

Cyprus

72. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RNAN-12

Washington, February 21, 1973.

CYPRUS: WILL MAKARIOS' NEW MANDATE SPUR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS?

Archbishop Makarios has been proclaimed President for a third 5-year term. The February 18 election was cancelled in the absence of a candidate in opposition to Makarios.

A rally arranged for February 8 to climax Makarios' campaign and to mark his "reelection" came off without incident. The crowd, however, was somewhat smaller than expected by Makarios supporters, thanks in large measure to the campaign of violence launched last month by the pro-enosis zealot, General Grivas. This campaign, apparently designed to embarrass the Archbishop and intimidate his followers, reached a climax when some 20 police stations were raided the night of February 6-7 and emptied of arms and ammunition.

Heretofore careful to keep his criticism of Grivas within prudent limits, Makarios has met the General's most recent challenge with scathing verbal attacks. Without naming him, he has taunted Grivas, in effect, for being so afraid of defeat that he did not put forth a candidate in opposition to Makarios.

Overtures Toward the Right. Secure in his new mandate, Makarios has recently indicated his intention to start a dialogue with the right. He also plans to call on the two Greek Cypriot center parties to unite. These efforts at fence-mending should serve to enhance Makarios' position as national leader. They also point to the possibility that Makarios is becoming embarrassed by his reliance on a base of support that includes a large leftist contingent. It is doubtful, however, that he would go so far as to risk alienating the left, since the center and right could not be expected to fill the gap created by a defection of the well-organized Communist Party (AKEL) and independent leftists.

Turks on Edge. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriots are concerned that violence within the Greek community may spill over into attacks

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 CYP. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Bernard Rotklein and cleared by George Denney, Jr., and Curtis Jones, Director, INR/Near East and South Asia.

on them. Providing he does not adopt the pro-enosis slogans of the Grivasites, any success Makarios may achieve in unifying the Greek Cypriot community behind him should calm Turkish nerves by reducing violence and improving the atmosphere for the intercommunal talks. On the other hand, accommodation toward Grivas' views would seriously jeopardize the talks.

The Intercommunal Talks. The expanded talks, which began last summer, have been generally marking time in recent months as it became clear that Makarios would call a presidential election. Prior to that time, however, some significant progress had occurred, and it was assumed that reelection would enable Makarios to make the concessions required for success. His investiture speech, scheduled for February 28, may provide a hint of further flexibility in Makarios' position on key issues. His brief references to the talks in his February 8 address, however, were far from conciliatory.

An Old/New Complication. Another issue complicating the intercommunal negotiations reemerged last fall when Makarios, in a press interview, raised the question of "second-stage" talks. Such talks, involving Greece, Turkey, the UK, and Cyprus, would be necessary to revise the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance² that ushered in Cypriot independence. These treaties provided for the stationing of mainland Greek and Turkish troop contingents on Cyprus and the right of intervention by the UK, Greece, and Turkey—either in concert or unilaterally. The two accords are intimately related to the delicate balance between the two communities on Cyprus, and it has long been clear that changes in the Cyprus constitution affecting that balance would require convening the interested powers for a fresh look at the treaties. Nonetheless, Makarios' surfacing of the problem of second-stage talks has caused reverberations of concern in Athens and Ankara. The Turks are particularly jealous of their right of intervention, considering it indispensable to the safety of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Even if the intercommunal talks succeed, the Turks may view any attempt by Makarios to tamper with this right as evidence of bad faith. By raising the issue of second-stage talks, Makarios has reminded all concerned of the long road yet to travel before the Cyprus problem can be solved.

² For documentation on the negotiations leading up to these treaties, see *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, volume X, Part 1 and Part 2. They were known as the London-Zurich Accords or Agreements.

73. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

OCI No. 1456/73

Washington, September 24, 1973.

CYPRUS—AN OLD PROBLEM**Summary**

The conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus has had repercussions far beyond the island. Greece and Turkey have twice threatened war to protect the interests of their communities on the island. The US and UK have been caught up in the island's problems, the Soviets have occasionally tried to take advantage of the situation, and a UN peacekeeping force has been on the island for almost a decade, keeping the lid on deep-seated intercommunal antagonism.

Cypriot intercommunal problems continue to elude a satisfactory solution. Animosity between the two communities is deeply rooted in the island's history, and independence in 1960 did not help. Major hostilities erupted in 1963 and again in 1967, and passions continue to smolder. Though talks between the communities have helped to keep the level of violence down, they have made little progress toward basic solutions—despite the addition of “advisers” from Greece and Turkey, as well as a UN observer. The talks remain deadlocked; the Greek Cypriots will accept nothing less than majority rule, and the Turkish Cypriots demand greater participation in the administration of the island than their 20-percent minority would seem to justify.

Total political supremacy on the island is a basic goal of President Archbishop Makarios. A shrewd political maneuverer, his tactics have at times created misunderstanding and mistrust in both communities. Makarios clings to the conviction that he was hoodwinked into accepting the original terms for independence, which included a protective veto for the Turks; he is dedicated to expanding the already dominant Greek Cypriot position on the island.

Cyprus has been relatively quiet since 1968, but trouble has been brewing since late last year. This time the threat lies within the Greek Cypriot community. George Grivas, a leader of the fight for independence, secretly returned to the island late in August 1971. The aging guerrilla leader has always been a fierce champion of enosis—union of Cyprus with Greece—and he is now a bitter foe of Makarios, who favors enosis in theory but not in practice. Grivas has carried out a

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79-T00861A, Box 22, Folder 14. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

series of terrorist acts against the Makarios government, and there is a danger that violence could eventually spill over into the Turkish Cypriot community.

This working paper defines the major issues, identifies the principal players, and provides some historical background of a complex problem that promises to be with us for a long time.

The Problem

Part of Cyprus' problems grew out of the London–Zurich Agreements, which gave the island its independence from Britain in 1960. The agreements sought to bring about cooperation between the two communities by limiting the power of the Greek majority and providing guarantees for the Turkish minority. The agreements, not surprisingly, failed to overcome the hostility and mistrust. By 1963 the machinery of government had ground to a halt, largely because there was (and is) no sense of Cypriot nationalism among the islanders; cultural and ethnic chauvinism divides Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots, and their separate political administrations prevent the development of any sense of nationhood.

The limited sovereignty granted to Cyprus by the London–Zurich accords also contributed to the intensification of communal disputes. Although the agreement made Cyprus an independent nation, it gave the UK, Greece, and Turkey—the “guarantor” powers—the right to intervene in concert or unilaterally if any one of them believed the status quo on Cyprus were being threatened. This provision virtually ensured outside interference in Cypriot problems. The trouble became international when Greece and Turkey became protective of their island communities, as they did twice in the sixties.

The upheaval in 1967 exemplified how a relatively minor incident in Cyprus can spiral into an international problem. General Grivas, then commander of the Cypriot National Guard, sent armed patrols into two Turkish Cypriot villages from which the guard had withdrawn three months earlier. Makarios probably did not favor this move, and Grivas was motivated in part by a need to do something about his sagging reputation. Fighting continued for several days, and the Turks threatened to invade the island. Only an agreement by Athens, after US mediation, to withdraw Grivas and its illegal troops from the island ended the confrontation. Troops from both Greece and Turkey were introduced into Cyprus prior to the 1967 clash in numbers beyond the terms of the London–Zurich agreements. After the 1967 clash most of these illegal troops were removed. The mainland contingents on Cyprus are generally now kept within the treaty limits: 950 for Greece and 650 for Turkey. Greece and Turkey seem more reluctant to intervene militarily today because of the international disapprobation provoked by the 1967 episode. Both communities are still armed camps, however, and

weapons are easily smuggled onto the island. A single spark, perhaps struck by the enosists, could lead at any time to renewed violence, which would again tempt mainland guarantors to intervene.

The main division on the island is between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but there are also serious divisions within the two communities themselves. The continued jockeying of these forces creates instability within each community and minimizes the possibilities for compromise.

The Divided Majority

Archbishop Makarios would reject any arrangement that detracted from the concept of a unitary state run by the Greek Cypriots. He regrets signing the London–Zurich Agreements because they granted a separate status to the Turkish Cypriots. His desire to achieve a unitary state in Cyprus is evident in the intercommunal talks, where he has been willing to cooperate on minor issues, but not on the concept of majority rule. The Archbishop also wants Cyprus to be a totally independent state, free from outside interference. Although he is a devoted believer in Hellenism—the cultural identity of Greeks—he opposes enosis in the belief that political union between Cyprus and Greece would greatly diminish his power. His public position is, “enosis is fine, but not now.”

Other Greek Cypriots do not share Makarios’ view on enosis. Some want it now; others would accept temporary independence with union to come later. Makarios plays these factions against each other with notable success, but occasionally radical elements within the Greek Cypriot community push the enosis issue.

The most persistent of these is George Grivas, whose terrorist campaign against the British was a significant factor in London’s decision to give up its former colony. Grivas believes Makarios sold out the island’s interests by signing the London–Zurich Agreement, and he has never given up his self-appointed mission to make Cyprus a province of Greece. In his latest effort, Grivas pulled together about 500 men who were willing to fight openly for enosis. Grivas and the Archbishop have been waging an increasingly hazardous battle for the support of the community since 1972, when Grivas turned his guerrillas loose in a terrorist campaign to discredit Makarios. The increase in violence in their dispute is a reminder that civil war could again visit the island.

As the months of 1973 wore on Grivas’ forces were demoralizing the police and embarrassing the government with well-coordinated raids and bombings of police stations and other public buildings. Makarios countered by purging the police of many Grivas adherents and by creating a tactical reserve unit. This police unit, composed of 500 trusted officers and men, arrested many of Grivas’ supporters and confiscated large amounts of arms. Grivas struck back by kidnapping Makarios’ minister of justice and continuing the bombings.

Makarios would like to be rid of the General, but is constrained by certain factors. Grivas is a hero of the struggle for independence, and to arrest him would risk alienating the enosisists among the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, Makarios must be concerned over Athens' reaction. As a result, the Archbishop has been limiting his actions to rounding up Grivasites and to denigrating his group as "bandits."

Grivas is an avid anti-Communist and has vowed to destroy the party on Cyprus. The Communist Party supports Makarios and his drive for an independent Cyprus. Another leftist faction, led by Vasos Lyssarides, who is close to Makarios, is determined to block Grivas by any means. It has about the same strength as the Grivas force. Up to now, Makarios has held Lyssarides back and prevented a blood bath involving these two radical extremes within the Greek Cypriot community. Should the Grivas forces make any really determined and forceful push to fulfill the general's lifelong goal of enosis, there is a good possibility that Makarios would allow Lyssarides to use all his resources against Grivas.

Makarios always has blamed Athens for part of his problems. He believes—with some reason—that the Greeks want to weaken his control of Cyprus and that this was why they allowed the exiled Grivas to return to the island. Inasmuch as Athens cannot openly oust the Archbishop, supporting Grivas has been the logical decision.

Makarios also blames Athens for the attempt by the Cypriot bishops to defrock him in the midst of Grivas' terror campaign. Grivas openly supported the action of the rebel bishops, but it was they—rather than the Archbishop—who were subsequently defrocked.

The Greek Government had avoided publicly coming between the two rivals, but by late summer newly designated President Papadopoulos clearly and openly castigated Grivas. Papadopoulos urged that an end to his terrorist campaign would be the highest service the general could render to Cyprus and the "national center," meaning Greece. Papadopoulos may have feared that the intracommunal struggle was risking more direct Greek involvement at a time when he had his hands full giving his own administration—the "Hellenic Republic"—a changed look. British and Canadian *démarches* also had urged Athens to curb the general's activities.

Whatever Papadopoulos' motives, Grivas responded by branding the Greek leader's intervention a betrayal of the cause of Hellenism. A verbal battle continues on the island, but violence has tailed off and Makarios appeared to be winning the latest round. Whether the general is ready to give up the battle, however, is still questionable.

The Turkish Cypriots see all this instability within the Greek Cypriot community as a threat to their own security, fearing that the fighting could spill over into their enclaves and lead to another inter-

communal clash. Troop maneuvers and alerts within the Turkish enclaves are held to prepare for this eventuality. The Turkish representative to the intercommunal talks cites the recurrent violence to justify demands for greater autonomy.

The Turkish Cypriot position has become more inflexible since February 1973, when Rauf Denktash took office as the Turkish Cypriot vice president of the island. Denktash has little of the dynamism of Makarios, but he is a strong leader, has the support of the Turkish community, and has done a good job at the intercommunal talks. He favors direct intervention by Turkey to force compromises from the Greek side.

Some of Denktash's goals have created tensions between the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara. The relationship between the Turkish military on the island and the Turkish Cypriot administration has always been touchy. Denktash insists that the vice president must have autonomous control of both the military and political affairs of the Turkish community. His position challenges not only Makarios' authority as president, but also Ankara's insistence that its commander of the Turkish mainland force on Cyprus control military matters within the Turkish community and review political decisions. Strains between Ankara and Denktash surfaced recently when Turkish troops on the island went on maneuvers in direct violation of an agreement between the two communities not to hold exercises or parades that might increase intercommunal tensions.

These differences are likely to continue. The Greek side might cite the Turkish maneuver as an example of overly aggressive Turkish behavior, but the Turks would justify their position by pointing to the instability on the Greek Cypriot side. This sort of argumentation serves only to continue the polarization of the communities.

The Outsiders

A dozen or more nations have an active interest in the Cyprus question. Aside from simple bilateral interests, many countries believe that the balance of power in the Mediterranean could be upset if Cyprus were to slip over the edge.

Greece and Turkey

Greece and Turkey have had an uphill struggle since 1968 to prevent tensions on the island from harming their bilateral relations. Greek President Papadopoulos has made it clear that Greek-Turkish hostilities over the island would not serve Greek interests. To prevent any misunderstanding over Cyprus, there is now a "hotline" between Athens and Ankara and foreign ministers of the two countries meet periodically. Efforts are being made to separate problems Greece has with its Turkish minority and Turkey with its Greeks from the Cypriot

communal problem. Both nations have urged their respective communities on the island to resolve their differences and return to some degree of harmony.

Despite these efforts, another Greek-Turkish confrontation is always possible. For Turkey, the fact that more than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots live under the Greek Cypriots is an emotional issue that cannot be easily dismissed. Turkish military leaders add fuel to the issue by contending that Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a threat to Turkey's security. They maintain a force in southern Turkey to remind Greece and the Greek Cypriots that they are ever ready to defend the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey trains and arms the 10,000-man defense forces of the Turkish Cypriots and provides Turkish officers to command them. Without Turkey's moral, military, and increasing monetary support—now about \$30 million a year—the Turkish Cypriots would probably be forced to knuckle under to the Greek majority or to leave the island.

Similarly, most mainland Greeks still have strong emotional ties to the substantial number of Greeks outside Greece. Greece's influence over the Greek Cypriots has diminished in recent years, partly because almost 8,000 Greek troops were withdrawn in 1968, and partly because Athens has been trying to improve relations with Turkey. Another factor that has reduced the role of Greece in Cyprus is the enmity between Makarios and junta leader Papadopoulos. The Greek President apparently regards Makarios as the main obstacle to peace on the island and improved relations with Turkey. Makarios worries about Greek-Turkish rapprochement on the Cyprus problem that might lead the two nations to collaborate to oust him.

Other NATO states

NATO wants to preserve a strong southeastern flank against the growing Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean. NATO's strength in the area depends largely on the US Sixth Fleet and the military support of Greece and Turkey. Another Greek-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus could seriously impair that effectiveness. NATO members are also concerned that a weak government in either country might use the Cyprus issue to divert attention from problems at home and cause another confrontation, with all the headaches that would entail.

[2 paragraphs (15½ lines) not declassified]

The US

The US shares the same basic concerns as the UK and other NATO allies regarding Cyprus. The US has made two unsuccessful attempts since the London–Zurich Agreements to mediate a settlement to the intercommunal dispute. In a major initiative in 1964, Dean Acheson

proposed partitioning the island along ethnic lines, but this would have meant shifting population and Makarios turned down the proposal. A stern warning from President Johnson to Ankara in 1964 may have cooled the Turkish fervor for an invasion of Cyprus, but it also weakened US relations with the Turks. As a result of Cyprus Vance's hectic mission of November 1967, Athens, under Ankara's pressure, recalled Grivas and most of the "illegal" Greek and Turkish troops were withdrawn. US political and financial support of the UN has helped preserve a peace-keeping force on Cyprus, but diplomatic pressure by the US and others has, through constant use, lost much of its effectiveness.

The USSR

The Soviets have drawn the most benefits from the festering Cyprus issue. They like Makarios' efforts to preserve Cyprus' independence and to stimulate antipathy between the Greek and Turkish mainlanders. The Soviets want to keep the island from becoming a NATO base and thus weaken NATO's southeastern flank—goals which are served by either continuing friction or independence. The Soviet position is aided by a strong, well-organized Communist Party that encourages good relations between the USSR and the island. Although the Russians themselves have sent no arms to Makarios since an agreement in 1964, they have not prevented other Communist nations, particularly the Czechs, from delivering arms. A shipment of Czech arms contributed greatly to the 1967 outburst, and a shipment last year helped produce current uncertainties. Moscow is careful to ensure that the Cyprus issue does not disturb its relations with Greece or Turkey, but applauds Makarios for the discomfort he causes NATO. The Soviets have consistently supported Makarios at the UN, but have refused to contribute to the maintenance of the UN force on Cyprus.

The UN Force

The principal peace-keeping, peace-making task has fallen to the UN. A peace-keeping force, now composed of 3,000 troops and police from Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the UK, has been on the island since 1964. Because of its small size, the force has been unable to prevent outbreaks of violence on the island like that of 1967, but has successfully mediated a number of minor intercommunal squabbles. Ironically, because of these successes, as well as financial reasons, the contingent has been cut back over the years, despite the constant underlying threat of violence. Financial backers of the UN force would like to reduce the numbers even further. Suggestions about changes in the force always raise questions about whether it is really needed. Its mandate is renewed every six months; the next review will be in December.

The Road Ahead

While others are using diplomatic persuasion to influence Cyprus' future, the islanders themselves have been discussing ways to resolve their problems. Since 1968, representatives from both communities have been talking intermittently on constitutional issues. The representatives have made no progress on major issues, but the talks do provide a channel of formal communication; indeed, they may offer the only hope for settlement of the basic issues.

In 1971, arguments over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Turkish Cypriots led to a breakdown in the talks for several months; it took strenuous pressure from the UN Secretary General to get them started again. Local autonomy was discussed again last fall, and another deadlock set in. A UN observer and constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey are pressing hard for compromise on this issue. The UN observer has had some success in inducing the two sides to discuss issues previously considered not negotiable. Still, in the fall of 1973 settlement of these issues seemed remote.

The turmoil in the Greek community now diverts the attention of the participants and helps them to put off the painful compromises required. The Turkish Cypriots continue to prepare for new violence. Ankara provides Turkish Cypriot forces with new weapons; considerable quantities of arms have been smuggled in over the years, most often by ship. A few Turkish Cypriots would welcome new intercommunal violence; they believe that disruption on the island and a subsequent military action from the mainland are the only way to attain the rightful status for their community.

Thus, in the short term, political conditions will not change very much from their present deplorable state. Makarios is extremely popular and is not likely to relax his hold. He has demonstrated a capacity to outwit and outmaneuver his opponents. Grivas and other Greek Cypriot opponents will continue to work against him and at times will use violence to press their case. The Turkish Cypriots will insist upon full recognition of their rights. Greece and Turkey will find their dealings with the island more a liability than an asset, and neither will wish to project itself more actively into the Cypriot maelstrom. The international community, wishing above all to prevent a major power showdown in the eastern Mediterranean, will seek to maintain the status quo. Cyprus, in short, will not change much, and this means that a violent eruption is possible at any time.

[Omitted here are chronological and "Armed Forces Breakdown" appendices.]

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, April 4, 1974, 1550Z.

575. Subject: Adjournment of Intercommunal Talks. Ref: Nicosia 558.²

Summary: Osorio is working on a formula to provide basis for resumption of talks. Both he and Turkish Ambassador relatively confident that talks will be resumed after GoCyprus maximizes its propaganda advantage. If USG approached by GOCyprus, we suggest Dept make sympathetic noises but downplay importance of crisis by gently reminding GOCyprus of flimsiness of present pretext for stalling talks. End Summary.

1. Osorio has given us description of April 3 intercommunal session which makes it clear that Clerides went into session with intent to sandbag it. He pointblank asked Denktash whether he could disavow GOT position on federalism. Denktash tried to waffle in terms he used with press on Tuesday (reftel),³ saying he did not object to term unitary so long as this meant system similar to that established under 1960 agreements (e.g. bicomunal state). Clerides demanded explicit answer, despite Osorio intervention that Denktash could hardly be asked to disavow Turkish Prime Minister. During meeting, Osorio started trying to draft an agreed statement of basis on which talks were being conducted, avoiding controversial terms. Meeting wound up in unusual situation of four (including Dekleris) against Clerides. Only small solace from this exchange, according to both Osorio and Turkish Ambassador, was that Clerides was willing to use term "bicomunal" in describing nature of agreement sought; this of course is term dear to Turkish hearts. (Note difference this account from Greek version Athens 2034).⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, US NATO, USUN, USDOCOSOUTH, and USEUCOM.

² Telegram 558 from Nicosia, April 3, reported the adjournment sine die of the intercommunal talks. Cyprus formally demarched the UN Secretary General protesting Turkey's "federal" position, but Clerides did not view the suspension as permanent." (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 558 also reported that on April 2 Denktash downplayed the "federal" issue and claimed that Ecevit's remarks on federalism had been misinterpreted. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegram 2034 from Athens, April 2, reported a Greek view that the Turks had altered the basic position of the two sides agreed to at the inception of the intercommunal talks in 1968. (Ibid.)

2. Osorio and Turkish Ambassador both considered Clerides' action a negotiating tactic rather than deliberate effort to end talks. (Turkish Ambassador admitted privately that both sides had been staking out tough positions in recent negotiations and that elaborate treatment of recent Denktash visit to Ankara was a part of this game.) Osorio, however, was concerned that talks if suspended too long might be difficult to resume. He is also, he said, profoundly disturbed by sharply tougher attitude with which Dekleris returned from his most recent visit to Athens. Osorio noted that both experts had seemed to have patents from home capitals to make serious effort at solution; he now feared Athens had changed that signal. (He asked particular protection on this estimate.)

3. Osorio thinks best way to get talks going again is for Waldheim or preferably Osorio to keep working at text of a statement which he can issue, reporting both sides' concurrence, describing purpose of talks and hopefully avoiding inflammatory words. He has talked to Denktash since meeting, believes Denktash will go along with this procedure, and even permit Osorio to give press his own gloss as to what the statement means which would permit him to say things Denktash could not explicitly approve. Osorio tried same idea on Makarios, who made anticipated rumbling sounds, indicated he thought it necessary for Turks explicitly to disavow federalism, but carefully avoided making this into an absolute demand. (Foreign Minister yesterday made considerable point to me of the argument that if the Turks pointed out that federalism was simply a dream but not necessarily obtainable, this would match Makarios' "feasible" policy on enosis, and would provide adequate justification to continue talks.) Osorio notes that GO-Cyprus is really on fairly weak ground, if it breaks up negotiations on basis of statements which were made in Ankara but never repeated in the talks themselves. He is operating on assumption that Makarios will go along when GOCyprus has extracted enough political capital from this issue. Osorio admits that GOCyprus might demand that its feelings be assuaged by a statement from the UNSYG, but if possible he thinks problem could be managed better if Osorio could do it. (*Note: we agree.*)

4. *Comment:* We are being treated to some Chinese opera. If GO-Cyprus comes into Dept for support, we recommend that Dept make appropriate sympathetic noises, but then downplay crisis by pointing to conciliatory noises by Denktash, to fact that statements made in Ankara hardly constitute grounds for suspending the talks in Nicosia. We should also express hope that Osorio can develop a formula which will reassure all parties that there has been no substantial change in the basis on which the talks are proceeding. On such a basis, we believe all parties' interests would be served by returning to table.

5. The issue of real concern in Nicosia is not this mini crisis, but rather what Athens is up to (septel).⁵ Osorio points out, and we agree, that Makarios has little interest in successful conclusion of the talks, at best, and with present uncertainties as to whether Athens would launch a propaganda attack on him if the talks were successful, he is even less likely to feel much interest in proceeding very fast. In short, he probably has an interest in seeing the talks continue, but not in seeing them succeed immediately. *End comment.*

Grant

⁵ In telegram 576 from Nicosia, April 5, the Embassy reported Cypriot uneasiness at Greece's larger motives regarding Cyprus. Speculation ranged from Athens hoping to keep the Cyprus situation "in the air," to hoping to control Makarios or hinder inter-communal talks. "GOC remarked that it was difficult to determine who actually ran GOG." (Ibid.)

75. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia¹

Washington, May 6, 1974.

CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR CYPRUS

I. Summary

Cyprus is a foreign policy problem for the United States because strife between the Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots brings Greece and Turkey into military confrontation unhinging NATO's southern flank; because Cyprus' crises are invariably raised in the Security Council; and because such crises have the potential to complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and affect the atmosphere in which the United States and the Soviet Union deal with the Arab/Israeli conflict.

In addressing the various Cyprus contingencies, the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the USG can bring to bear on the situation. The important decisions relate almost exclusively to diplomatic strategy and

¹ Source: National Archives, S/S-I Files: Lot 83 D 411, Box 3418, NSC Contingency Plans: Cyprus. Secret. The paper was drafted by Thomas Boyatt and Richard Erdman of the Cyprus Desk, reviewed by the Contingency Planning Working Group, and transmitted to the Washington Special Actions Group on May 6 by Brandon Grove, Jr., Alternate Chairman.

tactics, and focus on the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use our diplomatic influence in an evolving contingency scenario. We believe that the best answers to these questions are: (1) that the USG should use its influence, (2) that this influence should be used in any given Cyprus scenario *before* the situation degenerates into a crisis, (3) that US influence should be applied evenhandedly to all of the parties including Greece and Turkey and (4) that joint initiatives under UN or third party aegis are preferable, but that when the chips are down the US will be required at the crisis stage to act unilaterally.

Of the six contingency scenarios, the first deals with the status quo which provides tolerable stability. The other five contingencies involve various developments all of which have great potential to evolve in a manner that threatens basic US policy interests. A deadlock in the local talks (Contingency 2); a spontaneous outbreak of violence (Contingency 3); an attempted coup by pro-*enosis* forces (Contingency 4); a mainland Greek putsch against Makarios (Contingency 5); and a joint Greco-Turk attempt to occupy and partition Cyprus (Contingency 6) all provide real possibilities for generating a military clash between Greece and Turkey and a diplomatic clash between the US and the Soviet Union.

With respect to Contingencies 2 and 3 we recommend active US diplomatic involvement under UN aegis or jointly with interested countries and suitably supported in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the UN. With respect to Contingencies 4, 5 and 6 we recommend low-key joint diplomatic representations to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from undertaking potentially disastrous para-military or military adventures in Cyprus.

The continuing challenge for the United States is to avoid a Cyprus crisis without becoming too involved in the Cyprus dispute itself.

[Omitted here is Section II—The table of contents.]

III. Basic Plan

A. Contingencies

The permutations and commutations of contingency scenarios in the Cyprus situation are practically endless. The list below attempts to outline the basic directions in which events impacting on US policy interests would probably evolve. US diplomatic involvement in past Cyprus crises amply demonstrates that rapidly evolving situations invariably entail unanticipated combinations of and unexpected gradations between predicted contingency scenarios. However, this contingency study is based upon its 1970 predecessor and both are outgrowths of our historical experience with Cyprus. It is worth noting that in the 1967–73 period variations of contingencies 2, 3, 4, and 5 actually occurred.

1. The intercommunal talks, which the USG supports as the best hope for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, either continue in

some form or are postponed with both parties accepting an uneasy status quo and avoiding armed clashes.

2. The intercommunal talks reach an impasse or break down completely with tensions rising rapidly. Fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities erupts with Greece and Turkey heading toward confrontation as they support their compatriots on the island.

3. A major outbreak of intercommunal violence occurs spontaneously (e.g. Makarios is assassinated and chaos ensues, pro-enosis guerrilla group attacks Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots initiate hostilities hoping to provoke mainland Turkish intervention) generating an immediate armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

4. Pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, possibly with the help of mainland Greece or Greek officers, initiate efforts to overthrow the Government of Cyprus (GOC). This effort might include an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios.

5. The Greek Government attempts to subvert the GOC and remove Makarios from office or closely control his activities. This development occurs without the knowledge of the Turkish Government whose reaction remains unpredictable.

6. Greece and Turkey, acting jointly, attempt to "solve" the intercommunal problem through joint or parallel steps to occupy Cyprus militarily and partition the island between them.

B. *US Interests*

US interests in Cyprus are basically determined by the linkage of the impact of local crises, resulting from Greek and Turkish Cypriot communal conflict, upon other parties. The most important of our concerns flowing from the situation is to neutralize the Cyprus problem's potential to embroil NATO allies Greece and Turkey in armed confrontation and/or conflict, thus unhinging NATO's southeastern flank.

A second US interest involves the Soviet dimension. The Soviet Union over the years has monitored the Cyprus situation closely, consistently supported the island's independent status, and opposed efforts to extend mainland Greek or Turkish influence or control. In reacting to the various contingencies—most of which would arouse Soviet suspicions of a "NATO plot" to subvert Cyprus' independence—the US must therefore consider whether and how its moves might complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and affect the atmosphere in which the US and the Soviet Union deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the international sphere Cyprus crises have been invariably brought before the UN Security Council as posing threats to international peace and security. The problem is periodically before the Security Council which maintains a UN Force (UNFICYP) on the island and supports a good offices role for the SYG. Consideration of the Cyprus problem

in the UN framework engages US interests in terms of our relations with the Security Council and other UN members, and focuses international and domestic attention on US reactions to the dispute. It also provides a proven and generally acceptable multilateral option to supplement, or, if necessary, supplant bilateral efforts during a Cyprus crisis.

Finally, the US has an interest in the maintenance of our now much reduced communications facilities on the island. It is likewise important for us that the two British bases on Cyprus (which are currently “sovereign” bases) remain in friendly hands.

Contingencies 2 through 6 would all engage in greater or lesser degree the US interests noted above. In the past we have reacted by using diplomatic capital to contain the situation. In 1964 Secretary Rusk sent the Ball mission and later the Acheson mission to try to resolve the crises. With the outbreak of the 1967 fighting President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance as a special emissary. Vance found a formula for avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey on that occasion, and, in 1968, US diplomacy was successful in arranging for local negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives. When these negotiations were broken off in 1971, the US participated in a diplomatic initiative which achieved resumption of the talks with the addition of constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. Because of our interests in the wider ramifications of the Cyprus dispute, US involvement has been constant and in times of crisis intense. Our broad goal remains the promotion of a viable intercommunal solution that will remove Cyprus as a potential cause for a Greco-Turk clash on NATO’s southeastern flank.

C. Assumptions

The dominant factors expected to affect the Cyprus situation during the next two to three years are:

1. *Archbishop Makarios will continue to be the major political force in the equation.* In the last five years Makarios has twice been overwhelmingly and democratically elected President of Cyprus. He has the strong support of the Greek Cypriots. When the Government of Greece tried to use diplomatic and political means to pressure Makarios into resigning in February–March 1972, his reservoir of popular support was a key factor in his turning aside of the Greek effort. In addition to his domestic political support, the Archbishop has for over a decade been consistently successful in dealing with greater and more powerful countries (Greece, Turkey, Soviet Union, UK and the US) either in neutralizing their actions which he opposed or in mobilizing actions he supported. The Archbishop is a “big leaguer.” His stature and charisma far exceed that of any mainland Greek leader (which no doubt accounts at least partially for the dislike of recent Greek juntas for him). This international standing together with his internal sup-

port gives Makarios and the GOC a freedom of action not enjoyed by Greece with its political instability, or by Turkey with its fragile coalition government.

In short, the primary assumption of this study is that US reaction to any contingency scenario regarding Cyprus will have to take very heavily into account the qualities and capabilities of Archbishop Makarios. Conversely, the departure of Makarios from the political scene—through death, overthrow, or assassination—will transform the political equation (most likely bringing House of Representatives President Glafkos Clerides to the presidency), create considerable political instability, and increase the chances of a spontaneous outbreak of violence on the island (contingency 3).

2. *Both Greece and Turkey will maintain to the extent possible their present policies of rapprochement in the context of NATO.* Both countries place great importance on their NATO connection and understand the importance of friendly bilateral relations in this regard.

3. *Animosity between Greece and Turkey is still a factor.* The coexistence of Greece and Turkey within NATO is 25 years old while their ethnic antagonisms reach back 1000 years. It is important to understand that in the evolution of any of the contingency scenarios posited, once blood is spilled, Greco-Turk hatreds are likely to very quickly boil to the surface as they did in 1963, 1964 and 1967.

4. *The Soviet Union will maintain its watching brief on Cyprus.* The Soviet interest is in ensuring Cyprus' continued independence and neutrality. If the Soviets see this interest threatened, they will not hesitate to use diplomatic pressure on other involved parties, including the US, to protect and promote their interest. Thus, when rumors of coup threats reached a peak in March (1974), the Soviets reminded Greece and Turkey that they would not remain indifferent to actions hostile to Cyprus' independence or territorial integrity. At the same time, the Soviets requested Britain and the US to use their influence to dissuade Greece and Turkey from taking any provocative steps. The Soviet Embassy here approached us "in the spirit of détente."

There has been and there is no evidence of Soviet intent to use its military power to influence crisis situations in Cyprus. Such action would risk confrontation with Western powers and run counter to the basic Soviet interest in the independence and neutrality of Cyprus. In any case, it is highly unlikely that Greece, Turkey, Britain, or the US would permit the situation on Cyprus to deteriorate to the point where the Soviets would find intervention either necessary or worth the risk.

On the other hand, Soviet military and operational capabilities are improving—witness the improved performance of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron during the October '73 Middle East Crisis. Thus, the possibility of Soviet military intervention to forestall Greek, Turkish,

or other Western military intervention can no longer be dismissed out of hand. If the Soviets ever did decide to intervene militarily, it would only be after Soviet diplomatic efforts to involve the US and others in stabilizing the situation and to counter Western (i.e. Greek and/or Turk) military moves had failed.

Soviet military intervention—were it to occur—would very probably take the form of subtle naval diplomacy. The Soviets, for example, might position a few ships just outside Cypriot territorial waters or, at Makarios' invitation, they might make a show of naval force within Cyprus' waters. In an extreme case—again at Makarios' invitation—they might even make a port visit to Limassol or Famagusta to buttress Makarios' position and to demonstrate that they would not remain indifferent to a Greek or Turkish invasion attempt.

5. *During a crisis, the dispute will at some point be brought before the UN.* Given the decade of UN involvement, the presence of UNFICYP, and the role of the SYG's Special Representative, the UN Security Council is likely to be involved early in the crisis. Makarios is most likely to turn quickly to the Security Council to gain UN support for Cypriot independence and against Greek-Turkish intervention. The other three parties (Greece, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriots) are less likely to find a sympathetic voting line-up in the Council unless they seek to cool the crisis on the basis of continued Cypriot independence and territorial integrity.

6. *U.S. interests in containing Cyprus situation will continue.* Because of the fragility of the Cyprus situation and its capacity to threaten U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, the imperatives of the situation will require the USG to continue to involve itself diplomatically in the situation in order to prevent another Cyprus crisis.

D. Key Issues

In addressing the various Cyprus contingencies, the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the USG can bring to bear on the situation. We have no military or AID relationships with Cyprus but we do make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of the UNFICYP (\$66.5 million since 1964). The military and economic aid and assistance which the USG provides to Greece and Turkey is linked to our crucial NATO and bilateral relationships with these countries and is in effect unavailable for leverage except in the most extreme circumstances. U.S. military intervention—even the more subtle forms of naval diplomacy—is not a viable means of influencing the Cyprus situation. Such a course would be widely criticized and would provoke a Soviet counter-move (shifting their fleet). This would nullify any moves on our part, increase tension on Cyprus and involve us directly with the USSR. Above all—assuming that timely and appropriate diplomatic action were taken—US military intervention would be avoidable.

Any Cyprus contingency situation is, therefore, almost totally and uniquely diplomatic. The important questions which will confront the policy maker in determining courses of action relate exclusively to diplomatic strategy and tactics and can be subsumed under four headings: whether to use U.S. diplomatic influence, when to exert such influence, with whom; and how.

1. *Whether.* In any given Cyprus contingency short of an acute military confrontation between Greece and Turkey, one attractive approach is to answer all four questions negatively on the grounds that the USG should "stay out" of the intricate Cyprus problems. The "no action" option is always appealing in that U.S. silence is less likely to offend the parties—particularly Greece and Turkey—than a more active stance. The risk of this approach is that the Cyprus situation itself is likely to deteriorate to the point of a Greco-Turk military confrontation requiring U.S. intervention in most difficult circumstances. As an example, in the summer and fall of 1967 Embassy Nicosia was recommending a USG request to the Government of Greece to recall General Grivas from Cyprus. Embassy Athens took the position that it was impossible to approach Colonel Papadopoulos and the junta with such a request. In November 1967 General Grivas overran two Turkish Cypriot villages generating a first-class confrontation between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. was then required not only to go to the Government of Greece with the request that they withdraw General Grivas but also that they withdraw 10,000 Greek troops from Cyprus. At the same time special emissary Cyrus Vance was required to put maximum pressure on Turkey to prevent an invasion of Cyprus.

2. *When.* The question of timing has in past Cyprus crises been crucial. Here again the power of inertia and the attractiveness of doing nothing rather than doing something unpopular—particularly with allies Greece and Turkey—has a critical impact on the problem. In opposition to the "no action" option, another approach which attracted a great deal of support just after the USG managed to scrape through a crisis (as in 1964 and 1967) is the activist approach. Following special emissary Cyrus Vance's 1967 crisis diplomacy which was successful in avoiding a Greco-Turk war, both Deputy Secretary Vance and Ambassador Charles Yost undertook critical surveys of the Cyprus situation with a view to recommending a consistent U.S. policy approach. The main conclusion of both studies was that the USG should actively promote a viable intercommunal solution to the Cyprus problem to remove it as a potential cause of a Greco-Turk clash on NATO's southeastern flank. Both studies recommended that the USG either directly or indirectly mediate the substance of the Cyprus dispute. While this approach had a great deal of support in the aftermath of crisis, USG policy has become more and more passive as the distance from the crisis has increased. In any case, policy makers must decide whether the USG

should make representations to the parties before a crisis erupts. The hope in adopting this timing is to *prevent* a crisis, but the problem is that without a crisis the parties may be less amenable to accepting USG views. A different timing approach would be for the USG to move in the context of an ongoing crisis when it would be clear that our basic interests are threatened. The hope in this approach is that the pressures of the situation will make the parties concerned more accommodating, but there always is the risk that the crisis will be too far advanced to contain.

3. *With Whom.* The Cyprus problem is basically a quadrilateral dispute involving the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Community. The path of least resistance is to put maximum pressure on the Government of Cyprus and the path of most resistance is to bring pressure to bear on NATO allies Greece and Turkey. The simplistic approach is for the USG to support or at least accept whatever Greece or Turkey can agree upon. The problem with this approach is that it is often difficult for Greece and Turkey to agree on anything and, if they do agree, Archbishop Makarios maintains an enormous capacity to upset any Greco-Turk agreement by playing the Russian card, and/or taking the matter to the UN Security Council. The historical record demonstrates that USG diplomatic successes in averting a Greco-Turk war over Cyprus in 1964 and 1967 and in achieving the establishment of negotiations in 1968 were based upon our even-handed pressure on all parties to compromise.

4. *How.* In the past the USG has acted unilaterally in truly emergency situations and, having gained time, has moved to involve others—particularly the UK, Greece and Turkey under a UN umbrella to take needed action. For example, during the 1967 crisis the USG averted a Greco-Turk showdown through the unilateral diplomatic vehicle of the Vance mission. In 1968 a joint UN–US–UK effort achieved the initiation of the local talks. In 1971 the local talks, which had reached an impasse, were rejuvenated through diplomatic activities in which the Government of Greece took the lead supported by ourselves, the British, the UN and to a lesser extent Turkey.

In summary, the policy maker will have at his disposal the single asset of U.S. diplomatic influence and will be faced with the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use this asset in an evolving contingency scenario. In general terms, the best answers to the questions posed are: (1) the USG should use its influence, (2) this influence should be used in any given Cyprus scenario before the situation degenerates into a crisis, (3) U.S. influence should be applied evenhandedly to all the parties including Greece and Turkey and (4) joint initiatives under UN or third party aegis are preferable, but when the chips are down the U.S. is likely to be required in an acute crisis situation to act unilaterally.

[Omitted here are three sections, comprising 27 pages, detailing contingencies and options, and two summary attachments and 14 annexes, comprising 23 pages.]

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, June 25, 1974, 1401Z.

5012. Subject: Cyprus Danger Signals in Greece–Cyprus Relations. Ref: Athens 3936.²

1. We suspect that from GOT viewpoint, current Cyprus situation seems somewhat less complex than it may appear to GOG and GOC. Turks derive some grim satisfaction from “Greeks fighting Greeks,” whether antagonists are Makarios and Ioannides, Makarios and Grivas, or Makarios and Papadopoulos. (This despite fact they got along pretty well with latter.)

2. GOT has little desire get involved in favor of one side or the other. Its basic interest in Cyprus rests on concern for Turkish community there and unwillingness for strategic reasons see unrestricted or unchallenged Greek control of island (e.g., enosis).

3. Thus, most Turks prepared indefinitely live with present situation. In face of clearcut prospect of suppression Makarios by Ioannides or any other “hostile” Greek leadership, GOT might be prepared be a little easier on Makarios, but as yet we have seen no sign of this here.

4. We concur wholeheartedly with recommendation for US policy contained para 11 reftel.³

Macomber

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.

² Dated June 24. (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 3936 from Athens, Tasca expressed increasing concern with the crisis atmosphere developing in Cyprus: “In my view, we should limit U.S. action to reinforcing our approaches to UNSYG, urge NATO SYG to keep attentive watching brief and encourage both to work directly with the London–Zurich signatories. Within this context, when opportunities occur, consistent with our secondary role in the complex of problems, we should seek to discourage solution based upon violence, and gambling that somehow violent solution will bring positive gains to any of the parties of lasting value.” (Ibid.)

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece and Cyprus¹

Washington, June 29, 1974, 1907Z.

141500. Subject: Greece–Cyprus Relations. Ref: Athens 3936;² Nicosia 1224.³

1. We share concerns of Athens and Nicosia regarding gravity of relationship between GOG and GOC. From various reports, it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering way to topple Makarios from power, a move which could have disastrous consequences for US interests in Eastern Mediterranean as well as for peoples of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. In our view effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos eventually causing Greco-Turk confrontation; involving Soviets in Cyprus situation; and complicating developing US-Soviet détente.

2. We know that Ioannides has long been obsessed with issue of communism both in Greece and in Cyprus and that his dislike for Makarios has bordered on the pathological. Until recently, our impression has been that he preferred to play for time on Cyprus problem until he had consolidated his position in the internal Greek context. Now, however, he apparently feels that Makarios is seeking to take advantage of Greek-Turkish tensions and the Greek regime's domestic difficulties to reduce Greek influence on the island and that this effort is a personal challenge which he cannot ignore.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Ankara. Drafted by John Day of the Office of Greek Affairs; cleared by Sisco, Boyatt, Stabler, Dillon, and Samuel Gammon (S/S).

² See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 76.

³ In telegram 1224 from Nicosia, June 27, the Embassy agreed with the Embassy in Athens about the gravity of the Greece/Cyprus situation and that démarches would not be useful. Deconfrontation best served the interests of the United States, Cyprus, and Greece. Grant recommended that the United States, in approaching Ioannides, stress that "Athens could have trouble Sovs and Third World if it went after Makarios." He concluded, "If GOGreece would give its officers meaningful command not to engage in anti-Makarios propaganda, dissociate the NG from EOKA–B activities, and find some means to recognize legality of GOCyprus Council of Ministers' role in selection of cadet officers, we think Makarios (probably already shaken) would be glad to defer any larger plans for asserting control over NG." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I)

3. *For Ambassador Tasca:* We have carefully weighed recommendations in Athens 3936 and Nicosia 1224 and have concluded you should send a signal to Ioannides. Through whatever channel and means you deem most appropriate, our view that any effort to remove the Archbishop from power by violent means could have disastrous consequences not only for the two communities on the island, but also for Greece and Turkey and that, therefore, we would be strongly opposed to any move of this nature. Our basic position remains that we would welcome any settlement which would be acceptable to the parties involved. We strongly believe that lasting settlement can best be achieved by peaceful (underlined) means.⁴

4. *For Nicosia:* You are to take no action whatsoever on the above. Subsequent to Ambassador Tasca's approach to Ioannides, we will advise you whether we want anything done.

Sisco

⁴ Tasca reported on his meeting in telegram 4179, July 1. (Ibid.)

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 9, 1974, 1645Z.

1302. Subject: Greek Embassy View re NG Controversy.

Summary: Greek Embassy recommends Athens accept Makarios' demands. Admits military opposed. Says NG reduction will lead to deconfrontation. Expresses fear over possible leakage of arms. *End summary.*

1. In conversation with EmbOff July 8, Greek Embassy officer [*name not declassified*]—protect) said Embassy has recommended to Athens that it accept Makarios' demand for withdrawal of Greek mainland officers. [*name not declassified*] said Embassy has further recommended that GOGreece agree provide 100 officers to train reconstituted NG (though Embassy hopes convince Archbishop of need for additional

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USDOC-OSOUTH, USEUCOM, USNATO, and USUN.

mainland personnel). Embassy argument reportedly based on rationale that it impossible for Greece to completely extricate itself from responsibility for Cyprus; defense and presence of even limited number mainland officers will make this defense more credible.

2. [name not declassified] admitted this view not shared by military colleagues here. Said they advocating either direct confrontation or total renunciation of Greek responsibility for island's defense. (Latter course reportedly enjoys more support among military officers.) Thus far, [name not declassified] said Greek Embassy has no info which policy Athens will pursue.

3. Despite lack of guidance, [name not declassified] maintained NG general staff proceeding plan for force's reduction to 5,000 men. Initial study indicates this extremely complicated and will require extended period to implement. [name not declassified] noted that 5,000-man force will be totally unable defend Cyprus against external enemy (read Turkey) and said Makarios apparently has totally discounted possibility that Aegean crisis could spill over onto Cyprus.

4. In [name not declassified] view, only way maintain defensive capability will be complete reorganization of NG's reserve. However, fact that large number NG recruits depart island for university studies immediately upon discharge will make this task virtually impossible.

5. [name not declassified] maintained drastic reduction in NG strength will inevitably lead to unilateral deconfrontation. Guard simply will not have enough people to man barricades while maintaining reserve strength. In his view this a positive development and he probed, at considerable length, on possible Turk Cypriot reactions.

6. At end of conversation, [name not declassified] advanced "personal view" that it "impossible" for GOGreece to simply reject Makarios' demands. Admitted, however, that he not sanguine that rational counsel will prevail in Athens. On local scene, [name not declassified] expressed fear that pro-EOKA mainland officers may divert considerable quantity NG arms to dissidents prior surrendering control of NG camps.

7. *Comment:* [name not declassified] is very open, forthcoming Greek officer who is normally an accurate reporter. While possibly not fully read into Embassy planning, above probably reflects his honest assessment of current trends. *End comment.*

Davies

79. Memorandum From Rosemary Niehuss of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 6 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Coup by Greek-Officered National Guard and Death of Makarios

According to late reports from embassy Nicosia:²

—The Greek-officered National Guard on Cyprus has taken over the government and Archbishop Makarios is reported dead.

—All reports coming from the National Guard forces have stressed that this affair is purely internal to Cyprus and within the Greek community and have urged calm. Among the reports of sporadic firing associated with the coup are none which yet allege any serious incidents involving Turk Cypriots.

—A "Government of National Salvation" has been announced, based on the following:

—The new government has been created "to restore spiritual unity of Greek Cypriots, restore harmony in the Church of Cyprus and prevent Armed Forces from falling into the hands of 'anarchy and criminal elements'." Those responsible for the latter have been removed.

—The new government will continue the intercommunal talks.

—The foreign policy of Cyprus will remain unchanged, in particular non-aligned aspects.

—Thus far, the reaction of the Turk Cypriot community has been a plea for calm by its leader Denktash and a call for UN intervention.

This situation is the "dynamic" solution to Athens concern about Makarios that junta leader Ioannides, according to reliable intelligence, has been speculating on in recent weeks. Makarios' efforts to remove the Greek-officered National Guard, Athens main instrument of influence on the island, provoked this turn of events.

The intelligence community is closely monitoring for reports of Turkish and Soviet political and military reactions. As of this writing, neither Ankara nor Athens has made any official statement about the coup.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger discussed the Cyprus crisis in the third volume of his memoirs, *Years of Renewal* (Simon and Schuster, 1999), pp. 192–238.

² Telegrams 1339, 1340, and 1344, July 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

There are two possibilities on the Turkish side: (a) If any fighting associated with the coup begins to spill over into the Turk Cypriot community and seriously threatens it, Turkey may move to fulfill its promise of immediate military assistance and all the implications that such a move would have for a broader Turkish-Greek confrontation. (b) If the Turk Cypriot community remains relatively unaffected and its needs met by the new government, Ankara may well acquiesce in these developments. In that regard, it is worth noting that the coup leaders have said all the right things about the coup—that it is internal to Cyprus, that the new government promises a continuation of the inter-communal talks (and not enosis which would draw Turkey in) and that foreign policy will remain unchanged.

The Soviets will be attentive to these developments. They have been a staunch supporter of Makarios—under whom a strong local communist party has developed in the last decade—and, according to reliable reports, have been concerned about tensions brewing between Athens and Nicosia and the prospect that Athens might move against Makarios. They do not want Cyprus NATOized.

We will discuss our options at a WSAG meeting this morning.

80. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 10:18–10:43 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Joseph Sisco

Wells Stabler

Thomas D. Boyatt

Robert McCloskey

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-096, Meetings Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

Defense

William Clements
 Robert Ellsworth
 Harry Bergold

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown
 Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

CIA

William Colby
 George Lauder

NSC

Col. Richard Kennedy
 Rosemary Niehuss
 Henry Appelbaum
 James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The aircraft carrier *America*, due to return to the U.S. on regular rotation today, will remain at Rota, Spain for at least the next twenty-four hours;

—State and Defense will prepare a joint message for transmittal to appropriate embassies today outlining U.S. policy in the current situation.²

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we would have a quick review of the situation and discuss briefly what we can or should do about it. Bill (Mr. Colby), would you like to brief?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.³

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Not really. I don't have anything to add. I've just been listening. Frankly, I'm not clear on what is going on.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe (Mr. Sisco), do you have any views?

Mr. Sisco: I've got a couple. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe we should hear from the Chairman (General Brown) first.

General Brown: From our viewpoint we have only one item. The carrier "America" was scheduled to begin its return to the States today. We have sent out instructions to hold for 24 hours at Rota, Spain because movement of our ship west (or east) might "say something" and we might want to avoid any such impression at this particular

² Apparently a reference to Document 82.

³ Not attached. A copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 21, WSAG 11/73-4/76.

time. Besides there would be a gap as her relief is not expected for 12 to 14 days. So, we thought it would be better to hold her for a time. Is that all right?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, let's hold her there, I agree completely. I don't think it would be wise for her to move anywhere, east or west, for that matter as it might indicate something.

General Brown: No, under no circumstances.

Secretary Kissinger: It shouldn't move either way.

General Brown: Then we will hold her for a while.

Secretary Kissinger: Which carrier is supposed to replace her?

General Brown: I think it's the "Forrestal." No, it's the "Independence."

Mr. Sisco: The way I see it, over the next 24 to 48 hours there isn't a great deal we can do. The situation is too confused and we'll just have to wait until it clarifies. I think, however, our two objectives are very clear: (1) do what we can to avert war between Greece and Turkey; and (2) do what we can to avert Soviet exploitation of the situation.

The situation offers great opportunities for Soviet intervention. I think we must operate on the assumption that what is important is that the integrity and political independence of Cyprus be maintained. What this means will depend on how the situation evolves on the ground. So far it has not become an intercommunal matter.

Whether this is a limited objective coup inspired by Greece or will lead to a prolonged civil war will depend partly on whether Makarios is alive and whether his Communist supporters and others will fight. Our best interests are protected within the framework of the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

I suggest that we continue to operate quietly, that not to internationalize the situation would be in our best interests. Over the next 24 hours we should get a reading on the situation from both the Greeks and the Turks. By the way, the Cypriot Ambassador called to see you this morning. I recommend that you (Secretary Kissinger) see him sometime today.

Secretary Kissinger: What is his name?

Mr. Sisco: Nicos G. Dimitriou.

Mr. Clements: Henry, I think we ought to get a reading on the situation. We are tasking the attaché in Turkey—and perhaps State should do the same—to go see the military people and come back to us with some thinking. There have been some rumblings out of the Turkish military and we ought to find out what they are up to.

Mr. Sisco: From what I've seen so far there is no collusion between the Greeks and the Turks.

Secretary Kissinger: I think our first objective should be to prevent any kind of Soviet action. Whether they succeed depends on the degree this stops being an internal Cyprus problem. So we must keep this as an internal affair and keep it from becoming internationalized. Someone in the Department told me this morning of the pro-Makarios problem, that his supporters might start a scrap with the Turks to internationalize the situation.

The other thing we ought to do is get some sort of coordinated line on this thing, so that we can all speak with one voice. Could we get a few simple themes (to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Clements)? Can we draw up something that we can agree on?

Mr. Clements: Absolutely. There's no problem.

Secretary Kissinger: To the Turks we want to point out the dangers of internationalizing the problem. We want to advise on preserving the present structure on the island; we don't want the Turks to become provoked and want them to understand who is provoking and why. I think it would be a good idea to tell the Turks that we support them, that is, the maintenance of their existing rights on the island. We should tell the Greeks that there should be no—that we oppose any change of the existing political status of the island or of the Turk Cypriot rights.

Mr. Sisco: We need a public line for the noon briefing. I think we ought to put out a low-key statement, indicating we continue to operate on the assumption that the political integrity of Cyprus will be preserved. We don't want to alarm the Turks and we don't want to give them an excuse for exploiting the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Bob (Ambassador McCloskey), do you have anything you would like to say?

Ambassador McCloskey: It has been my observation that Makarios has been deeply worried for several years now that he would be killed. He has been worried about it for some time.

Secretary Kissinger: Why wasn't he killed earlier?

Ambassador McCloskey: There have been several attempts to kill him over the last few years but they all failed. His (Makarios') overriding concern all this time is that Grivas is behind the whole thing. But I am a little disturbed by this report that Sampson has been put in as the new leader.

Secretary Kissinger: I've never heard of him. Who is he?

Mr. Boyatt: He is a killer. He has already got twelve notches on his gun. I've known him personally for several years.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that our immediate objective is to keep this thing from becoming internationalized, the Greek-Turk problem, the Soviet angle. There is really nothing we can do at this

time internally but we can keep it from becoming an international issue.

Mr. Colby: He (Sampson) is far to the right. This could stimulate Communist elements.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we get some cables off right away on what our line is? Can you (to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Clements) get together on what we send out so that both the Embassy and Defense are saying the same thing?

Mr. Sisco: Sure, we'll make it a joint message. We can get it out very quickly.

Ambassador McCloskey: There is one thing, the UN question. Do we want the UN involved?

Secretary Kissinger: Not until it becomes an international issue. At this moment we don't see it that way and I think that taking it to the UN would only internationalize the situation, which is what we want to avoid. Am I not right?

Ambassador McCloskey: Somebody could talk to (Secretary General) Waldheim. That might be a way to keep it out of the UN.

General Brown: How about NATO?

Mr. Stabler: They have a watching brief.

Secretary Kissinger: We can tell (Ambassador) Rumsfeld what we are doing—give him our position. If NATO calls for a meeting we'll just have to see what happens. No problem if they want to offer to mediate. But I see no objection to telling Rumsfeld what our line is.

Mr. Sisco: And could we slip in, could you see the Cypriot Ambassador?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, let's make it 12:30 today.⁴ Does he know anything? We will let you (the WSAG members) know what he says.

Mr. Sisco: He (the Cypriot Ambassador) doesn't know what is going on. He probably knows less than we do.

Secretary Kissinger: Then why see him?

Mr. Sisco: It would be consistent with our policy line on the integrity of Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to pick a fight with the Greeks. We want to keep this fairly low key. We want to let them know our thinking, but in a low-key way. Can (Ambassador) Tasca do this?

Mr. Sisco: He is out of the country—no, he's back now.

⁴ No record of a meeting has been found.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K., before the end of the day let's get these people informed of our views. We'll take another look at the situation on Wednesday, or maybe tomorrow, depending on how the situation develops, and the next time we meet we should discuss the Greek-Turkish Aegean problem, too.

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, July 15, 1974, 1615Z.

4494. Subject: Cyprus: Further Reflections from Athens.

1. The evidence to date seems clearly to implicate Ioannides with the coup in Cyprus. It is also clear operation against Makarios was carefully planned, as declaration called "Government of National Salvation" demonstrates.² This is a carefully prepared document taking into account main threats to successful execution of coup. Whether Ioannides has in fact unlocked Pandora's box or provided principally for the replacement of Makarios with some far more pliable Greek remains to be seen.

2. However, the brutality of the operation as well as the skillful manner in which it was pursued indicate once again how dangerous and unreliable General Ioannides can really be—a concern which my reporting and analysis of the November 25 coup clearly reflected.³

3. Makarios apparently misjudged Ioannides, believing his confrontation with Turkey would make him more amenable to elimination of the Greek National Guard officers as a major power element on the island. Instead, in the Ioannides posture, there is evidence the Greek military considered the Greek military presence in Cyprus important in their own overall military posture vis-à-vis Turkey, because it kept important Turkish forces in southern Turkey and away from Aegean and Evros areas. Makarios meanwhile sought continued and perhaps

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Nicosia, London, Ankara, USNATO, USUN, and USCINCEUR.

² Transmitted in telegram 1342 from Nicosia, July 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

³ See Document 8.

strengthened support of Eastern Europe, Russia, Peking and probably other Third World elements.

4. Ioannides and his cohorts, it must be remembered, are fanatically anti-Communist. With them, whose leaders participated in the “sacred war” against Communism in Greece in the 1940’s, only Christianity, perhaps the obverse to them of Communism, ranks in national values with it. Makarios in his misjudgment committed in eyes of Greek military regime the unpardonable sin of not only rejecting and repelling the “Motherland” but adding insult to injury by publication of the Makarios letter to Ghizikis⁴ without GOG approval. The philotimo of the Greek military was sharply and clearly challenged at a time of national crisis with Turkey. These probably led to decision for violent confrontation with Makarios.

5. Available information [*1 line not declassified*] indicates GOG made last effort to deter Makarios but failing had clearly completed contingency plans to remove him. Dept will recall that earlier Ioannides stated flatly he could get rid of Makarios within 24 hours whenever he wished. Frankly, this proves once again how dangerously narrow a view Ioannides holds (see Athens 8294 November 27, 1973—“Greece’s apparent master: Demetrios Ioannides: some fears”),⁵ but even more alarming his willingness to resort to violence and perhaps even murder. This bodes darkly indeed for a peaceful solution to the Aegean problem between Turkey and Greece. A negative substantive reaction on our part will likely lead to negative substantive reaction from them.

6. A further question in present context of the problem is the effect upon the internal stability of the regime. Certainly, the people of Greece will not be happy with the violent extermination of Makarios and loss of liberty of the island. In fact, the real opposition to these military adventures, to call them what they are, is likely to deepen greatly. On the other hand, Ioannides remains effectively in control of the armed forces at this point. His stress on clearing out “anarchic” elements on the island will not weaken his present hold. Greek military are even likely to feel that clearing out the “Communist” elements on the island against prospect of an imminent confrontation with Turkey may make a lot of military sense. Thus, the immediate effect upon Greek regime’s stability does not appear visibly negative.

⁴ Makarios wrote Ghizikis on July 2, as reported in telegrams 1276 and 1303 from Nicosia, July 5 and July 9, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

⁵ Not printed. (Ibid.)

7. Of course, if the context should change in a fashion clearly demonstrating ineptness on the part of Ioannides and his adherents as "sacred custodians" of Greek national interest, this could affect reaction. While fight on Communism, internal and external, and the confrontation with Turkey will not impair Ioannides' strength, serious difficulties with the U.S. and its NATO allies could create problems for his continued leadership.

8. Look forward keenly to comments from Nicosia, Ankara and London regarding their reaction to all this.⁶

Tasca

⁶ The Embassy in Ankara responded in telegram 5589, Document 85. No response from Nicosia or London was found.

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 1947Z.

152379. Subject: Cyprus Coup. For Ambassador From the Secretary.

You should seek an immediate appointment with Ioannides to convey the following:

1. We wish to have immediately from the GOG an appreciation of the situation in Cyprus.

2. As to our policy, we wish GOG to know that the United States continues to regard Cyprus as a single, sovereign and independent state and our actions in this matter will be governed by this continuing fundamental tenet. We have made the same point to the GOT.²

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969-77, Box 7, Cyprus 3. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO and USUN.

² Instructions were transmitted in telegram 152380 to Ankara, July 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

3. Consistent with the above principle, the United States cannot condone any action by the GOG to change the political and constitutional structure of the island.

4. We continue to support a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks with a view to assuring appropriate guarantees for the security of the Turkish community.

5. We strongly urge all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and avoid actions which might further destabilize the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, exacerbate relations between two NATO allies, and give an opportunity to forces extraneous to the area to exploit the situation to the detriment of Western security interests.

Kissinger

83. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

K: Anatoly. We just got a message from Cyprus that your Counselor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the introduction of Soviet troops to restore order.

D: Troops?

K: I can't believe this.

D: I have no information. I have no telegram telling me this. I doubt that very much.

K: I can't believe he would do this.

D: I doubt this and you don't have anything from your mission? Your mission in Moscow?

K: In Moscow?

D: I mean in Moscow. They might have been in touch with them.

K: We have nothing from Moscow and nothing from Cyprus. Only that there is still fighting going on.

D: Who was it . . .

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Anatoly Dobrynin. No classification marking.

K: Your second man in the Embassy.

D: The second man come to the British . . . to me it sound unbelievable.

K: Me too. If you planned something like this you would talk to us.

D: Yes.

K: You know, we would not look on it with favor.

D: I know . . .

K: Let's see if it calms down. There are plenty of troops there.

D: What is the latest report?

K: The latest report is they are still fighting.

D: What about Makarios?

K: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.

D: I know, but nothing from your Embassy. I will check with Moscow. I don't have anything at all.

K: I don't want to start a crisis to keep you here. I don't want anything to interfere with your vacation.

D: I know. I want to get away. I know this could come about only if Makarios asked for it and then it would have to be discussed. But if Makarios is not there we would not do it on our own. This I am sure. This is not done at all. I doubt very much they do this on their own.

K: That is my view.

D: Ok. Be in touch.

84. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 6:30 p.m.

D: Hello Henry. The Ambassador of Cyprus has just informed me that Makarios is alive and in UN troops [?], he is in another place.

K: I have seen that as an unofficial report.

D: This is what he mentioned to me. I don't know if it is official.

K: I'm glad you called. I was just getting ready to call you. I just had an unofficial report that he is in a town called Phados.

D: I heard . . .

K: Well, we got the first letter the same. If that is true it puts a new complexion on the situation.

D: And it says he has asked the Secretary General to have Security Council tomorrow to discuss and according to this information the Ambassador has . . . in this area, where Makarios is, it is quiet, where the Archbishop is, but in Nicosia there is strong fighting. This is what he mentioned to me.

K: Let us see if we can keep our actions coordinated. The United States has no unilateral interests there. And we support the existing Constitution. Can we stay in touch with each other before we take any drastic moves?

D: I will send a telegram saying let's coordinate our actions.

K: We are in favor of the existing Constitutional arrangement. Let's check before doing anything. I will let you know if we plan anything. We don't plan to do anything until we get a report but we have made those demarches² I told you about.

D: Ok, Henry.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Anatoly Dobrynin. No classification marking.

² Presumably a reference to telegrams to the Embassies in Athens and Ankara instructing the Ambassadors to relay the American view that Cyprus was a sovereign state and that the current crisis should be resolved peacefully. See Document 82.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, July 15, 1974, 2330Z.

5589. Ref: Athens 4493, 4494.²

1. Turkish policy on the Cyprus coup is still evolving. Yet two judgments which will be important as USG moves to prevent spread of conflict and protect its own interests can now be suggested with some confidence:

(A) GOT will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist and emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy.

(B) Until so convinced, GOT likely attempt lay responsibility for action on Geneva signatories, UN, NATO, and US—unless Turk Cypriots come to suffer substantially, in which case direct action of some kind would again be likely.

2. Other, more subtle, choices and actions will probably for time being seem less important to Turks than to Greeks, Cypriots themselves, NATO, UN, and even Russians: e.g. comparative virtues Makarios (if he is still alive) and Clerides, reinforcement or not of the Turkish contingent, role of UNFICYP, etc. At same time, GOT will continue deeply suspicious of Ioannides government and Ankara is already clearly very fearful that any government led by Sampson is an enosis government. For these reasons and because of its own political necessity, the GOT can be expected to undertake military alerts and troop movements within Turkey which will inevitably increase tension even while it awaits international action.

3. In this situation, we see first sine qua non for the prevention of intra-NATO fighting as the blocking by all means available to the US of enosis or anything that looks like it. Second is the prevention of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, USUN, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 4493 from Athens, July 15, especially paragraphs 6–10, Tasca urged reiterating the U.S. interest in maintaining peace between Greece and Turkey and finding a long-term settlement for Cyprus. To that end, Tasca suggested promoting the return to the democratic structure just overthrown in Cyprus by concluding the intercommunal talks and arranging early elections, and he also envisioned a continuing role for the UN. Tasca thought that the United States should reiterate its opposition to violence as a solution, enlist the assistance of NATO allies and Secretary General Luns, and consult with the British regarding their reaction to the events. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974) Telegram 4494 is printed as Document 81.

significant hurt to Turkish Cypriots. In terms of avoiding Greek-Turk clash, these two, we think, are even more important than stopping a civil war between Greeks on Cyprus. After achievement these two objectives comes series of goals set forth paras 6–10 Athens 4493, with which we wholeheartedly concur. We will refine our thoughts on these and other ideas in Athens 4493 and submit ASAP.³

Spain

³ In telegram 5609 from Ankara, July 16, Macomber urged a concentrated effort to diffuse the Cyprus situation for fear of an armed Turkish intervention. Turkey viewed the coup as a major step toward enosis, a violation of the 1960 agreements, and a product of Hellenic (not Greek Cypriot) officers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

86. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 16, 1974, 10:36–11:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Joseph Sisco

Robert McCloskey

Wells Stabler

Thomas D. Boyatt

Defense

William Clements

Robert Ellsworth

Harry Berggold

JCS

Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

NSC Staff
Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

- that the two U.S. naval task forces now in the Mediterranean would remain out of ports, in a holding position;
- that Ambassador Tasca ask President Ioannides for an unambiguous statement on Greek intentions toward Cyprus;
- that the Turkish Government be asked what they want to prevent on Cyprus;
- that our assessment of the situation be sent to relevant diplomatic posts; and
- CIA would prepare a situation report on the status of forces on Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing for us?

Mr. Colby began briefing from the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: What time? (In reference to the scheduled meeting of the UN Security Council.)

Mr. Colby: Sometime this afternoon, I think 3:00 p.m.

Mr. Sisco: Before Bill goes on I would like to bring you up to date with some later information. I was just on the phone to Buffum in New York. USUN has been informed that Weckman (the Special UN Representative on Cyprus) saw Makarios this morning—talked to him. Makarios said that the British had offered him (Makarios) protection and evacuation to any place he wanted to go. Makarios refused, but asked for UN protection. Waldheim is planning to convene the UNSC this afternoon to deal with this request.

Secretary Kissinger: I just talked to (British Foreign Minister) Callaghan on the phone five minutes ago.³ He says that Makarios has accepted—wants British protection. From what I understand, the British are flying him to the aircraft carrier *Hermes* and then to Malta. He was asking whether we had any ideas on where Makarios could be taken next. Everyone, at least now, agrees that Makarios is alive.

Mr. Sisco: Well, our information seems to be conflicting. I would think that the Callaghan information is more reliable.

² Not attached and not found.

³ Kissinger phoned Callaghan at 10:15 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Secretary Kissinger: I told him (Mr. Callaghan) the line we were taking and he said go easy on the legitimate government issue because Makarios is leaving the island.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they mean by this? (In reference to plans for a special Turk parliamentary meeting to be held July 18.)

Mr. Colby: It could mean that they intend to move their forces to Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: I just can't believe that. I just can't believe they want Makarios back in power.

Mr. Sisco: The Turks would intervene to (a) protect the Turk Cypriot community and (b) to prevent enosis from taking place.

Secretary Kissinger: It just seems inconceivable to me that they would support him (Makarios).

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: They are moving in an easterly direction away from Cyprus? (In reference to Mr. Colby's briefing on Soviet fleet movements.)

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of forces do we have in the Eastern Mediterranean now?

Gen. Pauly: There are two main task forces. One has the aircraft carrier *Forrestal* with it and the other is an amphibious task force. That group is located south of Crete. The task force with the *Forrestal* in it is now somewhere between Crete and Athens. There are other small elements around, but those are the two main task forces. We've told them all to remain out of the ports, in a holding position and to be prepared for a 24 hour lead time in case they are needed.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we ought to do anything with them now, even if the Soviet ships are moving, am I right?

Mr. Sisco: Definitely. They are close enough anyway if we have to call on them. They are in a holding pattern and can be moved quickly. Besides, any movement might be seen as attempts to internationalize the situation. Holding is consistent with our policy.

Mr. Colby resumed his briefing which touched on the Greek-Turk Aegean dispute . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Let's finish with Cyprus first.

(to Mr. Clements) Bill, do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Only that I think we ought to keep the forces where they are. No movement.

Gen. Pauly: I agree.

Mr. Sisco: I suggest we continue to maintain a low profile, remain cautious. Anything else at this time would be counterproductive. The situation is as murky today as yesterday. We just don't know what's going on. First, if the UK provides Makarios protection, that changes the situation. Second, we need to provide some guidance for today's UN meeting. Also, Henry, we need some guidance on what to do about recognition.

Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) I don't understand what you said earlier about the UN. What's happening at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Well, in general, the way I understand it, the Secretary General will make this report to the Security Council. It's scheduled to meet at 3:00 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger: Is (Ambassador) Scali there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I believe it will be Rossides (the Cypriot UN representative), who represents Makarios, who will raise the question. He will say that they will ask for the UN to support Makarios consistent with UN resolutions. The Soviets will jump in.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump. We have to look at the possibility of (1) civil war and the role of Makarios forces or (2) the Sampson regime establishes control with Makarios off the island. I think we ought to be careful that we don't provide the Soviets the excuse to legitimize the situation. I propose that in the noon briefing, if asked about recognition, we say that the issue has not arisen, or something like that. But, we do not want to be positive about who we do recognize. If Makarios is off the island, this might raise the Soviet angle.

Mr. Clements: That sounds reasonable to me. This UN thing concerns me, however. I mean, it could be a stamp of endorsement that would be premature from our standpoint.

Mr. Sisco: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Our first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized. We need to put stronger pressure on Athens, and today. We must get our Ambassador in to see the President, or Prime Minister, or whoever it is, and get our views across forcibly. We've got to get somebody in there who will ask the Greeks for a statement of their intentions. [1 line not declassified] We want an unambiguous statement of Greek intentions towards Cyprus from him. We want to defuse the Turk angle. They mainly want to prevent enosis. If civil war develops then we'll have to assess the situation then. As far as the public line is concerned, we can say that the recognition issue just hasn't arisen. Tomorrow we can decide on the internal situation when we know just where Makarios is. Callaghan can't be wrong.

Mr. Ellsworth: I might suggest that (Ambassador) Macomber also say something to the Turks. There has not been enough attention here to Turkey. It really fears the new Cypriot government.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K., but what should he say? Ask what they want to achieve.

Mr. Sisco: We need to make the point with Greece not to fool around with this troop rotation tomorrow.

Mr. Ellsworth: Something like, “don’t do anything”, just play it cool.

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: I don’t want to use it, but the Ambassador is insisting on it.

Mr. Lauder: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s get the word to Ioannidis. I don’t care which way, but do it.

Mr. Sisco: Ambassador Tasca should go see Ioannidis and tell him what we said yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: Right.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is also a protocol problem of a reception for military attachés in Athens in a few hours. We should get a cable out to them for some guidance.

Mr. Clements: What’s this you’re talking about?

Mr. Stabler: It’s the annual reception for military attachés that the Greek Government is holding this afternoon.

Mr. Sisco: The question is, should all of them go—I think there are 12—or only a few?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should cut it down a bit. Tell the top man not to go. Second-level our attendance.

Mr. Clements: O.K.

Secretary Kissinger: We should also write an assessment of the situation and send it to the various posts. Ambassador Davies in particular, and cut the number of attachés to the reception to about four. What do you want to do at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Providing the British information is correct, we ought to try to slow or deflect it. We should tell Scali to limit this round to what they want to say. Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey will certainly want to say something. We can be sure of that. They can go ahead and have their say, but we should say nothing. All we should say is that we support the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. I agree.

Mr. Colby: There is a good chance that resistance will develop on the island if the Turks invade.

Secretary Kissinger: What, Makarios and the Communists? But if he (Makarios) is off the island, it seems to me resistance would collapse.

Mr. Sisco: If he remains on the island, there is a better chance, I agree. Makarios in the past has had Communist support. He also has a broad-based popular support.

Ambassador McCloskey: That's right, in past elections Makarios has received upwards of 95 percent of the vote—in honest elections.

Secretary Kissinger: At issue here is what is the balance of forces if a civil war develops. If the organized forces are Communist, it's an entirely different situation than if they are not.

Mr. Sisco: What are the political leanings of Makarios' Tactical Reserve Forces?

Mr. Boyatt: They are basically pro-Makarios. They are certainly not Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a basis on which to move until the situation clarifies. It's too complicated at this point. When talking to Callaghan, I could give him no ideas on what to do with Makarios. I just don't think it is in his (Makarios') interest to leave the island.

Mr. Clements: What is the size of the organized forces there, again?

Mr. Colby: There are 950 regular Greek forces, 650 Greek officers in the National Guard, and about 6,000 total forces on the island.

Mr. Sisco: Through the London-Turkish agreement the Greeks have a right to station officers on the island.

Secretary Kissinger: Our objectives as I see it are: (1) to prevent the internationalization of the situation, and (2) if civil war develops to conduct ourselves so that the Communists aren't encouraged to exploit the situation. The first thing we have got to do is decouple the Greeks, and do it today. We also have to get the Turks to stay out of it. If he (Makarios) is indeed leaving, it seems to me that organized resistance will collapse. Callaghan told me it was at Makarios' initiative to leave. Callaghan said that Makarios asked to be moved to a British Sovereign Base and from there to Malta. I just don't understand his reasons for not staying.

Mr. Boyatt: I can't either. It's quite unlike him. He has guts, and this I don't understand.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing we cannot accurately assess is what paramilitary forces are going to do. History has proved this. We have to see what develops on the island before we can really do anything. I see no problem on the recognition thing. We don't want to recognize Sampson. He's just a figurehead anyway, isn't he?

Mr. Stabler: That's right. If asked, we should just say that the question of recognition just hasn't arisen.

Mr. Colby continued to brief on the implication of the Aegean dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have anybody who can talk to the Turks?

Mr. Ellsworth: I've got some contacts in New York. I would like to get their assessment of the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Can Macomber see Ecevit?

Mr. Sisco: Sure.

(At this point the Secretary was handed a cable from which he read.)⁴

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan has just reported that Makarios is now in a Sovereign Base Area. He is not off the island yet. I had better call Callaghan and get some clarification because we can't make a judgment until we know the status of Makarios. We need to get a better view of the ground situation on the island. Can I get that from you (to Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby: You can have what we have, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to find out what the situation on the ground is first, then we can decide who we will support.

Mr. Colby: We aren't getting much information. We are getting some traffic now on military moves, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) Give me a situation report by the end of the day. Today we will concentrate our moves on Athens and Turkey. We want a clear reading on what the Turks want. Tomorrow we can take up the internal situation.

Mr. Clements: What are the Greeks doing? What is their objective in this?

Mr. Colby: They want to take over the country. They think that Makarios is nothing but a bloody Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep the Turks and the Soviets out of this. We must see how the internal situation on Cyprus evolves.

⁴ Telegram 8934 from London, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

87. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and United Nations Secretary General Waldheim¹**

July 16, 1974, 11:50 a.m.

W: This is Waldheim speaking.

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Mr. Secretary, I am grateful for you returning my call. The reason is, you have probably heard from Buffum, that we have a serious development and I wanted to inform you of a cable that we have received. This would give a clear picture of the situation. I received from my special representative and Commander in Chief in Cyprus—I don't know if you have been informed by Buffum.

K: I think Sisco has told me about it.

W: Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss, what he terms, Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know four members of the Greek Government are being treated for wounds received during the coup d'état in the last two days, so there was some involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military contingent is involved. And he also asked me to convey to you and others to help keep Cyprus independent and sovereign. I sent a message to the government of Athens and Ankara stressing the importance of maintaining . . .

K: I notice the Greek Government has affirmed this.

W: Yes, the important thing is, well it is not so important, but that the Archbishop asked that the British send a helicopter to evacuate him to a British base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted this on the condition that the Archbishop would accept evacuation to the United Kingdom and in the meantime, our commander in chief there has asked for protection, so Makarios refused to evacuate the island and I have now authorized our commander in chief to grant protection. Of course, that will cause problems in the future. This will be a problem.

K: Yes.

W: This is most important information which I got this morning. I asked Rossides whether he will ask for a meeting of the Council. He did not . . . I consulted with the President of the Council and we decided there should be a meeting at 3:00 this afternoon. The situation is

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Waldheim was in New York.

very confused and all kinds of rumors around the world and I think it is important that the Council be informed.

K: I appreciate this very much and your information is later than ours.

K: I talked with Callaghan who reports they were evacuating Makarios and that didn't sound right to me.²

W: I agree. But for us it will be a problem if the new military government is in control and no President is sworn-in, then we have a problem of what to do with Makarios.

K: How about you and I talking tomorrow and exchanging information then.

W: Yes. I think it is important to avoid intervention by the Turks. Our information is that the Turks . . . will report that they will not provide or do anything which could create deterioration of the situation, but this is the real danger.

K: We are dealing with the Turks today and I will keep you informed and I understand we are going to get together next week or soon.

W: Yes. I want to talk to you.

K: Very nice to talk to you and I appreciate your keeping me informed.

W: If I hear anything else I will let you know immediately.

² See Document 86 and footnote 3 thereto.

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, July 16, 1974, 1645Z.

4528. Subject: Cyprus Coup: Meeting with General Ioannides. Ref: State 152379.² For the Secretary.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USNATO. A handwritten note by Clift, presumably to Scowcroft, reads, "Read this one in detail!"

² Document 82.

1. I used secure reliable channel directly to General Ioannides to deliver message reftel. He began by explaining he had personal message from USG. After emissary had read two paragraphs, Ioannides commented message must be same as that Ambassador had given Kypreos, in which case emissary wasting his time since he would receive message anyway. Emissary explained his job was to finish reading message and hand it to him and would do so, to which General Ioannides said fine.

2. After emissary completed message, the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says "consistent with the above principles . . ." and threatens interference. "No matter what happened in Cyprus I (Ioannides) will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the Communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July 1974 Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists".

3. General then calmed down, came over to where emissary was sitting and said he knew he understood him: diplomatic talk is time-consuming but he would answer in as diplomatic fashion as possible because he had diplomatic mission.

4. General stated that Greece also believed in non-interference and in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus; Greece would abide by the decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom were nationalists, and these nationalists were the ones who had moved against Makarios. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. At this point he went off on a tangent stating that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots had asked for enosis, that GOT had obviously accepted these developments in Cyprus, that Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair.

5. According to Ioannides only real resistance left on Cyprus were Communist supporters of Makarios in Paphos; these supporters were even singing EAM/ELAS³ songs. Most of the rest of island was in nationalist hands. General Ioannides stated that everyone should forget that Makarios was an international figure, that he was a national hero, that he had served several useful functions and that he was a man of the cloth; Makarios had become a rotten priest homosexual; he was perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate and the owner of half the hotels

³ Reference is to the Greek Communist resistance movement of World War II.

on the island. To preserve his position and to continue his activities, Makarios was willing to sacrifice seventy per cent of the Greek Cypriot population (only thirty per cent were AKEL) and entire anti-Communist Turkish Cypriot population. Ioannides asserted Greek Cypriots in National Guard realized these facts and had begged motherland for chance to act against Makarios; General claimed that he only assisted after being presented with a *fait accompli*.

6. At this point emissary interjected and told Ioannides point-blank that, with coup only twenty-four hours after his reporting to us regarding a possible overthrow of Makarios this was very difficult for anyone to believe. At this point the General again blew up with arms waving, knocked over the same table, broke a second glass and, between obscenities, stated that he did not plot and arrange the coup, initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July, after latter learned that GOG intended to accede to Makarios' demands to reduce number of Greek officers in National Guard. General stated he could not accept at least 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from Makarios' tyranny. This coupled with Makarios' anti-regime efforts, made him decide to assist Greek Cypriot nationalists. The General stated that if Makarios succeeded in kicking Greeks out of Cyprus what could keep him from thinking he could not kick junta out of Greece. After deciding to assist Greek Cypriots, the General claimed that he did not tell the Armed Forces leadership nor any Greek official. He limited knowledge of his intentions to few select officers on 13/14 July; no one else knew and even after events unfolded on 15 July only a handful of people were aware of his role. Ioannides justified this action by asserting that if he had briefed numerous people they would have raised suggestions, advice, alternatives, and possible problems. He added that he acted on spur of the moment.

7. Ioannides declared that game was now over for Makarios, that Greek Cypriots had booted him out, that National Guard and Greek officers had assisted nationalist Greek Cypriot brothers, and that only resistance now was in Paphos. In reply to emissary's direct question Ioannides stated that Makarios was still alive "but who cares; he now has no power and no one, if he believes in principle of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign nation will assist him—not even the Russians unless Turks ask them to do so and the Turks just don't care."

8. In reply to question whether Greeks were in direct touch with Turks, General stated we have not bothered the Turks; we have not declared enosis. Turks agree that "the principal thorn" (i.e., Makarios) is gone and, "I am not in touch with the Turks." He expressed view that Greece and Turkey could now proceed at some future time to sit down, talk and solve their differences. Indeed, according to Ioannides Greeks

might even be willing to share profits of petroleum finds in a joint exploration company; however, Greece would never surrender Aegean continental shelf because this would mean Turkish control of Greek islands. He also expressed belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could probably solve their difficulties peacefully, quietly and amicably. He even joked that in a year or perhaps more realistically ten, the Turks might want to sell their share of Cyprus for increased percentage of petroleum rights. Again in reply to direct question, General Ioannides stated that he was not in contact with any Turkish official; however, he added that Turks were "officially aware" that enosis was not the objective at this point and that Greek Cypriots did not intend any bloody action against Turk Cypriots.

