

Wednesday, March 18, 1970 - D.C.

[Omitted here is material on other issues.]

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At 3:30 p.m. I met with Ambassador Dobrynin in the presence of Dr. Harry Smyth, Ward P. Allen (Department of State), Myron Kratzer and Julie Rubin. I told him that the reason for the meeting was to discuss the NPT and means of insuring its success. Attached is a talking paper covering the points I discussed with him. I also gave him a copy of the paper which covered the main points of the discussion. Smyth, Allen, Kratzer and I all emphasized the importance of coming to an agreement on this matter with the Soviet Union before April 1, because if we do not work together we will not be successful in our common objective.

[Omitted here is material on other issues.]

PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR DISCUSSIONS

WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

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1. The US has valued the close cooperation with the USSR that brought the NPT into effect. We sincerely hope this collaboration will continue so as to assure the effective implementation of the Treaty.

2. The question of how the IAEA should organize itself to discharge its safeguard responsibilities as called for by Article III of the NPT recently was the subject of discussion by the IAEA's Board of Governors in February. Specifically, the Board considered a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to consider the form and content of the necessary safeguard agreements. The US decided to co-sponsor this resolution after extensive negotiations with the UK, during which we succeeded in obtaining UK agreement to a number of improvements on the very points of concern to the Soviet Union. We were convinced that further changes would be unacceptable to a number of Board members, and that a majority of Board members favored its adoption.

3. In deference to a request of the Soviet Governor, the Board agreed to defer the question of establishing a committee until a special IAEA meeting on April 1. The USSR requested additional time to formulate its views on the proposal. Accordingly, we wish to use

the time between now and the April 1 meeting to allay Soviet concerns on the resolution, since further delay or disagreement could seriously set back the steps necessary for widespread adherence to and effective implementation of the NPT.

4. We would hope to demonstrate to the USSR in these consultations that there is a close identity of objectives between the USSR and the US on how the IAEA should discharge its NPT responsibilities. If we have had any differences with the USSR, they have been primarily tactical in nature.

5. First, like the USSR, we wish to see the IAEA placed in a position to begin its safeguard negotiations with NPT adherents as soon as possible bearing in mind the time scale for negotiations specified in the Treaty itself.

6. Second, like the USSR, we have a strong interest in seeing the IAEA maintain a fully effective and credible safeguards system. Therefore, we would be strongly opposed to any efforts to curtail on the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system or subject that system to protracted review and revision prior to the initiation of the negotiations called for by the Treaty. It is our basic position that the IAEA safeguards document INFCIRC/66 is sufficiently flexible to permit the negotiation of the safeguard-agreements called for by the NPT and we shall be prepared to defend this position in Vienna.

While some efforts towards revising the system undoubtedly will be made in Vienna, we believe we can resist them if we have the support of the USSR and other countries

7. Third, and most importantly, we believe that the US and the USSR both wish to encourage acceptance of the NPT by a number of key industrialized countries, including Japan, the FRG, Australia, Italy, etc.

8. Events over the past year and at the February Board meeting have indicated that several key non-nuclear weapon states wish to have the opportunity to discuss, in some forum, the types of IAEA safeguard provisions that may apply to them. Certain key non-nuclear weapon states are specifically withholding their ratification of the NPT until the terms of the IAEA safeguard agreements are clarified under conditions that permit them to express their views on the subject.

9. It also seems clear that the IAEA Director General requires guidance from the Board on the character of the agreements to be negotiated in connection with the NPT. Establishment of a safeguards committee as proposed by the UK is thus essential to enable the IAEA to promptly get on with the task of implementing the Treaty. It is essential in our view that the April 1 meeting of the Board accept the UK/US resolution in substantially its current form and we would hope this step could be taken with USSR support

(or. at least, without their objection.)

10. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that we agree with the USSR that the proposed committee's deliberations should be well focused, should be handled as a matter of urgency, and should evolve in a fashion that will not lead to any erosion of the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system.

11. We believe the UK/US draft resolution provides a desirable focus since it emphasizes that the principal matter to be discussed will be the provisions to be included in the various agreements to be negotiated in connection with the Treaty. We are convinced that efforts to establish terms of reference any more restrictive than those now proposed in the UK resolution would not be negotiable with others, would be interpreted as an effort on our part to muzzle the debate and would be unrealistic since those who wish to discuss various aspects of safeguards will find a way to do so in any event. We plan as noted to stand firm in opposition to any time-consuming review and revision of the Agency safeguards document as a pre-condition to negotiating the necessary agreements since we believe this is neither necessary nor desirable.

12. However, we agree with the comments made by the Soviet delegation in Vienna that the committee should complete its deliberations as soon as possible and hence we favor the inclusion within the UK/US resolution of a target date for the completion of the committee's first report. We believe this first report should be

submitted to the Board within the 180 day period for the initiation of negotiations specified in Article III of the NPT. We also would look with favor, on what we understand to be Soviet idea, that one or more special Board meetings should be convened starting in the late summer or fall of 1970 if this serves to help expedite matters.

13. We also understand that one of the Soviet concerns is that the UK resolution might delay the ability of a state, party to the NPT, to promptly negotiate with the IAEA even though that state is ready and willing to do so. Finland is one such example. We wish to emphasize that we do not regard the UK/US resolution in any way precluding the IAEA from negotiating, on an ad hoc basis, a safeguards agreement with Finland or any other country that is now prepared to proceed.

14. The UK resolution would have the proposed committee consider agreements to be negotiated with individual states, the agreements to be negotiated with regional grouping such as Euratom, and the agreements that would be designed to implement the UK/US voluntary safeguard offers. We have been informed that the USSR is opposed to including the US and UK offers within the committee's terms of reference. We strongly believe that it would be contrary to our mutual interests in having a strong NPT to do anything which creates doubt that the US offer will be effectively implemented. Application of IAEA safeguards in the US will result in substantial inconvenience to us, and is not a decision which we took lightly. Moreover,

while we would of course welcome parallel Soviet action in any degree, the US offer was never intended to place the Soviet Union under any pressure to put its own peaceful facilities under safeguards, and no suggestion to this effect was made at the time of US offer. The US offer was based on conclusion that industrial nations especially West Germany would not accept safeguards unless their competitors especially the US and the UK did so. Thus, US offer was in interest of and essential to NPT.

15. The US also believes its offer will be a key factor in maintaining the effectiveness of the IAEA system. This is so since we intend to stress the point that we are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards system as set forth in document INFCIRC/66.

16. In conclusion, we are ready to join with the Soviets to take the necessary steps to assure that the committee conduct its deliberations on a prompt and well-focused basis concentrating on the illustrative provisions that might be included in the various agreements. We believe that our common objectives will be seriously impaired if the USSR opposes the UK/US resolution or refrains from participating constructively in the committee's deliberations.

H. D. B.  
March 16, 1970