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and independence countries whose policies generally oriented  
in our direction. In certain countries, further, US has  
had installations of importance to it whose presence has  
implied a US interest.

3. States can to certain extent share responsibility in  
matters of external threat to one of them, but internal  
security depends in last analysis on government in power.  
In some cases US has made specific commitment to consult in  
event of external aggression but nowhere in Arab world have  
we made specific commitment to commit forces, to support  
specific regimes or to intervene in internal disorders. Making  
of such commitments by the US raises Constitutional questions,  
number of which are currently under study by Congress.

4. We are concerned, naturally, for survival of friendly  
regimes and would have an interest therefore in how they  
deal with internal problems which may threaten their stability  
and progress. To some extent we can be of help to government  
that is helping itself to ward off such threats in timely

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and constructive fashion, but in last analysis stability and  
security of regime depends overwhelmingly on its own actions.  
US strongly believes viability greatest where regimes main-  
tain enlightened, vigilant attention to basic national  
social and economic needs. US has endeavored, while not  
ignoring direct security requirements, to emphasize these  
other needs in relations with its friends. Where regimes,  
either through growing distance from people, inattention,  
or toleration of corruption, make themselves vulnerable to  
sudden change, there is little US can do to save them from  
their own weakness.

5. In specific case of Libya, Deptel 149764 (being repeated to  
addressee posts) outlines limitations of US commitments.  
Conversations with key Libyan figures including King and  
Crown Prince over last few years have emphasized both that  
US most unlikely to intervene in internal disorders and  
that US would have grave doubts regarding viability regime  
imposed or reimposed by outside military intervention. ]

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6. Intervention to support or preserve specific regime unable to help itself is serious and unpopular matter in modern context and may raise international legal questions. Even French, who have specific commitments with regard to certain African states, carry out their responsibilities with greatest discretion. US experience further has suggested that even when foreign government might be sympathetic to intervention, internal political factors within its own borders might seriously limit support it is able to give in this regard.

7. One further factor needs emphasizing. In dynamics of modern politics, slogans and categories can be misleading. Full evaluation of nature each country's problems necessary before reaching conclusions on implications of political change. Too rapid an assumption regarding nature or support of political change can seriously affect ability of interested neighbors (like Tunisia in case of Libya) to influence and determine full results and effects of such change. END

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