9. When asked for specifics on Makarios, Ioannides stated that according to Greek information, Makarios was alive and in hands of British at Episkopi Base; he had gone there with assistance of Canadians and British on island.

10. At this point Ioannides summed up as follows:

A) He stressed that he too had a God; he was definitely not anti-American; "even a jackass needed a post to be tied to" and in his case it was the U.S.

B) His hasty decision on 13 July might have been stupid. Instead of abandoning Cyprus and letting U.S. worry about its fate and pour money down another rathole, he had allowed love of country, a moral obligation to the Greek Cypriot nationalists and his "philotimo" to overrule logic and to assist Greek Cypriots.

C) Greece would do whatever was necessary to preserve its national identity and to stay anti-Communist. If this meant keeping Yiaros open it would stay open as long as it was necessary and he would accept no static from anyone on this score. Indeed, he had instructed a Greek official to tell British officially that whenever the British let Irish political prisoners out of British jails, he would free the forty-two Greek political prisoners on Yiaros.

D) He personally didn't like Nikos Sampson, but that was Greek Cypriot nationalist decision. He knew Sampson personally and in his opinion Sampson was "crazy." He jokingly remarked that new Cypriot Minister of Defense Dimitriou was very pro-American and that our Embassy there would soon realize this. He also knew Dimitriou personally.

E) While shaking hands at close of conversation Ioannides stated, "Remember we too believe in a free, independent and sovereign Cyprus, we too believe in non-interference, along with Turks and especially with Kissinger. We too believe that the Cypriots should be free to solve their own problems, be they Greek Cypriots, Turk Cypriots or both."

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, July 16, 1974, 1800Z.

4530. Subject: Potential Aftermath of Coup.

1. Makarios' escape from assassination once again could represent a signal failure in the execution of the coup. Moreover, Cypriot radio announcement quickly following the coup that Makarios killed indicates this part of pre-established scenario. The carefully prepared Sampson statement of the strong anti-Communist "Movement of National Salvation" also undoubtedly part of same scenario. Failure to kill Makarios clearly complicates the consolidation of a new regime by Sampson backers.

2. With Makarios now in a position of personal safety combined with British Foreign Office announcement it continues to recognize Makarios government, position of the rebels could become precarious. This is particularly likely if resistance on the island should continue. It seems difficult to believe that, with the expertise of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, one of the best organized Communist parties anywhere, a very strong Communist-dominated trade union and an active Socialist party under strongly leftist Lysarrides, who had developed some sort of para-military forces of his own, armed resistance to Greek led Cypriot National Guard, will not continue. In circumstances, one could expect the USSR to seek to rush military supplies to those resisting, although island probably already possesses large supplies of arms clandestinely cached. USSR would then simply be responding to request of legitimate head of an independent government and UN member.

3. If fighting should continue, it seems likely GOT would feel under increased pressure to augment its forces in Cyprus. They are legitimate under terms of London–Zurich agreements as one of three guarantor powers. In the event Turk Cypriots killed, injured or seriously threatened, pressure upon Turkey to act likely to be even greater.

4. In latter event, hard to believe Ioannides would not feel he must augment Greek forces. Incidentally, if fighting is protracted or threatens to become so, Ioannides may try to augment Greek forces in any feasible way, e.g., even clandestine infiltration since the longer and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO, and USUN.

more independent the resistance, the more disastrous the entire operation could become for Ioannides.

5. Embassy believes there is reason to lay this operation at the door of KYP, Greek central intelligence organization. A clear failure by Ioannides, given Greek tendency to abandon leaders who fail, could seriously undermine Ioannides junta. Ioannides is likely to feel under pressure, and our contact with him today indicates his actions may reflect this nervous condition, so that he may move to ensure establishment of Sampson regime as soon as possible. Unless he succeeds he could well fall into great trouble with other members of military hierarchy, particularly since Ioannides now claims he did not keep them informed, assertion for which there is some supporting evidence.

6. A final word about Sampson; a review of our biographic data and knowledge about this man confirms the impression we have had of him hitherto. His is an out and out gangster, a gorilla-type with no compunctions against murder and assassination. He may well be considered as potentially a pliable tool for Ioannides, but it seems more likely he would be a marked liability in most respects.

7. The GOT may feel that in the final analysis it is better off dealing with a direct agent of Athens rather than both Athens and Makarios. This was Papadopoulos' line, and GOT, recalling this, may feel a deal between the two military to settle Cyprus issue along with others between Greece and Turkey, may now be easier to realize. This is particularly true in light of strong public assurances GOG and Sampson group are putting out proclaiming their firm adherence to the principle of a united, sovereign and independent Cyprus, as well as their continued support for intercommunal talks to establish stabilized and viable relations between the two groups on the island.

8. At same time it should have been clear to Turkish Government from initial stages of Athens/Nicosia quarrel that tolerance of Greek regime leaders had definite limits. Uncharacteristically relaxed attitude on Turkish side supports speculation that Greek/Turkish communication in private channel, probably military, may have provided reassurance essential to avoid escalating Turkish reaction. If true, Turkish military leaders with firsthand knowledge of intentions of Greek counterparts could constitute significant element in maintaining Ankara/Athens balance in this crisis.

Tasca

90. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**¹

Ankara, July 17, 1974, 1329Z.

5629. Subj: Cyprus Coup: Amb–PriMin Meeting. For Secretary From Ambassador. Ref State 154148.² I had eighty minute meeting with PriMin noon (local time) July 17. Acting FonMin (normally DefMin Isik) and DCM Bergus also present.

After I had made points outlined para 1, reftel,³ PriMin responded as fols:

1. Current GOT assessment of situation:

A. Coup appears to have succeeded. While there are still undoubtedly Makarios resources on island, they probably are lying low now so as to avoid risk of exposure and destruction at this time.

B. Coup completely engineered by Greek Govt.

C. GOT does not fear de jure enosis move in immediate future. On contrary, Turks believe that Athens will maintain fiction of separate-ness, as this will enable GOG in effect to have two votes in UN, while it has one foot in NATO camp and another in non-aligned world.

D. GOT does not accept this as an internal Cypriot problem. On contrary, it is international matter involving violation of an agreement to which Turkey is a party and guarantor.

E. Deterioration of position of Turks on island is inevitable, if new regime stays in power.

F. Vulnerability of Turks on island greatly increased by lack of their having secure access to sea coast.

G. Current situation therefore completely unacceptable to the GOT. If acceptable situation not recreated, Turkey will have to directly intervene with military force on island.

H. If intervention necessary, it will be “bloodier” the longer it is put off. Therefore, GOT not prepared to delay intervention beyond “few days”.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated July 17. (Ibid.)

³ According to telegram 154148 to Ankara, the Embassy “made fully known to GOG, including Ioannides, our support for single, sovereign and independent Cyprus (and you should give Ecevit gist of State 152379), and urged the GOG to carry out the rotation of their contingent on Cyprus in a routine way without increasing the total number of their forces on Cyprus (State 154147).” Telegram 154147, July 17, is *ibid.* Telegram 152379, July 15, is printed as Document 82.

I. Situation has brought to head growing GOT conviction that Greek Turks cooperation within NATO must be terminated (see septel).⁴

J. GOT seeking to work closely with British as a "joint-guarantor" on this situation. (Shortly after his advising me that they were seeking high level meeting with British message was handed to PriMin saying UKG had agreed to such meeting right away in London. PriMin read me message and indicated that he and Isik would be leaving immediately for UK. He will arrive there tonight. He expected visit to last for day or so.)

K. With respect to Soviet attitude, PriMin said Russians were restless over situation, and not keeping this a secret. He saw considerable significance in official TASS statement that Cyprus developments endangered détente. Sov Amb had repeated this statement in meeting with Pres Koruturk last night. I said that we had heard of Soviet offer to put troops on island and that was one thing situation definitely did not need.

2. GOT objectives:

A. PriMin said that GOT basic objective is restitution of Cyprus' constitutional govt. By this he meant return of Makarios to his head of govt position, or if this not feasible, that Makarios successor should emerge through previously established constitutional procedures.

B. That Greek officers of Cyprus National Guard must leave the island.

C. That a secure corridor to the sea must be obtained for Turkish community.

3. I asked PriMin if he and British should reach agreement on above objectives during London meetings, how he expected them to be brought about. PriMin said "We will see. They have bases there. If they do not use them now what are they for? We will see what the British think. We will explore all peaceful solutions before considering others."

4. At end of conversation PriMin summarized situation as follows:

A. New regime on Cyprus completely unacceptable to GOT. GOT hopes status quo ante can be restored without Turkish military intervention. If this is not done, GOT prepared carry out military intervention. It believes latter would be better done within a few days rather than waiting weeks or months.

B. If new regime retains control of island, GOT might be willing hold off military intervention if a corridor to the sea guaranteed to Turkish residents of island. This, combined with clear Turkish military superiority in area, would give GOT assurance that it could rescue Turkish population if that were needed.

⁴ Not found.

5. PriMin wishes to stay in close touch with USG and would be very grateful to have Secretary Kissinger's comments on foregoing. He expressed hope that these could be conveyed to him while he was still in London.

Macomber

91. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 17, 1974, 10:10–10:48 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Joseph Sisco

Robert McCloskey

Wells Stabler

Thomas D. Boyatt

Defense

William Clements

Robert Ellsworth

Harry Bergold

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown

Lt. Gen. John Pauly

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

NSC

Richard Kennedy

Harold Saunders

Ms. Rosemary Niehuss

James G. Barnum

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), would you like to brief?

Mr. Colby briefed the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they want to achieve by doing that? (referring to information that Ankara is moving troops into positions in southern Turkey)

Mr. Colby: They probably want to move into this area (pointing to North Central Cyprus on the map). They probably want to establish an enclave in that area.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: (To Mr. Stabler) Have we told the Turks that we know of their concern?

Mr. Stabler: Not yet, but a telegram is being prepared. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: That takes too long. Call the (Turkish) Ambassador. They should know right away what our position is.

Mr. Sisco: I'll give him a call right now. (Mr. Sisco left the room.)

Mr. Clements: What's this you're doing?

Secretary Kissinger: Informing the Turks that the Greeks are not increasing the number of their forces in the island.

Mr. Colby finished his briefing.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have anything?

Mr. Clements: Well, Henry, I agree with Bill's assessment. But I don't really know why. I don't think the Turks will move in (on Cyprus). They may make some noise, but I don't think they'll move.

Mr. Colby: Oh, I think they'll try to avoid having to move. I didn't mean to say that we think they'll move. I think they'll try the diplomatic route first, but may feel in the end that they have to move in.

Secretary Kissinger: To what end? Why should they do this?

Mr. Colby: To maintain the status quo ante.

Secretary Kissinger: I still do not understand why Turkey wants Makarios back.

Mr. Colby: Well, look at it this way. It's either Makarios or Sampson at this point. Makarios is certainly better than Sampson from a Turkish point of view.

Secretary Kissinger is handed a cable.³

Secretary Kissinger: This just talks about the influx of forces; we already knew that. (Pointing to the map) If the Turks intervene, if they take that quadrant (Southwest), what is the proportion of Turks to Greeks in that area?

² Not attached and not found.

³ Not further identified.

Mr. Colby: It is largely Turkish.

Secretary Kissinger: If they take that quadrant (pointing to the northeast section of the island) what's the population there?

Mr. Lauder: It's about 50 percent Greek and 50 percent Turkish.

Mr. Colby: Their main purpose would be to establish themselves on some portion of the island just to gain a foothold.

Secretary Kissinger: With the ultimate objective of permanent occupation?

Mr. Colby: That's one proposition.

Mr. Clements: But what would they want?

Mr. Colby: To partition or divide the island.

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to talk to the President about sending someone to London to see Makarios and Ecevit. Maybe Bob (Ingersoll). Bill, (to Mr. Clements) maybe we'll send someone from Defense too.

Mr. Clements: Excellent!

Secretary Kissinger: Well, everybody's agreed on that.

I think it is important that we send somebody over there to explain what our position is. The Sampson regime, it seems to me constitutes de facto enosis in the Turk view. He (Sampson) is a most unattractive guy. It's not in our interest to have him. It's my feeling that if Makarios is brought back it can be done only by the removal of Sampson and the Greek officers and Makarios would then have to lean more to the East.

Mr. Colby: Greece continues to pretend that this is strictly an internal Cypriot affair.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but once they (the Greek officers) are removed the balance of power changes. If a Greek engineered coup fails, it would be a disaster from the Greek standpoint. It would be more than a slap in the face, it would be disastrous.

Mr. Colby: Not necessarily.

Secretary Kissinger: How's that? If a coup fails, it would weaken the influence of Athens in the entire area. As I assess the situation, for us the best outcome would be a Clerides government. I just don't understand why the Turks would want to bring Makarios back. I don't think (the Turks) understand our analysis of the situation. Somebody has to go to London and explain our position.

Mr. Clements: It's one thing for the Turks to invade, and another thing to take over only part of the island. That would downgrade Greek influence throughout the entire area.

Secretary Kissinger: If the Turks bring Makarios back, he (Makarios) would have to rely more on the Eastern bloc. We can't let Makarios become a stooge of the Turks.

Mr. McCloskey: Well, that would depend on how much support we give him (Makarios).

Mr. Colby: There seems to be no alternative to Makarios.

Mr. Boyatt: This is not a Greek-Turkish ethnic fight; it's basically a political squabble.

Mr. McCloskey: Whoever has the blessing of the U.S. will also have the necessary popular support.

Secretary Kissinger: That means we can pick and choose whoever we want. That makes us king makers.

Mr. McCloskey: Whether we pick Makarios or Clerides it would stick because we could back them.

Mr. Boyatt: In my opinion Makarios would be the best for stability, but Clerides would be better from the Turkish standpoint.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the first problem is that the National Guard is in control. How would you bring Makarios back?

Mr. Clements: That would be tougher than hell.

Secretary Kissinger: It would take a massive U.S.-Soviet effort and that would probably bring down the Greek government. How do we bring Makarios back?

Mr. McCloskey: I think we should work for Clerides.

Mr. Boyatt: We could try a diplomatic ploy. We could go to Ioannides, tell him to withdraw the Greek officers, and insist on a constitutional change, i.e., Clerides. Sampson certainly is not acceptable.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but what if Greece doesn't agree? It might be tough to do. We all love to conduct these grand stand plays, but where do we go after that? What do we want after that?

Mr. Colby: The status quo ante.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that's easy to say, but where are you after that?

Mr. Boyatt: We have stability because Clerides has been neutralized.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not so sure that serves our long-term interest. The trick is to diffuse the situation without tilting the present structure.

Mr. Colby: I'm not sure that Ioannides has all that long a future.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe (Sisco) what do you think?

Mr. Sisco: I think there is a faint hope of a political compromise. I would think our hopes rest in the restoration of a constitutional arrangement under Clerides. He has support in Cyprus. In my view, Makarios has had it. Another point I would like to make is that I don't see a Sampson-Ioannides axis as making for a long-range stability. It is a very shaky situation with the possibility of Turkish intervention.

Secretary Kissinger: I think both are primitives. (Makarios and Ioannides.)

Mr. Sisco: I share Bill's (Mr. Colby's) views. In my judgment the Turks won't leave. That would be a difficult exercise.

Secretary Kissinger: I think constitutional continuity is what we want. We want to keep the Turks from interfering and the London talks from collapsing.

Mr. Clements: Do you feel that this will escalate to the UN?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I do, but it is not in our interest to get it there. I will talk to Callaghan and see what we can do. We will send somebody over to London to talk to the Turks. I will talk to the President about this in a while. We can't let them run loose over there when they don't know our analysis of the situation.

Mr. Ingersoll: It is in our interest to work out a constitutional solution and not get the UN involved.

Secretary Kissinger: If we can keep something going on in London, we can stonewall in the UN. We want to keep Britain and Turkey out in front of the game.

Mr. Sisco: The British judgement is that Makarios has had it.

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any other points? (To Mr. Kennedy) Can you arrange for a call to Callaghan?

Mr. Kennedy: Yes.

Gen. Brown: I have one minor point that sort of parallels what we have been talking about. This Turkish opium issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's shut up a week on the poppy issue. We don't need to get that involved now.

Mr. Sisco: I have one small point. [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: That's absolutely out of the question.

Mr. Sisco: I would think so, too. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Ellsworth: Regarding the squeeze we are putting on the Turks on aid . . .

Secretary Kissinger: What is this?

Mr. Stabler: The shipment of some \$20 million worth of spare parts for Ankara has not been resumed. It is part of the opium thing.

Secretary Kissinger: There is a difference between not giving additional economic aid and not giving spare parts. We should resume the spare parts. To hold up spare military parts would be a major blow to the Turks.

92. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary Callaghan¹

July 17, 1974, 2:50 p.m.

K: Can you hear me?

C: I think so. I think if about seventeen people get off the line I could hear you better.

K: I was thinking of sending Joe Sisco or Bob Ingersoll to London so that you could get a more first hand impression of our thinking on Cyprus.

C: That would be very good.

K: Is Ecevit going to stay over night?

C: Probably will leave in the early morning. Makarios is leaving at 11:00 our time and will be with you at 1:35. He will then ask for a Security Council meeting on Friday.

K: Right.

C: So that gives you time.

K: I will try to get someone over tomorrow morning and then have him go to Athens and Ankara.

C: I think it would be very valuable. I would like that. I'll tell you our position and this is basically the European position—all the countries in the Nine and NATO. We think the ideal solution would be to get Makarios back. Whether we can do it by diplomatic means remains to be seen. Makarios asked for diplomatic activity to continue and the need for non-recognition of the new regime in Cyprus. When you look ahead for six months—will the situation be more than or less tense? Our estimation is more—that it would look to be more tense if we can't get Makarios back—but the question is can we?

K: Some of our people are wondering if a compromise not be Clerides.

C: He couldn't hold it. But the compromise might be an election in 3 months with Makarios back on the Island.

K: But how will you get him back?

C: What we would do? Well, hopefully you would exert your influence on the Greek Government about the national guard officers. The Turks under our guarantee Treaty may say to us what are you going to do and if action doesn't seem possible—any of the three powers has the

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Callaghan was in London.

right to take action. I think we can take it that we can talk about unilateral action and if so then there has to be US pressure on Greece. How do you see it?

K: I see it similarly. But I am not sure about what we are embarking on when you say diplomatic action.

C: I think the Greek regime is a bit worried. _____² has called our man in Athens to see when tomorrow . . . and I think he is going to ask what we and the Turks are up to. We think there is a chance that if there is concerted diplomatic pressure they might calm down by withdrawing some of their officers. I am thinking about the Turks tomorrow or tonight. But, if you think six months ahead, my view is that it is better to have Makarios there than Sampson.

K: That is almost certainly true, I agree.

C: The problem is three to one or five to one chance it won't succeed, but it would be worthwhile to do . . .

K: Well, we want to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to make what happens legitimate.

C: Yes. Again, looking six months ahead of Sampson—If Sampson stays, he would be accused of running a Fascist regime and the Russians are stepping up their activity so I come back again to—we may not succeed but it could be that we may crack the regime and get Sampson to withdraw.

K: Let me get somebody over to talk to you. We agree on the general approach. We are not too far apart on it.

C: Well, send somebody, but I don't think we can afford to lose much time to begin pressuring the Greeks.

K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?

K: Joe Sisco or Ingersoll.

C: After he and I talk, he can talk to you and you can make up your mind.

K: Exactly.

C: Well, I think this should come quickly. If there is a feeling in the Greek Government that you are holding back, then what is happening in the EC will not be of much importance. You have heard about the EC *démarche*?

K: No.

C: They put out a statement saying they made a *démarche* to the Greek Government—stronger than the terms I made publicly.

K: I didn't know that and it is good to know.

² Omission in the original.

C: I didn't know it til lunch and the House of Commons is anti-Greek on both sides.

K: Good, well, I'll be in touch.

C: Alright. If anything comes out of the meeting with the Turks, I will give you a call. We have had a request—that if they . . . get out of us, they might act unilaterally.

K: You can tell them we are willing to exert ourselves with the Greek Government but I want to get our strategy more precise and also that we are not supporting Sampson.

C: I'll tell them and I will leave it to you to tell them about who is coming.

K: You can tell them that we are thinking seriously about it. Call me.³

³ Kissinger and Callaghan spoke again at 5:04 p.m. Kissinger informed Callaghan that Sisco would likely be his envoy for the London talks. Callaghan, in the middle of meeting with Ecevit, informed Kissinger that Ecevit would like a joint U.S.-British statement condemning the new regime and restoring the old one, which both Kissinger and Callaghan believed too extreme. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

93. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger¹

July 17, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry. How are we getting along with our Greek friends?

K: The problem in Cyprus is the Europeans have taken a united position that Makarios ought to be brought back and they want us to bring pressure on the Greeks. My worry is that Makarios now has to lean on the Communists and Eastern bloc. All our evidence is that the opposition is in total control of the Island. My recommendation is that first, we get someone over there to make our view clear and secondly, we work for a compromise in which neither Makarios or the other guy take over. . . . They want us to rake the Greeks but if they get overthrown then that will jeopardize our whole position.

N: I know that. I can see that, but not much support from Europe?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was at the Western White House in San Clemente July 13–28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) Kissinger was in Washington.

K: No, but they know we are dragging our feet, but they don't know exactly what we want.

N: Who are you going to send?

K: Either Ingersoll or Sisco. Ingersoll has the advantage of taking orders well, but Sisco is more knowledgeable.

N: Whatever you decide, it's alright with me.

K: Sisco is necessary here to manage the thing on a day to day basis.

N: I see. What can he accomplish. Explain to them what we're trying to do.

K: The danger is this, if everyone runs to Makarios embracing him as the legitimate head . . . and if the Soviets are the only ones to offer to help restore him, we have no basis for resisting it.

N: I see the danger. We have no support.

K: We can not openly oppose Makarios but we can try to slow it down enough so that perhaps we can crystalize enough support for an internal solution. The Europeans are talking a tough game, but we have to defend their position.

N: We have to defend their game plan.

K: Exactly.

K: If the Greeks collapse, then the left wing could take over or a bunch of Greek colonels who could throw in with the Quadafi group.

N: It seems to me our course is to try to . . .

K: That's is what I would propose, with your permission, to do.

N: I think it's a good try.

K: And if it fails, we can join the consensus.

N: That's right.

K: My analysis is if Makarios is brought back this way, he will have to kick the Greek officers off the island and then the Communists will be the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on the Eastern bloc. So the coup will have shifted the balance to the left.

N: I get it. Too bad he has to come back.

K: [1 line not declassified]

N: You have to go ahead. Use either man. You're much closer to it.

K: Right and I'll arrange for Ziegler to make the announcement. Sisco² and Ingersoll are the two who know our thinking best.

N: Ingersoll is a good calm man, if he knows our position.

K: That's the advantage of Ingersoll. Well, I'll keep you informed.

² Kissinger called Sisco at 5:10 p.m. with the decision that he leave for London later that evening. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

94. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 18, 1974, 11:41 a.m.–12:22 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
John Day

Defense

William Clements
Amos Jordan
Harry Bergold

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

CIA

William Colby
George Lauder

NSC

Richard Kennedy
Rosemary Niehuss
David Ransom
James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the JCS would draw up a list of what units were available in the U.S. and Europe for movement to Cyprus, and how long it would take to move those units to the island;

—that the carrier *Forrestal* and the amphibious task force would stay 24 hours distant from Cyprus at the present time; and

—there would be no cut-off of military aid to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

² Not attached and not found.

Secretary Kissinger: What's this you're talking about?

Mr. Colby: The Soviet statement (on its position on the dispute).

(The Secretary left the room to take a phone call at 11:45 and returned at 11:51)

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements)?

Mr. Clements: I don't have a lot to say. We do have this report that DIA . . .

Secretary Kissinger: The one about Soviet forces at Odessa?

Mr. Clements: No, the one about [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. We got it through your Sit Room. I think you have seen it already. We tend to discount the information since [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are not going to publish it until this afternoon.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I don't put much credence in that. I don't think that would happen while Ecevit is in London. George (General Brown)?

General Brown: There's only one small point of concern to us. As you know, our naval forces are now in a holding pattern—well to the west of Cyprus as we discussed the other day. The amphibious forces are 24 hours away from Cyprus. Do you think it would be wise to permit them to come closer, say 10 to 12 hours from the island?

Mr. Clements: One thing that bears on that, Henry. You know we have several military programs—hardware—ongoing with the Greek regime. You may want to play with that one. I am not advocating we stop the program, just that you may want to consider it.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I'll think about that.

General Brown: Another thing. We have not upgraded any alerts. I don't know whether you might want to or not.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't see any reason at this point. It would only draw attention, wouldn't it? The Soviets would know that we have upped our alert status. How long would it take the 82nd Airborne, for example, to get to Cyprus if we had to?

General Brown: There's one company on two hour alert at all times at Fayetteville (North Carolina). It would take C130s to get them over there. They could be loaded in about two hours, but it would take about twelve hours to get them to Cyprus. I would say it would take 18 hours to get one or two battalions there.

Secretary Kissinger: (to General Brown) Can I get a chart on how long it would take to send troops over there? Could we slightly increase the alert?

General Brown: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It's a bit premature to increase the alert now. No need at this point.

General Brown: There are, of course, other units in Europe and Germany that we could send on a quicker basis.

Secretary Kissinger: Get me a chart of the units available and how much time it would take from each place—here and in Europe. Can you do that? By the end of the day?

Mr. Clements: Sure. That amphibious force, however, is still what we want to count on; it's the closest.

General Brown: Yes, but it's 24 hours away from Cyprus right now. Maybe we should move them to within, say, ten hours distance.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think we should make any movements now. I think it's premature. If the Soviets find out—and they will—they might misunderstand. We don't know what this Odessa thing is anyway.

Mr. Colby: How long would it take a division to get there? Five or six days?

General Brown: At least. It would probably take a battalion about the same time.

Mr. Clements: Our best bet is still that amphibious group.

Secretary Kissinger: How many British troops are on the island?

General Brown: I think it's about 8,000.

Secretary Kissinger: Are those all combat units?

General Brown: Some are. Some are housekeeping units. Not all, I'm sure, would fight.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to know what we have. Get me that chart.

Mr. Colby: I think I have it here, 2,700 British army troops and 5,300 Royal Air Force personnel.

Secretary Kissinger: The UN Security Council meets today.³ We have instructed our delegation to delay a vote on the resolution, if they can. We want to assess the Sisco diplomatic effort from London first. We have to find out first what is negotiable between the Greeks and the Turks. I agree that an ideal solution would be to get negotiations started, within the Zurich framework, towards a solution on which all sides would agree. I know some of my colleagues believe we are advocating the overthrow of the Ioannidis government, but that is not our policy. We still have the Cyprus problem with Turkish intervention. Our first objective is to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intervention. We can worry about Ioannidis later. We do not want to tip

³ The Security Council began deliberations on July 16, which culminated in Resolution 353 being passed 15-0 on July 20. See Document 109.

our hand on a Cyprus solution yet til we know what will come out of it.

Mr. Colby: I'm not sure that we can stall Makarios that long.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we'll see. But how can you bring him back? It's fine to say that everybody is behind Makarios—that is easy to proclaim. But the problem still remains of how to bring him back?

Mr. Colby: And we don't want a split to develop between the U.S. and the Soviets over the Cyprus issue, with the Soviets backing Makarios.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. We are not opposed to Makarios. What we want to do is try to avoid taking a stand. It's bad to get the Security Council involved.

Amb. Ingersoll: Have you heard from Joe (Mr. Sisco)?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Mr. Clements: We can't do much til we find out what the British and Joe have been talking about.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going to come out against Makarios. If he does come back (to power), fine, but it's better that he comes back with U.S. backing than with Soviet backing. If the Turks go in and restore Makarios, he has no alternative but to lean more towards the Soviets and the Eastern bloc.

Mr. Clements: Exactly right. Let's let the British move out in front on this thing.

Secretary Kissinger: And see what they offer for our support. If we declare first, the Soviets will get bold and we will give up our bargaining position. If we say that the Greek officers must go, how can they resist the pressure? We have a de facto government on the island and a de jure outside. We must find a compromise between the two. We do not want to elaborate a theme for Soviet intervention, or Turkish. If the Turks and the British want Makarios, then we will reassess.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Now, (returning to the Cyprus problem) on our press line. For the noon briefing we want to say nothing about the Sisco visit. As far as Makarios, play it cool, don't say anything if you can avoid it. Just repeat our standard line on the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Mr. Colby: I would like to put in a pitch for what the British and Ecevit talked about.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, of course. But, we don't have a report yet. Oh, you said Ecevit and the British. I thought you meant Sisco. Ecevit proposed increasing the level of Turkish forces on the island and placing the National Guard under UN control and then Makarios might be

able to come back. This, of course, would make Makarios a Turkish stooge and he would then look for a counter to Turkish influence, i.e., the East bloc. This would amount to a total shift in the balance of power on the island in part towards Turkey, but really towards Soviet/East bloc influence. Even the UK is going along; they have pulled back slightly in their public line of support for Makarios. If Makarios accepts to come back, we still have the problem of how to get him back. If the Turks brought him back, he would look for a counter to the Turks. But we have nothing personally against Makarios.

Mr. Colby: How strong is Ioannidis?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not worried about Ioannidis. If he falls, fine. That doesn't worry me. Let him fall because of his own incompetence. Getting rid of Ioannidis is no more a worry than keeping Ioannidis; it's no factor. Preventing a Greek-Turkish war and a shift in the balance of power are factors. I don't think Ioannidis is going to survive very long anyway.

Mr. Colby: He is the weakest link in the chain.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not in the interest of the U.S. to cooperate in the fall of Ioannidis. We should walk carefully on this matter and not go off half cocked.

Mr. Stabler: On the Sisco visit. He plans to go to Athens and possibly to Ankara. Should we announce that he is going to Ankara?

Secretary Kissinger: He is not going to Nicosia! What I said was that Sisco would go to Athens but that we can't confirm that he will go on to Ankara. That depends on the results of his talks in London and Athens.

Amb. Ingersoll: I do think it would be wise, however, to say that he may go on to Turkey, just to bring the Turks into this thing.

Mr. Clements: I have just one quick thing on military sales to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we made it clear yesterday that no ambassador will unilaterally decide about military aid programs. That is an interdepartmental matter and should be brought to this group for decision. We should be careful on heavy deliveries of military aid. Don't stop the stuff already in the pipeline. We'll know more in one week. I don't exclude pressure on Greece at some point, but we must wait until we see what kind of position the US/UK/Turk talks produce. But I agree I wouldn't send the heavy equipment.

95. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 18, 1974.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Honorable Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Honorable William Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs
Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State
Mr. Edward Djerejian, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Ambassador McCloskey: We want to review where we go from here. We want to send a message out giving our rationale.

Secretary: If we tie ourselves to Makarios without any precise way of returning him to power on the Island we will be giving anyone the right to support him. Also, such support for Makarios could foster unilateral attempts to get enosis. If we attempt a strong anti-Greek posture it could trigger a Turkish attack.

We want our European allies to understand that we do not want to elaborate any theory which would bring the Soviets in, or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs.

Nevertheless, we do not want to exclude the Makarios option at this point. We want to avoid the United Nations being used in an unconstitutional way during a Civil War which is a situation independent of the UN.

Specifically, I want it known that we are not drifting and our Ambassadors should understand that we want the situation to crystallize. What, in effect, is the possibility of the British using force on the Island?

Ambassador Buffum: There has been one report of British use of one Sovereign Base area, but this is highly unlikely.

Secretary: The British cannot use force. Also we have to determine what we would gain from supporting Makarios, except for psychic satisfaction and playing up to the *New York Times*.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian.

We are not opposed to the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the Island because it interferes with the internal affairs of Cyprus, but rather because it tips the internal balance on the Island and may foster the rabble in the National Guard.

Our Ambassadors should go into their host governments and not give the impression of a USG that is in doubt of its position but should definitely convey the current position that the USG is not going along with the howling mob. We want the situation to crystallize in order to enable concerted action later.

To attempt to overthrow the Greek Government to satisfy our goals and bring Makarios back is a high price to pay. Whatever our views of the Greek Government, to precipitate the present situation to a crisis which results in the overthrow of the Greek Government would open the way to Soviet intervention, force Turkish intervention and initiate a course of action that could not be sustained. Everyone must analyze the situation closely.

We must not be in an anti-Makarios position. In 1971 we were highly criticized over our policy toward India and now the Indians are coming to us. It just shows that it doesn't work that way. We require a calm and cool approach to this present situation.

McCloskey: Do you want us to send any further instructions to Sisco?

Secretary: Sisco should surface the Clerides possibility with the Turks and the British and he should get the Greeks to London on Sunday to have them face up to the situation. Basically, we have to get ourselves in a situation similar to that in which we are in the Middle East where everyone needs us and comes to us. At that point we can deliver the Greeks.

I was pleased with the French reaction.²

McCloskey: Should we be telling the French any more?

Secretary: Tell the French they can share our analysis with the EC-9 as much as they wish to. You should send Ambassador Irwin a cable telling him to approach Sauvagnargues on this basis.³ That should make the French quite happy.

² Reported in telegram 17519 from Paris, July 18. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

³ Telegrams 156348 and 157174 to Paris, July 19. (Ibid.)

96. Editorial Note

Joseph Sisco's mission to London, Ankara, and Athens began on July 18, 1974, when he met twice each with Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Prime Minister Ecevit. Excerpts of notes from his mission for those days summarized the meetings as follows:

"July 18—First meeting with Callaghan.

"Callaghan continues to support the legitimacy and restoration of Makarios on the Island. He claims Parliament and public opinion are very strong on this issue and he does not believe that UN efforts should be delayed. Callaghan agrees that restoration of Makarios in the long run would probably not be element of stability since he would be tempted to turn eastward. Callaghan claims, however, that public pressures force him to continue to support Makarios. Callaghan added that GOG would not do anything without hard USG pressure.

"Sisco emphasized that US and UK must make all out effort in UN to avoid legitimacy and restoration of Makarios since this would pre-judge further negotiations. Sisco also noted danger of Makarios being reintroduced and the unstable situation it would create. Sisco added that USG does not see Sampson as permanent feature of landscape.

"July 18—First meeting with Ecevit.

"Ecevit took hard line and his comments indicated he was sensitive to domestic situation in Turkey. He gave pro forma support for Makarios and continues to call for withdrawal of Greek officers. He places major emphasis on 'strengthening the Turkish presence in Cyprus and the need for Turkish access to the sea.' Ecevit agrees it would be useful to have further talk with Sisco in Ankara.

"July 18—Second meeting with Callaghan.

"In second meeting Sisco and Callaghan concentrated on possible elements of a package to resolve Cyprus problem. They include: (1) flexible constitutional arrangements, (2) Turkish access to the sea under UN supervision, (3) replacement of Greek officers in National Guard, (4) closer UN supervision of troop rotation, and (5) strengthening of Turkish presence on the Island. Callaghan notes that he does not necessarily preclude use of military forces by UK since there are important UK interests involved.

"July 18—Second Sisco–Ecevit meeting.

"In second session Ecevit took more extreme line presenting some ideas which were tantamount to partition. Ecevit noted that Turkey could not tolerate situation created by coup in Cyprus and believes that creeping enosis is taking place. He calls for two autonomous provisional governments. Also asks for free access to airports and seaports supervised by guarantor powers. Sisco agrees to examine all ideas and

discuss situation further with Ecevit in Ankara. Sisco also agreed to visit Ankara evening of July 19.

"During both Sisco–Ecevit conversations there were indications of a separation in Ecevit's large delegation with pressures from home for a very hard line.

Comment: Compared to the first session with Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit's proposals in the afternoon were very stiff. He called for a 'Strengthening of the Turkish presence' which no Cypriot or Greek Government could accept. He was also stronger in second meeting that he would not talk to Greeks.

"Sisco's strategy on how to proceed in both Athens and Ankara was as follows: In Athens he would make all-out effort to get GOG to commit itself to talks with UK in London in spirit of London–Zurich agreement. He believed, however, that even this process would not likely be enough to stay Ankara's hand. In Ankara he would tell the Turks that he is prepared to return to Washington to recommend to the Secretary and the President that US explore with Greek Government a return to Constitutional arrangements in Cyprus at an early date. This would involve Clerides taking over. In the meantime he would ask for Turkish assurances not to undertake any military action.

"Enroute to Ankara Sisco put together a 'return to constitutional arrangements' proposal which would entail Clerides assuming acting Presidency." (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

The notes summarized Sisco's more extended reports transmitted in telegrams 9092 from London (*ibid.*, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974), and 4624 and 4625 from Athens, all dated July 19. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)

97. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, July 18, 1974, 2354Z.

156312. Subject: Policy Considerations in Cyprus Situation.

1. Our principal objectives at this time are (A) to prevent a Turkish decision to intervene militarily, and (B) to avoid the development of positions by other countries which might contribute to the outbreak of civil war in Cyprus. In either event, the Soviets would exploit the situation to their advantage, thus enhancing their position in the Eastern Mediterranean and strengthening the Communists in Cyprus.

2. We must, therefore, seek to slow down actions either by individual countries or within the UN which might tend to precipitate either of the above two events and endeavor to gain time to develop a situation where a negotiated settlement on Cyprus can be achieved. The ideal solution would be to obtain a negotiated agreement between the UK, Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers.

3. The situation is that while Makarios remains the *de jure* President of Cyprus, a *de facto* regime exists on the island and it has established full control. It seems unlikely that Makarios can reestablish himself without outside support. If the UN is permitted to adopt a resolution which legitimizes Makarios' position and calls for his return on the possible pain of sanctions, then in the wake of certain refusal of the Western powers to undertake this mission, the Soviets would undoubtedly endeavor to fill the void, with all its implications. Makarios' return to Cyprus under these conditions would only enhance the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and that of the Communists in Cyprus.

4. While the Turkish Government is presently supporting the return of Makarios, its demands to improve its strategic position on the island would not be viable since if Makarios should return under these conditions, he would be unwilling to appear as a Turkish satellite and would look to outside support, in all probability the Communists, to counterbalance the Turkish position. We must, therefore, urge the Turks to take a long-range view of the situation and recognize that their present posture could be seriously detrimental to their interests.

5. We also believe that the UK, in considering its present course, must face up to the probability that Makarios cannot be restored by

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974, Folder 2. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Nicosia, London, Paris, Bonn, Athens, Ankara, USNATO, USUN, USCINCEUR, and the White House to pass to San Clemente for Secretary Kissinger.

political means and must recognize the fact that it does not have the means to accomplish this in any other form.

6. With respect to Greece, it is quite clear that the return of Makarios would be totally unacceptable since the whole objective of the regime has been the removal of Makarios. Moreover, Makarios' return could only be accomplished through the removal of the Sampson regime and the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the National Guard. If Makarios were restored under these conditions, the influence of Athens in Cyprus would be reduced, and the consequent weakening of the balance of force would tend to make Makarios place greater reliance on the Communists and on the Eastern bloc.

7. The Sampson regime is clearly unacceptable to the Turks and to a good part of the international community. The US also cannot accept the Sampson regime. However, it is now in place and we believe it would be unwise to seek the removal of Sampson until a substitute solution is in sight. With regard to the Greek officers of the National Guard, we believe that it would be a mistake to take any position on that matter for the reason outlined in para 6 above and pending the development of a negotiated solution. However, we are not committed to the continuing presence of Greek officers in the National Guard.

8. It is important that our friends and allies understand that any course of action relating to Cyprus which results in the overthrow of the Greek regime, opens up the Eastern Mediterranean to Soviet meddling and exploitation, and invites active Turkish intervention would initiate a course of events which would be unpredictable, difficult if not impossible to control, and which would have seriously damaging effects on Western interests.

9. The thrust of our position at this time, therefore, is to avoid assuming a public posture which commits us to any particular course of action. We view as unlikely the restoration of Makarios and we do not accept a Sampson regime. Consequently, the situation in favor of either one or the other should not be allowed to freeze, thus creating the conditions for the development of a compromise and negotiated settlement which would permit the maintenance of constitutional arrangements in Cyprus, both in their internal and external aspects.

10. *For Ambassadors or Chargés:* Above should be used only in your discussions with highest level of government to which accredited.

11. *For Ambassador Rumsfeld:* You may use above in briefing Luns on US analysis of Cyprus situation, but for obvious reasons cannot be used in NAC session. However, you are authorized in NAC session to seek to slow down any moves which might compromise our objectives as outlined.

98. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 19, 1974, 2:43–3:29 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Robert Ingersoll

State

Robert McCloskey

Wells Stabler

Dean Brown

John Day

Defense

William Clements

Amos Jordan

Harry Bergold

JCS

LTG John W. Pauly

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

NSC

Richard Kennedy

Harold Saunders

Rosemary Niehuss

David Ransom

Col. Clinton Granger

James Barnum

Amb. Ingersoll: I am sorry gentlemen, but we have been on the telephone to the Secretary,² who has been talking with Callaghan to get the British views.³ The British have promised to send us a cable

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

² Kissinger, who was in San Clemente, spoke with McCloskey, Ingersoll, Stabler, and Buffum at 9:30 a.m. (EDT); McCloskey soon thereafter; and McCloskey, Ingersoll, and Stabler at 11:35 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

³ Ambassador Ramsbotham called Kissinger at 2:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) and transmitted a letter from Callaghan. (Ibid., Box 123, Geopolitical File, Chronological File) Kissinger and Ramsbotham discussed the differences in emphasis in the positions

this afternoon on Joe's (Mr. Sisco) visit and the British position. We'll have it for you all shortly. Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.⁴

Amb. Ingersoll: Bill, (Mr. Clements) do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Bill (Mr. Colby) and I, we were talking about the situation before you came in. We have the same information that he has and are in substantial agreement. I would like to bring up the amphibious forces, however. As you know, we have ordered our amphibious group—with your concurrence—to move to about one hundred to fifty miles off Cyprus.

Amb. Ingersoll: How long do you estimate it will take them to get there?

Mr. Clements: Well, we're thinking in terms of ten hours. That is, ten hours to the beach.

Amb. Ingersoll: Is that ten hours from where they are holding or from the one hundred miles away?

Mr. Clements: From the one hundred miles out. We could cut the time if we need to.

(Messrs. Ingersoll, Kennedy and Stabler were called to the phone at 2:52 p.m. and returned at 3:02 p.m.)

Mr. Stabler: That was the Secretary.⁵ He had just received a message from Joe (Mr. Sisco) on the Athens visit. It is not clear if he saw Ioannidis. We're not clear on that, but it probably was not possible. Joe said that the British Ambassador saw Ioannidis yesterday. Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have anything to add?

Mr. Clements: Only what I said before you left, that we have moved the units closer to the island; but I want to stress that the orders that have gone to the fleet are that they move for evacuation purposes only, not for intervention. The other thing we're doing is beginning the process of drawing up some contingency plans, but they are purely contingency.

of their respective governments despite having the same overall policy toward Cyprus, owing to the fact that Britain remained a guarantor power of Cyprus.

⁴ Attached but not printed. Colby related information about Turkish military movements, which indicated that a Turkish invasion would occur July 21 or 22 or possibly earlier. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings)

⁵ Reference is to a group of phone calls made in the few minutes before and the first few minutes of the WSAG meeting. Kissinger talked to Ingersoll, McCloskey, Stabler, and Kennedy at 2:30 p.m. (EDT); French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues at 2:45 p.m.; and McCloskey, Ingersoll, and Stabler at 2:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, we at State have also told our escape and evacuation people to get ready. We have made no moves, just have asked them to get their plans up to date. I think it would be wise at this time to move the amphibious forces in closer.

Mr. Clements: Yes, they're moving in now. You might want to mention what the Secretary decided to do yesterday.

Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, the Secretary suggested . . .

(Amb. Ingersoll was called to the phone at 3:05 p.m. and returned at 3:10 p.m.)⁶

Amb. Ingersoll: Have we received that wire from Joe (Mr. Sisco)?

Amb. McCloskey: No. I understand we won't see it until we get back to the Department.

Amb. Ingersoll: Why don't we have it sent here?

Amb. McCloskey: Why not.

(Mr. Kennedy instructed the Situation Room.)

Amb. Ingersoll: Bob (Amb. McCloskey) would you like to explain our position to the people here on what we plan to tell the Turks, that we're not opposed to Makarios, but are against Sampson. By the way, the Secretary is meeting with Makarios here on Monday.

Amb. McCloskey: I don't know if you have seen the instructions to Ankara,⁷ but the emphasis is on convincing the Turks that military action won't settle the problem on Cyprus or in the area as a whole, and would only invite Greek counter activities. It explains that we don't support enosis and that we're working to find a diplomatic solution that all will agree with. We have no U.S. proposals to make at this point, but are thinking of possible alternatives. It's our thinking that if the Turks insist on the return of Makarios this can have only a destabilizing impact on the island and on the area as a whole because we think that Makarios will have to turn to the left inside the country and out in order to remain in power. Joe (Mr. Sisco) can raise the name of Clerides as a possibility, but not as a U.S. idea, of a compromise solution.

Mr. Clements: Have we said this publicly?

Amb. McCloskey: At State we have. We are saying that we think that a military solution is completely out of the question and that we are working for a solution through diplomatic processes. Privately we are thinking about alternatives.

⁶ Kissinger called Ingersoll at 3:05 p.m. (EDT) and relayed his instructions for comments to the press. Kissinger wanted to emphasize that there was no American plan, only that the United States was discussing ideas designed to prevent a Greek-Turkish war and to restore constitutional rule. (Ibid.)

⁷ Telegram 156801 to Ankara, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Mr. Clements: But we are not saying that we are looking for a plan to end this thing.

Amb. McCloskey: No, I think that probably we have taken enough of a beating. I think that by Makarios coming here and the Secretary seeing him on Monday⁸ this will tend to dim some of the criticism. Also, Senator Fulbright will see him (Makarios) on Monday, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee has made a similar invitation. One thing. This may not be a proper question to raise here, but apparently there is concern as to Makarios' security while in the U.S. There have been some threats to his safety and the ambassador has asked us to supply him with a plane from New York to Washington on Monday. My inclination is not to do this.

Mr. Clements: Why?

Amb. McCloskey: Well, there is a fine diplomatic line here that you may not understand. What we are trying to say diplomatically is that we neither support Makarios or any other person. The fact that Makarios has been acknowledged by the Security Council, and if we supply him a plane, gives the impression that our position is one of leaning toward Makarios. This we want to avoid at the time being. This may be over worked, but . . .

Mr. Colby: There are dozens of planes we could charter that would avoid the whole problem.

Mr. Clements: Frankly the problem is completely lost on me. If we are worried about his security, let's give him an unmarked air force jet. We could make it small and one with no insignia.

Amb. McCloskey: Their request is based on a security threat. I wouldn't . . .

Mr. Lauder: The report came from a good source [*less than 1 line not declassified*] saying that orders have been given to assassinate Makarios anytime and anywhere in the world. Now, it is only one source and one report. We have no back up. We passed this on to the Secret Service because we felt we should. You can never tell about these things.

Amb. Ingersoll: Bill (Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby: Nothing to add to what George said. I don't think he should fly in Air America, however!

Amb. Ingersoll: We'll think about that. Should we talk a little about what happens if the Turks land? What should we do?

Mr. Clements: We've thought a little about that, but have had no real chance to discuss it. There are several plans we could enact, like

⁸ July 22.

embark by air, or take them to British base areas. There are all kinds of things we could do to protect our nationals. That is our sole mission at this point, protecting our nationals, right?

Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, that is all we are talking about. What is the complement of the amphibious forces?

Gen. Pauly: There is a total of five ships. There is one LPH and two LPDs. There are some 1800 marines on the LPH. In addition, there are 14 helicopters that could be used to evacuate personnel.

Amb. Ingersoll: Then you could evacuate all of the American personnel.

Mr. Clements: Sure. What we want is a secure situation on the shore, before we act. This we are going to have to get from you (State). We will have plans to cover all evacuation. All State has to decide is when.

Amb. Ingersoll: We will know better when we get a feel from Athens and Ankara.

Mr. Colby: There is also the British. They have some 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel on the island and 2,700 army.

Mr. Lauder: There are a great many tourists still on the island.

Amb. Ingersoll: Do we know how many are off yet?

Mr. Lauder: No.

Amb. Ingersoll: From what I have read, it sounds like the Berlin Airlift. Is there a port at the British base?

Mr. Lauder: The big port is at Famagusta. There is also a base there.

Mr. Colby: There is also a port at Larnaca.

Mr. Clements: One of the things that Joe (Mr. Sisco) is doing down in Ankara is impressing the Turks on the necessity of getting our civilians out of there, I hope.

Amb. Ingersoll: I have tried to reach the British Ambassador today but he is out. There is also a message coming in saying what they plan to do (regarding evacuation on Cyprus).

(Mr. Ingersoll was handed the attached cable from Athens (4269).⁹

Amb. McCloskey: (reading from cable) The Greeks have agreed to send someone to London to consult the UK as guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich Agreement.

Amb. Ingersoll: At least he has something to talk about.

Mr. Colby: The real problem is getting the Turks to hold up an invasion until Monday.

⁹ Attached but not printed; the preliminary number was 4269.

Mr. Clements: We could leave them out there in those small boats; they'll be good and sick by that time.

Amb. Ingersoll: I believe this brings us up to date. We'll have to see now how Joe does in Ankara. I believe you all should keep close. We'll meet tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m.

Mr. Kennedy: (to Mr. Ingersoll) I suggest that a WSAG Working Group be established to develop the various issues and options open to us in the event the Turks invade Cyprus. I also think it a good idea that the Working Group be kept in being at all times so it can do options studies for the WSAG as the situation develops.

Amb. Ingersoll: Good. (to all) We'll set up a Working Group, and each of you name a principal. The first meeting of the Group should take place this afternoon.

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, July 19, 1974, 1707Z.

4658. Polto 20. For the Secretary from Sisco. Department pass to selected posts and to Schlesinger and Clements.

Subject: Cyprus—Discussion With GOG Leaders.

1. I have just completed long discussions with GOG leaders (PM and FM) and including surprise and unannounced participation of General Ioannides and General Bonanos, #2 in the country.

2. I go with something from the Greeks to Ankara since I believe they are beginning to realize how serious the situation is and how equally serious it would have been for me to go to Ankara empty-handed. What I bring is probably not enough, but I have something. I have been authorized by the GOG to convey the following to the Turks.

A. Greece has agreed to go to London to consult the UK as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London-Zurich agreement. The PM said he had in mind for talks to take place on Monday.

B. Greece agrees to use its influence with the Government of Cyprus to work out practical arrangements which would strengthen

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951-1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 1749Z.

the role of the UN on: effective control of certain seaports and airports in order to insure against importation of clandestine troops, arms and material coming into the country, and to assure regular rotation by Greek and Turkish units.

3. I got nowhere on the question which interested the Turks most, namely, a willingness to give the Turkish community access to the sea [garble—via?] some port or ports under UN supervision. As I expected, GOG saw this proposal as a form of separatism or partition (which it is) and it was therefore politely but firmly rejected. GOG rejected anything smarting of partition, and I did not therefore put forward out-right partition proposal which Ecevit gave me in my second meeting yesterday,² since it might have cooled them on going to London.

4. I will of course make the most of all of this with the Turks and argue that the above can constitute the beginning of a serious process and that we will maintain a continuing interest as UK continues contact with GOG and Turks as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich agreement. I do not believe it will be enough, and I believe it will be necessary to launch my recommendation of last night re constitutional arrangements³ (Clerides) in order to bulwark the above and to try to secure a commitment from GOT that it will not intervene militarily.

5. Finally, I have the distinct impression that no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis.

Sisco

² See Document 96.

³ See *ibid.*

100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger¹

July 19, 1974, 8:15 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello. Jim.

S: Yes Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we're in step on it. My view is that—you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.

S: Right. They're landing.

K: They're landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don't fire. So we're going to pass that message and we're also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That's—that means they have gotten rid of Makarios and they'll have to give up Sampson. And we'll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don't think this will really fly but at least it's a slender thread.

S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.

K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.

S: That's very generous of them. That's good. OK . . .

K: If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enosis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enosis or Clerides.

S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.

K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I'm not against it, I just wish they'd do first things first.

S: Well, my feeling on that is we can afford to wait and see what circumstances develop.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente with President Nixon; Schlesinger was in Washington.

K: That is my feeling.

S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US Government.

K: Agree completely.

S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint—the statement that I got—was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.

K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.

S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.

K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of—if they convince me that we need it, I assume we can appeal to you.

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.

S: We can move by car.

K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.

S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.

K: So we will work either for double enosis or for Clerides, whichever works out.

S: OK, bye.

K: Bye.

101. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador at Large McCloskey¹

July 19, 1974, 8:45 p.m. PDT.

M: Hello.

K: Hello, OK. Sisco is to go to Athens. Callaghan agrees.²

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; McCloskey was in Washington.

² Kissinger spoke with Callaghan at 8:22 p.m. PDT. (Ibid.)

M: OK.

K: Before he goes to Athens he is supposed [to go?] back to the Turks and he is to tell them first of all that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, we now believe that the Clerides solution is the only one and that he has been instructed to [go to] Athens to propose it, and that we expect the Turks to go along with us. And we are interpreting that phrase "go along with it". Now is there anything else on his tortured mind? Has he told you our whole plan on the telephone?

M: No.

K: What is his objection? Callaghan does not want him in London.

M: OK, that is doesn't know and no one could tell him that before now. [*sic*]

K: Well, what was he going to do in London? Will you tell me?

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I don't know what he was going to do in London. I had to be interrupted twice while I was speaking with him.

K: What is his reason for not wanting to go to Athens?

M: He says there is no way the Greeks will accept the Clerides proposal that has already been rejected by the Turks furthermore.

K: Then he has been writing out the cables.

M: But that is what he is saying to me over our rough connection.

K: As to who will be president under those circumstances, Ecevit said government in Turkey does not care. Now, what in the hell does that mean?

M: OK. I think I still have an open line to him. I'll go back to him and tell him he must go, we will have detailed instructions for him there and . . .

K: Yeah, but before he goes we want him to go back into the Turks. By now what else have the Russians not picked up? What is there left to say? OK, we've said so much on the open line we might as well go ahead. But Sisco is going to Athens and he is going to stay there. Now has anyone talked to Tasca?

M: We have been trying to get a call into him also. Bob Ingersoll is trying to get that call through.

K: Yeah, but not before we have had an evacuation. OK, let's get to Tasca, but let's not do everything on an open line.

M: OK.

K: Fine. Bye.

102. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Director of Central Intelligence Colby¹

July 19, 1974, 9:35 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill, how are you? Sorry to have kept you on the line.

C: That's OK.

K: I just wanted to check in with you and to make sure you would of course be keeping a close watch on this thing. Can you get us out here—I'm in San Clemente—your estimate of how this thing is going to evolve.

C: All right. Fine.

K: And also what the Turkish capability is to put troops ashore. What is it, do you know?

C: It's very good. They've got about I'd say about a regiment or so on the ships. They've got about 20 odd ships.

K: A regiment is what, 2000?

C: It's 2 or 3 thousand, yes.

K: And then how many can they send?

C: And they've got some airborne also. They have an airborne brigade.

K: How many is that?

C: They apparently are going for Kyrenia on the north coast. That's the first step.

K: But what do you think they're after? They're not after the whole island are they?

C: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.

K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.

C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka on up and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.

K: What do you think the Greeks are going to do?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Colby was in Washington.

C: Well, the local Greeks will fight and there are some reports that there is some bombing at Kyrenia already. And the National Guard particularly will fight. This is the one with the Greek officers in them.

K: They will fight.

C: You will have a very unpleasant thing in Cyprus itself. The Greeks themselves are a bit far away, quite frankly. They are about at the range of their aircraft and they can't do very much from there.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Pardon.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Well, but their basic airfield is back in Greece and Athens and that area.

K: What is the relative strength of those two armies?

C: The Turks are about 300,000 and the Greeks about 100,000. But most of the Greek forces are up in the north, up in Thrace. And if you had kind of a mixup, that's where it would take place. Up in the northern area there, around Salonika.

K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?

C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let's negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.

K: OK.

C: Their basic position has been that this is an internal affair in Cyprus. You know, so they have a face saving basis for saying, "Well, that was just a local affair. It's not Greece."

K: Yeah, OK. Thank you.

C: So in a sense they could say "Well, that was a great mistake down there in the island, but we're above that." I think the most important thing is to limit it to Cyprus and not let it go out beyond that.

K: OK, thank you.

C: We'll pass on anything else we get, Henry.

K: Thank you. Bye.

103. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger¹**

San Clemente, July 19, 1974, 10:06 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Apparently the battle is started, huh?

K: Yeah. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven't had a Greek reaction yet. I've got Sisco going to Athens under protest because he thinks it might be a little dangerous for him there.

P: Oh.

K: But I figure if Tasca can stand it, he must be able to stand it.

P: Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?

K: Yeah. That's all right, Mr. President, that's what they pay under-secretaries for.

P: God almighty, that's what they pay us all for.

K: That's right.

P: And with Tasca there I should think he could have some—if anybody could have any influence with the people. Thank God he's there; he's a tough guy.

K: He's a good fellow.

P: What does he report?

K: We haven't had anything from Athens yet—not one word.

P: You think this is the kind of a thing that requires—that they feel my presence in Washington—that I have to get the hell back there for this thing?

K: Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war.

P: Yeah, and then what do we do there?

K: Not much but I think . . .

P: I have to be there.

N: That is all that matters is that you know we can do everything—I can do everything here that I could do in Washington.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

K: You remember we had the same problem when the Mid East war started—you were in Key Biscayne and we advised strongly not to move.

N: In the Mid East we had basically interests that were—well—

K: We didn't want to exacerbate the situation and there wasn't anything you could do in Washington that you couldn't do in Key Biscayne—But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.²

N: How?

K: Well, if the Greeks accept Clerides as a solution and if they—and if the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire.

N: And you don't want to go to the UN because that'll get the Russians in it.

K: Well we can go to the UN in a few hours—it's the middle of the night.

N: Oh, I know, I know.

K: But it won't contribute much—we can do it tomorrow morning.

N: Well as you know Henry, there is always a damn symbolism in the UN—you and I both know what a mine field it is, but I don't know.

K: The UN is going to meet again tomorrow morning, Mr. President. They met on Cyprus today.

N: Yep. Security Council.

K: Yeh. I think to call them in the middle of the night when neither of the parties involved—

N: No, no, no. That's the point, I just—it is—

K: I would wait until tomorrow morning on the UN.

N: Just so we can avoid the appearance that we are not completely on top of it and I think we certainly are—now you are planning to go back tomorrow afternoon?

K: That is right, Mr. President. That's night out there and that gives me a chance to get on top of it.

N: Hell, you are on top of it here too.

K: What I mean is I'll be travelling while people are sleeping out there—in the Middle East.

N: True, true. Thank God it isn't Syria and Israel or something like that—that'd be worse wouldn't it?

K: Well before your term is over Mr. President, we'll have that privilege too.

² July 22.

N: I hope not.

K: I hope not, but I wouldn't lay odds on it.

N: That depends on our Israeli friends to a great extent—we are going to keep a very strong line there—anybody who gets arms from the US by golly to use it—this of course is the Cyprus thing—an . . .

K: [1 line not declassified]

N: [1 line not declassified]

K: [1½ lines not declassified]

N: Yeah, yeah. It is really what we have here as far as the Turks are concerned as you pointed out is just one of the problems you have when you have a weak government and they want a foreign adventure to prove their toughness.

K: And a great opportunity—the Greek government . . . and the—and isolated itself; the Cypriot government can get no international support being headed by a professional gunman and so the Turks did what they have been wanting to do for 15 years—establish a predominant position on Cyprus.

N: And the Greeks will never let them do that.

K: No, but the only place the Greeks can fight them is not in Cyprus but some other place.

N: Now tell me just in that connection, Henry, what is the alignment of forces there—the Greeks don't have enough forces there, I mean if they control the Cypriot government, I would assume that—

K: The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probably . . . over about 3,000 or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000 airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster.

N: They can, huh.

K: Yeah.

N: So what would the Greeks do—I'm just trying to—

K: Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace.

N: Gosh.

K: I don't exclude that they'll negotiate Mr. President. If Sisco hasn't lost his nerve completely, I think they can be gotten to negotiate.

N: God Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca won't. Don't underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now.

K: No, no, I have already gotten instruction to him, Mr. President.³ And he has—he is already working.

³ Instructions were relayed in telegrams 156801 and 157127 to Ankara, both dated July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

N: And they know too the penalty of failing to negotiate is a—they just rupture their situation with us—they break it right, don't they?

K: That is right. First.

N: That of course isn't much of an option for us—consider what it does to NATO.

K: Exactly. No, it is a mess. It is two totally irresponsible governments going at each other.

N: We got to posture needless to say in a way that we are not—that we aren't responsible for the damn thing. I don't think—except for a few nuts—that what, that we could have saved this fellow—how could we have saved him.

K: Who Makarios?

N: Yeah.

K: There was no way we could have saved Makarios—the question was could we have brought him back faster. The answer was he didn't even show up in London till Wednesday⁴—that night we sent Sisco there—Mr. President, I have Callaghan calling me⁵—should I take that call and then call you back.

N: You could do it and then call me. Right.⁶

⁴ July 17.

⁵ Kissinger spoke to Callaghan at 10:15 p.m. PDT. Callaghan suggested that if Sisco could persuade the Greeks to replace Sampson with Clerides, then the Turks might motivate the Turkish Cypriots to support a cease-fire. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁶ No record of this conversation has been found.

104. Editorial Note

On July 20, 1974, Joseph Sisco held meetings in Ankara and Athens, in the midst of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Excerpts of notes from his mission for that day summarized the meetings as follows:

"July 20—Early morning Sisco–Ecevit meeting.

"Sisco met during the early morning of July 20 with Ecevit. It was clear that Turks had already taken decision to intervene militarily and Ecevit refused to budge. Sisco told Ecevit that in Greek eyes, so far as Turkey is concerned, what had occurred in Cyprus had destroyed a large measure of confidence. Also GOG realized seriousness of situation and agreed to engage in dialogue. Sisco noted that Greeks said they were ready to fight. USG believes that intervention in Cyprus

would not be in Turkish interest. Sisco also floated Clerides idea with the Turks and stated we have no preconceived notions and are flexible on this matter.

“Ecevit said that he would consult with his Council of Ministers on the situation. Later he informed Sisco—after his Council of Ministers meeting—that the Turkish decision was irrevocable.

“In the early morning hours of July 20 the Turkish invasion force landed on Cyprus and Sisco returned to Athens. He met with the Acting Foreign Minister who demanded the immediate cessation of Turkish action and also said that general mobilization had been ordered. Sisco said that the USG wanted an end to the hostilities and wanted both Greece and Turkey to negotiate settlement in London. We would work to this end. He added that Greece bears certain responsibilities for the present situation. He added that U.S. would be closely associated with negotiations in London. He then left immediately for Ankara to try to obtain Turkish agreement to a ceasefire.

“On July 20 Sisco saw Ecevit and in very tough language laid it on the line and gave him ceasefire proposal. He told Ecevit that GOT conditions for starting talks had been met and let him know that prolongation of the conflict would result in severe damage to U.S.-Turkish relations. Ecevit said he would talk to military and Cabinet as soon as possible and get back to Sisco. In reporting back to the Department, Sisco noted that it was his judgment that Ankara does not take very seriously the Greek threat to declare war.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

Sisco reported his meetings to the Department in telegrams 4664 (*ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II), 4667, and 4742 from Athens, and 5745 and 5746 from Ankara, all dated July 20. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974)

105. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 20, 1974, 11:07 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Robert Ingersoll

State

Robert McCloskey

Wells Stabler

Dean Brown

John Day

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

George Vest

Defense

Amos Jordan

Denis McAuliffe

JCS

LTG John W. Pauly

Gen. Eaton

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

NSC

Richard Kennedy

Harold Saunders

Rosemary Niehuss

David Ransom

Col. Clinton Granger

James Barnum

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.²

Mr. Ingersoll: Amos (Mr. Jordan), would you like to bring us up to date on where we stand?

Mr. Jordan: General Pauly is prepared to give us a run-down on the military factor.

Gen. Pauly: There are three main things that we have done since we last met. One is that we have directed the amphibious task force to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

² Attached but not printed.

move south of Cyprus, about 40 miles off-shore, with express orders to assist in the evacuation of civilians—not U.S. intervention. The other task force with the *Forrestal* in it is to move behind the amphibious group for support purposes only. [8 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Pauly: [6 lines not declassified]

Another thing we are trying to do is to get ourselves into a better position in terms of reaction time. Number one, we are moving, in a casual manner, if I can use that term, two C-130s to Aviano (Italy) in case of evacuation. They have been instructed specifically to do this without attracting attention of any kind. Also, the question of the US assets (military equipment and people) in Turkey has also come up. You might want to address the desirability of doing this. We have 18 F-4s, for example, in Turkey. [less than 1 line not declassified] In Greece, there is a small detachment there for a gunnery meet. There are also two destroyers in port at Athens. They are slowly being brought back to a state of readiness.

There is also the problem of the replacement for the aircraft carrier *America*, which, as you know, has been holding at Rota, Spain. Its replacement, the *Independence*, sailed two days ago on its regular schedule. Now, normal procedure for the turnover of these ships is to time it so they meet about 950 miles off the European continent and exchange the baton. If we follow the normal procedure, this would mean the *America* would pull out on the 24th (of July) and they would meet on the 26th. We need a signal from you if you want to proceed the normal way or alter it some way. If we want to stick to normal procedure, the *America* must sail on the 24th.

Mr. Ingersoll: How much advance notice do you need?

Gen. Pauly: Twelve hours would be enough. They are already on standby, and instructions to sail could be given at the last minute. The task force proceeding to Cyprus should be in position to begin extracting civilians by 2:00 a.m. tomorrow morning, our time. We can begin to start extracting civilians by midnight tonight, our time, with the choppers.

Mr. Ingersoll: Where will the task force be then?

Gen. Pauly: Off the south coast of Cyprus, about 40 miles south of the British Sovereign Base Area.

Amb. McClosky: And where are they now?

Gen. Pauly: They were some 20 hours out. By now they must have eaten up at least six hours of that time.

Mr. Ingersoll: That's amazing! I thought that yesterday you told me that they had been instructed to move. That was twenty-four hours ago. They must be closer than that by now.

Gen. Pauly: I'll check that. When I returned from the meeting yesterday the message to move had still not gone out.

Mr. Stabler: From where will they pull the civilians?

Gen. Pauly: From the ports along the southern part of the country. I understand from the British Ambassador that the British are working with our people over there for an evacuation route.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is a good port at Dhekelia.

Gen. Pauly: We'll probably use the choppers, there are 14 of them on the task force.

Mr. Ingersoll: Bob (Amb. McCloskey), would you give us a run-down on the latest diplomatic efforts?

Amb. McCloskey: The Secretary was in touch last night with the foreign ministers in Paris, London, and Bonn, explaining our position to them. I think we can expect the outcome of these discussions to show up soon in the deliberations of the EC-9. Our basic position is: (1) support a ceasefire; (2) get both Greece and Turkey to agree on negotiations with the British, in London; and (3) that our objective is to see the reestablishment of constitutional rule in Cyprus. In New York, at the Security Council, we are going to join with the British and the French in a resolution that calls for the three principles I just mentioned. The intention of our joining in the resolution is to show that the U.S. and the European countries are going in the same direction. Whether the resolution will reach a vote today is questionable. The Secretary has approved a statement to be made by (Amb.) Scali that, while critical of Turkey, puts the blame for the war on Greece.³

Mr. Stabler: Where is Joe (Mr. Sisco) now?

Amb. McCloskey: Joe is in Ankara and is scheduled to see the heads of the government today. The Secretary has instructed to be brutal towards the Turks in the sense that he can say that we will withhold all military aid in the event there is an all-out war.⁴ Joe will try to bring the Turks back to London with him, but his stay in Ankara is open-ended. The Secretary (Dr. Kissinger), by the way, is scheduled to leave San Clemente at 1:00 or 2:00 our time this afternoon. He'll get back here early this evening.

Mr. Ingersoll: I thought Joe got agreement for the Greeks to send representatives to London.

Mr. Stabler: There is some confusion over that. I think it is if there is not an all-out war and a temporary ceasefire.

³ For Scali's statement of July 19 during a UN Security Council session, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXI, No. 1833, August 12, 1974, pp. 262-263.

⁴ Telegram 157969 to Ankara, July 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951-1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974)

Mr. Jordan: If I could, for a minute, turn to the military supply problem. We have, as you know, put a temporary hold on all military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Amb. McCloskey: What's involved in that?

Mr. Jordan: Well, there were three barges of ammunition—bombs and 2.75 mm. rockets—that were heading toward Turkey, scheduled to get there tomorrow. There were seven barges of ammo headed for Greece. One of the problems was that all ten barges were tied together. The Greeks commandeered the three Turkish barges, so that ends the problem of whether or not to hold up on them. There are a number of things awaiting shipment from the U.S. and other places, such as M-48 tanks, some recoilless rifles, armored personnel carriers. There is also a shipment of TOW missiles for the Turks the end of the month.

Mr. Ingersoll: The Greeks got the three barges?

Mr. Jordan: Yes, the Greeks commandeered the ammunition. This business of the Greeks commandeering our vessels is something else again, it seems to me. Ever since this crisis began the Greeks have been obstreperous. I am wondering if we shouldn't be increasing our distance from the Greeks.

Mr. Stabler: This was a U.S. ship they commandeered?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Has this been told to Congress?

Mr. Jordan: No, I don't think they know. I know this will cause trouble in Congress, and we are worried. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Stabler: Has anything been done about the commandeering? Have we protested?

Mr. Jordan: Not that I know of, and the situation will just get worse. I think we must protest this vigorously.

Mr. Stabler: To their ambassador here?

Amb. McCloskey: I think it would be better to protest in Athens—through Tasca.

All: Concur.

Mr. Jordan: [5½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Jordan: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: Are we doing some thinking about evacuation in Greece and Turkey themselves?

Mr. Colby: How many people are we talking about in Greece?

Mr. Lauder: Some 31,000.

Mr. Ingersoll: Does that include tourists?

Mr. Day: No. There are some 20,000, plus tourists. We really have no idea how many.

Mr. Ingersoll: How many in Turkey?

Gen. Pauly: We have 26,000 (army and civilians) personnel in Turkey, and some 54,000 personnel in Greece.

Amb. McCloskey: How many helicopters do we have?

Gen. Pauly: Fourteen. They are big troop carriers.

Mr. Jordan: There are some 4,000 air-seats in the European theatre that we could call on for evacuation, if we have a secure airfield.

Mr. Ingersoll: Where would we move them?

Mr. Jordan: Rome.

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, our initial diplomatic goal is to achieve a cease-fire, to get negotiations started in London, and to work for the restoration of a constitutional arrangement. It looks to me as though double enosis is the only alternative if the above facts bear out.

Mr. Brown: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you think the Greeks would move into Thrace?

Mr. Colby: Well, they could. They could at least make a substantial demonstration of force. The Greeks also have six squadrons of F-4s.

Mr. Ingersoll: I thought we sent 17 F-4s to Athens in June. Bill Clements told me that yesterday.

Mr. Colby: It could be, my facts may not be up to date.

Mr. Jordan: I'll double check the figures.

Mr. Ingersoll: I heard a radio report coming to work this morning that said that some Greek fighter aircraft headed for Cyprus were headed off by Turkish interceptors. Do we have any information on that?

Mr. Colby: I don't, but looking at the map it's an awful long way.

Mr. Ingersoll: I think the report said they were intercepted off Rhodes.

Mr. Kennedy: We've been unable to verify that report.

Mr. Ingersoll: Have we been in touch with the British about their military (evacuation) plans?

Gen. Pauly: No.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The aircraft carrier *Hermes* is south of the island, isn't it?

Mr. Ingersoll: Somebody said that they docked at 4:00 yesterday afternoon. Somebody said that last night.

Mr. Colby: I think there is a ceasefire at Limasol—to get people out.

Mr. Ingersoll: We have held up all military aid to Greece and Turkey?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Kennedy: How much of that stuff will leak through to them. You know, we went through this exercise in the India–Pakistan dispute and we found out later that a lot of the aid we thought had been cut off slipped through. Can we get a firm, positive fix on where the stuff is?

Mr. Jordan: Yes, but I probably cannot get it until the first of the week since most of it is being shipped commercially. It is hard to get precise information.

Mr. Kennedy: I think we should get a paper on the status of the deliveries for this group because: (1) Congress may be a problem; and (2) the actual fact of it being delivered may be construed as a signal of our conveying favoritism toward one or the other.

Mr. Ingersoll: What are the chances of our getting such a status report?

Mr. Jordan: We ought to be able to do a better job now than in previous years. We do know the dates of sailings, the ports, and the names of the ships.

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, can we find out where they are?

Mr. Jordan: We will attempt to, but I don't think we will be able to until the first of the week.

Mr. Ingersoll: Do we ever take steps to intercept these ships?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The ship captains and companies are usually very responsible.

Mr. Kennedy: What will happen is that the ships' captains will just fail to offload the stuff.

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, I think it would be wise to root out the people to do it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We're only stopping deliveries selectively, right?

Mr. Jordan: I put a hold on everything.

Mr. Ingersoll: Including spare parts?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Including that \$20 million package, or is it still too early?

Mr. Jordan: Still too early.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We need a clear decision on what goes or what is to be held.

Mr. Kennedy: The question is, is it stopped or not? We need to get that information. The military on the other end will surely know if it has been stopped or not.

Mr. Ingersoll: Do you think we ought to work up something in case a full-scale war develops? Do we have a contingency plan for full-scale war between the Greeks and the Turks?

Mr. Jordan: No, we don't have full plans. More work has to be done on the existing contingency plans.

Gen. Pauly: The units in Greece and Turkey have their own contingency plans and they are up to date.

Amb. McCloskey: You can use the paper the back-up group did as a basis.⁵

Mr. Saunders: We're going to up-date that today.

Mr. Ingersoll: It seems to me that we should meet again tomorrow. What, 10:00? 11:00? Okay, 10:30.

Mr. Kennedy: Could we get the back-up group to think through some options for the possible outcomes of the fighting on the island? At least we ought to think through some of the possibilities.

Gen. Pauly: There is one thing we are going to have to face. I strongly recommend we do some thinking about how to recover U.S. aircraft in Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Do you have a judgement on that?

Gen. Pauly: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: On this military thing, I suggest we give very careful thought on how we handle the matter of recovering our assets and how we exchange those carriers. We don't want to denude ourselves over this issue. A general U.S. pullback could send a signal to the Soviets. It's an important thing, and something we should look at.

⁵ Not further identified.

106. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll)¹

July 20, 1974, 9:30 a.m. PDT.

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry.

K: Bob, that was a false alarm you got. Defense threatened to cut off aid [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. There is no cut off of military aid.

I: Good. They told us unequivocally in the meeting² that Schlesinger told them to cut off shipment.

K: You'd better go back there.

I: I surely will.

K: And make sure that they get in touch with their Secretary and that shipments are not to be cut off but on the other hand they're not to be delivered either. If you follow me. There should be in the next few days technical delays. There should be no formal announcement of a cutoff. We'll never get it started again.

I: Well this was—they told us that they had already held up . . .

K: It doesn't make a G. D. difference Bob. You're in charge of this operation until I get back. You just tell them what I agreed with Schlesinger.

I: Ok. You talked to Jim recently.

K: I just talked to him 5 minutes ago³ and he said it's a misunderstanding but if it's a misunderstanding you'd better make clear it doesn't happen.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Has Hartman talked to the Turks.

I: And right after that he was going over to see Schlesinger.

K: I know. And he did and Schlesinger was not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us. Did we tell him we'd have to cut off aid if there were no ceasefire.

I: I just heard the message described to me and he didn't put that in there. I don't know why.

K: Who, Schlesinger?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Ingersoll was in Washington.

² See Document 105.

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

I: No, Hartman. But we gave that to Joe and put it in a cable to him as well.⁴

K: What do you mean Hartman didn't put it in there.

I: I just had read to me a memo on his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador⁵ and he didn't say it. At least it's not reported.

K: Well, it's going to be a lonely department when I get back. You called the Turkish Ambassador. You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador and and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn't carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they're given an order.

I: Well, there may be . . .

K: There could be no misunderstanding. He was on the G. D. phone with me.

I: That's what I thought. I don't know that he didn't say. I just heard the message read to me and it didn't have it in it and I questioned it just before you came on the line.

K: There is no sense you doing it. Tell Hartman to call back the Turkish Ambassador. Tell him he did not make himself clear. He wants it clearly understood that the proposal for a cease fire that Sisco is bringing has our total support and that it is his view that it will lead—that if we threaten it to Greece it will lead to a cut off with Turkey also and we want him to know that as a friend so that there will not be a surprise if things don't go properly.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Now, it took me an hour and a half to get Sisco to deliver this in Athens, now do you suppose we could deliver it in Washington. We've spent 2 hours longer already than I ordered it so tell Hartman it's safe. And I want a call in 5 minutes that its been done.

I: Fine.⁶

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 105.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Kissinger and Ingersoll spoke at 10:15 a.m. PDT. In response to Ingersoll telling Kissinger that Hartman had delivered the message, Kissinger said: "My instructions this morning which Scowcroft wrote down was to say: Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they did not accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman's personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn't do it that way." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

107. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among Secretary of State Kissinger, the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll), and the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Buffum)**¹

July 20, 1974, 11:20 a.m. PDT.

K: Hello.

I: Henry. I'd like to have Bill Buffum outline to you what we have on the U.N. right now.

K: OK.

B: It has been proceeding at a very leisurely pace indeed Mr. Secretary. The Council has still not met at this 2:30 p.m.

K: It has not met.

B: It has not met. They have been negotiating in the corridors all morning long on our resolution. The Russians have been dragging their feet throughout the day trying to get everything they can from yesterday's text added to our text. And of course we've been stonewalling them.

K: Yes. Are the British and French with us?

B: They are generally although the French have been willing to accept the paragraph which would call for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces in excess of those envisaged in international agreement on the grounds that this now includes all excess Turks as well as Greeks. In other words those who landed yesterday.

K: Well that might not be a bad—except the Turks won't like that.

B: No. Neither the Turks nor Greeks will like that. I said provisionally I did not think that accorded with your understanding with the French Foreign Minister and they are seeking further guidance from you.

K: Well I don't think the French Foreign Minister ever expressed himself to me on that.

B: That is not covered of course in the agreement of the points to be put to the 9.

K: That is correct.

B: So I thought that went beyond what you had agreed. And what we are trying to do at the moment is get the Council President to announce as a simple consensus of opinion a common desire that there

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Ingersoll and Buffum were in Washington.

should be a cease fire and negotiations among the parties. It is possible but not certain that the Peruvian President will do this. If he does not then our best choice I believe is to accept this modified draft as the French have worked it out.

K: I agree. That is such a shocking sentence for me to say to my friends.

B: Well, we've held the hard line until we heard from you.

K: No, I agree. If we have to do it that way but make sure we've got the British and French with us when it happens.

B: Oh, they will definitely be with us. They are dragging us at this point.

K: OK. Well, that's not a bad position to be in.

B: Alright. Henry, Larry² just said you want a WSAG at 9:00 in the morning. We have our group here when you get in at 9:00 tonight.

K: Is that when I'm getting in?

B: That's what he said.

K: Well, I'm leaving here at 2:00. Let's just meet at the Department a half an hour after I arrive whenever that is.

B: You probably won't be here before 10 or 10:30.

K: That's what I would guess but can we work that out—I haven't worked it out.

B: I'll work it out with Larry.

K: OK now. Have we any idea what Sisco said to these guys?³

I: I've not seen a wire in yet and he wouldn't tell me over the phone.

K: Well, I've never been wrong about Sisco yet and if he didn't tell you he didn't carry out his instructions.

B: He said he was sending a report very shortly thereafter but we haven't received yet.

K: But the point is it would have been easy enough for him to say that he carried out the instructions.

I: I gathered that impression but he didn't say so in any exact words.

K: What, that he carried out the instructions? We'll give him a decoration.

I: We haven't received his cable. How was the press briefing?⁴

² Reference is to Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary.

³ See Document 104.

⁴ Kissinger held a background press briefing from 10:21 to 11:02 a.m. outlining the developments in the current crisis. (Text of Background Briefing; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 122, Geopolitical File, Cyprus)

K: I kept it very, very low key and my major concern was to give the impression that we knew what we were doing. The questions were very friendly. You know they are lethargic out here.

B: The questions are friendlier in California than they are in Washington.

K: Yes and the group out here hasn't been on top of all this excitement. You get the text. I did tell them that that airborne battalion in Europe has been alerted because I didn't want them to find it out afterwards. But I made it very clear we are in no posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union. We are working cooperatively with them and so forth.

I: What one is this?

K: Well, that G.D. General Goodpath that just went ahead and alerted for 509th Air Force without telling anybody. And I didn't want it to come out of Europe because if I did not say it and it hit suddenly it would sound as if something new had happened. So I listed it. I said it is a normal precaution, there is no alert, there is no confrontation and so forth.

I: Alright. We'll make it all available back here.

K: They can use my name but not quotation.

B: Henry. I was not able to reach Fulbright but I talked to Mrs. Fulbright and I gave her pretty much the story and she's going to get to him sometime this afternoon.

K: OK. Did you call Mansfield.

I: I spoke to Mansfield. He was very pleased that we gave him a briefing. He didn't disagree with anything we're seeking to do. In fact he said it seemed to be the right thing to do.

B: I got the same reaction from John Rhodes. I got him over.

K: Somebody should call Albert.

I: I've tried and we can't get him. I am trying to reach Morgan in Pennsylvania.

K: Good. Many thanks. I'll see you all tonight. I'll give you a call just before I leave.

108. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger¹

San Clemente, July 20, 1974, 1:15 p.m. PDT.

N: Well, Henry, how do you think the briefing went?² Well?

K: I think it did. I calmed them down. The situation is now the Greeks have accepted our proposal. The Turks have received our [proposal]. We were brutal with them. They are having a meeting.³ They are playing it down, stalling. To get as much established as possible. They will have to decide by midnight this time. The proposals are placed for a ceasefire and the Turks to go into enclaves that they have there and the Turks are gaining a strong bargaining power. Their National Guard has been effectively defeated.

N: Are there many casualties?

K: There hasn't been much fighting.

N: The Cypriots don't fight much.

K: The Turks fight well. They are tough. If the Greeks don't go to war in the a.m., I think we are all right.

N: I would think they won't in view of what you say they said.

K: They are waiting for the answer and they may get antsy. [*1 line not declassified*] We are playing the hard line and are in step with all our allies.

N: If the Greeks did go to war, then I would come back to Washington.

K: And we would cut off all aid

N: That would stop the war.

K: They can't fight long then.

N: That is the lever and we will use it if we have to.

