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March 1, 1969

STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSM 13

At the present time 87 countries have signed the NPT and nine have deposited their instruments of ratification. Ratification by the United States, especially if followed soon thereafter by Soviet ratification, could lead within a relatively short time to several key signatures. In particular, positive decisions on NPT signature by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan would be facilitated by our ratification. The signatures or ratifications of several additional influential countries will in turn become more likely after Germany and Japan have signed; this is especially true of such countries as Switzerland and Sweden in Europe and Australia and Indonesia in Asia. In any case our ratification will help to impart a momentum to the treaty which itself will have a beneficial influence on the deliberations of other countries.

There are three general courses of action at our disposal as we attempt to maximize the impact of our ratification. Each country's particular attitude toward the NPT, together with the status of its consideration of adherence to the treaty, will dictate the most useful course to be adopted toward that country.

The first course of action is essentially passive, and would apply to some countries in either of two categories: (1) those for whom U.S. ratification itself will probably be sufficient to bring about a positive decision, at least in conjunction with Soviet ratification. We believe this is probably the case with a number of smaller countries, such as Austria, Jamaica and Malta who are most likely simply waiting for a resumption of the treaty's momentum; and (2) those whose early signature and ratification are so unlikely that there would be no practical point to any special US efforts.

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals. Not
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This group would include such countries as Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia, Communist China and Albania.

The second course of action available to us is that of low-key diplomatic approaches. We would request our embassies in countries where such a course seems desirable to convey to the local government our hope that the treaty will come into force soon and thus begin to achieve its purposes. Our Embassies could review the world-wide security and economic considerations in favor of the treaty, drawing as appropriate upon the UN Secretary General's Report on non-proliferation. Each set of instructions would, of course, be written so as to take into consideration our knowledge of the particular country's attitude toward the treaty and, where applicable and potentially productive, would ask the Embassy to focus its remarks on that country's specific concerns by reiterating previous statements we have made either privately or in public testimony. Each of our Ambassadors would retain discretion regarding the utilization of particular arguments to ensure that no argument was used which was likely to back-fire in discussions with individual officials. The level within the host government at which this approach is made would also be left in most cases to the discretion of the Embassy. This type of low-key representation will be applicable to almost all countries which are in general favorably disposed toward the treaty and which would not resent some further prodding.

The third alternative course of action is that of uniquely tailored approaches for particular countries which we believe require and warrant more intensive treatment. These approaches could include any of the following elements: (1) letters from high-level U.S. officials, in cases such as Japan, where the suggestion has been made by the Japanese themselves, and Israel, where there is a precedent for such action; (2) coordination of our approach with other interested and influential governments, and (3) even the possibility of exercising leverage. In looking at the possibility of exercising leverage, we have of course borne in mind paragraph two of NSDM 6. Accordingly, such a course of action is seriously considered only in those cases where (1) the country has an existing nuclear program; (2) the country cannot be

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persuaded to adhere to the treaty through routine diplomatic persuasion alone; and (3) the country's failure to sign could have a crucial effect on the considerations of other countries.

Since the degree and type of influence which the U.S. can bring to bear varies so greatly from case to case, there is attached a series of individual country studies. Each study is in three parts: (1) a brief description of the status of the country's consideration of the NPT and any specific problems it has with the treaty; (2) a description of the specific areas of special and applicable influence available for use with the country, especially by the U.S.; and (3) a recommendation in light of these factors as to which alternative course of action should be pursued regarding that country.

It should be noted that in addition to the more immediate actions recommended for each country, the U.S. can also take steps over the longer term to demonstrate that non-nuclear parties to the NPT have ready access to the benefits of Articles IV (peaceful uses generally) and V (benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions). For example, the U.S. can make a point of responding with speed to any request for assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy from parties to the treaty. We should on the other hand be cautious in stimulating requests from countries which are clearly recalcitrant. We can also attempt to enhance the status of parties by supporting, where it seems appropriate and practicable, their representation in international bodies and their qualified candidates for positions of leadership in these bodies. In general, we should be careful to respond to specific requests for assistance having in mind the possible effects on the attitudes of countries considering either signature or ratification. Such visible demonstrations of the positive benefits of the treaty for its parties would play a significant role in inducing persistent hold-outs eventually to adhere. Another general factor likely to affect the prospects for wide adherence to the treaty is the extent to which significant nuclear arms control negotiations are taking place.

One of our tactical objectives throughout will be to separate countries that have associated themselves in groups

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in connection with NPT signing. An example is the situation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, none of which has signed. As long as Argentina and Chile do not sign, it is easier for Brazil to be a hold-out. We may thus be able to get at the Brazilian problem in the long-term by influencing Argentina and Chile. Argentina, for example, should be interested in the fact that nuclear-advanced countries of Europe have signed the treaty, including particularly Italy.

In addition to consultations with our allies, particularly those who are members of Euratom, before the US deposits its instrument of ratification, we believe that we should also ascertain Soviet intentions regarding the timing of their ratification.

Soviet spokesmen have in the past suggested that the Soviets would delay ratification until after FRG signature, if not ratification. It is possible the Soviets will defer ratification until the FRG signs. However, if it appears that FRG signature may be delayed until after the Bundestag elections in October 1969, it is also possible that the Soviets will ratify beforehand in order to exert additional pressure on the FRG and others to sign.

Recently there have been some hints that the Soviets would act promptly after the US does. A possibly significant indication is the Czech decision to ratify in the next few weeks.

It would not be prudent to leave this question up in the air. As the Italians have pointed out to us, with the UK having already completed ratification, if the US deposited its ratification and assuming the quota of the 40 additional ratifications, it would be left up to the decision of the USSR whether or not the NPT comes into force. It seems doubtful that the Soviets would consider their best interest served by holding up ratification and preventing the NPT from entering into force. Nevertheless, it would seem advisable for the US to raise the question officially with the Soviets before the US completed ratification.

[Omitted here are country-by-country recommendations of courses of action.]