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*POL MOR-45*

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**TELEGRAM**

*Rem*



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ACTION AF 18

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107802

R 281626Z MAY 69  
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7280  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMCONSUL CASABLANCA UNN  
AMCONSUL TANGIER UNN

 RABAT 2481

SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH GENERAL MEDBOUH

1. BRIGADIER GENERAL MOHAMED MEDBOUH, DIRECTOR OF ROYAL MILITARY HOUSEHOLD, CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST MAY 27 FOR WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A TOUR D'HORIZON. ALONG WITH GENERAL OUFKIR, MEDBOUH ENJOYS UTTER CONFIDENCE AND CLOSEST ASSOCIATION WITH KING HASSAN. VIEWS OF MEDBOUH THEREFORE LIKELY REFLECT THOSE OF KING WHO MAY INDEED BE PRESUMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIM GUIDANCE FOR HIS DISCUSSION WITH ME ON FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:


A) WHEN I RAISED MATTER OF MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH USSR, MEDBOUH STRESSED THAT APPARENTLY IMPROVED RELATIONS OF MOROCCO WITH SOVIET UNION SHOULD IN NO WAY BE INTERPRETED TO AFFECT WESTERN ORIENTATION OF MOROCCO. I REPLIED THAT WHILE INFORMED US OFFICIALS UNDERSTOOD

THAT MOROCCAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT WAS NOT AT EXPENSE OF INCREASINGLY CLOSE MOROCCAN-US RELATIONS. MANY AMERICANS WERE PERPLEXED AND WONDERED ABOUT ITS ULTIMATE EFFECT ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ESTEEM THAT CHARACTERIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I LISTED IMPRESSIVE SERIES OF ACHIEVEMENTS OF USSR IN ITS DRIVE TO ESTABLISH POSITION OF STRENGTH IN MOROCCO, E.G. 1) OPENING OF CONSULATE GENERAL IN CASABLANCA, 2) ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL CENTER IN RABAT, -3) SOVIET NAVAL VISIT

*Rabat 2481  
5-28-69*

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TO CASABLANCA, 4) PODGORNÝ VISIT TO MOROCCO, 5) INAUGURATION OF RABAT-HAVANA AEROFLOT FLIGHTS, AND LASTLY 6) PROSPECTIVE VISIT OF GENERAL DRISS TO USSR. I NOTED THAT COMING ON HEELS OF PODGORNÝ VISIT TO MOROCCO DESPATCH OF MOROCCAN MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW WOULD CREATE ERRONEOUS, BUT UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION THAT MOROCCO HAD LITTLE REGARD FOR SENSITIVITIES OF US AND AMERICAN PUBLIC.

B) ELABORATING ON AEROFLOT HAVANA FLIGHTS I POINTED OUT THAT MOST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAD CONDEMNED CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND THAT GOM WAS AWARE OF EARLIER CUBAN ATTEMPTS AT SUBVERSION IN MOROCCO AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. I SPECULATED ON HOW MOROCCO WITH ITS DEDICATION TO MODERATION COULD HAVE FALLEN INTO THIS SOVIET TRAP. MEDBOUH FULLY AGREED AND EVEN NOTED EARLIER INSTANCE OF ATTEMPTED CUBAN SUBVERSION AGAINST MOROCCO DURING ALGERIAN CONFLICT.

C) REFERRING TO RECENT SUDANESE COUP I RECALLED THAT EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN SUDAN HAD MADE STARTLING PROGRESS FROM RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT BEGINNINGS. THEIR HIGHLY EFFECTIVE ACTION INSOWING CONFUSION AT TIME OF GENERAL ABOUD'S FALL APPARENTLY STILL PAYING OFF AS COMPOSITION OF NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO INDICATE. I STRESSED IN DETAIL GREAT SOVIET EXPERTISE IN EXPLOITING NUMERICALLY SMALL COMMUNIST BASE.

D) ON US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO, MEDBOUH TOLD ME KING WAS PLEASED WITH AID FOR FY 1969 AND SINCERELY HOPED PROGRAM OF CONTINUING AID COULD BE ENVISAGED. HE STRESSED THAT AIR DEFENSE WAS TOP PRIORITY. I REPLIED US FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD HELPING MOROCCO MILITARILY, AND IMPRESSED WITH GOM ASSIGNMENT OF PRIORITIES, BUT YEARLY PROGRAM WOULD DEPEND UPON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS. MEDBOUH CONTINUED THAT WHILE GOM WAS PURSUING POLICY OF DETENTE WITH ALGERIA, MOROCCO HAD TO LOOK TO FUTURE WHEN AN ALGERIA FULLY ARMED AND TRAINED BY USSR MIGHT CHANGE ITS MIND AND REVERSE ITS FIELD. ACCORDING TO MEDBOUH, PROBLEM OF MEETING MINIMUM MOROCCAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WAS CRITICAL. I SAID I APPRECIATED THIS AND NOTED US VIEWED MOROCCAN EFFORTS TOWARD MAGHREB DETENTE APPROVINGLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DIVERT ALGERIAN ENERGIES FROM SOVIET ASSISTED MILITARY BUILD-UP FAR IN EXCESS OF ITS DEFENSE NEEDS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FURTHER MOROCCAN OR MAGHREB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WOULD ALSO BE ENCOURAGED AS A RESULT.

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I MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION WARM US APPROVAL OF THE KING'S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A MAGHREB ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT.

2. GENERAL MEDBOUH APPEARED CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY MY COMMENTS ON "BALANCING ACT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND US" AND, WITHOUT ANY PROMISES OF SUCCESS, SAID HE WOULD TRY TO HAVE DRISS VISIT TO MOSCOW POSTPONED. HE ALSO EXPRESSED COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH MY POSITION ON AEROFLOT AND SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THIS HAD COME ABOUT (SIC).

GP-3 TASCA