K: I will call you immediately of further developments.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² See footnote 3, Document 107.

³ See Document 104.

109. Editorial Note

Joseph Sisco held more meetings in Ankara and Athens on July 21, 1974. According to notes, which summarized those meetings:

“The early morning of July 21 Sisco called Bayulken and in strongest language told him that Turkish failure to meet Sisco was forcing us to conclude that Turkey not interested in continuing its close relationship with U.S. Bayulken immediately called back and said meeting at Foreign Ministry scheduled for 8:15.

“During meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister, he gave Sisco piece of paper in which Ecevit accepted, subject to USG assurance of Greek acceptance, standstill ceasefire as provided in SC resolution. Foreign Minister also promised Turkish rep would be sent to London provided ceasefire in effect. He also raised issue of phantom Greek fleet and said it must be stopped. Sisco agreed to take Turkey’s proposal to Athens.

“Sisco met with Greek Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister on July 21 and was informed that the GOG accepts ceasefire as provided for in SC resolution effective 3:00 p.m. Cyprus time. During same meeting, Prime Minister told Sisco that there will be change of government within next 24 hours. For this reason the Greek Government at that time could not take decision to go to London for talks on the following Tuesday.

“During following meeting with Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, PM agreed to present new Turkish idea on ceasefire to top-level Greek leaders. During the meeting, Greeks complained vociferously about Turkish duplicity and broken promises on ceasefire. Sisco showed PM hand-written copy of Ecevit ceasefire proposal. Sisco also added that if GOG wanted U.S. presence at proposed meeting between Greek and Turkish representatives, we would be there.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

Sisco reported more fully on his meetings in telegrams 5750 and 5753 from Ankara and 4746 from Athens, all dated July 21. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

UN Security Council Resolution 353 passed 15–0 on July 20. The resolution called upon all states to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus, cease all firing and foreign military intervention, exercise restraint and cooperate with the UNFICYP. It also called upon Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to negotiate a peaceful solution to Cyprus. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, page 291)

110. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Robert McCloskey

John Day

Arthur Hartman

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Defense

Amos Jordan

Harry Bergold

Denis McAuliffe

James Schlesinger

JCS

Gen. George Brown

LTG John Pauly

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

NSC

Richard Kennedy

Harold Saunders

Rosemary Niehuss

David Ransom

James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the WSAG Working Group would prepare a paper outlining U.S. options in negotiations, the balance of forces picture on the island in the event of a ceasefire, and the political balance on Cyprus following a ceasefire;²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

² A paper outlining negotiating options is printed as an attachment to Document 112. Papers on the balance of forces and the political balance on Cyprus, both dated July 22, are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File.

—that the FBIS station on the northern coast of Cyprus be evacuated, with Greek and Turkish permission.

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.³

Secretary Kissinger: Who is doing the fighting, the National Guard? (referring to heavy fighting near Karavas).

Mr. Colby: Yes, the National Guard. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: The whole town of Nicosia? [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: It's hard to tell at this point. [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: What is he saying? (referring to a late report that General Secretary Brezhnev was giving a report on the Cyprus situation over the radio).

Mr. Ingersoll: It's still coming in, but as far as we can tell now, he is not saying anything new.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: What message? (referring to Mr. Sisco's message).

Mr. Colby: The one Joe (Mr. Sisco) is sending back regarding the Turks ignoring the resolution to cease fire.⁴

Secretary Schlesinger: They should have withdrawn by now. What was the latest time they were to withdraw?

Mr. Colby: They have ignored them all. The first was 9:00 a.m. our time. I think that was pushed up to 11:00 a.m.

Secretary Kissinger: Did we send that message to the President? (Ecevit).⁵

Mr. Ingersoll: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there won't be a ceasefire until we hear from Ecevit.

Secretary Schlesinger: The ceasefire has been extended until noon?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what time—there is no fixed time.

George (Gen. Brown), would you like to add . . .

Gen. Brown: Just the NATO withdrawal . . .

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ An apparent reference to telegram 5755 from Ankara, July 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans, 1974)

⁵ The President's message to Turkish President Koruturk was sent in telegram 158084 to Ankara on July 21. (Ibid.)

Secretary Kissinger: What's the story in the *Washington Post* article this morning that we have cut off all military aid to Greece? Who leaked that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I can assure you that it did not come out of the Defense Department. Getler (the author) told Friedheim that he got the story straight out of the State Department.

Secretary Kissinger: Nothing would surprise me more than it was not leaked out of State!

Secretary Schlesinger: Getler claimed he was handed the story on a silver platter by the Department of State. The real story is that we have not held up on all military aid to Greece. The A-7 contracts are continuing, the F-4s are being held up at Rota (Spain), however. What is of more concern to me is the possibilities of more seizures (referring to the Greek seizure of three ammunition barges on Friday).⁶

Secretary Kissinger: They did? I didn't know that.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, they seized three of our ammunition barges.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the real situation is that we are not sending in any heavy equipment. We'll blame it on administrative delays or something like that. The problem when you cut off that stuff, however, is that it is so hard to get it started again. If pressed, we'll say that there are some delays because we are assessing the situation. If we say that the supply of military goods to Greece has broken down, we'll have one hell of a time getting them resumed (Congress). Moreover, we'll have to pay one hell of a price.

On the diplomatic side, I have talked at least five times with Ecevit since last night.⁷ All I could really get out of it was that they are totally confused. If their generals are as bad as their leaders, what can their captains and majors be like! Anyway, our efforts are aimed at getting a ceasefire. The Turks, by the way, were talking about a Greek armada off the coast of Cyprus somewhere. Do we know what they are talking about?

Gen. Brown: I think it was the one sighted off the southern coast. The problem is that it is within 25 miles of the coastline, and there are so many different types of ships in that area that we are having trouble identifying them.

Mr. Colby: They're off Paphos.

Secretary Kissinger: Can the Greeks land on that end of the island?

Mr. Colby: Yes, it's a safe area. They could at least introduce troops there.

⁶ July 19.

⁷ No transcripts of these conversations have been found.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll call Ecevit after this meeting.⁸ I think they are just stalling for time. I have real trouble assessing his motives and thinking. It's my guess that they (the Turks) will accept a ceasefire by the end of the day. According to Callaghan, the Greeks have agreed to negotiations, in Vienna. I think Vienna is a mistake, I'd rather see them held in London where Callaghan can keep prodding them. Callaghan is now going to ask the Turks to send someone to Vienna. Sisco says they are in no position at the moment to do so. Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold—what is the state of play on the island now?

Mr. Colby: Well, it's unclear, but they do have a foothold.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven't done as well militarily as they have politically.

Mr. Colby: You're right, they haven't done very well militarily.

Secretary Kissinger: They didn't go after Famagusta as we thought they would.

Mr. Colby: No, they put out some stories that they were going to take it, but apparently only for psychological purposes.

Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they would.

Mr. Colby: Yes, they are doing well.

Amb. McCloskey: What is their strength on the island?

Mr. Colby: About 9,000 National Guard troops, and plus 30,000 Reserves. The Turks have about 6,000.

Secretary Kissinger: Are the Greeks reinforcing?

Mr. Colby: Yes, today.

Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, we have two problems. One is getting a ceasefire. Without one, we are impotent. The Greeks are also in no position to do much. And two, what our stance should be in the negotiations. What is your judgement as to the internal situation in Cyprus following a ceasefire? Anybody heard from Sampson?

Mr. Colby: We've heard nothing from him. The National Guard is running most of the operations. What we've heard is that the various Turkish communities are doing most of the fighting.

Secretary Kissinger: What will this mean for the negotiations?

Mr. Colby: Well, it will leave them less to negotiate with.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm trying to understand what the balance of forces would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a course.

⁸ See Document 111.

Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area—more than they have now—and they have failed.

(Secretary Kissinger was handed a note)

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, this is what Ecevit has already told me—that there is to be a meeting of their NSC at 4:00 p.m. and a cabinet meeting at 6:00 p.m. The Greeks are complaining of heavy bombing in Nicosia. Anything could happen now. I could call Ecevit and tell him that if there is no ceasefire and there is war, this would severely jeopardize our relations.

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, you have to have a ceasefire before you can talk about a breakdown in a ceasefire.

Mr. Colby: It's our understanding that the bombing in Nicosia has died down.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me talk to Sisco and see if he can set them straight.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have two related questions regarding NATO [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we would like to discuss.

(Secretary Kissinger left to take a call from Mr. Sisco at 9:56 a.m.,⁹ returned at 10:00 a.m.)

Secretary Kissinger: What is the probability of having to evacuate U.S. citizens?

Mr. Ingersoll: The only possibility of getting them out is through the British Sovereign Base Area, isn't it?

Gen. Brown: No, we can lift them out by helicopters.

Mr. Ingersoll: (Amb.) Davies is already starting to evacuate . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Damnit! Davies is taking orders from here. I will not have an Ambassador, I don't care who it is, making these decisions without clearing it through here. This is an interdepartmental matter and the decisions are to be made here.

Mr. Ingersoll: No, the cable, I believe, is asking for approval to evacuate.¹⁰

Secretary Kissinger: Nevertheless, I will not have an Ambassador making these decisions unilaterally.

⁹ A transcript of the conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

¹⁰ Telegram 1591 from Nicosia, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Sisco says that if we get no action from the Turks we will have to leave NATO. I'll put in a call to Ecevit—it will give us some time in Athens. Seems to me that Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are doing lousy militarily. We've got two governments in and outside the country. Under these conditions we may have to turn to Makarios. I'm not sure we have any alternative now. What is going to be the balance of forces if we get a ceasefire?

Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some 40,000 troops.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't think we can get an accurate picture of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would change the whole picture.

Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, anyway?

Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough.

Mr. Ingersoll: How much ammo is on the island?

Mr. Colby: Lots of it. Every male over the age of 12 has a gun and lots of ammunition.

Amb. McCloskey: That's right. Also, Sampson opened up all the caches.

Mr. Lauder: They have also received weapons from the Palestinians.

Secretary Kissinger: From Fatah?

Mr. Lauder: Yes.

Mr. Colby: All the Greeks on the island are cleaving together on this thing. They all act as one against the Turks.

Secretary Kissinger: Then once we have a ceasefire, we have a united populace.

Mr. Colby: At least for the moment. Some cracks will begin to show, primarily between the Makarios and Sampson forces.

Secretary Kissinger: Is the Clerides option still open?

Mr. Colby: That's tough to say at this time.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we ought to get a Working Group together today. Arthur (Mr. Hartman) would you take charge. You should look at what options we want in negotiations, look at the various political forces in the event of a ceasefire and what the political balance will be on the island.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'd like to bring up the issue that we only touched upon earlier. I think the larger question here is the future status of NATO. The actions we decide to take might militate against NATO, destroy it. Is that what we are prepared to do?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have two separate questions here. If we have a peaceful solution today . . .

Secretary Schlesinger: The larger question is, is NATO going to survive in its present form? The other European countries have said that we have gone beyond the point of no return regarding Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: You want to kick the Greeks out of NATO?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, I am thinking more along the lines of some moves we might make to bring about a more sympathetic regime in Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a chance that will happen anyway.

Mr. Colby: If the Greeks leave NATO, it would be very hard to bring them back in later on.

Secretary Kissinger: No, what Jim is saying is, should we move to replace the current Greek government.

Secretary Schlesinger: That's the question. I don't have an answer. I'm not sure that the Greek Government could be shored up at this point.

Secretary Kissinger: Is it being shored up now?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't know.

Mr. Jordan: The fact that we have not turned off the military aid conveys the thought that we have not abandoned the regime.

Secretary Schlesinger: In fact, we are viewed throughout the world as supporting the Greek regime. The only point I want to make is that while we are looking at the political balance on Cyprus, we should also be looking at the larger question of how this would impact on NATO. [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of an arrangement do we have with them?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a bilateral arrangement with the Greeks, allied with NATO. They are under a NATO umbrella. If we want to show our distaste of the Greek regime—I don't know if we do or not—we could initiate actions [less than 1 line not declassified]. If a ceasefire does not occur, I think they may attack in Thrace. This is a regime, if I could say it in not too subtle terms, that is unsophisticated, irresponsible, that is growing increasingly desperate. [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: [less than 1 line not declassified] This home-porting business, by the way, is going down the drain. We have put Phase 2 in cold storage, and there is a question whether we will proceed with Phase 1. This is just one element we could use against the Greeks.

Secretary Kissinger: But what would we accomplish? What would happen a year from now?

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, I think we have to take each issue separately. Home-porting as far as we are concerned is OBE. Irrespective of the Cyprus situation, we don't want to proceed with home-porting.

Secretary Kissinger: *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[3½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[3½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: *[1 line not declassified]*

Gen. Brown: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Jordan: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[2½ lines not declassified]*

Amb. McCloskey: *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: That's quite possible. The Russians are doing so well at the moment anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: How are they doing so well?

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, NATO is not in such great shape.

Amb. McCloskey: It seems to me the Russians are more perplexed about this situation than NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we can't settle the NATO problem today. Cyprus is our problem today. I don't like overthrowing governments. I'm not sure the Greek government will last out the week, anyway. It seems to me there is no way it will survive.

Mr. Colby: The succession could come from the lower echelons—the generals first, then the majors and colonels.

Amb. McCloskey: How about Karamanlis?

Mr. Colby: He's not around. The King, as you know, has already made some moves. He would probably command more popular support than anybody else.

Secretary Kissinger: That's dangerous business in the middle of a war. I'll talk to the President about it. Anything operationally we need to do today? Any views on evacuees?

Gen. Brown: I don't know about the British capability to take care of those 350 people they have.

Mr. Colby: I'd like to take that batch out of the north coast.

Secretary Kissinger: Who's that?

Mr. Colby: The FBIS Station there. There are 12 Americans and their families plus some civilians.

Secretary Kissinger: We'll have to have both country's permission, won't we to get the helicopters in?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should get them out, by all means. Ask for permission to get them out.

Mr. Ingersoll: How about the Greek Cypriots there. Do you need permission for them?

Gen. Brown: I'd like to have both sides know we are coming to take them out.

(Secretary Kissinger left the meeting at 10:29 a.m. to take a call from the President and Foreign Minister Callaghan. He returned at 11:33 a.m.)¹¹

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I've just talked to San Clemente and with Callaghan. Our analysis is not correct—that we have the support of the EC-9. Callaghan filled me in on what is being done. Our total support at this point is one—Britain.

Secondly, Callaghan has a report, who he describes as an excellent source, that there will be a Greek coup tomorrow and that the group that is to replace the present regime is infinitely worse and that it leans strongly to the Soviet Union. He has appealed to me to try to bring about a ceasefire today and he will try to get the talks started. If there is no objection, I will call Ecevit [*1 line not declassified*]. I want you all to consider very carefully what we are doing here. I would propose to call Ecevit and insist on a ceasefire. Callaghan and Sisco are going to insist on talks—in Vienna. We don't have any other choice. Are there no objections?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Colby: You've got to give Ecevit something.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Colby: We put him in an untenable position. We have to give him something he can take back to his generals.

¹¹ According to telephone transcripts, Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 10:40 a.m., Haig at 10:50 a.m., Callaghan at 11:15 a.m., and Haig at 11:20 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) No record of a conversation with Nixon, who was in San Clemente, was found.

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy is to get rid of Sampson. What replaces him is no concern to us. The only issue is whether Makarios or Clerides or somebody else comes in.

Secretary Schlesinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: [3 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is as far as we can go today. We will keep you all informed on developments.

Gen. Brown: In our discussion on evacuation, should we prepare to move the task force closer into Cyprus?

Secretary Schlesinger: You'd have to move into the probable zone, no?

Gen. Brown: That would be preferable.

Secretary Schlesinger: I suggest we delay the question of evacuation until we see about the ceasefire. If we have a ceasefire, the whole problem disappears. We'll have a clearer picture of that later today.

Secretary Kissinger: Evacuation is not one of my obsessions. [1 line not declassified] If need be, just discuss what is being done on the ceasefire.

111. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit¹

July 21, 1974, 11:26 a.m.

E: Hello. We have reached this decision. Of course, we all accept the terms for a ceasefire once the Council has decided it and we want it to materialize. We are ready at the earliest possible time tomorrow to discuss the minimum conditions of ceasefire after all that has happened anywhere in all the countries concerned. It can be in _____ or anywhere in Switzerland so that we don't lose time travelling. And we will authorize our representative to declare for us the time of ceasefire for anytime tomorrow once the minimum conditions for ceasefire, for the supervision of ceasefire is complete. Would that be all right?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara. All omissions are in the original.

K: I am afraid not, Mr. Prime Minister. I have to point out to you a number of developments. First, we have information and the British have also that there may be a coup in Greece tomorrow.

E: A which . . .

K: A coup in Greece which will bring in a group which is going to be even more difficult and which will move towards the Soviet Union.

E: Yes.

K: And I do not believe that this can be in the Turkish interest.

E: I see.

K: And this is the information I received from Foreign Minister Callaghan² so it is not something I am telling you to make a point. He called me right now.

E: Even if that happens. If it is going to happen tomorrow, we will encounter the same difficulties tomorrow wouldn't we?

K: Secondly . . .

E: I mean this strengthens my arguments. You see, we will be _____ the ceasefire today—sometime this evening. Tomorrow as you say there will be a change of regime—a coup in Greece so obviously the new rulers will say we are not committed to this arrangement.

K: Well, in that case—of course then you can start again if you want to.

E: This is a very new development and I'll . . .

K: And the second consideration that I must put before you is that if the threat of war between Greece and Turkey isn't ended, we will have to ask you to let us [1 line not declassified].

E: Yes.

K: And we will have to do the same in—on the other side and [less than 1 line not declassified] it will have profound consequences.

E: I see. Well, that is very important. Our Chief of General Staff is here. I'll speak with him. We will leave the other subjects and then telephone you say within a half an hour.³

K: Good. Thank you.

² See footnote 12, Document 110.

³ Kissinger and Ecevit spoke at 1:25 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

112. **Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹**

Washington, July 22, 1974.

CYPRUS TASK FORCE

Effective today the Cyprus Working Group has been formally constituted into a Task Force under my chairmanship with Wells Stabler as deputy chairman and C. William Kontos as director. The Task Force will serve as the coordinating body for all Departmental activity relating to the Cyprus crisis.

There has also been established in the Task Force a special Cyprus Planning Group to prepare the Political and Military Intelligence Reports, the Situation Reports and analytical and policy papers for your consideration. The first such paper is attached. The chairman of this group is John G. Day (EUR/SE), and his deputies will be Philip Stoddard (INR) and Thomas Simons (S/P).

Attachment²

Paper No. 1

Cyprus: Issues and Options

I. The Situation

—The Turks will probably insist on consolidating their position on the island so they will have a realistic basis for partition or at least negotiation. If their position creates a de facto partition, they will also have strengthened their hand for negotiating some other settlement.

—If the Turks insist on continuing the fighting to consolidate their position, the Greeks will probably attack Turkey across the Evros River in Thrace. In that case the Turks would probably respond with action against Greek Aegean islands. Neither side is likely to make major gains in Thrace, where the Greek geographic advantage balances the Turkish numerical advantage, but the Turks would make gains on the Ionian islands.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, July 1974 Nodis Memcons. Confidential. Drafted by John Day and cleared by Wells Stabler.

² Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas Simons (S/P) and Philip Stoddard (INR/DDR/RNA). A note at the end of the paper indicates that it reflected discussion in an inter-agency group that included representatives of OSD/ISA, JCS, CIA, NSC, and S/P.

The purpose of this paper is to describe those options beyond the steps that would be taken for evacuation of Americans and protection of US facilities only (but including these steps where they could also constitute a modest show of US force).

II. *Issues*

The one longer-term issue that has to be considered now in judging the options is whether the US interest is served by Turkey's consolidating its military position on Cyprus in such a way as to create a de facto partition which would put the Turks in a position to negotiate for formal partition or some other constitutional arrangement.

It should be noted that Turkish military occupation of the island's northeastern third does not of itself constitute a viable partition solution (although it may lay the basis for one) due to the leopard-spot character of Greek and Turkish settlement. Additional and more complex arrangements, probably including exchange of populations, will be required if a stable solution is to be achieved. Various possibilities are described in the annex to this paper.

The present situation could lead in one of two directions:

—Double enosis is the more likely: it is a long-standing Turkish goal; once on Cyprus in force the mainland Turks are unlikely to withdraw and permit any other solution. At the same time, double enosis would mean NATO-ization of Cyprus and, coming on top of recent Soviet losses in the Mideast, would raise the issue of Soviet responses in its most acute form.

—Substantial return to the 1960 constitutional arrangements is also a possibility: it would defuse adverse international reaction to Turkish military intervention, would preserve Cypriot independence, and would thereby be more acceptable to the Soviets. At the same time, it is a potentially less stable solution than double enosis, and would make the return of Makarios as a hostage of the left more likely.

Combinations are conceivable, e.g., de facto double enosis which maintains formal independence, or formal double enosis with assurances or guarantees against changes in Cyprus' military status.

III. *Options*

It is assumed that efforts to end the fighting on Cyprus and to prevent Greek-Turkish fighting will continue. The question is what steps we might want to take if the fighting on Cyprus continues and Greek-Turkish hostilities begin.

A. Military moves in support of political goals

1. *Cut off military aid to one or both parties.* We have already warned that we will not permit them to fight each other with an open supply line to the US, and we have taken the appropriate internal steps to permit a military aid cut-off. In the early stages of hostilities, however, this

is essentially a political gesture: it is the easiest to take, and the least likely to have a concrete impact. If we wished to signal a tilt, we could cut off aid to one party only. In this context, withdrawal of MAAG missions might also be considered; however, it could endanger access to essential facilities without affecting hostilities. Withdrawal of MAAG chiefs only might be a harmless gesture.

2. *A show of force through introduction of modest US forces.* Modest forces could be landed either to protect American facilities (like the Embassy) or to evacuate Americans; if the latter, they could deploy either in the British SBA's (assuming HMG concurrence) or outside. If their mission were to show force *in addition* to the force shown by deployment for evacuation, forces additional to the Marines, who will be fully occupied with evacuation duties, should be deployed. This move, too, would be essentially a gesture, since such forces would be too small to have an impact on hostilities.

The 1800 Marines on TF 61/62 should be in position to deploy on Cyprus at daybreak July 21, and the 211 men of the Airborne Rifle Company now at Vicenza could deploy in approximately 17 hours.

3. *Imposition of a naval blockade around Cyprus.* The purpose would be to prevent further sea reinforcement of Cyprus. We could either threaten to make this move unless the parties desisted or actually make it. To minimize the likelihood of firing at NATO Allies, we should consider seeking a NATO mandate for this move. It might well provoke Soviet counter-reinforcement, given past Soviet practice and the current low Soviet posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviets, in the Black Sea, are closer than we are in great force.

The Sixth Fleet has sufficient forces in the Mediterranean at present to accomplish this mission, using all available escorts and P-3 aircraft and the *Forrestal* for support, and they could probably be deployed within three days. Since this action would not prevent aerial resupply and would preclude Sixth Fleet assets from carrying out other assigned missions, it would be highly undesirable.

4. *Use of US forces to impose a ceasefire on Cyprus.* Even more than for a naval blockade, a NATO mandate should be sought to minimize the prospect and impact of firing at Allies. Even in conjunction with UK forces aboard the Commando Carrier *Hermes*, this move is of questionable feasibility: the UK estimated before the crisis that 20,000 men would be needed to keep the peace on Cyprus, and given the confusion of the terrain, the forces on the ground, and the political situation, this is considered an under-estimate. Given its questionable feasibility and high political risk, this move is considered emphatically undesirable.

In addition to the men on TF 61/62 and at Vicenza (2,011 in 17 hours), forces available are: the rest of the Vicenza Airborne Battalion now in Germany (861 in 83 hours); two Mechanized Battalions in Ger-

many (about 2,000 in 154 hours/6 days); and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg (about 14,000 in 192 hours/7 1/2 days): total about 19,000 men in about a week.

5. *Possible military moves toward Greece and Turkey.* Such moves might have two purposes: to pressure Greece and Turkey to stop fighting and to counter threatening Soviet gestures. Moves to pressure Greece and Turkey might include US or US-encouraged NATO threats to withhold military supply following hostilities [2½ lines not declassified]. Either move might jeopardize Greek and Turkish post-conflict ties with NATO, since the threat to withhold military supply might provoke recourse to non-NATO suppliers, [1 line not declassified]. Military moves in the area to counter threatening Soviet gestures (deployment of Soviet forces to Bulgaria, Soviet moves in the Straits, pressure on Romania to guarantee transit) are difficult to envisage, and the appropriate response might be outside the area; at the same time, threatening Soviet military gestures in the area are considered unlikely barring a quite protracted extensive Greek-Turkish conflict in Thrace.

B. Political-diplomatic moves

1. *Support efforts to convene peace negotiations in London.* We have already undertaken this move. The "London-Zurich framework" for such talks would tend to drive results toward "restoration of the 1960 arrangements" rather than double enosis.

2. *Pursue a ceasefire in the UN.* We have also embarked on this move. The UN has an interest in helping bring about the cessation of international conflict, and the Soviets would be assured of some voice in the process. However, the Soviet voice cuts both ways, since Turkish intervention makes double enosis more and a neutral Cyprus less likely, and a UN role may somewhat enhance Makarios' claims. The UN context therefore also pushes results toward "restoration of the 1960 arrangements."

3. *Discourage third-country resupply.* We have also taken steps in this direction. The problem becomes acute in case of protracted major conflict where the US has cut off military supplies to one or both parties, and one or both are tempted to seek arms elsewhere. Since both parties now have US arms, airlift and POL are the most likely candidates, and the Soviets the most likely potential suppliers.

4. *Activate NATO.* Cessation of a Greek-Turkish war is a natural goal for NATO. In this context, efforts by both the SYG and SACEUR, who should enjoy the confidence of the military on both sides, might be considered. Injection of the NATO (and European) presence might mitigate the weakening of NATO's Southern Flank which will result from the war. On the other hand, the Soviets will be sensitive to a NATO role if it leads toward deneutralization of Cyprus.

C. Post-Ceasefire Moves

1. *Expand the role of UNFICYP.* All forms of this step would involve a role for the UN and the SYG, but it could take several forms: putting both Greek and Turkish forces in place on Cyprus under it, to encourage restraint; putting US forces on Cyprus under it (though this would be impossible without Soviet agreement or inclusion); putting increased UK and Turkish co-guarantor forces under it (though this would tilt toward restoration of 1960 arrangements). Where disengagement of forces and exchange of populations is sought, the UN would have a natural role; however, the Soviets would be expected to seek to block double enosis using the UN role.

2. *Disengagement in Thrace.* It would be advisable to exclude the UN from this purely NATO area, and to provide for a NATO role in negotiating and enforcing disengagement arrangements there.

3. *A Force Freeze on Cyprus.* The purpose of this move would be to prevent increase of forces present at the time of ceasefire. It could take many forms, from commitments by the parties through UNFICYP monitoring to blockade.

IV. Key Criteria

Identification of the following factors may help principals weigh the options.

1. *The Problem of the Soviet Response.* It is very difficult to predict the Soviet response in a given situation. The Soviets face a profound dilemma. They have no obvious direct way to achieve their goal of preventing deneutralization of Cyprus. However, three probabilities stand out:

—The Soviets are likely to be less supportive of Turkey now that the Turks have intervened militarily. They are likely to oppose double enosis until it is a foregone conclusion; the extent of their support for Turkey is likely to depend of the extent of Turkish support for Cyprus independence.

—The longer the war lasts, the more likely we are to have difficulty with the Soviets: as a force in the UN, as a military supplier, as a Mediterranean naval power.

—Formal partition of the island between Greece and Turkey is the outcome most likely to stick in the Soviet craw, since it would NATO-ize the island, and this political and military loss would probably not be outweighed by the war-weakening of NATO's Southern Flank. Presumably, an outcome which did not change Cyprus' military status or its formal international status would be less unacceptable.

The Soviets would probably be most hesitant to respond directly to a Greek-Turkish conflict. They have few means of doing so, and would be unlikely to do so unless extensive Thracian hostilities were prolonged. Direct Soviet responses would jeopardize the prospects for weaker Greek or Turkish ties with NATO and better ties with the USSR following the

conflict. The Soviets would be more likely to respond elsewhere—in East Europe (strengthening the Warsaw Pact), in Central Europe or the Middle East—and most likely to factor a deterioration of their Eastern Mediterranean position into their overall détente calculus. Even in these cases, however, they would face the prospect that such moves would strengthen NATO more than a Greek-Turkish war would weaken it.

Assuming protracted major Greek-Turkish hostilities and a direct Soviet show of force (e.g. moving troops into Bulgaria, pressing Romania to guarantee transit, moving large naval forces through the Straits), we would have to consider such responses as heightened alert status for our forces, moving naval forces ourselves, supporting Romania, a Western move in Central Europe, or cutting the Soviets into the Mediterranean action by joint endeavors to reestablish the peace.

In considering military options, we should recall that forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean for the options outlined are likely to be inadequate for most major counter-Soviet responses.

In considering political options, we should recall that an active NATO role would support eventual counter-Soviet responses as well as post-conflict Greek and Turkish ties to the West.

2. *The NATO Southern Flank.* Hostilities between Greece and Turkey will degrade the NATO Southern Flank, and it would be desirable in considering options to choose moves which permit reinforcement of their post-conflict ties to the Alliance to the maximum feasible extent. Rebuilding their relations with NATO Allies, re-equipping their forces, and reweaving the NATO fabric itself will be priority goals in the post-conflict period, and we should avoid moves which jeopardize them where we can. As examples, activating NATO and discouraging third-country supply should serve these goals, while threatening post-conflict arms cut-off [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would not.

3. *Other US Facilities.* We maintain myriad facilities for both NATO and non-NATO contingencies and uses in both countries, and should to the extent feasible avoid moves which could place them at risk in a post-conflict period. In general, the greater the direct US military intervention, the greater the risk to these facilities.

V. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified*]

Annex

Alternative Cyprus Settlements

Three political outcomes are identified in decreasing order of likelihood: (1) double enosis; (2) independence based on a return to the

1960 agreements; and (3) an independent, federated Cyprus. The difference between double enosis and the other two is that only double enosis offers a clearcut long-term solution to the communal problem. The trouble with double enosis is the Soviet dimension.

1. *Double enosis* has long been the preferred Turkish solution, and once in control of a large chunk of Cyprus, the Turks cannot be expected to withdraw easily and permit any other solution.

Double enosis, however, raises a host of difficulties. Because of the intermingling of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and despite the ingathering process of the past decade, large numbers of Greek Cypriots would be left in the Turkish-controlled areas, and thousands of Turkish Cypriots would find themselves living under Athens' authority. The border between the two zones would be a source of continuing friction, for popular feeling would run high, and especially so if the intercommunal fighting had been bloody. War damage and the economic dislocation of population shifts would generate requirements for extensive foreign aid to both areas. Finally, the London–Zurich agreements would have to be junked and replaced by complicated new arrangements between Greece and Turkey. There are precedents in the 1923 and 1930 agreements following the Greco-Turkish War of 1921–2,³ but post-intervention tensions would make this a difficult process.

Most importantly, perhaps, double enosis would raise the issue of the Soviet response to the NATO-ization of Cyprus in acute form. The Soviets have strongly opposed any kind of enosis for a decade and have consistently backed the independence of a *unitary* Cypriot state.

While Soviet displeasure could probably not block enosis, measures to deal with it could include:

1. [6 lines not declassified]
2. [5 lines not declassified]

Lessening the corrosive impact of population problems would probably require costly compensation for property left behind and possibly require a substantial augmentation of the UN presence to supervise the resettlement process and police the buffer zone that would be required between the two parts of the island. The Soviets could block the UN role in this process, but if Greece and Turkey had agreed on double enosis, UN involvement would be unnecessary.

³ The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne replaced the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which was part of the post-World War I Versailles settlement but was never implemented due to the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War. On June 2, 1930, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement that attempted to settle remaining disputes after their exchange of populations.

2. *Independence based on the London–Zurich Agreements.*

The Turks might use their control of territory on Cyprus to demand a return to some or all of the arrangements affecting local autonomy agreed to in 1960 but not fully implemented even before the 1963 clashes. This demand would strengthen the Turkish line that their intervention was in strict accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and was aimed solely at a return to constitutionalism. It would tend to defuse adverse international reaction to Turkish military intervention, and it should be more acceptable to the Soviets, as it would maintain Cyprus' independence.

Drawbacks to this outcome include its inherent instability and the fundamental unworkability of the 1960 arrangements. An attempt to return to the London–Zurich agreements—a basic Turkish hope after “renouncing” partition—would push the Cyprus dispute back to the unstable conditions that obtained from 1963 to 1967. If the 1960 apparatus could not be made to work during happier times in the first two years after independence, how could the Turks force the clock back after their invasion of the island? Moreover, even if Makarios resigned as President and the Turks agreed to accept Clerides in his place, Clerides is not a strong figure who could be counted on to slake the Turkish thirst for the kind of state within a state that would emerge from implementing the 1960 accords. The instability of the island under Clerides might pave the way for Makarios as a returned hostage of a revised left.

3. *An Independent, Federated Cyprus.*

The key feature would be substantial local autonomy for the two communities. While less beneficial to the Turks than a return to the local autonomy provisions of the London–Zurich agreements, it would reflect the thrust of the Turkish position in six years of intermittent negotiations, as well as the federation proposals the Turks advanced early in 1965. There are many precedents for federal solutions to communal problems, and, applied to Cyprus, these models would be less extreme than double enosis and would sound more realistic than return to the unworkable 1960 accords. Federation would give the Turks the “top-to-bottom” autonomy on which they have insisted since the intercommunal talks began in 1968.

On the other hand, a federal framework for a state consisting of very disparate parts is no assurance against strife. If those disparate parts were related through a commonwealth arrangement to two other countries, the problem of workability would become especially acute. A federal solution might mitigate the conflict in Cyprus by combining elements from the 1960 accords and the modifications of these arrangements that have emerged from the intercommunal talks in recent years. Turkey might then be able to assure its Cypriot compatriots of more

meaningful protection. But, the tension between the Greek preference for unity and the Turkish desire for maximum communal autonomy would create a permanent prospect for communal strife. No matter what promises and guarantees the Turkish invaders managed to extract from the Greeks, both sides would attempt to bend a federal solution to their own desires. Thus federalism contains the same inherent instability as a return to the London–Zurich arrangements and would be no more workable over the long term. While far more acceptable to the Soviets than double enosis, neither federation nor a return to 1960 would meet the basic test of stable practicality.

113. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Robert McCloskey

Wells Stabler

John Day

Amb. William Buffum

Defense

Amos Jordan

Harry Bergold

M/Gen. Denis P. McAuliffe

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown

LTG John W. Pauly

CIA

LTG Vernon A. Walters

George Lauder

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

NSC
 Richard Kennedy
 Rosemary Niehuss
 David Ransom
 James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the aircraft carrier *America* would continue to hold in the Mediterranean, but that scheduled training exercises could proceed;
 —the FBIS Station on Cyprus would be evacuated; and
 —there would be no hold up on ongoing military shipments to either Greece or Turkey.

Gen. Walters: Before I begin the briefing, I would like to comment on the DIA report you probably have seen about the reported coup in Greece.²

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I have a copy.

Gen. Walters: [*1 line not declassified*] they say they have heard the rumor, but that they have no hard information—only rumor. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there is absolutely nothing to confirm the rumors. I know this Davos, and he has made noises in the past about a coup. I doubt . . .

Secretary Kissinger: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Gen. Walters: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Gen. Walters: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Lauder: [*1 line not declassified*]

Gen. Walters: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

(Gen. Walters began to brief from the attached text)³

Secretary Kissinger: Sisco also reports that a coup is underway, but he wants out of there, and he'll report anything to do it! I think he is just looking for another reason to leave.

Gen. Walters continued to brief.

Mr. Stabler: Joe says he is leaving tonight.

Secretary Kissinger: I want Sisco to stay where he is and to check with me before he leaves. If that meeting begins in Geneva, I want him

² Attached but not printed.

³ Walters stated in the attached briefing that "both sides, having agreed to a cease-fire for 1000 Washington time today, appear to be making efforts to improve their position."

to go. The U.S. has got to be represented there, and I want him to go. (to Mr. Stabler) Make it clear to Joe that he either goes to Geneva or comes home, but that he does neither until he hears from us.

Gen. Walters continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: How could the Greeks land aircraft at Nicosia airport?

Gen. Walters: How could the Turks not stop it? A transport making a landing is a very vulnerable target. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: How much of Nicosia do they (the Turks) control?

Gen. Walters: We're not sure about that. Turkish paratroopers landed around the city, but we are not sure just how much of the town they hold. The main invasion came from the beachhead north of the city, up here, near Kyrenia (pointing to map). They have established somewhat of a corridor between the beachhead and the Turkish Quarter in Nicosia, but we are not sure just how much of the city they control at this point. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What was the name of that castle again?

Gen. Walters: St. Hilarion. It's at the pass in the mountains between Nicosia and Kyrenia. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there could be some individual executions going on, couldn't there? I mean, individual executions would not as a normal rule get reported. (In reference to a statement in the briefing that there have been no mass executions reported.)

Gen. Walters: Oh, I'm sure that executions of individuals probably were going on, particularly in the Turkish Communities. But, we have nothing to substantiate the claim that mass executions are being carried out. There has been a lot of killing on the island, and I surely would not rule out individual killings, particularly in the Turkish Communities. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: How has NATO frustrated or thwarted Greek designs?

Gen. Walters: I really don't know, but the Greeks seem to have this perception.

Secretary Kissinger: What exactly is the situation on the island? I've got to know that for my talks with Makarios this afternoon. Isn't the Turkish position on the island weaker now than before?

Gen. Walters: Well . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Wait, before that, George (Gen. Brown) would you like to say something?

Gen. Brown: There are two things. One, the Turks have not made the headway they expected. They underestimated Greek resistance and overestimated Turkish support on the island. However, and this is the

second point, they can re-supply and they control the air. Over time this will make a great difference. They can greatly strengthen their forces on the beachhead, which is already strong. They have a line of communication to the sea.

Secretary Kissinger: If I have learned anything since coming to Washington it is that you have only two choices in using force: either you use strong force or none at all. If you are going to use force, it should be used massively. There are no awards for moderate use of force.

Gen. Brown: There are indications that they have taken your advice.

Secretary Kissinger: How's that?

Gen. Brown: They attacked their own ships yesterday, apparently sunk a couple.

Secretary Kissinger: What's that?

Gen. Brown: We're not sure, somewhere off the southern coast.

Mr. Ingersoll: I think it was that group off Paphos.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have to know the situation on the island. I have to know it so that we can chart our course in the negotiations. It seems to me that the Turkish position is weaker now than before they invaded.

Gen. Walters: They have 5,000 more troops on the island . . .

Mr. Stabler: But that doesn't put them in a stronger position.

Gen. Walters: Five-thousand more troops . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I'm just trying to understand the situation. What is the Turkish position. It seems to me you can have two interpretations: (1) the Turks gained strength by establishing a beachhead, or (b) lost strength when Greek Cypriots overwhelmed Turkish Communities. Which one is right?

Gen. Walters: Well, I think that 5,000 troop advantage that the Turks have will begin to show up in the coming weeks.

Secretary Kissinger: I want somebody to tell me what the situation is on the island so that I can tell Makarios.

Gen. Brown: I would tilt toward the former (above). I think the Turks will pour in enough stuff during the ceasefire to put them in a better arguing position.

Gen. Walters: I agree.

(Secretary Kissinger was handed a message)

Secretary Kissinger: The Russians have an urgent message coming in. (to Mr. Kennedy) Can I take it down here?

Mr. Kennedy: We'll get it switched down here.

Gen. Walters: The Turkish Communities have all but been eliminated.

Secretary Kissinger: Where does this leave Makarios?

Gen. Walters: The Greeks don't want Makarios.

Secretary Kissinger: The Turks don't either.

Mr. Jordan: I'm not sure we know which way the balance has tipped and don't know if we ever will.

Gen. Walters: If a ceasefire . . .

(Secretary Kissinger was called out of the room at 10:58 and returned at 11:01)

Secretary Kissinger: That was the message from the Russians.⁴ They have a ship that is going into Larnaca for evacuation purposes. They have some 150 personnel they want to take out. They have asked for our assistance, and have also appealed to the British. They are not letting anybody else know. I said that we would give them our maximum support. (to Mr. Stabler) Get in touch with (Ambassador) Davies and their Ambassador there and tell them we have agreed to give maximum assistance. I hope they get the ship out of there fast.

Gen. Brown: I think we ought to tell the 6th Fleet also.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. (Gen. Pauly leaves meeting)

Gen. Walters: The Turks don't want him (Makarios).

Secretary Kissinger: The National Guard is overwhelmingly against him—it's an anti-Makarios force. After all, that's the unit that overthrew him. As long as it has Greek officers in command, it has to be anti-Makarios. Can they get rid of Sampson? Anybody heard anything from him lately?

Gen. Walters: We've heard nothing from him. He's given one or two talks on the radio, but other than that, nothing.

Mr. Day: Ioannides says that Sampson is expendable.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but Ioannides is not in Turkey. My question is, can Sampson rally independent support on the island or is this a question that has to be settled between the Greeks and the Turks? As far as we are concerned, he is expendable.

Gen. Walters: Yes, no question.

Amb. McCloskey: It's a question if Athens and Ankara can agree on anything.

Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, the balance of forces picture is this. The Turks have not followed up their gains on the beachhead, and they are doing even less well in the communities. It seems to me that

⁴ Kissinger spoke with Vorontsov at 11 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

it is unlikely that the Turks will be able to overtake the Greek Cypriots, even in time.

Mr. Ingersoll: We can probably rely on the Turks to keep reinforcing.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that if Makarios were to go back, he would have to look around for additional support, and to my way of thinking that means the East Bloc and left-wing Cypriots. Well, that's okay, we'll know what to do then, although it is a very complex problem. I want to make it clear that we are not disassociating ourselves from Makarios, but by the same token, we have no incentive to push him. We'll wait to see what emerges from the negotiations.

Mr. Jordan: There is the possibility that the Turkish army might overthrow Ecevit.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know so. He's a strange one. He really stalled on the ceasefire, gave me the weirdest collection of excuses I've ever heard. First of all was the business about the phantom "Greek Armada". Secondly, he gave us this stuff about the Greek airplanes using Turkish callsigns, and thirdly he talked about announcing the principle of the ceasefire but leaving the details to be decided later. We finally gave an ultimatum. The British and the French agreed to support us with separate messages but, in the event, their communications arrived too late, after the decision. Neither the Greeks or the Turks trusted the other enough to announce their ceasefire first. So we had to announce it. First the Turks accepted, then the Greeks.

Now we'll go into negotiations. There is a task force under Hartman working on our negotiating positions. We're going to bring Sisco back, I don't think he'll go on another mission again soon. He did a great job under impossible conditions. We'll send Buffum here as our representative to Geneva.

Mr. Stabler: I thought the Turks were opposed to Geneva—wanted Vienna. The Greeks want Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, wherever it is, the Turks will go anywhere now.

Mr. Stabler: The Greeks say they won't go until Friday.⁵

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't matter when they get started—a couple of days doesn't matter. I think we've come out of this crisis in a good position. Soviet impotence to influence the outcome or support their friends was again recorded. It will be noted in the Arab

⁵ July 26.

World in my opinion. In the meantime, anything that emerges from the negotiations is better for the U.S. With the balance of forces we can steer the negotiations. Bill (Buffum) we don't want to put up with any sentimentality on the part of the Greeks. Is there anything else we need to take up?

Gen. Brown: When this thing started, the aircraft carrier *America* was in Rota, Spain, due to rotate back on the 24th of July. We put a hold on her, as you know. I would propose that we keep holding her, but would also like to go to sea for scheduled training exercises.

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely, no problem with that. Go ahead with the training, but let's hold a decision on bringing the ship back to the U.S. By the way, we are going to talk to (UN Sec. Gen) Waldheim about increasing the UN force on the island to help keep the peace. What was the situation on the island before this thing started? Were the Turks all in enclaves?

Gen. Walters: Yes, as you can see by this map.

Secretary Kissinger: Were they all self-governing?

Gen. Walters: Not all of them were, but a number of them did have self-government.

Secretary Kissinger: The enclaves that were under Turkish control, did they lose them all?

Gen. Walters: Yes, almost all.

Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?

Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They (the Turks) couldn't even take Nicosia airport.

Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. Their air support was ineffective.

Secretary Kissinger: And they didn't even get their paratroopers anywhere near their enclaves.

Gen. Walters: Well, those enclaves are small and it's hard to drop them right on them.

Secretary Kissinger: But at least it would have kept the Greeks busy.

Gen. Brown: The whole operation at Famagusta was a debacle. There was no pre-planning or coordination, just a debacle.

Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they (the Turks) really that strong on the island then?

Gen. Walters: Well, I don't know . . . Incidentally, can we get those FBIS people out of there?

Secretary Kissinger: They're not out yet? I thought we said yesterday to take them out.

Gen. Brown: No, I think you said you wanted to wait until the ceasefire.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, by all means, get them out.

Gen. Brown: That is going to take some doing.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's get them out.

Mr. Ingersoll: I have another question. I think there has been a misunderstanding on the delay of military equipment to Greece and Turkey. The Department of Defense says a delay only to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we were going to delay only certain types of items.

Mr. Jordan: Our understanding was that we were to hold up major items only to Greece and ascribe the delays to technical reasons.

Secretary Kissinger: Correct! Everything else keeps going! We don't want the Greeks to think that they are being cut off. We want to keep the sympathy of Greek officials.

Amb. McCloskey: We're not holding up major items to Turkey too.

Mr. Jordan: They are continuing to be moved. We've only asked the suppliers to check with us before moving them on.

Secretary Kissinger: What are the major items? What have we stopped?

Mr. Jordan read from list.

Secretary Kissinger: We're holding the two F-4s in Rota and the A-7 contract. Everything else goes forward. Only the F-4s and A-7 contract is being held. It would be useful to give at least the visual appearance that the hardware is coming in.

Mr. Ingersoll: And no delay on the military equipment to Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: What is going in?

Mr. Jordan read from the list.

Secretary Kissinger: I see no reason to delay anything to Turkey. In fact, there is every reason to get the stuff to Turkey.

Mr. Jordan: There is another F-4 at the factory in St. Louis. It's supposed to go in a few days.

Secretary Kissinger: Move it to Rota. Then, if we have to, we can say there has been a technical delay. Now, what are you going to say at Defense about this military aid business?

Mr. Jordan: What we are saying is that this whole question of military supply is in the hands of State Department. If the suppliers ask what they should do, we're saying that we are trying to straighten out the situation, that it is all messed up in bureaucratic paperwork. As far as the press, we're referring them to State.

Secretary Kissinger: That Getler article did not come out of State. It came out of Defense. The President absolutely does not want a

cut-off of military aid to Greece. If need be, I'll get a Presidential Directive on that, but you shouldn't need one. I want to make it clear that we are not to withhold military aid to Greece. The F-4s can be held up, and the A-7 contract.

Mr. Kennedy: You mean, don't sign it.

Secretary Kissinger: When is it supposed to be signed?

Mr. Stabler: It has already been signed, but it will take some time yet to finalize.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want the Greek Government to feel that we have contributed to their rape.

Gen. Brown: If we delay the A-7 contract, we may have to renegotiate the cost. Since deliveries won't take place for months and months, I think we should go ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: Now, the Department of Defense's position is what? What are you going to say about military aid.

Mr. Jordan: That it has never been stopped.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we say that at the noon briefing?

Mr. Ingersoll: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. I don't want a hassle with Congress on when and why we resumed aid. I think this has been a well-coordinated and well-run crisis. I want to congratulate you all. We may meet again tomorrow or the day after.

114. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and British Foreign Minister Callaghan¹

July 22, 1974, 11:25 a.m.

K: You wouldn't take my call. I rang you this morning, and you wouldn't take my call.

C: [laughs]² Well, now, what's the situation?

K: Well, our understanding is that there is a coup in Greece.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Callaghan was in London.

² Brackets in the original.

- C: Yes.
- K: And Sisco thinks they won't be ready to meet tomorrow.
- C: Yes, I am told that this man Davos (?) is taking over. Is that right?
- K: That's right, and our reading is that he isn't so bad.
- C: Our what?
- K: Our reading is that he may be more moderate.
- C: Yeah, you know you've got a broken voice. I don't think it's just the accent of yours. It's that bloody machine you've got there.
- K: Do you want me to call you back?
- C: I think I can just make it out, Henry, if you go pretty slowly. Did you say that—uh, what did you say last?
- K: I said that my impression—our impression—is that this fellow may not be so bad to work with.
- C: Ah, right, I agree, but I am told he's pretty anti-Turkish.
- K: Umm.
- C: However, I'll put it off, and what do you suggest? Wednesday?³
- K: I would put it til Thursday.
- C: Well, is that letting it go a big long?
- K: Well, then do it Wednesday if you want.
- C: I think we'd better try for Wednesday, and we may have to settle for Thursday.
- K: Good.
- C: Because the situation is such that you've got this man Sampson still there.
- K: I agree.
- C: And Ecevit was ringing me up and saying that genocide is going on and there's no authority to deal with.
- K: Now we are talking to Waldheim . . .
- C: Yes.
- K: . . . to increase the UN force.
- C: Yes.
- K: And we will strongly support it if you will.
- C: Yes, we will certainly strongly support that, although we shall probably have to supply some people.
- K: That's what I would think.

³ July 24.

C: Yes, well all right. Well I would try and get that through, and we would have to add some people to the UN force and let them operate under UN auspices.

K: Good.

C: But I think in those circumstances it is all the more important we try and make it Wednesday if we can.

K: Good. And I will bring Sisco home, and I will send Bill Buffum.

C: Bill who?

K: Buffum.

C: All right. Yes.

K: He's a very stable and solid and unexcitable fellow.

C: Very good.

K: And he will have my thinking in very great detail.

C: Would he come to Geneva?

K: If you want him.

C: Well, I think we'd better have him in London first.

K: Ok.

C: And then he can come on from London to Geneva when we start the conference.

K: He will be in London on Wednesday.

C: On Wednesday.

K: Unless it slips.

C: Unless it slips, yes. All right. We'll see him here first thing Wednesday morning then, Henry.

K: He'll be there first thing Wednesday.

C: And then he can consult with us before we go. And we will try and make the conference Wednesday afternoon.

K: Wonderful.

C: See if you can make that stick with the Greeks and with the Turks, will you?

K: I'll do my best.

C: Right, old man. Good.

K: And I've really enjoyed working with you on this.

C: I really have. I think we've managed this not too badly, don't you?

K: I think it's come out as a net asset.

C: Yes, I think it's good too. We've got to get rid of this fellow Sampson quickly, you know?

K: Well, I told you, we'd support that.

C: Yes. That's right. OK. Well, when we get your man over here, we'll talk, and we'll try and coordinate again.

K: Now, look, I'm seeing Makarios this afternoon.⁴

C: Yes.

K: And I'm going to play it rather cool.

C: Don't be too cool.

K: No, I'll play it loose.

C: You must recognize, he's the legitimate President until any other arrangements are made.

K: That's right. No, no, I'll be very friendly, but I will be non-committal.

C: Yes, that's all right. I tell you, we will have to move very delicately on that one, Henry.

K: I agree with you.

C: Yeah, because we've got this big . . . well, I've got a lot of information I'll tell your chap _____⁵ on that. And I know all the difficulties, but I take it you want to appear to be isolated on this one, you know. If we move, we've got to move together.

K: No, no, we are not going to make a commitment, but we don't want a final decision made.

C: No, no, all right. Well, we are going to inform him through our UN ambassador there. Righto, we are going to inform him of what is taking place, and we will notify Denktash, the Turkish leader, too, and Clerides.

K: Right. And we will stay loose on it and very friendly.

C: Yes, that's right.

K: And we will send you a reporting cable.

C: Yes, you keep it going for a bit, Henry. You take your uncle's advice.

K: Oh, no, you can count on that. You can absolutely count on that.

C: And you must be absolutely filthy to Sampson.

K: You can count on that too. [laughter]⁶

⁴ Kissinger met privately with Makarios for 1 hour and 20 minutes, at which time Ambassadors Dimitriou and McCloskey joined them. Makarios handed Kissinger his six handwritten proposals for resolving the Cyprus issue, including demands for a return to the status quo ante and a mixed police force. Kissinger then briefed the Ambassadors on the private conversation and remained noncommittal on who should lead Cyprus. (Informal record of meeting, July 22; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File) Two other memoranda of conversations relating to the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P770087-0271 and P870119-0415.

⁵ Omission in the original.

⁶ Brackets in the original.

C: Very good. I can always count on you being filthy, can I?

K: We really have turned nasty on this.

C: [laughs] All right.

K: Good. Nice to have talked to you.

C: Goodbye now.

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 22, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary Kissinger

William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
(Notetaker)

UK

Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States

Jeremy Greenstock (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I wanted to inform you that the UK was supplying scout cars and some additional troops to the UN as requested.

Secretary Kissinger: I was already aware of this and in fact had advised the Turkish Government of it since your man apparently was having difficulty getting through.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: We counseled the Government of Turkey to assure that the ceasefire holds. The Turkish Government should give orders to its forces and its Ambassador in Nicosia to calm down. He is blaming the UN for everything that is going wrong. British reports indicate the Turks have been continuing with their shelling this afternoon, and the Greek Chargé has said Greek Army units were being attacked. Does the United States have any information on the situation in Greece itself?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled Material, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know. We had coup reports this morning, but the Prime Minister called me this afternoon and made no mention of it.²

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I saw Makarios this morning and took notes on a paper he showed me. It does seem sensible. It covers proposals for declaring the National Guard illegal. All that would be left would be Greek and Turkish contingents as well as a mixed force of UN military police. I doubt the police force idea will work because the Turks would not leave their own people with so little protection. However, these are generally rational ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: Makarios told me³ he did not want to raise the question of his own return to Cyprus and mentioned that Clerides is Acting President at the moment under the Constitution. However, elections must be held within 45 days. Makarios said he understood the United States wants him to stay away from Cyprus for some time, but I told him this was an unfair statement. We want the parties to work things out themselves. He is cold-blooded, and I told him we were looking at the situation in a cold-blooded way ourselves.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Makarios said he will be going back to London in about 10 days and alleged he's more concerned about the future of his country than himself.

Secretary Kissinger: He told me he would be happy to be relieved of his duties but made clear he is interested in getting re-elected. I told Makarios we will not oppose him. Makarios said that is not enough, that he needs our support to return. I replied that that would depend on who else he asks.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Makarios expressed gratitude for British support in the Security Council, and I thanked him for not insisting on Cyprus participation in the next round of negotiations. I told him it was not good to have the Soviet Union as his principal supporter, and he agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: He did make several sensible points, such as telling his people that enosis would be impossible because of the Turkish opposition.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I was concerned about the Turkish performance in Cyprus because they did not appear able to handle modern weapons well, and I think this has unhappy implications for NATO's southern flank. They even failed to take Nicosia Airport.

² No record of Kissinger's conversation with Androutsopoulos on July 22 has been found, but they spoke again on July 23. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

³ This refers to Kissinger's meeting earlier in the day with Makarios. See footnote 4, Document 114.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you consider the balance of forces now is in Cyprus?

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I think it is about right. The Turks now have 5,000 more men there and still have pockets of Turk Cypriots around the island.

Secretary Kissinger: As far as the future government is concerned, we have no particular interest in any special group. We do not mind jettisoning Sampson, but not before we know who will take his place.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: We are not backing Makarios as the future President.

Secretary Kissinger: I object to him because he is ambitious, able and strong; with the present balance of forces in Cyprus he must get the Turks out, and this can only be done with Soviet help.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I think you are wrong on that. I hold no brief for him; indeed, he has caused the UK a lot more difficulties than he has the United States, but he has handled that lot on Cyprus successfully for 14 years without outsiders like the Russians coming in.

Secretary Kissinger: I enjoyed talking to Makarios. He is wily and clever and gets subtle points. But I now see a balance of forces which will drive him to the Soviet bloc. Clerides might be able to do it.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Maybe the Turks don't feel so strongly now in view of their poor performance.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to be cold-blooded about who takes over and have no objection if Makarios could structure it satisfactorily.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I would also go for Clerides. He is clever and brave, although he would run Cyprus differently. He is the ablest man there. He was in the RAF.

Secretary Kissinger: We would like to delay a bit and see how the balance of forces develops following the excellent British example of the 19th century.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: As far as the negotiations go, we want to wait and see what the parties themselves bring.

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan told me the United States has supplied the muscle and now the UK would like to supply the brains. I guess he was really saying you don't want us in the negotiations.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I would certainly never have put it that way.

I want to mention with regard to Waldheim's request to double the size of UNFICYP that we will have difficulty in increasing our force contribution as much as he would like, and we would like time to think over just what we can do. The financial considerations, among other things, are quite considerable.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand that. I did talk about this problem generally with Waldheim this morning⁴ and told him we would support an increase in size of the UN force. I wish someone would keep him off my back.

⁴ Kissinger spoke with Waldheim at 9:40 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, July 22, 1974, 1954Z.

5815. Subject: Cyprus Situation.

1. Secretary's message for PriMin,² as conveyed to me by Buffum, passed to PriMin soon after 2045 local time. PriMin continues to be in National Defence Council meeting, and I have as yet had no response.

2. In meantime, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] information being received at Embassy here strongly suggests that Turks are not making effective effort to adhere to ceasefire and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] suggests that on contrary they are willfully continuing to ignore it, and placing entire effort in jeopardy. I have, on my own initiative, passed my "impression" in this regard to MFA SecGen Erez, but I do not feel I should pursue this further without having balanced appraisal from Department which concludes that Turks, in fact, constitute principal threat to ceasefire breakdown. Therefore, request soonest Department's appraisal as to: a) seriousness of threat of ceasefire deterioration and b) which of the parties is the most responsible.

Macomber

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Flash; Exdis handle as Nodis. Received at 4:45 p.m. Repeated Flash to Athens and Nicosia.

² Transmitted in telegram 158100 to Ankara, July 22, Kissinger's message to Ecevit welcomed the news of Turkish confirmation of the cease-fire. Kissinger called the act an "important act of statesmanship" and stated that the next indispensable step was a meeting of the three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom), which Callaghan had proposed for July 23. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV)

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey and Yugoslavia¹

Washington, July 23, 1974, 0159Z.

159043. Subject: Situation Report No. 14 (as of 1500 EDT, July 22).

1. Military Situation on Cyprus: Both Greece and Turkey agreed to a cease-fire on Cyprus beginning at 10:00 a.m. EDT. Commanders of both forces were subsequently notified, but sporadic fighting still continues, especially around Nicosia airport where the Turks are trying to gain control. The Turks apparently have a firm grasp on Kyrenia on the north coast. Despite the many flaws in the cease-fire, the Governments of both Greece and Turkey seem relieved it is in effect and have given no signs of wanting to abrogate it.

2. Talks: Greece and Turkey have agreed to meet this week in Geneva to begin talks on the Cyprus situation. The meeting will be held under UK auspices. Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes will attend, but Greece has not yet announced its representative. No agenda has yet been decided.

3. Greece: Rumors of a coup overthrowing the Greek Government and Brigadier Ioannides have been circulating all day. The rumors stated that Lt. General Davos, the Commander of "C" Corps in Salonika, would replace General Gizikis as President. However, these rumors have been denied by the Androutopoulos government and the Army, and the US Embassy in Athens has been unable to verify their truth. The British Ambassador has reported that the present GOG seems shaky, but has the appearance of conducting business routinely.

4. NATO: The threat that Greece may pull out of NATO has virtually disappeared. Greek officers at NATO headquarters in Brussels are staying at their posts, but Greek officers assigned to subordinate NATO commands have been alerted to report home for mobilization. However, Greek sources expect they will remain in place. The NATO allies have expressed satisfaction at the cease-fire and the expectation of talks between the parties.

5. Turkey: Prime Minister Ecevit held a press conference at which he stated US "contributed greatly to establishment of a cease-fire." He also said he was very pleased that "serious war" did not break out with Greece, and that he did not expect a change in US-Turkish relations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Richard Miles (EUR). Repeated Immediate to Athens, Nicosia, Moscow, London, USUN, USNATO, the White House, and CINCEUR.

6. In a press conference today, Foreign Minister Gunes stated that Turkey had put troops on Cyprus to ensure that the constitutional rights and physical safety of the Turkish community will be protected. Calling for a "sovereign independent" Cyprus, Gunes insisted that future constitutional arrangements must take into account the fact that there are "two sovereign peoples" in Cyprus. He seemed to be implying that Turkey will press hard for a federated regime in Cyprus.

7. Evacuation: Evacuation by helicopter from Dhekalia SBA to CTF 61/62 for onward movement to Beirut has been completed. In addition to American citizens, 80 Lebanese nationals are aboard.

Kissinger

118. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 23, 1974.

THE IMPACT OF THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GREEK AND CYPRIOT GOVERNMENTS ON THE GENEVA TALKS

The return of Konstantine Karamanlis to Athens and the formation of a new Greek Government under his leadership represents a fundamental change in the political structure in Athens and the best hope for an early settlement of the Cyprus crisis.² It is not yet clear whether the summons to Karamanlis was made with the concurrence of Ioannides, but it is doubtful that he will ever be able to regain the kind of power that he has exercised since last November.

Karamanlis was Prime Minister of Greece from 1955 to 1963 when he went into voluntary exile in Paris. He is the most respected political figure in Greece, among both the civilian population and the military establishment. His Government will have the support not only of his own party, the National Radical Union (conservative), but also of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, July 1974. Secret. Drafted by John Day (EUR/SE).

² Following the overthrow of the military junta in Greece on July 22, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis returned from exile in Paris to restore democracy to Greece. See Document 17.

most of the members of the Center Union. Only Andreas Papandreou and his supporters and a hardcore associated with the left-of-center would oppose Karamanlis.

All the personalities who join Karamanlis in the new Government are likely to be strongly pro-Western and committed to Greece's participation in NATO. All of them, however, have been critical of our failure to dissociate ourselves from the Papadopoulos and Ioannides regimes, and Karamanlis has personally felt slighted that we have not maintained regular contact with him in Paris in recent years. Thus, we will probably have to do some bridge-building with the new leadership initially.

On the immediate crisis in Cyprus, we can expect the new Greek Government to keep Greece's pledge on a ceasefire and on talks in Geneva unless it believes that Ankara is involved in major violations of the ceasefire. Both Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averof were personally involved in the London–Zurich negotiations, and both are well and favorably known to the Turks. Thus, the formation of the new Greek Government will probably be regarded by Ankara as a most welcome change. A few days ago, Karamanlis spoke publicly in favor of Makarios, but whether he will stick to this position or support Clerides is not yet known.

Ankara also undoubtedly welcomes the formation of a new Government in Cyprus under Clerides who has played the principal role on the Greek-Cypriot side in the inter-communal talks. Politically, he's regarded as a moderate who has been more inclined than Makarios to grant the Turkish Cypriots a greater degree of local autonomy. Clerides is not popular with the Sampson extremists, but they are not likely to be a major factor as long as the Cypriot National Guard is under the effective control of Athens. By the same token, Clerides does not have a firm control of the Greek Cypriot center and left. As a representative of the Greek Cypriot position, Clerides will not be able to speak with as strong a voice in Geneva as Makarios did at London–Zurich.

119. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 23, 1974, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Cyprus Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
William Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Sisco (Notetaker)

PARTICIPANTS WHO ENTERED MEETING LATER

Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William Hyland, Assistant Secretary, INR

Sisco: My judgment is that Prime Minister Karamanlis would be supported by the moderate wing of the Greek military. General Bonanos, who worked out the ceasefire, is not an extreme right-wing officer of the type that supported Ioannides. Karamanlis will have the support of the moderate military factions in the Greek Army.

Kissinger: But Karamanlis will have to govern democratically, which means the left in Greece will have to be unleashed.

Sisco: He would have the support of all the political leaders. Karamanlis is not an Ecevit. Karamanlis is a conservative. As long as he gets along with the military government, I think the possibility of the left being unleashed in Greece to introduce a man like Papandreu is an unlikely scenario.

Kissinger: My prediction is that Karamanlis will legalize the left. The Greek Army is demoralized. Within a year there will be an active left-wing movement combined with other political movements in Greece. Of course, this is a better government for us domestically here in the United States. It would be easier to work with. But we will see.

The nightmare now is that in the Mediterranean littoral many countries are turning away from political party rule and are turning towards the military. For example, in Portugal there is a movement

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, August 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

toward the military. In Spain, with Franco's imminent demise, the military could come into power. Coupled with the events in Greece and Turkey, the whole northern littoral of the Mediterranean is in a state of political flux. These are realities. It is not a question whether we like military rule or civilian rule.

Sisco: Let us reserve judgment for the moment.

Kissinger: Where are we now from the foreign policy view?

Sisco: I want to add one point. Concerning the Geneva conference, I do not think there can be a meeting in Geneva without the Greeks being represented.

Kissinger: Is there any possibility of that?

Sisco: We have word that Callaghan may be talking about going to Geneva without the Greeks.

Kissinger: Get me Peter Ramsbotham on the phone.

Eagleburger: If they are expecting Buffum in Geneva, we ought to warn them that he may not be coming.

Kissinger: Will Karamanlis accept Makarios?

Sisco: I don't know. What is important, however, is this middle group of officers.

Kissinger: You can't be sure of how influential the military will be in Greece now. Karamanlis will not be a figurehead ruler. In fact, I am not sure General Bonanos can decide what will happen in Greece.

Buffum: I wonder if the military will be discredited after the politicians come to power.

Kissinger: The military has changed the balance of forces inside Greece. It will not be easy to override a civilian government in Greece.

McCloskey: Karamanlis will be more receptive to Makarios initially. We may have to think differently about Makarios.

Kissinger: We can go either way. Clerides emerged faster than we expected.

Sisco: Makarios has sent a message through the British to Clerides.

Kissinger: I saw that.

If a slight right-of-center government is established in Greece, we are fine. Also, if a left-center government comes to power, it would be a development which we could not have controlled or influenced in any case. If we had overthrown that government last week, we would be in deep trouble. There would have been no restraints on Turkey. We would have been blamed in Greece. This government fell on the basis of its own incompetence. If Greece goes left, it is because this gang destroyed the political process in Greece.

Sisco: Ioannides and General Bonanos were there when I met with the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. It is interesting that

Ioannides left before the meetings were over, but General Bonanos stayed throughout the meetings.

(McCloskey hands a copy of Makarios' message to Clerides² to the Secretary.)

McCloskey: You've got to be really cool to send a message like this.

Kissinger: There is simply not enough of a balance of forces in Greece.

(Bill Hyland entered the office at this point.)

Kissinger: What is going on?

(Bill Hyland gave a brief summary of the latest intelligence reports on the political and military situation.)

McCloskey: Has there been any formal announcement on Clerides' swearing-in as President of Cyprus?

Sisco: We are going to ask Ambassador Davies about Clerides.

Kissinger: I want to know in what capacity Clerides was sworn in.

Sisco: The British are more worried about our jumping on Clerides than we are worried about the British doing so too quickly. It is under consideration.

Kissinger: Now it depends on the Greek Government if they want Makarios back. If that's the case, that's it, but let's not rush in.

Sisco: No one is rushing in.

Kissinger: (Secretary telephoned Ambassador Ramsbotham.)

I take it the talks will not start now. We should not start until the situation gets crystallized. Is Clerides Acting President or President? We will hold off recognizing him but would appreciate it if you would do likewise. In any case, we will do nothing until we have consulted together. We will keep Buffum here until the situation clarifies a bit. Please tell Callaghan. (End of telephone conversation.)³

The British have sent a message to Nicosia on the question of the recognition of Clerides. As for us, we should avoid any act which implies recognition, but should do everything to establish contact to conduct business. I take it there are two conversations with Clerides that Davies has had.⁴

² The message reads: "I have just heard the news that Sampson has resigned and you have assumed the duties of acting president according to the constitution. Until I return to Cyprus, you shall preside over my council of ministers with the exception of Odysseus Ioannides, who is hereby dismissed." (Telegram 159167 to Nicosia, July 23; *ibid.*, Records of Joseph Sisco, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus, 1974/75)

³ Kissinger spoke with Ramsbotham at 3:04 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁴ Reported in telegrams 1680 and 1681 from Nicosia, July 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Sisco: And a third today asking what our relationship would be.⁵

Kissinger: Let's give Davies a warm and friendly reply. We need Clerides as a bargaining function. Even if Makarios comes back, we do not want Clerides to resign prematurely. Ramsbotham thinks it is going to be hard to bring Makarios back. His support in Greece will not be as strong as before. We've got to get Clerides enough into play so that he doesn't quit on us.

Buffum: It is noteworthy that only a few people rallied around Makarios after his overthrow despite his reported popular support on the island.

Kissinger: Makarios told me that when his palace was attacked, he simply walked out of his office into a car and drove off. They forgot to guard the rear door.

(Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and Assistant Secretary Hartman entered the office at this point.)

We would never give support to a conference without the Greeks being there. Under present conditions, it would not be good to have a conference convened tomorrow. Tasca has to know we are not bringing pressure on the Greeks to go to a conference tomorrow.

(The Secretary telephoned Ambassador Ramsbotham.)

Your Ambassador has told the Greeks that you are prepared to start a conference without them and that this reflects U.S. support. Under no circumstance will we support a conference on Cyprus without the Greeks, and we will have no one there under such conditions. Let us separate two problems: (a) we strongly support a conference on Cyprus with Greek representation; (b) you cannot count on our support for a conference which excludes the Greeks. The day after a coup d'état is not the day you should have a conference.

Joe Sisco is sitting here and he was prepared, had he stayed in Athens a day longer, to be named the new Prime Minister of Greece. (Laughter)

(The Secretary's telephone conversation with Ambassador Ramsbotham ended.)⁶

Greece and Israel are two countries where you insult a man by giving him a Cabinet position. Whichever man gets in the other guy will try to cut his throat. In any case, we can't do anything before matters crystallize.

⁵ Presumably a reference to telegram 1663 from Nicosia, July 23. (Ibid.)

⁶ Kissinger spoke with Ramsbotham at 3:23 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Hartman: It seems that General Bonanos is behind the coup.

Kissinger: There is no way the military can turn power over to the civilians in these circumstances. They can turn power over to another government and have that government start its own momentum. Then, the military can try to intervene. However, total military rule is not viable in these circumstances. A political process has to be started in Greece and the army may try to influence it later.

Depending on how strong the left is in Greece, current events will bring the left to a more enhanced position in that country. We must see how this emerges. Frankly, the army would not have turned to the civilians if it had enough credibility of its own. The Greek military cannot enforce King Constantine who, in my mind, is absolutely ineffective. The military can no longer be decisive.

Sisco: In any case, the military may not be able to avoid Makarios.

Kissinger: I agree with Sisco that the Greek military cannot decide on Makarios.

In our policy we should not oppose Makarios, since we may want to have him back.

McCloskey: How did your talk with Makarios go?⁷

Kissinger: Makarios was playing a rough game. He asked me if we want him out of the non-aligned bloc. I told him that I was in no position to respond on the international position of Cyprus. I said I want to see what happens in the negotiations. My thinking is that if there is a stalemate, we can support Clerides. If there is no stalemate, we could also go for Makarios. I told Makarios not to go to the Russians. What Makarios has to get into his head is that in a crisis he cannot operate without us.

McCloskey: He knows this; he wants the U.S. to be involved.

Kissinger: He is a tough guy. I told him we do not oppose his coming back to power. Our not supporting Clerides at this point is the most meaningful gesture to him. He is an impressive figure.

Eagleburger: (Reading a cable)⁸ There is little chance in the next few days for the Greeks to produce someone in Geneva. Callaghan is worried about delaying further, especially because the Turks are getting steamed up. The Turks could get difficult. Callaghan is giving the go-ahead for the conference the day after tomorrow.

(The Secretary called Michael Alexander in London, the private secretary of Foreign Minister Callaghan.)

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 114.

⁸ Not further identified.

Kissinger: I hope you won't act without talking to us. What is the compulsion to have this meeting? I do not have the impression that the Turks are so upset. Please make it absolutely clear to your people that all the parties have to be there before we can do anything. We have to give the Greek Government 48 hours before they face a conference. We will handle the Turks with you. If the junta was still there, it would have been desirable to have a conference rapidly. However, in its absence, there's no advantage to an early meeting.

(The Secretary ended his telephone call.)⁹

Eagleburger: Callaghan will call you within the hour.

Hartman: The Turks have given us five locations on Cyprus where Turkish Cypriots are allegedly being wiped out.

Kissinger: Get that message to Waldheim in New York.

(The Secretary had a telephone call placed to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit.)

Ingersoll: In your conversation with Schlesinger did you release the planes.

Kissinger: Yes.

Our view on Makarios is that if he is the most logical candidate, he should go back. However, he should go back as a result of talks with us. He is not inclined to rely on the Soviet Union, at least for this week. By next Monday we should have a good read-out on the situation when I next meet him. If the Greek Government wants Makarios and the Turkish Government does not have any objection, we have no objection.

Ambassador Davies should give us an assessment of the balance of political forces on the island.

(Mr. Hyland entered the office again.)

Hyland: Clerides has been sworn in as President of Cyprus.¹⁰

Sisco: Was there any reference to Paragraph 2, Article 44, of the Cyprus constitution?

Kissinger: I want the question answered on whether or not Makarios is the strongest man on the island. I want an analysis soon. Davies should stop just short of recognition but should establish some relationship with Clerides.¹¹

⁹ No record of this conversation has been found.

¹⁰ Hyland held a teletype conference at 3:25 p.m. with members of the Cyprus Task Force. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File)

¹¹ Davies had urged formal U.S. recognition of the Clerides government in telegram 1663, July 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)

(The Secretary spoke on the telephone to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit at approximately 3:30 p.m.)

Kissinger: How do you see the situation? Mr. Prime Minister, give that view to my Ambassador. You got my cable this morning. When should the talks start in your judgment? That is a terrible mistake. My suggestion is that when there is no government, it is unfair to bring pressure on that country when they have no Foreign Minister. Give them the courtesy of forming a government. This is my personal view. I will not have the United States representative before Thursday in any event. Buffum will not come before Thursday.

(While awaiting a response from Ecevit, the Secretary stated the following to the group in the office: they want to open a conference and sit there and wait for the Greek. Larry, call Alexander and say that we have learned that Callaghan and Ecevit have agreed to a conference this Wednesday in Geneva without the Greeks.)

(To Ecevit on phone) We will not send anyone before we know the Greek Government has agreed to send someone to Geneva. You should proceed with what you have agreed to do. I have no right to get in the way of an agreement you have made with the British. Nevertheless, I would prefer to know that all the parties are coming. They do not have a government at this point. How can you hear anything from them when they don't have a government? (End of telephone conversation)¹²

The British have an agreement with Ecevit that Foreign Minister Gunes and Ecevit will meet without the Greeks. Tell the British I want to inform them of the following: Ecevit told me they agreed to meet in Geneva, regardless whether the Greeks came or not. If the Greeks are not there, they will wait for them in Geneva. This will look like the raping of the Greeks and will only reinforce the myth of a U.S.-UK-Turkish rape of Greece. It would undermine any civilian group coming to power in Greece. We made no move without checking it with the British. We are astonished at this decision and we think it is a horrible idea. In sum, until we have official word from the Greeks, there will be no U.S. representative in Geneva.

Sisco: The principal reason the Greeks indicated that they would go to a conference is because the U.S. would be there.

Hartman: Have the Turks been in contact with the new Greek Government?

Kissinger: I don't care. It is an insane idea to bring pressure on a government that has just been formed. Call Callaghan's office. What is

¹² Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 3:30 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

the hurry? Ecevit is responding to British pressures. Until the U.S. Government gets definite information from the Greek Government, there will be no U.S. representative in Geneva. We would request also that they take no further unilateral steps.

By the way, Ecevit told me that Clerides has a great advantage in that he has the shade of legality. Ecevit told me that his Ambassador in Athens would check with the Greeks before Greek Foreign Minister Gunes goes to Geneva. If at the end of this Makarios comes back and it emerges after a U.S.-UK-Turkish gang-up on Greece, the Greek Government will be against us from the beginning.

(Eagleburger and Hartman left the office.)

Sisco: This is an attempted pre-emptive move by Callaghan. He wants to display assertive leadership. He says he has Parliament behind him and he thinks he can force the Greek hand. He is mistaken. The UK could play such a leadership role only if they maintain their credibility with the Greeks and the Turks.

Kissinger: If their first act is to restore Makarios, it would undermine the new Greek Government.

Sisco: They will adopt a pragmatic approach by dealing with Clerides for the time being.

Ingersoll: Did you get any feeling from Ecevit?

Kissinger: Ecevit wants to keep the Turks in Cyprus. He does not want Makarios back. Therefore, if the conference brings Makarios back, it should not be done by our imposing him on the reluctant Turks. It is not in our interests to shove him down the Turkish throat. It is possible that after two years Makarios will call for a unitary Cyprus which is against Turkish perceptions.

Sisco: Ecevit is trying to bridge the political gap in Turkey. The young leftists support him. Yet he cannot stay in power without the Turkish military. Therefore, the reason he is adopting the position he presently advocates is because he is trying to take care of both his political left and the military at the same time.

Kissinger: In the beginning Ecevit was interested only in increasing Turkish forces on the island and gaining access to the sea for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, by later adding the conditions of removing the Greek officers from the National Guard and returning Makarios to office, he knew the package would not be acceptable to either Makarios or to the Greeks. In fact, the first thing he said to Joe Sisco was "Now I don't care who becomes President." If we want legality, he can get Makarios. If one analyzes this, any Makarios return to power would be bad for the Turks. Makarios is capable of unifying Cyprus. Also, he will try through the UN to get the Turkish forces pushed out of Cyprus in the future.

What the Greek Government wants I do not know. Perhaps Clerides is the best solution to the situation on Cyprus. As for the United States, we cannot impose Clerides, or, for that matter, back Makarios before the Turks and the Greeks have either acquiesced to Makarios or decide to oppose Makarios. If both the Turks and Greeks acquiesce to Makarios, it is okay. If both oppose Makarios, then we should go for Clerides. What we cannot have is a conference between the UK and Turkey opting for Makarios. The Greek Government could then blame it on us.

Buffum: The Turks could not accept Makarios without radical structural changes on Cyprus.

Hyland: Clerides was sworn in as Acting President of Cyprus.

Kissinger: What is Rodger Davies' perception of his role? When he talks to Clerides, what signal is he giving? We better get guidance to Davies. He should understand that he should be extremely friendly to Clerides and just stop a shade short of recognition.

Sisco: We will have instructions sent out to Davies immediately.¹³ Davies has said that Clerides will have Cypriot support and can maintain himself in office. In my view, Rodger has been superb during this crisis.

Kissinger: I agree. Davies has done very well.

Hyland: Clerides told Davies that the Turks are moving heavy armor to other areas and that a Turkish offensive may be expected at dawn. Clerides urged that a message be sent to Turkey to cease and desist and to prevent a massacre on the island.

Sisco: These reports are coming from the right-wing military in Greece who are out of the picture. They are trying to give a rationale for intervention.

Hyland: In that respect, one general has claimed that there is a full-scale war on Cyprus.

Kissinger: Davies needs to know what he has to do. He has done an excellent job.

By the way, it's good to have you back, Joe. You know I can't do without a loyal opposition here. (Laughter)

(Eagleburger and Hartman returned to the meeting.)

¹³ In telegram 159994 to Nicosia, Kissinger instructed Davies: "I want you to understand that you should be extremely friendly to Clerides and that you should continue to establish effective communications and contact with him, stopping just a shade short of recognition." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)

Eagleburger: I gave them hell.¹⁴ Their final answer is that they have not agreed with Ecevit. If they learn tonight that the Greeks are not coming, then they will put off the conference for 24 hours. The Brits are getting in touch with Gunes to put it off and, in any case, they will not go tomorrow. I underlined your view that if there are no Greeks, there should be no meeting and that there should be no unilateral moves. Also, I stressed that we would like to be consulted.

Kissinger: The British tell us that unless they get word from the Greeks that they will not be there, there will be a conference. The problem is that there is no Greek Government to tell them they are coming or not. This is all a fabrication. For seven years they have been screaming for a Greek civilian government. It is not in their interests now to kill this government. In any case, they should avoid a UK-Turk or U.S.-UK-Turk gang-up on Greece. If Callaghan must go to Geneva, he should go and have separate meetings with the Greeks and the Turks.

Sisco: If the UK forces bilateral meetings with Turkey before the Greek Government is ready, then this can topple the Greek civilian political leaders from rule.

Eagleburger: We have a problem with reporting from Athens. The Embassy seems to be making direct approaches in Washington to the NMCC.

Kissinger: That is totally unacceptable. We must direct Ambassador Tasca that the Embassy should not make any approaches in Washington in any other channel than directly to me. At no level are they to call the NMCC. What we need now is clear reporting on the actual situation in Athens. Who is doing this at the Embassy?

Eagleburger: Whoever is doing it is working under Tasca's orders.

Kissinger: I have never seen such incompetence.

If you have the Greeks demonstrating in the streets, it means the military is finished. Under those conditions Greece cannot go to war. In the instruction to our Embassy in Athens tell them to inform the Greek Government we will not be sending a representative to Geneva before they have made their decision to go there themselves. Also, elicit from them a sense of timing.

As for the Turks, give Macomber in Ankara a feel where we stand, especially in relation to my conversations with Ecevit and what our position is on the Geneva negotiations.

On Clerides, we cannot tell until the governments have made their positions clear.

¹⁴ Eagleburger spoke with Alexander at 3:45 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; *ibid.*)

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 24, 1974, 1330Z.

1723. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Cyprus.

Foreign Minister Dimitriou telephoned EmbOff and asked following be passed:

1. Makarios' statement that he hopes return to Cyprus in two or three weeks has had an immediate and increasingly adverse reaction with Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots of all stripes (strong enosists, EOKA-B, the indifferent, etc.) other than AKEL and Lyssarides followers are already saying that if Makarios comes back blood will flow again and there will be civil strife on island, Greek will be fighting Greek again.

2. Present govt, including Clerides, are convinced Makarios' return, if it is soon, would be a disaster here. The island needs time now for emotions to settle and for a return to some kind of stability and sanity. Greeks are pulling together, and hopefully under Clerides leadership they can be kept together—united and ready for a solution to Greek/Turk problem on the island.

3. Govt feels that Makarios' early return would only disrupt orderly return to normality here. Perhaps if Makarios insists on returning, he could put off his return for at least three months. By that time the course here could be set, emotions soothed and his return would not be too disruptive. If, however, he keeps saying he will return in two or three weeks and if he does come back this soon, then civil strife is almost a certainty.

4. Clerides has relayed substance of the above to Karamanlis as has Dimitriou to Gen. Bonanos. They have urged that Makarios not be permitted to return for at least three months. Karamanlis replied he would think about it. Bonanos agreed that Makarios should not return, at least not for present.

5. Clerides govt, through Dimitriou, urges U.S. to exert its influence, indeed to take all possible measures, to avoid Makarios' return to Cyprus in near future.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the White House at 7:13 p.m. Repeated Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.

