition for prestige and influence in strategic areas will continue for an indefinite period of time. It would, therefore, seem prudent to maintain a capability of influencing third-country intellectuals and elite groups through the words and voices of distinguished Soviet nationals who are disaffected.

The intellectual dissidence movement has demonstrated a vitality of its own. It is reasonable to assume that these dissidents will continue to seek outlets for literature and socio-political commentary that has thus far been suppressed. Each time the regime has silenced a group of dissidents a new group has emerged to produce a new generation of protest literature.

An American professor [2 lines of source text not declassified] reported that the dissidence is widespread among the Soviet intelligentsia and they "yearn for exposure to Western literature and cultural influence." Graphic evidence of the existence of this dissidence was provided in October 1969 by Dr. Pyotr L. Kapitsa, the "dean" of Soviet physicists, when he publicly endorsed in Washington the thesis of Dr. Andre D. Sakharov, a distinguished Soviet physicist credited with a major role in the development of the hydrogen bomb, that the United States and the Soviet Union can avoid a clash only through the convergence of their systems of government. The Sakharov thesis is set forth in a lengthy essay which has been circulating underground in the Soviet Union and which has been a staple of the CIA distribution program. Recent press dispatches from Moscow [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicate that the convergence ideas expounded by Dr. Sakharov are being widely circulated among the intelligentsia, including military personnel, in the form of underground mimeograph publications.

3. Effectiveness

[4 paragraphs (65 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Alternatives

A. The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from

the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination. On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which the program is trying to promote.

B. It could also be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities. In this event the efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American “subversion” would lose some of their credibility. This argument, however, is negated by the fact that suspicions of U.S. intentions are so deeply ingrained that any change in U.S. policy toward the emigration would have minimal impact on the conservatives. Moreover, a source of support for those in the Soviet Union who are sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration would be removed and the Soviet authorities would be able more easily to foist their own version of events on the people and be under less pressure to make reforms.

5. Risks and Contingency Planning

All of the above projects have been subjected, at one time or another, to attacks by Soviet regime media, including allegations of CIA sponsorship. Each project has weathered the attacks without any apparent loss of effectiveness. It would be prudent to anticipate that the attacks will continue sporadically but without any effect on the operations.

6. Coordination

A. CIA’s covert action program set forth herein was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Emory C. Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Adolph Dubs on 21 October and 6 November, 1969. The individual projects⁴ had been coordinated previously within the U.S. Government as follows:

[5 paragraphs (32 lines of source text) not declassified]

⁴ Additional documentation on these projects is in the National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files.

7. *Costs*

The allocations for the covert action program are as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]

Total \$766,000

These funds for the program are available in the FY 1970 CIA budget.

8. *Recommendation*

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the continuation of CIA's covert action program directed against the Soviet Union and reaffirm the approval it has given in the past to the individual projects, as described herein. The 303 Committee is also requested to approve the funding level for these projects as set forth in paragraph 7 above.

104. Editorial Note

On December 9, 1969, in a public address before the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education in Washington, D.C., Secretary of State William Rogers outlined a proposal for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The position set forth in the Secretary's speech, which became known as the Rogers Plan, incorporated most of the language contained in the United States proposal handed to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco on October 28, 1969 (see Document 98). Rogers enunciated the main elements of his plan as follows:

"Peace between the Parties

"—The Resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years. We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Straits of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

"But peace, of course, involves much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and intentions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.

“Security

“—A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the Security Council resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring’s help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security arrangements. It is, after all, their interests which are at stake and their territory which is involved. They must live with the results.

“Withdrawal and Territory

“—The Security Council Resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the Resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

“The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 Armistice Agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the Armistice Agreement.

“The Security Council Resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

“We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the Resolution provides. We support Israel’s security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.”

Rogers explained that “in our recent meetings with the Soviets, we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions.” He outlined the three principal elements as follows:

“*First*, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

“*Second*, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, un-

der Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the Armistice Agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the Four Power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

"So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm al-Shaykh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution, and final arrangements in the Gaza Strip.

"*Third*, in the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

"Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the UAR. It would require the UAR to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, pages 7–11)

On December 10, 1969, Israel rejected Rogers' proposals. At 10 a.m., the National Security Council met to discuss the situation in the Middle East. When discussion turned to the best forum to continue negotiations, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger made the following comments about bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States:

"US-USSR talks have been confined to the UAR because the issues seemed more tractable, because a UAR settlement would facilitate a Jordan settlement and because we thought the USSR might press the UAR. Those who argued for entering those talks did so on three grounds. First, for global reasons, the US had an interest in seeing whether it could negotiate seriously on a range of important issues. Second, the USSR's persistent requests since September 1968 to talk about a Mid-East settlement suggested that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the Mid-East and might participate seriously in trying to work out a reasonable arrangement. While we maintained a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far enough to see what was possible. Third, the USSR should pay at least as much of the price for a settlement as the U.S. in expanding its influence with its clients. Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the USSR did not want a real peace; it simply wanted to persuade us to press Israel to give back

the territory of Moscow's clients. Since the USSR was not likely to act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the USSR's role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the peace table."

President Richard Nixon then commented:

"It has been one of our assumptions in the U.S.-Soviet talks that we could get the Soviet Union to help bring the UAR around. Mr. [John] McCloy yesterday hit hard on the following point: Nasser tells him and other American businessmen that the Egyptians don't want to be exclusively in Soviet clutches. They would like the opportunity for direct communication with the U.S. The oil people all seem to feel that we are making a mistake not to have a direct channel of communications with the Egyptians."

Rogers remarked as follows:

"We do have direct channels of communication with the Egyptians. It is interesting to note that when I sent my letter [outlining the Rogers plan] to [UAR] Foreign Minister [Mahmoud] Riad, [Soviet] Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin came in and told me that [Soviet] Foreign Minister [Andrei] Gromyko had been embarrassed by what I had said in my letter. Riad had turned over a copy of my letter to Gromyko. Here was an opportunity given to the Egyptians to communicate with the U.S. and not to involve the Russians, and the first thing they did was to turn over the communication to the Russians."

After further discussion about Middle East issues not directly related to the Soviet Union, Nixon remarked:

"On the Middle East, however, it is fair to say that Soviet interests can only be served by tension. I know it is sometimes said that the Soviets are uncomfortable in the present situation. But I sometimes have trouble understanding why."

The following exchanges then took place:

"Mr. Helms: I think they want the situation to stay the way it is.

"Secretary Rogers: I am not so sure of that. I believe they are quite concerned about the consequences of the kind of explosion Israel could provoke.

"Dr. Kissinger: The longer Israel holds its conquered Arab territory, the longer the Soviets cannot deliver what the Arabs want. As that time drags on, the Arabs must begin to conclude that friendship with the Soviet Union is not very helpful—that it led to two defeats, one of which the U.S. rescued the Arabs from, and to continued impotence in regaining what they have lost.

"Secretary Rogers: The Soviets have some of the same problems with the UAR that we have with Israel. They cannot just walk in to Nasser's office and gain his acceptance of any proposition they may put to him. They must consider the fact that the more radical Arab

elements like the fedayeen are going to blame the Soviets for not producing what the Arabs want.

“President: Then it is possible to argue, is it not, that if we want the Soviets to help, Israel is producing that result by scaring them. Why should it not be our policy to let Israel scare them a little bit more?”

“Secretary Rogers: I think our position is pretty well spelled out now as a result of my speech last night. The position I elaborated on there is thoroughly consistent with the UN Security Council resolution.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969 [5 of 5]) The minutes of this meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.