



Department of State

Ad Book
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 285

PAGE 01 USUN N 00122 272313Z

91-80
ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 PM-03 IO-04 INR-06 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

ACDA-10 RSR-01 RSC-01 /056 W

005204

R 272227Z JAN 70
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 578
INFO WHITE HOUSE 121

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 122

LIMDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

ACDA FOR SMITH

WHITE HOUSE FOR KISSINGER

RE: CBW

A US DECISION NOT RPT NOT TO BAN USE OF TOXINS OR TO CONTINUE THEIR MANUFACTURE WOULD IN MY VIEW BE WIDELY INTERPRETED BY UN MEMBERS AS RETREAT FROM PRES' POSITION ANNOUNCED TO GA NOV 25. PRES'S SIGNIFICANT POLICY DECISION WAS WARMLY WELCOMED BY ASSEMBLY THEN CONSIDERING CBW NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF HIS ACTION ON GENEVA PROTOCOL BUT EVEN MORE BECAUSE OF HIS INITIATIVE IN RENOUNCING RETALIATORY AS WELL AS FIRST-USE OF ALL METHODS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISPOSING OF EXISTING STOCKS OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT TOXINS ARE CHEMICAL RATHER THAN BACTERIOLOGICAL AGENTS, I FEAR THAT, IN VIEW OF THEIR ORIGIN, OUR CONTINUED USE OR MANUFACTURE OF THEM WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT IMPACT OF PRES' DECISION.

ADDITIONALLY, IF US WERE TO RETAIN BACTERIOLOGICAL FACILITIES FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF TOXINS, WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN OVERCOMING SUSPICION THAT WE WERE IN FACT MAINTAINING BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. GP-4.

YOST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
47