6. *Comment:* Clerides in his press conference this morning publicly stated Archbishop should not return, and question of his return should be decided through elections. As incidental information, Dimitriou said Council of Ministers has told Clerides that he has a free hand to reshuffle the Cabinet as he wishes.

Davies

121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff (Ginsburgh) to the President's Chief of Staff (Haig)¹

DJSM-1063-74

Washington, July 25, 1974.

SUBJECT

Impact of Withdrawal from U.S. Military Facilities in Greece and Turkey (C)

1. (C) Reference is made to the 20 July meeting of the NSC Cyprus Planning Group during which the request of Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, USA, (Ret.) was orally conveyed to the Joint Staff representative. That request was to provide a supplemental paper giving a general appreciation of the impact of the loss of all U.S. military facilities, installations and capabilities (excluding intelligence elements) associated with withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Greece and Turkey as a result of the Greek/Turkish confrontation in Cyprus.

2. (S) U.S. facilities in Greece and Turkey are of major military importance to the United States. These facilities provide:

a. Command, control and communications for the eastern Mediterranean.

b. Essential elements of the U.S. Defense Communications system.

c. Major Military Airlift Command cargo and passenger facilities.

d. [2 lines not declassified]

e. A U.S. presence which demonstrates U.S. resolve to support NATO's Southern Flank.

f. Major War Reserve Material stocks for U.S. air and naval forces.

3. (S) U.S. military facilities in Greece and Turkey would, in general, be expensive to replace. In some cases, regardless of cost, replacement

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat—Contingency Plans 1974, Greek-Turkish Contingency Plan. Secret. The memorandum was transmitted by Lieutenant Colonel Douglass W. Smith, Head, NSC Coordination, to the NSC on July 29.

would be most difficult because of these nations' geographic locations. The selection of alternative locations is complicated by increasingly difficult base rights negotiations and a trend toward greater quid pro quo that other countries are exacting as the price for their cooperation.

4. (S) The strategic importance of Greece and Turkey should be emphasized. Greece and Turkey are important links in the overall NATO defense to deter or defeat Soviet aggression and provide important forces in the Western line of defense across the southern border of communist-dominated Eastern Europe. They serve as a barrier between Warsaw Pact ground forces and the eastern Mediterranean.

5. (S) U.S. withdrawal from facilities in Greece and Turkey would:

a. Weaken the NATO Alliance and make the Mediterranean area more vulnerable to Soviet penetration and influence.

b. Encourage other NATO nations to reassess their positions and probably precipitate a major divisive move within the Alliance.

c. Diminish US influence and possibly change the pro-West attitude of Greece and Turkey.

d. Possibly induce either or both to leave NATO, adopt a passive attitude, or deny use of NATO facilities to the Alliance.

e. Cause other countries to question the credibility of US commitments.

f. Probably result in the denial of the use of Greek, Turkish and NATO facilities in both countries for US contingency operations.

g. [1 line not declassified]

h. Severely degrade US Mediterranean and Middle East communications/navigation support.

i. Possibly result in denial of US overflight rights which would adversely impact on US capability to support Middle East peacetime and contingency operations.

j. [3½ lines not declassified]

k. Possibly enable the USSR to overfly Greece and Turkey to conduct air operations against US and Allied forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean and littoral areas thereof.

l. Possibly result in the Government of Turkey becoming more amenable to USSR pressures for increased transit of USSR forces through and over the Bosphorus, with resultant diminution of the influence of US and Allied forward force presence.

6. (S) Considering the above factors and the information contained in the Appendices hereto,² the security interests of the United States would not be served by a permanent withdrawal of US defense facilities from Greece and Turkey.

Robert N. Ginsburgh
Major General, USAF

² Not attached.

122. Briefing Memorandum From the Cyprus Task Force to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 28, 1974.

US INTERESTS IN THE CYPRUS CRISIS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

I. The Problem

Against Greek resistance, the Turks at Geneva are trying to push the cease-fire discussions into preliminary negotiations on a political settlement. As the talks approach the substantive aspects of the settlement, the risk of an impasse increases. In anticipation of this occurring, this paper analyzes the various arrangements that may be proposed to determine how they impinge on U.S. interests.

II. The Situation

Militarily, the situation on the island is relatively quiet. The Turks have consolidated and enlarged their enclave north of Nicosia, but the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves outside the Nicosia–Kyrenia triangle have been eliminated or reduced, with the exception of Famagusta and the Kokkina area, where Turkish Cypriot militia are still holding out. The new government in Athens has threatened Greco-Turkish war if the Turks continue to advance in violation of the cease-fire, but international efforts over the past 24 hours have reduced the Turkish violations.

Politically, the situation is unstable in Greece and among the Greek Cypriot community. Clerides, trapped between the extremists on right and left, is moving cautiously out of fear of a move against him. In Greece, there are reports of coup plotting against Karamanlis by pro-Ioannides military elements. The Greek military probably will allow Karamanlis considerable latitude in trying to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue, provided that Turkey does not push its advantages in Cyprus too far. The Turks seem united around Ecevit, but the political opposition and the military will be watching him carefully to be sure he does not bargain away Turkey's gains.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thomas Boyatt, Harmon Kirby, Richard Erdman, and Philip Stoddard. Cleared by Bruce Hirshorn, Lloyd George and Stabler. This was one of four papers that C. William Kontos, Director of the Cyprus Task Force, requested on July 25. The others are entitled "Turkish Politics After Cyprus," "Preliminary Assessment of Turkish Military Operation on Cyprus," both dated July 27; *ibid.*, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, July 1974, Folder 2; and [title not declassified] dated July 29; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File.

Diplomatically, by invading Cyprus, continuing to advance after the cease-fire, and stating that Turkey intends to remain on Cyprus in force, the Turks are coming under increasing international criticism. The UK is anxious about Turkey's aims, and the Turks, for their part, consider the UK pro-Greek. In these circumstances, Turkey's only significant international support now seems to be coming from the US.

III. *US Interests*

Our fundamental interests in the area are: (1) to maintain the Western defense-deterrence capability, which requires NATO cohesion, the maintenance of US/NATO facilities in the area, and Greek-Turkish harmony; and (2) to contain Soviet influence.

An unstable Cyprus threatens both these interests. Greco-Turkish contention weakens the defense capability of the Alliance, and Greco-Turkish hostilities would deal it a severe blow. Further, if badly handled, the crisis could easily result in a better Soviet position on Cyprus and in either Greece or Turkey or both. Thus the US does not have fundamental objectives as regards Cyprus itself except in the context of Cyprus' effect on other US interests.

IV. *Intentions and Objectives of the Parties*

Turkey: The Turks are determined to use their strong position on Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all along the lines of de facto governmental separation of the two communities within the framework of an independent Cyprus. This is described by the Turks as "the restoration of two autonomous administrations" coordinated only at the top by the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice president. This arrangement must be recognized by the Greeks in a formal document. The Turks oppose a return to the 1960 constitutional system as unworkable. They also oppose the return of Makarios. They do not speak of partition (double enosis), presumably because they do not think that Greece, the US, the Soviets, and the international community would tolerate the disappearance of the independent state of Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey may try to use its gains on Cyprus to pressure Greece to resolve other Greco-Turkish issues, principally the dispute over Aegean oil and the demarcation of territorial waters. Turkey may calculate that, with Karamanlis in power in Athens, there is a good chance to solve outstanding problems. Finally, Turkey believes it is bargaining from strength and will not approach the negotiating process in a concessionary mood.

Greece: Karamanlis, like Ecevit, wants to resolve outstanding Greco-Turkish problems. However, he will be under pressure from his military not to capitulate to Turkish demands. The Greeks would prefer an independent, unitary Cyprus with minimal guarantees for the

rights of the Turkish community. They know that enosis is unacceptable to Turkey. In between, they would probably like the status quo ante without Makarios and without additional Turkish troops. Their minimum would be continued Cypriot independence. The Greeks might accept a federal solution if the Turkish military were reduced to a symbolic presence and if the federal arrangements were not simply a guise for Turkish extraterritoriality. If the Greeks concluded that there was no give at all in the Turkish position (i.e. that the Turks had effectively combined their autonomous enclave with Turkey) they might well move to do the same on the Greek side and approach the Turks on the basis of de facto enosis for both sectors.

Cyprus (The Greek Cypriots): The Turkish Cypriots are under Ankara's control, but Athens will have to take the views of the Greek Cypriots into account. Whatever Athens agrees to with the Turks will have to be sold to Greek Cypriot opinion (despite Ankara's total misconception that Greece can impose its will on the Greek Cypriots). In the past, Athens has had trouble dealing with Makarios, but once brought around, he could deliver Greek Cypriot agreement. Clerides is more amenable to Athens' direction and more appealing to the Turks, but may well be unable to secure acceptance of Greco-Turkish compromises. The leftists want continued independence under Makarios; the rightists want enosis without Makarios. The Greek Cypriots have the potential to sabotage an agreement between Athens and Ankara.

Like the mainland Greeks, the majority of Greek Cypriots could probably accept a federal solution if it did not involve a massive Turkish military presence or any other type of Turkish extraterritoriality.

V. Alternative Models for New Arrangements on Cyprus

A. An Independent Cyprus with Extraterritorial Turkish Area(s) would involve:

—An independent and sovereign Cyprus minus the Turkish area(s).

—Recognized or de facto Turkish control of the Nicosia–Kyrenia triangle.

—Turkey maintains a large number of mainland military forces in the Kyrenia enclave.

—Some freedom of movement.

B. Partition would include:

—Recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the Kyrenia enclave or some other area.

—The declaration, perhaps following a plebiscite, of the union of the rest of Cyprus with Greece.

—The optional transfer of Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish enclave and of Greek Cypriots out.

C. Federation and Demilitarization would include:

- An independent and sovereign Cyprus.
- The establishment of two communal structures—one Greek and one Turkish—autonomous at the local level and merged at the national level.
- The phased reduction, under UN supervision, of mainland Greek and Turkish forces to the symbolic presence of a few hundred each.
- Demilitarization of Cyprus—no local armies.

Discussion

Analyzing these three models, in terms of U.S. interests and objectives, leads to the following observations:

—Model A would be unstable and quickly evolve into Model B. This model also runs the risk of renewed fighting if the Turks decide to expand the Kyrenia enclave, or if Greece attempts to insert mainland Greek troops on the island. If the Greek Cypriots are required in effect to cede significant territory to Turkey, they would have little incentive to give up the historic goal of enosis to maintain an independent state, and Greece would be unable to refuse.

—Models A and B have the advantage of separating the Greek and Turkish communities but the disadvantage of creating yet another frontier.

—Model B would probably involve the eventual transfer of mainland Greek military forces to Cyprus to balance the Turkish forces already there.

Concluding Observations

Model A (extraterritoriality) is inherently unstable and therefore is the least preferable model from the US point of view. Model B (partition) is probably unacceptable to the Greeks and could result in more, rather than less, confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Model C (federation) poses a potentially serious political problem: Even if Greece and Turkey agreed on a federation scheme, the Greek Cypriots might conclude that the arrangement gave too much to the Turks, and they have the capability to undercut a Greek-Turkish agreement.

On the other hand, Model C (federation) recommends itself because it would minimize the Greek and Turkish presence on the island.

123. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, July 29, 1974.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-M01048A, Box 2, Folder 26, Cyprus. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

124. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 29, 1974, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Visit of Archbishop Makarios

PARTICIPANTS

Cyprus

Archbishop Makarios

Ambassador Dimitriou

US

The Secretary

Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey

(Conversation already under way.)

Archbishop Makarios: I have been telling the Secretary that the Soviets are trying to exploit the situation and that their interest in this problem is not genuine. Yesterday they asked for a Security Council meeting and we were greatly disappointed at what proved to be a waste of time. But, as I said, to some extent the United States is giving ground to the Soviets.

The Secretary: We have three parties to consider and therefore our policy is more complex than for someone who backs only one of the parties.

Archbishop Makarios: We don't want to do that.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

The Secretary: We succeeded in bringing about the ceasefire. I don't see any reason now to take an anti-Turkish position publicly because it will only aggravate the situation.

Archbishop Makarios: I am not asking that. I am interested in results, I believe only the United States can influence Turkey—and Greece—and Cyprus. Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and both receive military aid from the United States. The Cyprus problem is only a small one for the United States and it is not proper to say that the United States must do this or that. We are not in a position to say anything to you about pressure.

The Secretary: We will not do anything under pressure, in no circumstance, and it is in our interest to make this clear. This is a fact of life, not a threat. You would do the same thing. I am not accusing you.

Archbishop Makarios: We are not . . .

The Secretary: You're an able person. What do you see as a solution?

Archbishop Makarios: I am not satisfied with the position of the United States. It is in your interest to stop the Turkish invasion. I don't say you should exercise pressure and in the process develop anti-U.S. attitudes. I don't know what you've conveyed to Turkey. But, despite this, Turkey is continuing its invasion without showing any respect for the Security Council Resolution.

The Secretary: Turkey is not advancing any further.

Archbishop Makarios: They are now seeking to impose themselves in Cyprus. Greece is weakened. I don't know whether Karamanlis can survive. The Turkish demands are unreasonable.

The Secretary: What?

Archbishop Makarios: 1) They won't go back to the lines called for in the Security Council Resolution. 2) They are calling for federation. 3) Ecevit is saying "our troops will stay." This is blackmail! And the airport is under their control. Furthermore (in the inter-communal negotiations) they are demanding that the Vice President should have veto power.

The Secretary: I thought you had agreed to the latter in the 1960 agreements.

Archbishop Makarios: Yes, they want changes. We also want changes. Talks have been going on for years.

The Secretary: What concretely do you want us to do?

Archbishop Makarios: Take a more decisive role. You are in a position to play this role. You can make certain proposals. Turkey will accept. When you sent Sisco to Athens and Ankara I have read that you used strong language. And now you are very cautious.

The Secretary: You don't know what we say privately. There was an improvement in the situation last week as a result of what we did.

Archbishop Makarios: The situation is worse now. People have been uprooted and a great number of refugees have been created.

The Secretary: While the U.K. is negotiating with Greece and Turkey it is not proper for the United States to attempt to take over the negotiations.

Archbishop Makarios: But, behind the scenes . . .

The Secretary: It depends on what you want. You have addressed the important problem of the long term attitude of Turkey. From the point of view of the Geneva negotiations it is not necessarily decisive whether there are 20 or 23,000 troops there as far as this round of negotiations is concerned. It is important though whether agreement can be reached in a political context to reduce that number. Now, what we want is to settle this in terms of implementation of the ceasefire and thereby have that contribute to the further political negotiations.

Archbishop Makarios: What disturbs me is that the Turks will not be in for settlement. As time passes they will be consolidating their position there. The talks will take months or years . . .

The Secretary: I think they want a quick settlement, although it might have been their purpose to delay. Maybe we're wrong.

Archbishop Makarios: Have they accepted a UN corridor?

The Secretary: (After checking by telephone.) Yes, they seem to have accepted that.

Archbishop Makarios: I understand the Turks will not withdraw unless there is a final agreement.

The Secretary: Yes.

Archbishop Makarios: If the talks are prolonged what will the situation be? Our people are suffering. They say they will accept the 1960 Constitution only with changes.

The Secretary: They haven't said this to me. My impression is they may want to keep troops there.

Archbishop Makarios: Until a solution or forever?

The Secretary: Between a solution and forever. But I'm not here as their lawyer.

Archbishop Makarios: They invaded they say to restore order and safeguard the Constitution.

The Secretary: During the first week we knew once they got there it would be difficult to get them out, but we didn't want to sanctify Turkish invasion.

Archbishop Makarios: Suppose Greece and the UK do the same?

The Secretary: The result will be double enosis. I don't believe this should be the permanent solution. It is not being supported by the United States. There should be no Greek troops or that would lead to permanent partition.

Archbishop Makarios: What are the prospects for settlement?

The Secretary: Right now there are too many cooks. Callaghan needs a quick success. The Soviets have their own motives. The Government in Greece has its problems. And, Ecevit . . . We have been encouraging a settlement. We have not been all out active. We can't be the only country to produce a settlement, but this may change. In this phase of the Geneva talks the prospects are good. In the next phase Turkey will have to change its position. There are still too many cooks.

Archbishop Makarios: I prefer an American cook. Going back to the Constitution—we don't want only that.

The Secretary: What about the Mixed Police Force?

Archbishop Makarios: This would be a special force for collecting illegal arms. It would have equal numbers for Turks and Greeks. This is the only way to collect those arms.

The Secretary: We have no American view on this subject. We'd go along with what others want. Have you given this to others? Should we give it to the Turks? Do you mind?

Archbishop Makarios: No.

The Secretary: We could say these are your views and could let your Ambassador know. Basically, I understand you want us to play a more active role.

Archbishop Makarios: Yes. I believe you can play an active and decisive role.

Archbishop Makarios: Recently I read about military aid for Turkey announced in the *New York Times*.

The Secretary: We explained that if Greece and Turkey had gone to war neither could count on U.S. military assistance continuing. Some thought was given to cutting aid to Greece under its military regime. This could be used against Sampson.

Archbishop Makarios: What should I say my impressions are about our meeting today?

The Secretary: I wouldn't presume to tell you what to say.

Archbishop Makarios: You will play a role?

The Secretary: Certainly, we will play a constructive role.

Archbishop Makarios: You can play a decisive role.

The Secretary: It is a question of timing.

Ambassador Dimitriou: (Referring to conversations in the UN) All believe if you were more active you could bring about a settlement. I

have talked to members of the British and other European delegations. They all believe this and therefore the Geneva talks would be successful.

The Secretary: We can't conduct those negotiations. We have someone there and in each crucial development we have been asked our view and we have given it. We have been helpful in a quiet way. We have made major efforts in Geneva but it isn't our style to do it so vocally. Nobody has yet put all his cards on the table, either the Greeks or the Turks.

Archbishop Makarios: We have no cards.

The Secretary: We know your views and have studied your six points.² Unless you have others, we will send them to Turkey tonight.

The Secretary: You can say that I told you we will play an increasingly constructive role.

Archbishop Makarios: Am I satisfied?

Ambassador Dimitriou: You'd be justified in saying that.

The Secretary: If I say you're not, I will be popular in Turkey. Frankly, it is better for me internationally if you're not satisfied.

Ambassador Dimitriou: (To Makarios) Are you satisfied?

Archbishop Makarios: I didn't get a clear answer.

The Secretary: Frankly, I can't say. I had to study your 1960 Constitution. I didn't know anything about it. Let me say we are in favor of independence. We are not in favor of partition. We are in favor of a solution agreeable to all three parties.

[Secretary interrupted meeting to take a call outside.]³

The Secretary: (Continuing) We will play an increasingly constructive role. We cannot take a public position now that we are bringing pressure on anybody. That may change later. If you look at the Middle East negotiations you will see that we did not pressure the parties publicly. That is not in anybody's interest.

The Secretary: I will say we had good talks. As negotiations continue we will play an increasingly constructive role. That we seek a solution within the context of the independence, sovereignty of Cyprus and its Constitutional arrangements. You should speak first. I'll calibrate mine from what you say.

Archbishop Makarios: In case of a very urgent situation may I call you on the telephone?

² See footnote 4, Document 114.

³ Kissinger spoke with Stabler at 5:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Brackets in the original.

The Secretary: Yes. You are free to call me.

Attached are the USIS Reporter's notes of the Secretary's and the Archbishop's remarks to the press.⁴

⁴ Attached but not printed.

125. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 9, 1974, 1750Z.

5147. For Sisco from Hartman. Subj: British Intelligence Report.

1. Immediately after long session with Callaghan this afternoon I was called back to his office to read what Callaghan referred to as an alarming intelligence report. He thought that our people had access to the same report dated August 9 [*less than 1 line not declassified*].² The report is information obtained without the knowledge of the source [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It reports a Turkish army plan to begin another military operation on August 20 designed to take over all areas above the line drawn five miles east of Morphou through the Nicosia area and on to Famagusta.³ The plan is to complete the operation in 18 hours using mainly elements of the 39th Infantry Division. Paratroop units are said to have already withdrawn from the island for use in this second phase operation. The report also describes a third phase, if Turkish demands are not met after phase II, which includes a line from Koutrophas, Lefka to Korinna. The airfield at Aghirda is said to be in shape to take Dakota aircraft.

2. Callaghan is ready to believe that the Turks are capable of this kind of duplicity. Gunes had assured him, as he had me, this morning that the Turkish armed forces have no intention of broadening their

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969-77, Box 8, Cyprus 32. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Ankara and Nicosia.

² Not found.

³ Macomber reported in telegram 6403 from Ankara, August 9, that Turkey might make a military move should it not achieve an acceptable solution at the Geneva talks, which began August 8. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft Office Files, 1969-1977, Box 8, Cyprus 32)

territorial holdings. However Gunes had apparently alluded in an oblique way, as he had with me, to the possibility that further military action might be required if Turkey's objectives were not obtained by diplomatic means. While not wishing to definitely rule out this possibility, I said that we had several pieces of information recently including an apparent air mobilization which had caused us to go into the Defense Minister twice in the last several days. We had been assured that "nothing was afoot". Callaghan immediately began painting the picture of a British reaction to this contingency, including a British military reaction. He said that he would have solid backing for this because it was inconceivable that there would be any possible justification for the Turkish action and anyway "Wilson liked to play with soldiers". Before he could work up any more righteous indignation I suggested that the first step was to obtain the best estimate of our intelligence services and of our respective Embassies. I promised him I would seek such an assessment and report to him tomorrow. I also mentioned that of course we were aware that a number of contingency plans had always existed in the TGS files. In fact some of those plans seem to have appeared in newspaper reports in the last few days from Ankara and it was at least possible that the air mobilization and leaks of further intentions represented Turk effort at psychological warfare.

3. Would appreciate soonest Washington assessment since this report will obviously color Callaghan's attitude in the crucial hours of negotiation this weekend.

Dale

126. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 9, 1974, 1940Z.

5151. For the Secretary from Hartman. Subj: Cyprus Phase II—Callaghan Strategy.

1. We had a long exchange of assessments with Callaghan and his staff the afternoon of August 9. It led him to develop a strategy which he tentatively plans to use for concluding this phase of the Geneva talks

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 8, Cyprus 32. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle As Nodis. Sent with instructions to pass Niact Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia.

and establishing a framework for ongoing negotiations. The strategy is designed to take into account what UK and we have ascertained to date as to the positions for the various parties, including those not directly involved, such as Makarios and the USSR. Callaghan also stated frankly that it is designed to meet his minimal political needs at home where he, as Chairman of a Labor Party approaching elections, simply cannot afford to be seen as completely selling out the new Greek Govt.

2. The basic elements of this strategy are simple and are set forth below.

3. On the constitutional side, Callaghan understands the strength of Turkey's demand for a prior commitment in principle by Greece (as well as Greek Cypriots) to the concept of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration in a separate geographical area, within an independent, sovereign state. Without a prior commitment along these lines Turkey may refuse to agree to ongoing negotiations and resort again soon to military acquisition of additional territory. The wording of such a commitment, whether it be verbal or written, will be very important in order to minimize the political strain it will place on the Greek Govt and Clerides. However, the commitment, in one form or another, appears a *sine qua non*. My advice to Gunes was that the Turks should not demand excessive precision. Above all, but for obvious reasons I did not say this yet to Gunes, they should not insist at this session on a reference to the percentages of total land area or on a map of their zone. (I believe Callaghan understands the importance of trying to avoid a map approach to the regions in this phase.)

4. To balance the constitutional commitment by Greece, Callaghan will seek a commitment by Turkey on the phased reduction of troops, to begin following the conclusion of this phase of the Geneva talks and the beginning of working-level discussions on constitutional arrangements. (Dept. and Ankara will recall that Ecevit told me on August 4 that this was conceivable for him if the Greeks agreed in sufficient detail to the principle of the Turkish idea on geographic autonomous administration, and that it could begin before final agreement on the new constitutional arrangements.) Among the questions almost certain to arise are those of use of word "withdrawal", time-table for reduction steps or phases, numbers to be evacuated in each stage, and linkage Greek numbers to Turkish numbers.

5. The ongoing talks, for which the above commitments are pre-conditions, are envisaged by Callaghan as taking place between Clerides and Denktash, preferably without Greek, Turkish, British or UN representatives either participating or observing. However, there would be some agreed formula (probably incorporated into a phase II Geneva declaration) which states that the talks are not on previous inter-communal basis and that the two will report results of their

efforts back to a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting which would be set for the first week in September. This would help meet Turkish concerns that the talks not drag out, not be a reversion to the old inter-communal formula (and 1960 Constitution), yet be associated with tripartite guarantors of 1960 Constitution. It would also help meet the UK and Greek concern that they not be associated directly with drawing up a new constitution for an independent state. Callaghan is reluctant to have a British presence but he assumes that the parties will have unofficial advisers and plenty of guidance from Greece and Turkey. Waldheim has told Callaghan that old format for talks is dead and he sees (and wants) no role for the UN. A potential problem in Callaghan's idea of framework is Clerides' need for political support or "cover" which might cause him prefer more direct Greek participation.

6. Conclusion:

A. I find myself more and more forced into the role of "professional optimist" among these gloomy Joes. After listening to Callaghan in London express his righteous indignation about even sitting down with fellows who break their word (read Turkey), I gradually nursed him (with no great opposition on his part since he was really letting off steam) to the point where he began to see his role as impartial chairman and not a moral arbiter of equities. Each time we see each other, however, he has new bad news and half the conversation is nudging him back on the positive thinking road. I congratulated him profusely on his first day's efforts to help assure that he goes out of his corner tonight in an up mood. He was in good mood after our long discussion but his final comment to me at short meeting a propos another Turk military action, was an old Derbyshire miner's saying more crudely put: "Never let them kick you in the tail twice by the same boot."

B. Needless to say both Gunes and Mavros are also pessimistic since both realize that an agreement means receding from their present positions. They both seem to have a detached view that assumes things won't work out and it will be someone else's fault. Gunes has been hauled back before by Ankara for being too "soft" and seems to have lost his zest for negotiations. Mavros seems to fear he might be instructed by Caramanlis to make concessions which would weaken his political base. What is lacking is the human element and I can only hope that Clerides and Denktash may supply it. I am afraid my own appearance of optimism is only barely credible.

C. If Callaghan's strategy is to succeed, it is clear he will require our continuing support. At some moment this may well require firm, high-level *démarches* to both Ecevit and Caramanlis. Addressees should be thinking about how this can best be done. My guess is that critical moment will probably hit August 11.

Dale

127. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, August 10, 1974, 3:40 p.m.

F: Yes, Henry.

K: Mr. President, sorry to bother you.

F: That's all right.

K: We are having some developments on Cyprus. Until I know how you want to work, I thought I should check with you on some of these actions. You know the Greeks and Turks are meeting under the British Chairmanship in Geneva and we have an Assistant Secretary there to be generally helpful.

F: Sisco?

K: No. Art Hartman.² The British Minister represents a government that will have to stand for election so they are looking for a quick success and they are a bit like a bull in a china shop. Callaghan is not too experienced. The Turks want a quick result leading to partition of the Island into Greek and Turkish parts with sort of a general federal government which would however be very weak. They have about 15 percent of the island and want 30 percent. They might try to grab it. I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey.³ He was a student of mine and I have told him that we could not—really in the first 48 hours of your term of office—be very relaxed about unilateral military action.

F: We sure cannot.

K: If that happens we might have to disassociate from that which we have tried to avoid. Our danger in Turkey and why we must maneuver carefully. They might turn very nationalistic and the Russians have been trying to exploit that but we cannot let them act unilaterally. I am writing a letter to Ecevit.⁴ He has promised to hold off for 24 hours. I am writing to Ecevit on my behalf outlining where I see the

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Ford took the oath of office as the 38th President at noon on August 9, following Nixon's resignation. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President's Daily Diary)

² Hartman traveled to Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, London, and Geneva, August 3–14. Notes of his discussions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters HAK, Folder 7.

³ Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 3:35 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁴ Telegram 175382 to Ankara, August 11, transmitted the letter to Ecevit. (Ibid., Box 238, Turkey, April–September 1974)

negotiations stand. The Turks propose two areas—one Turkish & one Greek. I think the Greeks we can push into a position where they would be willing to accept two or three autonomous Turkish areas but not one contiguous area. That would avoid a population transfer.

F: Right.

K: This would give us an opportunity to stall military actions long enough to get it working on the foreign minister level to see if we can get a compromise.

F: You think the letter to Ecevit will first hold off any military action and secondly maybe lead to some modification of their demand.

K: Right. The British are all out backing the Greeks right now and are even threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard. All they have there on Cyprus are a few Phantoms and 1,000 troops. It is purely a political thing. They could not pull it off. They want to get a crisis started and we would then have to settle it and they would claim credit.

F: Why don't you proceed. I will be here in Washington all weekend. It seems sensible to me and I would rely on your good judgment.

K: Right, Mr. President. If anything happens I will call you. I will not bother you with every tactical move.

F: The general idea, I approve.

K: It is to take a position which is between the British and the Greek position and the Turkish one so we can ameliorate the Turkish demand but not let the Turks claim that we were the ones that thwarted them and at the same time be tough against unilateral Turkish military moves.

F: And calm down our British friends a bit.

K: Yes. We will get a message to Callaghan.⁵

F: Sounds sensible to me.

K: When we get to regular morning briefings I will have it set up to give you a briefing so we can tell you what we expect for that day. You will not have such short term questions. However, they may come up from time to time. I will proceed on that basis.

F: Thank you, Henry.

⁵ Presumably sent in telegram 175407 to Geneva, August 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P840109–2567)

128. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 12, 1974, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
William Eagleton, EUR/SE
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Stabler: Callaghan called Hartman. Callaghan had just talked to Denktash who said that his Turkish protectors have gone crazy and that they are ready to shoot their way [out]. He said there was nothing he could do with them. Art said that Callaghan will call you to see where we go from here. There is a Turkish Cabinet meeting on now.

Eagleburger: McCloskey thinks if Denktash says what he has, this is a serious situation.

(The Secretary called British Ambassador Ramsbotham into the office.)

Kissinger: Apparently Gunes has made a proposition to take it or leave it. Denktash said the Turks on his island have gone crazy. Should I issue a proclamation against the Turks?

(The Secretary placed a call to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit).²

Ramsbotham: I thought both Denktash and Clerides were looking at the draft we had proposed. What happened?

Stabler: The Turks instructed Gunes to call a meeting tonight.

Kissinger: Have the Turks put forward their cantonal proposal?

Stabler: Their position is that the Geneva participants meet at once to establish agreement, in principle, on the one autonomous zone concept and then further discussions continue.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 8. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office and followed an earlier meeting at 11:30 a.m. (Ibid.)

² Ecevit was apparently not available because he was in a meeting, but the two talked at 4:15 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Ramsbotham: Acceptance of what?

Kissinger: One northern Turkish zone.

(Stabler showed the area on a map.)

Kissinger: Have they put this proposal forward?

Stabler: Yes, to Callaghan. They want acceptance of this larger area in the north and then to start substantive discussions on other arrangements.

Ramsbotham: The larger zone means almost doubling the triangle they presently hold.

Kissinger: There is nothing we can do until we hear from Callaghan.³ I will talk to Ecevit and tell him to put the proposal forward.⁴

Ramsbotham: The Turks' excuse is Greece is sending in troops and that the British are doing something.

Stabler: This meeting has gone on for five days without any formal sessions. Basically they have been concentrating on the nuts and bolts of the Turkish enclave but have had no formal meetings to discuss the bigger issues. We should try to find out from Ecevit if he is indeed issuing an ultimatum. We have tried to resist this in the past.

Kissinger: What exactly have the Turks done? Assuming it is an ultimatum, what do we do? Use the 12 F-4s? After my call to Ecevit has failed, what do we do?

Stabler: If he is determined to go, there is not much we can do.

Kissinger: We would not support him in the UN Security Council and we would probably have to support a resolution against the Government of Turkey. Then what do we do?

Ramsbotham: What would the Soviet attitude be?

Kissinger: They would probably be against the Turks.

Sisco: The Soviets are in an awkward position as well.

McCloskey: If Ecevit confirms it is an ultimatum, we vote against them in the UN Security Council and then consider cutting off military assistance.

Kissinger: We will not do that. It will not be done, at least not right away. We are throwing the threat of military assistance around like it is charity. What is the long-range advantage to the U.S.?

³ Kissinger and Callaghan spoke at 5:05 p.m. and 5:50 p.m. They spoke about how to put the proposal forward and balance the Turkish demand for a quick response on the size of a Turkish enclave, the sense of an impending second Turkish invasion, and the need to get the Greeks to consider a Turkish enclave. (Transcripts of telephone conversations; *ibid.*)

⁴ Kissinger did so in the 4:15 p.m. telephone call. (Transcript of telephone conversation; *ibid.*)

McCloskey: They cannot continue to enjoy U.S. military assistance if they are running loose in an area the U.S. is interested in.

Kissinger: Let's see what the situation is.

Ramsbotham: The Germans have begun to do something about assistance to Turkey.

Kissinger: We did that after the Suez crisis in '56—a grandstand play and look where it got us.

(Turning to Mr. Sisco) Joe, prepare by 6:00 this evening a paper on exactly what we can do in this situation.⁵

⁵ Printed as Document 130.

129. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 13, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[General Scowcroft came in late.]²

Kissinger: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating—they want to go home for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much harder to take unilateral action.

President: What would we do if the Turks moved?

Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

² Brackets are in the original.

ago, the Turkish tactics are right—grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi.

[Scowcroft left to call Macomber and returned after about 10 minutes.]³

Kissinger: We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey—that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the *New York Times* off our back, but we should not twist their arm.

I would like to mention the Turkish poppy issue. President Nixon signed a letter to Ecevit which, because of Cyprus, we have not yet delivered. We could redo the letter for your signature, or I could send it. I think the whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Maybe I should do it.

President: The other side of the coin is that you already have very good relations with Ecevit and there would be less damage coming from me.

Kissinger: Let's wait a bit. If we come out of the Cyprus thing all right, we will have more leverage. The Turks can't focus on it now anyway.

President: Yes. Let's wait a bit.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

³ Brackets are in the original.

130. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

Cyprus Contingencies

The Problem

The problem is what we should do if the Geneva conference breaks off because the Turks insist that the northeastern third of Cyprus be ceded to Turkey as a precondition for further negotiations.

Background/Analysis

If the talks are broken off, there will almost certainly be meetings of the UN Security Council and of the NATO Council. In these meetings, there will be pressure on the Turks to refrain from military action to enforce their claim and on both sides to resume talks.

If the Turks move out of the areas they currently hold to enforce their claim, they will be resisted by the Greek Cypriot National Guard. But, with over 30,000 Turkish troops on the island, resistance cannot be serious, or delay Turkish advances long.

If the Turks break out and do not halt soon, at some point the Greek Government is liable to attack Turkish forces. Turkey enjoys military preponderance everywhere, but frustration will force the Greeks to attack anyway, even with foreknowledge that they will lose. They cannot seriously reinforce on Cyprus, though they may move to do so, and are therefore likely to attack in Thrace.

There are therefore three contingencies: a breakoff of talks without a Turkish breakout on Cyprus; a Turkish breakout and hostilities on Cyprus without Greek-Turkish fighting elsewhere; and Greek-Turkish fighting outside Cyprus.

Our goal, as in July, should be to prevent Greek-Turkish hostilities and to get talks started. But the situation will be worse than in July—both governments will be passionately united, talking will appear to have been unproductive, and the Greeks will have no military option whatsoever on Cyprus, so that Thracian hostilities are more likely.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thomas Simons (S/P), John Baker (IO/UNP), and Martha Mautner and Igor Belousovitch (INR/RES). Cleared by John Day (EUR/SE). The Cyprus Working Group sent the paper to McCloskey on August 13. (Ibid.) The Cyprus Task Force was disbanded on August 22.

The Soviet Angle

A breakdown of the Geneva talks and renewed hostilities on Cyprus will stimulate Soviet efforts to throw the crisis into the Security Council, where Moscow believes that it has a better chance of influencing its outcome. The Soviets have consistently criticized the Geneva venue and the Geneva declaration because they suspect the conference was seeking to arrange a partition of the island rather than to implement Resolution 353 of the Security Council.²

Given the circumstances, Moscow's first priority at the UN will be to seek clear-cut public agreement in principle from Athens and Ankara to maintain Cyprus as a sovereign state on the basis of a new federal arrangement between the two national communities. Extracting such an agreement, however, poses monumental problems, the most pressing being time.

The Soviets have little ability to influence either Greek or Turkish actions quickly unless they opt either to assume a militantly threatening posture, i.e., seek to frighten the protagonists, or inject themselves directly by proposing a Tashkent-style mediation exercise. Given the NATO alignment and the likely repercussions of Soviet saber-rattling in the absence of a threat to USSR territory, we discount the prospect of resort to military posturing, i.e., maneuvers in the Balkans, at least until full-scale hostilities erupt in Thrace.

An offer to mediate would appear Moscow's only feasible form of direct unilateral action at the moment, if indeed the USSR wants to become directly involved.

The Soviets have indications the Greeks might be responsive; they probably have doubts about the Turks.

The Turks, for their part, are acutely aware of Soviet objections to the thrust of their maneuvering on Cyprus; they would welcome Soviet background support but not Soviet involvement on the scene. In any event, Moscow will not proffer its services as mediator unless it has assurances from both sides that the services are acceptable. There is no such assurance at this point.

It would not be unrealistic to assume that the Soviets have already dangled some suggestion along this line before Athens. We doubt they have yet gone so far as to "promise" to keep the Bulgarian front quiet—or unquiet—in support of Greece. They probably have assured Athens,

² The Geneva Declaration was signed on July 30 by the U.K., Greek, and Turkish Foreign Ministers at the conclusion of the first round of meetings at Geneva. It called for a ceasefire and security measures, implementation of UNSC resolution 353, and restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.

however, that Warsaw Pact intentions are related to preservation of an independent Cyprus, and they certainly have passed similar hints to the Turks by now. We would not rule out additional hints to Turkey that the USSR might even consider, in extremis, moving some of its naval vessels between Cyprus and Turkey.

Expectations that a Soviet mediation effort à la Tashkent will collapse on Turkish intransigence raises prospects of exacerbated Soviet-Turkish relations. However, it also raises prospects of a Greek-Soviet rapprochement as a consequence of the collapse.

Moscow could conceivably attempt to avoid the former and still gain the latter advantage by publicly proposing joint US-Soviet mediation. In that event, the US would have to decide.

—whether we want to participate in such a joint venture;
 —if so, whether we think we could manipulate it to our advantage by neutralizing the possibility that it might result in closer Greek-Soviet relations.

Given time, the Soviets have some diplomatic assets at their disposal.

They were skillful in managing their relations with Ankara during the initial period of the Turkish intervention by maintaining a posture of benevolent neutrality. Strains developed only when Moscow began to suspect that Ankara was seeking partition rather than federation.

The Soviets could now try to convince the Turks that Ankara's national interests would be best served by accepting a formula acceptable to the USSR, thereby assuring themselves of continued Soviet support on this issue as well as wider Turkish interests. Whether Turkey would be responsive to such an approach now is moot.

Athens is actually far less of a diplomatic problem since Karamanlis is already perceiving the advantage of striking a deal with the Soviets. Furthermore, Greece still formally backs the return of Makarios to Cyprus, which dovetails with Moscow's own official position. We do not believe the Soviets will interject the Makarios factor at this stage of the crisis, nor attempt to diddle behind the scenes with the Archbishop, but we expect them to be keeping their channels of communication to His Beatitude open.

Contingency 1: Breakoff of Talks without a Turkish Breakout on Cyprus

In the event of the break-up or suspension of the Geneva talks and the concomitant threat of resumed military action either on Cyprus or in a wider Greek-Turk context, it will be important to *develop urgently means of engaging the Governments of Turkey and Greece in discussions which have a chance of delaying military action* which could rapidly escalate to Greek-Turkish conflict or possibly UK clashes with Turkey on

Cyprus. Options which might achieve this are considered in their order of *effectiveness*. However, it should be borne in mind that the *possibility of carrying out the more effective options decreases as hostilities begin*. The less effective options may still be possible after the outbreak of hostilities but their impact becomes even more questionable.

Option I: Ecevit–Karamanlis Meeting

Such a meeting, possibly in a third country, would make it difficult for the armed forces on either side to initiate action. There might be merit to having the meeting occur in a neutral (Vienna, Geneva) location or even in a non-aligned (Cairo, Malta) location to diminish the impression of a NATO or “guarantor powers” approach. From the US standpoint *it would be best to have the UK call urgently for the meeting if the Geneva talks appear to be unsalvageable*. The US would then support the meeting, referred to in Ecevit’s July 28 proposal of such a meeting. The UK could encourage the agreed host country to offer facilities. *Ranking UK and US (Sisco, Hartman) officials and possibly Greek and Turk Cypriot leaders should be on location in this scenario to help maintain contact*.

Option II: Geneva Recess Plus NATO Council

Rather than let the Geneva talks fail, it would be better to have the participants agree to a recess during which a NATO Council meeting could be called to deal with the danger to the alliance of threatened hostilities between two member states. This would provide a potential delaying mechanism and *avoid abandoning entirely the Geneva Guarantor Powers framework*. This framework now has a useful status and recognition in SC resolution 353 but the Soviets will oppose reviving it in any future SC resolution in view of the threat to future Cypriot independence and non-alignment which they see in an agreement by the Guarantor Powers (they don’t like the Geneva Declaration). *The NATO Council would not address the Cyprus problem per se (since that could immediately trigger a Soviet call for an SC meeting and resolution) but would convene specifically to examine a threatened weakening of the alliance caused by non-NATO related troop movements by Greece and Turkey*.

Option III: Geneva Recess plus Invitation to SYG

On the same rationale as Option II, the Geneva talks would be recessed and the SYG asked to mediate between the parties. This could be a time-buying device but would *probably only produce appeals by the SYG to us to restrain the Turks*. It is unlikely that the SYG could be any more successful than Foreign Secretary Callaghan with the parties and, as far as the Turks are concerned, *he starts off with two strikes against him. However, if faced by a possible Soviet-sponsored Security Council mis-*

sion by three to five governments to Cyprus, (see Option V) an SYG role might be a lesser evil. Very possibly, the Turks would accept this idea only if it came about in this way, and by that time it might be too late to be effective. This option has the advantage of putting a prestigious office into play, a useful deterrent which does not, however, get the parties into direct negotiating interaction.

Option IV: Geneva Recess plus Presidential Emissary

In this option, the Geneva framework would again be preserved if at all possible, with an American intermediary volunteering, at the request of the parties, to revive negotiating momentum and buy time. The difficulty with this option is that it does not engage high-level officials face to face and runs the risk of the same kinds of delay and refusal which were used to frustrate Under Secretary Sisco's bid in Ankara on July 19. The seriousness of the present situation would suggest that we would have to go back at least to the level of Sisco—or perhaps to a Presidential emissary who knows where the military and money come from in Congress (Laird? A current confidant of President Ford?). Assistant Secretary Hartman's involvement with the present Geneva round would appear to rule him out if this round breaks down. This option also fails to engage the parties directly and has the added disadvantage of weakening the guarantor powers framework and putting the US in the middle, responsible in the eyes of both sides and their peoples for less-than-optimum compromises.

Option V: Security Council Action

Regardless of our ability to launch one of the foregoing options, the Security Council (SC) is likely to be convened if the Geneva Talks break down. Although we would not favor this, it can happen—either by the Greeks or Cypriots appealing the Turkish ultimatum, the UK reporting its findings on the Geneva talks and emphasizing their temporary recess, or the Soviets convening the SC as SC President for August.

The Soviet approach would be to (1) downplay the Zurich-London agreements (which so far have general mention in the main SC resolutions on Cyprus); (2) call for withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces—(implying UK, Greek, and Turk); (3) play up the "Government of Cyprus" (meaning the non-aligned Makarios rather than the Greek and Turk Cypriot communities); and (4) assert the role of the Council in defending Cypriot independence against threatened dismemberment, perhaps through appointment of a SC mission to Cyprus. The Greeks, however, will not wish to see the Zurich-London treaty structure altogether abandoned; rather they would prefer reinterpretation to produce the withdrawal of the Turks—or at minimum their withdrawal to the July 22 cease-fire lines. This will somewhat inhibit the Soviet effort.

We should encourage the UK to propose, with our support, an alternative way of maintaining the negotiating momentum (e.g. one of the first four options) in lieu of a Security Council mission. The *US–UK success in blunting Soviet efforts* will, in the last analysis, depend on the credibility and acceptability of the chosen option which should, in the event of a SC meeting, be mentioned, endorsed, or encouraged by the SC if a resolution is being negotiated. Given the membership of the Council—Iraq and Mauretania as Moslem states will not be automatically aligned against the Turks—there is a good chance of neutralizing a Soviet effort in this manner.

The Soviets (possibly with Greek support) may be tempted at some point to try for a special Emergency Session of the General Assembly—where non-aligned votes are plentiful—especially if fighting breaks out again. A Special UNGA has no advantages for us and should be discouraged if at all possible with the argument that the Council continues to be effectively seized of the matter. If it should convene, it is unlikely to be able to act in a time-frame relevant to the present stage of the crisis and in any event the Turks will not consider its action binding.

Although we would not favor going to the Security Council as an option in and of itself, in the event of the breakdown of the Geneva talks, we should consider a preemptive move to the Council either alone or with the British once we select one of the previous four options. In this way we might get the Council to focus on and endorse the preferred option, thus inhibiting other efforts in the Council which could be unhelpful.

Contingency 2: Turkish Breakout and Hostilities on Cyprus without Greek-Turkish Fighting Elsewhere

Our major goal should be to *prevent extension* of the fighting, *while working to keep the Soviets out of the picture.*

Our tactics will depend partly on previous activity:

—*If the UK is still out front and U.S. bargaining leverage is still intact, the United States can more effectively urge restraint on both Greeks and Turks.*

—*If a Karamanlis/Ecevit meeting and/or a Sisco trip, designed to gain time and get the parties talking again, have not taken place, they may still be available, although this is uncertain.*

To prevent extension of the conflict, we should take *four immediate steps:*

—*make high-level representations* to both sides: this will involve a more forward U.S. public posture.

—*warn both sides, as in July, that they cannot indulge in warfare with an open military pipeline to us.*

—*interject Waldheim and Luns (and possibly SACEUR on a personal basis), to counterbalance our more forward role.*

—*move U.S. naval elements into position to evacuate American citizens from Greece and Turkey (and to apply pressure).*

To inhibit Soviet interference, we should:

—*renew our public and private warnings against outside interference, while assuring the Soviets we are not seeking outcomes which injure their interests;*

—*renew our commitment to Cyprus independence and press the Turks to do likewise: this deprives the Soviets of a legal basis for interference, and pressure on the Turks could constrain the Greeks from seeking Soviet support;*

—*advertise our support for the UN role, and bottle the Soviets up in the UN.*

We must recognize that *the more desperate the Greeks, and the larger the UN and NATO roles, the greater the scope for Soviet meddling.* The Soviets are already edging closer to Greece, and the Greeks are sure to be vociferous in the UN; an active NATO role will fire Soviet fears of NATOization of Cyprus. On the one hand, an active Soviet “tilt” towards Greece would isolate the Turks completely and enhance our leverage with them, but on the other hand it could leave Greece open to long-term Soviet influence. *The best antidote to Soviet meddling if fighting begins on the Island would therefore be visible U.S. restraint on the Turks.* Only you can choose the moment to apply it.

Finally, if all else fails, we should consider *promoting* a Foreign Ministers’ meeting under NATO auspices.

Contingency 3: War between Greece and Turkey

If Greek-Turkish hostilities break out, the best outcome we can hope for will be a strengthened partition situation on Cyprus, Greek honor saved, and both sides still in NATO and ready to begin talking again. At worst, the Turks will have imposed partition of the Island, the Greeks (whether Karamanlis or his over-thrower) will be humiliated, NATO will be shattered, and the Soviets hopping mad.

Our goal would have to be a ceasefire, with resumption of talks secondary, and it would be essential to exclude the Soviets and keep the UN role to a minimum.

In a war, the Turks have the capacity to “take” Cyprus (although occupation would amount to daytime control of roads in many areas), to take some Greek islands off their coast, and to advance in Thrace after initial losses.

In a war, the Soviets are likely to side diplomatically with the Greeks, who might well announce withdrawal from NATO. This would leave Turkey isolated in the international community.

The immediate steps we would have to take would be:

- evacuation of American citizens;*
- [1 line not declassified];*
- mobilization of all “friendly” means (NATO and European) to obtain a ceasefire.*

In practice, a ceasefire could only be obtained by the exercise of extreme U.S. pressure on Turkey to limit its war aims. While we should also urge restraint on the Greeks, we should above all:

- encourage the Turks to stop at the Kyrenia–Nicosia–Famagusta line on Cyprus;*
- encourage them to assume the defensive in other areas, i.e. not to bomb the Greek mainland and not to take Greek islands which will become irredenta; and*
- move U.S. naval forces between Greeks and Turks.*

131. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, August 14, 1974, 3:10–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert Ingersoll

Joseph Sisco

Wells Stabler

Robert McCloskey

Defense

Robert Ellsworth

Gen. Denis McAuliffe

Amos Jordan

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown

LTG John W. Pauly

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-18, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

CIA
 William Colby
 George Lauder

NSC
 M/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
 Richard Kennedy
 Denis Clift
 James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the F-4s now located at Torrejon, Spain would be held up until Friday, August 16, and that the F-4s now in the U.S. would be held up until Monday, August 19, using technical problems as the excuse;

—the WSAG Working Group would prepare contingency plans in the event of a Greek-Turkish war;

—that CIA would prepare an assessment of the domestic situation in both Greece and Turkey, with emphasis on Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill . . .

Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: That doesn't seem to be their speciality. (referring to the possibility of a Turkish invasion along the northern coast of Cyprus)

Mr. Colby: No, you're right, it isn't. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean the Greeks are hard pressed?

Mr. Colby: That they are being pushed by the Turks in that area between Nicosia and Famagusta. Incidentally, we do have a press report of a ceasefire. It's from Nicosia, but we are unable to confirm it. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean by a Greek defeat? (referring to the statement in the briefing that Karamanlis might not be able to survive a clear Greek defeat over Cyprus)

Mr. Colby: A Turkish victory in the Cyprus area—Turkish occupation of the whole island. I don't think that is their intention—to take the whole island—only that part they want.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Have we heard from those recalcitrants at State? I mean the ambassadors abroad—in response to our cables?

² Attached but not printed. The briefing indicated that the Turkish offensive on Cyprus was making progress. While there were no signs of significant changes in Turkish forces on the mainland, the Greek forces had increased their readiness.

Mr. Sisco: No, nothing. They just went out a few hours ago.

Secretary Kissinger: What we are talking about is that we sent messages today to Ecevit, Karamanlis, and Clerides outlining our views on the current situation.³ Haven't we heard anything from any of them today?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, we did get a message from Karamanlis which said that they were withdrawing their military forces from NATO, but that they were not withdrawing politically.⁴ It was cautious, gave as the reason, NATO's inability to stop Turkish intervention.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that it is in our interest now to keep all avenues of negotiation open. Our major strategy now is not to get ourselves in a position that would give vent to righteous indignation on the part of either the Greeks or the Turks. I think this development has its own logic for solution. We don't want to contribute to the Greek humiliation, and we don't want the Turks to feel that we have turned against them. The British are out in front on this thing, and as long as the British are out in front, it is better from our point of view. We're going to take some heat, I'm sure of that, but time will ease that. What we want now is to get a disengagement of forces. In my judgment, it is going to wind up that way—would have anyway if they would have accepted our 48-hour proposal.

Our goal now is to make it possible for the Greeks to accept this. At the end of this meeting I want to establish a firm press line that we *all will follow*.

(to Mr. Colby) What is your assessment of the Greeks and Turks going to war?

Mr. Colby: We don't think it's in the cards, at least at this point.

Mr. Sisco: (to Mr. Colby) What is CIA's estimate of rising anti-Americanism in Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't really care at this point about rising anti-Americanism in Greece. We're not playing 48-hour politics here. Our interest is in what happens three weeks from now.

Mr. Sisco: I understand, but is there really something to it? How broad is anti-Americanism?

Mr. Colby: Well . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I was talking to Callaghan this morning,⁵ and he was complaining that he is unpopular in Greece. I can understand

³ Telegrams 177679 to Ankara and 177680 to Athens, both August 14. No telegram to Nicosia was found. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

⁴ Transmitted in telegram 5694 from Athens, August 14. (Ibid.)

⁵ No record of this conversation has been found.

that. In this business you are paid by your results, and he didn't deliver a damn thing! I have no doubt that the Greek Left will go after us after the thing is over.

Mr. Colby: They'll go after us anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: At the least, we can get credit for stopping the Turkish attack. If we play our cards right, and with some skill, we will come out of this thing on the good side, with both governments.

Mr. Colby: One critical area, however, is the Turkish military.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean?

Mr. Colby: They are the active force behind the Ecevit government. We've got to see that they come out all right.

Secretary Kissinger: I talked with Ecevit the other day,⁶ and he said the 36-hour proposal was that of the military. He promised he would do what he could to control them.

Mr. Colby: I think it would help if you could communicate with the Turkish Generals.

Secretary Kissinger: To what end? What do I tell them?

Mr. Colby: At least tell them to stop where they said they would.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we'll see what kind of answers we get back from our cables first. (to Mr. Sisco) What is the UN doing?

Mr. Sisco: There is a Security Council meeting scheduled for 5:00 p.m. today.

Secretary Kissinger: What are they going to talk about?

Mr. Sisco: Some resolution—condemnation of Turkey for its actions.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's make sure we are not out in front on this thing. I agree that we had better wait until we get our answers from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and tomorrow we can make a decision. Nobody here should talk until we get our answers. We just can't go beyond where we are now at this point.

Amb. Ellsworth: There are two things of concern to us . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, we'll support the U.N. efforts to end the trouble, but lay-off on the condemnations. I saw Dobrynin today and told the Soviets to lay off, and they agreed to do nothing. They would agree to do anything at this point. Okay, the military . . .

Amb. Ellsworth: The first thing is that we have two firm cargoes—a mixture of military grant and aid—enroute to Athens and Ankara. It's easy to tell them to stay where they are or to go on . . .

⁶ Apparent reference to Kissinger's telephone conversation with Ecevit on August 12 at 5:26 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Secretary Kissinger: Where are they now?

Amb. Ellsworth: One is scheduled to offload at Pireus, Athens' port, on Saturday. It is carrying cargo for both the Greeks and the Turks. What worries me is that the Greeks might pull the same thing they did before, grab the stuff headed for Turkey.

Gen. Brown: What's the name of that ship?

Amb. Ellsworth: The *Lash Espana*. We can tell them to proceed on course but to check with us before they go into Pireus.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell them not to stop unless they receive orders from here.

Gen. Brown: I have an outgoing message here that says that under the direction of the Secretary of State, they are not to go into Athens or Ankara, but to be held where they are.

Secretary Kissinger: That is total nonsense. I want them to keep going as if nothing is happening. I don't want to escalate this thing into a big deal. Our object is to keep NATO together and to keep peace between the two parties.

(to Mr. Sisco) What about General Brown's information? Who is it in State that told the military not to offload the cargo?

Gen. Brown: My information is from J-4, which is working with your office (to Mr. Ellsworth).

Mr. Jordan: I was told that we were told by State to do this.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Find the guy who did this. I want to know who did this. Tell the Greeks that the ship is coming in, and ask them if we can get their assurance that it will not be tampered with. Can you still split the cargo?

Amb. Ellsworth: Yes, that's no problem.

Gen. Brown: She's due in Naples tomorrow. We can split the cargo there.

Amb. Ellsworth: We'll get that corrected. The next subject concerns the F-4s. We've got some going to both Greece and Turkey. We have some in Torrejon, Spain, and some in the U.S., ready to move.

Secretary Kissinger: Hold the ones at Torrejon until the 16th—Friday. Hold the ones in the U.S. until next Monday. Use technical problems as an excuse.

Amb. Ellsworth: Okay. Next subject—[2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [5 lines not declassified]

Amb. Ellsworth: [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

Gen. Brown: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: That's a good idea. We didn't have a working group during the last crisis, but I think it would be a good idea to get

one together. Dick (Mr. Kennedy), would you take charge of that? What I want you to look at is two things: (1) contingency plans for a Greek-Turkish war; and (2) a CIA estimate of the domestic situation in both countries, particularly in Greece. I think we have sent out all the necessary messages. The President talked to Harold Wilson early today.⁷ I'm not going to send any message to the Soviet Union. I have a message from NATO Secretary General Luns that he intends to go to Athens and Ankara. I don't think he will do any good, but I have no objections to his going.

Amb. Ellsworth: We have no objections, but I don't think it will do much good.

Gen. Brown: I talked with General Goodpaster this morning, who talked with Luns. It's Luns' opinion that we just ought to go slow on this thing for the time being.

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan told me this morning that he thinks he made a mistake by siding with the Greeks. He also thinks he didn't move fast enough. He's right! He now believes that diplomacy will not work. He believes the Turks will occupy only what they want and that the situation will eventually evolve into a federated state of some type. I don't agree with all of his ideas. I think we can move toward a constructive agreement, but first we must get a ceasefire.

The Press—what did we say at the noon briefing?

Amb. McCloskey: That if there was no ceasefire we would have to withdraw military assistance from both countries, and that if war develops between two NATO allies, they would get no support from the U.S.

Secretary Kissinger: We'll see what answers we get back. We'll meet again tomorrow. Do we have anything scheduled tomorrow?

Gen. Scowcroft: An SRG on Australia.

Secretary Kissinger: We'll scrub Australia and have a WSAG tomorrow at 10:30. Did you brief the congressional people?

Amb. McCloskey: Everybody but Rhodes. He hasn't called me back.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. We'll meet again tomorrow at 10:30.

⁷ No record of this conversation has been found.

132. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, August 15, 1974, 11:36 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Robert S. Ingersoll

Joseph Sisco

Wells Stabler

Robert McCloskey

Defense

William Clements

Robert Ellsworth

Gen. Denis McAuliffe

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown

Lt. Gen. John Pauly

CIA

William Colby

George Lauder

NSC Staff

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Richard T. Kennedy

A. Denis Clift

James G. Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—JCS and Defense will determine, by this afternoon, what is involved if it is decided to offload the MAP and FMS equipment to Turkey first; and

—a determination on the forward movement of the F-4s located at Torrejon, Spain and in the U.S. would be made tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill . . .

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-18, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: We've called somebody—who was it—about that, and have a direct report from Famagusta that they are not being fired upon. (in reference to an unconfirmed report that Turkish forces were invading the British Sovereign Base Area at Famagusta)

Mr. Colby: We're checking on that now.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a direct report, by telephone that they (the Turks) are not firing on Famagusta. I think we can trust the British enough to know whether they are being fired upon or not.

Mr. Colby finished his briefing.

Mr. Sisco: When is Papadopoulos due back?³

Mr. Stabler: On the 19th (of August).

Secretary Kissinger: We ought to offer him a ten-year position at Harvard!

Mr. Sisco: Yes, with tenure!

Mr. Ingersoll: Bill, do you have anything on reinforcements from Turkey?

Mr. Colby: We have nothing so far. They have the capability to move reinforcements any time they wish, but we have seen no reflections as yet.

Secretary Kissinger: We have received reassurances from Ecevit that the Turks will not move south of that line they have established.⁴ I think that their military operation will run its course by tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: Well, one potential problem is the area to the northwest. They may try to take that too.

Mr. Sisco: They said they were going to keep their military operation going until they get what they want.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also said that it would end tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: That area to the northwest is not very far. It's only about 40 miles from the controlled area.

² Attached but not printed. Colby briefed on indications that Clerides might be ready to hand over the northern part of Cyprus to the Turks. The Turkish offensive continued on the island, but there were no further reports of a Greek build-up on the mainland. The Cyprus fighting also had domestic political ramifications in Greece and Turkey. In Greece, anti-American sentiment was on the rise, but Karamanlis seemed at least briefly enhanced by the fact that he did not cause the Cyprus coup. In Turkey, Ecevit faced hard-liners on Cyprus, which decreased his ability to negotiate a settlement.

³ Apparently a reference to Andreas Papandreou.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 131.

Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) when we first met at this table—when this Cyprus thing first got started—we talked a lot about that southwest area and what might happen there. As I recall, we were worried about that area and thought they might try to take that also. What is your judgement of what might happen?

Mr. Sisco: That is of some concern.

Mr. Colby: There is quite a concentration of Turks in that southwest area. There could be some further attempts to take it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that once this Turkish operation runs its course, they won't go any further. We won't stand for it. We just can't stand for any more Turk operations. They have already stretched us to the limit.

Mr. Colby: The Greek Government could be in for a hard time if the Turks move on those Turkish communities in the southwest.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Colby: The shock effect in Athens. This would be looked on as further aggression—could topple the government.

Mr. Ingersoll: That would fill out the line they said earlier that they wanted.

Mr. Colby: Yes, that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we haven't heard from the Greeks yet. What has happened? Has Embassy Athens broken diplomatic relations with me? We should have heard two hours ago, and we haven't heard anything yet?⁵

Mr. McCloskey: We haven't heard yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Let them know that we want to know when they are sending the reply.

Mr. Ellsworth: Is there any authenticity to that press report that (Greek Foreign Minister) Mavros says that they are going to throw the U.S. military out of Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no official report of that.

Mr. Ellsworth: There was also some press report that Mobil Oil personnel were going to be expelled.

Mr. Sisco: We have nothing on that.

Secretary Kissinger: We were told that that cable from Karamanlis would be here at 8:00 this morning and we don't have it yet?

Mr. Sisco: When we get back, we'll put a call into Athens and find out when it is coming.

⁵ Telegram 5713 from Athens, August 15, reported that Karamanlis hoped to respond on August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Mr. Ellsworth: On the F-4s and the ships . . .

Secretary Kissinger: On the ships, we were going to wait until tomorrow to tell them whether to go in or not.

Mr. Clements: Yes. We're going to have to await word from you then.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we should know tomorrow morning. Can they go to Turkey first?

Mr. Ellsworth: Certainly.

Gen. Brown: It would be awkward though, and expensive. The equipment is containerized. It's loaded according to which part is offloaded first.

Mr. Clements: The stuff that is last on, is first off, making it difficult. But, we can do it if you want to.

Secretary Kissinger: If we decided to offload in Turkey first, we'll have to tell them by late tonight.

Gen. Brown: I have the list of equipment here. (reads from the list)

Mr. Ellsworth: Are any small arms included?

Gen. Brown: I don't have anything on small arms. Let's see, there are some recoilless rifles, torpedoes . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would be possible to unload at Turkey first.

Mr. Clements: Oh, yes, it's possible. It screws up the handling. But in answer to your question, yes it is possible to offload at Turkey first.

Gen. Brown: We can get an estimate from the ships company about what would be involved in offloading at Turkey.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. Can you get it to me by this afternoon?

Gen. Brown: Sure.

Mr. Clements: Henry, I still have this gut feeling that we could still have some trouble in the southwest corner. I think the Greeks might well retaliate against those Turks in the communities down there, and a real fight could develop.

Mr. Colby: I think the chances of a backstage fight are good.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know, if this situation leads to double enosis, Makarios will become a Greek politician. There's no joy in that. Okay, thank you.

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 15, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert M. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: We should do another letter to Karamanlis.² I have a call in to Ecevit to stop the military operations.³ I want a message out tonight and a Presidential message tomorrow to Karamanlis inviting him to a meeting with Ecevit and me somewhere in Europe. We made a mistake in not telling Karamanlis everything we had done to try to stop the Turks. We ought to do a letter to Karamanlis indicating that we realize his concerns; that we thought it most effective to deal with the Turks without publicity. Refer to the White House statement⁴ and my message to Mavros⁵ and tell him about my call to Ecevit. We must show him that we have done something. Later we can send a Presidential letter which proposes the meeting.

Sisco: I think it needs delay.

Kissinger: It's coming out about right. They needed a fall guy.

Sisco: Tomorrow evening is about right, if the military operation goes on as we guessed. The matter has been decided on the ground

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Edward Djerejian. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² Regarding the first letter, see footnote 3, Document 131.

³ See Document 134.

⁴ In the White House statement, the President stated: the "United States disapproves of the Turkish military action on Cyprus and he strongly urges immediate compliance with the relative United Nations cease-fire resolutions." (Telegram 179118 to Ankara, Nicosia, and Athens, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

⁵ Presumably a reference to telegram 178613 to Athens, August 15. (Ibid., P850095–2349)

though there are broader considerations in seeing the Secretary of State.

Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a joint initiative with the U.S. which involves a joint guarantee of the outcome of the negotiations and joint intervention in the case of war according to the agreement. I told them that if they interpreted the agreement in this manner, we would have to abrogate it.

We don't have to have a meeting until the end of next week or even the beginning of the following week. Sooner or later the Greeks will have to give up. The best solution would be to have the Turks give up 10 percent of the 30 percent of the territory they have physically occupied.

You (Stabler) should draft a letter to Karamanlis.⁶ Make it an account of what we have done before. Include that the situation on Cyprus was lost by the previous Greek Government. Short of military intervention, which our domestic and other factors could not permit, we did what we could. They can count on our good will. Ecevit has assured us they will not move below this southern line. Refer to our public statements. If he gives us an answer by noon, we can decide on a Presidential initiative later on in the day.

Buffum: Concerning the situation at the UN, minimal action will be a reaffirmation of the previous resolutions on the ceasefire.⁷ The maximum would be the French draft which is being circulated. It formally disapproves of the Turkish action, affirms the ceasefire and the resumption of the negotiations. This text has been opposed by the representatives from the Moslem countries because of the specific reference to Turkey.⁸

Kissinger: But the Turks can give us trouble in the next Middle East war. We have to be careful not to get too far separated from the Turks. Do the Turks in New York know we are holding back? Do they know we are not leading any crusade?

Sisco: They are abundantly aware of our position.

Buffum: There was a Soviet effort to get peace efforts reconvened under the Secretary General.

⁶ A likely reference to telegram 181127 to Athens, August 17, in which the Ambassador was instructed to read a letter but leave no paper. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece, Nodis from Secretary of State 1)

⁷ The Security Council took this action when it unanimously adopted Resolution 358 on August 15. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, p. 293)

⁸ The Security Council adopted the French-sponsored Resolution 360, 11-0 with 3 abstentions, on August 16. (*Ibid.*)

Kissinger: How cynical can you get? I told Waldheim that if I can't turn over an island to you and you can't keep it peaceful, what problem can I hand you? (Laughter)

Eagleburger: He doesn't have a sense of humor.

Kissinger: I told him he had the third largest military force in the non-Communist world. He didn't catch the humor of it.

If we can get agreement for a meeting in Washington, then President Ford can join Ecevit, Karamanlis and myself. At this meeting we can establish guidelines for a reconvened Geneva conference. I am persuaded that Callaghan does not know how to do these things himself. He should have taken a more neutral position and put concrete proposals on the table.

Hartman: I told him to have the proposals put forward.

Kissinger: In all of our Middle East negotiations our proposals were always put forward at the right time to have the parties focus on something. Callaghan should have sent someone around to the capitals—a senior representative. The Greeks went to Geneva with the idea of the British backing them and with the idea that they could depend on the British. To reach a stalemate in 48 hours after the conference is convened is a sign of incompetence. If Callaghan had gotten Clerides to put something forward, then he could have built on this.

Hartman: Clerides had a deal with Karamanlis that once Clerides told him what his minimum position was, Karamanlis would support him.

Kissinger: Why didn't he do it?

Buffum: He has no experience. He was dealing in these negotiations like it was a trade union meeting.

Kissinger: Time and again I called him and he didn't know what he was going to put forward, like the 5 kilometer proposal. He should have seen himself as the agent of the Greeks and had them face the facts of life. Karamanlis is seen as selling out Greek interests against the British. That sort of strategy he never discussed with us. Callaghan was pushing for a meeting on the 8th of August. The Turks wanted the 12th or 14th. If he had any sense, the later the better. He focused on minor ceasefire violations.

Hartman: He is the head of the party and had electoral factors in mind. He had only two days before the elections.

Kissinger: If he had sent a senior British representative to the interested parties who could put forward proposals . . . I was naive in thinking that when he didn't want a senior officer there, he had a plan for a strategy and a position of his own with some agreement of both the sides. We will not be that quiet any more. Anytime it blows up, we get the blame. He doesn't have the fire power to control this situation. When the Soviets propose joint action, we are running against time because

they will be raising this the next time again. Dobrynin told me that he stopped the note on Monday but you can frustrate this thing only so long.

Stabler: I would like to raise the problem of the *Lash Espana* and *Lash Italia*. The information DOD gave you at the WSAG this morning⁹ on their control over the ship is not correct. The ship is controlled by its owner who wants the ship to pass Piraeus and then go on to Turkey. If the ship goes by, then it will put us in a difficult position with the Greeks.

Kissinger: What is your solution?

Stabler: If the ship can be sent to Brindisi in Italy and offload the military equipment there, it would help matters.

Kissinger: I agree.

⁹ See Document 132.

134. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit¹

August 15, 1974, 6:25 p.m.

K: Hello.

E: Hello.

K: How are you?

E: Secretary Kissinger this is Ecevit. Well I can give you an exact time for tomorrow for the end of our operation 12:00 noon New York time latest.

K: 12:00 noon. Ok. Mr. Prime Minister can we inform the Secretary General of the UN of this?

E: Yes and we shall be available for talks at that time if necessary.

K: Ok.

E: Thank you very much.

K: Now Mr. Prime Minister may we inform the Greek Government and the Secretary General of the UN?

E: If you want we can also directly inform the Secretary General of the UN.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.

K: Give us a few hours and we will inform them then you can inform them.

E: Ok. Inform them before morning Turkish time. I suppose you know about the resolution at the Security Council.²

K: Well I will try to avoid a vote on it.

E: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you.

² See footnote 8, Document 133.

135. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis¹

August 15, 1974, 7:22 p.m.

K: I am sorry to disturb you in the night, Mr. Prime Minister. I first of all wanted to tell you I am sending you a message but I have just had one of many conversations with the Turkish Prime Minister² and he has told me they are going to stop military operations tomorrow at 12:00 noon Washington time and I wanted to tell you that we will hold them to this promise.

C [Karamanlis]: They will complete it at 12:00 tomorrow?

K: They will have completed it.

C: They will complete until tomorrow their plans [change?].

K: Well this I cannot judge. But we will in any event take an active role in the negotiations from now on.

C: I am going to think about this but I am afraid that after this fait accompli it will be a little difficult.

K: We have issued another strong statement today condemning the Turkish action . . .³

C: I have heard.

K: . . . from the White House and I just wanted to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, we will do everything to strengthen your position and show our friendship for Greece.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Karamanlis was in Athens.

² See Document 134.

³ See footnote 4, Document 133.

C: I appreciate it but I am afraid it is a little late. As I said the Turks have created a fait accompli.

K: Well this . . . we have to see what can be done now.

C: Unintelligible . . . to avoid this you know . . . inaudible . . . under the threats and . . . inaudible.

K: I understand this and we are opposed to it.

C: I beg your pardon?

K: We are opposed to a policy of military pressure.

C: Why? As you know, Turkey doesn't understand the advice in Europe and in your opinion what are they going to do?

K: Well, they have offered to negotiate.

C: After the fait accompli they want to talk. But it is difficult for us to.

K: Well, let me see whether I can think of a procedure. Would you be prepared to pay a visit to the United States?

C: Who?

K: You.

C: I don't think because you know it is difficult for me to leave the country. We have many problems. The people are very bitter, angry, the armies are upset. It is difficult to leave the country. Maybe a little later, but just now it is impossible.

K: Well, I am sure that maybe our President will be in touch with you tomorrow by cable.

C: Who?

K: President Ford. And let us see perhaps what can be done.

C: Mr. Secretary, I believe you have to get out Turks. The Turks . . . If they don't get rid of this obsession it is difficult to get agreement.

K: We will consider it very seriously. I didn't quite understand what you said.

C: I said the Turks . . . inaudible . . . if they don't get rid of this obsession, it is very difficult to get an agreement.

K: With that I agree. There can be no further pressures.

C: But in spite of that the Turks have broken everything. The Greek people think . . . inaudible . . . bit late. Without giving instructions to the public it is very, very difficult for me to begin again talks.

K: Yes, I understand.

C: Mr. Secretary there is a climate very difficult.

K: Let me report this to the President and we will be in touch with you tomorrow.

C: Yes. I will be here. Yes, thank you.

K: Mr. Prime Minister if you have any proposal we would look at it very seriously as to what should be done.

C: In my opinion you have to do something more than give advice to the Turks.

K: If you have any concrete suggestion, we would be prepared to look at it very seriously.

C: I am going to answer your message today.⁴

K: Good. I look forward to hearing from you Mr. Prime Minister. Good night.

C: Good night.

⁴ No record of a response has been found.

136. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 16, 1974, 6:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: Where do we stand?

Sisco: The principal focus is the situation in Greece. We have to let the situation settle down a bit. I can't see suggesting something concrete for the moment. At some point we have to remind the Greeks that there is a mutuality of interests between Greece and the U.S. Of course, they have a public opinion problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

Kissinger: Have you seen the intelligence report that the French are trying to replace us in Greece?²

Buffum: The French are also taking the lead at the UN Security Council. We should vote for the French resolution which asks that negotiations be reconvened, the outcome of which should not be prejudiced by military gains. Of course, the Turks are kicking in New York about that.

Kissinger: The French resolution is alright. It could mean there shouldn't be future military operations. We can vote for it.

Buffum: The Soviet position is unclear.

Sisco: I spoke to Archbishop Iakovos who is leaving for Greece. He will be getting in touch with Larry when he comes back and wants to see you.

Kissinger: He is even more cynical than Makarios.

Stabler: We have a report that one of our NATO aircraft went into Athens Airport without prior clearance as usual but that the Greek Air Force said that there are no bilateral agreements valid any longer and that we would need prior clearance.

Kissinger: We must not show excessive eagerness and not now tilt toward Greece and lose the Turks.

Hartman: I think this is a conscious policy on the part of Karamanlis to try to avoid coming to the conference table.

Sisco: He is going to (a) put the bee on the back of the junta for what has happened and (b) push us around but he can't do too much.

Kissinger: Karamanlis is kicking us to preempt the left. If we had someone in Athens we could trust, we could contact him to say we understand the situation but he should not push us too far.

Hartman: We are looking at other things we might do outside of the Cyprus context.

Stabler: We can speed up aircraft deliveries such as the A-7s to Greece.

Hartman: Another thing that might help Karamanlis and the situation in Cyprus is to suggest negotiations with the Turks to beef up the Greek military presence on Cyprus.

Kissinger: Do you think the Turks will reduce their forces on the island?

McCloskey: Also, will they give up territory?

Kissinger: If we can define the negotiations, it would be to give up some territory. Ecevit is subtle enough to do it, but can he get the military on board?

² Not found.

Hartman: I don't see it in the early negotiations.

Kissinger: The British are playing electoral politics. There may be some symbolic pieces of territory the Turks could give up. They went further south on the road to Famagusta, but all that is high land.

Hartman: They have taken the best land on the island.

Stabler: It is hard to see them giving it up.

Kissinger: They've got to give something up if there are to be negotiations. We will see by Monday³ if we can get some talking points for Tasca stressing it is in our interest to strengthen that government. There is a mutuality of interests and they must realize that if they lose the American connection, they will play into Papandreou's hands. Who else can they depend on? We are willing to listen to concrete suggestions. On Cyprus, the balance of powers was destroyed by their predecessors. Your view, Art, is that they would kick us around regardless of whether or not we could have stopped the Turks. An important question is can they negotiate? As to the anti-Americanism in Greece, to what extent is it genuine and to what extent is it to rally the leftists who wanted to go to war?

Hartman: The parties did agree to autonomy.

Kissinger: I got that from everyone. There were cables that greater autonomy had been conceded. We didn't get ahead of anyone on this.

Hartman: Athens was behind Clerides.

Kissinger: I didn't think we were breaking new ground.

Sisco: We knew that Clerides was alright, but we didn't know the position of the Greeks and if Clerides could carry it.

Buffum: Scali wants to talk to you about the UN.

(The Secretary received a call from Ambassador Scali.)⁴

Kissinger: Scali tells me that the Russians are going to abstain. Callaghan is mad because of Gwertzmann's article.⁵ We should explain the Reuters story.

³ August 19.

⁴ Kissinger spoke to Ambassador Scali at 6:56 p.m. and the two agreed to vote for the French resolution. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁵ Kissinger spoke to Ambassador Ramsbotham at 7:19 p.m. about an article critical of Callaghan and his Cyprus strategy in the lead-up to the British elections. (Transcript of telephone conversation; *ibid.*)

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: We have to placate the Greeks but I do not want to give the impression that the more they can kick us around, the more they can get. Karamanlis should not attack the President his first week in office. If they take an irreversible anti-U.S. line, we can take it better than they can. We tried to prevent military actions. The paragraph in the cable has to be strong.² If this continues, the U.S. will have to reconsider its policies. We have no interest in supporting a country which follows a professional anti-U.S. position.

Joe (Sisco), tell the Cypriot Ambassador that he is Clerides' Ambassador and not Makarios' Ambassador or we will not continue to see him.

McCloskey: Dimitriou is in a difficult situation.

Kissinger: The word has gone forth that the U.S. will not be pushed around. This campaign must stop. We made our record. Karamanlis can rely on our support. The Greeks must realize that the outcome

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office and it followed up on a meeting held one hour earlier. (Memorandum of conversation, August 17, 11:30 a.m.; *ibid.*)

² An apparent reference to telegram 181127 to Athens, August 17, which discussed Turkish military action: "It is totally unjustified for the blame to be laid on the U.S.; nor do we believe it is in the interest of Greece to do so. As close and friendly allies, we believe it is important for both of us to remember that this crisis was not of our making or of the Karamanlis government. Both Greece and the U.S. were put in the situation in which we now find ourselves by the irresponsible and unwise actions of the Greek junta in upsetting the balance of forces on Cyprus." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece, Nodis from Secretary of State 1)

cannot be one which is very pleasant. If they get in a state of mind that we will push the Turks back . . .

Sisco: The psychology that is evolving with this new government is like the one the Greek junta had, namely, that we have greater interest in Greece than they have in us.

Kissinger: I have no confidence Tasca can carry this message.

Sisco: Henry, we have to take a chance. I don't think we have any alternative. We can supplement this with a telephone call to Monty Stearns.

Ingersoll: You can call Tasca back and have Monty Stearns do it.

Kissinger: I don't want Tasca running around town at this time.

Buffum: You can leave a piece of paper.

Sisco: You will have a problem there. If you want, I'll call Tasca and underline your concern and tell him that you are to read the following to Karamanlis.

Kissinger: If we send a representative, they may not let him in the country. We should also send a message to Ecevit and let him know that what we need is now needed.³ They must make a generous gesture, giving up some territory as a prelude to negotiations and in the negotiations they should be willing to give further concessions. I would like to have Ecevit's ideas.

Eagleburger: Do you want to tell Ecevit about the last Soviet proposal?

Kissinger: The Soviets have now proposed a joint guarantee which we will also refuse. We understand Greece's concerns and frustrations. On the other hand, we consider it unjust. We have made a major effort to moderate the Turks. We have gotten several delays. We do not use U.S. military forces against a NATO ally especially in terms of our domestic and international situation. We have our own considerations. Greece is in NATO not for U.S. interests but for Greece's own interests. If Greece wants to follow an anti-U.S. policy, we want to know how.

Buffum: Even the UK as a Guarantor Power did not use force.

Kissinger: Callaghan's strategy was a disaster.

Up to this point we have understood the anti-U.S. position of Greece. There were domestic considerations. From the foreign policy view, this could become irretrievable. We want to strengthen the Greek Government. If Karamanlis is willing, we are prepared to support him.

Buffum: We should protest against the demonstrations against U.S. installations in Greece.

³ See Document 138.

Kissinger: I don't think we are going to get anywhere by being too soft or gentle. Anyway, our motto is if Sisco can't go, no one can go. (Laughter)

I didn't understand how precarious the second round of negotiations was. I thought that it would lead to a technical round of discussions. Where I miscalculated is that it became the prelude to military hostilities. I didn't know by Tuesday⁴ that no negotiations were in flux and that the Greeks had not made an offer. Why was not the 5½ kilometer zone proposed?

Hartman: Gunes had one talk with Callaghan and then it got lost.

Kissinger: Callaghan told me it was a non-starter.

Sisco: Because the Turks had in mind breaking out of the zone.

Kissinger: But it was the Turks who proposed it.

Hartman: That was a means of making it hard for the National Guard to resist.

Kissinger: It was a combination of all circumstances. Geneva wasn't played to bring all factors into the negotiations.

McCloskey: On Monday⁵ the Turks were talking about a 20-kilometer buffer zone.

Kissinger: By Tuesday Callaghan and Ecevit told me of the 5½ kilometer proposition. Whether it was serious or not I don't know. (To Hartman) Did you know about it?

Hartman: The British never mentioned it to me.

Kissinger: I have not yet understood the paralysis in Geneva.

Hartman: Callaghan concentrated on ceasefire violations for the first four days. Gunes found a reason why a session on Friday could not be held. Then, over the weekend the Greeks took the position that the Guarantor Powers could not discuss a settlement. Gunes then said, "Why are we here?"

Kissinger: When it became clear there was the likelihood of a military move, we or the British should have gotten a proposal interjected.

⁴ August 13.

⁵ August 12.

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, August 17, 1974, 2022Z.

181115. Subject: Cyprus. For the Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. You should see Ecevit at earliest possible time and give him the following message from me (but do not leave any paper with him):

2. We have received disturbing reports that despite your assurances Turkish forces are continuing to occupy more territory and that fighting is still in progress. I cannot emphasize strongly enough my earlier warning that the domestic situation in the United States has now reached a point where further Turkish military operations will put the USG in an impossible position. If they continue, we will be obliged to take public steps which would threaten our ability to work together toward a just solution on Cyprus and result in a further deterioration of the Western security position in the area. I therefore ask that the GOT take all steps necessary to see that the ceasefire is strictly observed.

3. As to the longer range problem of bringing about a situation in which the Cyprus crisis can be brought to a conclusion acceptable to all sides, I see little chance of bringing the Greek Government to the negotiating table without some generous prior gesture from the Turkish Government. I would not presume at this point to suggest what that gesture might be; but that one is necessary I am convinced. Further, I believe that, given the strong position the GOT now finds itself in on Cyprus, such a gesture is feasible.

4. I am equally convinced that, once the negotiations have resumed, it will be necessary for the GOT to show further flexibility—probably in terms of territorial concessions—if there is to be a reasonable final outcome.

5. I hasten to add that I do not believe that it is only the GOT which must demonstrate flexibility and a spirit of compromise; so must the GOG. Indeed, I recognize that it was in part Greek unwillingness to come forward with concrete proposals that led to the breakdown in the Geneva talks.

6. The Prime Minister should know that the Soviets continue to press us for some form of joint action. They have now told us that they have no views on what the final outcome of the Cyprus dispute should

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–77, Box 34, Turkey, Nodis from Secretary of State 1. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Eagleburger and cleared by Kissinger.

be, so long as that outcome—whatever it is—is guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. I assure the Prime Minister that this proposal, too, we shall reject. But the Prime Minister must understand that so long as the Cyprus dispute continues unresolved, and with no apparent progress toward resolution in sight, the USSR will continue to agitate—and I expect with growing insistence—for a role in the settlement. That is something that cannot be in the interests of either of our governments.

7. I want the Prime Minister to know that the United States has not changed its position with regard to Cyprus nor its sympathy for an acceptable and lasting resolution of the problems the Turkish Cypriots have so long faced. What I have said today has been said in the spirit of frankness and friendship that has marked our relationship throughout these difficult days. It is because I want that relationship to continue that I have spoken to him of our domestic limitations and the need for a generous gesture from the Turkish Government to bring the disputing parties back to the negotiating table. I would welcome the Prime Minister's views.

Kissinger

139. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Acting Cypriot President Clerides¹

August 19, 1974, 8:21 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Excellency, this is Clerides speaking.

K: How are you?

C: I'm terribly sorry, Your Excellency, that our first conversation has to be under such circumstances, and there has been an attack on the United States Embassy.

K: Yes, I know about it.

C: And Rodger Davies lost his life.²

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Clerides was in Nicosia.

² As reported in telegram 181216, August 19, Davies was shot during a demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia on August 19. Clerides took the injured Ambassador to the hospital, where he died. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 1)

K: I know.

C: I cannot but express my bitter sorrow and to [about?] him I have already issued a public statement to that effect. Rodger Davies took all necessary measures to protect the United States Embassy in Cyprus and the American citizens there in the Republic. I am grieved because not only the United States has lost an Ambassador, but I have lost a precious friend.

K: Well, Mr. President, we understand that this was out of your control, and you are quite correct, Rodger Davies was a friend and the United States thinks of itself as a friend of yourself and of what you are trying to do.

C: I rushed as soon as the news reached me. I entered the Embassy under fire and bring out . . .

K: Well, I understand, Mr. President. But the only thing I would ask is that the deliberate effort to blame the United States for what has happened is one of the contributing causes to this situation, and if we are to play a useful role, which we are eager to do, we cannot do it under this sort of pressure. And so we are asking all responsible Greek leaders to stop the anti-American agitation or we will withdraw completely from the negotiations, and leave it to be settled directly between Greeks and Turks.

C: That's what . . .

K: Well, in that case there has to be an end to this agitation.

C: I will do my utmost to press upon the people that there is no reason to show hostility whatsoever against the United States. Today I had a press conference for everything that happened and I stated the United States had exerted a lot of pressure to prevent the Turkish Army from attacking.

K: Exactly.

C: And I will continue bringing all I can to prevent any anti-American feelings or any anti-American demonstrations in Cyprus.

K: We are prepared, as Mr. Davies must have told you yesterday, to use our influence to produce the most favorable outcome and to use our influence to bring about a change in the present disposition of forces. But we cannot do this under the pressure of anti-Americanism.

C: I only appreciate the position you have just explained. Rodger spoke to me last night about the points you have mentioned and I was today going to elaborate. But unfortunately for him it is too late.

K: Well, Mr. President, no one can blame you for this horrible tragedy. And we have supported you from the beginning and we will continue to support you.

C: Thank you.

K: But there are certain realities which you also must take into account which I have outlined to you.

C: Yes, I know.

K: And we will say the same thing in Athens.

C: Well, I am completely aware of the reality of the situation, and I feel because I was aware of the realities that I was fine . . . I will continue doing my best so that together we can work a reasonable solution to the Cyprus problem.

K: Right. And Mr. President we will do the same and I may send out a replacement in the next day or two so that we have a senior diplomat on the spot.³

C: I will be very grateful if this is done. First of all it will help us all to have a senior diplomat here, and also because if . . .

K: Yes, but there can be no question about the fact, and I'm not saying this to you, that if these attitudes continue in Athens and Cyprus, then we will just wash our hands of the whole thing.

C: I fully realize and you can rest assured that I will do everything, even publicly, to prevent any anti-Americanism in Cyprus.

K: Good. Thank you very much for calling, Mr. President, and I hope we will have the opportunity to meet very soon.

C: I look forward to our meeting in America.

K: And you can count on me as a friend.

C: Well, you can count that in Cyprus you have both a friend and admirer.

K: Thank you, Mr. President.

C: Thank you. Good-bye.

K: Good-bye.

³ Kissinger sent L. Dean Brown, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management and former Ambassador to Jordan, to take charge of the Embassy pending the appointment of a new Ambassador. (Ibid.) On August 23 William R. Crawford, Jr., was appointed Ambassador to Cyprus.

140. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit¹

August 19, 1974, 10:15 a.m.

E: Mr. Kissinger, this is Ecevit.

K: Mr. Prime Minister how are you?

E: I feel very sorry. Please accept my condolences.

K: This is one of those unfortunate events. I have to make a statement at noon today and I want to make a fairly strong statement along a number of lines, that we're not going to be pressured.² I would like to say we favor an immediate negotiation in which we are in favor of a reduction of Turkish forces on the Island and we have been assured by the Turks of it. I think it would help us greatly. We are having demonstrations of 30,000 people here in Washington. What do you think?

E: Let me get you straight. You are going to make a strong statement . . .

K: What I would say in my statement is, here is what we've done.

E: That you are not going to be pressured by . . .

K: And we believe negotiations should be started immediately. We believe that in these negotiations we would use their influence that some of the territories that have been occupied recently, that Turkey should show flexibility in respect to the territory it now holds and the . . .

E: You know my idea about _____³ to relinquish some of it with regard to the reduction of forces. Under the present circumstances, it would be difficult to commit ourselves. You can explain it in this way. Negotiations are established so that a final settlement could be reached immediately or without delay so the Turks could be expected to start reduction of their forces.

K: Can I say I have been assured by the Turkish Prime Minister that he would be prepared to consider this?

E: As soon as a final settlement is reached and reasonable security is reached on the Island this is a great _____ atrocity _____ we found killed. It would be very difficult for us to commit ourselves to a reduction of forces. We are bound by the Geneva agreement _____ that the Turks are committed to it.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.

² The text was sent in telegram 181676 to multiple NATO posts, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

³ This and other omissions are in the original.

K: Can I say you have reaffirmed that?

E: Yes, we reaffirm our _____ to the Geneva declaration.

K: I think it would help here greatly. I will send you a message Mr. Prime Minister. You know that this _____ move we're encouraging and we shouldn't discuss it on the telephone. I will send you a further message about this.⁴

E: Can I ring you back and tell you after consultations with our foreign ministers about how much we can commit ourselves?

K: Could you do it within the next hour?

E: Shall I reach you at the State Department or the White House?

K: At the State Department.

E: I'll do that.

K: The statement I'm making will have the support of President Ford and its purpose is to get negotiations started.

E: I understand. I'll give you a ring within the next hour. My condolences again.

K: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

⁴ Not found; see Document 141.

141. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit¹

August 19, 1974, 12:10 p.m.

E: We have prepared for your consideration a text. May I dictate it to someone?

K: The text I am going to read? Go ahead.

E: The Turkish Government is reaffirming their commitment to the principle of timely and phased reduction of forces as stipulated in the Geneva Conference on July 30 . . . when conditions allow . . . (inaudible) the Turkish Prime Minister has declared publicly August 17 that the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate the demarcation line of the area that should remain under Turkish rule and he

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.

hopes that Turkey would not be . . . (inaudible) about retaining all of the territory but it should be (inaudible) in an atmosphere conducive to developing and securing for all on the Island and negotiate for a final solution in a constructive spirit without delay. This should be a framework, if acceptable to you.

K: May I make a suggestion? What I am going to say is not a diplomatic document. It is an attempt to get control of events here. I think, for present purposes, it is enough if I can say that part of what you say about [omission in the source text] to hope.

E: Excuse me, I couldn't understand.

K: I should not refer to your public statement. I should put it on the basis that you have confirmed this to me. Secondly, I can say the gist of this but I think we should leave out all this about terrorism. The major point is to give people a face-saving excuse to get them back to the Conference. I should say that I have been given to understand that you will not insist on holding all the territory for Turkish autonomous rule.

E: I should tell you that . . .

K: The details I think we should leave to the negotiations.

E: What I am after is . . .

K: You shouldn't be asked to go beyond what you have given us before the Turkish operation began . . . not beyond that border that you gave before the operation started.

E: I have shown the line to Macomber.

K: What you said about the reduction . . . I can say . . . according to the Geneva Conference.

E: Timely and phased.

K: What I would like to say about the terrorism is that we do not believe, that is, I would say we do not believe that the territory not being held by Turkey should be put in the Turkish autonomous zone and we have been given to understand that in a negotiation Turkey would not insist on that.

E: Say the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate the final demarcation.

K: I may put it that way, but I think for our public opinion it would be helpful to make you appear conciliatory.

E: I understand, but after the terrorist acts here, the public opinion has become fierce also.

K: I will say that the Turkish Government has assured me that they consider the demarcation line negotiable.

E: That's right. To a certain extent; to a reasonable extent.

K: Ok.

E: Alright, thank you and my condolences again.

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 20, 1974, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

President: It is important that we have continuity.

[After some discussion of other subjects the President asked Dr. Kissinger to brief.]²

Kissinger: Briefly about the development of the Cyprus situation and where we are. It started when the Greek junta used the Greek officers in Cyprus to overthrow Makarios and put in a government with support of the EOKA, as an attempt to bring about enosis.

In 1960 the Constitution was set up; in 1964 Makarios overthrew it. In 1967 there was another one and since then the Turkish people had been living in ghettos and the Turks thought the U.S. had kept them from getting their rights. The Makarios overthrow and the junta's unpopularity gave the Turks an opportunity to rectify the situation. They moved in. Initially we were under heavy pressure to overthrow the Greek government. We tried to keep the crisis from being internationalized and to prevent the change of the constitutional government in Cyprus. The junta fell, Karamanlis came in, and the British got the talks started. We kept in the background so as not to look like we were the policemen for every civil war.

Clerides we think is a good man.

We support the Greek government, but since it had replaced the junta it didn't feel it could make concessions. It was afraid of being caught between the left and the right. The Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions. Also the British got mad at the Turks and put pressure on them, thus relieving the pressure on the Turks for concessions.

The solution was to be greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots and restoration of the 1960 Constitution. But the negotiations stalemated.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

² Brackets are in the original.

The Turks then attacked and now hold 55 percent of the good land and the best part.

Greek emotions are high, but the U.S. could have prevented it only by putting forces around the island sufficient to balance the Turkish forces.

The cut-off of aid would not have affected the battle and would have forced the Turks either to the Soviet Union or to a Qaddafi-type regime. It also would have gotten us embroiled in all the details of the negotiations.

We threatened if they went to war with each other that it would be a very serious move.

We now must get them to the conference table. We said yesterday that we insist that Turkey maintain the ceasefire line and negotiation is essential. I made a statement on this. I read this position to Ecevit and he agreed, and he agreed also to give up some territory and reduce his forces.

The reaction to our statement has been positive. The Greek tempers seem to be cooling. Clerides gave a good statement—he is willing to negotiate without severe preconditions. We have encouraged the British to put forward a federal solution giving more autonomy. After it is discussed more, we will offer to play a more active role.

So: A war was stopped; the Turks will give up some of their gains; and the Turks will reduce some of their forces.

The pressures on the Greek government were severe. They couldn't go to war and so they kicked at us a bit.

President: We have dismissed our duty. Our position is the right one. We can't go into every hot operation. We were working with all the parties.

Remember, the situation was precipitated by the Greek government, and one that was disapproved of by the U.S. and the world. When they did it, they couldn't take advantage of it—but the Turks could and did. Now we are assured there will be some moderation in the negotiation.

My relations with the Greek community have always been excellent. They don't think so much of me right now but I think they will come around as things go forth.

Kissinger: Even the Greeks will eventually see it was our influence which made for Turkish moderation.

143. **Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹**

Washington, August 21, 1974.

SOME THOUGHTS ON CYPRUS

Hopefully the initiative Callaghan is launching will succeed,² but judging by Tasca's latest talks with the Greeks³ and Macomber's conversations in Ankara,⁴ it is doubtful that it will.

Moreover, it seems faulty in the sense that forcing all the participants to confront, at the outset, the ultimate solution, risks their rejection of it or at least causes each to attach so many conditions that genuine talks will founder. (It is analagous to forcing Israel and Syria to agree on the disposition of the Golan Heights before discussing military disengagement.) Asking Karamanlis and Clerides to accept, even in principle, the political partition of the island is not really different from asking them to accept the Atilla line,⁵ which they claim cannot even be the basis for negotiation.

The obstacles to negotiations are not so much the final terms which in the end will reflect reality but the impact the process has on the domestic political position of each of the participants.

The status quo is dangerous: (1) it will ensure Karamanlis' drift into a permanent anti-American, Gaullist posture; (2) it risks a resumption of Turkish military action, in the face of Greek stonewalling and Cypriot terrorism; (3) it freezes all concerned into increasingly rigid and intransigent positions.

Yet each side seems to prefer the status quo to the painful decisions and concessions required by negotiations, because both the Greeks and Turks have shakey political positions at home.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger wrote at the top, "Excellent paper."

² Callaghan proposed a bi-regional federal solution.

³ Reported in telegram 5962 from Athens, August 21. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 9, Cyprus 44)

⁴ Reported in telegram 5734 from Ankara, August 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850076-2031)

⁵ The Atilla line marked the Turkish military advance on Cyprus.

Greece

—Neither Karamanlis nor Clerides can stand to lose face by acquiescing in the Turkish conquest, even if they privately concede that it is a hard reality that will have to be faced eventually.

—Karamanlis' position must be stronger now than two days ago because he has reached some *modus vivendi* with the army; whatever deal he has made with the army must touch on the question of how to handle Papandreou; a plausible assumption is that the army will support Karamanlis' efforts to resist the certain pressures that Papandreou will now mount on the government.

—However, Karamanlis cannot guarantee military support if he makes concessions to the Turks; his hope to stay in power rests on a nationalistic position that satisfies the army and defuses the left.

—At the same time the professionals in the Greek armed forces will want to do something about their weak military position; at a minimum they will look for alternative sources of equipment to free themselves from the US; France is the most logical source, and politically this will shore up Karamanlis' willingness to play the French role in NATO.

Turkey

—There are no moral, diplomatic-political pressures that will induce Ecevit suddenly to give up the gains the Turks have made.

—*Indeed, the more real danger is that the Turks, with their appetite whetted by their success, will be tempted to force a "final solution" of all their problems with Greece; they could take such drastic steps as moving on the Greek islands; there is the danger that in the course of negotiations Turkey will broaden the scope of territorial bargaining to include questions of the Aegean Islands, oil rights, etc.*

—In any case, talk of significant troop reductions or territorial concessions is simply more Turkish eyewash. The Turkish army, according to latest reports, is digging in for the "winter"; it plans some very minor withdrawals to adjust the lines, but no major withdrawals before next spring; moreover, "mopping up" operations will begin on August 21 (Wednesday)—and this will raise new charges of a breakdown in the ceasefire.

—The Turks still have not given up the option of new operations on Cyprus, as hinted by Ecevit (Tab A: some disturbing intelligence reports on Turkish intentions).⁶ We can expect that the Turkish position

⁶ Not attached; examples of such intelligence are in CIA Intelligence Information Cables TDFIR 314/05514-74, August 21, and TDFIR 314/05540-74, August 22 (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 1) and in telegram 2542 from Nicosia, August 22 (*ibid.*, Box 3, Nodis to Secretary of State 1).

in Cyprus will remain volatile, if only because terrorist incidents are almost certain.

Obviously, the negotiating process should begin urgently, as you have said publicly.

The question is how?

1. A case can be made for circumventing both Athens and Ankara and using Clerides and Denktash as the vehicles to start the process.

—The subject for their discussion should be narrow—refugees and relief; under this rubric, an arrangement might be discussed for opening Nicosia airport under UN supervision, with some sort of Turkish observer; then perhaps they could move to questions of the plight of Greek and Turkish minorities on both sides of the line; and Clerides can raise the question of some adjustments in the situation in Famagusta to meet one of his conditions.

2. If such contacts can start, without having to confront the major question of whether Clerides accepts the status quo, then it might be possible for us to continue discussions with Ecevit on his “whole carrot”.

—Ecevit’s willingness to withdraw from the area around the British base is an opening wedge (the Turks apparently occupied more territory than called for in the General Staff plan.

—One possibility worth some thought is whether we could use this wedge to suggest a differentiation between the zone occupied by the Turks at the start of the Geneva talks on August 9—to which Karamanlis demands the Turks return—and the present Attila line. For example, could the Turks “thin out” the areas that they have occupied in the past week—if only as a gesture? This would at least acknowledge Karamanlis’ condition.

—And we might go further and suggest an adjustment of the territory between Myrtou and Lefka: this area was not part of the original Turkish proposal but they now hold it; it has some valuable agricultural land and is not purely Turkish in character. If the Turks would withdraw from it, while holding only the road to Lefka, as compensation they might extend their western line to Point Samos, taking in Kokkina and Limnits which they had hoped to grab in the last operation but did not quite make, or make some arrangements concerning the Turkish communities in those coastal cities.

3. Finally, we should give some serious thought to helping the Greeks put a token military force on the island with, of course, Turkish acquiescence; it might only be a regiment of infantry to show the flag, and could be brought over under UK auspices, with the US sponsoring it in Ankara; the rationale would be that some Greek regulars would be needed to help with relief and to maintain order; they would not be in Nicosia.

In sum, the US could adopt the following scenario:

1. Support immediate talks on local emergency matters between Denktash and Clerides with no preconditions and no complications of what the legal or political ramifications of such talks would imply.

2. Propose to the Turks that as a gesture of good will, they agree that they will “thin out” their forces in the area between the present line and the August 9 enclave; leaving the actual thinning out terms of numbers, etc., rather ambiguous.

On this basis, we could suggest to Karamanlis that his position has at least been reflected and a basis for negotiating a territorial settlement exists which would then be embodied in some new constitutional framework, the last rather than the first step.

Meanwhile, we continue to explore a more precise Turkish definition of their “main canton” and whether they could give up the area between the August 9 position and the area after Lefka.

As an option, we could explore with Ankara whether the Turks could acquiesce in the transport to Cyprus of a small contingent of Greek regulars on the understanding that they will not advance up to the Turkish line.

144. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to British Foreign Secretary Callaghan¹

Washington, August 24, 1974.

Please convey the following message to Foreign Secretary Callaghan from Secretary of State Kissinger:

Dear Jim:

I understand that you are increasingly concerned about the lack of movement in the Cyprus situation and the increased efforts the Soviets are making to stake out a more active role for themselves. I share your concern.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the message reads, “delivered to UK Embassy, 8/24, 5 p.m.”

The latest Soviet move is decidedly unhelpful.² Should this proposal be accepted, the Soviet Union will have succeeded in gaining a voice in an area in which up to now it has had little influence. This in turn would undermine further our basic security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

In informing us of their proposal, the Soviets have once again proposed that we join with them in some form of joint guarantee. This is a proposal which we could not under any circumstances contemplate.

It may well be that the Greek Government will consider accepting the Soviet proposal for the effects this will have domestically and because it wishes to avoid the distasteful choices which more direct negotiations among the Guarantor Powers would force upon them. I think we should all impress upon our Greek friends the dangers of such acceptance in the longer term, not only for themselves, but for all of us.

Your proposal for a bi-regional federal system is a good one and we completely support your suggestion to reconvene the Geneva talks in order to explore that proposal. I believe the Greek Government must be brought to realize that it can rely on the friendly support of all of us but that it must take an active part in negotiations and must support a weak Clerides Government in its effort to reach an understanding with the Turkish-Cypriot community. A long period of stalemate would only be an advantage to the Soviets. Certainly it will not be an advantage to the Greeks, since the only hope they have for improving the present state of affairs is to return to the negotiating table. If we are to use our influence on the Turks in an effort to obtain some of the concessions which will be needed for a negotiated solution, this could only be done within the context of a negotiation. A prolonged stalemate would diminish our capability of exercising a positive influence on the Turks.

I am troubled by the encouragement which the Greek Government is giving to anti-American and anti-NATO opinion in Greece. If this anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment is not curtailed soon, it may get out of hand and provide yet another opening for Soviet meddling. I would hope that you, the French, and the FRG—and I am writing to Genscher in this same vein—will do what you can to moderate these tendencies.

I am equally concerned that the efforts of some of our European friends to engage in entirely worthwhile efforts to support the Karamanlis

² The Soviet Government's statement, received at the White House on August 23, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, the NATO-centered approach to settlement talks, and the ongoing interference with Cyprus' sovereignty. The Soviets proposed an international conference within the UN framework, consisting of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and all Security Council member countries, and probably other countries including those in the non-aligned movement. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969-1977, Box 27, USSR, "D" File)

Government may be misconstrued by that Government as evidence of European support for Greece as a counterweight to American support for Turkey. The end result could be a further polarization of the situation and the strengthening in Greece of the extreme left.

It is my view that the first order of business, after turning aside the Soviet proposal, is to get the negotiations underway again. Certainly Clerides should be encouraged to talk directly with Denktash. The first item on the agenda may relate to humanitarian questions but it is possible that these discussions could eventually be broadened to cover political questions. These could include taking a look at your proposal for bi-regional federalism.

I should be most grateful for any ideas which you might have as to how we could be helpful at this stage in moving the Cyprus question back to the negotiating table.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, August 25, 1974, 1300Z.

2622. Subj: Turkish Intentions on Cyprus.

1. Turkish actions on ground, and statements by officials both here and in Ankara, have reinforced our initial impression that Turkish Army intervened to protect the security of mainland and not assist local community, except insofar as this relates to primary purpose. Best indication this regard is total write off of enclaves located in southern half of island. Despite repeated radio requests for aid, so far as we aware, Turks made no effort reinforce or resupply these areas. Turk mainland Commander in Larnaca, who exfiltrated in civilian dress via Dhekelia, reportedly told British that his instructions were to offer token resistance before surrendering. Said he had ample ammo and weapons to have continued fight for extended period. (This info, which contradicts accounts put out by Turk Cypriot leaders, largely confirmed by UNFICYP observation.)

2. Thus, while Turks had force to occupy entire island, and divide it up as they wished, they carefully limited operation to grabbing

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Exdis to Secretary of State 1. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn. Repeated Priority to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, USUN, USDOCOSOUTH, USEUCOM, USCINCEUR, and DIA.

sufficient territory to insure that they would be in predominant position to dictate future status of an independent Cyprus. As we read their intentions, Turkey wants a federal (confederal) state and has little or no interest in creation of an independent Turk Cypriot mini-state or move towards double enosis.

3. Either of latter two courses would run contrary to basic reason for intervention since, by implication, they would open the door to introduction of substantial Greek mainland forces onto island. This would place Turkey in position of having southern ports (and heartland cities) again endangered or of going to war to take entire island, destroying island's quasi-independence, and facing prospect of protracted guerilla struggle.

4. Once negotiations get underway, we expect Turkey to push for two canton confederal system, trading territory (of which it has excess) for transfer of populations. Believe also that Turkey will make every effort hold on to Famagusta port or at minimum, insisting on Turkish community's right to import freely from mainland, with no hindrance from central govt. (Agreement on this may be key to getting Famagusta's Greek Cypriot civilian population back to their houses.) This likely also be Turkish position on airport. During bargaining sessions, Turks may raise specter of independent Turk Cypriot state or float prospect double enosis, but we expect this will be largely bluff. What will not be bluff will be Turk demand maintain superior military force on island.

5. Danger is that goals frequently escalate following initial success of military actions. To extent possible, we should force Turks concentrate on their real security needs and long term interests in lieu immediate tactical gains. Further military moves at this time, rather than forcing Greeks to bargaining table, would probably preclude meaningful negotiations for foreseeable future. (Fortunately, atrocity rhetoric, which had been running at high pitch—with attendant danger of possible rescue operation—cooled noticeably today, Aug. 26. Odds on Turks mounting such move remain, however, high.)

6. By now, Turks have consolidated hold on occupied territory and internal security appears solid. Question remains how to get negotiating process underway in shortest possible time. Believe we should continue to support British effort convene Geneva III, while encouraging Denktash and Clerides to resume talks here (septel).² Earlier consultations begin, less likely will be prospect of renewed fighting and further destabilization this area.

² In telegram 2611 from Nicosia, August 25, Brown reported that he told Clerides: "What was needed was genuine negotiations, not sterile UN debate; and that it was in the context of negotiations, probably along the British-suggested line, that US could help its friends." (Ibid., Nodis to Secretary of State 1)

7. Believe we should encourage two sides to focus on refugee problem and need to facilitate free movement populations. While we have no illusions that many Greeks will move into Turkish area, much of problem would be met if they could move into border areas (and particularly if they could return to Greek section of Famagusta). If Turk Cypriots in south could choose between return to villages or removal to Turk Cypriot enclave, explosive danger of further Turk military moves would be reduced substantially.

Brown

146. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 27, 1974, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Sir John Killick, Deputy Under Secretary, British Foreign Office
Mr. Richard Sykes, British Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Michael Alexander, Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary
Mr. James Cornish, British Embassy
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Wells Stabler, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Ambassador William Crawford, Nicosia
Ambassador Jack Kubisch, Athens

Killick: I bring you best wishes from Foreign Secretary Callaghan and his appreciation that you agreed to receive us.

The Secretary: Thank you. It goes without saying that I would be happy to see you.

Killick: Our visit here is, in effect, a reply to the last message you sent over the weekend to Callaghan.² He is out in the country on

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stabler. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² Apparent reference to Document 144.

holiday for a rest. He does not want to go back to the Geneva forum at this time, there is no basis for it.

The Secretary: I seem to be the villain of your negotiations and I wonder how I got there.

Killick: Callaghan wants to look down the road a bit and he does not like what he sees ahead. He would like to have a discussion with you in greater depth, but this is not feasible at the present time. He, therefore, asked us to come over to have an exchange with you because this is rather better than telephone calls and diplomatic exchanges. I have a full sheaf of notes here that I would like to go over if you agree. May I proceed?

The Secretary: Yes, go ahead, and when you have finished, I will give you my thoughts. Where is Buffum?

Eagleburger: I did not know you wanted him. I will get him.

Killick: When Joe Sisco came over in July, there were some conversations with us which envisaged a package solution for Cyprus. On paper we have identified the solution as being biregional federalism.

The Secretary: The question seems to be whether the region can be extracted from the Greeks, by you or by the Turks.

Killick: There is already a de facto movement of population, and there should be some form of self-releasing guarantee as far as we are concerned. I might add that all the parties have been disenchanted with the failure by us to use military force in their interest.

The Secretary: The Turks were not unhappy that you did not use force.

Killick: That is past history and it is all highly theoretical. Nobody can impose a solution and anything that is imposed would not be a solution.

The Secretary: You mean the Greeks will not accept? How did you ever get me on the firing line in this matter?

Killick: We were not conscious that there was any act on our part which produced that result.

The Secretary: Well, it makes no difference because our actions would have been the same in any event. The Greeks have leaked what we said to them about the Soviet proposal.

Killick: The Greek insistence that a return to the August 9 line is a precondition to the resumption of negotiations is impossible. Our assessment is that the Government in Athens is weak and divided. We do not think that the Greek note of rejection of our proposal should be taken too tragically. As a matter of fact, some of the points we made are ones which Clerides would find acceptable.

The Secretary: Did we receive the text of Greek note of rejection?

Stabler: Yes we did—from the British.

The Secretary: Well, I did not see it, but I did see the summary. I am not being critical, I just wanted to know if we received it.

Killick: The following are the points on which there would have to be movement by the Turks: (1) a reasonable adjustment in the territory now held by the Turks; (2) not just a reduction of Turkish forces, but a commitment to total withdrawal; and (3) a return of the refugees to their homes since it would be hard to accept a forcible transfer of population. If we could get something from the Turks along these lines, it would be helpful. Incidentally, the Turkish emissary, Ulman, did mention in London yesterday that the Turks would be satisfied with 28 per cent of the territory.

The Secretary: I think it is stupid that Ulman said this publicly at the present time.

Cornish: I have just talked to London and they said that Ulman has backed away from this percentage.

The Secretary: Good, it is better they start at 35 per cent and then come down.

Cornish: It appears that Ulman is now speaking about the need to have a certain percentage to correspond to Turkish land holdings in Cyprus and then an additional amount for security purposes.

Killick: We should get movement from the Turks on this, and you will recall that in your letter to Callaghan, you mentioned that if you are to use your influence on the Turks to obtain some concessions, it would have to be done in the context of negotiations. You also mentioned your view that the Greek government must be brought to realize that it can rely on the friendly support of all of us, but that it must take an active part in negotiations.

The Secretary: The attitude of the Greeks toward NATO and toward our bases is most unrealistic and makes no sense.

Killick: If Turkey should make some concession as a result of the exercise of U.S. diplomacy, you would be well on your way to solving the anti-U.S. feeling in Greece. Perhaps there is some Soviet pressure building up on the Greeks, but it is difficult to read the Soviet attitude.

The Secretary: The Soviets are not moving strongly and they have taken no measures on the Turkish or Greek borders. They are doing just enough to stimulate the left in Greece. Every three days, Dobrynin comes in to suggest a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee. When I asked Dobrynin what his view was on this proposal, he said he had warned Moscow that we would run them ragged with this proposal. I have now asked Dobrynin to get for me Soviet ideas on what a solution should be. What, in effect, can the Soviets do? If the Soviets support a bizonal solution, then they could present it in Athens. In any event, we would oppose any joint guarantee in Cyprus.

(Mr. Buffum enters the room.)

Killick: Well, we would be grateful if you would keep us filled in on what the Soviets are doing.

The Secretary: Yes, we will. The Soviet moves do not seem to be anything from Brezhnev, but rather seem to reflect Gromyko's phobia.

Killick: In your letter, you spoke of a period of stalemate and the dangers of a prolonged stalemate. Do you think that a shorter period would be any more desirable? In Callaghan's view, time is of the essence.

The Secretary: A stalemate would certainly work against the Greeks. We would welcome UK efforts to move forward now. Movement is desirable, but a proposal by the U.S. to Greece would provoke a complicated reaction.

Killick: We cannot stand still. There is a problem, for example, of the Turkish Cypriot communities surrounded by Greek Cypriots. I want to thank you for your successful effort last week to deter the Turks from their action to relieve those areas. Your influence was decisive. Unfortunately, the Turkish minds still seem to be moving in this direction. Denktash himself has just made certain declarations about what the Turks might do if guerilla warfare broke out. Maybe these press statements are for the purpose of flesh-creeping, but they are nevertheless worrying.

The Secretary: I do not think the Greeks would really undertake guerilla warfare against the Turks. This is quite a different matter and I do not think it is feasible.

Killick: There are a number of difficult points such as the movement of Greeks from Turkish zones and the settlement of certain Turkish mainlanders in former Greek zones. On the Greek side, there is evidence of military readiness in Crete, and some days ago, Karamanlis told our Ambassador that beyond a period of some fifteen days, he would find it very difficult to control the situation.

The Secretary: Will the Turks accept partition?

Killick: The Turks say they will not, but we do not exclude this.

The Secretary: They would probably say we had arranged it.

Killick: Callaghan is not available to take a personal hand in this negotiation because of the forthcoming elections. From the announcement which we think will be made on September 4, he will be campaigning until the elections which we think will take place on October 3.

The Secretary: In other words, Callaghan would not be available for another Geneva effort. I have had this impression for some time.

Killick: Callaghan is worried about the public image of a Foreign Secretary constantly remaining available for negotiations which may never take place. He is in an exposed position and is made to look ridiculous.

The Secretary: Callaghan should not be too worried about this point.

Killick: Callaghan does worry though about maintaining his position.

The Secretary: I believe that UK initiative would be useful to keep the ball in play and also to have something that we could support.

Killick: You should know, and this is important, that if the Turks embark on another aggressive act, Callaghan might well throw in his hand with respect to the UK's diplomatic role. Callaghan's present thinking is to make "one more heave" possibly this week to follow up his efforts to get the ball rolling last week. All our Ambassadors in the area share our assessment of the short-term threats. The key lies in Ankara and long-range diplomatic messages will not do the trick. We are thinking of despatching as our emissary, Minister of State Roy Hattersley. He would go to Ankara—and Nicosia if necessary—and then to Athens. He would see what he could extract from the Turks. To borrow a phrase, we would engage in shuttle diplomacy. Our decision as to whether to follow this road will be taken only in light of your comments. We are also talking to Waldheim and to several Turks in London. I should make the point that Callaghan is not prepared to put the UK in an exposed position in this sense without the U.S. making a major effort to persuade the Turks to make concessions. It will depend on your leverage and how you would go about it. We would also enlist the support of the Nine and other members of NATO in our dealings with Athens. We have noted your concern in your letter to Callaghan that the efforts of the Europeans to support Karamanlis might be construed by Karamanlis as evidence of European support for Greece as a counterweight to American support for Turkey. The UK would never lend itself to such polarization.

The Secretary: There is a danger of the exploitation of anti-Americanism. This would tend to stiffen the Greek backs just when flexibility is essential. One could write a script which the left in Greece would exploit. Anti-Americanism is synonymous with withdrawal from NATO.

Killick: We do not believe that in cultivating Athens, there is any intention on the part of Europeans to encourage anti-Americanism.

The Secretary: This is all right up to a point, but it can be very dangerous.

Killick: We must all help Karamanlis in the consolidation of democracy in Greece.

The Secretary: Shouldn't Crawford and Kubisch be here?

We support this view, although we are worried about the stance assumed by Karamanlis. I do not think this stance reflects dissatisfaction with the Cyprus policy, but rather is a reflection of the Greek

domestic situation. The army is nationalistic and radicalized. The left is becoming disproportionately strong, while the center is not.

Killick: Our Ambassador in Athens recently constructed a scenario of the military returning to the fore to insist upon war with Turkey, a Greek defeat, the fall of Karamanlis and all this would bring about.

(Ambassadors Crawford and Kubisch enter.)

The Secretary: If Karamanlis signed an agreement, he then would be destroyed as having sold out Greek national honor.

Killick: That is why we are opposed to a meeting between Ecevit and Karamanlis.

The Secretary: If the Greeks blame us for our actions in Cyprus, we should be more comfortable since the Cyprus problem is basically soluble. There is nothing which has been done by the Europeans so far in Greece to which we could object. However, we have intelligence reports that the French plan to replace us. What does this mean and is it true? Is there any crisis that NATO can withstand? If not, this raises some very serious questions.

Killick: Originally we were more relaxed regarding the Soviet proposal, as the Greeks were really rather negative.

The Secretary: We saw the press reports regarding Mavros' attitude and that is why we sent word to Karamanlis.

Killick: The Turkish aims in Cyprus must be repugnant to the Soviets; therefore, it should be possible for you to exercise your influence on the Turks since Turkey would not move toward the Soviets. The situation in Athens would be different.

The Secretary: The Turks could either turn to the Soviet Union or to Qadhafi nationalism. While they might not turn to the Soviets in this crisis, if they were humiliated, they could go in this direction in two or three years time. The seeds for this could be sown now.

Killick: The likelihood of Turkish humiliation is small indeed. Turkey has it made.

The Secretary: The outcome will still be that the position of the Greeks in Cyprus will be much worse than what it was on July 15. I blame myself to some extent for what happened in the second round in Geneva. I do not understand, and no one has been able to explain to me, why no proposals were put forward by anybody. The only way to stop the Turkish attack would have been to flood the table with proposals. The essential ingredient, even if it was morally wrong, was to pressure the Greeks to make some concessions. The more the Greeks were outraged by the Turks, the more their backs were stiffened and the more excuses there were for the Turks to attack. I am reluctant for the U.S. to be put in the position that it was at that time. Nothing probably could have stopped the Turks in Geneva. I wonder what happened

to the suggestion that was made about security zones in some areas of five kilometers and in other areas of eight kilometers. This seems to have disappeared and was never put forward. It would not have changed the outcome in any event. My concern now is that the outcome be such that it not cause the Greeks to dance in the streets. The Turks have gained and the Greeks have lost, but in the negotiations the Greeks will have to gain something and the Turks will have to lose something.

Killick: Callaghan is not overly optimistic, but feels he must make another try.

The Secretary: You want a U.S. "heave". I am not at all eager for us to be in a position where it can be alleged that the UK failed because we did not do enough. Failure would, therefore, be the U.S. fault.

Killick: Callaghan does not want to land you with the baby.

The Secretary: Well, if it came to that, it would certainly be a close decision.

Killick: There are, of course, risks in what Callaghan is proposing.

The Secretary: I am not blaming anybody for what happened at Geneva II. I tried to get the Turks to come up with a proposal we could move forward. I never knew what happened to these proposals. They were not put forward.

Killick: The Turks were determined to move unilaterally.

The Secretary: We might have gained 36 hours, but I suppose the outcome would have been the same. Mavros would never have obtained approval to accept a cantonal arrangement.

Killick: We must be careful to have no failure of communication.

Alexander: I do not think there was any failure of communication in Geneva. Callaghan, I believe, regrets that he did not float proposals earlier, but there is an important dimension here. The situation was most complex and we were arguing with the Turks on irrelevancies such as place cards. On Sunday, the Turks wouldn't meet because their Cabinet was meeting. The other dimension was that Callaghan wanted to remain on speaking terms with the Greeks and, therefore, had to be careful.

The Secretary: The elements of negotiation really did not exist. The only thing that made sense was the biregional federalism and the only question was the size of the regions. I suggested a cantonal plan only to get the principle established. My concern now is with the forthcoming UK elections. It has been my experience as a mediator that one must be less eager than the parties. Let the parties exhaust themselves so that they are then ready to negotiate. There should be no time pressure.

Killick: You suggest that this should be a more deliberate operation. I think the opportunities for consultation are good.

The Secretary: I think there are two out of three chances that the idea will fail.

Killick: The matter is not that urgent as far as we are concerned, but it is a question of how long we shall remain available to undertake the process.

The Secretary: If the UK wants to do this on its own, that is all right. But it is another matter if we are to be a participant.

Killick: The U.S. role is essential.

The Secretary: Well, then we are in trouble. If Turkey makes no concessions, we will get stuck with the consequences. We will be accused of either being incompetent or lacking in good will. It is a question of timing with respect to Turkey. A tremendous heave at the right time and with the right framework might do it. But to support a junior minister . . . Wells, what do you think?

Stabler: I do not think the Turks will agree to any concessions at this time. They really have nothing to gain at the moment.

Killick: We will not go forward with this idea without a major heave and an effort of major persuasion by you.

The Secretary: What movement would be required?

Killick: We would not expect detailed concessions, but there would have to be the objective of complete Turkish withdrawal and agreement not forcibly to remove Greek Cypriots from Turkish areas. We would have to have forward movement to take something to the Greeks.

The Secretary: If you want a message from the President to Ecevit—I am not sure that would be the way to do it—if this goes forward as a U.S.–U.K. initiative, then we would be the fall guy. You should not be confused by shuttle diplomacy. It is not something that can be done overnight. It takes months to prepare the ground. I started on Egypt long before I went there, and when I finally got there, both parties pled with me to go even faster. I am obviously influenced by my experience. I do not sense readiness by either party to make a major move. If we could find that there is flexibility, then we could get behind it. It would be dangerous for Callaghan to commit himself at this time to a last-ditch effort. I am very worried that if the Turks do not play, then the UK will announce that the beastly Turks had thwarted their efforts. This would then force us into a position which would make it more difficult for us to do something later. The final heave will have to be a UK effort in Athens, but the Greeks would still be dissatisfied by the small concessions that would be made.

Alexander: The UK elections will not play a role in this, and I am sure if the project moves into negotiations, Callaghan will make sure that domestic considerations do not play a part.

The Secretary: If the Turks made a major proposal, then it would be better not to conclude prior to the elections since it would be certain that one of the parties would complain. The negotiations should continue during the election period. In any event, the Greeks will blame somebody. Moreover, the Turks will probably be beastly and Ecevit tricky. I can assure you that it took me a very long time to get a proposal in the Syrian negotiation and at any time I could have blown this up. However, it was essential to take the time necessary to move forward. If Hattersley goes this week, it would take a week or more to know whether there would be real progress. The Turks will not yield at this time—if they yield to the UK at all.

Killick: We are under no illusions as to what the UK can achieve alone, but we do not want to demonstrate this publicly.

Alexander: We must be seen to be making a major effort to shift the ground in favor of the Greeks in order to get a negotiation going.

The Secretary: There is no doubt that major pressure must be placed in Ankara and the United States must do it. I agree as to the optimum outcome, but I am concerned how to get there. The Turks do not react to public pressure. We have built up considerable capital with the Turks and we must determine how to spend it usefully. Is this the right time and right context for the U.S. to make a massive effort? We have a firm rule—we do not act under pressure. Until the Greeks stop picking on us, we will do nothing to help them. But we are not anti-Greek. It makes no sense to stop aid to Turkey since it would produce nothing, and if we had to stop it for any length of time, it would be extremely complicated to get it going again.

Killick: May I ask if Congress will force your hand with regard to aid to Turkey?

The Secretary: This is possible. I do think that the scenario suggested by Callaghan should be played out at some time, and we would prefer to have the UK do it. Our concern is that the time is not yet right for an all-out effort.

Buffum: What heave can we give with the Turks in addition to the many things we have already been doing with them? The Secretary has sent many messages.

The Secretary: There is really no sign of flexibility in the Turkish position and nobody can promise Greek flexibility. The real problem is the behavior of the Greek Government.

Sykes: From my experience in Greece, the Greek Government might well go off the deep end in spite of its recognition that this would not be in its best interest.

The Secretary: It is desirable that the UK make an effort and we are prepared to give considerable support. But the time factor

would produce a deadlock. Under the best of circumstances, the mediator would have to take several weeks before getting a break. If the elections were announced in the meantime, this would create a pressure.

Alexander: The implication is then that you think we should do nothing until after October 3.

The Secretary: You might send Hattersley around to see what flexibility there is. This we could back. However, if this is a do-or-die effort, then this would radicalize the situation. It is all right to send Hattersley on an exploratory mission to keep the Turks in play and to hold the Greek hands, but a do-or-die effort would be most difficult. The Turks would be the fall guys. Cutting off aid will not only be bad, but will not move the negotiations forward. The Turks would then not withdraw their forces for a long time and we would not be able to provide aid for a long time. Other arrangements would be needed.

Alexander: The Hattersley mission is exploratory.

The Secretary: My impression is that what would help the most would be serious negotiations under UK auspices. There would be distinct foreign policy advantages as well as domestic political advantages for the UK. Once the negotiations were started, one would not push unduly. But the problem is to get over the present hurdle and start the negotiations.

Alexander: This proposal is not to be presented as a do-or-die effort.

The Secretary: If Hattersley goes the end of the month and the elections are called next week, he has only a week in which to produce something. This seems most doubtful.

Alexander: I do not think the domestic political angle looms large here.

Buffum: The communal talks in Cyprus are a major step forward and are a measure of hope for the situation on the ground.

Killick: If the Turks make another rash move, will the U.S. try to restrain them?

The Secretary: I would prefer to have the negotiations started and it should be a U.S.-UK effort. Can you stay overnight so I can talk with the President and meet with you again tomorrow?

Killick: That is all right with me, but I am not sure about you, Michael. You may have to get back.

Alexander: Mr. Secretary, how do you think the situation will improve if we hold up our initiative for a time?

The Secretary: The Greeks must learn two things: they cannot kick us around, and we will not yield to pressure. The Greeks may prefer the status quo to any action on their part to legitimize the territorial

change. We have made many efforts with Karamanlis and with Mavros to get a dialogue started. Each time, the Greeks have kicked us in the teeth. The Greeks have never proposed anything which we could do something about. The last reply of Karamanlis was irrational. He said that the Turks would have to return to the August 9 line or there could be no negotiation. We do not believe that the Greeks are yet willing and there is no basis for U.S. mediation until the Greeks are ready. The settlement will have to be based on a partial withdrawal from present areas and something on refugees. The troop withdrawal question will be very tough. How do we get into this with the Greeks? The Greeks will say that they were giving us another chance to show our support using the UK as agents. Then we will be in a very false position and this before we had prepared the Turks' position. I have really no idea as to the elements of flexibility in the Greek position. The question is how to bring the parties together and we would like the UK to do this. My strong preference is for the U.S. not to do it. Basically, I think your idea of an emissary is about two weeks premature. There is some evidence that the Greeks are moving in the right direction, but the domestic structure in Greece today is such that the U.S. is still the fall guy. The army blames us, the left does not need anything—it almost won in 1967. The army is destroyed as a counterweight and is radicalized. Karamanlis is on a dangerous ledge and at some point will be driven to produce something. He certainly doesn't want to do anything for Papandreou. Karamanlis may be more reasonable later.

I will talk with the President about your proposal. I agree with your concept. It has to go this way. The solution is realistic and must go via Ankara. I am not clear where we are going to be when the UK launches its initiative in a period which we consider slightly premature and in a situation in which we cannot operate very well. We have not had a rational communication from Karamanlis, and the Greeks have given us nothing on which we can get a handle. I had no conception prior to Geneva II just what Karamanlis wanted. I am worried about the UK elections. You can send Hattersley, but can you guarantee that there will not be a break-up?

Alexander: Would you like us to get some view from London as to what the effect of the election might have on this initiative?

The Secretary: I would like to have a sense of Callaghan's timing. Is he moving toward a break-up or what?

Alexander: It is important that we stay closely in touch on all of this.

The Secretary: Callaghan will get mad at some point and the thing will stalemate. I would consider it a diplomatic achievement if there were a stalemate for four weeks without a break-up. But what would

happen then in Athens? Let's meet tomorrow.³ We will give you a time. In the meantime, I will talk with the President.⁴

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

⁴ When Kissinger met with Ford, the President agreed that the British should take the initiative. (Memorandum of conversation, August 28; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, 8/28/74)

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 9, 1974, 1915Z.

6541. Subj: Cyprus: First Caramanlis–Tyler Meeting. Ref: Athens 6507.²

1. The meeting opened promptly at ten in the morning on Monday, September 9. Present, in addition to the Prime Minister and Ambassador Tyler,³ were Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios and DCM Stearns. After welcoming Ambassador Tyler, PM Caramanlis asked what news he brought from Washington.

2. Ambassador Tyler extended to the Prime Minister greetings of the President and the Secretary and conveyed to him their admiration for Caramanlis and his government. Ambassador Tyler said that the U.S. wishes to be helpful to the PM and his government and the Secretary believes that the opportunity to exchange views afforded by Ambassador Tyler's visit is crucial to determine how this can be done. The Secretary wishes to establish close and cordial relations with the PM on a confidential basis and would welcome the PM's ideas on how to achieve this. Ambassador Kubisch will be arriving in Athens on September 19 and will bring with him the Secretary's response to any proposals that Caramanlis cares to make on this or other points.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Telegram 6507, September 9, briefly summarized this meeting. (Ibid., Box CL 284, Memoranda of Conversations/Staff and Others, 1974).

³ Kissinger sent retired Ambassador William Tyler to Athens and Wells Stabler to Ankara on informal missions in the aftermath of the second Turkish invasion. According to *Years of Renewal*, p. 235: "They were instructed to put forward a concept for a bi-zonal federation of Cyprus and a significant reduction of the Turkish-controlled areas, as well as a phased withdrawal of Turkish forces."

3. Ambassador Tyler said that he was instructed to stress the importance that U.S. attaches to close relations with the PM and his government. Greece is a respected friend and valiant ally. We warmly welcome the return of democracy to Greece and believe that our mutual interests can only be served if there is no misunderstanding between us.

4. In this spirit and for these reasons Ambassador Tyler said that he would speak with complete frankness. (To which the PM interjected, "I like that.") In doing so Ambassador Tyler was fulfilling the wish of the Secretary that Caramanlis be made fully aware of the motives, attitudes and reactions of the U.S. Government.

5. PM then asked "What is the position of your government on the Cyprus question?"

6. Ambassador Tyler replied that we wished to be helpful although the PM should realize that our ability to be helpful requires a constructive attitude on the part of the Greek Government. The US, like Greece, has its own self-respect and we do not react well to pressure tactics.

7. The PM asked what sort of pressure Ambassador Tyler had in mind.

8. Ambassador Tyler replied that our role is made more difficult if either party to the Cyprus dispute takes an anti-American stand. "If the atmosphere is poisoned by anti-Americanism," he said, "then we will have no choice but to stand aside until another opportunity arises, if it ever does." In this connection the Secretary believes that no alternative solution could be provided by the Soviet Union, a point of view which we understand Caramanlis shares.

9. Ambassador Tyler went on to say that the Secretary has always stressed the need for careful preparation before negotiations are launched. This was true of both the Indochina and Middle East negotiations. The Secretary will not act as a lawyer or advocate for any of the parties of a dispute that we are helping to resolve. Nor is he in the habit of making statements to the grandstand or of making empty promises that the U.S. cannot fulfill.

10. "How do we move from words to actions?" asked Ambassador Tyler. We must find the parameters of a solution to the Cyprus problem allowing a certain margin for negotiation. We must know the ultimate objectives of the parties before we can try to harmonize them.

11. The Prime Minister at this point observed with a smile that there were many conditions and prerequisites affecting the American role. Nevertheless, speaking seriously, he appreciated the Secretary's desire to be helpful. He asked how long Ambassador Tyler planned to remain in Athens.

12. Ambassador Tyler said that his tentative plan was to depart on Thursday, September 12, but that he could, of course, remain longer in Athens if the PM wished him to do so.

13. The PM indicated that this time frame was probably satisfactory and that he would wish to meet with Ambassador Tyler again on Tuesday, September 10. He then asked Ambassador Tyler to proceed with his presentation.

14. Ambassador Tyler said that at the Secretary's request he wished to give Caramanlis the U.S. view of events since July 15. The Secretary considered that it was important to do this because he was concerned about press reports in Athens and statements by Greek political figures that falsely alleged that the U.S. had taken an anti-Greek position in the Cyprus dispute. The Secretary understands that domestic considerations may lead a government to neutralize attacks from the left or right by preemptive statements of its own. We have, however, been stunned by some of the anti-American statements and charges emanating from Athens. The PM must realize that major decisions possibly involving the use of force could not be seriously contemplated at a time of a Presidential changeover in the U.S. "What would the Greek Government have had us do?" asked Ambassador Tyler. We refrained from taking an anti-Greek position at the time of the coup against Makarios because to have done so would have constituted an open invitation for the Turks to take military action. The PM should realize that U.S. military intervention against the Turks, with the consequences that would have ensued, was "unthinkable".

15. The PM noted that following the putsch against Makarios, world press had reported that the Secretary had expressed satisfaction because "a Mediterranean Castro" had been eliminated. Tyler denied that Secretary had said anything of the kind.

16. Ambassador Tyler observed that many of the Secretary's advisers had urged him to take an anti-Greek stand when the Junta made its move against Makarios. The Secretary rejected this advice not only because he believed such a stand would have encouraged Turkish military intervention, but also because the injection of anti-Greek bias into our policy would have destroyed our ability to be helpful later. Contrary to suggestions made inaccurately and tendentiously in the press we had no illusions about the character of the Sampson government and had not favored him. Results of the anti-Makarios coup were in any case bound to be unfavorable to Greek interests leaving behind at least temporarily no government in Cyprus and a discredited military regime in Athens. To sum up, the US did not tilt toward the Turks—the balance of forces had tilted in favor of the Turks.

17. Caramanlis laughed and said that he appreciated this exposition of the American point of view but still believed that we could have been more helpful.

18. Ambassador Tyler said that we tried to be as helpful as possible during both the first and second Geneva conferences. We were not,

however, conducting the negotiations and thus were operating in difficult circumstances. We are in fact “puzzled” by the course taken in the second Geneva conference. There was an almost exclusive concentration on the ceasefire issue without any long term proposals being put forward. Preparation for the conference had been totally inadequate with the predictable consequence that the conference was deadlocked after two days. The success of any future issues and the putting forward of specific, substantive proposals. [*sic*]

19. At this point Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios said that the latter comment was worth translating verbatim for the PM and he did so.

20. Ambassador Tyler said that the Secretary attempted during the course of the second Geneva conference to get the Turks to make specific proposals concerning possible cantonal arrangements in order to gain time. It was of course possible that the Turks had been prepared to move militarily on the island from the beginning of the conference. With this possibility in mind, the State Department issued its public statement regarding the need for greater autonomy for the Turkish community on Cyprus.⁴ This statement was made to demonstrate that there was no justification for the Turks to move militarily. The statement was not, as it was incorrectly depicted in some quarters, a tilt toward the Turks.

21. PM said that this impression was created by Turkish PM Ecevit who greeted the statement warmly and thanked the US for its “understanding”. Caramanlis commented that Ecevit made too many public declarations: “He speaks fifteen times a day—I speak once every fifteen days.”

22. Ambassador Tyler said that this was of course past history. Admitted we had not been successful in deterring the Turks. Caramanlis should accept, however, that we had not connived with them and had done our best to be even handed and helpful. More recently we have warned them that they could not make future military moves without causing public and active opposition by the US to the Turkish position with all that this implied. We do not wish events to move in this direction. We recognize that legitimate Turkish complaints exist about the treatment of the Turkish minority on Cyprus and the stupid acts of the Greek Junta. The US does not favor public condemnation of Turkey and does not believe that such condemnation would contribute to achieving a settlement of the Cyprus conflict that is both enduring and consistent with the honor and dignity of Greece.

23. Having reviewed the past, we must consider the future, Ambassador Tyler continued. We want to be helpful and we believe that our help can only be effective in the context of negotiations. We are

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 140.

prepared to use our influence in Ankara to create a climate favorable to the resumption of negotiations. The Secretary has studied very carefully the points made by the PM in his letter of August 22.⁵ He said on several occasions to Ambassador Tyler that the only solution in Cyprus that we want is one compatible with the honor and dignity of Greece and in the interests of the people of Cyprus.

24. Nevertheless, the Greeks must realize that no solution to the Cyprus problem can produce a situation which existed before July 15. (Caramanlis nodded his agreement with this point.) What the Secretary hopes will come out of our conversations in Athens is a negotiating framework within which we can plan a useful role; the Secretary wants to work out with the Greeks a common approach which can help bring about a satisfactory solution. This common approach must of course reflect the realities of the situation and not wishful thinking.

24. The Secretary wants to know what Caramanlis and his government envisage as a general outline of a solution that they can live with. The US has husbanded its influence with the Turks and is ready to use it at the appropriate time. But to use our influence effectively we must know what Greek goals are and what they regard as the outlines of a realistic settlement. If Caramanlis and his government wish to live with the status quo, that is their decision to make, but if they wish to move toward a solution we must know his position within fairly broad limits.

25. Such an outline must include at least three principal components: (A) the size of the Turkish-held area in Cyprus; (B) the size of Turkish forces and their rate of withdrawal; and (C) the refugee question.

26. Caramanlis said that a fourth component was the form of the future Cypriot Government.

27. Ambassador Tyler said that we would also be interested in Greek views on this point. Would the Greek Government accept a bizonal federal system for example? The Secretary would welcome their views.

28. Regarding procedures, the Secretary was ready to play a much more active role if this would be helpful. We would like to have Greek views on procedural questions. One approach would be direct talks between the Secretary and Caramanlis and Ecevit in Europe or in the U.S., or with Mavros and Gunes.

29. At this point in the meeting the PM asked Bitsios to telephone to the PM's office in the Parliament building to say that he would be late for his next appointment. When Bitsios had left the room, Caramanlis

⁵ Not found.

turned to Ambassador Tyler and said that he attached great importance to the current discussions.

30. When Bitsios returned, Ambassador Tyler continued with his discussion of procedures. The first phase was to begin the process of seeking a framework for a Cyprus solution. The second phase was to obtain the blessing of this framework by the guarantor powers. (At this point Caramanlis interrupted to say that the guarantor powers had ceased to exist since in addition to the parties to the conflict there were only the British who “sat back with folded arms.”) Ambassador Tyler did not comment on this interdiction by Caramanlis but said that the third procedural phase would be for the details of a settlement to be worked out in talks between the communal leaders.

31. Caramanlis then said that he could suggest an alternative negotiating procedure. Instead of direct talks with the Turks, it would be possible to have indirect negotiations through intermediaries.

32. Ambassador Tyler said that he thought we would be receptive to any approach that would lead to a practical solution. There would certainly be a need for rapid and flexible communication of confidential information, if we were to play an intermediary role of the kind suggested by the Prime Minister. We would not wish to see the mistakes of Geneva repeated. Ambassador Tyler informed Caramanlis that the Secretary planned to ask David Bruce to play a role at an appropriate time. The overall timing of negotiations was, of course, up to Caramanlis but in our view it would be easier to find a lasting solution sooner rather than later when positions had hardened.

33. Ambassador Tyler suggested that Caramanlis consider the possible advantages of broadening the scope of the negotiations. If the Aegean question were included, a package settlement might be achieved in which Greece would obtain compensations to offset whatever concessions the Greeks might have to make on Cyprus.

34. At this time the meeting concluded. The PM said that he wished to meet again with Ambassador Tyler on Tuesday, September 10, at seven in the evening.⁶

Tasca

⁶ See Document 149.

148. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 10, 1974.

CYPRUS COUP POST MORTEM

Attached is the chronology you requested of significant intelligence reporting and events leading up to the anti-Makarios coup. The conclusions seem to be:

1. Between about mid-May and mid-June, there was growing concern in Washington within the State Department (at the desk level) and in Embassy Nicosia that a confrontation between Makarios and Athens was becoming a dangerous risk; *before* any significant CIA reporting was received on a possible Ioannides-sponsored coup, the Department recommended to Ambassador Tasca that a *démarche* be made in Athens.

—In this period, for some reason, Embassy Athens resisted any approaches to the Greek Government, despite the fact that on May 29 CIA reported that Ioannides was thinking about removing Makarios.

—Apparently the Embassy made a low-key intervention on June 17 to the Cyprus desk officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry (the Department had by then acquiesced in a low-key approach).

In light of this record, it is reasonable to question whether Ioannides, who was speculating freely about his various plans, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] received what he might have construed to be a weak US response.

2. Nevertheless, the intelligence in the subsequent period through early July was erratic and probably included some deliberate misinformation from Ioannides.

—On June 19 CIA reported [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Ioannides had not made up his mind.

—On June 28 CIA reported Ioannides was working up “contingency plans” should Makarios force a showdown.

—On July 3 CIA, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], claimed that Ioannides had decided *against action to remove Makarios (sic)*.

Meanwhile:

—On June 29 the Department instructed Athens to inform Ioannides that the US would be strongly opposed to any effort to remove Makarios.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Nodis.

—On July 1 Tasca objected to this démarche.

—Tasca did, however, talk to the Greek President Ghizikis and expressed his satisfaction with Ghizikis' reiteration of Greece's attachment to the inter communal talks.

3. In the immediate pre-coup period the intelligence continued to be ambiguous; [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on July 12 reported that Ioannides felt that the removal of Makarios would lead to ramifications too explosive to ensure success (this was not received until July 15).

4. On the other hand, there was sufficient concern in the Department and in Nicosia which led to Ambassador Davies' conversations with Makarios on July 12 in which he told the Archbishop that (1) we had informed the Greek government that resort to violence would exacerbate Cyprus' problems, and (2) that the Greek government was aware of US opposition to activities that tended to threaten stability in the eastern Mediterranean. (*Comment: One can only speculate whether this information conveyed to Makarios on July 12 was too reassuring, since in fact we had made only limited and lower level interventions in Athens.*)

One cannot conclude from the attached survey that we had what could be called "warning" of an impending coup. What we did have were sufficient storm signals to warrant some diplomatic action—which, in retrospect, seems to have been weak and indecisive. Thus, it is possible that in Athens our policy was interpreted as seeming acquiescence in Ioannides' plans, especially since the Greek junta could not know of the various pulling and hauling between the Department and the Embassy.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines) not declassified]

Attachment²

THE CYPRUS CRISIS UP TO JULY 15

Rising Tension

Longstanding differences between Athens and Makarios became acute following Ioannides' seizure of power in November 1973. Ioannides regarded Makarios as overdependent on the support of the Cypriot Communist Party and dangerously beholden to the USSR. He was, moreover, frustrated by Makarios' independence from Athens' influence and by his inability to affect Nicosia's policies, particularly in the context of the intercommunal problem.

² Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Nodis.

Following the death of General Grivas in January, Ioannides launched a campaign to gain control of EOKA-B, Grivas' terrorist organization, using the Cyprus National Guard led by officers seconded from the Greek army.

For his part Makarios had long regarded the National Guard as a hotbed of subversion completely subservient to Athens and a force to be feared. He had formed the Tactical Reserve Unit as a palace guard loyal to his person. As EOKA-B violence increased, he was busy expanding and arming the TRU, but he must have been aware that it could never hope to stand up to the 10,000-man National Guard.

Tension came to a head in early May when EOKA-B guerrillas stole arms from a National Guard armory with the probable connivance of NG officers. In a letter to Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes, Makarios protested anti-Makarios activities by the NG. By mid-May the collision course had been set.

Consideration of US Démarche

On May 17 the Department proposed (103030)³ that Athens approach Greek leaders, including Ioannides, to convey US disquiet over the course of events in Cyprus. Athens (3121)⁴ on May 24 recommended against such a démarche on grounds that

—Foreign Minister Tetenes had denounced the arms theft;

—As a staunch anti-Communist who viewed Makarios as too relaxed toward Communist activities on the island, Ioannides would react negatively;

—The GOG could not be expected to take action against NG or EOKA-B activities unless the GOC distanced itself from leftist support and disbanded its armed groups;

—The démarche would be untimely because the GOG appeared to be reviewing the NG's role in Cyprus;

—A direct approach to Ioannides carried risks that could adversely affect US security interests in Greece.

On the other hand, Embassy Nicosia (1002)⁵ on May 29 endorsed an early US approach to both the military and civilian Greek leadership, arguing that NG involvement in an EOKA-B move to overthrow Makarios would prompt a forceful Turkish reaction.

On May 29 Ioannides [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that

³ Telegram 103030 to Athens, May 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

⁴ Telegram 3121 from Athens, May 24. (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 1002 from Nicosia, May 29. (Ibid.)

—Greece was capable of removing Makarios with little bloodshed and he felt that Turkey would quietly acquiesce to such a coup.

—Nevertheless, *he believed Makarios' continuation in office at least in the short run was in Greece's national interest*. He said that he had not made a decision on Greece's policy toward Cyprus, but added that in the long run Makarios would not serve Greece's interests because he was irrevocably leading Cyprus into Soviet arms.

—He could either pull Greek troops out of Cyprus and let Makarios fend for himself or remove him, but both options were distasteful and extremely dangerous.

On May 31 Embassy Athens (3289)⁶ repeated its reservations to a US *démarche*, asserting that other matters in US-Greek relations and the Aegean dispute argued against US involvement in the Athens-Nicosia tension. Athens estimated that the GOG was not so important as to risk action in Cyprus that could escalate dangerously. It said that, in any event, the initiatives should rest with the parties to the London-Zurich accords.

On June 8 the Department responded (121776)⁷ to the views of Embassies Athens and Nicosia by informing Athens that it continued "to feel that some expression of US concern in low key to GOG is desirable, but we leave this matter to your discretion."

On June 13 Embassy Athens reported that it raised the concerns contained in the Department's May 17 telegram with the Cyprus desk officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry.

Makarios Prepares

By the end of May we began receiving information of Makarios' plans for the drastic reduction of the NG and the expulsion of mainland Greek officers. During June Makarios intensified his public attacks on the NG and promised to purge the force. Meanwhile, violence on the island continued unabated and Embassy Nicosia reported that Makarios' campaign against the NG had not received widespread popular support. Many Cypriots felt that the NG was a necessary counterweight to the ambitions of the left and indispensable in a confrontation with the Turks.

On June 17 Embassy Nicosia (1153)⁸ suggested that, without furthering Makarios' efforts to establish control over the National Guard, the US should continue efforts to convince Athens that toppling Makarios would generate instability.

⁶ Telegram 3289 from Athens, May 31. (Ibid.)

⁷ Telegram 121776 to Athens and Nicosia, June 8. (Ibid.)

⁸ Telegram 1153 from Nicosia, June 17. (Ibid.)

On June 19 Ioannides [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that

—He had not made up his mind on whether to pull out of Cyprus completely or remove Makarios and then deal directly with Turkey over the future of the island.

—He believed Makarios had chosen this period of Greek-Turkish tension over the Aegean to consolidate his power and destroy Greek influence in Cyprus.

—“The Turks would agree to the removal of their archfoe, Makarios,” but if not, he would propose an all-encompassing agreement to settle all outstanding problems between Greece and Turkey. His terms amounted to Turkish capitulation in Cyprus and the Aegean.

—He felt the only major obstacle to an agreement along those lines would be the uncertain reaction of the USSR.

—He suspected that the US would favor a Greek-Turkish agreement that would remove all points of friction.

On June 24 Tasca (Athens 3936)⁹ expressed increasing concern over the developing crisis in Cyprus. He thought it probable that the initial stage of a head-on collision between Makarios and Ioannides had begun. He continued to oppose a US *démarche* to Athens, noting that this would appear to question the announced Greek policy of support for the intercommunal talks and opposition to all violence on Cyprus. Instead Tasca recommended US approaches to the UN and NATO Secretaries General to encourage them to work directly with the London–Zurich signatories. On June 25 Embassy Ankara (5012)¹⁰ concurred wholeheartedly with Tasca’s recommendation.

Agreeing with the gravity of the situation as posed by Tasca and that a formal US *démarche* was not desirable at that time, Embassy Nicosia (1224)¹¹ stated on June 27 that Makarios’ confrontation was with Ioannides and the NG, not with EOKA–B. Nicosia felt that Ankara was likely to react quickly against an “*enosist coup*.” *The Embassy proposed that Ambassador Davies warn Makarios of the dangers of confrontation in his initial interview and stressed that Ioannides “should be reached,”* adding that “Any help NATO can provide is fine, but we wonder if Luns has all the arguments at his fingertips.”

The CIA reported June 28 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Ioannides [*less than 1 line not declassified*] he would continue taking action to thwart Makarios’ tactical moves while developing with his advisers

⁹ Telegram 3936 from Athens, June 24. (Ibid.)

¹⁰ Document 76.

¹¹ Telegram 1224 from Nicosia, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

a contingency plan should Makarios force Greece into a showdown situation. In its NID of June 29 the CIA noted that Ioannides had speculated the previous week on the possibility of removing Makarios and entering into an “all-encompassing” agreement with Ankara, but that he considered such a move dangerous and was unlikely to attempt it soon unless Makarios pressed the NG issue too far.

On June 29, against a background of increasingly sharp *démarches* between Nicosia and Athens over the National Guard, the Department (141500)¹² instructed Ambassador Tasca to inform Ioannides that the US would be strongly opposed to any effort to remove Makarios from power by violent means. Tasca in his reply July 1 (4179)¹³ objected to such a *démarche* and recommended waiting until Ambassador Davies could provide an assessment following his initial contacts with Makarios and other Cypriot personalities. He contended that

—the GOG was fully aware of the US opposition to any resort to violence and support for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through intercommunal talks;

—he had expressed this US position the previous week to Archbishop Seraphim, who is close to President Ghizikis and Ioannides;

—he would “again refer to our interest in a peaceful settlement” when he would see Ghizikis the following day.

Subsequently Ambassador Tasca reported (4254)¹⁴ that in his July 2 conversation with Ghizikis he expressed his satisfaction at the reiteration of Greece’s attachment to the intercommunal talks and opposition to violence. He felt that his conversation would be reported to Ioannides.

No additional cabled instructions were sent to Athens, but in the following days Department officers were in telephone communication with Embassy Athens for specific information on how the US position had been conveyed to Greek leaders. In its cable of July 11 (4378)¹⁵ Embassy Athens stated that in addition to Tasca’s approaches, noted above, other Embassy elements had “used their own channels to convey the US position against any resort to violence on Cyprus.” The Embassy added CIA information that upon learning of Tasca’s meeting with Ghizikis, Ioannides said that Tasca’s “policy line with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean controversy was particularly pleasing.”

¹² Document 77.

¹³ Telegram 4179 from Athens, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

¹⁴ Telegram 4254 from Athens, July 3. (Ibid.)

¹⁵ Telegram 4378 from Athens, July 11. (Ibid.)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] stated on July 3 that Ioannides had decided, for the time being, against action to remove Makarios because of

- the uncertainty of Soviet reaction and
- fear that Turkey might misinterpret the move.

On July 2 Makarios wrote to Ghizikis formally announcing his plan to reduce the National Guard drastically and demanding the recall of the mainland Greek officers. Makarios released the contents to the public. On that day INR commented in the Secretary's Summary that Makarios' decision to expel over 90 percent of the mainland officers would precipitate a confrontation with the Ioannides regime.

On July 5 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reported that Prime Minister Androustopoulos confided that Athens would attempt to persuade Makarios to postpone his plans. Androustopoulos' tone was conciliatory. In its NID of July 8 CIA estimated that the GOG would try to stall attempts by Makarios to reduce the number of mainland officers and thus buy time. In the Secretary's Summary of July 7 INR thought that Makarios was likely to feel that Athens' argument for not immediately complying with his request to remove the officers was only a ruse to keep Greek forces on the island. According to the INR comment, his suspicions would be heightened by Athens claim that it could not control anti-Makarios activities by Greek nationals.

On July 5 Tetenes and the two next highest officials of the Foreign Ministry resigned. The CIA had reported on June 21 [*document number not declassified*]¹⁶ that Tetenes had urged an accommodating stance toward Makarios, and the resignation may have been over his failure to dissuade Ioannides from action.

In a conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary Stabler on July 9 (150100)¹⁷ Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou referred to Makarios' letter and opined that Greece "won't take this lying down." He speculated that Athens might withdraw the NG completely and recall its ambassador.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reported on July 11 that Makarios' response to Androustopoulos' request for a delay in the implementation of the Archbishop's NG plans was negative. Androustopoulos said that extremes should be avoided and a compromise sought. In its NID of July 11 the CIA stated that *an attempt by the Greek junta to remove Makarios could not be ruled out.*

¹⁶ Not found.

¹⁷ Telegram 150100 to Nicosia, July 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

On July 11, reacting to Nicosia's proposal of June 27, the Department instructed (150449)¹⁸ Ambassador Davies to comment as follows in a scheduled meeting with Makarios if he should raise the subject of Greece–Cyprus relations:

—the US has informed the GOG that resort to violence would exacerbate Cyprus' problems;

—the GOG is aware of US opposition to activities that tend to threaten stability in the eastern Mediterranean, peaceful relations among our allies, and the single, sovereign, and independent status of Cyprus;

—the US hopes that issues between Cyprus and Greece can be resolved in a manner consistent with Cyprus' sovereignty, independence, and security and with the interests of stability in the region.

Davies conveyed this information to Makarios on July 12.

On the same day [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reported the statement of a Soviet diplomat in Athens that a strong Soviet *démarche* would be sent to the GOG warning against interference in Cyprus.

On July 13 in the Secretary's Summary INR said that since receiving Makarios' letter demanding the recall of most of the mainland officers, Athens had reacted moderately, but the Ioannides regime was capable of an attempt to remove Makarios.

Information obtained by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on July 12, received by the Department on July 15, purported that Ioannides felt removal of Makarios at this time would lead to ramifications too explosive to ensure success. Ioannides added that on July 12 a reduction of 100 mainland officers from the NG would be ordered.

As the record shows, there was ample intelligence prior to the July 15 coup of the heightening tension developing between the Greek and Cypriot governments. Although much of it was conflicting, and even intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannides.

Ioannides may well have read into the US warnings that reached him primary concern over intercommunal violence. (According to a CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] [TDFIBDB-315/06765-74],¹⁹ when asked immediately after the coup about foreign reaction, Ioannides replied, "the Americans are okay.") He could have concluded that he had a free hand, insofar as the United States was concerned, as long as his gambit was intra-Greek. Indeed, immediately following the coup on July 15, the Sampson government was at pains to reassure the Turkish Cypriot community.

¹⁸ Telegram 150449 to Nicosia, July 11. (Ibid.)

¹⁹ Not found. Brackets in the original.

It may be relevant to point out that during the months of spring and early summer our attention was fixed on the Aegean dispute as the arena that would most readily ignite into Greek-Turkish hostilities. Although we felt that Cyprus would inevitably be dragged into such a conflict, we were less certain that Cyprus would be the flash point. Perhaps as a consequence, our sensitivities to Cyprus-related events were less sharp than they should have been. Be it noted, however, that our reasoning was shared by Makarios. He undoubtedly decided to use the opportunity of what he thought would be Ioannides' preoccupation with Turkey to assert control over the NG. He miscalculated only in that he greatly overestimated Ioannides' understanding of Turkish imperatives.

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 11, 1974, 0040Z.

6587. Subject: Cyprus: Second Caramanlis-Tyler Meeting.

1. The second meeting began at seven in the evening on Tuesday, September 10. It lasted one hour and forty minutes. Present in addition to Prime Minister Caramanlis and Ambassador Tyler were Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios and DCM Stearns.

2. Following preliminary discussion of press inquiries on the Tyler visit (septel),² Ambassador Tyler opened the discussion by saying that he wished to clarify his remarks at the first meeting on the subject of negotiating procedures.³ He wished to emphasize that Secretary Kissinger did not envisage direct Caramanlis-Ecevit or Mavros-Gunes talks in the initial stages of negotiations. What the Secretary had in mind were indirect talks. These could be conducted through the Secretary himself or another intermediary in whom both sides had confidence. Ambassador Tyler said that the Secretary did not insist that he be personally involved. Although he was ready to be involved if the

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 284, Memoranda of Conversations, Staff and Others, 1974. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Telegram 6586 from Athens, September 10. (Ibid., Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus)

³ Kissinger sent Tyler instructions on this issue in telegram 197320 to Athens, September 9. (Ibid.)

parties thought this would be helpful. The Secretary would welcome Greek views on this point.

3. Caramanlis responded by saying that he agreed that indirect talks were advisable. He could not participate in a summit meeting unless the way were prepared in advance through indirect negotiations.

4. Ambassador Tyler said that indirect talks could be conducted in various ways. The Secretary could, for example, meet with Caramanlis and Ecevit separately on successive days in the same city. Rome or Vienna might be appropriate locations but there were of course other possibilities. Alternatively, if it were impractical for Caramanlis and Ecevit to be present in the same city, the Secretary might meet with Caramanlis in Corfu and then proceed to Ankara to see Ecevit.

5. Caramanlis repeated that advance preparation was essential from his point of view. Some preliminary progress would have to be made and a more favorable climate created before he, Ecevit and the Secretary began to tackle the problem.

6. Ambassador Tasca observed that a third, perhaps less desirable way, of conducting indirect talks would be in New York with Mavros and Gunes during the UN General Assembly session. If indirect talks at the Foreign Minister level were to take place, however, the Secretary believed that the two Foreign Ministers would have to be authorized to conduct the same kind of discussions that would have taken place at the Prime Minister level.

7. Caramanlis repeated that he could not engage in substantive negotiations, whether direct or indirect, without advance preparation. He then commented that he would like to describe to Ambassador Tyler the Greek Government's perspective on the present crisis and the events which led up to it.

8. Caramanlis began by saying that he appreciated the Secretary's initiative and was grateful to Ambassador Tyler for undertaking the current mission to which Caramanlis attached great importance. Ambassador Tyler had been frank in his exposition of American views—the Prime Minister would be equally candid.

9. Tyler had spoken of "pressure tactics" and anti-Americanism in Greece. The Prime Minister did not engage in blackmail. He was guided solely by Greek national interests. When he expressed disappointment with American policy, this was not a maneuver. His statements reflected genuine Greek conviction that there was a lack of understanding in Washington of the Greek position and of Greek interests. Caramanlis had deliberately refused to inflame Greek public opinion against the U.S. He was a man of moderation and had proved this by the tone of his statements. He had repeatedly advised the Greek people to remain calm. He had warned the press against irresponsible rumor-mongering. Under the circumstances, his criticism of American

policy had been the least he could do and was a sincere expression of his feelings and those of the Greek people.

10. Caramanlis said, "When I returned to Greece, I found anti-American sentiments here: I did not create them." These sentiments were generated both by popular disappointment with American policy on Cyprus and by a general feeling that the U.S. Government had supported the Greek military regime. Popular bitterness increased as the Turks continued their military operations on Cyprus and there was still no effective American reaction.

11. "I am a friend of the U.S. by conviction," said Caramanlis, "and I am the first to regret anti-Americanism. I believe that in their hearts the Greek people still think that the U.S. will help them." The Prime Minister added that he would try to maintain the moderate tone of his popular pronouncements. However, if the Turks were to remain inflexible, his tone would have to change.

12. "You know the recent history of the Cyprus conflict," Caramanlis continued. "The junta made a stupid mistake in trying to purge Makarios and they later claimed to have been encouraged by Washington." The PM believed that the attempted coup could have been prevented by Washington and London. The British had both the right and the duty under the London-Zurich accords to act to protect the independence and legitimacy of Cyprus. They failed to do so. The Turks took advantage of the junta's stupidity to execute a plan that had been prepared beforehand. Caramanlis believed that the Americans and British could have prevented both the junta's coup against Makarios and the Turkish landings in Cyprus. If the U.S. was genuinely concerned about anti-Americanism in Greece, Washington should admit that it had followed the wrong policy and help find a solution to the Cyprus crisis which the Greek Government and the Greek people could accept. If this were done, the bitterness of Greeks toward the U.S. would gradually fade.

13. Continuing with his presentation the PM said that even if the initial Turkish landing on Cyprus were construed to have been justified by the junta's coup against Makarios—a contention Caramanlis did not accept—the second phase of the Turkish military actions was totally inexcusable and clearly expansionist. The Turkish beachhead after their initial landings was roughly four to five percent of the land area of Cyprus. The Turks accepted a ceasefire and negotiations in Geneva. Their action in establishing the Atilla line was a "premeditated crime."

14. The Prime Minister then proceeded to review the course of events at the second Geneva conference. He said that the Turks had proposed a plan which was unacceptable to the Greek Government. Nevertheless, the Greek Government requested a delay of twenty-four

hours to study the Turkish proposal because of the lack of a Turkish response to the Greek request. The twenty-four hours became thirty-six hours. Secretary Kissinger had called the PM at two in the morning asking him to keep Mavros and the Greek delegation in Geneva. The PM had done so and had then found himself faced with a Turkish ultimatum. The Turks launched their attack at five in the morning. Thus, summarized Caramanlis, there was no shred of a pretext for their second military offensive. He said, "It was an attempt to kill my government and they did it under the eyes of the Americans." For these reasons the PM believed that the U.S. had made mistakes both of omission and commission. We must begin to take the initiatives necessary to remedy the situation. Faced with the threat of Turkish military action in Cyprus, the U.S. might have reacted as it had in 1964. The U.S. had ways and means of stopping the Turks without intervening militarily. Not only had we failed to act along the lines of our 1964 policy, we did not even give moral satisfaction to the Greeks by condemning publicly what the Turks had done.

15. Greece had shown moderation in its Cyprus policy since 1960, Caramanlis said. He personally had taken the lead in this by signing the London–Zurich accords. He had formally relinquished the goal of enosis which had great popular appeal in Greece. As PM he had signed these accords in 1960 despite Greek public opinion and in order to preserve Greek-Turkish friendship. He had been similarly moderate in the present crisis when he told the Greek people frankly that Greece could not fight the Turks on Cyprus. It was not a question of winning or losing. Greek military action against Turkey would have been extremely popular even if the Greeks were unable to defeat the Turks in the field. Instead of calling for military action against Turkey the PM had shown moderation and had called for a peaceful effort to achieve a just settlement of the Cyprus problem.

16. But, said Caramanlis, this Greek restraint could not continue indefinitely in the face of Turkish provocations. Cyprus would become a "volcano" if nothing was done to redress the situation. The peace of the area would be endangered and the Soviet Union would seize the opportunity to involve itself in the crisis and increase its influence in the region. Caramanlis said he was not making a threat. This was his realistic appraisal of the dangers. If Greece continued to be humiliated by the Turks, Greece would have to go to war. "I would have to go to war or leave the country. I was welcomed back to Greece as a savior. I could not let my own people down." War, of course, would be a catastrophe but there would be no other choice. And if war occurred, others would inevitably be involved. These were not empty words or blustering threats. If an honorable solution to the Cyprus problem was not found, the PM saw these as the inevitable consequences of a problem that would continue to fester. This was the way the Greek Government

saw the Cyprus situation and Caramanlis wanted the U.S. to understand its point of view.

17. Ambassador Tyler said that he would faithfully report to Secretary Kissinger what the PM had said. He would, however, like to comment on some of the allegations made by Caramanlis. The PM should not deceive himself into believing that the U.S. was laboring under a sense of guilt. The President and the Secretary believed that we had done everything that we could do to avert the crisis. We had no intention of admitting "mistakes" because we did not accept that we had made mistakes. At this point in the meeting Defense Minister Averoff called the PM and, at the request of Caramanlis, Bitsios left the room to take the call. In his absence Caramanlis remarked, "We really have different viewpoints on this particular issue. I sincerely believe that you could have done more." Ambassador Tyler replied that the PM must believe that the President and the Secretary were convinced that we had done all we could. If Caramanlis really believed that we had encouraged the junta, as Ambassador Tyler had understood him to say, then the PM was wrong. Washington accepted no responsibility for the stupidity of the junta.

18. When Bitsios reappeared, Ambassador Tyler repeated to the Prime Minister that our desire to be helpful in resolving the Cyprus crisis in a way that would be consistent with Greece's honor and dignity was not just rhetoric. The U.S. was sincerely and deeply desirous of being helpful, not to expiate "guilt" but because peace in the area and the interests of our friends were important to us. Ambassador Tyler would not wish the PM to think that he was coming to him as a supplicant.

19. Caramanlis laughed at this and said, "I don't ask that you come as a supplicant. I understand that you do not accept any imputation of guilt. There is a difference of viewpoint between our two countries. That is all."

20. Ambassador Tyler said that the Cyprus dispute involved high stakes. He had noted the PM's remarks about the dangers that would result if no satisfactory solution were found. He had noted the PM's remarks about exploitation of the Cyprus problem and finally, he had noted that Caramanlis was not making threats but giving his honest appreciation of the situation. He would report these things to the Secretary. Meanwhile, he hoped that the PM understood that Tyler's mission reflected the serious interest of the U.S. and our desire to help the parties to the Cyprus dispute move toward a settlement that both could live with.

21. The PM said that Bitsios would outline the Greek position on a Cyprus solution. Before he did so Caramanlis wanted to make two preliminary points. The Turks must stop presenting Greece with faits

accomplis and cease their provocations. Greek refugees were arriving in Greece who had been forced out of Turkish-controlled Cyprus and elsewhere. There were 130,000 Turks in Western Thrace. Greek public opinion would favor forcing them to return to Turkey. Caramanlis would resist this pressure but could not do so indefinitely without clear signs of Turkish flexibility.

22. Bitsios then read aloud the text of what he and Caramanlis characterized as an “unofficial” statement of the Greek position on a possible Cyprus solution (text was subsequently handed to us and is being transmitted by septe).⁴

23. When Bitsios had completed reading the paper, Caramanlis asked Tyler whether he wished to comment on the substance of the Greek position. The PM emphasized that Greece accepted the Turkish claim of federation but that it had to be on a reasonable basis.

24. Ambassador Tyler replied that he would refrain from commenting on the Greek position but, if the Prime Minister was interested, would outline Washington’s preliminary estimate of what a settlement might look like. He would of course fully report the Greek position as given in the informal document which Bitsios had read.

25. Caramanlis then said that during the first meeting Ambassador Tyler had mentioned a possible package deal. The US should realize that, as far as Greece was concerned, Cyprus was the outstanding problem. In the Greek view any other problems were covered by existing treaties. It was the Turks who complained about “other problems”, not Greeks. Nevertheless, if progress were made toward a Cyprus settlement, the Greek Government would have no objection to discussing other subjects with the Turks.

26. Bitsios then amplified Greek views on the problem of the minorities in Greece and Turkey. He said that at the time of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924 there were roughly 100,000 Greeks in Istanbul and 100,000 Turks in western Thrace. Today there were –[less than] 30,000 Turks in western Thrace and only ten to fifteen thousand Greeks in Istanbul. The Turkish Government must stop agitating this issue just as they must stop agitating the Cyprus issue.

27. Caramanlis repeated that if the Turks were not persuaded to control their actions in Cyprus a “catastrophe” would not be easy to avert. Turkish military actions had given them a superiority complex. They had become arrogant. If they did not adopt a more reasonable attitude the joint efforts of Greece and the US would be in vain.

28. The group then discussed the question of press interest in the Tyler visit. This part of the discussion has been reported in septe.

⁴ Document 150.

29. Caramanlis then turned to Ambassador Tyler and said again that he hoped that the initiative being taken by the US would bring results. Secretary Kissinger had enjoyed spectacular success in reconciling enemies. It ought to be easier to reconcile allies. He requested Tyler to convey his greeting to the Secretary and said that the Greek Government looked forward with keen interest to Washington's reaction to current discussions and to the Greek point of view.

30. Ambassador Tyler observed that Ambassador Kubisch, a close friend of the Secretary who had worked with him for three years, would be arriving in Athens on September 19 and could at that time provide Washington reaction. Tyler asked whether the Greek Government wished to be advised of Washington's reaction before September 19.

31. Caramanlis said that he would appreciate receiving word from Washington as soon as possible. This was particularly important in view of the fact that debate on the Cyprus problem was imminent in the UN General Assembly and this would almost certainly lead to exchanges of recriminations and worsening of climate for negotiations. If the Secretary's reaction to the Greek position on Cyprus as set forth in the PM's talks with Ambassador Tyler led the Greek Government to believe that progress was possible, Caramanlis could ask the Cypriots to delay General Assembly debate on the Cyprus issue.

32. Ambassador Tyler asked whether Caramanlis wished to meet with him again. Caramanlis smiled and said that personally he would be glad to but that in view of the apparent leak about the Tyler mission he thought it would be difficult to have another meeting. Furthermore, it appeared to the PM that all of the main ground had been covered in the first two meetings.

33. Ambassador Tyler said that since this would be the final meeting, he would like, with the PM's permission, to outline the Secretary's preliminary estimate of a possible Cyprus settlement. In the Secretary's view, some kind of bizonal federal arrangement seemed the most practical framework. (Caramanlis remarked that, "we accept this idea, although the Greek Cypriots do not.") Ambassador Tyler continued by saying that we envisaged some reduction in the area of Turkish control and important reductions in the size of the Turkish forces. (Bitsios said that if we envisaged Turkish troops remaining on Cyprus after a final settlement was achieved, this would not be compatible with Cypriot sovereignty.) Ambassador Tyler said that as far as the refugee problem was concerned we believed that there would be the return of some refugees to their homes but probably a fairly sizeable exchange of populations as well.

34. The PM asked whether these were Secretary Kissinger's views on a final settlement.

35. Ambassador Tyler said that they were his preliminary estimates at this time. Of course, any bizonal federal solution would have to be accepted by the two communities on the island if it were to work. Two final points that Ambassador Tyler wished to make on behalf of the Secretary were that a successful U.S. mediatory role would require careful preparation and the confidence of the parties involved in the dispute.

36. Bitsios said that the Turks had accepted a solution based on the independence of Cyprus. A bizonal solution would verge on partition. It would amount to *de facto* rather than *de jure* partition. How would it work in practice? Would a Greek Cypriot need a passport to cross the “frontier” between the two zones?

37. The PM observed that the Turks had claimed that they had landed troops in Cyprus to protect its independence and sovereignty. Bizonal arrangements seemed to qualify Cypriot sovereignty and he wondered whether the Turks had further expansionist aims. If the outline of an eventual settlement provided by Ambassador Tyler represented Secretary Kissinger’s point of departure as a mediator, Caramanlis was not particularly optimistic about the chances of success. Bitsios commented that bizonal arrangements would raise qualitative as well as quantitative questions. The northern part of the island presently occupied by the Turks represented eighty per cent or more of the productive capacity and wealth of Cyprus. Tyler repeated that he had given only a preliminary appraisal.

38. In conclusion Caramanlis said that Greek Government was aware that it would have to make concessions, but, “we will not let the Turks have everything they want.” In 1960 the Greeks had abandoned enosis and accepted the independence of Cyprus. In 1974, the Greeks were prepared to accept modifications of the 1960 structure and the creation of a federal system of government in Cyprus. It was not realistic to expect the Greek Government to go further than that. If a “solution” was arrived at which humiliated the Greek Government or proved impossible for Greek Cypriots to live with, it would not last.

39. The meeting ended with a friendly exchange of greetings and farewells at 8:45 p.m.

Tasca

150. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 11, 1974, 0045Z.

6588. Subject: Cyprus. Ref: Athens 6587.²

1. Following text of unofficial statement of Greek position on possible Cyprus solution handed Tyler by Caramanlis during second meeting, Tuesday, September 9. (See Athens 6587 numbered paragraph 22):

"1. Having occupied 40 per cent of Cyprus territory by force of arms Turkey demanded the resumption of negotiations. Having behind them the bitter experience of the Turkish Foreign Minister's behavior in Geneva, the Greek Government requested that Turkey, in order to prove her good faith and her willingness to negotiate in a conciliatory spirit, make certain gestures before any direct negotiations are initiated.

These pre-conditions were:

A. That the Turkish forces withdraw to the line drawn on August 9, 1974, or, at least, north of the Piroi area and of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road;

B. That the masses of refugees who have fled to southern Cyprus be allowed to return to their homes in safety.

If Turkey continues to ask for direct negotiations, the request regarding fulfillment of the said pre-conditions is maintained.

2. If, on the other hand, Turkey accepted the initiation of a dialogue through a third power, substantive issues could be tackled at once. The basis for such an exchange of views could be the federative organization of the Cypriot state under the following conditions:

A. The Turkish area would correspond approximately to the percentage of the Turkish Cypriot population;

B. No exchange of populations would take place;

C. Refugees would return to their homes where they would be allowed to reside in safety;

D. The federal government would have substantive powers effectively ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Republic of Cyprus would be demilitarized following the conclusion of a final agreement. An effective system of international guarantees would be set up to preclude a repetition of the invasion of the island by Turkish forces.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Document 149.

3. Should a convergence of views occur on the fundamental points mentioned above, Greece would have no objection, if such were Turkey's wish, for talks to be held in Nicosia between Messrs. Clerides and Denktash, under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and in the presence of the Ambassadors of Greece and Turkey, to draft in detail the text of the new constitution of Cyprus.

4. The future of Cyprus is only one of the difficulties created by Turkey in her relations with Greece. A separate agreement on Cyprus would not by itself substantially improve Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey has of late followed an aggressive foreign policy aimed at expanding her influence over the Aegean and over western Thrace. There have been several indications that these explosive issues, although momentarily overshadowed by developments in Cyprus, are very much alive and are likely to be raised by Turkey as soon as the question of Cyprus has been settled. Therefore, the Greek Government takes the view that if durable peace and stability are to return to the area, the Greek-Turkish relationship ought to be reconsidered in its entirety now, with a view to eliminating all points of friction between the two countries."

Tasca

151. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, September 12, 1974, 1800Z.

3066. Subj: Clerides–Denktash Private Meeting, Sept 11. Re: Nicosia 3052.²

1. Sensitive UNFICYP source (existence of which must be fully protected) has given us in strictest confidence advance read-out on private Denktash–Clerides meeting which followed Sept 11 "humanitarian talks" (reftel). Dept requested give this information fullest Nodis/Noform protection, preferably with no lateral dissemination.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus to Secretary of State, Nodis 2. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Noform.

² In telegram 3052 from Nicosia, September 12, the Embassy reported on the Clerides–Denktash "humanitarian talks" of September 11 that concentrated on prisoner/detainee releases by both sides. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

2. Source said both Clerides and Denktash sense imperative need to move ASAP toward political agreement. At Clerides' suggestion, they agreed to bring maps with proposed demarcation lines to Sept 13 meeting, in effort agree on extent of Turkish zone, or possibly of cantons. They will also review powers of future federal GOCyprus over Turkish areas.

3. Source said both men continue to talk as Cypriots interested primarily in welfare of whole island. They spoke in terms of allowing some minorities to remain in/return to emergent zones. Denktash strongly hinted that demarcation line would (1) run north of Morphou, thus giving back large part of valuable plantation area to Greek Cypriots, and (2) allow Greeks return to new Famagusta. Clerides implied willingness allow Turk Cypriots move north freely to enclave, once this happens. Denktash further suggested Turk Army not on island to stay. Throughout, he showed great sensitivity for Clerides' delicate position vis-à-vis Greek/Greek Cypriot elements.

4. According source, both men acknowledged mutual interest in keeping Makarios off island. They agreed that their efforts to find Cyprus solution would suffer greatly if Makarios returned to island politicking, or made foray to UNGA. (Source said that discussion had addressed latter contingency as probable, not definite.)

5. *Comment:* If accurate (and source generally impeccable), above account suggests that Nicosia talks are moving quickly into key substantive issues. *End comment.*

6. From UNFICYP agenda for Sept 13 meeting, it looks as if "humanitarian talks" continue gather momentum. Meeting will consider: educational facilities for both communities; ICRC's general plan for release prisoners/detainees; special case of over-50 group (which raises prospect of large northward trek by Turk Cypriots if family heads allowed to go there); family reunification; agricultural matters (such as feeding of abandoned livestock); date for implementing points agreed Sept 11 (reftel), and use of Nicosia airport for relief operations purposes.

Crawford

152. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹**

Washington, September 28, 1974, 1848Z.

214632. Subject: Secretary's Message for Clerides. Ref: Nicosia 3361.² From the Secretary for the Ambassador. Deliver to Ambassador 8 am September 29.

1. Please see Clerides as soon as possible and give him the following oral message from me.

Begin message: The Secretary wants Clerides to know that the President and he have been following with great interest and admiration his efforts over the past week to promote a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. The Secretary has been informed by Ambassador Crawford of Clerides' belief that his discussions with Denktash on humanitarian issues can be enlarged to encompass negotiations on the basic political issues which are of interest to the two communities in Cyprus. The United States fully supports the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash. We believe these negotiations provide the best prospect for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem and hope that Clerides will continue to play the active and constructive role which has already earned him such a measure of respect. The Secretary met with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey in New York last week³ and he will be seeing them again early next week. The Secretary was gratified to find that they too support the efforts that Clerides and Denktash have been making and agree with us that the talks in Nicosia should be encouraged to move ahead on substantive issues.

When the Secretary meets again with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey he will reaffirm to them our strong support for Clerides' efforts. At that time he will restate our view that nothing should be done at the UN or elsewhere that would weaken Clerides' leadership of the Cyprus Government or diminish prospects for the success of his negotiations. In particular the Secretary will stress again

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 2, Cyprus, Nodis 1. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and Stabler, cleared by Hartman, and approved by the Secretary. Repeated Immediate to Athens, Ankara, and London.

² Dated September 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

³ Kissinger met with Mavros on September 24. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, External) For Kissinger's meeting with Gunes, see Document 210.

to the Greek Foreign Minister the need to urge Archbishop Makarios to take no action that could prejudice the continuing efforts in Nicosia. Finally the Secretary wants Clerides to know that he remains in close direct touch with Athens and Ankara in his search for flexibility and progress in the Cyprus issue. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. *End message.*

Kissinger

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 29, 1974, 7 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister George Mavros

GREEK PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister George Mavros
 UN Permanent Representative Karayiannis
 Ambassador to the U.S. Alexandrakis
 Ambassador Tzounis, Director
 General for Political Affairs
 Mr. C. Yerocostopoulos, Attaché, MFA

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
 Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
 Assistant Secretary Arthur A.
 Hartman
 Mr. William Eagleton, EUR/SE
 (Notetaker)

Mavros: I have talked with Makarios. In his UNGA speech he will talk about Turkish aggression. He will oppose single geographic divisions, which would mean an exchange of populations and would lead to partition and double enosis and the end of Cyprus independence. There is a possibility of a geographic federation not with one but with several cantons and without much exchange of population. The majority of the Turks would be in five, six, seven or eight cantons.

The Secretary: How did the Turks and Greeks get together on the same island?

Mavros: They must live together on the island. The division of the island into two might be an impossibility. Makarios believes the solution could be found in a larger body, but not necessarily the Soviet proposal. Still, it could be a wider body within the framework of the UN.

The Secretary has told us he is going to Ankara on the 14th.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Memoranda of Conversations, External. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers.

The Secretary: That depends on the situation in Turkey.

Mavros: The first thing in Ankara should be the refugee problem and the possibility of sending 50,000 of them to Famagusta.

The Secretary: I have not had any exchanges with the Turks yet. The tragedy is that the Turks' proposal to us on August 8 would only have had them take the Turkish part of Famagusta and they only wanted two-thirds of what they have now. Was it ever presented in Geneva? If you had been willing to give them their northern canton they would have held off.

Mavros: My impression from Callaghan was that the Turks had already decided on military action.

The Secretary: This proposal was not taken to the conference?

Mavros: No. Gunes was proceeding on the basis of an ultimatum. We had the impression a military move was imminent.

The Secretary: I would be amazed if they would let 50,000 back to Famagusta before negotiations began. When I suggest is we get some troop withdrawal, some return of refugees, and I don't know what else.

Mavros: And what in exchange? If they want their people to go to occupy the homes of the Greeks it would be accepting a mass exchange and it would cause a terrible refugee problem.

The Secretary: I don't have details in mind but I have the impression they want an exchange of population.

Mavros: But with many small cantons they would not need such an exchange.

The Secretary: This is not likely though.

Mavros: Makarios knows how a number of cantons could encompass the Turkish population. No Greek Government could accept anything except something near the percentage of the Turkish population, and with a number of cantons. The way the problem should be put to the Turks is this: Do you want a just and fair solution? Ambassador Tzounis feels from talking to Makarios that he thinks this multi-cantonal solution is fair.

Tzounis: He thinks this is fair.

The Secretary: It is impossible. If Makarios wants a big conference we will do as the others do. It will lead to a stalemate and no results.

When I saw Makarios in July² he did not want any cantons. If he had wanted them we might have proposed it. He wanted the Constitution of 1960 which is unworkable. I believe the outcome will be a

² See Document 124.

federal solution with one Turkish canton in the north. The size could be negotiated as well as the nature of the federal system. But cantons of small size do not seem practical.

Mavros: Gunes proposed five cantons in Geneva.

Tzounis: The main canton was 17% of the island.

The Secretary: He wanted that one at once. Maybe the others would not have come into being. Ecevit told us if you (the Greeks) would agree to let the Turks occupy 17% there would be time to negotiate about the remainder. He gave us a map.

Mavros: Gunes produced a scheme for 34%.

Tzounis: The large area with 17% and the smaller cantons would total another 17%.

The Secretary: My impression is we could have negotiated at that time and kept them with the northern canton and little else.

Mavros: What do you think his position is today?

The Secretary: I have avoided pressing them on this without knowing your position. I don't want to be the whipping boy. If I make a proposal the Greek politicians will object. My impression is the Turks want a bizonal system.

Karayiannis: Is it your impression that what you could eventually work out would be less or more than the Turks proposed in July?

The Secretary: That is a good question. If I had been in good communication with your government in August I could have assured you an outcome less than they offered. Now I think it is hard to resurrect the proposal of August. Now we have the present zone but it can be reduced.

Karayiannis: But do you think we would be asked to give more than we were asked to give in Geneva?

The Secretary: I don't yet have a judgment. I would try to get the best terms possible. It might be possible to get less than 34%, but that would probably be one area. I have not yet had a serious discussion with the Turks.

Mavros: If Makarios says this is a betrayal it will cause a problem.

The Secretary: I agree. We should try to find an acceptable solution.

Mavros: We hope not to make Cyprus a political issue in the elections.

The Secretary: Sending 50,000 Greeks to Famagusta is not possible. If I have to say he does that before negotiations it is impossible. I don't exclude that by the end 50,000 will return but it is next to impossible at the beginning.

Mavros: In the present state of affairs with elections we will want at least to prevent a deterioration of the situation.

The Secretary: Yes. We can prevent deterioration and I can in Ankara bring some symbolic gesture, some refugees to return and some troop withdrawal.

Mavros: They will ask something in exchange.

The Secretary: My recommendation to Ecevit will be the gestures should be made without reciprocity. But I do not want every Greek politician to attack me for not doing enough. Why should we exert ourselves to be the whipping boy of Greek politics?

Sisco: It is important in connection with your trip that our Greek friends understand what is realistically possible so that there will be no misunderstanding.

The Secretary: I think it is possible to get symbolic gestures.

Mavros: You don't think 50,000 to Famagusta is symbolic?

The Secretary: For the Turks that is a major substantive concession. They might give it at the end but not at the beginning. I reminded Ecevit in the cable³ that his original suggestion did not include Greek Famagusta. He did not give a forthcoming reply.

What could happen is the Turks make symbolic concessions, show their recognition of certain problems, then the two communities could get to the main problems. We could agree on some principles.

Mavros: We do not want the Greek press to be anti-American. We have talked to them and they promised. But I don't think they could take the action of August 8 in silence. I don't think we should give them big expectations for your trip.

The Secretary: I agree. We probably will announce my visit to Ankara while I am on the trip.

Mavros: We will say he is not going to get a solution or act as a mediator.

The Secretary: The question will be asked why I did not visit Athens.

Mavros: We will say the problem is in Ankara so that it would not be considered unusual.

Hartman: But it does not help us to say the problem is in Ankara. Why can't you welcome the trip as a contribution?

The Secretary: As an encouraging sign?

Mavros: Yes, we could. Still some of the press might write that it should have come sooner.

The Secretary: Suppose the Turks make concessions. What will you say? Will it be greeted as a contribution, or will they say those bastards are doing it to us again?

³ An apparent reference to telegram 213247 to Ankara, September 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850104-1798)

Mavros: We can say that it is all right but it is for the Cypriots to make the decision.

The Secretary: I understand, but you must decide how far you are going to carry anti-Americanism. Up to a point it cuts the ground from under Papandreou but at some point we will lose our interest.

Mavros: There is a stage if the communities reach agreement.

The Secretary: We could study some general principles which Clerides and Denktash could adopt.

Karayiannis: If the Turks make a gesture could you (Mavros) say in Athens that these would facilitate the communal talks?

Mavros: It would cause a problem if the gesture is just a withdrawal from 40 to 38% or of the forces from 40 to 35,000. This is all the same to me. We cannot make a public statement giving much importance to this.

The Secretary: Suppose 5,000 refugees return, 5,000 troops withdraw, and there is a small pullback as a beginning.

Mavros: Makarios pointed out that there are hotels in Famagusta that can take 1,000 people. That would help solve the refugee problem.

The Secretary: But the Turks won't do this for nothing.

Mavros: These refugees are a large proportion of the Cyprus population.

The Secretary: There are now 2 million Arab refugees. This is a U.S. electoral period but after the election the Greek Congressmen won't excite public opinion. If after your election anti-Americanism continues I will talk back. You should have no illusion that this will go on in the U.S. press, except for the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* which will bring up the issue every two weeks.

We can agree to the Russian proposal and have an international conference. Then the press can say let the conference settle it. I just want to be realistic.

Congress might cut off military aid and aid might slow down to Greece. We want to be realistic.

Mavros: We too. Makarios is realistic. He told me that a solution would come from pressure from Washington.

The Secretary: You can't have this pressure if you put pressure on us. We won't go on the barricade on the UN resolution, unless it was too obnoxious. If there is a big conference we will do what others do—speeches and nothing will happen. We will not cooperate with the Soviet Union on the Cyprus solution. We cannot allow the Soviets to decide on a question between two allies and to have an effect on the situation in the Middle East. In a big conference we will join in the rhetoric. I don't want to be cynical but what has world opinion done for anybody? I don't object to your having a resolution. What can we realistically do?

Before your elections we won't embarrass you, but afterward we must have a new situation of confidence. What we did for the Arabs was difficult. We can't carry pressure beyond a certain point. But we will bring the pressure to the greatest degree, we can within a realistic framework. I will have to give the Turks some idea of your position.

Mavros: Will you try with the zonal idea?

The Secretary: I will try but my judgment is they won't accept. I don't think they can accept less than their offer before the military move.

Karyiannis: I am speaking of your relations with Greece. They can't be repaired unless you can get a situation better than was offered in Geneva.

The Secretary: I think that basic assumption is ridiculous. Why should we have to repair a situation that was started by the Greek Government? I don't accept the proposition we have done anything against Greece. I understand domestic reasons for your anti-Americanism. We too want you to succeed in the elections.

Mavros: I would like to put aside Cyprus. What about the continental shelf, air space and minorities?

The Secretary: We will not permit another military move on these issues—unless Greece opposes us, and then we would not support such a move. I have not studied the question of the continental shelf, but we are prepared to make a major effort and to try to understand the position of both sides. I must talk to Ecevit. I have not studied these other questions yet. Basically, concessions must be made by Turkey. We are prepared to use pressure up to the point of not ruining our position with Turkey. We have already used pressure in preventing a Turkish action against Larnaca. Makarios can come and propose cantonal arrangements. If he had made a realistic proposal we might have been helpful, but Makarios asked for the 1960 Constitution.

For four years the Arabs beat us to death with demands. When Sadat and I sat down his first scheme was impossible but we finally got the Israelis back farther than we thought we could. But there is a point beyond our efforts cannot succeed. My view is the following: The best way to proceed is I get what I can in Ankara and we use this to get a joint declaration of principles between Denktash and Clerides. After the elections we try to solve all the problems together.

Mavros: For us when you get to Ankara we could say it was a useful initiative and we could welcome it. But we don't want that to be used as proof that we agree that military aid to an aggressor should be continued.

The Secretary: You have to look at our position. (1) We want Turkey in the Alliance too. (2) We want to prevent a Qadhafi-type regime. (3) We want to keep the Turks from lining up with the radical Arabs.

If we cut aid, the Turks will not be able to make concessions. If the Turks make a concession, what should I offer to restore military aid? If we restore and they will have what they want and they will not give another concession. I have sent an emissary to explain to the Turks the legal position on aid. It is more effective this way than by cutting off aid. I want to keep the Turks worried, but not cut it off. There is a danger that if aid to Turkey is cut, one way or the other it will be cut off to Greece. Suppose aid to Turkey is cut off? That can mean no new aid but there are two years of aid, \$180 million in the pipeline. Then you can turn to the pipeline, but at that time the President would turn against Greece. I do not expect you to back aid to Turkey. I do not care about military aid one way or the other. I only look at it for what it can do to help solve problems. The Turkish position on Cyprus does not depend on it. If I go to Ankara and aid is cut what do I tell Ecevit?

Mavros: Tell him to end the Turkish stay on the island.

The Secretary: I agree. We want to get the Turks off the island though there may eventually be Greek and Turkish contingents.

I will make a flat prediction: when we cut military aid to Turkey the Soviet Union will move toward Turkey. I can show you our intelligence report. It was the Soviet Union that urged Turkey to invade Cyprus. We opposed it. I would ask you to read *The New York Times* editorials in early July. They were inciting the Turks to attack. No American officials dealt with Sampson. But I felt if we made a public statement Turkey would have an excuse to attack the island. From the first day of the coup the Turks intended to go in. There was no government in Greece with international standing, nor was there a legitimate government in Cyprus. This is a reality. The newspapers said I was pro-Sampson. Sisco went out to prevent the Turks from attacking.

Sisco: When I got to Greece I found the regime unrealistic. Ecevit had told me the situation was intolerable.

The Secretary: He was supposed to get concessions from Ioannides, and take them to Ankara to stop the invasion. But they gave nothing worthwhile. On the day before the invasion I called Callaghan and told him I expected an invasion. He did not think there would be one. I called Sauvagnargues. I shared my opinion that there would be an invasion, but said that public opinion in his country was against doing anything for Greece. On the Sunday after the invasion the senior officers in the Department wanted to throw Greece out of NATO but I prevented such action. Nevertheless there was a news article that the U.S. would cut aid to Greece.

Sisco: There is no doubt in Greece about who started events in Cyprus.

Mavros: Yes, but then there was August.

The Secretary: Mr. Tzounis was going to come to Washington. Could he and Sisco get together tomorrow with Eagleton; and you and I can get together after I see Gunes. We can discuss the general idea of where things might go. We can meet at your suite in the Plaza after by dinner at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m.⁴

Mavros: I agree. I am leaving Tuesday for Washington.

Tzounis: Tomorrow I can meet with Sisco to discuss all the problems between Greece and Turkey.

The Secretary: That would be useful and Hartman could be there too.

I wish you to know that I consider Greece a natural friend of the U.S. with ties of strategic importance. On the other hand, I consider the Turks important too. They are more unpredictable than Greece. I do not want to drive Turkey in a direction unfavorable to all of us. I want to establish relations of confidence with you. I want to come to an understanding. If I go to Ankara we could announce the trip on the 10th and say I am going to explore things and that I am not going to Athens because the first problem is to see what there is in Ankara. But I could send Sisco to Athens. I will try to get some concrete gestures, then Denktash and Clerides can agree on some principles. That will get us to your elections. After that we will use influence to bring about a comprehensive settlement but you can not make demands on us that cause problems with the public.

Mavros: Tzounis could meet with Sisco here and later in Washington.

Sisco: We could meet tomorrow in my suite at 11 o'clock.

⁴ Kissinger met Mavros at 10:40 p.m. on September 30. (Memorandum of Conversation; *ibid.*, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 21, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, May–November 1974)

154. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 2, 1974, 11:25 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Archbishop Makarios
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Kissinger: These records will stay only in the White House. I've been praising you all along. I told Mavros that I like men without illusions.

Makarios: I thank you very much.

Kissinger: Men who are practical and realistic. Contrary to what you read in the papers, there are no anti-Makarios tendencies here.

Makarios: If you and I agree on a solution, it will contribute to a solution.

Kissinger: If events here continue as they are doing, I will not be able to contribute. If these amendments pass, I cannot continue.² This doesn't affect you directly.

A threat to cut off aid is a weapon; an actual cut-off is not. It will be impossible to conduct the negotiations under these circumstances. Suppose we get the Turks to withdraw 10 kilometers and release 10,000 refugees, and then we restore aid? What do we do two months from now? Cut it off again? It will be on and off like a yo-yo. It can't be done with fixed deadlines.

My skill is to get the other party to do what needs to be done. It can't be done with threats. My ability is to get them to do it. So this is violently against Cypriot interests. The art is to get the process started. The process is more important than the conclusions. The art is to get the Turks thinking of withdrawal, and this is easier without precision about final solutions. If I withdraw from this, you will get double enosis.

The Turks won't yield to visible pressure. The Turks will yield to pressure with a silk glove that looks like they are yielding on their own initiative.

Your Beatitude knows the Turks better.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers.

² Reference is to bills in the House and Senate cutting off aid to Turkey because both chambers viewed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as a violation of the Foreign Assistance Act, which allowed for such measures to be taken only in self-defense. Congress did not consider the Turkish military action to fall into that category.

Makarios: You are going to Ankara.

Kissinger: I was going to Ankara. But I won't go under these circumstances.

Makarios: What do you think will happen?

Kissinger: I will withdraw from the negotiations. I will still be American Secretary of State and will be willing to be helpful. But I think the result will be double enosis. Your Beatitude will be a Greek political leader! [Laughter]³ They have reason to be afraid of you.

Makarios: As you notice from my yesterday's speech . . .⁴

Kissinger: Which was reasonable.

Makarios: I don't want any solution that allows a mass transfer of the population. The Turks are insisting on a separate jurisdiction, because they want to safeguard Turkish autonomy. We are prepared to consider ways to do this, this autonomy, but not with transfer of populations. The Turks won't allow our people back to their homes—perhaps only a limited number. The problem is a serious problem for us. 200,000 Cypriots, or more than half the Greek population of the island.

Kissinger: I thought there were 600,000 Greeks.

Makarios: No, 650,000 altogether. 200,000 Turks. The area occupied by the Turks is the most productive area. We accept federation, but on a communal basis. I don't care whether you call them cantons, but these areas don't entail the transfer of many thousands. If there are only two big areas, one under Turkish Cypriot and one under the Greek Cypriot administration, this solution would pave, in my view, the way to partition. Even now, there are Cypriots who say federation is better than double enosis. I think for Turkey to say they are not in favor of double enosis, it is sincere.

Kissinger: I'm not so sure.

Makarios: We will see; Turkey is not so eager for this but some Cypriots say it is better. Many areas are better than two big areas.

Kissinger: In August, five were proposed.

Makarios: I would prefer more than five. Say ten.

Kissinger: The negotiations in Geneva were totally mismanaged.

Makarios: Because I wasn't there. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I think it is true. The Greeks mismanaged it. They could have had a delay, which would have averted these operations. But the British got morally outraged at the Turks—which one can never afford in a negotiation—and the Greeks were afraid of Papandreu.

My feeling is this solution is unobtainable.

³ All brackets are in the original.

⁴ Makarios delivered a speech at the United Nations on October 1.

Makarios: If Turkey insists on two areas, the question is why didn't we accept this at Geneva? Before the second invasion of the Turkish troops.

Kissinger: At Geneva, you could have gotten a settlement on 70% and negotiations later on the rest. It would be better than now.

Makarios: Turkey occupies now 40%.

Kissinger: That is too much.

Makarios: Say Turkey agrees to reduce up to 28%. So the question is what is better for us: To legalize a defacto situation or not legalize it and insist on 28%?

Kissinger: What is your view?

Makarios: My personal view is not to accept it.

Kissinger: Your Beatitude's view occasionally prevails in Cyprus.

Makarios: Then there is the problem of refugees; it is related. If the area is reduced to 28 percent, then the people will go back to the areas given back to us. But most of the refugees will not go back to their homes. We will have lost a lot. I don't know if it's better to legalize getting back ten or twelve percent.

Kissinger: Then Turkey will annex the part and make it a Turkish province.

Makarios: I can't exclude this. But there are hopes that one day, after many years, we will come to an agreement which is better for the future of Cyprus. What is your advice?

Kissinger: I so far have not actively participated in the negotiations. Because I understand the useful role I'm playing now in Greek domestic politics by being the focal point for criticism. At some point I'll turn and resist.

My preference was a cantonal solution. How many, I don't know.

I've never seen so mismanaged a negotiation. The British wanted to resume August 8; the Greeks wanted August 14. I don't understand the crucial difference. We should have got agreement on a cantonal solution.

Now I think there will be either no solution, as Your Beatitude proposes, or a bizonal solution. The question now is how to arrange it so a bizonal solution doesn't become a facade for double enosis. So my feeling is that the federal government should be given substantial powers, say over emigration, and the Turkish portion should be considerably reduced.

I've no objection to asking the Turks to go back to five cantons.

But if the Greeks are going out on the streets of America calling me a killer, I have no interest.

Makarios: Whether you have interest or not, you're the Secretary of State of the United States. Peace in the area is important to you.

Kissinger: The interests of the United States are its relations with Greece, with Cyprus, and with Turkey. There is also the problem of peace. But the peace of the world will not be threatened. Who would threaten it? The Soviet Union? We will not allow it, for other reasons, including our whole Middle East position. But our relations with Greece, and with Cyprus—and because we believe Turkey acted excessively—for all these reasons we have an interest.

There are a lot of heroes who don't know how to get one percent of their territory back. Maybe it will become like the Arab refugee problem. Maybe Turkey will leave NATO; maybe it will become an issue here.

So our reward is somehow in our relations with Greece and with Cyprus. And of course our interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. And this is also in the interest of a final solution. Because if Turkey feels it's been violated, it will look for ways to undo it. Then we are back where we started.

So as you told me last time, American influence is important. Then it depends on our ability and our willingness to do it. Peace will be maintained anyway; a just one, not necessarily. You excuse me for being frank. But you can count on my word.

The realistic objectives—with tremendous effort, and my active personal participation—would be: a reduction of the area, a solution of the refugee problem. But we can't have these interviews in *Le Monde* calling me a killer.

I've said to you that your abilities were too great for the island you governed. You were the best solution to the island. If you think in June or July, when we had a President being forced out, we would intervene against you . . . We've had reports of coups every three months. What was Your Beatitude doing against us? We had no conceivable objection to what was happening. The first I heard of a coup was Monday morning after it was carried out. We were the only government that knew the Turks would come in. We said nothing about Sampson—because the worse we said about Sampson, the more certain it was that the Turks would invade. The Europeans were encouraging the Turks to invade, for stupid sentimental reasons. Sampson I knew couldn't possibly survive. Read our newspapers: we were accused of being pro-Greek.

Once the Turks were on the island, Your Beatitude understood it better than I. You urged me to get the Turks off. I expected the next negotiation to succeed. If I knew it would fail I would have done it differently. The British were sure it would work. I was heavily preoccupied with the President.

For the future: My view is that Your Beautitude is the only one who can make a realistic solution. I believe that. We are not anti-Makarios. If we become the villain of your story, we'll be forced to turn against you. Clerides we have to support now but we've done nothing final.

Your Beatitude is essential for a final solution. But we have to support Clerides now; otherwise there will be a total deadlock.

I don't mind proposing cantons initially, to see what happens. But I don't want to mislead you. But I didn't know what I would do. I can do nothing with these restrictive amendments.

It is easy to get concessions at the beginning. It is easy to get from 40 to 35 percent. Then to get from 35 to 20, that's when you need the actuality.

We're definitely not anti-Makarios. Nor do we insist that you be pro-American. We were perfectly happy with the situation before the coup. The best solution was to leave Cyprus alone. Had I known of the coup, I would have stopped it. We had a good talk when we met in Cyprus in May.⁵ We had no conceivable American interest. We had nothing against Makarios.

So we'd appreciate it if Your Beatitude could do what he could do to strengthen Clerides for these negotiations. For the ultimate disposition of power, that isn't our affair. I'd never heard the name of Clerides until the coup.

And if Your Beatitude's attitude toward the United States is not hostile, this is a concern to us. We can survive it [laughter], but it affects the attitude we can take.

Makarios: I don't know if I can do something significant.

Kissinger: But we can't be seen to act under pressure.

We're prepared to act in a way that it's clear that Turkey has to make some major concessions.

Makarios: First, I have to make it clear I never shared the view that the United States or the CIA was ever involved in the coup against me.

Kissinger: I give you my word.

Makarios: And what *Le Monde* said didn't correspond to what I said. I didn't have an interview with Mr. Eric Rouleau, just a talk. He asked me not whether the CIA was involved, but whether the CIA knew in advance. I said I didn't know whether they knew in advance about a coup on that particular day. You had information that the possibility of a coup could not be excluded.

Kissinger: I was told Your Beatitude was told about this.

Makarios: There were public reports that at the last moment the CIA got information but there was not enough time to approach anyone in Greece to stop the coup. But this is much different from what

⁵ Kissinger visited Nicosia on May 7, 1974 to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations and the Middle East with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. No record of his discussion with Makarios has been found.

was published, that the CIA made the coup. That was not in the interests of the United States.

Kissinger: That's ridiculous.

Makarios: So the interview in *Le Monde* was not true.

As for the solution, my personal view is: As for federation on a geographic basis, it should be more than five areas. And in my judgment, in my view, the United States and particularly you personally can influence the Turkish Government and in the end they will accept this solution. There is no strong reason for them not to accept this solution. They occupy forty percent, and they say they will give 10 to 15 percent back. If they had fifty percent, they'd appear more generous and give 20 percent back.

If you personally agree with this, I'm under the impression you will succeed. You're a very capable person. [They both smile.]

Kissinger: I'm flattered. My capability consists in seeing what is possible and operating in that framework.

I will make an effort. I may make an effort—if I'm permitted domestically.

Makarios: We can't say to Turkey that we accept a federation on a geographic basis.

Kissinger: That I understand.

Makarios: If from the beginning we gave up the principle, we'd be in a difficult position. If they insist on two areas—and on the transfer of population, which is most difficult—we won't accept it. Of course I care about the consequences but I personally can't accept. If there are more areas, it reduces the danger of partition and double enosis.

Of course you'll be in a position to do more and know more when you visit Ankara.

Kissinger: I may not visit Ankara.

Makarios: In case you don't succeed in the first attempt, try to convince the Turkish Government to return the Greek city of Famagusta. From a military point of view, they have nothing to lose. And we'll accommodate 50,000 refugees. It will be something for us. It will not be very difficult.

Kissinger: No, no, no, it's going to be very difficult.

Makarios: It is just pressure on us. [Makarios takes out a cigarette case.]

Kissinger: There are two problems: How to get any concession at any one point, and second, how to get the process started. The problem now is to get it started. I don't know how I could get Famagusta without any idea of what they get in return. I haven't studied it.

Makarios: I would emphasize that Mr. Clerides has my full backing, and if he resigns it will be a big problem for Cyprus. Yesterday I

talked with him on the phone. I said I hoped he would not insist on resignation. We have different views on some things but I say he has my full backing. I am not there on Cyprus. We don't have any real differences. He has my confidence and he will have my full backing. I told him that if I withdraw my backing I'll let him know in advance. [Laughter]

But he's disturbed at the demonstrations, thinking I'm coming back. There are people blocking me. I can't say to my people I don't want to go back. [He lights up a cigarette.]

If Mr. Clerides says he agrees on a certain solution like this, I don't think it will be accepted.

Kissinger: Unless Your Beatitude backs it.

Makarios: I'm not very strong.

Kissinger: You overestimate my ability and perhaps I overestimate yours. Maybe we're both right.

How should we leave this conversation?

Makarios: If Turkey insists on only two areas, we won't accept it. I don't know if Mr. Clerides will accept it or the Greek Government. If they think it's the only solution, I won't create difficulties for the Greek Government. But they shouldn't expect me to say I agree.

Kissinger: I can see the villain of the piece will certainly be an American! The question is: I or some other person?

If I go to Ankara I'll discuss it. I'll study it. There is no reason on my own side.

Your Beatitude is going to London?

Makarios: I will be here two more weeks.

Kissinger: It depends on our legislative situation. I doubt seriously that I'll get to Ankara if they [the restrictive amendments] pass. If I go we'll meet after I return.

Makarios: President Sadat said to me, "You'll have the support of my country. But the key is in Washington; it is in the hands of Dr. Kissinger."

Kissinger: The Egyptians dealt with us on the basis of cooperation. The Greeks are dealing with us on the basis of blackmail.

Makarios: It's helping me.

Kissinger: It's helping me if it's directed against Turkey.

Makarios: My speech helped you.

Kissinger: Your speech is no problem. Your speech was helpful.

For me to do anything, I need authority. I can't just do it by flitting around the world.

Your Beatitude, what will we tell the press?

Makarios: That we had a useful exchange of views. Nothing more.

Kissinger: All right. If you want to say the United States can play a helpful role . . . Well, you have said that.

Makarios: Can I bring in the others who accompanied me? [The Secretary agrees, and Rodman goes out to summon the others in the party, and returns.]

Kissinger: I think the Greeks are now the ones who should do something for Greek-US relations. Since they are the ones who broke it.

[The other members of Archbishop Makarios' party⁶ and the American side arrive.]

Makarios: We had a good talk with the Secretary of State. As usual, he was very convincing.

Kissinger: I had a good talk with the Archbishop—the President. I discussed what was possible and realistic. I pointed out what could be done in the framework of good relations between Greece and Cyprus and the United States; that is the only basis. This was in the context of Greek-American relations.

Makarios: If the Secretary and I agree, it can be solved.

Kissinger: I was going to say that we saw that it was in everyone's interest to find a solution to the Cyprus situation, that is just to the people, and consistent with the international situation, and realistic. We had a good initial discussion.

Foreign Minister: It was good for peace.

Kissinger: I explained to His Beatitude that what has happened now in Congress will make it very difficult. I have to point that out as an existing fact. It will remove a threat and impose an actuality which will have to be changed every few weeks.

We were moving towards an active American role.

It is clear that Turkey is the one who has to make the major concessions.

If I understand the President, he did not reveal all his thinking. [Laughter]

This is not needed now. But we need an understanding of principles.

This is not the time for ultimatums.

Anyway, it is always a pleasure for us to meet. We'll stay in close touch. We'll consider seriously playing a very active role.

[The meeting ended at 12:45 p.m.]

⁶ Christofides, Rossides, Kyprianou, and Dimitriou joined the meeting; reported in telegram 3658 from USUN, October 3. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, October 3, 1974, 1700Z.

3454. Subject: Conversation with Denktash.

1. I saw Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash October 3 a few days after his return from Council of Europe and consultation in Ankara. Bulk of our conversation dealt with problems of Turkish travel restrictions, consular access, protection of property, etc. (septel).²

2. We then turned to the Cyprus topic of the day: Clerides' threat to announce resignation in next day or two unless he receives clear public mandate from Greek Cypriots, from Greece and from Makarios, with some assurance from latter that he will not return to Cyprus soon and will call off the disruptive public clamor he has instigated.

3. I said that in my view Clerides was right to insist that latent support for his role, in Cyprus and internationally, be made tangible and public to maximum extent possible. Denktash had been right, too, in posing the stark questions on September 20 as to whether Clerides could stay in the negotiations and, if so, whether he could sign. It was my impression that Clerides doing well. Karamanlis had come out on September 30 with a gratifying message of support even though he had disappointingly let it be watered down the following day. In New York, there was a lot of responsible thinking and activity designed to support the existing Cyprus negotiation and dissuade Makarios from early return. Secretary Kissinger is engaged in energetic diplomacy directed at support of Clerides–Denktash negotiation and introduction of flexibility on substance. Clerides had unequivocal statement of US support. Even Makarios had belatedly expressed his support for Clerides following October 2 meeting with Secretary.³ On island, Greek Cypriot factions from left to right were beginning to wake up to what Clerides' departure would mean and were asking that he not resign.

4. I said that while things seemed to be moving in the right direction, I was not sure whether Clerides would yet feel he had carried

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 3453 from Nicosia, October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

³ See Document 154.

his threat far enough and received sufficient mandate to continue in face of Archbishop's undercutting which reflected through his supporters and in the substance of his UNGA statement.⁴ My personal guess was that Clerides would judge that he had to move further on his threat and perhaps even go through with it, until he received more. I hoped this would be forthcoming today and over coming weekend, especially from Cyprus House of Representatives which scheduled to meet in rump session later today and again with full membership, including members recalled from abroad, on October 6 or 7.

5. Denktash said with obvious sincerity that he wished Clerides well. Turkey was prepared to make concessions to help him if we could get over this hurdle.

Crawford

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 154.

156. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, October 22, 1974, 9–10:10 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Mr. Hartman: On the UN debate on Cyprus, we now have three points of view. The Turks are still very anxious to get a postponement, think it would be better to have a meeting after your visit. Also they have been further delayed I think in forming their government.

Secretary Kissinger: What happened to Demirel?

Mr. Hartman: We haven't a report yet. They are still holding their conference as of today.

We have talked to Bitsios,² whose view is that it is better to get it over before your visit and come out with a moderate conclusion, because he is afraid that if they do something—if the Turks give some con-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary's Staff Conference. Secret.

² Bitsios replaced Mavros as Foreign Minister after Mavros resigned on October 16 to focus on the November election campaign. According to telegram 7528 from Athens, October 16, Kubisch was scheduled to have lunch with Bitsios on October 17; no record of this meeting has been found. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

cession when you go there, and then there is a debate, that that might be used, some statements during the debate might be used by the Turks to say that they can no longer go ahead with those concessions.

There is a third problem in that Bouteflika³ says he has already had one postponement and he is very anxious to schedule debate. And he has given no support at all to the Turkish approaches. And our people I think need some further instruction about whether they should go directly to Bouteflika, to try and get this thing postponed until the 11th of November.

It was mentioned again by Ecevit yesterday, in his talk with Bill Macomber.⁴

Mr. Sisco: Since the Turks were having some confusion. Late last night Scali called me. The Turkish Ambassador in New York is not on the same wicket as his own government, so we have to straighten that out. He thought a delay from October 21 to the 28 was all the Turks were talking about. I explained to John that was not the case.

Secretary Kissinger: But there are some governments where Ambassadors do what the Prime Ministers want. And if the Prime Minister wanted November 11, I am inclined to go with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Sisco: I am, too. Except he didn't seem to be aware of it. That is the point I am making.

Mr. Hartman: Bitsios says there have been some talks about what the resolution should say, and thinks they can come out with a moderate one that the Turks could abstain on. I am not so sure that the situation is that controllable, once it gets started up there, and the Greeks can actually come through with a moderate resolution.

We can discuss that.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the idea seems to have gotten into people's heads that, one, we overthrew Makarios, two, that we are doing it to establish a NATO base, and therefore we are going to get all the non-aligned against us, and the Turks are going to be isolated.

Mr. Hartman: But there seems to be some pulling of punches by the Arabs. I think a moderate resolution can get through. But it is the debate that will have some elements in it that will be unhelpful.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't suppose we can be the leaders in getting it delayed.

³ Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Foreign Minister and representative of the Non-Aligned Movement, was President of the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly.

⁴ The meeting was reported in telegram 8270 from Ankara, October 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850095-2143)

Mr. Hartman: They have taken the initiative, and we have to be sure that they have taken the initiative with this November 11 date in mind.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Secretary, I think we have pretty well done what we can do. I myself feel that this October 28 date is not going to get turned off. We have made our position clear. Bouteflika is absolutely adamant on this. At the most, I would suggest a low, low key approach to Bouteflika. John could call him and say what about all this. But I don't think we are going to be able to pull this thing off, because the Greek view is very strong on this. Bitsios said we really want this on the 28th. My advice is not to expend too much energy and capital on this, because it is a losing fight. We have done what the Turks have asked us to do. They realize that the cards are stacked against us.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Sisco: Namely, we have indicated our support for a delay.

Secretary Kissinger: To whom?

Mr. Sisco: To, I think, the Secretary General. Bill—I think we told it to someone there.

Mr. Buffum: The Secretary General.

Secretary Kissinger: In what form have we told it to the Secretary General?

Mr. Buffum: Scali has been talking to him. But Bouteflika is the key on this.

Secretary Kissinger: When you say Scali has been talking to him, what exactly has Scali said? Has he said we recommend a delay, or has he sort of said wouldn't it be nice if you could think up a delay?

Mr. Sisco: My understanding is that he has said that we support the Turks in a desire for a delay.

Mr. Buffum: That is my understanding. We do not have a written report. Just based on a phone call to Joe last night.

Mr. Sisco: We have got to call him again this morning. As I say, the Turkish Ambassador is quite confused.

Mr. Buffum: I agree with Joe. The chances of delaying it further are very slim, because of the heavy Greek pressure to go ahead and Bitsios' departure this weekend for New York, plus a very heavy plenary schedule that Bouteflika has to manage.

Mr. Sisco: I might add something else, Mr. Secretary. In the cable that came in yesterday,⁵ reporting our latest conversation with Ecevit, Ecevit I think has pretty well concluded that he is now faced with an even more delicate situation. First, the congressional action. Secondly,

⁵ See footnote 4 above.

what I found interesting is that I think he does assume that some kind of a resolution is going to be adopted before any trip on your part.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's forget about the trip.

Mr. Sisco: Let me just make this point. He nevertheless said that he would try to do—try to be as helpful as possible—

Secretary Kissinger: We are going to drive the Turks into rapid nationalist neutralism by our stupid diddling around. That is what we are going to do. And by our cowardly behavior in every respect. That is what the end result of it is. And three years from now no one needs to claim any responsibility, because you will never be able to pinpoint what happened. This is my concern.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. And Ecevit in effect said this.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no way you can read the Ecevit cable—it is like '56 with the British. We were all congratulating ourselves, I am sure, in this building on the heroic thing we did with the British and French, and how we got world opinion on our side, and all the other great platitudes, and 70 percent of the troubles we have had with them since have been caused by our brutality in '56.

Mr. Sisco: But this is a totally different situation.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not at all a totally different situation, because the end result, that the Turks can only conclude, is that, sure, I'm a nice guy, the President is a nice guy—and we cannot manage our domestic situation. Foreign governments deal with foreign governments. Secondly, whenever we step up to a problem, we just sort of—we say the right things, we want to do the right things. But somehow we just cannot deliver. You combine that with the reports we get from the Middle East. Everybody thinks I'm a great guy, the President means well—it's just a great pity that this damned government cannot do anything. And if you think a great power can conduct its foreign policy this way, then you are on the wavelength of my former colleagues at Harvard.

Mr. Sisco: I think the practical result may be the same. When I said that the situation is different, you had there in Suez a specific executive branch policy. Now the situation with respect to the executive policy is distinctly different from the Congress. They understand this. I am not saying that they can discount this.

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that the Turks looking at this have to conclude they must make themselves independent of the United States. When Ecevit said yesterday—he said it absolutely correctly. He said "Usually it is said that people get along and governments do not; this is a case where governments get along and the people are determined to do this to us, first on poppies and now on this." What conclusion can a Turkish Prime Minister draw from that? "I will take it now, I will grit my teeth and take it. But this is not a reed on which I can lean, and I must work and move heaven and earth never again to get into this

position.” That is the conclusion. It has nothing to do with whether he likes you, whether he likes me. I am undoubtedly extremely popular with the Turkish Government. They will do as much for me as they can possibly do. If we want to get the foreign policy of the United States, with all the nonsense of institutionalization, if you want to gear it to one man, by saying everyone else is irresponsible in the country, then we are doing fine. But that is no basis for the foreign policy of a great country.

And now to me, this vote, it doesn’t make any difference, but we are sort of ineffectually bumbling around in New York. I am not sure that Scali has even said anything that means anything. Are you? Honestly.

Mr. Buffum: I don’t know, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger: You know damned well that Scali wants the debate. At any rate, that Scali is not going to fight with Bouteflika and Waldheim on this.

Mr. Buffum: I think it is a matter of confusion in part because of the Turkish delegation. They really—

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted us to be on record that we support a delay. Have we done that?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: In a way that everybody understands?

Mr. Sisco: You mean if you are talking about the whole General Assembly, no.

Secretary Kissinger: Not the whole General Assembly. I want the Turks to have at least the feeling that we responded to them in something other than bureaucratic talk. Have we done that? Well, have we done it? You ought to know that. It is your department.

Mr. Buffum: We have to clarify the picture this morning with Scali.

Secretary Kissinger: We have been talking about this for a week. Has he done anything in the week?

Mr. Buffum: He just got the cable yesterday with the final instructions on delay.⁶

Secretary Kissinger: The objective reality is that when you have a problem for a week, do nothing with it, that then the momentum becomes irreversible. Well, I don’t give much of a damn. You can make many arguments why the debate would be one way or the other. I am impressed by some of these arguments. But—

Mr. Sisco: Well—

⁶ Not found.

Secretary Kissinger: Have we ever told the Greeks clearly that we think it would be better to have a delay?

Mr. Buffum: Categorically, and why.

Secretary Kissinger: And do the Turks know what we have done—which is where we have got our historic problem?

Mr. Sisco: I think they do.

Secretary Kissinger: Has anyone in this building considered what will happen if there is an Israeli-Syrian war next summer and the Russians try to intervene, how we can operate in the Eastern Mediterranean, without the Turks?

Mr. Brown: Or the Portuguese.

Secretary Kissinger: Or the Portuguese.

Mr. Sisco: We will make doubly certain the Turks know.

Mr. Hartman: I talked to Esenbel yesterday.

Mr. Sisco: I think, Mr. Secretary, you can be reassured on that.

Mr. Hartman: He told me actually that he thought his colleague in New York did not understand his instructions.

Mr. Sisco: That's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Do the Turks know that we have tried to do something?

Well, let Scali in a low-key way talk to Bouteflika on the ground that I may be going there. I know Bitsios' concern—he won't get his concessions after a debate, which is another way of saying if he has Turkish concessions, he may have to be restrained in the debate. He can avoid his fear by arranging an unrestrained debate. What the Greeks want is an unrestrained debate and Turkish concessions. And even better—make it look as if the Turks were beaten into the concessions by a combination of the UN and the American Congress, depriving the U.S. of any capability of claiming any leadership role. That is what the Greeks really want.

Mr. Buffum: By setting up a resolution—

Secretary Kissinger: And you saw Ecevit's great concern already in his cable saying "If I make concessions, please make sure that you say I had already agreed to them before the congressional vote."

So now we are arranging a UN vote on top of it. I mean not we. But that seems to me to be the great strategy, to try to humiliate the Turks.

Mr. Buffum: It is their compensation for the military debate. They have political support, particularly for the withdrawal issue, which is going to be the most sensitive, I believe.

Secretary Kissinger: Three years from now, when the Greeks have a communist government, and the Turks have been forced off Cyprus, and there is a communist outfit sitting on Cyprus, we are all going to

scream that Kissinger should have said something against Sampson, and then all of this would have been avoided—or some other profound thing that goes by the name of foreign policy.

I am not saying the Greeks would have a communist government. But the fact that in Greece things will be as in Portugal is at least 40–60. And I think the result will be if there is a very tough resolution, it will make it harder to get Turkish concessions. If Turkish concessions occur anyway, they will be conceived by the Turks as a humiliation. In time, we will be seen as having objectively colluded with all these forces, and the end result of all of this is going to be a wild Turkish nationalism that decides above all to be free of the United States—“Whatever else you do, get the Russians, you can get anybody you can rely on, but not the United States.”

That will be the sequence that will be unleashed. It won't be visible for a year—but that is the certain result of what is happening. And a UN resolution after the Turks have offered some concessions is totally different from a UN resolution which the Greeks will then claim was the chief factor in bringing about Turkish concessions. Between the combination of the Congress and the UN, it will be claimed that the U.S. Government did nothing.

Mr. Buffum: It is also going to require you to choose up sides, Mr. Secretary, at the time when that will be the most awkward of all. We will have to vote. And probably it will be for a resolution that the Turks cannot support and that the Greeks are pushing.

Mr. Sisco: It is very likely that is the situation, because I think most of the elements are going to be okay. I am not quite as optimistic as Hartman is. I think we are going to have great trouble with the withdrawal paragraph. Notice the way we put those principles. Even the mention of the word, and he came back with Paragraph 4 of the Geneva Declaration.

Secretary Kissinger: But even if the Greeks get all the principles we have been talking about into the UN resolution, we will be deprived of every American credit for it, and therefore we will not have any impact in Greece. And the main reason why we are doing it, which is to ameliorate the situation in Greece, will be totally destroyed.

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that the Greeks have some interest, Mr. Secretary, assuming we can get these concessions from the Turks—I think the Karamanlis Government has some interest in giving the United States Government some credit. Obviously this is our line. Because they are going to play it both ways.

Secretary Kissinger: The Karamanlis Government has obviously turned on the AHEPA group. This was perfectly plain in talking to the AHEPA group. Now they are doing it in the UN. At the same time they want total support from us. It is impossible. We cannot operate that way.

Mr. Hartman: The AHEPA group was much more extreme than the Greek Government.

Mr. Sisco: Very extreme.

Mr. Hartman: Can I raise our other favorite country?

Secretary Kissinger: You better tell Scali to make it clear—and you better make clear to Bitsios, it is going to be very hard for me to go to Ankara if they insist on a debate before. I just don't see—just tell them they can go ahead, we will not make an open fight against it, but it is going to be difficult.

Mr. Buffum: It is also going to raise a very sensitive question, Mr. Secretary, what we say during the debate during that period when you will be out of the country. People will be looking for us for full public exposé of our position in the Assembly.

Secretary Kissinger: If I am going to Ankara, we are not going to also publicly beat up on the Turks. For what? Can somebody explain to me what for? For what United States interest? To make Brademas happy? What is the United States interest? In what respect is my analysis wrong? If my analysis is wrong, let somebody put it forward and we will change our policy. What are we gaining in Greece compared to what we are losing in Turkey?

Mr. Sisco: I did not interpret what Bill said, Mr. Secretary, that any statement that we would make would be intended to beat up on the Turks. I think we ought to be very, very careful, indeed.

Mr. Buffum: That was not my intention.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not blaming Bill. I am saying if we are forced to take a stand, we will either get into again massive trouble domestically here, or we will get into massive trouble internationally. On the withdrawal issue, what are we going to say?

Mr. Buffum: I think we just have to stick to the formulation we got in the first round in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is no longer acceptable to the Turks.

Mr. Sisco: But that is the maximum we can go at this point.

Mr. Buffum: Reduction rather than withdrawal.

Secretary Kissinger: But that may force us to vote against the resolution.

Mr. Buffum: Again, that puts us in a highly partisan position at just the wrong time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. And hard to explain. Very hard to explain. We will have a murderous time with Congress, and with the AHEPA group, if we don't vote for withdrawal. But if we do vote for withdrawal, anything that is done in Ankara will not redound to our credit. I don't mean to our personal credit. What we have to do is

to show the Greeks that only by working with the United States can they get something. But they are having it all ways.⁷

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

⁷ The General Assembly met from October 28 to November 1, at which time it adopted Resolution 3212 by a vote of 117–0. Resolution 3212 called for respect for Cyprus' sovereignty, removal of foreign troops, return of refugees, cooperation with UNFICYP, and the involvement of the Secretary General in a solution. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974*, pp. 284–288, 295)

157. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rome, November 5, 1974, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Greek

H.E. Dimitri Bitsios, Greek Foreign Minister

E. F. Phimios Stoforopoulos, Greek Chef de Cabinet

US

The Secretary of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Secretary: It's good to have you here. I understand that you don't like meetings this early in the morning and I very much appreciate your coming at this hour. I was very anxious to have this opportunity to talk to you prior to my next talks with the Turkish authorities.

Bitsios: I do not mind at all coming although I must say that I do prefer to do my work later in the day. In fact, I prefer the evenings for serious work. I met Gunes in New York and to break the ice I put a question to him—Are you going to be statesmanlike? He did not give a direct answer but I have the impression that he is a reasonable man.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Henry Kissinger Papers, Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The breakfast meeting was held at the Hotel Excelsior in Rome while Kissinger was on a visit to meet with President Leone and Foreign Minister Moro and address the World Food Conference.

Secretary: I think you are right and, of course, we have advised Gunes to be as reasonable as possible.

Bitsios: He is not very experienced and we had the impression that he was under great stress in Geneva.

Secretary: I consider the second Geneva meeting to be the most incompetently handled negotiation I have ever witnessed. The British thought that they could achieve a settlement there. In fact, we had encouraged the Turks to make a proposal so that there would be something on which to negotiate but Callaghan was so mad at the Turks that he could not get the process moving.

Bitsios: On the whole I think that Gunes' answer was satisfactory. He and Ecevit have their troubles with this extremist party but I think that your visit can be helpful in getting the Clerides–Denktash talks going although I think Denktash is really quite reluctant to proceed. Denktash seems to be holding back and unwilling to come forward with specific proposals. We didn't want to get Clerides to press him on the eve of your visit.

Secretary: It would be useful for me to know whether Athens can acknowledge any Turkish gestures or seem to be in agreement with them.

Bitsios: Our approach is quite different. Caramanlis' position is well known and in this period before the elections he would like to see some movement on the Clerides–Denktash talks. There is the question of the form of a federal government. What kind will it be? There is the Gunes' plan for a large area in the north and several cantons in the south and then there is the Denktash plan for two large zones. We can accept a cantonal arrangement but not a bizonal one. We also would not like to see a large movement of people from the south to the north and vice versa.

Secretary: Clerides seems to be willing to accept a bizonal arrangement.

Bitsios: But after the Geneva meetings and the discussions with Makarios I think he now thinks that the best solution would be a cantonal arrangement.

Secretary: Makarios is now talking about ten to twenty cantons.

Bitsios: The Turks have proposed a large canton in the north and about five cantons in the south. Our position is that the area should be roughly equivalent to the percent of population.

Secretary: That was the kind of thinking that the Turks were willing to discuss in Geneva but no one else would talk about it. Let me describe the situation we face. We have been trying to obtain some concessions from the Turks which would help start the negotiating process.

The actions of our Congress,² however, have complicated the situation for Ecevit but he wants to do something. We have been thinking about getting agreement on some principles and some gestures which would enable the negotiations to go forward. Now what do the Turks want? They seem to want to have two autonomous areas and they wish to describe these areas geographically. With respect to gestures we believe we can get the Turks to consider opening the airport and allow some Greeks to return to the Nicosia Industrial Estate. We also might get some minor withdrawals in Turkish forces. The Turks want several things: first, some acknowledgment of the geographic basis for the negotiations; second, some statement on the future which they will interpret as bizonal and, third, having some Turks leave the SBA areas to go north. They would be prepared to go ahead with negotiations on this basis but without some counter concessions they will be tough. (At this point the Secretary showed Bitsios our November 4 draft and a little later on he showed Bitsios the tough Turkish counter draft on the principles.)³

Bitsios: What do you think the Turks really want?

Secretary: I think the Turks do not want me to leave without some concrete progress.

Bitsios: If the question of gestures was dropped, would it be a question of not getting any principles? You see, it is difficult for Clerides because Makarios is pressing very strongly for a cantonal arrangement and he cannot do anything which would seem to approve a bizonal solution. Anything that is done now to clarify this situation will complicate the negotiation and not help solve the problem.

Secretary: It is not absolutely necessary—we could just announce the beginning of political talks.

Bitsios: Just starting the talks could be difficult. If we could just manage to get Denktash to obtain some guidelines through secret diplomatic efforts—something that would direct Denktash to begin the talks.

Secretary: We would probably then have the same deadlock. If we could get an agreement that there would be discussions on the basis of geographic zones but not specify that this meant two areas. I think the best procedure would be, first, to get the negotiations started; second, I will make an approach to the Turks and then, third, we will discuss how to proceed. We are prepared to keep engaged and, perhaps, I could designate someone to help in this process. I had thought, for example, of David Bruce but now that he is going to NATO, perhaps I could find someone else.

² This is a reference to the Congressional vote to cut off military aid to Turkey on October 17.

³ Not attached and not found.

Bitsios: It is important that there be some voluntary move from the other side—some gesture. Then there could be something reciprocated. We are the party that has been hurt.

Secretary: There are several ways to get maximum gesture and then some reciprocity. You could leave open the possibility for you to suggest a cantonal system and for them to come back and suggest two zones.

Bitsios: What we need is a maximum gesture and, quite frankly, a withdrawal of 5 to 10,000 is not much of a gesture to us when there are 40 or perhaps 35,000 Turks on the island. We will throw all our weight on a cantonal plan. Caramanlis cannot accept a settlement which does not appear to be fair. He cannot take anything approaching partition. There is a deep psychological feeling on this.

Secretary: Our experience in getting a negotiation started is that you can't use your maximum weight at first. Therefore, we think that in the first meeting the attempt should be made to get the two proposals on the table—bizonal vs. cantons. How many cantons are you going to ask for? Twenty?

Bitsios: No, we would be prepared to start from the Gunes plan but not from 35 percent of the island. We also do not want to have an exchange of population.

Secretary: You also want half of Famagusta.

Bitsios: Famagusta could be, at least in part, in a more modest northern zone. We can accept a larger area around the Turkish areas. This might help reduce the population problem. But we also have the question of the powers of the central government. We are looking to you to help.

Secretary: It is very difficult for me to help if anti-American positions are being taken by the Greek Government. I cannot perform miracles. There are no American proposals. What, I wonder, is whether or not it would be possible to have a general discussion and leave out the gestures.

Bitsios: You should be more optimistic.

Secretary: The only thing you want is acceptance of the cantonal system and that is out of the question to begin with.

Bitsios: There are other questions we should discuss, for example, bilateral Greek-Turkish relations but it is not wise for you to enter into those details. Perhaps, eventually, you could. Why don't you ask them what their intent is after achieving a Cyprus settlement? If they say the rest can be put off into the future, that would be all right with us. If they enumerate other areas you should say that you don't believe the Greeks will make serious concessions since they will have already done so on Cyprus. If the negotiations achieve some success, then perhaps these other issues can be discussed later.

Secretary: First, we ought to consider putting these issues off for a number of years. Second, if there is some success, then perhaps we could link the two. Which would you prefer?

Bitsios: Obviously, it is better to settle all that can be settled.

Secretary: I don't know what the balance should be. Perhaps we could link if there is a potential advantage to Greece.

Bitsios: Of course.

Secretary: We will try for separation however.

Bitsios: On the continental shelf, we have always wanted to negotiate on the basis of the 1958 treaty.⁴ Then we could negotiate as other countries have on the basis of law and not guns. Second, there is the question of the islands and their remilitarization and, third there is the question of the minorities problem dealt with on the basis of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. There are a hundred thousand Turks remaining in Thrace while most of the Greeks have been displaced. Those Greeks who remain must be protected and perhaps the Turks should be exchanged.

Secretary: You mean exchange populations?

Bitsios: Yes, that perhaps would be easier but it would present a moral problem. It would also undermine Makarios' view that there should be no exchange of population on Cyprus.

Secretary: Yes, if you are going to exchange populations, then the principle could be applied to Cyprus and the argument that the population should be separated there.

Bitsios: It would be very cynical of us to sacrifice this principle at the expense of Cyprus.

Secretary: What do you think we can get out of political talks?

Bitsios: Perhaps we could discuss some of these issues. The Turks want two zones. There is a question of how large the area will be. It must be below 30 percent. Denktash wants to be head of an autonomous Turkish administration. We think Denktash speaks more authoritatively than Gunes.

Secretary: We think Denktash follows Ankara. There are two roads we can take—either move to reduce the Turkish zone or try to get a cantonal solution but I must tell you that I do not believe a cantonal arrangement is now acceptable. It is a great pity that we could not have gotten this matter discussed seriously last August. The trouble was that Callaghan wanted to move too quickly because he thought a success would help them in their election. I have one worry in this situation and that is that every time I take a step I will become the

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 67.

whipping boy of the Greek Government. You have got Demetrapoulos working with Papandreou. By the way, the Soviet strategy is clear. First, they want to internationalize the whole problem. Second, they would not mind seeing a disaffection by Turkey from the West if the Turks break with us and that is what will happen if the Greek-Americans succeed.

Bitsios: The danger is always there but why will the Turks turn to the Soviets? We cannot accept gestures as a price for a bizonal solution.

Secretary: Can't we talk of a federal solution—not bizonal and leave open whether there are two or five cantons?

Bitsios: But the Turks must learn that we won't accept a bizonal arrangement.

Secretary: Should I tell this to the Turks that you won't accept?

Bitsios: We accept a federal solution on a geographic basis. They should also open Famagusta and allow refugees to return there. We have given \$20 million since July for the refugees.

Secretary: I don't think they will take 40,000 back. I have been urging some gestures and you say that you can only talk about a cantonal solution.

Bitsios: Yes, but we are prepared to negotiate. Provided you make it clear to the other side that we don't accept a bizonal solution, we are prepared to discuss the number of cantons and we feel the Gunes plan offers a good basis.

Secretary: Let us find a formula that both sides can understand. First, the Turks get some kind of federal solution. Second, the Greeks get some symbolic gesture and a process of negotiation. Let me emphasize to you that there is no law of nature that we have to be involved in this situation.

Bitsios: We all belong to the same family. In any case, this is not just one visit. If you fail to get agreement on a cantonal solution, we must try again.

Secretary: Well, we can try first to get some small gesture moving; second, to get agreement to start political talks; and, third, to discuss a federal solution on a geographic basis. While we have a benevolent attitude toward the cantonal plan I am not sure it will be accepted.

Bitsios: They will make public the fact of Greece yielding. They will say we have accepted the principle.

Secretary: You want us to argue in favor of the cantonal solution but there has to be some outcome—some movement.

Bitsios: If the Greeks have accepted a geographic basis before the elections, that's as far as we can move.

Secretary: We support Caramanlis very strongly and want him to succeed.

Bitsios: The best thing from our point of view would be a silent visit with the contacts continuing. We don't want the Turks to announce anything.

Secretary: For the first ten days after the first attack everyone in the United States wanted us to attack Sampson and the junta but we did not wish to encourage the Turks to move.

Bitsios: No, but you have assets to use with the Turks.

Secretary: But these must be played in the negotiations.

Bitsios: You can tell the Turks that you have seen Bitsios and that you can confirm that the Greeks are prepared to envisage a process that will lead to geographic federation. Second, that you can't go as far as saying bizonal for fear of it being taken as partition. Third, that they are looking at the bizonal problems and the enlargement of the areas and are prepared to start discussing on the basis of the Gunes plan but they cannot accept 35 percent of the island.

Secretary: But not 17 percent either. I don't think we should ask for many gestures at this time. After we hear their view we can then consult again with you. What should we announce?

Bitsios: After you have had your meeting, perhaps you could send Hartman to tell us what the results were, particularly if you have succeeded in getting acceptance for a cantonal solution.

Secretary: The Turks negotiate like Israel. They sell every inch. Suppose the Turks accept not to have one large zone but rather something like the Gunes plan?

Bitsios: We could accept to have _____⁵ number of cantons and one could be fairly big.

Secretary: What is the difference between the first and second points? A geographic basis is in the first point and the second deals with the bizonal question. Why do we have to say that? On the general question of the visit, this can be a quiet visit. Maybe we should suggest that political talks start without preconditions. Would you be willing to come to the States?

Bitsios: Yes.

Secretary: American pressure can produce a settlement but there is going to be a massive fight on the aid restriction with respect to Turkey because that will mean that our pressure will do no good. You should know, however, that we will use our capital to help Greece. We know that a settlement will involve concessions but we will try to find a solution acceptable to Greece.

⁵ Omission in the original.

Bitsios: The Greeks will understand your position but they must have some sign of sympathy, some impression that they will not be let down.

Secretary: I will be in touch with you through Kubisch. This will be a brief meeting with the Turks so that we should not expect too much. I will try to help move along the cantonal solution and to get political talks started and we may discuss some gestures.

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, November 6, 1974, 1410Z.

3905. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Turkey's Partitionist Moves in Cyprus.

1. Before your arrival in Ankara,² we will be sending you for background current, detailed information on Turkish actions within its zone of occupation in Cyprus. From our vantage—and this will perhaps be relevant to your discussions—Turkey is moving in a direction contrary to its public statements which favor a Cyprus that is independent, sovereign, with a federal structure and territorial integrity.

2. What we see happening ever more clearly day by day is a forced division of the island: military, ethnic, economic, and administrative. We are witnessing the creation of a mainland, not a Turkish Cypriot Government, as the Turkish Cypriots increasingly complain.

3. I feel this bodes ill for future stability between Greece and Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The situation on Cyprus itself is already quite tense enough and will remain so for a long time to come because of the passions engendered by past summer's events and reciprocal cruelties. If in addition there is focused on the line of rigid division and confrontation which the Turks are bringing into being on the island the inheritance of millenia of Greco-Turkish hostilities, I fear no Cyprus solution or stabilized relationship between Greece and Turkey will be durable.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 4. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Kissinger did not go to Ankara because of the October 17 Congressional vote to cut off military aid to Turkey.

4. The contradiction between Turkish words and Turkish deeds leads us to feel that to a degree at least we are being trifled with. We wonder anew whether it is not the Turkish General Staff rather than civilian leadership which has the greater influence on Turkey's action in Cyprus. Ambassador Macomber would be in the better position to comment on this.

Crawford

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 13, 1974, 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Archbishop Makarios

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Deputy Assistant Secretary Stabler
Mr. William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Cyprus

Archbishop Makarios
Ambassador Dimitriou
Mr. Angelides

(The first 25 minutes of the conversation were tête-à-tête between the Secretary and the Archbishop.)²

The Secretary (to Stabler): Do we now have a Turkish Government?

Stabler: No. A Prime Minister has been designated but he has not yet formed a government.

The Secretary: Then there is no Foreign Minister?

Stabler: No, not yet.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved in S/S on November 16. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² No record of this portion of the conversation has been found.

The Secretary: Will the government have the support of the parties?

Stabler: Supposedly it will, but it would be to some extent a caretaker government.

The Secretary: Would it be able to negotiate?

Stabler: If it is merely to prepare for elections it is doubtful.

The Secretary: When are the elections?

Stabler: Probably next spring.

Makarios: This is very unfortunate.

I get the impression from the Secretary of State that we have agreed on a solution because we have agreed on certain views I have presented.

The Secretary: I have explained to the Archbishop the missed opportunity for a solution last August.

Makarios: The Secretary indicated that a solution would be postponed until after the Greek elections.

The Secretary: No, that was not the point. Since October we have been involved and have obtained gestures but our Congress intervened³ and caused the postponing of my visit to Ankara. This delayed negotiations. By the time things were ready here the Ecevit government was not in a position to receive me. We are prepared to continue the course I outlined. We want a settlement that meets the needs of the parties. I cannot claim that there has been any progress until we have talked with the Turkish Government.

We have not foreclosed the kind of solution proposed by His Beatitude. I pointed out that the possibilities for progress in negotiations on behalf of various other parties who have sought our help were on the basis of good faith. After the Greek elections we will not accept any more pressures of the type we have had. This comment is not directed at the Archbishop.

There is now a difficulty in that until we talk to the Turks we do not know the dimensions of the problems. In any case, U.S. influence will be needed for any solution even if it is to reduce the size of the Turkish zone in a bizonal solution. We know that negotiations will involve an active U.S. role in which concessions will be substantially on the Turkish side.

(Chanting is audible from the street.)

Are those some of my students?

In the course of negotiations, I will be able to see better the terms of the solution that we might support.

Do you have anything to add, Joe?

³ Reference is to the Congressional vote on October 17 to cut off military aid to Turkey.

Sisco: I have just been explaining to Ambassador Dimitriou our regret that your visit to Ankara was not possible since there had been prospects for some movement forward at that time.

Makarios: I forgot to say that a reduction of Turkish troops on the island would not necessarily be considered to be in our interest since it might be better to have a large number of troops remain there to increase the Turkish economic problem.

The Secretary: Will you be saying that on TV?

Makarios: No.

The Secretary: There are two phases that will be necessary: one would be the movement in the direction of negotiations, and, two, would be political talks in which we can see the possible outcome. Without such talks we are only dealing with theory. To get talks going there have to be developments in Turkey. I told the Archbishop that in connection with the NATO meeting I would perhaps be prepared to go to Ankara to continue our efforts or, if not that, to meet with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers who will be at the NATO meeting.

160. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 16, 1974.

SUBJECT

- (1) Cyprus; (2) Potential Points of Misunderstanding between the EC and the US;
- (3) Energy Conservation; (4) Consultations in the Event of a New Mid-East War;
- (5) Trade Bill; (6) Cargo Preference Bill

PARTICIPANTS

Great Britain

Sir Peter Ramsbotham, The Ambassador of Great Britain

Mr. Jeremy Q. Greenstock, First Secretary, Embassy of Great Britain

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Wells Stabler, The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Miss Anne Pinkney, Country Desk Officer for Norway and Iceland (Notetaker)

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pinkney and approved in S on December 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

(1) *Cyprus*

Sir Peter: Callaghan knows that you will be away from Washington for two weeks and wanted me to get your views on various matters, especially as there will be a meeting of the Nine in Paris this week. For this meeting, it will be helpful to have your views. By the way, Callaghan has sent you a message on Cyprus which you have probably not had time to see yet.²

The Secretary: The system in the Department is designed so that I shall never see it. Could you tell me, in essence, what it says?

Sir Peter: There are actually several matters that I would like to deal with. First, a brief word on Cyprus. Second, I want to go over some concerns that Callaghan has, and I share, about emerging situations that could potentially lead to misunderstandings between the US and the EC. The first has to do with the debate in the UN, the second with the Europe/Arab dialogue . . .

The Secretary: I am glad that it is not to be a political dialogue . . .

Sir Peter: . . . and the third with the Yamani-French proposal.

The Secretary: What did Callaghan's message on Cyprus have to say?

Mr. Stabler: It gives Callaghan's views on what may happen when Makarios goes to Greece toward the end of the month and refers to what Makarios has been saying about his talks with us.

Sir Peter: In the message, Callaghan says that, in view of the political situation in Greece, it is probably best to let things rest for the time being. In Callaghan's view, the Turks will insist that the solution be a bi-regional geographical division. We have heard from Bitsios that discussions are going well. We believe the Turks will probably not settle for any solution other than the bi-regional one. We realize that this will be extremely difficult for the Greeks to accept publicly, but, as we read the situation, it would appear that if the Greeks indicated privately to the Turks that a solution along these lines could be discussed, it would be o.k. We are, however, concerned because the Cypriot Foreign Minister has told Callaghan that Makarios believes that the US is holding out some hope that a cantonal or multi-regional approach might still be feasible.

The Secretary: My one desire when Makarios is here is to keep him from going downstairs and blasting what we are trying to do—to get him out of the country in peace. He has at least improved his position to the extent of reducing his demands from twenty cantons to five.

² Ramsbotham transmitted a letter from Callaghan to Kissinger on November 15. (Ibid., Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File)

Mr. Stabler: In the last proposal I thought he also used the figure of ten.

The Secretary: He asked me to back five. I told him I would have no objection if such a solution were obtainable but I made it clear that, in my judgment, it was not, and that a settlement along the lines of a bi-zonal arrangement would prove to be the only acceptable one. Makarios then said that the U.S. can make the Turks accept anything we want them to; this is simply not true.

Sir Peter: The best solution, of course, would be to prevent Makarios from going back.

The Secretary: I agree, but this will never be. His efforts to get me to support his five cantonal plan have no chance, but I did not come out flatly and say this. In this way he could not say that I had insisted on a bi-zonal arrangement. Makarios is trying to turn us around by saying what he has. It is better for me to give my opinion after I have talked to the Turks—if I ever talk to them. But, in any case, you can assure Callaghan we are in total agreement on this matter.

Sir Peter: If Karamanlis gets 50% of the vote today, the meeting of Clerides, Makarios and Karamanlis will take place on November 24. It is important to get Karamanlis to say that the Greek Government privately accepts the bi-regional solution. Clerides, showing much courage I think, has already stated publicly that this solution is not impossible. This is the solution that Callaghan will be supporting at the tri-partite meeting.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): It seems to me that I should send a message to Karamanlis in connection with that meeting, pointing out that I do not believe that he will want Cyprus around his neck forever. Tell him that I am willing to help, but that there must be a realistic objective which would have to be a bi-zonal federation. We would work to reduce the size of the Turkish zone and seek a strengthened federal government. We are prepared to help to achieve this either through the Clerides–Denktash talks or as part of a more general settlement of Greek-Turkish issues.

Sir Peter: We do not think that this weak Turkish Government would be willing to start negotiations unless it received a private assurance, rather than a public one, that the Greek Government was willing to discuss a bi-regional federation.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): See to it that such a message is prepared and sent to me on the plane.³ Wells is one of the few who will write a message for me just as instructed—most in the

³ The message was sent in telegrams 15174 and 15182 to Athens, November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850023–2542 and P850023–2540)

Department think that my instructions are only an interruption to what they were in the process of doing!

Sir Peter: Also on Cyprus, we are concerned about the prospect of opening the Nicosia Airport and the possibility that the Russians might try to get in on that. This problem is also mentioned in Callaghan's message to you. We are prepared to pull out all the stops to prevent this from happening.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): Aren't we acting on that?

Mr. Stabler: Yes, we are. We have asked Macomber to do something about this matter. You know that the Cypriots have sent a delegation to Moscow.

The Secretary: In spite of what we have been doing, might the Cypriots do it anyway?

Sir Peter: We have a plane . . .

The Secretary: The Greeks seem to take great pleasure in seeing the Turks get hit—they liked our Congressional resolution even though it was against them too.

Mr. Stabler: We are trying to get some movement on the airport situation.

The Secretary: Do we know the Soviets will be kept out if the Nicosia Airport is opened?

Sir Peter: The Turks have opened a small airfield in their zone and the Soviets have established service there with a Yak plane. The British think that the service which they are offering the Cypriots is as good.

The Secretary: Would that mean the end of the Yak service?

Sir Peter: The Turks are telling us that they want to settle this issue as part of the overall political solution. I think that we must sit down and talk straight to them as NATO allies, asking them if they really want to establish a Soviet base on Cyprus.

The Secretary: If we can be sure that the Soviets cannot use the Nicosia Airport if it is opened . . .

Mr. Stabler: We have made our point of view clear to the Cypriots.

The Secretary: Be very sure that they understand it. Tell them again.

Sir Peter: We will do anything to keep the Soviets out. The general problem now is how we move from the present stalemate; how we stop people from making statements which just make things more difficult.

The Secretary: How about bringing the whole matter up in the upcoming NATO meetings?

Sir Peter: Yes. That is an excellent suggestion. That would give Karamanlis time to think. Callaghan will probably be talking to the Nine about this.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

161. **Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**¹

Nicosia, November 19, 1974, 1800Z.

4109. For Secretary from Ambassador. Department pass Athens and Ankara. Subj: Secretary's Message to Clerides. Ref: State 253547.²

1. Summary: Clerides welcomed your message on March [November] 13 meeting with Makarios³ and your encouragement of his role. His preference is that Karamanlis press Makarios not to return and that Denktash be given greater latitude by Turkey, in which case he feels a realistic solution can be quickly reached. Failing this, he insists that at minimum Makarios [garble] Athens should be committed in writing on the nature of a solution to be pursued and his signature of it. He says we need not worry about a Soviet air service in Cyprus. He leaves November 20 for London to brief Makarios at latter's request, and to brief Callaghan. His discussion with Denktash on Nicosia airport reopening looks mildly promising. End summary.

2. I delivered your oral message to Clerides evening November 19. Clerides asked me to convey to you the following reply.

3. "Please tell Dr. Kissinger that I express sincere thanks for everything he has done and for encouragement he has given me. I fully agree with his evaluation. Although a number of solutions may be tried premised on a geographical federation, my belief is also that Turks will not agree to anything unless there is a bizonal federation or a cohesive Turkish area in the north with a substantial opening to the sea. Just cantons will not satisfy them. Perhaps they could accept something like Gunes' proposal in Geneva provided there are two basic zones, possibly one sub-zone in the north, a few cantons elsewhere. The total Turkish areas may not be the 34 percent Gunes proposed but will certainly have to be somewhere between 23 and 25 percent.

4. With regard to Makarios' return, my feeling is that his presence here will not help the situation. His public statements would not be constructive. If he returns, it will be with exactly the same entourage

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 4. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 253547 to Nicosia, November 17, Kissinger summarized a discussion with Makarios in which he told the Archbishop that his return to Cyprus in the next few weeks might set back progress toward a negotiated settlement. Kissinger also emphasized the U.S. belief that only a bizonal arrangement seemed realistic and practical. (Ibid., Box 2, Cyprus, Nodis 2)

³ See Document 159.

as before. There is the risk of his militant opponents being persecuted by his supporters who have substantial quantities of arms. Certainly his opponents will react violently.

5. My problem is that I cannot publicly take a position on his return because his supporters may then start trouble. This again will lead to a clash with anti-Makarios elements. The only possibility is for Karamanlis to exercise maximum pressure to dissuade him from coming.

6. There is of course the possibility that the Archbishop may ignore advice from Karamanlis and then I do not see how he could stop him. Then what I see as a problem that could be solved realistically, in a short time, particularly if Denktash had more authority from Ankara, may become extremely difficult because my authority will also be diminished. The happiest development would have been to have Makarios stay away and Denktash be given greater freedom of action. With both of us operating with limited authority, there is a real danger of stalemate.

7. If Makarios' return cannot be stopped, at least I hope that in our coming Athens meetings Karamanlis will insist that the Archbishop sign a memorandum on the policy to be followed. I have already told the GOG that if the Archbishop returns without a signed memorandum authorizing me on behalf of the GOG and himself to negotiate on the basis of a biregional geographic federation, after trying for a short time the cantonal theory, I would not accept a continuing role as negotiator. From the Athens meetings there must be at least an agreement on procedure and objectives and a firm commitment from the Archbishop that he will sign a solution. I have told the GOG that I would not accept a situation in which the Archbishop returns, I negotiate a solution and then he refuses to sign it. I assume he would accompany his refusal to sign by resignation. This would throw the country into an election. Public controversy would hinge on signing the solution and in the end no Greek Cypriot could sign. In my view, either the Archbishop should decide now to resign or agree to enter into firm commitments with the GOG on policy and the signing of a solution."

8. As to the final paragraph of your message regarding introduction of a Soviet air service in Cyprus, Clerides said to tell you "don't worry".

9. Clerides spoke with deep gratification of Karamanlis' election victory. He is confident that his earlier understandings with Karamanlis on the nature of a solution (para 5, Nicosia 3910)⁴ hold firm. In his view,

⁴ Dated November 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850093-2637)

Karamanlis will try to get the Cyprus problem resolved as quickly as possible so that he can go on to the matters of major concern to him: the consolidation of the new democracy in Greece, the development of a good relationship with Turkey, and a careful return to NATO. Clerides sees starting point on all these as early progress in the Cyprus negotiation.

10. Clerides confirmed to me that he will leave tomorrow for London for meetings with Makarios and Callaghan. Trip was at repeated insistence of Makarios who is asking to be briefed in person on situation in Cyprus.

11. Clerides asked again for our evaluation of report emanating from Soviet/Czech sources that Turks would stage a land/sea commando operation to “rescue” Turks in south before end November. I said we had nothing that pointed to this. Clerides replied that he, too, tended discount report but was a little concerned because of information that Turkish forces in Cyprus had been placed on alert which not scheduled to end until November 29.

12. On Nicosia airport reopening, Clerides said that in reply to his earlier suggestion for a joint Greek Cypriot-Turk Cypriot civil aviation board to assist a UN/ICAO interim management team, Denktash at negotiating session November 18 had come up with a constructive thought. Denktash had noted near-collisions thanks to current confusion between non-cooperating Turkish and Cypriot FIR centers. Subject to Ankara’s approval he had suggested that as first step in cooperation looking toward implementation of Clerides’ proposal for airport reopening, Greek and Turkish control centers be relocated and amalgamated at Nicosia airport. Clerides had said he would be quite willing to talk on this basis as soon as green light received from Ankara.

Crawford

162. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal¹

DIAIAPPR 153-74

Washington, December 6, 1974.

MAKARIOS' RETURN TO CYPRUS*Summary*

President Makarios has announced that he will return to Cyprus on 7 December. Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders have reportedly reached a common negotiating position on Cyprus, but Makarios has yet to give his written endorsement and is apparently allowing himself maximum maneuvering room. The Cypriot Police and National Guard will provide the Archbishop's security. Although anti-Makarios factions will not now forcibly oppose Makarios' return for the sake of unity, dissident elements could attempt to assassinate him. EOKA-B and the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) will respond to Athens, which has backed the Archbishop's return. Athens will withdraw its support, however, if Makarios reneges on agreements made to assure his return. Turkey believes Makarios' return will lead to hostilities in the Greek sector and are prepared to initiate a military operation to liberate Turkish Cypriots in the south. Turkish forces on Cyprus and some air and Jandarma elements on the mainland have been placed on alert. No Turkish offensive will be undertaken unless Turkish-Cypriot safety in the Greek sector is threatened, or they are not allowed to migrate north.

Background

Recent events made it necessary for Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders to reach a common position on Cyprus so there would be no misinterpretation by the Turks as to who had responsibility for actions on the island. Agreement on a Cyprus negotiating position with Makarios returning as President, and Clerides as the negotiator was reached at a 30 November Athens meeting between Makarios, Acting Cypriot President Clerides, and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis. Although previously calling for a multi-cantonal federation, Makarios reportedly agreed to a geographic federation based on one major Turkish zone and possibly one or two cantons. However, he deferred formalizing the agreement at that time and reportedly will not sign the agreement until after his arrival on the island. Believing biregional federation to be the only viable solution, the Turks are adamantly opposed to a

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974-1977, Box 5, Europe, Cyprus 1974. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared by Robert P. Myers, DI-5. Released by Colonel John J. Madigan, Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence/National Military Intelligence Center.

cantonal system. Makarios has recently been publicly noncommittal, allowing himself maximum maneuvering room for the negotiation. There is no guarantee that he will honor any final negotiated settlement achieved by Clerides.

Massive crowds of Greek Cypriots are expected to greet Archbishop Makarios upon his 7 December arrival on Cyprus. They see him as the only leader capable of restoring their rights. Makarios realizes the difficulties that face him upon his return to Cyprus but feels confident. Due to his unpredictability, it is impossible to gauge accurately the course of events that will take place.

Greek Reaction to Makarios' Return

The Cypriot Police (CYPOL) and the CNG have been charged with the Archbishop's personal security and the island's internal security, respectively. They are believed capable of performing their missions, and Makarios' Tactical Reserve Force (TRU), a special unit used before the coup to combat EOKA-B, has not been activated.

While most Greek officers in the CNG believe that Makarios is dangerous and therefore do not support his return at this time, they will respond to orders from Athens. Athens has backed the Archbishop's return since to do otherwise would evoke an unfavorable response from the populace on the mainland. However, Athens will probably withdraw its support of Makarios if he reneges on agreements made to assure his return. Makarios fears the Turks, and the threat of such a loss will influence any decision he makes.

Although the anti-Makarios factions of which EOKA-B is the best organized and most feared do not approve of his return, they will not interfere for the sake of unity. The enosis movement—union of Cyprus with Greece—reportedly will take a wait-and-see approach and will follow instructions received from the Greek Government. The possibility remains, however, that dissident elements within the organization could attempt to assassinate him, triggering widespread Greek-Cypriot civil disorders and probably leading to renewed Turkish military actions.

[less than 1 line not declassified] expects some minimal anti-Makarios activity after his arrival. The pro-Makarios factions—Lyssarides' para-military force and the Communist Party (AKEL)—will gain sufficient strength and confidence after Makarios' return. This could lead to a confrontation between them and EOKA-B. Makarios must control his supporters if internecine fighting is to be prevented.

Turkish Reaction To Makarios' Return

Makarios' poor treatment of Turkish Cypriots and his obstructionism during six years of intercommunal talks aimed at giving the Turkish Cypriots civil rights are the primary reasons for Turkey's opposition to him. Turkey has attempted to pressure the Greek Government into

obstructing his return, warning that Ankara will not negotiate with Clerides if they believe that he is a front for Makarios.

The safety of Turkish Cypriots in the south will be the main factor influencing a decision for a renewed Turkish offensive. Clerides and Denktash have made progress on the refugee issue and several thousand Turks have been quietly allowed to migrate to the north. If Makarios tries to stop this or if his return leads to disorders among Greek Cypriots, which threaten Turkish Cypriot safety, Turkey will initiate a new "peace offensive" aimed at liberating "once and for all" Turkish Cypriots in the Greek-controlled area.

Turkish forces are on alert, and military exercises, from which their forces could launch an attack with little or no warning, are planned. Other precautionary measures include alerting selected mainland air force units and a 5,000-man Jandarma contingent for movement to Cyprus should hostilities resume.

Turkey will accept no delaying tactics by Makarios and will proclaim an independent Turkish-Cypriot Republic if necessary. Turkey hopes to avoid this, however, since it would preclude any Turkish influence in Greek Cypriot affairs and would institutionalize Greek military presence on the island.

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 11, 1974, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Ambassador Kubisch

Nelson Ledsky (notetaker)

Greek

Foreign Minister Bitsios

Mr. E. Stoforopoulos, Chef du Cabinet to Foreign Minister Bitsios

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation: The Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74-4/75. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ledsky. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Brussels Hilton.

Meeting began with a five minute picture taking session with newsmen.

The Secretary: Having your picture taken with me may ruin you in Greece.

Bitsios: That's all right. I am very glad to see you again. I am also glad to see Ambassador Kubisch. We are looking forward to having him back in Athens and I want you to know we have very much appreciated his courtesy and abilities in dealing with our problems. (Smiling) Perhaps you should let him remain in Greece and not call him back to Washington where some misunderstanding has arisen.

The Secretary: We have sent you one of our very best. He has my total confidence and in addition is a personal friend. I understand, however, that you need 2,000 police to protect him there.

Bitsios: Oh, no. There was some kind of big demonstration . . .

The Secretary: Do you think I would draw a crowd if I arrived in Athens now?

Bitsios: I would hope you would draw a cheering crowd when you come. We want to find a formula that would enable that to happen. I don't regard that as an impossibility, or even overly difficult task. In the last several weeks we have settled a great number of our previous political problems.

The Secretary: I want to say at the outset that we were delighted by the outcome of the recent Greek elections. The results have given your Prime Minister a relatively free hand.

Bitsios: You must understand, of course, that the new Government has inherited a great number of problems from the previous regime.

The Secretary: I hope it is understood in Athens that I am a great admirer of Caramanlis. I am really delighted with recent developments in Athens. We want Caramanlis to succeed very much in the important work he has undertaken.

Bitsios: I appreciate those remarks, but I want you to understand that we not only have pressing political problems, but great economic difficulties as well.

The Secretary: We are prepared to be of any help that we can in this area.

Bitsios: Thank you very much.

The Secretary: I am not sure what we can do in the economic area, but in principle we are prepared to be helpful. I am sure we can get congressional support.

Bitsios: Within the past year we have, like most countries, suffered from the marked increase in petroleum prices. This has cost us some \$400 million already. Then came the coup in Cyprus last summer, which

absolutely wrecked our tourist season, and cost us countless millions in revenue.

The Secretary: Have we had any detailed discussions with you on economic questions?

Hartman: No.

The Secretary: What I want you to know is that we want Caramanlis to succeed very much. We are disposed to be helpful. Any program undertaken in the economic field should in my judgment be on a substantial enough scale to succeed. You can, if you wish, make an approach through Ambassador Kubisch at any time.

Bitsios: Thank you very much for these remarks. I shall pass them to the Prime Minister.

What is really encouraging is that we are beginning to see the outlines of our political questions in clearer focus. We settled our main domestic problems with the elections. We have now met with the Cypriots, and have obtained their full views. These are not, I might add, very much different from the description I gave you in Rome in early November.² Roughly speaking, there is now agreement on common lines for a Cyprus solution. There must be a federal system which provides for a main Turkish area around Kyrenia and a smaller number of Turkish cantons.

The Secretary: Let me halt you here, so that we can be somewhat more precise. All of the Turkish areas would be in the north?

Bitsios: Yes, the main area would be in the north as would the smaller Turkish cantons. (Bitsios then produced a map with the proposed Turkish areas marked on it.)

The Secretary: Has Makarios accepted this kind of a geographic division.

Bitsios: Yes, he is prepared to accept it. The Turks would get a federated system on a geographic basis. That is what they have been requesting.

The Secretary: It is, of course, not decisive what it is called.

Bitsios: There are a number of advantages to this kind of solution. The number of displaced persons would be relatively small. The Turks would have concentrations of their population in the areas they desire. The lines could be negotiated, but the Turkish territory would have to be closer to the general population percentage on the island. That means closer to a 80–20 split. There is also the fact, which I didn't appreciate in Rome, about the management problems the Turks have had in running their area of Cyprus. With this kind of division, they should

² See Document 157.

be able to manage their territory without jeopardizing the general economic life of the island.

The Prime Minister wanted me to tell you that we are ready to move for a breakthrough now. We want to start negotiations in Nicosia as soon as possible. This is the time to act—this moment must not be lost.

The Secretary: I agree completely.

Bitsios: Secondly, the Prime Minister wanted me to assure you that there is broad acceptance in the Greek community of a federated solution. The Prime Minister also wanted me to indicate to you that if you did not get good results from your discussions with Esenbel here in Brussels, he would welcome your traveling to Ankara in the very nearest future. It is our view that you could have some personal success as well out of such a visit. We have confided to you and only to you on this matter. We are convinced that if the negotiations can be started, many of the problems in other political areas can be quickly solved.

The Secretary: Before commenting in detail on your presentation, let me explain some of my own problems. First on the domestic side. The question of an aid cut off does not primarily involve Turkey, but goes to the question of executive authority over the conduct of foreign relations. If we permit Congress to dictate the tactics to be employed in foreign policy, we will lose control. It is for this reason we cannot yield. In our negotiations with the Soviets for example, we are exchanging aide-mémoires every day. We cannot have a situation, however, where congressional committees call up our bureaucrats and demand to know what our negotiating tactics are. I know that no Greek Government can support us on the question of aid to Turkey, and I would not ask for such support. As for a possible visit to Ankara, you will appreciate that I cannot go following these NATO meetings. There are scheduled meetings with the French in Martinique. I could perhaps, if the situation warrants, go to Ankara in early January.

Bitsios: Do you think there is any prospect of making a breakthrough here?

The Secretary: Let's define that a little more clearly. I tried out with the Turks the idea of a large Turkish area in the north and some smaller Turkish cantons in the south. The Turks were adamantly opposed. It is my impression that this is a weak Turkish Government, and a relatively unimaginative foreign minister who is not empowered to make decisions here in Brussels.

At some future point it may therefore be necessary to go to Ankara. At that moment, the threat of an aid cut off could be helpful to my negotiating position. My intention is to talk to Congress about this next week when I return. My objective would not be to get an obligatory aid cut off, but to have the flexibility to use such a cut off as a threat.

I am very pleased to hear your position as you outlined it. Your feeling that the negotiations should start quickly and that you can accept some form of geographic federation are positive elements.

Bitsios: Okay. We should of course avoid getting involved in semantics over what an acceptable geographic federation is.

The Secretary: I agree, but I got the impression this morning from my talks with the Turks³ that they might be willing to pay something in concrete terms for some acceptable language on geographic federalism.

Where is Stabler?

Hartman: In view of the numbers here, Wells stayed back.

The Secretary: I have discovered it always takes five Americans to conduct these conversations. (To Bitsios)—That reminds me have you read the novel called *The Greeks*? It presents a scary picture.

Bitsios: I hope you have read more about Greece than that single book. If not, I'm going to start sending you a whole collection of reading material.

The Secretary: No, I have read much more. As you know, I have been interested primarily in two periods. Classical Greece, and the period around the war for independence. Those are the periods on which I have focused my interest.

Let's go back to the negotiating process. I think the idea of Turkish gesture which we talked about in October and November is no longer important. What we need now is to get the negotiating process started.

Bitsios: Once negotiations start, they will have a momentum of their own.

(Humming noise heard in room.)

The Secretary: What was that?

Hartman: The wind.

The Secretary: I can assure you that we have no recording system here. If there is one, it's strictly Belgian.

Let's go back to the question of how we get the negotiations started. When I saw Mavros in New York in October,⁴ he was concerned about the powers of the federal state. Perhaps the negotiations could begin by discussing two basic issues: (A) alleviation of the conditions of suffering on the island (B) the nature of the federal governmental structure. It seems to me that the stronger the federal structure

³ A report of the breakfast meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P860133-2646.

⁴ See Document 154.

can be, the less fear your side will have of partition as an eventual solution. There is, of course, the question of who should conduct the negotiations. The Turkish side says it doesn't know whom to negotiate with.

Bitsios: That should be obvious. It's Clerides. Clerides was so designated in the communiqué.

The Secretary: Good. We strongly prefer him. There is also a second question. I have no desire to become the fall guy for this entire operation. You know the outcome on Cyprus will not be brilliant. I have never been eager to get in the middle of the negotiations.

Bitsios: I see no reason why you should get yourself in the middle. Once the talks begin between the two sides, they will have a momentum of their own.

The Secretary: What should I do now?

Bitsios: What we need to know is whether the Turks want to negotiate or not.

The Secretary: I can get you an answer on that. One thing I can assure you, the U.S. will use its influence to produce negotiations.

Bitsios: But that is not the real question. The real question is do the Turks wish to negotiate or are they simply playing for time? We have studied the recent statements by Esenbel, and were amused by suggestions that Ankara is leaving a decision about negotiation to Denktash. Everyone knows Denktash decides nothing. Why would they wish to delay? Either to solidify their position on the island, or simply to mark time to see what happens with Makarios.

The Secretary: Probably both.

Bitsios: We have been encouraged by a report we saw from Nicosia in which Ambassador Crawford indicated that the Turks may eventually be preparing to accept some kind of cantonal solution.

The Secretary: I think there is no basis for this. I've seen no such report.⁵ It could happen, of course. I don't exclude anything, but I see no basis for any such conclusion.

Bitsios: Knowing the Turks had such a thought in the back of their mind would help us in moving forward.

The Secretary: I can tell you from today's conversations, that the Turks are absolutely firm. They may have been a shade, but only a shade, less passionate in describing their position than previously. The

⁵ In telegram 4400 from Nicosia, December 9, Crawford reported on Denktash's prepared statement in response to Makarios' return and speech: "In question period Denktash reiterated Turk position that possibility cantonal system no longer acceptable because Greek Cypriots themselves have proven that these do not safeguard security of life and property." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Foreign Minister I saw today seemed weak and not excessively imaginative. My own view is we should not get bogged down in discussing cantonal solutions or bi-zonalism, but move to complete as much of the negotiations as we can and then the geographic arrangement may fall more naturally into place. I can assure you of this: that we will bring pressure to bear on Turkey for a solution better than the present status quo. We are also strongly in favor of early talks.

The real question is how to get negotiations started. We had talked earlier of Turkish gestures. Whatever these gestures would have been, you would have had to say they were unsatisfactory. So I am prepared to turn away from this approach. Let's get the talks started. We can talk about the airport, ports, and perhaps a few other things such as troop withdrawals, perhaps in return for stating the principle of geographic federation. Turkey has indicated it wishes to wait for December 24 to see if Makarios provides a signed mandate to Clerides. As for the United States, I see no reason to press for an announcement here in Brussels.

I intend to see Esenbel this afternoon⁶ and I could put the following points to him: (1) The Greek Government wishes these negotiations conducted through Clerides, who it will back against Makarios. If a disagreement arises between Makarios and Clerides, both the United States and the Greek Government will support the latter. The first subjects to be discussed in a negotiation would be (a) the powers of the Federal Government and (b) relief for the civilian population on the island. Once agreement is reached on these subjects, the negotiations can proceed to other issues.

If I cannot bring about an agreement along these lines here in Brussels, I would be prepared to go to Ankara soon.

Bitsios: I agree. We can discuss the powers of the Federal Government. This is a point where we could begin, but I think you must understand that fairly soon we would have to come to a discussion of territorial arrangements.

The Secretary: It is a pity that Ecevit is still not in power in Turkey. Esenbel is simply not of the same caliber. He is too rigid and unimaginative.

Hartman: The Turks, you must understand, however, have a natural aversion to Makarios.

Bitsios: Turkey holds the key to US/Greek relations. It also holds the key to Greek/NATO relations. You may say that you are giving aid to Turkey for alliance purposes, but the Greek public reads these statements and notes that Turkey uses United States equipment on Cyprus

⁶ A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, P860140-1465.

and may be prepared to use it at a later date against Greece itself. We understand the positions you have taken publicly. We appreciate your need to maintain this line, and if you can get a negotiation process started on Cyprus, we will work for Greece/Turkey détente in other areas.

The Secretary: I have to say that Prime Minister Caramanlis has handled anti-Americanism in Greece magnificently. He has maneuvered with great skill. It is clearly in his interests to have the Cyprus problem settled as quickly as possible so it does not hang over his head. We will support an early solution.

We must at the same time say frankly that these threats to withdraw from NATO or to undermine the United States/Greek bilateral relationship cannot be accepted quietly. We must state our opposition openly.

Bitsios: The actions we have taken in these areas have been forced upon us by public opinion. There are no threats involved, and we have carefully refrained from being provocative or moving precipitously.

The Secretary: All right. To return to Cyprus. Let me see what we can do. You are no longer haggling about gestures. That is very helpful. Let me talk to Esenbel this afternoon. Then, Art, I am afraid, you may have to go to Ankara.

Hartman to Bitsios: Do you think Clerides can work out a satisfactory working arrangement with Makarios?

Bitsios: I think so. They will get along. I don't believe they will have a falling out.

The Secretary: The attitude of Caramanlis which you have outlined this morning is most statesman-like. Frankly I was going to tell you this morning that I would do nothing more and that I saw no basis for making progress here in Brussels. This was based also on the position you have taken on NATO and bilateral issues.

Bitsios: Surely Ambassador Kubisch here has told you how we are considering NATO and other bilateral security issues. Yesterday we delivered a new letter about US bases.⁷ I can assure you there is no pressure intended. We have issued no threats. We spent hours, in fact, in formulating the note delivered yesterday in Washington, and we would not have spent the time if we did not recognize the importance of proceeding in a manner so as to preserve the US/Greek relationship.

The Secretary: You must understand our problem. In the United States we have a threat to the central authority which we must resist.

⁷ While no letter has been found, according to telegram 8808 from Athens, December 11, Karamanlis delivered a policy speech to Parliament in which he said that the Government of Greece was reviewing the status of U.S. bases in Greece but did not intend to interrupt political, cultural, and other relations with the Western world. (Ibid.)

It happens that the Turkish aid question has come up first. We have decided to take on the Congress whenever it wishes to intrude on the issue of foreign policy tactics. This has importance for Greece, for the Middle East, and indeed for the entire future conduct of United States foreign policy. Congressional action on Turkish aid will be completed next week.⁸ My original intention was to do very little here in Brussels. But I will now talk to Esenbel again and then I would like very much to talk to you.

A subsequent meeting was arranged to begin between 10:30–10:45 P.M. this evening.⁹

Bitsios: I have one or two more items I would like to mention. But on the first point you will not tell Esenbel about our interest in early negotiations, will you?

The Secretary: Let me put this matter to Esenbel in my own devious way. I certainly will not give him the impression that you are anxious for negotiations.

Bitsios: Can you tell me anything about the possibilities which we read about of further Turkish military moves?

The Secretary: We simply won't tolerate any, and frankly I don't believe the Turkish Government is strong enough at the present time to undertake any such activity.

Bitsios: I also want to inform you that with respect to the Aegean, we intend to put this matter before the International Court of Justice.

The Secretary: I want you to know that I have sent General Haig to Turkey to warn against any further military moves. I have made the same point to Esenbel today in the strongest terms.

Bitsios: Concerning the NATO meeting, my Government would find it extremely difficult to have it take place in Ankara. Would there be any possibility of your offering Washington as a site?

Hartman: We should perhaps talk to Luns about it.

The Secretary: I will. (To Hartman:) Could you call the Turks and tell them not to talk to Luns about the Cyprus situation at all, because if they do so it will be all over town before the end of the day.

⁸ On December 18 Congress passed the fiscal year 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (S. 3394). A provision in the bill suspended military aid to Turkey until progress was made on the Cyprus issue, but authorized President Ford to delay the cutoff until February 5, 1975. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 858)

⁹ The meeting took place at 11 p.m. Kissinger and Bitsios discussed further particulars for trying to move Greek-Turkish negotiations on Cyprus substantively forward. Kissinger sought support for the emerging idea of the two sides supporting a Clerides–Denktash negotiating framework. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74–4/75)

Bitsios: One last point that concerns Ambassador Kubisch and his statement on the Hill.¹⁰ I want the Ambassador to return to Athens in the best possible circumstances. Could there be a further statement that the United States understands the concerns of the Greek Government on Cyprus and with respect to aid to Turkey?

The Secretary: Something along those lines might be possible, but I want you to know that Ambassador Kubisch said nothing on the Hill with respect to aid to Turkey on my direct instructions.

Bitsios: What about the Humphrey statement implying that based on a statement by a high US official, he could state that the Greek Government would not oppose a continuation of aid to Turkey.

Ambassador Kubisch: I never spoke to Humphrey or, indeed, to any other Senator.

The Secretary: What do we say to the press?

Bitsios: I shall say after the meeting that your interest in a Cyprus settlement is well known, and that you have briefed me in our meeting today on your continuing efforts on this subject.

The Secretary: What should I say?

Bitsios: Anything you wish.

(The Secretary then showed Bitsios the statement made by Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel following the Turkish-US bilateral this morning.)¹¹

The Secretary: The Turkish statement is very bad, but don't worry, we can overcome this by events through the course of the next day or so. You might wish to say that we will meet again later today. I will say that we had a good talk; that we are both agreed that a solution based on conciliation, and on the interests of all parties is highly desirable; that we are aware of the great concern of the Greek Govern-

¹⁰ An apparent reference to remarks Kubisch allegedly made that Greece would not object to continued military aid to Turkey. According to telegram 269679 to Athens, December 9, a prepared response for the day's briefing, which was not used, stated: "Ambassadors Kubisch and Macomber met informally with members of the House subcommittee on Europe on December 5. Concerning allegations that Ambassador Kubisch stated before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives or before other members of the Congress that the Greek Government did not object to the continuation of military aid for Turkey, I [Kissinger] can assure you that such allegations are totally without foundation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

¹¹ According to telegram 9722 from Brussels, December 11, the statement reads: "Turkey and the United States decided on a course of action in October on Cyprus. But unfortunately the action taken by the United States Congress since then had hampered the progress we could make. We are inclined to look forward rather than backward. But I must say the course of action that Turkey had decided to follow might not change and should not change whatever action is taken back in the United States as far as the aid situation is concerned. We are hopeful that we will get to some positive results in the foreseeable future." (Ibid.)

ment for an early settlement which will relieve the human suffering now going on in the island.

About later this evening, I want you to know that if our meeting starts a little late it is because I must attend the Quadripartite Dinner. Since we have nothing to discuss, the meeting may never end.

Bitsios: That is all right. We will meet between 10:30 and 10:45 this evening.

The Secretary: Thank you.

164. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, December 12, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following report to you from Brussels.

"Cyprus: I spent most of today in a series of meetings with the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers and will meet with each of them again later tonight.² My meetings so far have, I think, made progress in moving both the Greeks and the Turks toward the opening of substantive negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Greeks, in particular, have come a long way since last September and have dropped virtually all of their previous prior conditions for the commencement of the substantive negotiations.

"Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios, who spent many years in the Greek Foreign Service, is intelligent, suave and well prepared. He works very closely with Prime Minister Caramanlis and clearly has his full confidence. From what Bitsios said it is very evident that Caramanlis would like to rid himself of the Cyprus problem rapidly and is prepared to have a confrontation with Makarios if that is necessary. Bitsios told me that Greece will back Clerides as the Greek Cypriot negotiator and will support any agreement which Clerides may reach

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-1976, Box 4, HAK to President, 12/10-12/13/74. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The President initialed the memorandum.

² On December 12, Kissinger met with Bitsios at 5:30 p.m. at NATO headquarters (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External December 1974-April 1975) and with Esenbel (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P860140-1512). For the follow-up meetings with Esenbel, see Document 165, and with Bitsios, see Document 166.

with the Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash. Bitsios stressed that if Makarios should disavow an agreement reached by Clerides, Greece will not tolerate this maneuvering. Bitsios said that Greece could not accept the Turkish demand for a bizonal federal solution at this time.

“I had seen Foreign Minister Esenbel before my meeting with Bitsios. Esenbel is also a career diplomat, but he is infinitely less intelligent. As Foreign Minister in a caretaker government with an uncertain future, he does not have the authority, the precision or the decisiveness which was displayed by Bitsios. Esenbel is still accredited as Ambassador to Washington where he has served for almost ten years and where he hopes to return when he is no longer Foreign Minister. In my first meeting with Esenbel I went over with him the continuing determination of the Administration to provide military assistance to Turkey in the mutual interest of both countries. It was clear that Esenbel was not prepared to offer any gestures in light of Congressional actions. This is a position I find understandable, even as I found that the Turkish position was quite rigid with respect to the ultimate outcome of the constitutional structure of the island. They say that they can accept nothing short of a two-zone arrangement, with the Turkish zone in the north being populated by the island’s 135,000 Turkish Cypriots.

“Following the rather encouraging meeting with Bitsios, I again saw Esenbel and put to him the Greek view on the opening of substantive negotiations between Clerides and Denktash. I urged Esenbel to obtain the agreement of his government before we leave Brussels on Friday³ to some announcement that the Greek and Turkish Governments are prepared to have substantive negotiations started on the island. I pointed out that this was an opportunity that Turkey should not miss, particularly since no concessions would be asked of Turkey to agree to this. I also said it would be helpful to our domestic situation. Esenbel was hesitant because he said his government did not trust Archbishop Makarios and was afraid that the Archbishop would pull the rug out from under Clerides. I told Esenbel that if the Greek Government was prepared to support Clerides and he knew that the United States also supported the Clerides–Denktash talks, the position of Makarios was irrelevant. I offered to give him a letter that we would back the outcome of these talks. If things go as planned we may see the beginning of political talks next week.

“This makes the outcome of the Congressional vote very decisive. If aid remains cut off either the negotiations will fail or they will quickly stalemate. On the other hand, we have a chance now to get things moving and I have the impression that Caramanlis is eager for a rapid settlement.

³ December 13.

"These facts cannot be used but I would urge a rapid solution.

"Esenbel is to discuss this matter urgently with Ankara and let me know tomorrow.

"French Attitude on European Security Conference Summit: I have found a very negative attitude here among the allies toward the decision of President Giscard to agree in the communiqué with the Russians to accept a summit meeting of the European Security Conference.

"Giscard has gone further than any other allied country in agreeing to the summit without the condition, that we have always placed, that the results would have to justify that level. Many of the allies, and particularly the Germans, feel that the French have badly compromised the western position for purely domestic reasons. In addition, Giscard has totally aligned the French with the Soviet position on the Middle East and on Cyprus. In both cases we may well have damaged prospects in delicate diplomatic negotiations. It is clear that Giscard's communiqué, as well as his position on energy, are largely an appeal to the left-wing and old Gaullist constituencies in France.

"The result is a policy that differs little, if at all, from Pompidou and Jobert even if his tone is less hostile and his own instincts are not anti-American. I believe that in light of this situation and the strong view here that France has ignored the wider interests of its allies, we should not permit the meetings in Martinique to be portrayed as a great success for Giscard. If the allies should gain the impression that we are rewarding France for its lack of regard for allied interests and indeed treat it as Europe's spokesman, this would be contrary to our basic instincts. I would like to discuss this in much greater detail with you before the Martinique meetings."

165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 12, 1974, 10:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Brussels Hilton.

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ambassador Macomber
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (notetaker)

Turkish
Foreign Minister Esenbel

SUBJECT

US-Turkish Bilateral Meeting, December 12, 1974

The Secretary: (Speaking into the telephone) Get me the White House. (Turning to Esenbel) I want to get an up-to-date reading on what happened in Congress.

Esenbel: I have known and worked with Bitsios before. We were together at the Zurich Conference. He came over to see me today during the NATO lunch. He said that after all we had started together on the Cyprus problem at Zurich and why not go on together now. I said I was ready to talk with him and tomorrow we shall get together without any publicity and alone at some point during the NATO meetings.

The Secretary: That's a good idea.

Esenbel: Yes. I want to test him on the Greek position.

The Secretary: My reading is that Caramanlis wants to get rid of the Cyprus problem as quickly as he can. The Greeks are ready to make major concessions and it is my feeling that they will settle for a bizonal arrangement. They need some face-saving device in the form of a few little cantons near the big one. This is really a bizonal arrangement but one they could accept.

Hartman: The cantons would all be in the north.

The Secretary: Yes. That is true they would be in the north. As a friend of Turkey, I would like to say that if you can organize yourselves to show any flexibility, progress can be made. As I see it, there are two options. The one is a long drawn out political warfare between Greece and Turkey and involving considerable trouble with Makarios. This would of course cause difficulties with US public opinion. In this event you would have to be ready eventually to pay a substantial price. It is important to know when to move. If you can get organized swiftly, then the question can be settled quickly. When I came to Brussels and during my flight over it was my assessment that this process would be a long one. I did not want to get involved because if I were, I would then be blamed for the situation. It is important to test the situation with Clerides and I am willing to help in this regard.

Esenbel: We want you to play a role.

The Secretary: I am not eager for a role.

Esenbel: We want your help.

The Secretary: The more you do, the better we like it. If, on the other hand, you reach a crucial point and we can help, we shall be glad to.

Esenbel: I was not ready for a dialogue with Bitsios but I would not turn one down.

Hartman: It is my feeling that discussions in New York between Gunes and Bitsios were helpful.

Esenbel: Regarding your suggestion that we talked about this morning and yesterday, I have checked with Ankara. I want you to know how we generally feel about the situation in Cyprus. The return of Makarios made a very bad impression.²

(The telephone rings. The Secretary answers a call from the White House and inquires whether our people were lining up the House and Senate conferees. The Secretary completes call and returns to his chair.)

Esenbel: During the past week public opinion in Turkey was very sensitive to Cyprus developments. I was asked why we had not been able to stop Makarios in some way. I was also asked how he had come back and I said he had come back the way he had left; that is, via the UK base. I have to tell you that his return has represented a big problem for us. However, I was able to convince Ankara that even if Makarios came back, we should let Denktash negotiate. Ankara told me that if Dr. Kissinger gave his assurances, and I told them about the letter, then the thing to do was to try the Clerides–Denktash talks and ignore Makarios.

The Secretary: Well, you will get a letter from me.

Esenbel: That is why I was able to convince Ankara and that is why there can be talks.

The Secretary: You are a tough negotiator. What do you want me to do?

Esenbel: No.

The Secretary: I will be glad to give you a letter and I think it will be helpful to you. The practical problem is that you must negotiate with Makarios and why is it not better to do it under these circumstances. When we had breakfast yesterday morning I had no intention of letting anything happen here because there seemed to be no prospect.

Esenbel: The principle of negotiation is okay. However the offer for negotiations should come from Clerides to Denktash.

The Secretary: We can arrange that.

Esenbel: Clerides should tell Denktash that he is empowered to negotiate.

The Secretary: When?

Esenbel: I think in about two or three days time. We shall warn Denktash to expect a call from Clerides.

² Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7.

The Secretary: Shall we say next Tuesday?³

Esenbel: That's all right.

The Secretary: Yes. Tuesday. (turning to Hartman) Why is it that our Ambassador in Nicosia feels he must leave?

Hartman: We told him he could come home for Christmas to see his family.

The Secretary: What a tough Service! Tell him he can stay a few days longer and we will get instructions to him.

Esenbel: What should Clerides and Denktash discuss? It is our view that he should discuss humanitarian questions plus political matters. However, we are not too inclined to define exactly what all these points should be. Ankara would agree to start with the airport, about which Callaghan is very anxious. I promised him we would start on this.

The Secretary: Callaghan knows nothing about our conversations. When UNDOF was extended Waldheim got all the credit. I suppose when the airport opens, Callaghan will get all the credit. There must be political talks. If Caramanlis wants a settlement, then there must be political talks and not just talks about such matters as the airport. The domestic situation also requires this. When the political talks start then we can draw back from the matter. From the domestic political viewpoint it is important to have political talks. Also Turkey is in a good position. Turkey makes no concessions and yet there will be talks. Before, Turkey was ready to offer concessions, then there was a Congressional action and now Turkey will offer no concessions.

Esenbel: All of this will give Denktash an opportunity to test the good faith of Clerides. We should start with pragmatic matters such as the airport plus Farmagusta port. You have mentioned discussing the powers of the central government. I do not exclude this, but it should not be the first item. Everybody is much more worried about the economic situation.

The Secretary: This should perhaps not be the first item, but it should be an early item.

Esenbel: Okay. Pragmatic questions first plus political matters. But I will not tell Bitsios about Ankara's position because we want to be sure that the Greeks will accept the bizonal solution. What is the sense of discussing the central government's powers and let other practical questions fall behind? Ankara is not sure how all this will work out. It wants to be sure that Clerides is negotiating in good faith and has the authority to do so. The powers of the federal government can be discussed later.

³ December 17.

The Secretary: You should keep in mind the overall strategic considerations. You cannot find out about the good will of Clerides until there are political discussions. Moreover Caramanlis cannot move until the political talks are underway. I have seen a recent British report which suggests that it would be desirable to move fast so Makarios has no excuse for delay. I know what you want. If Makarios approves, then this makes agreement inevitable. If he does not approve and fights a guerrilla political warfare, then this would make matters difficult. But it is senseless to argue over these points—let's put these aside.

Esenbel: Let us start on humanitarian matters and then go on to political matters, but let us not try to define precisely what comes under this heading.

The Secretary: I wonder if I should see Bitsios tonight. (Turning to Macomber) Why don't you get someone to call him to see if he is available?

(Macomber leaves the room.)

Esenbel: The only way to settle the Cyprus problem is by agreement on a bizonal structure.

The Secretary: It is essential to separate tactics from the end result. I am sure you know my viewpoint if you have seen my correspondence with Ecevit. What do the Greeks have in mind? It is too early to determine if the Greeks have some possibility for face-saving on the geographic federation. If there is agreement to have political talks, this would be important. How shall we announce the agreement?

Esenbel: In Nicosia.

The Secretary: After its announcement, do you have any problem about using the announcement?

Esenbel: You should handle it as you like. After the announcement in Nicosia you can say anything that would be helpful.

The Secretary: I may be asked how my talks went. I should like to reply either at my press conference or on the plane going back that I explored the respective positions and that I looked for ways to bring the parties together. I would also say that I was moderately hopeful.

Esenbel: I hope that when you get back, Clerides will make his move.

The Secretary: Is there any reason to hold up?

Macomber: If the conference report is turned down by the House, then this may affect progress.

Esenbel: I understand that Clerides will call on Tuesday and I understand that matters in Congress should be settled by Monday.⁴ I shall

⁴ December 16. See footnote 8, Document 163.

tell Bitsios that Clerides should move on Tuesday and that Denktash will be receptive. I am not excluding anything.

The Secretary: Tell Denktash to be open-minded. Please keep in close contact with Macomber about what is happening so that I can pass to you any ideas I might have.

Esenbel: He can always reach me privately at home.

The Secretary: When shall I give you the letter—tomorrow?

(The Secretary rises and gets the letter⁵ from his desk.)

This is what I would like to give you.

(He hands the letter to Esenbel.)

The Secretary: (Turning to Macomber) I may have to pull you out because you are so good in handling Congress—no, I am really joking. I need you in Ankara, but I have been impressed by the way you handle members of the Congress.

Macomber: I had the job twice.

The Secretary: No.

Esenbel: (Handing the letter back to the Secretary)

This looks alright to me.

The Secretary: I think it provides a good assurance. Do you mind if I give it confidentially to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Esenbel: I told you that when the talks start you can do what you want.

The Secretary: It would help. The Senate has a good record on leaks. Perhaps I should also give it to the House.

Esenbel: Perhaps you could give it to them in Executive Session.

The Secretary: We have given confidential documents to the Senate and there have been no leaks. In this case there would be no harm if there was a leak.

Esenbel: There is only one trouble. In the assumption that the Aid Bill is passed, it would help. If it is not passed, the letter could work against us.

The Secretary: How? Why don't you write a letter to me saying that if aid is cut off, there would be no progress on the talks.

Esenbel: I have already spoken to the press twice along this line.

The Secretary: That was helpful.

Esenbel: In a sense such a letter would be contradictory, because we have already said that we should keep aid separate from the Cyprus question.

⁵ Printed as Document 168.

The Secretary: As you know we are fighting on the aid question. We are prepared to make it a public issue. The letter will not be a liability. By Monday⁶ we should know what will happen in Congress. If signals change, we shall be in touch with you. What Congress is doing to the Turks is a symbol of what they are doing to US foreign policy. What weakens Turkey weakens the U.S. This letter shows the Greeks have taken the initiative.

Esenbel: In principle the letter is alright.

Macomber: We should get a good conference report.

The Secretary: There may be a fight on the floor.

Esenbel: If there is a successful conclusion in Congress, then the situation is good. Otherwise, there will be problems.

(Telephone rings. The Secretary gets up and answers it. He is told that Bitsios has gone to bed. The Secretary asks if it would be possible to come up even if Bitsios is in his pajamas.)

The Secretary: You must not capitulate. If you do, it would cause problems for us. The letter shows that the initiative comes from the Greeks. If matters go right and we have a good conference report, there will be time for maneuver through Monday. If Congress rejects the conference report, I may recommend that you not proceed. However, we will still have the letter and agreement in principle.

Esenbel: We do not want to take no action, but we may be forced to do so.

The Secretary: If aid is cut off, I will understand if you cannot proceed. It is your independent decision to make.

Esenbel: This is the first time you have had such a quick settlement. I am not the tough bargainer that you say I am.

The Secretary: My view previously was that the Greek position was aimed at making me the guilty party if we failed in getting the negotiations. Now I think that they want to make Makarios the fall guy. If this doesn't work, then they can return to me. I asked Bitsios if he wanted a quick settlement and he did not contradict me.

Esenbel: The Greeks could have stopped Makarios, but they didn't. Perhaps they thought it would be more useful to have Makarios on the island where they could use him as an ingredient, not a threat. They must deal with Makarios and any agreement must have his support. This gives them another option.

The Secretary: I agree. Outside of Cyprus he becomes a Greek politician. The Greek leadership would prefer that he be in Cyprus dealing with Clerides rather than in Greece dealing with Papandreou.

⁶ December 16.

Esenbel: I told people yesterday . . .

The Secretary: Do you trust Caramanlis now? Do you think I can?

Esenbel: I don't know. I am not so sure. The Greeks are very sentimental. I am not sure. . . .

The Secretary: Are the Turks sentimental

Esenbel: We are less Mediterranean than the Greeks. I knew Caramanlis when he was cooperating with the late Menderes. He showed that he was able to deal with Makarios before on Cyprus and that he could dominate him.

The Secretary: I think we have good assurances and I went over the letter with Bitsios. He cannot say that he did not know what was in it. I shall tell Bitsios that there is an agreement in principle to begin the talks, that they should include political aspects, but that they should begin with the airport and Farmagusta, Denktash will be instructed to talk about political subjects, although they may not be precisely defined. Clerides should get in touch with Denktash on Tuesday, Denktash will be receptive; and if the Aid Bill is negative to Turkey, we may not be able to carry out the plan.

Esenbel: What should I tell Bitsios?

(Telephone rings. The Secretary gets up and answers. He is told Bitsios is not feeling well and would prefer, if possible, to talk to the Secretary in the morning. The Secretary asks that Bitsios be told that he would like to see him at the beginning of the session tomorrow morning about 9:30. He hangs up and returns to his chair.)

The Secretary: You should tell him . . .

Esenbel: What should I tell . . .

The Secretary: Tell him exactly what I said. Tell him that you were acting on my strong advice and that the letter is a big factor in your decision. Tell him Clerides should call Denktash and that they should be prepared for political talks. Tell him that you have instructed Denktash to deal open-handedly. You may be sure that we will only tell the Greeks what we tell you and vice versa.

Esenbel: Well, I will do the same. Incidentally, I have said nothing to Callaghan.

The Secretary: What shall I tell Callaghan?

Esenbel: I told him nothing.

The Secretary: Can I tell him of our talks?

Esenbel: No, I rather you would not.

The Secretary: Well, anything we say to the other side we will tell you. It is essential that everybody knows what everybody else is doing. My experience with Makarios is that when I told him that I thought the bizonal arrangement was the only practical one, he went out and said that I had said I favored a multi-regional one.

Esenbel: You can be sure that we will speak with the same frankness to you.

The Secretary: Good night. I think we have made good progress and I will see you tomorrow.

166. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 13, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary Kissinger
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Ambassador Kubisch, (notetaker)

Greece

Foreign Minister Bitsios

The Secretary: I saw Foreign Minister Esenbel last night² and he has agreed in principle to the letter and to the prompt opening of negotiations between Clerides and Denktash on substantive political issues.

Bitsios: Did the letter include the changes I suggested?

The Secretary: Yes, your changes were incorporated. The plan is for Clerides to call Denktash on Tuesday³ to make the arrangements for the meeting. Denktash will be instructed to accept. Initially the talks and negotiations will be about the Nicosia Airport, the Port of Famagusta, refugees and similar matters. However, it is expected that the negotiations will move quickly to political issues and to questions on the federal system. I am preparing to do all I can to keep this moving and I have told the Turks that I believe that Prime Minister Caramanlis is prepared to go to a rapid solution and settlement on the island. Therefore I said to the Turks that they must show flexibility so that an agreement can be reached promptly. Is that a fair statement?

Bitsios: Yes, Prime Minister Caramanlis wants a speedy solution. However, the negotiations and approach to it must not be done in an inelegant way.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74-4/75. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at NATO headquarters.

² See Document 165.

³ December 17.

The Secretary: I understand. I want you to know that I proposed to the Turks your thoughts about a cantonal agreement on the island. While they did not accept it, I think it is important that they did not reject it either.

Bitsios: Will they insist on starting the negotiations with insistence on a bizonal arrangement for the island?

The Secretary: No, they will not do that. I will see to that. I want you to know however, that they remain quite concerned about the cut off in military assistance. We don't know how the Congress will deal with the legislation over the next few days. I am hopeful this matter can be fully resolved by Tuesday and that I can send you the word to have Clerides call Denktash. However, you should understand that there could be a delay.

Bitsios: Would it be possible for you to give me a memorandum summarizing the points you have just been making to me?

The Secretary: Would you rather have a letter?

Bitsios: No, I think just a memorandum on these points would be alright.

The Secretary: Okay, I don't mind. (to Kubisch) Jack will you prepare a summary of these points? (Kubisch indicated that he would.)

The Secretary: (Showing Bitsios a copy of the December 13 letter to Esenbel)⁴ Here's the letter that I am giving to Esenbel. (Bitsios studies the letter.) You notice we have made the changes you wanted. This is exactly what you saw yesterday.

Bitsios: Are there any implications in this letter about Greece or anyone else being a future guarantor of the settlement.

The Secretary: No.

Bitsios: Callaghan asked me about this point and I told him it was too early to consider at this stage.

The Secretary: That's right, but in any case, it cannot be the Soviets.

Bitsios: Not necessarily, and there can be other forms of guarantees.

(As the conversation was breaking up there was a brief exchange of remarks about Israel and humorously, about possibly distracting Israel from some of its present activities and pre-occupations by making Israel one of the guarantor powers.)

The Secretary: (to Bitsios and Kubisch) Jack, will prepare the summary of the points and I will see that you get them later this morning.⁵

⁴ Printed as Document 168.

⁵ See Document 167.

167. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, December 13, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass the following report to you:

"When I saw Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios this morning² he fully confirmed the understanding I had reached last night with Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel with respect to the Clerides–Denktash talks. He told me it would be useful to him to have a memorandum from me which he could take back to Athens. Accordingly, I gave him the following:

'Memorandum for Foreign Minister Bitsios:

'Confirming our conversation this morning the Foreign Minister of Turkey has informed me that he agrees in principle to the prompt opening of negotiations between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash on substantive political issues. The agenda will include the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, matters related to the Port of Famagusta, and such other questions whose prompt resolution would contribute to the timely achievement of a settlement. The powers of the Central Government in the future federated state will also be included as an early agenda item. It is my understanding that other political subjects can also be discussed.

'In accordance with our mutual understandings, it is expected that Mr. Clerides will call Mr. Denktash next Tuesday, December 17, to make the specific and final arrangements for the meetings to take up these topics. I shall be in touch with you again on my return to Washington to reconfirm this point and the timing of this of this contact.

'Henry A. Kissinger.'

"Bitsios was very pleased with the understandings which we worked out.

"I handed my letter to Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel this morning and also gave him a copy of the memorandum to Bitsios. Esenbel expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the discussions here. However, he made clear once again that if Congress adopts legislation cutting off aid, then all bets are off at this time.

"I believe we have made good progress here to unblock the negotiating situation on Cyprus. I am convinced that if we lose this opportunity due to congressional action, we may not have another chance."

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 4, HAK to President, 12/10–12/13/74. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Ford initialed the memorandum.

² See Document 166.

168. Letter From Secretary of State Kissinger to Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel¹

Washington, December 13, 1974.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have been informed by the Government of Greece that it fully supports the immediate continuation of the Clerides–Denktash negotiations and their expansion to encompass substantive political issues. I am further informed by the Government of Greece that it considers that the initial agenda of these expanded negotiations should include the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, matters relative to the port of Famagusta, and such other questions, the prompt resolution of which would contribute to the timely achievement of a settlement. The powers of the Central Government in the future federated state will also be included as an early agenda.

The Government of Greece has also informed me that it will make every effort to promote a successful outcome to the Clerides–Denktash negotiations and that it will do all it appropriately can to assure that if an agreement is reached it will be fully implemented.

The United States Government for its part makes a parallel commitment to the Clerides–Denktash negotiations as the proper forum for the resolution of outstanding issues and for the conclusion as soon as possible of a peace of conciliation between the parties directly concerned. The United States Government undertakes to use its full influence to the end that agreements reached in these negotiations are fairly and fully implemented.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger²

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 239, Geopolitical File, Turkey, October 1974 to July 1975. No classification marking.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

169. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, December 26, 1974.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

Background

The following is a brief report on recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations. During my bilateral consultations with both the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at Brussels, December 11–13, both parties agreed that substantive negotiations should resume promptly between Rauf Denktash (leader of the Turkish Cypriots) and Glafcos Clerides (leader of the Greek Cypriots and former Acting President of Cyprus during Archbishop Makarios' absence) on Cyprus. The new round of talks between the two leaders were to include political matters as well as the humanitarian issues discussed in the past.

After some initial false starts, Clerides and Denktash finally met in plenary session on December 19 and 20.² At the plenary meetings the two parties agreed on the following points:

—All constitutional issues will be discussed. Denktash has finally accepted Clerides as the “full empowered representative of the Greek Cypriot community and its negotiator.”

—The sequence of negotiations will first deal with the powers and authority of the federal government, then define the nature of the federation (bizonal or multiregional). With these matters settled, the two sides would discuss economic and humanitarian issues. In this regard, I have been suggesting that both sides take the opposite approach to the negotiations: that is, to reach agreement quickly on the less contentious issues, thus creating an atmosphere of accomplishment which will lead toward solution of the more complex problems.

A major point of contention has surfaced: Denktash quite unexpectedly raised the question of international guarantees (possibly Five Powers—Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the two Cypriot communities) for any agreement reached during the negotiations between the two leaders. This matter

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box A4, Cyprus 3. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum. Another notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² A summary of the discussion is in telegram 4551 from Nicosia, December 21, (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 6)

was not discussed at Brussels and Clerides had no instructions. Clerides has requested guidance from Athens which has been slow in coming. In the meantime, official announcement of resumption in the talks is being delayed until Clerides receives instructions and the two leaders can work out compromise language on the guarantees.

It should be noted that Archbishop Makarios has shown a preference for expanding the number of guarantors, possibly to include some or all of the permanent representatives to the UN Security Council, or some non-aligned nations. The Greeks, with an eye to the Archbishop's preferences and the pressure of aid cut-off on the Turks, are moving slowly. The U.S. position is plain to all sides: that substantive talks must begin immediately without prejudging ultimate issues such as international guarantees. In any event, we are exploring various options to break the apparent impasse if some sort of compromise cannot be reached between the parties.

Outlook

Substantive meetings between Denktash and Clerides are tentatively scheduled to resume on January 6, provided that the question of international guarantees can be quickly resolved. In the meantime, I plan to meet in Washington with our ambassadors to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara during the week of January 6 to review the current situation and coordinate the next step in our strategy. The objective will be to take advantage of the present momentum and sense of urgency in order to reach an early agreement. Clerides and Denktash know each other well and can be expected to bargain seriously. The basic problem will be to make their respective sponsors in both Athens and Ankara live up to the spirit of the Brussels agreements and remain within reasonable bounds. At the same time, we must insure that Makarios continues to maintain the relatively low profile he assumed upon returning to Cyprus in early December, for he has the potential for mischief and could upset any agreement reached. In this regard, I believe that he is slowly becoming aware of the realities of the situation on Cyprus and will not present a serious obstacle to success.

170. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 7, 1975, 4:35–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. William Crawford, U. S. Ambassador to Cyprus
Amb. Jack Kubisch, U. S. Ambassador to Greece
Amb. William B. Macomber, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Kissinger: Macomber tries to stay out of town so I don't stick him with the Congressional Liaison job.

The President: You wore out a lot of shoe leather.

Macomber: I had two tours.

Kissinger: Mr. President, these people have been carrying a lot of the burden.

Let me sum up where we are. At Brussels,² the outline of the talks was agreed to. At that time the question of guarantees was raised. I told you I called Esenbel and he agreed to start the talks tomorrow.³ He asked for one wrinkle—that everyone agree to submit the final results to a meeting of five powers—which is not the same as a guarantee.

For concessions, we will aim for the opening of the airport, the port of Famagusta, the withdrawal of some troops, and the return of some refugees. We won't get all these, but with two or three we could move the Congress. We have to get a longer extension this time.

The President: If we get three or four of them, isn't that substantial progress?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, January 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

² See Documents 163–168.

³ A preview and an account of these talks are in a memorandum of conversation, January 7, 3:40 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, January 1975) and telegram 77 from Nicosia, January 8. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 7)

Kissinger: This package would alleviate most of the conditions, but we can't get it all in the few weeks available. We also hope to step up the pace of talks to three or four per week. The Greeks have given up most of their earlier demands. The major issues now are the extent of the Turkish area, the powers of the central government, and the refugees.

The President: Will other issues, like Law of the Sea in the Aegean, be thrown in?

Kissinger: The Greeks are willing, but it would complicate it.

Macomber: It could follow the Cyprus talks.

Kubisch: The situation in Greece has improved greatly, and the American position has improved from the bad position of last summer. Karamanlis has done a great job in the country. He understands the need for close U.S. ties and he supports it, but he can't move fast publicly. He has the Greek side all held together for now, but he can't hold them for long. He wants a quick settlement and is willing to concede much. He is willing to follow with talks on the Aegean, on overflights, and so on—and more to a real *détente*. We are on a good trend in Greece.

The President: How did Wayne Hays do?⁴

Kubisch: He talked Turkey, but they know he is a friend and he has credibility. He gave a press conference and did a great job.

Macomber: He was good in Turkey, too. The Turks want to be European and oriented toward us. They don't work democracy very well. They had bad luck in the last election but Ecevit's government was good. If there is an election, Ecevit will win big and the other parties don't want that. The military are getting impatient. They will agree to elections at some point, but it will be a weak government until it is over.

The President: Will the military agree to a reasonable settlement?

Macomber: Yes. They are tough. They are incredulous that the United States could do what was done—but they are deeply grateful to you and Secretary Kissinger.

The President: It was really tough last October and in December. We had this Demetracopolous who really incited the Greek community here.

Macomber: Their problem is they see this little island so close to their shores, with their countrymen being screwed for such a long time by nine million Greeks far away. They like Karamanlis but they are determined it won't happen again. They are very offended that the United

⁴ Representative Wayne Hays (D-OH) led a congressional delegation to Turkey and Greece in late December and early January.

States turned on them. If it wasn't for you two, Turkey would be down the drain.

Kissinger: We will pay for this for years to come.

Macomber: If there is an aid cutoff, our influence will be almost zero. We have many installations there. With their fine Army and the Straits, they are really an asset.

The President: Do they control Denktash?

Macomber: Yes. But it is a weak caretaker government.

Crawford: Cyprus is a tragedy, from the paradise it used to be. It is now a divided island. There are only 12,000 Greeks in the Turkish zone and 18,000 Turks in the Greek zone. The Turks move into the big villages but there are no jobs. There is a political division and economic division now—which doesn't make sense. Even the Turkish Cypriots say "Turkey didn't come in to save us, but for their own purposes." The Greek Cypriots are now becoming disillusioned with Greece. So both of them are disillusioned. Now there is a sort of a Cypriot nationality coming out of this. Denktash and Clerides are old friends and were raised together. But looking over Clerides' shoulder is Makarios and Greece; over Denktash's shoulder is the Turks. But still their relationship is the best possible for negotiations.

Kissinger: Karamanlis is playing Makarios skillfully. If Makarios blesses the agreement, he is off the hook; if Makarios rejects it, Karamanlis can say he tried and can stick Makarios with it. If the Turks could give up a little, they could get a lot. Makarios won't stay quiet for long. He wants a stalemate so he can maneuver and get the Soviet Union in.

Macomber: I agree.

Kissinger: Few Greeks will go back to the Turkish zone.

Macomber: But the Greeks and Turks hate each other. They have trouble getting together.

The President: Henry and I have been talking this subject since my first day. Keep it moving and we will try to take care of the Congress. We need enough progress to get us over the hump, and Bill [Macomber],⁵ you can use my name to get the Turks to move.

Crawford: I hope we can get aid money for Cyprus, too.

⁵ Brackets are in the original.

171. Study Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff for
Director of Central Intelligence Colby¹

USIB–D–15.2/127

Washington, January 1975.

Principal Findings

The Record of Performance

1. Like most international crises, the Cyprus crisis of 1974 consisted of a series of interlocking events, each, in sequence, presenting new problems for U.S. policy makers and posing new challenges to the U.S. intelligence community. Seen, as it is here, as a test of both the sagacity of intelligence analysts and the ingenuity of intelligence collectors, the record of the community's performance during the Cyprus affair must be adjudged a mixture of strengths and weaknesses:

—There were a number of exemplary successes [2½ lines not declassified] and some prescient calls by analysts (including their forewarning of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus).

—But there were some notable shortcomings as well. On the basis of a single [less than 1 line not declassified] the analysts in early July, notwithstanding their earlier concern, conveyed the impression to the policy makers that the world had been granted a reprieve: Ioannidis, they suggested, had now decided not to move against Makarios, at least for the time being. And, later, after the Turkish landing, the analysts misjudged Ankara's ambitions on the island, were persuaded that the crisis was about over, and thus gave scant attention to the possibility that Turkish forces might soon be on the move once more.

—There was one "peripheral" analytical success which should receive explicit mention: an assessment of the role the Soviets were likely to play in the crisis which subsequently proved to be wholly sound. Quiet and undramatic as it was, this particular accomplishment was important and impressive none the less.

The Analytical Aspect

2. Ultimately, intelligence will be judged in the context of its ability to provide the consumer with premonitory assessments. The ability of the community to provide its consumers with the news *after* a crisis has erupted is widely recognized (and is pretty much taken for granted); it is the ability of the community to provide warnings of crises to come which is so often questioned. And it was here, again, in re

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269R, Box 12, Folder 83. Top Secret; Ruff; [codeword not declassified]; No Foreign Dissem; Byeman–Talent–Keyhole.

Cyprus, where the community's analytical performance fell quite short of the mark, specifically its failure in July to estimate the likelihood of a Greek-sponsored coup against Archbishop Makarios (the incident which precipitated the entire crisis).

3. As was the case in the period before the Arabs' attack on Israel in October 1973, this inability to foresee critical events—in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary—seems to rest in part on an old and familiar analytical bias: the perhaps subconscious conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek-sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men.

4. If this bias does in fact unduly influence the mind of the analyst, there is obviously no pat solution. But identification of the problem is a necessary beginning; the further development of training techniques (including those which help the novice analyst to perceive his own prejudices) is another; and, finally, the establishment of a regular system of devil's advocacy—which is currently under investigation by the IC Staff—is yet another.

The Collection Effort

5. The bulk of information on the Cyprus crisis, especially in its early stages, was supplied by human sources.

—With one notable exception [2½ lines not declassified] contributed significantly to the intelligence effort during the pre-coup period. Clandestine reporting [less than 1 line not declassified] concerning the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was also very good.

—The quality of reporting from U.S. diplomatic missions was uneven. Thoughtful, accurate assessments were prepared in the weeks preceding the coup by the embassy in Nicosia, and strong reporting on the possibility of a Turkish landing on Cyprus was dispatched by both the embassy and the DAO in Ankara.

—But reporting from the embassy in Athens, especially in the pre-coup period, was weak; it fairly consistently downplayed the likelihood of serious trouble over Cyprus, even in the face of repeated expressions of great concern from Nicosia and Washington.

6. Analysis of the crisis may also have suffered as the result of the nonavailability of certain key categories of information, specifically those associated with private conversations between U.S. policy makers and their representatives on the scene and between these policy makers and certain principals in the dispute. Because ignorance of such matters could substantially damage the ability to analyze events as they unfold, in this or in any future crisis, the problem is serious and one which should be addressed by the community and by policy makers as well.

7. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Consumer Reactions

8. Interviews with a number of consumers of intelligence on the Cyprus crisis indicate a degree of displeasure with both the performance and the procedures of the intelligence community. There were, surprisingly, few complaints about the failure to provide forewarning of the Cypriot coup, perhaps because the concern of policy makers and their staffs over the possibility of a coup did not seem to abate very much during the first half of July, despite some reassurances from the community.

9. But there were specific complaints (some legitimate, some not) from officers on the NSC Staff and in the Department of State about a variety of other matters: the alleged failure of the community to alert policy makers to the impending Turkish invasion of Cyprus (a notion which seems to rest on the complainants' failure to get the word); the plethora of CRITIC messages received during the crisis [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the significance of many of which was obscure; [*1½ lines not declassified*] the purported failure of the community to highlight significant items (there may be some substance to this) and to keep the reader abreast of military developments (a highly puzzling assertion which, on the face of it, seems contrary to the facts); and the redundancy of the CIA and DIA Situation Reports and the confusion occasionally engendered when these reports seemed to disagree.

10. Some of these problems are correctable, some not. Those which probably reflect in the main the inability of harried consumers to keep abreast of fast-breaking developments—indeed, to read all the relevant reports issued by the community—can be addressed but not solved. But others, such as the failure to call quick attention to highlights, can be remedied by improvements in the formats of the situation reports and by the issuance of Alert Memoranda by the DCI. And the problem of redundancy and confusion could be eliminated by the issuance of a single community situation report during major crises (a proposal now under development by the IC Staff).

The Impact of Intelligence on Policy Decisions and Actions

11. We note, finally, that the Cyprus crisis provided excellent examples of the role intelligence plays in helping to shape (and to inhibit) policy decisions and actions. In five of the six key developments prior to and during the crisis, State Department initiatives (or lack thereof) were clearly consistent with, and were presumably based at least in part on, intelligence.

—When intelligence warned of dire developments (Ioannidis' June threats against Makarios, Greek threats to attack the Turks in Thrace), the State Department acted to prevent them. When, on the other hand, intelligence failed to provide explicit warning (Ioannidis' coup against Makarios, Turkey's Phase II offensive on Cyprus), the State Department failed to act. And the State Department's relatively sanguine

attitude towards possible Soviet reaction to Cyprus developments was clearly consistent with intelligence on that subject.

—The only occasion when there appeared to have been an inconsistency between intelligence and policy action was with respect to the Turkish invasion. The intelligence warning of that event appears to have been explicit, but the State Department apparently did not act on it.

—The following table summarizes these correlations:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Intelligence</i>	<i>Policy initiative</i>
June 1974	Ioannidis threatens action against Makarios.	Intelligence provides explicit warning of growing confrontation.	Embassy passes message to Ioannidis seeking to discourage action against Makarios.
3–15 July	Ioannidis plans coup against Makarios; passes reassuring message to USG.	Intelligence reassures consumers; provides no warning.	No preventive action; USG clearly caught off guard.
15–20 July	Turks plan Cyprus invasion.	Intelligence provides explicit warning, including date.	State Department takes little, if any, preventive action; claims it did not get the message.
20–25 July	Greeks threaten Thrace offensive.	Intelligence provides strong warning.	[3 lines not declassified]
20–30 July	Soviets react benignly.	Intelligence provides reassuring appraisal.	State Department accepts intelligence appraisal and remains relaxed about possible Soviet initiatives.
1–15 Aug.	Turks plan Phase II offensive.	Intelligence warning is confused and unconvincing.	State Department takes no action to dissuade; is clearly caught off guard.

[Omitted here is the body of the study.]

172. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 1, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Thomas F. Eagleton
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Congressman John Brademas
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes

The Secretary
Ambassador McCloskey
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Rosenthal: (Hands Secretary an article from the morning *New York Times* on Cyprus—Secretary reads but does not comment.)

Secretary: I thought it would be a good idea to explain where we stand. I will give you our view and I want to assure you that we understand each of us will have to do what is necessary. I'll try to be brief. First, where do the negotiations stand? There has not been much progress.

We have tried to move the negotiations along as quickly as possible but up to now the progress that has been made has really been of minor nature. I could, therefore, not recommend that the President find that substantial progress has been achieved. It is not surprising that this process does take time. After all, the negotiations in this new form only began on January 14.

On the Nicosia airport, both sides apparently want to place conditions on the management of the airport which will prejudge the management of the whole island in the later negotiations. Thus the Turks want to have equal representation on the Board which would make the eventual solution look like a bizonal concept. The Greeks on the other hand want UN, Greek and Turkish representation and they have talked about weighting the membership according to population numbers. We have tried to move the negotiators toward a proposal of a joint Greek-Turkish Board with a neutral running the airport operation. I am sure that the airport matter will be settled but it is going to take more time.

On troop withdraw, there is a paradoxical situation. The Turks have announced that 1,000 troops have been withdrawn. They also tell us confidentially that there are only 25,000 troops on the island. The

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on February 20. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

question is did they ever have 40,000 and are they understating the number of troops they have there now? There is probably a better story to be told here but the Turks will not allow us to know exactly how many people they have—they say because of security considerations.

The Turks have announced that all shipping may now use the Famagusta harbor. This has some optical advantage but it does not really affect the situation one way or another.

The Turks have also announced that they will permit 8,000 Greek refugees to reenter the Atheniou area in territory which, while they do not occupy it, they do exercise control.

I would like to stress that in recounting these events I am not in any way trying to build the case for significant progress—I am merely giving you my assessment of the situation. Now let me analyze this for you. My understanding of the position taken by the Greek Government is that they are very anxious to settle the Cyprus problem as rapidly as possible. I have this from communications and talks with both Bitsios and Caramanlis. By the way, I consider Caramanlis to be very constructive. He has done everything he can to keep Greek public opinion calm so there is a minimum obstacle to progress. Our relations with the Greek Government are very close.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, Makarios seems to be up to playing his old game. Unlike Caramanlis he is not as interested in fast progress. His strategy is to allow the situation to worsen so that he can take advantage of it. He also does not wish to become an appendage to Athens but, instead, he wishes to be a force in his own right. He is anxious to create conditions that will lead to the building of international pressures and that is why he wants aid to Turkey cut off.

The Greek Government feels that the aid question is too hot to handle and does not wish in any way to be caught appearing to be against an aid cut-off even though they may realize that it will not help with negotiations. Makarios, on the other hand, wants the aid cut-off to bring maximum pressure to bear on Turkey.

Now, as far as the situation in Turkey is concerned, they have a weak government and there is no doubt that they have not wanted to produce real progress because that will look as though they are giving in to pressure. (The Secretary looks at transcript of Bob Anderson's remarks which could be taken as implying that Greece is indifferent on the aid issue—he says in an aside that this should be corrected.) Now, as I said, the Turks find it difficult to move because they have a weak government.

The Prime Minister barely exists in this situation and Esenbel, as you all know, is not strong and terribly cautious. Also from their point of view an aid cut-off makes Makarios even more intransigent and then, of course, the Turks become more intransigent. I have asked Macomber to see some of the political leaders as well. Ecevit is taking the posi-

tion that aid will be cut off in any case and he goes back to the difficulties we had over poppies and he thinks that Turkey should adjust to this and that it can no longer count on the U.S. Esenbel took the position that giving any concessions prior to the aid cut-off would lead Makarios just to pocket those concessions and, therefore, I don't really expect very much in the talks that will take place on Monday.²

What is the situation we face? There was some chance in October that we could have made some progress with Ecevit. There was more of a chance then than there is today. The use of an aid cut-off as a weapon or lever is much more effective as a threat and I have always felt that that particular weapon would be needed at the end of the negotiation and not now when we are essentially discussing only procedural matters.³ Our estimate is that the Turks are becoming reconciled to this possibility. They are making some approaches to Iraq and Libya at a faster rate. They may also put some pressure on our bases. Over the longer term my fear is that the Left in Turkey led by Ecevit will move into an anti-American posture and that our influence on the negotiations will diminish. Today our influence in Ankara is certainly less than it was in October. The Turks are incredulous about our actions. They cannot believe that we would jeopardize our long-term security relations with an ally.

Saying all this, I want to emphasize that I am not in any way criticizing the honorable convictions of those who favor a cut-off of assistance to Turkey but I must say to you in all seriousness that I consider it to be a foreign policy disaster. It hurts the chances of a Cyprus negotiation. It will not in any way help us with the Greeks. It will be looked upon by others in the area as calling into question the good sense of the United States in taking care of our long term interests. At the same time, I can't recommend to you that we make a finding that the terms of the legislation have been met. So, in a sense, we are all trapped.

Let me also tell you that I have tentatively made arrangements to see Esenbel and Bitsios in Brussels on the 9th and 10th but I cannot be sure that these meetings will go forward. In addition, we have tried to be helpful on the Aegean issue. We have supported the Greek suggestion that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice. The fact of the possibility of our meetings has leaked and I am very much afraid that either Bitsios or Esenbel may now cancel.

This is where we are and I am honor bound to tell you that we must as an Administration make an effort to get this situation reversed. We will invite the leaders and explain what the situation is but I again must stress that I consider this situation to be a tragedy. I don't know

² February 3.

³ See Document 216.

what you may wish to suggest and I do wish to emphasize that I consider that all of you have behaved with great fairness.

Brademas: Let me say that we appreciate your talking to us and also Paul and I want to thank you for all you did to help us with our trip. You undoubtedly have noticed that we have not made any public comment on the trip.

Secretary: Yes, I very much appreciate that.

Brademas: We share your analysis in many respects. We too see that there has been no serious progress and it looks to us as though the Turks are taking even more of a hard line. But we cannot share your view that this has been a disaster. You must see this in the context that American arms have been used in violation of the law and, therefore, from our point of view, it would be a disaster not to react. We believe that the law must be enforced and that, therefore, aid must be cut off. We think that the Turkish policies have been aggressive.

Secretary: On the point about a violation—no new commitments have been made and we have gone beyond what traditionally has been done in saying that this applies as well to the pipeline. In the past when assistance was cut off, it was usual to allow pipeline aid to continue. We told the leadership what the situation was and the leadership did not object but the trouble is that the leadership is not in control of the rank and file. The Administration applied the law delicately with the approval of the leadership.

Brademas: We disagreed with this and we told Mansfield so. We tried to be helpful and certainly if there had been any hard evidence of progress we would have worked for an extension, especially if there had been any movement on refugees.

Secretary: The refugee issue is going to be extremely difficult. Makarios is talking very tough. Caramanlis is strong but cannot take hard decisions by himself. On the Turkish side they seem to lack the flexibility to move in a politically sensitive situation. As a sign of how weak he is, Esenbel has not even resigned his position as Ambassador in Washington. The politicians in Turkey cannot agree to form a government. Macomber has tried to influence both Ecevit and Demirel to be helpful. The main key is between the Greeks and the Turks and quite frankly the differences are not all that great.

The Greeks are now prepared to accept a cantonal arrangement and they have reduced the number of cantonal areas and they are all in the north. The tragedy is that the situation is soluble through patient negotiation. But the aid cut-off forces us to be impatient. Our tactic in a negotiation like this is not to get engaged too early. If the U.S. comes in and is impatient it tends to freeze the situation. With the aid cut-off, I am not sure that the U.S. should involve itself any more in this negotiation but I will meet with Bitsios and Esenbel and decide after that.

Sarbanes: We came back from our meetings cautiously optimistic. We met with all the parties involved. I recognize the problem of the time frame but the main problem here is how to get a sizable number of refugees back in some area controlled by the Turks. After all, the Turks got their people off the British sovereign base area.

Secretary: We had nothing to do with that negotiation. There was a minor Turkish concession in that they agreed to look for missing Greek Cypriots in return but Callaghan gave away his position on that in mid January.

Sarbanes: What is needed now is a substantial concession by the Turks. They should permit 60 to 80,000 Greek Cypriots to return and then, I think, we could get the deadline for the aid cut-off extended. Otherwise, there is no rational argument to change the date and we need something to justify this. It is not advisable for us to seek to press Congress to change when there is no basis. You must decide what your relations with Congress are going to be. I have read your interview with Bill Moyers and your speech in Los Angeles⁴ (quotes from Los Angeles speech on moral basis of policy). We have been reasonable and have not taken any cheap shots.

Secretary: I have no complaint with your conduct.

Brademas: What has been the Turkish reaction, particularly of the Armed Forces?

Secretary: They have been hoping that the Administration would get a change in policy. If we don't they will take the stance that they can never again depend on the United States. They will also approach Libya and Iraq for help in buying European equipment. They do not see any reason to move.

Sarbanes: We must not forget what the origins of this situation were. The Turks invaded Cyprus. That is the origin of the problem.

Secretary: Perhaps we didn't move correctly to begin with. The President could have waived the original action with respect to MAP. He could have found compliance in the beginning but we did not wish to play games. We did not wish to be accused of flouting the law. The history of this whole situation is that events have transpired in early October to prevent significant progress. The Ecevit government fell and then the whole situation disintegrated.

Rosenthal: I have to differ with the optimistic view. If this is a disaster then the law should be changed. If the cut-off stays and the Turks

⁴ Kissinger's interview with Bill Moyers is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXII, No. 1859, February 10, 1975, pp. 165–178. Background information for his January 25 speech is in telegram 16936 to Los Angeles, January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

turn to Libya and become Europe oriented, then that will just have to happen. But if we wipe out this action, there will be a reaction in the American Congress because there is a deep-seated principle involved and it does not favor a pragmatic solution. I can tell you that if we here in this room don't agree you will not get Congressional action.

Brademas: This is going to come out with no extension of the deadline. At the end of two weeks we can see what the situation is.

Secretary: I can understand your taking that position but I still think it is misguided.

Brademas: This is a whole new ballgame in Congress. If you try to get this overturned, you will be clobbered and it will not contribute to a Cyprus solution and it could worsen your relations with the Congress.

Secretary: This is what people tell me every day. The position we are taking on Vietnam will envenom our relations with Congress. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment pushed us over the cliff. Each action creates its own situation and each of us must take a personal position. I am deeply convinced that this is very bad for foreign policy. Eighty percent of this problem may be blamed on the Executive. We did not stand up and oppose the OPEC amendment in the Trade Bill. We went along with the Jackson-Vanik approach until it was too late. We did not stand up and say what was needed for Vietnam. We now have a Turkish aid cut-off because of Cyprus pressures. We are running into difficulty in getting an energy conservation program out of the Congress. The total pattern of all these actions is a massive weakness in foreign policy. I can tell you that I have never been so worried by a situation. There are no victors in this situation. Who are we going to put together to build a new consensus? The cumulative impact of all of this is tragic. Even the Chinese are beginning to wonder whether we have lost our senses and they may now try to change their weight in the balance and shift it to the third world. I am about to go to the Middle East and I am sure this is not going to make my task there any easier. In the case of the Turkish aid cut-off, we must oppose this.

Sarbanes: The only way to do that is to change the law.

Rosenthal: We want to be conciliatory but we have to reach an understanding.

Secretary: In the case of the energy conservation program, we must have a reduction of one million barrels per day. We don't have any preference about how it should be done but we do have a concern that some program be enacted. In the Middle East look at the position we are going to be in if we separate ourselves from Turkey.

Sarbanes: But we enacted a provision which bought some time but when February 5 comes, the law must be applied.

Secretary: But the net result is going to be a worsening of U.S.-Turkish relations and also I must tell you quite frankly of

Greek-Turkish relations. We also have the problem of the perception of others who will see this as an irrational act by the U.S.

Brademas: Suppose we gave you more time, there would be a bad Greek reaction.

Secretary: Yes, it is very difficult to get out of this situation.

Rosenthal: Why can't the President make a determination?

Secretary: He would have to find compliance and substantial progress but if he did people would question the basis on which that determination was made.

What should we say about our talks?

Eagleton: You can say that we had an amicable discussion but that we are in basic disagreement.

Secretary: Actually we have made some progress. Since October we have managed to get the talks started. The Greek Government has made some progress in coming forward with more reasonable proposals. We think that with some time progress could be made but up to now only minor progress has been registered.

Brademas: Esenbel has in fact hardened the position in his recent public statements.

Rosenthal: The fact is that the aid cut will stand until there is meaningful progress.

Sarbanes: The aid cut will go into effect on February 5. You could extend or change the date if 70,000 refugees were allowed back into Famagusta. You could then have some time to negotiate a final settlement.

Rosenthal: Perhaps we could extend the date six months.

Sarbanes: That might be too long. Maybe just until April.

Secretary: The bad thing about this whole procedure is that we are made to appear more anxious for a settlement than the parties themselves. We are going to attempt to get the deadline extended. You should avoid any victory claim.

Rosenthal: Nothing is going to happen so that is not possible.

Sarbanes: The basis is just not there.

Secretary: Since the basis is not there, we could say that you are willing to move if some progress is made in the coming weeks.

Brademas: I want you to understand that this is not an ethnic issue. I am not anti-Turk.

Secretary: I must express my conviction that this whole procedure is wrong but I will not be aggressive in stating my view.

Eagleton: We will have to state what the law is.

Secretary: I would appreciate it very much if you didn't say anything about my coming meetings. I am not looking for an epic confrontation. Let us keep in touch and see if any possibilities develop.

173. Editorial Note

On February 5, 1975, in accordance with the requirements of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, a total ban on U.S. military aid and arms shipments to Turkey went into effect. In response, President Ford issued the following statement:

“Legislation enacted by Congress requires that arms deliveries to Turkey must be suspended February 5. The Administration will comply fully with the law. However, it should be made clear that military aid to Turkey is not given in the context of the Cyprus issue, nor has it been granted as a favor to Turkey. Rather, it is based on our common conclusions that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and to the security of the United States and its allies.

“A suspension of military aid to Turkey is likely to impede the negotiation of a just Cyprus settlement. Furthermore, it could have far-reaching and damaging effects on the security and hence the political stability of all the countries in the region. It will affect adversely not only Western security but the strategic situation in the Middle East. It cannot be in the interest of the United States to take action that will jeopardize the system on which our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been based for 28 years.

“When it is seen that the United States is taking action which is clearly incompatible with its own interests, this will raise grave doubts about the conduct of American foreign relations even among countries that are not directly involved in that area.

“The Administration judges these adverse effects of a suspension of aid to Turkey to be so serious that it urges the Congress to reconsider its action and authorize the resumption of our assistance relationship with Turkey.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, February 1975)

174. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, February 7, 1975, 8:11–9:04 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Secretary Kissinger: Joe?

Mr. Sisco: What would you like to have me tell the Cypriot Ambassador this morning? He's coming in at 10:30.²

Secretary Kissinger: From now on he'll be seen by the Country Director! (Laughter.)

No—seriously. Wayne Hays has been telling me he's been throwing him out of his office because he was up there.

Mr. Sisco: Recently?

Secretary Kissinger: Within the last week.

Mr. Sisco: Because he insists that he's being very, very circumspect.

Secretary Kissinger: Wayne Hays said he threw him out of his office when he was simply threatening him. Do you believe that?

Mr. Jenkins: He's capable of exaggerating.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Jenkins: He's capable of exaggerating.

Mr. Hartman: Dimitriou couldn't threaten anybody. He's so mild you hardly know what he's talking about.

Mr. Sisco: Well, Bob and I talked about this. I think that we should take the posture with him that the situation is not at an impasse and that if—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, is it at an impasse?

Mr. Sisco: —and if they're going to put anything forward, they ought to put it forward seriously.

Mr. Hartman: No. If they are going to put their proposal down, they shouldn't go around to announce it to the world and deposit it at the Security Council.³ They ought to put it on the table.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary's Staff Conference 1/10/75 to Secretary's Staff Meeting 4/16/75. Secret.

² See Document 175.

³ Apparent reference to a series of letters in late January and early February, in which the Cypriot (Greek) representative to the UN leveled accusations against the British, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Turks. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975*, pp. 274–275)

Secretary Kissinger: No. Makarios has absolutely no intention of being capable. We're beating the Turks over the head before we have received a proposal. It's to reject something, the contents of which we don't even know.

I mean, our unlimited busy-bodies—

Mr. Hartman: No. But we have an interest in keeping them.

Secretary Kissinger: We have an interest. Let Nature take its course now. Besides, Makarios pays no attention to Dimitriou—or whatever his name is. But what are we going to say to Esenbel. If Makarios had wanted to be reasonable, he would have pushed.

I think there's something undignified about the United States pleading with all these maniacs to be reasonable when we have absolutely nothing to gain from it, and when a pressure group—an ethnic pressure group—is pushing this country in a direction that is totally against its interests.

Mr. Hartman: But I think that's a separable issue.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not a separable issue if, after that, we go around crying all over the place, saying: "Please be reasonable." They've been unreasonable all along. We're not going to plead with anybody any more. We're going to say, "You've made this mess. See what happens?"

Mr. Hartman: They got the communal talks started. I think they want to keep that in play.

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want us to go plead. I do not want the United States to be in a position where we give the impression that these talks are more important to us than they are to the parties.

Mr. Hartman: All along—

Secretary Kissinger: Let them go to an international conference. What the hell is going to happen at an international conference? But I don't know why we should get blackmailed by people committing—if they want the Island partitioned, if they want to maneuver in a way that partitions the Island, that's their problem. We are prepared to assist, and that's it. And we're not going to beg these guys, and I want to have a tough and aloof line.

Mr. Hartman: It's more likely not to be just an international conference but the talks will break down. There will be movement by the Turks somewhere along the line, and then it will be in the Security Council.

Secretary Kissinger: And then it will be in the Security Council; and then we will disengage, step by step. As it internationalizes, we will become another international party and we will keep in exact step with the Security Council.

Why is that so much against the national interest?

Mr. Sisco: I think it's contrary to the American interest because I think, (a), the Soviets get the maximum opportunity; and, secondly, it's going to contribute to the process of deterioration in Ankara and Athens even more rapidly than we fear.

Secretary Kissinger: That's what I had predicted all along, but we are not going to stop that now by our running around—you know, I approved the cable,⁴ so I can't complain. But when I thought about it, I thought it was a rather unworthy cable to send.

Mr. Hartman: It's not pleading. It's saying: "You've got something in place. Keep it there."

Secretary Kissinger: If they see that, do they need a lecture from us?

Mr. Hartman: But up to now they have not acted in a very bright fashion.

Secretary Kissinger: The Secretary of State will be begging, pleading, maneuvering, working harder than they for six weeks; and they frivolously blew the thing up. Now we're going to tell them—they were all set to have riots this week if this thing continued. They had riots while the talks were going on. They played with the Soviets while this thing was going on. And if they don't want to do this, you tell them we're willing to help.

It's entirely up to him to decide—we believe the communal talks should continue. Whether they do or not is entirely up to him. But once they make irrevocable decisions, "Don't come crying back to us with the"—

Mr. Sisco: That's all right.

Mr. Hartman: That's all right. In fact, that will have the effect of keeping control.

Secretary Kissinger: 15 minutes in, and then you can send him out.

Mr. Sisco: 10 minutes after he sees me! (Laughter.) Really—I've got three appointments. I'm serious.

Secretary Kissinger: Our cable is abject: "Please let us help you."

Mr. Sisco: I think that's an unfair characterization of the cable.

Secretary Kissinger: I approved it.

Mr. Sisco: I know you did.

Secretary Kissinger: For all we know, the Greeks are going to ask to go back to the August 8th line.

Mr. Hartman: We're asking them to keep those talks going. We're also trying to do something here. The last thing we want is for those talks to break down right now when there is, at least, still the possibility of turning the situation around.

⁴ Not further identified.

Secretary Kissinger: Then what we want and how we act is an entirely different proposition. We have gotten ourselves too involved in these talks, to begin with.

Mr. Hartman: Well, I don't mind—I mean, what you're saying I think will have this effect. It puts it the other way around and tells him that he's got nothing from us—particularly, if these things do break down.

Secretary Kissinger: You tell him if he internationalizes it, we will be in exact step with the international community. We will be doing exactly what everyone else is doing. We'll play no special role. If that's what he wants, he can internationalize it. If he does, we are willing to help, but it's entirely up to them. And we're sick and tired of them playing around in our domestic politics.

I don't want to hear that he is doing it and then his boys aren't doing it. And if that doesn't stop, we'll withdraw.

If you have any hesitation to saying it, I'll be glad to see him.

Mr. Hartman: He'd love to see you, by the way! (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: That's the posture we're going to take with the Greeks, and Turks as well.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹

Washington, February 8, 1975, 1852Z.

29536. Subject: Sisco Meeting with Cyprus Ambassador.

1. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou called on Under Secretary Sisco under instructions on February 7 to bring to our attention Denktash's recent remarks on possible declaration of independent Turk Cypriot state. He also expressed view that opening and operation of airport in Turkish zone was illegal as well as dangerous. Sisco replied that no comment on this was really necessary by US. Cyprus Government knew our policy regarding provocative public statements, our efforts to promote negotiated settlement, and our opposition to partition.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Erdman and approved by Sisco. Repeated Immediate to Ankara, Athens, and USUN.

2. Sisco said aid cutoff is complicating the situation and our ability to be helpful. Dimitriou, speaking personally, said he felt President's statement about the adverse effects of the cutoff² had gone too far and had unwittingly encouraged Turkish intransigence. Sisco replied that this was a unjustified characterization. US has no interest in increased intransigence on any side. Talks got started as a result of our efforts in Brussels and we could have no possible interest in encouraging intransigence. Plain fact is that the cutoff has complicated our role and made it more rather than less difficult for Ankara, where the political situation is already working against Turkish flexibility, to make the necessary concessions. Dimitriou backed off and reiterated he had not been instructed to make the aforementioned statement, but this was a personal observation.

3. Sisco said the Clerides–Denktash talks continue to be the most realistic and desirable manner in which to proceed. We have offered our help and remain available but we do not have a greater interest in these talks than any of the other three parties. If there is a move to internationalize the question, there will obviously be an impact on the role US can play. Internationalization has failed in the past to produce realistic and practical progress toward a Cyprus settlement and in the present situation will only make matters more difficult than they already are; but of course, if this is route Cyprus wanted to go, it was its decision to make.

4. Dimitriou said that Clerides would be presenting official proposals at next Monday's³ scheduled session of the talks. If nothing transpires by the end of February, question will unavoidably come before the Security Council. When it does, Cyprus hopes US will play leading role to "take the wind out of Soviet sails." Sisco replied that the US will cross that bridge when it gets there. It was up to Cyprus to choose what course to follow; the history of UN consideration of Cyprus contains a lesson, and that is that UN discussions of Cyprus solution have not been practical steps toward real progress. On the contrary, internationalization of the issue has been complicating. Sisco said again we were not making any pleas here; this was a decision for Cyprus to make and that US interests in continuation and success of ongoing talks not greater than parties in area. Dimitriou asked if there were any plans for a new meeting with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Sisco said there was nothing definite but the possibility remained.

Kissinger

² See Document 173.

³ February 10.

176. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, February 14, 1975.

SUBJECT

Declaration of Independent Turkish Cypriot State

Establishment of Turkish Cypriot state pending agreement on Federated Republic of Cyprus² will have little practical effect on the ground since there is already almost complete separation of populations and administrations. However, the impact on the negotiations and the prospects for progress on a Cyprus settlement will be far-reaching and serious. There will be an impact on five major areas.

Clerides–Denktash talks: The Greeks will be under pressure to break off the talks. Once broken off, the talks will be difficult to reactivate. The Turks may insist, as a condition for continuing the talks, on Greek recognition of the full legal and political equality of the Turkish community. Prospects for negotiations at the Clerides–Denktash level in the next several months are poor.

Military Aid to Turkey: Proponents of the aid cutoff will argue that this step is another indication of Turkish bad faith, and another reason why the aid cutoff is necessary to bring the Turks around. While we will take the opposite tack and suggest the Turkish action is a natural consequence of Congressional action, the Turkish move could tend to freeze the situation in Congress.

Internationalization: Makarios will seek to internationalize the Cyprus question, by involving the Soviet Union more directly and appealing to the Security Council to condemn this Turkish action. (We have received word that Greece and Cyprus have jointly called for special Security Council session to consider recent developments on Cyprus.)

US Embassy Security: The US could again become a target of inflamed Greek-Cypriot opinion. This could lead to renewed demonstrations and violence directed against embassy property and personnel in Nicosia.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 4. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed for Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum.

² Turkish Cypriot officials made this announcement on February 13, as reported in telegram 606 from Nicosia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

Embassy Operations: Our ability to carry out normal diplomatic and consular responsibilities in the Turkish zone of Cyprus could be substantially reduced. The Greeks may seal off the border and deny access to the Turkish area from the Greek side. The Turk Cypriots may also insist on foreign missions dealing with them directly and not through the legal facade of the Office of the Vice President or Minister of Defense (positions recognized in the 1960 Constitution).

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 17, 1975, 0945Z.

1306. Subject: Possible New Initiative by the Secretary on Cyprus. Department please pass this highly sensitive message “personal for the Secretary from Kubisch.”

1. Over the weekend I have had very private discussions—separately—with three of the four ministers who together with Caramanlis make up the real inner power structure of the Greek Government: Defense Minister Averoff, Economic Coordination Minister Papaligouras and Foreign Minister Bitsios. (The fourth, George Rallis, who is Minister to the Prime Minister, works primarily on internal political and press matters.)

2. I get the strong impression that with the exception of Bitsios, who has made almost a diplomatic and writing career out of Cyprus, Caramanlis and his inner circle want very much to have done with the Cyprus problem. They simply have too many other major problems to address and solve in Greece. The “Priest,” as they call Makarios, gives them a pain; and somehow a more stable and tranquil *modus vivendi* with Turkey must be found to give them the breathing space they need to proceed with the internal rehabilitation this country still requires.

3. Bitsios, on the other hand, still seems mesmerized by the Cyprus problem and appears still to be advocating the kind of rear-guard holding action on Cyprus and the too-little too-late piecemeal concessions to the Turks that have characterized Greek policy for years with such dismal results.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 11, Greece, Nodis to Secretary of State 8. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee.

4. In any case, it has been suggested to me that you consider making a new and major move now to break the deadlock on a Cyprus settlement. Averoff (his name must be protected in this) told me that he is confident that Greece will accept a bi-zonal federated system on Cyprus if the Turks will reduce their zone to 25 percent of the island (which would still comprise approximately 35 percent of the economic activity and resources on Cyprus). He also told me that he had information from a reliable Turkish informant that Turkey was prepared to reduce to 25 percent in exchange for a Greek acceptance and international endorsement of the two-zone arrangement. As for Makarios, Averoff said he would resist mightily but that Greece could "make" him go along.

5. The specific suggestion is as follows: you send a very private personal message to the GOT saying you are prepared to try and get the Greeks to accept the bi-zonal system but you need to hold out a really major Turk concession to them in order to have any chance of success. You suggest that the Turks agree to draw back to 22 percent of the island, which is still more than their population ratio, and you would be prepared to give it a try, the Turks will say no, counter with 25 percent, and then—if the scenario plays out—the Greeks accept and other things fall into place.

6. I am not recommending that you do this at this stage, but I do believe it deserves your careful consideration. There are obvious pitfalls: if you try and fail, it will surely leak, and the "Kissinger Plan" to sacrifice Cyprus for NATO bases, Congressional strategy or whatever, will be denounced on all sides. At the same time, if you succeed, many Greeks and Greek supporters will attack you for selling out Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots for the sake of some nefarious scheme or strategy of yours. Still, if it works, it could help greatly in repairing our relationship with Turkey, get Congressional restrictions lifted, allow Greece to attend to its internal problems, preserve the main bonds of the alliance flank, and soothe a major world trouble spot—all without the intrusion of undesirable third parties.

7. Perhaps you can feel your way into this somewhat tentatively with the Turks, and if it leads to something worthwhile and specific, then send me in to see Caramanlis directly and privately—bypassing Bitsios. Bitsios would not like it, and you and I would both pay a price with him for doing it, but it may be the only way. It would not have to be billed as a "Kissinger proposal" but simply as one more effort on your part to try and assist two allies to get together.

8. One final note of caution: you have no doubt seen [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports—and my comments thereon—about coup plotting in Greece, possibly involving Averoff. While I continue to believe these reports should be substantially discounted, they cannot be dismissed altogether. Averoff, in his Defense Ministry post, is in a key

position. I have no reason to doubt his solidarity with and loyalty to Caramanlis, but one can never be sure. He may be playing his own game and trying to pave the way both for a Cyprus settlement and our support in the event he decides to ally himself with others. This is one more reason to feel your way carefully into the terrain indicated above, should you decide to go ahead.

Kubisch

178. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 24, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Buffum
Deputy Assistant Secretary Laingen
Mr. William Eagleton (Notetaker)

Cyprus

Mr. Glafcos Clerides
Foreign Minister Christophides
Ambassador Nicos Dimitriou
Mr. Angelides

(This portion of the conversation was preceded by a meeting between the Secretary and Clerides, with Ambassador Macomber present during part of that meeting.)²

Clerides: This is not the Ambassador in New York (pointing to Dimitriou and referring to Rossides).

Christophides: I asked Rossides why he had written the letter to *The New York Times* regarding Turkish aid. His reply was that he was not accredited to Washington.

Secretary: If he had been accredited to Washington he would have been out of the country by now.

Sisco: We have already discussed this matter with Mr. Clerides.

Christophides: I understand the point perfectly.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved in S on May 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² No record of this portion of the conversation has been found.

Secretary: Well, we have settled everything. It is alright as long as you realize that every crisis occurs in Joe Sisco's area. We tried to take Cyprus out of his area but were too late.

Secretary: When I was in Syria, Asad said we had arranged the coup against Makarios in Cyprus so as to have a NATO base from which to attack Syria. Now he asks why we are helping Makarios since we will not get a base that way.

I have told Mr. Clerides that I believe what was started in Brussels could have led to a solution. It would have been slow since the Turks hardly have a government. In my contact with the Greek side I found a willingness to make progress. We could then have put pressure on the Turks. However, the Congressional action has produced a tragedy. The first victims are the Greek Cypriots and Greeks. I don't think a solution can be put together except by the U.S. using its influence with Turkey. The Turkish Government is weak but we can work on Demirel and Ecevit. The Greeks must decide whether they want progress. If the aid cut continues the Turks will continue to take steps which will make it difficult for the U.S. to play a role. It is a case wherein action produces the opposite effect.

Mr. Clerides and I talked about what to do—talks could be moved to another city or they could be enlarged. I have doubts that the Turks will accept enlargement. What do you think Joe?

Sisco: Yes, enlargement would lead to an impasse.

Secretary: I understand that you need something new to get the talks going again.

Christophides: Above all we want effective progress.

Secretary: There is only one way. That is for the Greek Government, the Cyprus Government and ourselves to agree and then I sell the agreement in Ankara. What do you think Joe?

Sisco: I agree.

Secretary: You see I have the Under Secretary's support. Mr. Clerides, you will read that the Department is completely terrorized, but look at this.

Sisco: Don't worry, he holds his own.

Christophides: Yes, I have seen that in his talks with me this morning. There is one point—the question of cutting the aid is not in the hands of Greece and Cyprus but in that of Congress. If Congress does not reverse the cut you say you will have no leverage. Therefore, should we not find another way?

Secretary: There is no other way. If you bring in the Soviets we will oppose it. When I was in Europe the Europeans asked whether they should become involved.

I told them that if they could find a way to be helpful we would support them. I don't know what leverage they would have in Ankara.

Clerides: I go along with what you say. Only the U.S. can guide the Turks. It is necessary to regain that leverage. The help you need would be to say that the Turks will do something if Congress removes the cutoff. But it is extremely difficult for us to go to our friends in Congress or make statements until there is something positive. Where you have failed to persuade them I would have no chances either.

Secretary: They got off to a wrong start last summer in the wake of Watergate. They did not understand our strategy which was very similar to yours. The problem now is to get results. This is the first test of political action by the American/Greek community and they do not know how to handle it.

If we can remove the aid cut, then we get the British, French and Germans to support us on the plan that we agree on. Then we can go to Ankara.

And on my trip to the Middle East I will talk to Ecevit.

If you turn to Guyana it will be pure eye wash and no progress.

You, Caramanlis, along with Makarios and I, should agree on a program.

One good thing about the cutoff is that both sides now seem to be worried about a freezing of the situation, although I don't really know about Turkey since we have not had substantive contacts with them since February 5.

Buffum: One kind of expansion of the talks would be a greater role for Weckmann plus observers from Greece and Turkey.

Clerides: In the past when we have brought others into the talks, for instance on the constitutional issue, things have become more complicated.

Secretary: Suppose—this is just a personal idea—two neutrals, one chosen by Greece and one by Turkey—act as advisers to Weckmann. Do you think the Turks would agree?

Buffum: Waldheim is thinking of three nonaligned representatives as advisers to him.

Secretary: Will the Turks accept?

Sisco: I don't think so but I would think that if each country designated one adviser it would be less objectionable to them. We are trying to meet the problem and get a consensus of the UN. You will need agreement of the Turks for any negotiations to be effective.

Secretary: If this goes on for another month it will be completely out of control and the Cypriots will be the losers.

Clerides: Suppose we concede that talks continue, then will the Turks be willing to accept an enlargement of the peacekeeping forces and the return of some refugees?

Secretary: My instinct is that the Turks will agree to nothing while aid is cut off.

Sisco: There is that and also the problem of getting unilateral concessions from them.

Secretary: We would explore the return of some but how many refugees are you referring to?

Clerides: The first problem is 9,000 Greeks who are still in the north and are being badly treated. If the Turks could withdraw, and these Greek villages were placed under UN control, that would ease the situation. Then if some refugees could be let back to Famagusta.

Secretary: We have tried that many times before without success.

Christophides: And that was before the aid cutoff.

Secretary: Yes, the aid cut was hanging over us. The aid cut was a tragedy. Negotiations always begin slowly. I believe we had better than a 50–50 chance.

Sisco: Yes, there was a good possibility in November.

Dimitriou: But then there was the problem of the fall of the Turkish Government.

Secretary: We can explore with the Turks what we can get from them if the aid cut is removed but I don't believe these things made any difference. What is worthwhile is a rapid conclusion. We ought to reach an understanding—Clerides, Makarios, Caramanlis and I. I will take this understanding to Ankara where I can sell it. Otherwise we will be in for a long guerrilla war.

Esenbel will dig himself into a foxhole. I would have a better chance than Esenbel to sell the plan to Ecevit, Demirel and Sancar.

I have now come to the opposite conclusion from what I had believed previously. I had thought in December that proposals then could lead gradually to a solution.

It seems difficult for the Turks to decide even on some small concessions now. If we three can agree on a package I can take it to Ankara and sell it. If I have to get concessions from the Turks first and negotiate it with Brademas it will lead to an endless nightmare.

An expanded forum may allow you to return to the talks. However, if aid is resumed it won't be important to go to the talks immediately.

Clerides: That is why it is necessary to get from the Security Council the right impression that a forum has been created, and meanwhile we can work on the package.

Secretary: Where are you going now?

Clerides: Back to New York and we will stay until the end of the Security Council session.³ We could stay several days later.

Secretary: We will support a reasonable solution at the UN. We can explore it with the Turks. I am going to the Middle East in March. If we can get aid lifted I can go to Ankara. I can meet first with you and Bitsios. If we don't lift the cutoff I fear the Turks will make it impossible for me to go.

Dimitriou: Do you think you can get the Turks to hold in abeyance implementation of the Turkish Cypriot state?

Secretary: I don't think I can get anything from the Turks right now.

Christophides: Will you be able to go to Ankara before the end of the cutoff?

Secretary: Esenbel says he won't see me before resumption of aid. I told Congress I wanted the threat of a cutoff—and that would have been useful—but not the cutoff itself.

Dimitriou: If you have a meeting with the Greeks and Cypriots that would help in lifting the cutoff. It might be a question of prestige for Congress.

Secretary: But that would delay progress. The President is determined to fight this issue on the basis of executive authority. I leave on March 6 and while I am gone the whole matter will be delayed.

Clerides: There is one possibility. If the Secretary meets with the Greeks and Cypriots and reaches a common line to take to the Turks, this movement would help lift the ban and then he could go to Turkey.

Secretary: That is alright with me. Perhaps Clerides could meet me in London. I will be there on the 7th.

There could be problems in London but that might be the most practical place.

³ The Security Council met in February and March and adopted without vote Resolution 367 on March 12, which called for continued negotiation on the Cyprus issue and regretted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of February 13. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975*, pp. 297–298)

179. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, March 8, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report of his meeting with Foreign Minister Bitsios be passed to you:

"I have just concluded a three-hour discussion with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios in Brussels² in which we reviewed in some detail the current aspects of the Cyprus problem. The overall impression which I have is that Greece is ready to find ways to restart the Clerides–Denktash negotiations in a serious way. This reflects Caramanlis's judgment that the longer the impasse continues on the Cyprus issue—as distasteful as any solution might be—the more vulnerable Caramanlis becomes politically at home. For this reason Bitsios reaffirmed today Greece's willingness to consider a Bizonal solution, which of course would represent the major concessions which the Turks have been looking for. In return the Greeks want to reduce the area which would go to them. Bitsios, who is considerably more cautious than Caramanlis, made clear that the area around Morphu in the northwest and the area in the southeastern portion of the present Turkish zone are the keys to a solution which gives economic viability to the Greek Cypriots. It is principally within this context that my efforts will be concentrated over the next two weeks.

"I am sending Hartman to Ankara to give Esenbel, Ecevit and Demirel a report of my talk with Bitsios. Hartman will also explore what the possibilities are and in particular how much a reduction in their zone the Turks would be willing to consider as part of a settlement. We are all convinced that as well disposed as Esenbel is, the views of Ecevit and Demirel are even more important and more influential. Bitsios wanted me to go to Ankara promptly, so that I could talk directly to Ecevit and Demirel. While I agreed to explore this possibility once again, I made clear to the Greek Foreign Minister that because of the aid cutoff it was unlikely that the present Turk Government would be willing to receive me. I have left it up to the Turks as to whether they would be willing to meet with me early next week in Ankara; if not, I am suggesting to Esenbel that we meet in Brussels about the 16th.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² A March 7 memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975.

“If I go to Ankara the issue of spare parts may become acute. Haig tells me that the Turk military are desperate and will go to war with Greece rather than permit their military establishment to run down for lack of spare parts. If I find it necessary to get negotiations started, I would appreciate your authority to explore the waiver route—warning Turkey that it may delay the actual total lifting of embargo. I have asked Brent to look into the legal position.”

[Omitted here are two paragraphs unrelated to Cyprus.]

180. Editorial Note

Henry Kissinger visited Ankara March 10–11, 1975, as part of a trip to the Middle East March 8–19. He met with the principal Turkish leaders and discussed Cyprus and the Congressional ban on U.S. military aid to Turkey. See Documents 218–220 for his reports to President Ford on his meetings.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, June 10, 1975, 1920Z.

1882. For the Secretary From Ambassador. Department pass Athens, Ankara, USUN as desired. Subject: Oral Message From the Secretary to Makarios. Ref: State 132961.²

1. Summary. Makarios considers Vienna II³ failure and is deeply angered by Clerides' performance there, perhaps to the point of trying

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 10. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 132961 to Nicosia, June 6, relayed the text of an oral message from Kissinger to Makarios. Kissinger shared his impression that both the Greek and Turkish leaders wanted to move ahead on a Cyprus settlement. He thought that positions could be clarified during the intercommunal talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

³ The first set of intercommunal talks under UN auspices, Vienna I, began in the summer of 1972 and adjourned April 2, 1974. See Document 74. The first round of Vienna II lasted from April 28 to May 3. (Telegram 3803 from Vienna, May 3; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

to replace him as negotiator. He asserts, however, that he is not trying to substitute internationalization for this negotiating track. He acknowledges constructive role being played by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and welcomes reduction in Greek-Turkish tensions resulting from Brussels. Says visits to Arab states imply no intention change form or content of good relations with Israel. Statement's regarding "long struggle" do not portend building toward guerilla warfare. Makarios remains interested in availability of US AID funds for rehousing refugees. End summary.

2. I called on Makarios morning June 10 to deliver your oral message. He listened attentively and said to thank you.

3. Without introduction, Makarios then launched into a diatribe against Vienna II and Clerides. Vienna, he said, had been a "fraud and a failure covered over with nice words". GOC position had suffered as a result. He could not fault Waldheim for trying to convey an appearance of optimism and progress, but he himself was completely pessimistic. He could and would take Clerides to task for having made several serious mistakes.

4. Enumerating Clerides' errors, Makarios said that, first, he had without guidance stated before departure that he would leave Vienna if Turkish Cypriots proceeded with June 8 constitutional referendum. In Vienna, Clerides had been obliged to climb down from this. Second, in final communiqué,⁴ he had accepted language referring to possibility of a transitional federal government. He had done so without instructions and transitional government was unacceptable to GOC. Third, in press questions and answers following announcement of communiqué, Clerides had alluded to a Turkish proposal on refugee return when no such proposal existed.

5. Makarios said Clerides would be briefing Council of Ministers and National Council about Vienna on June 11 and intimated that he would be chastised both in that session and publicly.

6. I replied that just before our meeting I had been ruminating about the prodigious amount of diplomatic energy it has taken to get a Cyprus negotiation going and keep it alive. I cited the recent principal and visible manifestations of the effort: visits to Ankara by Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Hartman, visits to Athens by latter,⁵ Bitsios-Caglayangil meeting, President Ford's sessions with Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in Brussels⁶ and supporting Foreign

⁴ Transmitted in telegram 3800 from Vienna, May 3. (Ibid.)

⁵ Hartman met with Caglayangil on April 21 (telegram 3136 from Ankara; *ibid.*), Demirel on April 22 (telegram 3184 from Ankara; *ibid.*), and Bitsios on April 24 (telegram 3176 from Athens, April 24; *ibid.*).

⁶ For Ford's meeting with Karamanlis, see Document 50. For Ford's meeting with Demirel, see Document 227.

Minister-level discussions, Demirel–Karamanlis bilateral, and Waldheim’s admirable labors against odds in Vienna. I pointed out that the objective of these several efforts was to create the framework and atmosphere in which a Cyprus solution fair to Greek Cypriots could be reached. We were well aware of Archbishop’s interest in internationalizing the Cyprus problem. We believe this was his decision to make, but frankly we would not see it paying off. While we understand that Turkish unreadiness to talk about specifics in Vienna was a disappointment to GOC, we felt strongly that continued negotiation along present line was the only path with any promise. Others obviously felt the same. Actions of Waldheim and Clerides in Vienna should, I believed, be read in this positive light. With admittedly very little to go on, prospects for a continued negotiation had been salvaged.

7. Makarios backed off somewhat. He said he recognized and appreciated the great efforts of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to keep negotiation and hope for progress alive, even though these efforts were “late”. Similarly, although nothing positive had resulted for Cyprus itself, Karamanlis–Demirel meeting had undoubtedly been beneficial in terms of easing tension between Greece and Turkey. That easing of tension in turn, might eventually help a Cyprus solution. Nevertheless, Vienna II had ill-served GOC interests. In addition to the annoying reference to a transitional government, which was a clear effort to erode the GOC’s international position, language of communiqué put Greek and Turkish sides on an equal plane. In fact, Clerides had gone with positive attitude and flexible instructions that empowered him to discuss all aspects whereas Turkey had reneged on Denktash commitment of Vienna I and come up with nothing. As a result of communiqué language, GOC’s international position had suffered. The basis for any useful debate in coming SC meeting on Cyprus had been destroyed. Waldheim’s report would be anodyne and a resolution on the negotiation, if any, would be inconsequential. (In reply to my interjected question, Makarios said it would now be pointless to send special representation to New York for the debate. GOC position would be handled by Rossides.)

8. Makarios said that despite his criticisms of Vienna, Waldheim and Clerides, he fully supported continued negotiation. He was not seeking internationalization as a substitute. He had little to gain from an international conference. Rather, he was afraid that lulled by a series of communiqués along the lines of Vienna I and Vienna II, the world would forget about the unsolved Cyprus problem and condone continued *faits accomplis* by the Turks, such as their referendum, elections, possible unilateral declaration of independence, and their adamant refusal to discuss the real issues. Therefore, he considered it essential to use meetings of the UNSC and UNGA, and his own travels, to keep the Cyprus problem before the world.

9. I replied that I could understand Archbishop's desire to keep international attention alive, if that was as it was. I cautioned, however, that this variety of internationalization, if pushed too far in certain directions, would cut across the other negotiating track.

10. I asked the Archbishop whether he viewed his recent visits to Gulf states and forthcoming visits to other Arab states in terms of maintaining international interest and, further, whether his efforts to win greater Arab support had implications for GOC relations with Israel. Was he, for example, considering any downgrading in GOC diplomatic relations with Israel as a gesture to the Arabs? Makarios replied that he valued GOC's good relations with Israel and intended no change whatsoever. In visits to the Arab states, while showing sympathy for Arab concerns, he had been and would continue to be careful to hew a delicate line between sympathy and underwriting all their positions. In general, he had found the safest way was to refer to UN resolutions. He repeated that he was not prepared to consider any change in the nature of his relationship with Israel. I suggested that, this being the case, he have FonMin Christophides say something reassuring to the Israelis before he left on his next swing through the Arab world. Makarios said he would do so. He indicated that his present plan is to leave June 16 for Cairo, then go to Damascus and Beirut if situation there was stabilized by then, and thereafter to Baghdad, Libya and possibly Algeria although Algerian arrangements not yet firm.

11. On another aspect, I asked Makarios whether his frequent use of the term "long struggle" implied a military component as well as the economic revivification he had previously mentioned to me and which, I noted he now had under discussion with GOC. I referred in the former sense to creation of various new self-styled "resistance fronts" and GOC promulgation of a law on compulsory reserve training for all Greek males up to age 60. Makarios replied blandly that he was a man of peace and did not believe in force to solve problems. He did not approve creation of resistance fronts (although he acknowledged at least one group was comprised of his own supporters).

12. Concluding, I recalled question Makarios had put to me in Washington concerning use of a portion of potential FY-76 \$25 million in supporting assistance for construction of houses for refugees now in tents. I said that despite what Archbishop had been told by Congressmen, this money might be some distance from appropriation. If it was voted, USG would want to continue to donate a substantial portion to UNHCR for its valuable relief work. Nevertheless, question of supporting GOC in some way on refugee housing was discussable and in fact, pursuant to Archbishop's interest, was already under review by Embassy with appropriate GOC officials. One thought was to relieve GOC of some of the burden of its subsidies to refugees through their activity in this field, thus freeing GOC funds for housing. On

basis of personal experience with Palestine refugee problem, I expressed concern that US funds not be used to create permanent camps which would become a breeding ground for an immutable refugee mentality and fanaticism which was not in GOC interest. Makarios agreed and said his purpose was to construct housing to integrate refugees into existing urban communities.

13. *Comment:* Makarios' anger with Clerides as evidenced in this conversation is supported by a well-sourced [*less than 1 line not declassified*] report being transmitted simultaneously.⁷ Latter states that Makarios is actually thinking of ways in which he can unload Clerides in favor of a more compliant Greek Cypriot negotiator.

Crawford

⁷ Not found.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, June 27, 1975, 1700Z.

2069. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Department pass Athens and Ankara as desired. Subject: Conversation with Clerides. Ref: Nicosia 1882.²

1. Summary. Clerides has asked that I convey his current thinking to you on a confidential basis pursuant your suggestion. He believes Makarios is trying to weaken his position out of suspicion that there may be an evolving axis between him and Karamanlis, and a desire to see present negotiation fail quickly. Clerides reiterated criticism of pro-Makarios role of Greek Ambassador here. He stressed urgent need for centrist political movement, led by him, to counter increasingly successful Communist activity encouraged by Makarios. End summary.

2. I saw Clerides June 27—our first meeting since Vienna II and UNSC Cyprus debate.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 10. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Noforn.

² Document 181.

3. At the outset, I told Clerides that Makarios had sharply criticized him in conversation with me just after Vienna II (reftel). I asked if there were an explanation for this display of calculated anger other than reasons given by Archbishop, i.e. Clerides' acceptance of an appearance of progress and reference to transitional government in final communiqué. Karamanlis had given strong support Clerides in Vienna. Was Makarios perhaps worried that Karamanlis and Clerides had developed a mutuality of interest and understanding from which he being excluded? Was Makarios seeking to demean him in eyes of Greek Cypriots in order to break up this "axis"? I noted the private conversations which had taken place between Karamanlis and Clerides and asked about the state of their relationship.

4. Clerides prefaced his reply by recalling that in your last conversation with him you had said he could communicate with you confidentially through me. He asked that his following remarks be treated in this sense.

5. Clerides said he believed Makarios was actively seeking to undermine his position because (A) he had wanted Vienna II to fail and (B) he was suspicious of the very good relationship which had evolved with Karamanlis. Re (A) Makarios wished to be free to pursue his preferred path of building Arab, non-aligned and Soviet support looking toward UNGA and its advocacy of a broader international negotiation. As evidence of this, Clerides said he had informed Makarios that substantive progress might well not be possible by July 24 date for reconvening Vienna discussion and that a postponement might therefore be desirable. Makarios had replied that, regardless, they wanted the next round to take place as scheduled. Makarios, Clerides thought, wanted to precipitate a failure of this negotiation as quickly as possible lest Turks come up with something quasi-reasonable. Unfortunately, Turkey playing directly into his hands by its unwillingness/inability to table positions on territory and refugees. Given the situation in Ankara and Makarios' attitude, the prospects for sustained negotiation were poor. Clerides said he was relying on your assurance that you would do what you could with Turkey, but he appreciated the difficulties in this.

6. Returning to my question of his relationship with Karamanlis, Clerides said everything was fine when the two could meet face to face. When he was in Nicosia, however, all communications had to run through (Greek Ambassador) Dountas who put everything through the optic of his total personal commitment to Makarios. I asked if this had come up in Clerides' private conversations with Karamanlis and Clerides nodded. He thought Karamanlis had come to realize how much of a problem he had on this score. Karamanlis had looked "creased" after their discussion. *Comment:* Undoubtedly, because Dountas is a strong partisan of Mavros, he would be difficult to transfer without stimulating politically

motivated criticism from latter. *End comment.* Clerides cautioned me against confiding in Dountas. I said that from long experience with him I had learned the wisdom of being quite uncommunicative.

7. Clerides then broached what he said was the main concern he wished to convey at this time: the interrelationship of developments on the Greek Cypriot political scene and the negotiation under Waldheim.

8. Clerides remarked that, as I undoubtedly aware, Makarios was discreetly encouraging activity by AKEL (the official Cyprus Communist Party) and Lyssarides (unofficial Communist) as part of his effort to attract non-aligned and leftist support internationally. Building on economic dislocation and political frustration, both were making dangerous headway. The situation urgently required the creation of a broad political movement aimed at pulling together political factions from the genuinely progressive left-of-center to the right but excluding on the far right those tainted by active association with last summer's coup. This movement would not be opposed to Makarios and would indeed draw in many of his supporters who currently discomfited by his reliance on the left. A counterweight to the latter was increasingly essential and Clerides said he knew only he could lead it. Problem for him was that he felt himself intellectually and morally committed to continuing the present Cyprus negotiation. If, having brought a center movement into being, the negotiation failed and discredited him it would also seriously and perhaps irrevocably damage the chances of a successful center coalition. Clerides said he had to weigh this against the danger of letting non-Communist forces remain leaderless. His decision was to defer for at least another two or three months the announcement of a center movement to allow some more time for progress in the negotiation. In the interim, time would not be completely wasted as lists of movement leaders, structure, and program could be developed. To counter AKEL, which subsidized by Russia, and Lyssarides who generously supported by Syria and Libya, and successful opposition movement would have to have resources which would be hard to come by given straitened economic circumstances of politically sympathetic potential backers.

9. My conversation with Clerides was three times interrupted from calls from UNSYG Special Representative Weckmann to the effect that Denktash has gone back on agreement reached June 25 to swap some Turkish students in the south for permission for ten Greek Cypriot teachers to be allowed to go to Greek enclaves in Karpass (Nicosia 2059).³ Denktash, Weckmann told Clerides, wanted his Turks but was temporarily unable make arrangements for the Greek teach-

³ Dated June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

ers. Clerides said then there could be no deal and by telephone ordered transfer of Turkish students halted, commenting to me that matters were back to square one. Clerides also noted with dismay Denktash's admission to foreign journalists that Greek personal property and merchandise in Famagusta being removed and transferred to Nicosia for sale and other disposition. Greeks, he said, read this as indicating Turkish intention to repopulate New Famagusta in the near future.

10. *Comment:* Unless you wish, I do not think a reply from you to Clerides is required by the nature of his comment. *End comment.*

Crawford

183. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Greece

Foreign Minister Bitsios

U.S.

The Secretary of State

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

(After a discussion which has been reported by cable on the ammunition theft at Souda Bay,² the following exchange took place.)

Bitsios: I saw Caglayangil this afternoon and he told me that the President had asked if it was possible to have a statement on the Turkish position with respect to Cyprus. He said that Demirel had replied that his Government could not discuss these matters with the U.S. because it does not accept that there is a link between the American embargo and the Cyprus negotiations. I said why don't you speak to

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on August 9. The meeting took place in Finlandia Hall. Kissinger was in Helsinki for CSCE talks.

² Reported in telegrams 5781 from Athens and Secto 8088, both July 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

me—we are ready to negotiate. Caglayangil replied that Turks could not speak about Cyprus as long as the embargo is still on. You see, they are continuing to make their excuses. First, it was their internal political troubles. Now it is the embargo. Where do you think we can go from here? We want with all seriousness to have these negotiations. We approach this problem with an open heart.

The Secretary: That is what I have been telling the Turks.

Bitsios: Caramanlis told me that he was the only one who was trying to fight to get talks going in spite of the embargo and all the other things. He said that they don't like what Caramanlis had to say. But what are we waiting for?

The Secretary: Your negotiation is the only one that I have failed to move forward. I am not saying this in any way to complain—we both know how to solve this problem. The only criticism I would have of your negotiating tactics is that you don't take a position and stick with it. You give a little every three months and that just causes the other side to delay. The basic problem was last August. We decided that military action by us was impossible and, of course, there were other factors. If we made a mistake it was in Geneva.

Bitsios: If Mavros had known that you were behind the Turkish proposal he might have considered it more closely.

The Secretary: The mistake is that we should have taken over the negotiations from Callaghan but you will recall it was the week of the transition. If it was not for that I might have gone to Geneva myself. We could have tried to use Turkish gratitude for our attitude in order to get concessions for you but, frankly, I must tell you I am getting very tired of your supporters in the United States. I am called a murderer and a liar by all kinds of Greek Americans and I can tell you that that kind of thing does not hurt me, it hurts you. If I am going to be able to help, I can't constantly have my prestige attacked.

Bitsios: But they are all just playing internal politics.

The Secretary: But I can tell you that the people that have attacked me usually end up being mortally damaged themselves. Jackson tried it and he got nowhere. In the end Brademas will be discredited. He has just done a stupid thing. Above all, this presents the Turks with a beautiful excuse not to negotiate. If we had won the vote,³ the Turks would

³ On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject an amended version of S. 846, which would have allowed resumption of most military aid to Turkey. The following day Turkey ordered the United States to cease operations at its 27 bases in Turkey, including 4 intelligence-gathering facilities. On July 31 the Senate voted 47–46 to pass a new bill, S. 2230, which contained the language in the rejected House bill. The House was unable to vote on the new bill before its month-long summer recess because of parliamentary obstacles. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 866–867)

have been morally obliged to do something. I know that your Government probably did the minimum although your Ambassador was probably a little overenthusiastic. This was mainly the actions of the Greek-American community. We have talked to Caglayangil and told him that something must happen. We have said that it is our belief that Caramanlis wants to settle this matter on generous terms but, of course, within his domestic limitations. We have said that you can get what you want if you act now. They told us they would try to come up with something. We also have encouraged the Europeans to take an initiative and we will support it.

Bitsios: I hope they are not thinking just of a *démarche*. That will not help us very much and that is not a good way to approach Turkey. Also Turkey might interpret it as weakness. They should have an honest feeling that we want to settle.

The Secretary: Yes, for you Cyprus is a disaster. The opposition will attack any settlement because it will not be as good a situation as before July. You know that the quicker you get a solution the better but no one knows how to move. We are effectively out of the act. Congressmen are even talking about getting a new man and taking me out but I can tell you this would lead to stalemate. They said to us at first there ought to be a discussion of the central government. What do you think we could do, Art?

Hartman: Is there any chance that we could be helpful in bringing together Caramanlis and Demirel here in Helsinki?

The Secretary: What is your impression?

Bitsios: I don't think Demirel wants to meet with us.

The Secretary: Perhaps you are right. Can we think of anything else?

Bitsios: One thing you said strikes me. You said that we always put forward a position and then change it. I can tell you that the position that Caramanlis gave you is our minimum position. We do not want any further delay.

The Secretary: The history of the last year has been one of constant change on your part. First you wanted to go back to the 1960 agreements.

Bitsios: That was Mavros, not me.

The Secretary: Then you finally accepted a cantonal solution and you moved from 20 to 14 to 5 and finally to a bizonal arrangement. On territory you moved from 18 percent to 21 percent and now Makarios tells us he can accept 25 percent and a bizonal solution. By the way, the President told him he did not think that was enough. I think the Turks will settle for around 30. But the percentages are really not important. If we could go the route of specifying the territory—X, Y or Z that would be better. After all, it is more important if it is Famagusta and Morphu—then no one would care what percentage it was.

Perhaps at some point tactically someone else can put forward the idea so that you won't have to back it.

Bitsios: But I can tell you that what Caramanlis said is our final position.

The Secretary: But he did not specify a specific percentage.

Bitsios: Do you see any role for the EC-Nine?

The Secretary: Italy, of course, is not exactly the best intermediary. The Germans would have more influence in Turkey. Maybe I should talk to Genscher.

Bitsios: The Nine seem to be willing to get in the picture. Turkey is in a real mess and they need help and we would want others to help them.

The Secretary: How can we help?

Bitsios: Everything would be settled automatically if we could move this negotiation along. You have talked to the Nine but I think you should talk to Genscher again and then I will explain our general position. It is difficult for me to talk to the Germans before the Italians who are in the chair but maybe the Germans could go separately to the Turks.

The Secretary: If the vote should pass this week and I am not asking for your help because I think the situation in Washington is too chaotic for anyone to be of important help—the Turks will have a moral obligation to make progress but I will ask the Germans to help you. And even if we fail, we will see if the Germans can support something. One of the tragedies of the present situation is that we are now going to have to pay to get our bases reopened—and what we pay we might have used to help produce a Cyprus solution. But if you have any ideas please tell us because regardless of what Congress does we want to support your Government and we know that in the end Turkey will have to make significant concessions. We don't want Greece to go the way of Portugal and, in my view, that is not impossible. I think five years from now your military may turn to the left too.

Bitsios: I don't think that will happen but we are in a serious situation now and we need economic help.

The Secretary: Aren't we moving that along?

Hartman: Yes, it is in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Bitsios: That may be too late. We need it now. If we can get our economic situation straightened out, then Caramanlis can build a strong democratic regime.

The Secretary: We really want to help but the Greek Americans have got to get off our back.

Bitsios: Some day I will be free to tell you something about our Greek-American friends. This has been a very difficult period.

The Secretary: I recognize that. They were either Junta supporters before or they will attack Caramanlis to support the left-Papandreou.

184. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, August 1, 1975, 1:30–2:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic
 Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Claude Pierre-Brossolette, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs

SUBJECTS

Economic Policy/Cyprus; French Nuclear Programs; Energy

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Giscard: I had breakfast with Karamanlis today. We are open to any suggestion for a European move which would help with the embargo. If there is no change I think it will be impossible to start any negotiation. The Greeks fear having the embargo lifted without any movement from the Turks.

President: Let me bring you up to date.

[Described the Congressional action to lift the embargo.]²

The Senate passed it again yesterday, but it is difficult to get it through the House because of the rules. We can't get anything until September. So we are in limbo.

Kissinger: No House move is possible until September 9. If the European appeal comes too soon, it will be dissipated. It would be the end of any appeal to both parties and to the U.S. to lift the embargo. Turkey might be able to respond to an appeal from you that they wouldn't to us. We have a list of concessions.

Giscard: Are they significant?

Kissinger: Not now. The airport opening, some refugee return, etc. They could be made to look so if Greece cooperates. Greece will accept a bizonal arrangement and 25 percent of the territory to the Turks. Turkey has said they need 32 percent. So the difference comes down to 7 percent on territory. I think Greece will accept just short of 30 percent.

Giscard: They are Greek. It will be 27.8 percent or nothing.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. The luncheon meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.

² Brackets are in the original.

Kissinger: I think we shouldn't talk percentage, but what specific areas they want. The Greek portion of Famagusta, Morphou, etc.

Sauvagnargues: Yes. It is a question of what kind of territory.

Giscard: Yes. Like Morphou with an outlet to the sea.

Kissinger: If Ecevit were in, it would be settled quickly. He wants to use it now to break up the coalition.

Giscard: If Demirel is clever enough he can show it as a success.

Kissinger: But he can't look weak.

The President: He can move more easily in response to a European appeal, rather than an American one.

Sauvagnargues: But how are we to make the position of the Nine more precise, to carry the weight with the Congress? It will be seen as implying the kind of settlement which would appeal to the parties. It is difficult.

Giscard: We would have to say it is a settlement according to certain principles, with vague wording. Then we could say we will help the parties to cooperate and call on the U.S. to lift the embargo as its contribution.

Sauvagnargues: Giscard said to Karamanlis that lifting the embargo would not necessarily resume arms deliveries.

Kissinger: But it would.

The President: [Describes the embargo and the types of aid. Also discusses the waiver authority.]³

Giscard: If we were Metternich we could use another tactic. Turkey wants us to sell large amounts of arms. We said no, because we wouldn't want to interfere vis-à-vis the Greeks, etc.

Kissinger: It would help with the Congress, if there were at least rumors.

The President: If the stories come from Europe it would help with the Congress—for aircraft, tank areas, etc.

Sauvagnargues: It would be delicate to manage, but it might be done.

Giscard: We will see what we can do. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

³ Brackets are in the original.

185. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 24, 1975, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS

Greece

Foreign Minister Bitsios

Ambassador Carayannis, Greek Foreign Ministry

Mr. Vlassopoulos, Notetaker

United States

The Secretary

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

William L. Eagleton, Notetaker

(Photographers take pictures.)

The Secretary: You might have to run for office in Greece.

(Laughter)

Bitsios: After your speech in the General Assembly yesterday,² I can afford that (proximity to the Secretary).

The Secretary: You were pleased?

Bitsios: Yes.

The Secretary: That was our basic policy.

Bitsios: It gives the Turks an idea that others understand the basic elements of the Cyprus problem and are willing to declare them publicly. We are facing immobility from Ankara.

The Secretary: I had a talk yesterday with Caglayangil.³ (Hartman leaves room to pick up piece of paper.)

They have me on a schedule where I can't talk to my associates. The bureaucracy is gaining on me.

Bitsios: You have been in New York several days?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on October 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria while he attended the UN General Assembly.

² Kissinger delivered his speech on September 22. On Cyprus, Kissinger stated that the status quo must not be permanent and an equitable solution was imperative. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, October 13, 1975, pp. 545-553.

³ See Document 236.

The Secretary: Yes, since Monday.⁴ It is my impression from my talk with Caglayangil yesterday that he was more forthcoming than at any time I have seen him. Not that he gave me any formulas. I did not ask for any percentages, but I thought his attitude more forthcoming—but he conditioned it on the October 12 elections and on our Congressional vote. For the first time he specifically mentioned New Famagusta and Morphou as something to talk about if the constitutional arrangements are satisfactory. At first he proposed constitutional issues be decided first, but then in the course of our conversation he accepted that simultaneity could be applied. This is provided the arms embargo is lifted and the elections don't represent a gain for Ecevit.

He said that if Denktash puts forward a territorial position, Ankara will not object.

We don't expect your help on the arms embargo vote. I am merely explaining it to you. If it is lifted, we will make a major effort. If it is not lifted, I think the Turks will make life very difficult for us. I am not talking to Greek Congressmen this time so that there will not be any misunderstanding as there was before.

We will have a domestic mess if the embargo is lifted and there is no progress on Cyprus.

Bitsios: Prime Minister Caramanlis asked me to talk to you about the embargo. First of all, you are aware that we shall not be pleased with the lifting because we have no guarantee that the arms will not be used against us. Secondly, we will not take a public position or be active in Washington.

The Secretary: Your Embassy will not be active?

Bitsios: Our Embassy will remain neutral. Caramanlis told you and President Ford he is concerned that the Turks might get arms without a previous commitment.

A third question is how you envision making a gesture to Greece.

The Secretary: I have discussed with Jack Kubisch the possibility of sending a mission to Athens. The President and I were talking about sending a team to study your economic and military needs. We will then put it to Congress.

Bitsios: Is there a timetable?

The Secretary: No, we can discuss that. I did not want to give you a formal proposal that might have complicated things for you.

Bitsios: Re Cyprus, I don't know what to tell you. It is clear that the reasons the Turks give for nothing happening are not convincing. On the election, if he loses, what will happen? If he wins, there might

⁴ September 22.

be general elections. However, Caglayangil has given commitments to you and to the Nine.

The Secretary: As a practical matter, if the embargo is lifted and the Turks don't do anything, we have to—but we have to consider what is meant by lifting the embargo. The present bill is only for the pipeline and not for grant or credit aid. Some items will not be on the list. The next thing would be to lift the ban on credits and grant aid in the foreign aid bill. If there is no progress by November, those restrictions will remain. I don't want a situation where the Greeks don't want progress so as not to help the Turks and the Turks are unable to move. But if nothing happens we will have to take a public position.

We are working closely with the Nine. They don't have the fire-power, but they have good will. But the Turks do want to belong to the European area. Genscher and Sauvagnargues told me they will talk to you.

I have made it clear to Caglayangil that if the embargo is lifted, something must happen. I have also agreed to try with the Greek community here. I feel the situation could force us to say something.

(To Hartman): What is your view?

Hartman: Someone on the Turkish side must screw up the courage to make proposals. Ecevit's statements have been helpful. He talks of negotiations.

Bitsios: It is a question of what forum for negotiations. I am not sure under the Secretary General is the best forum for all things.

The Secretary: I believe you should begin with him.

Bitsios: This holds back the Nine. At first they had the elements of a solution.

The Secretary: What is your idea?

Bitsios: The Nine could have done it. I asked Rumor why they did not, and he said they did not want to embarrass Waldheim. The Nine can put forward things that Waldheim cannot. And this could lead to a breakthrough.

The Secretary: If Waldheim doesn't do it, the Europeans could do it, or we could do it, or the two of us could together. But doing it together can work only if only two or three are designated. It cannot work with nine. In my mediations in the Middle East, the practice has been—I would as soon not do it. A settlement will not be wildly popular in Greece, and I am not volunteering. Our strategy has been to get the parties to state their positions and then we narrow the positions. This must be a continuing progress.

I believe this is easier than the Middle East. We know that it will be a bi-zonal system. We know something of the powers of the central government. Re territory, you have indicated three areas of importance:

New Famagusta, the Morphou area, and something below the Nicosia–Famagusta road.

Bitsios: Our position on percentage is that it should be proportional to the population.

The Secretary: That is your formal position, but I have been told on the Greek side 25 per cent and by the Turks 34 percent. I think it is best not to talk percentages at first. Instead, one can talk areas.

Bitsios: You can combine the two.

The Secretary: If we start with areas, the percentages might appear differently. The differences don't seem unbridgeable.

Bitsios: No, unless they want to keep what they have.

The Secretary: Yes, if the Turks want an agreement, they can go beyond their wildest dreams of a year ago.

Bitsios: The present situation doesn't make it easy for the Turks.

The Secretary: Caglayangil talked yesterday of withdrawal of forces. However, nothing was said with precision that could be put on paper. He has always been more forthcoming than Demirel. Demirel is very cautious. He is afraid of being accused of selling out by Ecevit.

Bitsios: Mr. Hartman says Ecevit is encouraging negotiations.

Hartman: He is pressing Demirel to give him his position.

The Secretary: Ecevit wants to use the negotiating issue to force early elections. He said first the government must take a position. Then he can attack Demirel on it. He knows that I know his previous position. He wants Erbakan out, and elections. If Ecevit were Prime Minister, we could settle Cyprus in a month. He screwed it up, though. All our calculations went down the drain. What is your idea? Should we and the Europeans both designate someone?

Bitsios: You went to Ankara and then your position weakened, so we went to the Europeans.

The Secretary: We have no objections that the Europeans designate someone—and we can also designate someone.

Hartman: It is important that this not look like international pressure on the Turks.

The Secretary: Can we keep the UN debate in low key?

Bitsios: I have discussed this this morning with the Cypriots. The Cypriots will wait until Turkish elections to see if the Turks are more forthcoming. In which case the debate would take another turn.

The Secretary: I think Waldheim should call a meeting of Clerides and Denktash within two to three weeks after the elections.

Bitsios: We must know first that Denktash will come forward with proposals.

The Secretary: I would be prepared to send someone to Ankara.

Bitsios: When is the Congressional vote?

The Secretary: Tuesday.⁵ Art, what is the Rules Committee decision?

Hartman: We haven't heard yet.

The Secretary: I don't understand what the Greek Congressmen are doing. If Brademas wins in the Rules Committee, things will blow up in Turkey and sooner or later the embargo will be lifted, but it won't do anything for the Greeks. It is beyond my ability to reason with them. I respect Brademas, but he will lose in the end, like Jackson did.

Bitsios: What is next?

The Secretary: It may be over today. If they don't rule on it, then Demirel may move to kick us out. (The Secretary asked to be connected by phone to Scowcroft.) The Greeks on the Rules Committee might prevent a vote this week, but if it goes to the House we will probably win by a narrow margin. What will happen is that many people are becoming isolationists. I don't want to give the impression we want you to help. That is not possible. If the bill doesn't pass, the Turks might do something irreversible. If it does pass, let's discuss what we can do. (Secretary speaks with Washington by phone.) They have reported the bill out of the Rules Committee nine to six and there will be a vote next week.

I think Hartman should see Caglayangil to make sure he understands that if we win the vote and nothing happens, it would make our position impossible. We should tell him this before the vote. Then we wait until October 12. I should send Arthur (Hartman) to Ankara to talk to them—maybe a European should go with him. Maybe he should go to Athens also.

Are you prepared to talk about equal representation in the government?

Bitsios: That is a Cypriot problem.

The Secretary: What do they think?

Bitsios: It is difficult for them to swallow.

The Secretary: (To Hartman): What do you think?

Hartman: It is more a question of the Head of State. If that is settled, there could be agreement.

Bitsios: They will need Makarios for some time. The central government should not have too much power, so that serious divisions will not occur.

⁵ September 29. The House voted 237–176 on October 2 to partially lift the embargo per S. 2230 but with an amendment requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on preventing the diversion of Turkish opium into illicit channels. Ford signed S. 2230 into law on October 6. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 867)

The Secretary: You are willing to discuss loose powers?

Bitsios: Yes.

The Secretary: That is perhaps the way to approach it. I don't want personally to get involved until I see the parameters.

Bitsios: You will see this with the Europeans. You can then undertake the main bargaining.

The Secretary: There is no question of pride involved between us and the Europeans. Let them designate someone and we will be in touch.

Hartman, do you think it will work?

Hartman: It will be difficult for the Europeans to get a position together.

The Secretary: Later we will need someone to drive it home. We will cooperate with the Europeans.

Hartman: It should begin under Waldheim.

The Secretary: The purpose of your trip would be to get the Turks to put something forward at the next meeting. We won't do all the work for Greece and Turkey.

Bitsios: If you get a breakthrough we can continue the negotiations.

The Secretary: Yes. If you get an agreement on territory.

Bitsios: Before I leave, I would like to know what is the linkage of aid to Greece and your dealings with Turkey? You asked about the timing of a mission to Greece. I can see the Prime Minister and tell him. We would like to have the two issues separate. We are not twins with the Turks.

The Secretary: Caglayangil said to me yesterday he wanted an official call in Turkey. I said in that case I would have to go to Greece, and he said: "We are not twins." (Laughter)

Bitsios: We have discussed assistance to Greece in Rome. You said it should be on a grand scale. Our Minister of Finance came over here and came back with an encouraging report. We are not underdeveloped any more, but we have specific needs after seven years of military government. There are the problems of expense for petroleum and defense.

The Secretary: It is easier to do things for Greece under the condition of lifting of the Turkish embargo. To make a massive program for Greece when the Turks feel we are discriminating against them is difficult. This does not mean we need an aid program for Turkey now. (To Hartman): How are they linked?

Hartman: Grant aid on military supplies would be difficult if there was no aid to Turkey. There is no link on economic aid. We may put a provision in the bill and then hold up implementation on the military side.

The Secretary: I would prefer a package of aid to Israel, Egypt, Bangladesh, Greece, Turkey and Portugal rather than individual bills. I don't see any advantage of a Greek-Turkish package. I would rather have items that have a constituency be put in the same bill with others. Then the Jews and the Greeks will help us get aid through.

Bitsios: When will this be?

The Secretary: Within a month.

Bitsios: Is the assistance to Israel from your last agreement?

The Secretary: We have a demoralized and cynical country. Before, seventy-six Senators called for aid to Israel. Now Congress is in the position to blame me for what they would have done anyway. The agreement doesn't affect what Congress would have done. There is something for Egypt.

Do you prefer a totally separate bill?

Hartman: What we are thinking of is in terms of a loan going in with the package.

Bitsios: Our concern is that with the passing of the embargo bill, we have a feeling in Athens—first, what has Turkey done?—nothing. Second, the arms can be used against Greece. So something must be done to show it is not inimical.

We are doing things to explain to public opinion that the US position on the embargo is based on strategic considerations. This attempts to explain it, but there will be things you can do to sweeten it.

The Secretary: We are willing to send a team to look at economic and military needs. I would be willing to submit to Congress a one-time loan and grant and credit military package. That (the loan) can be announced when you want it.

Bitsios: Can I send you a message on that?

The Secretary: Yes. It would be better to announce it after the Turkish vote. Any time after the following Monday. Then we would send Hartman within a few days of the Turkish vote to Ankara and Athens. I believe the UN debate should be muted. You wouldn't think of negotiating until after the debate?

Bitsios: No.

Hartman: Will Makarios remain here?

Bitsios: No, only for a few days.

The Secretary: We have to find out from the Turks after the elections what they can do. Then you can decide how to play the Assembly. Then get the debate over quickly.

(The group stands to leave)

The Secretary: What should we say to the press?

Bitsios: That we had a long and interesting conversation and a further exchange of views on a variety of subjects.

186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹

Washington, October 1, 1975, 1613Z.

233620. Subject: Secretary's September 29 Bilateral with Makarios.²

1. The Secretary, accompanied by Undersecretary Sisco and EUR/SE Eagleton, met with President Makarios, Foreign Minister Christophides, Ambassador to the UN Rossides and Ambassador to the US Dimitriou on September 29 in New York.

2. Makarios expressed appreciation for the proposals made by the Secretary in his UNGA speech³ and indicated that he continued to believe the Secretary had a key role to play in reaching a Cyprus settlement. The Secretary said the United States was prepared to play a role, but he could not be usefully involved if he were constantly harassed by Congress and the Greek-American community. He observed that the Turkish arms embargo might have been useful as a threat, but not as a reality.

3. When the Secretary asked for Makarios' idea of a reasonable settlement, the Archbishop replied that the basis could be bizonal, with a Turkish area less than 25 per cent and a central government in which Turks did not participate on a fifty-fifty basis. He said the powers of the central government were not of major importance. The Secretary replied that he had no precise idea regarding the percentage basis of a final settlement, though he felt it unrealistic to expect a Turkish zone of less than 25 per cent. He suggested that a more practical approach would be to consider a return of territory on the basis of regions: for example something in Famagusta, Morphou and the area south of the Nicosia–Famagusta Road.

4. Re next steps, the Secretary said that once the arms embargo was lifted and the Turkish Senate election had taken place, he would be prepared to make a major effort to obtain a Turkish territorial position as a basis for renewed negotiations. He did not specify what form that effort would take. He warned that the negotiating process would be slow and would have its difficult moments, particularly toward the end. He counseled moderation in the UNGA debate, noting that if there

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated Priority to Ankara and Athens.

² A September 29 memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which was held at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File.

³ See footnote 2, Document 185.

was no progress in two or three months, the issue could be raised again in the General Assembly.

5. Makarios expressed concern over the weakness of the Turkish Government and its inability to move on Cyprus. The Secretary acknowledged that this was a problem but reiterated that he would make a major personal effort. The Turks, he said, had been told that if the embargo was lifted, the US-Turkish relationship would depend on movement on Cyprus. This would place maximum pressure on the Turks, and if a period free from Congressional harassment could be obtained, there was a chance for progress.

6. After the meeting Makarios made some remarks to the press to the effect that he had discussed various aspects of the Cyprus problem with the Secretary and they had made assessments on further developments and repercussions if no solution is found. Makarios added that he believed the Secretary could play an important role in achieving a peaceful and just settlement. Christophides told us later that Makarios was relieved that he was able to get into the elevator and away before the reporters asked his views on the Turkish arms embargo.

Ingersoll

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹

Washington, November 21, 1975, 2002Z.

276244. Subject: Secretary's Meeting with Denktash.²

1. Rauf Denktash came to Washington from New York morning November 20, met with the Secretary, and returned immediately to New York where UNGA debate was still in progress. Denktash's presentation of Turkish-Cypriot case contained much bitterness toward Makarios and frustration over unequal status of Turkish Cypriots at the UN. He said that purpose of trip to Moslem countries and to New York was to undo damage that Makarios had caused. He had wanted

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus Exdis. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Eingleton and approved by Hartman and in S. Repeated Immediate to Athens, Ankara, and USUN.

² A November 20 memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951-1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975.

to show Greek Cypriots that Makarios could not get away with it and thereby turn Greeks toward a more realistic approach to negotiations.

2. The Secretary acknowledged that the Cypriot problem did not begin in July 1974. He observed, however, that there was now a stalemate and that if nothing happens, Congress will pass additional restrictive measures which will further damage US-Turkish relations and hurt Turkish-Cypriot position as well. He observed that Turkish side could now have far more than was thought possible two years ago, under bi-zonal system and central government with limited powers. With a weak central government the participation issue would not be so important. Question now was whether Turkish side would be able to put forward territorial proposals. If not, we would be in difficult position, having obtained lifting of arms embargo on basis that progress would be made on Cyprus.

3. Denktash argued that a show of too much eagerness to negotiate was a bad tactic, and would only make Makarios more difficult. He had suggested to Waldheim that he should leave Makarios alone for a while and the latter would come to him with renewed interest in intercommunal talks. He complained that Makarios had never renounced enosis and would have to do so.

4. The Secretary suggested that renunciation of enosis could be part of a package. Denktash agreed there could be a package settlement. He emphasized, however, that while Greeks look at economic gains, Turks look at territorial problem from point of view of future security of Turkish sector. Turkish military believe that cession of New Famagusta would cause security problem. Denktash suggested, but did not insist, that there should be an interim government which could negotiate territorial aspects.

5. With regard to renewal of intercommunal talks, Denktash said that because of developments at the UN, he must save face and continue to make negative noises for a while. He felt then Waldheim would approach the two sides and "at a certain stage," they would agree on talks. He thought, however, that talks should be prepared beforehand in Nicosia, possibly with Waldheim's representatives shuttling between him and Clerides.

6. In closing, the Secretary again warned that if the Turks do not put something forward, Congressional pressures would weaken US-Turkish relations and the position of the Turkish-Cypriot community as well.

7. After the meeting Denktash met briefly with the press. He denounced Makarios and Greek-Cypriot activities at the UN. In answer to a question re resumption of intercommunal talks, he said he must reserve his position pending the outcome of the UNGA vote on Cyprus resolution.

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹

Washington, November 22, 1975, 1922Z.

277353. Subject: Cyprus Ambassador's Call on Under Secretary Sisco.

1. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou called on Under Secretary on Friday, November 21. Dimitriou stated he was interested in Rauf Denkash's call yesterday on the Secretary² but that he first wished to get into the more important question of Cyprus' future. With the arms embargo lifted, the Turkish elections concluded and the UN debate over,³ Dimitriou wondered what would be the next step by the US.

2. Sisco said that we have been engaged in a major effort to get resumption of the talks and that the effort would continue. It had to be acknowledged that to date this effort has not been as fruitful as we both would have wished. Sisco stated that he was convinced all parties wanted the talks to resume, but if they were to be meaningful—they had to start on a meaningful basis. The thrust of our discussions with the Turks has been that the time is propitious for talks to start. We have indicated that to the degree that Turkey can be specific on territory the better are the prospects for successful negotiations. We have made it clear to the Turks that Congress expects movement and that the administration is committed to get meaningful talks started.

3. Sisco turned to the Cyprus resolution, which he termed unhelpful. Dimitriou asked why we abstained. Sisco said that we had made it clear we could not accept a resolution that was not acceptable to both sides. Replying to Dimitriou's comment that we had voted against allowing Denkash to address the plenary, Sisco said that had been a matter of a constitutional principle. It had had nothing to do with the merits of the issues involved.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by J. Morton (EUR/SE) and approved by Sisco, James Lowenstein, Eagleton, and in S. Repeated Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.

² See Document 187.

³ Regarding the lifting of the arms embargo, see footnote 5, Document 185; Turkish Senatorial elections were held October 22; and the UN debate concluded with the adoption on UN General Assembly Resolution on November 20 by a vote of 117–1 (Turkey) with 9 abstentions, including the United States. The resolution demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and called for the voluntary return of refugees and the immediate resumption of negotiations. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, p. 300–301)

4. Dimitriou asked Sisco if he thought Denktash would resort to UDI in the aftermath of UN consideration of Cyprus. Sisco expressed the hope that they would not, and said he felt this particular action was not foremost in their minds at the moment.

Kissinger

189. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, February 16, 1976.

SUBJECT

U.S. Emissary to Break Greek/Turkish/Cyprus Impasse

I. Report on Haig Mission

In reporting on his meeting last Friday² with General Sancar, General Haig has noted (Tab A)³ that the Turkish General Staff is presently maintaining the same tough line as Prime Minister Demirel:

—the United States must lift its arms embargo before Turkey will open U.S. installations,

—the United States must provide greater grant support to Turkey,

—there can be no linkage between the US-Turkish issue and the Cyprus crisis,

—the United States must stop favoring Greece,

—despite Turkey's good intentions, efforts toward a Cyprus settlement are destined to failure because of the perfidy of Archbishop Makarios and the inability of the Greeks to control him.

Based on his conversation with General Sancar, General Haig believes:

—it should be possible to reduce the Turkish grant aid demand from \$700 million over five years to \$300–\$400 million, if the latter amount is front-loaded.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 33, Turkey 14. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote "Thanks" on the memorandum.

² February 13.

³ Not attached and not found; summarized below.

—concerning Cyprus, the fundamental problem is the mistrust between Greece and Turkey.

Accordingly, General Haig recommends that:

—consideration be given to naming a special emissary to give the Turks greater confidence in the good faith of the Greek side and its ability to deliver on the terms of acceptable details of a compromise Cyprus solution,

—that the Cagliyangil visit be re-scheduled as soon as possible,

—that we work out a formula with Cagliyangil that enables us to compromise with the Turks on the reopening of the bases in Turkey—i.e., that we be in position to tell Congress that “almost all” the bases are operating while the Turks are still in position to say that the “key” bases are closed.

II. Overview of Current Situation

General Sancar’s unbending reception of General Haig again underscores the current impasses we face in the Greek/Turkish/Cyprus problem:

—the Greeks and Turks do not trust each other;

—the Turks do not trust the United States because of the actions of our Congress;

—the Congress does not trust the U.S. Executive enough to give the President the latitude and the tools he requires to move the parties toward agreement.

At the same time, no matter what may be said publicly, I believe that each of the parties is counting on the United States to produce the forward movement required for a settlement.

At present, Secretary of State Kissinger is directing our diplomatic efforts toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. With the intercommunal talks about to resume on February 17, with the likelihood of renewed Congressional criticism if the President—by the time of his April report⁴—is unable to report progress on Cyprus and if the U.S. bases in Turkey are still closed, with the probability that a carefully structured Presidential initiative would be interpreted by all concerned—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the U.N. Secretary General and our NATO and EC friends—as a very important opportunity for progress that must be seized, *the President may wish to consider naming a Special Emissary to*

⁴ Public Law 94-104, signed by the President on October 5, required the President to submit at 60-day intervals reports to Congress on progress made toward solution of the Cyprus problem.

represent the United States with the parties and to move them closer together and toward a settlement.

What are the pros and cons of naming a Special Emissary:

Pros:

—a fresh initiative by the President lifting everyone's sights above the current stalemate, demonstrating his leadership and galvanizing all parties to work toward a settlement;

—the entry of a new U.S. negotiator able to devote full time to the task and unencumbered by the Secretary of State's past involvement in the issue. This latter point is important:

—The Secretary of State is mistrusted by many Greeks because of the Nixon Administration's support for the former Greek junta government, and because of allegations concerning his role in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. It would, in fact, be difficult for the Secretary even to visit Athens announced without generating a riot;

—The Secretary of State does not have the confidence of the pro-Greek elements in the U.S. Congress because of the reasons just cited;

—The Secretary of State does not have Prime Minister Demirel's full trust because of the Secretary's former professor-student relationship with Ecevit and Demirel's current political rivalry with Ecevit;

—The Secretary of State cannot afford the time that would be required for such a Presidential initiative—Turks and Greeks have reacted somewhat cynically in the past to the Secretary's treating their problems as a mere appendage to his Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy.

—Knowing as we do that the Caramanlis Government is willing to make the major concessions required for a settlement, the U.S. Emissary would have the tools required to move the parties toward a settlement.

—The U.S. Emissary could move between capitals—allowing the Greeks, Turks and both Cypriot representatives to avoid the risk of losing face—during delicate stages of the negotiations. We presently do not have this latitude, as Ambassadors Macomber, Kubisch and Crawford are each too compartmentalized to be effective in this regard.

—If there is progress on Cyprus—even signalled by the naming of the Emissary—there is the real opportunity for progress on the US-Turkish front.

Cons:

—there is the risk of false expectations on the part of all concerned, and the Presidential initiative would have to be couched in terms of our renewed willingness to be of help—with the main burden still on the shoulders of the Parties directly involved;

—the Secretary of State might prefer to keep direct responsibility to the President on this issue.

III. Next Steps

I am in favor of the naming of a new U.S. Emissary. I think the timing is right; we have the opportunity to get moving and it may be more difficult to do so if many more months pass. *The Emissary should be an individual of known stature and ability not linked in any way to the personalities or current framework of our Cyprus efforts. In my opinion, Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General, successful negotiator of the US-Mexican Boundary Agreement (and a Republican well-known to the President) would be a very strong candidate for this role.*

Recalling your comments about the need for crisp, forward looking language in the President's State of the World speech, I believe this speech to the Congress, if delivered within the next few weeks, would offer the right occasion for announcement of the Brownell mission. These would not be speech-writer's words, they would be Presidential action.

I recommend that you discuss the possibility of naming a U.S. Emissary with the President and the Secretary of State. If all concerned agree that it is a move warranting approval and early action—and if the emissary selected agrees to take on the task—discreet, advance consultations with the parties involved will be required prior to the President's public announcement of the mission.

Recommendation

That you discuss with the President the naming of a special U.S. Emissary—possibly Herbert Brownell—to head U.S. diplomatic effects in the Greece/Turkey/Cyprus problems.⁵

⁵ No action is indicated.

190. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1976, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on June 17 and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

PARTICIPANTS

Cyprus

Foreign Minister John Christophides
Ambassador Dimitriou
Minister-Counselor Angelides
Mr. Pasharkis, Aide to Christophides

US

The Secretary
Philip Habib
Arthur A. Hartman, EUR
Ambassador William Crawford
William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE

Christophides: Thank you for giving me your time. I know that you are very busy right now. There have been unpleasant developments.

The Secretary: Usually when these things happen, there is nothing you can do.

Christophides: Do you know who is responsible?

The Secretary: No, we do not know who or what is behind this. There is nothing you can do until you know who has him.

Christophides: It is difficult when there are so many factions.

The Secretary: Maybe the Greeks are behind it.

(Laughter)

Christophides: (smiling) I don't think so. Don't put this in the record.

The Secretary: (smiling) If you were behind it, it would be much more complicated.

Christophides: Dr. Kissinger, the last time we met was in New York in October, 1975.² During that meeting you told us that in order for the Turks to move and for you to have leverage on them, you needed two things: 1) lifting of the embargo and 2) the Turkish Senate elections which would give strength to the Turkish Government. You said you could then try to get the Turks to produce some progress on Cyprus. On October 1 the embargo was lifted. On October 22 there was a strengthening of the Turkish Government. I remember that I put the question to you: How can there be a strengthening of the Turkish Government with these partial elections? Your answer was: We can't take these domestic developments as an excuse for no movement on Turkey's part regarding Cyprus.

Then there is the question of pressure on Turkey. I remember that when we met last time Sisco repeated what he had said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the effect that if the Turks are intransigent, it would go to the heart of US-Turkish relations.

² See Document 186.

Eight months have unfortunately passed and there is no movement. The situation is worsening. There have been expulsions from the north, there have been no refugees returned, there has been Turkish colonization, and there has been a recent development which was reported by the "Economist." This involves looting in New Famagusta.

The Secretary: What do you mean?

Christophides: Famagusta was a ghost town guarded by the Turkish army. Now there is systematic looting of hotels, shops, banks and so on.

I have been wondering what happened that there has been no effective pressure on the Turks. Second, I would like to know how you envisage a process toward the solution of the problem.

The Secretary: We have spoken before, and you know my views. I have never negotiated in a situation where the government of one side was vilifying us in the press, also the Greek community, and then privately comes to us as the party from which they expect to obtain solutions. When I meet Greeks and Greek Cypriots, we have warm relations, but then the press treats us quite differently. You have also used Congressional pressures. We have never had anything like it. In other negotiations the parties worked with us. So all of this creates serious problems.

This morning we were discussing some of the unilateral concessions the Turks were willing to make in 1974. There was a whole list. This is to indicate that with a slightly accusatory tone you can't put us in an impossible position on the one hand and ask help on the other. In fact we have talked often to the Turks about Cyprus and we have gone to the Germans and the French and the British to get them to do likewise. This has developed into a difficult situation. We are now trying to get talks started again. If your side put forward a map at the next meeting and the Turks replied with a map or with specific territorial formulations, then there could be a subcommittee in Nicosia. I don't see the problem with Nicosia subcommittees.

Christophides: You refer to "a slightly accusatory tone."

(The Secretary is called out of the room.)

The Secretary: What can be done? It is hard for us to bring pressures on the Turks when there is no negotiation going on. I discussed this with Waldheim³ and suggested that the Greek side could put forward a map showing 20% for the Turks, then let the Turks put forward a map or precise criteria. Then you could move to a subcommittee. If

³ According to a May 3 briefing memorandum, Kissinger met with Waldheim on May 4 in Nairobi, Kenya, while attending the May 3-6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conference. (Telegram 107038 to the Secretary's Delegation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976) No memorandum of this conversation has been found.

you agree, we would urge this on the Turks. Even if two useless and preposterous maps are put out at first, we will have something on which to work.

Christophides: Our position is that: 1) the negotiating process is the best way to seek a solution; 2) there was the agreement in Vienna on 22 February; 3) the Vienna communiqué makes two main points: a) each side should submit concrete proposals. We have done so and the Turks have not; b) for the parties to go to the subcommittees, there must be a common basis.

We have submitted proposals. We would be prepared to come forward with a map provided the Turks also come forward with a map (later it was clarified that he meant simultaneously) but we can't refer them to subcommittees unless a common basis is developed. Otherwise there will be a protracted delay and nothing will be accomplished.

The Secretary: What common basis do you need?

Christophides: I told Waldheim that I was not at Vienna and that he should tell us what this common basis is.

The Secretary: How do you have that when you will say 20% and they will say 38%?

Christophides: Wouldn't it be a good thing to have 20% and 38%? That is the time when someone else, Dr. Kissinger or Waldheim, could come in with an idea.

The Secretary: The problem is that a gap of 18% is one thing and 4% another. Both sides would like to hold someone else responsible. We could say 27%, but then we would see riots in Athens and Nicosia if the US put forward a proposition. We want you to come closer before we make proposals. Everyone knows more or less where it will come out.

Christophides: We don't.

The Secretary: I have talked about this to Makarios⁵ and know where he would be willing to go. He thinks he has more of a margin. The Turks have mumbled some things to us about percentages, and the two sides are not that far apart. Privately the two sides are within range of each other. If you said to the Turks what you have said privately, and the Turks say to you what Caglayangil has said to others, you would have something.

I am sorry, I must go to the White House. I will leave this for the afternoon.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 186.

(Secretary leaves the room.)

Christophides: The Secretary says that he has had some territorial indications from Caglayangil. How does one get that?

Hartman: You don't seem to take seriously the Turkish desire for a military presence at the talks. The Turkish argument is that they need a military man there.

Christophides: They can bring one then.

Hartman: They want this in the subcommittee. It would change the basic pattern if they brought him to Vienna. This is what the Greek and Turkish Ministers discussed at the NATO meeting in Brussels.

Christophides: At Brussels it was agreed that only details would go to the subcommittees. That is the problem.

(Secretary returns briefly.)

The Secretary: After you have had lunch, come back and we will meet for fifteen minutes or so at 2:30.

191. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Cyprus

Foreign Minister John Christophides

Ambassador Dimitriou

Minister-Counselor Angelides

Mr. Pasharkis, Aide to Christophides

US

The Secretary

Ambassador William Crawford

William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE

Christophides: Do you have news regarding your Ambassador in Beirut?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on June 17 and cleared in S on July 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

The Secretary: Yes, he and his Deputy have been killed.

Christophides: Do you know who did it?

The Secretary: No, we do not know yet. This is not one of our better days.

Christophides: I very much regret it.

The Secretary: Back to our discussion. You feel there has to be a common basis before you can go to subcommittees, but the Turks argue that there must be a military expert present. Secondly, the Turks say that in Vienna everything becomes public.

Christophides: My question is regarding the second point. Why must it be more public there than in the subcommittee? It would be better if they find a way to discuss this in Vienna in secrecy with only two persons there.

The Secretary: What is your objection to subcommittees? I do not understand it.

Christophides: What will the subcommittee do?

The Secretary: Narrow the differences.

Christophides: The subcommittee level cannot make political decisions. They cannot say what would be the extent of territory. Second, we know from our own sources that the plan of Denktash is to send the problem to the subcommittee so as to kill it as an issue, to show the world that he is negotiating. Third, there has been an agreement in Vienna which they want to go back on. This is that there must be a "common basis." I admit that I do not know what is meant by common basis. Perhaps Waldheim knows.

The Secretary: He hasn't told me. The idea I have had is that if you put forward a map then they will put forward a map or exact criteria. I suspect, however, that prior to our elections they will not listen to our pressures. The tragedy is that we did not settle this in 1974. Even as late as January, 1975, there was a Turkish package. Then the embargo came. Another possibility was during the Geneva talks in 1974 when the Turks put forward the Gunes plan. This was that if you gave them immediately the northern district or 19% or 20%, they would relax and negotiate the other areas with you. These would not have been given back. It was our fault not to have pressed, but there would have been riots in Athens and in Nicosia if we had supported this plan. The dilemma at that time was that we could not consider imposing it.

Christophides: I understand that.

The Secretary: Demirel is scared of his elections which must occur before October 1977. At one time I thought of sending an emissary to the parties, but with a 20% difference in the positions, an American emissary would antagonize everyone. Now if the difference were between 26 and 34 per cent, it would be manageable. In the Middle East

negotiations I stayed on for weeks until there was a narrow difference and then put forward an American plan which I thought could be accepted by both parties. Makarios talked reasonably to me. What he said had possibilities.

Christophides: He also talked to Schmidt.

Suppose we were to give you a map and say these are our territorial positions?

The Secretary: A realistic map?

Christophides: Yes, but you hold back one or two per cent and the Turks do the same and give us a map.

The Secretary: That is an interesting idea. I assume the map is not what you have already proposed. It is better to put that proposal first and then we can say to the Turks that we will go to the Cypriots and get a realistic map and that they might answer it with a map. Then you give us a map minus 2 per cent. This is an ingenious idea. We can certainly try it, but you would have to go to another Vienna round.

Christophides: I emphasize that this is my personal idea and has to be checked out with the government.

The Secretary: I might also ask some Western Europeans to join us and perhaps Waldheim. Or would you prefer we do it alone?

Christophides: I have not studied this in detail. I was just thinking aloud.

The Secretary: I like the principle of it.

I am sorry that our meeting has been interrupted so often.

Christophides: I appreciate your attention to our problems.

192. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 23, 1976, 10:04–11:01 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

[Rumsfeld:] Carter has a group working on the Cyprus issue, including Brzezinski etc. Their people are saying the Republicans screwed up with the Greek colonels and didn't keep them from going into Cyprus. Then Carter meets with the Greeks, makes friends with them, and tells them he has to give the appearance of even-handedness to solve the problem. Then he says the key to everything is a Cyprus solution. Therefore, the base deals should be scrapped. Instead we should negotiate a 1–2-year base deal and then go after Cyprus.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

193. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 2, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Southern Africa, North/South Relations, The Middle East, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Cyprus, The Aegean, MBFR

PARTICIPANTS

Netherlands

Foreign Minister van der Stoel
Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker
M.J.H.C. Rutten, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lodewijk van Gorkom, Director General for International Cooperation
Maxime De Jonge, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Netherlands

United States

The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador McCloskey
Counselor Sonnenfeldt
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Katherine Shirley, EUR/NE (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

van der Stoel: I'd like to turn to Cyprus.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shirley on October 4 and cleared in S on October 26. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room at the Department of State.

The Secretary: That's a problem I'd like to turn over to the EC-Nine.

van der Stoel: You have formulated principles about which we have informed the others. I have a question about what is called frontier rectification. You say that territory should be reduced.

The Secretary: Do we need the words "boundary rectification?"

van der Stoel: Rectification sounds minor.

The Secretary: And I don't like the word boundary. Why not say territorial adjustments.

van der Stoel: That would be more acceptable to the Greeks. The French think that the principles are too vague.

Rutten: Yes, they say it's all old hat, and has no new elements. They think it should be more specific and should say what the adjustments would be and what the constitutional arrangements should be.

The Secretary: That is stage two.

van der Stoel: I agree with you.

The Secretary: Right now the Turks have, what? 38%? The Greeks are willing to go towards 30%. But if we push them they may use it as an excuse to beat us to death. Let them negotiate. Let the Turks go to 34% and the Greeks to 26%, and then they can move to 30%. That is not possible now because neither side wants to settle right now for domestic reasons. They should negotiate first.

van der Stoel: The present Turkish government cannot make major decisions. That situation may last until October 1977.

Rutten: Caglayangil said they were willing to negotiate on territorial issues.

The Secretary: They always say that in the abstract but quickly get bogged down in procedural disputes.

Mr. Hartman: They want the other side to put its proposals down.

van der Stoel: It's true. They hide behind procedural difficulties.

The Secretary: I would support anything leading to negotiations.

Mr. Hartman: The main thing is to get the process going and to get both sides involved in it.

The Secretary: Caglyangil and Bitsios both said my speech at the UN was especially fruitful—and I said nothing.²

van der Stoel: So you will suggest principles in the near future?

² Kissinger addressed the General Assembly on September 30. He reiterated the need for a Cyprus settlement negotiated by the Cypriot communities and the U.S. readiness to assist in restoring the momentum. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, October 25, 1976, pp. 497-510.

The Secretary: We'd like to do it with someone else.

van der Stoel: We would be willing although the doubt is about the French.

Rutten: They might go along.

The Secretary: This doesn't preclude more detailed proposals later on.

van der Stoel: We will be having a ministerial-level meeting on October 18.

Rutten: The question is whether we should have a combined proposal or a parallel one.

The Secretary: I think parallel.

van der Stoel: It would be easier for the French if it were parallel. The most dangerous problem there is not Cyprus but the Aegean.

The Secretary: That's right. One of the French—De Laboulaye—says that there is Greek willingness to settle.

Mr. Hartman: They said they have concessions.

The Secretary: They can't make concessions on delimitation. Their claim goes all the way to Turkey. The Turks only want a median line. But if the Turks accept delimitation, the Greeks can claim sovereignty permanently and undo the joint ventures.

Mr. Hartman: They'd be better to leave another area for joint exploitation.

The Secretary: The Greeks have to give up something on delimitation.

van der Stoel: Turkey must be prevented from further unilateral action—not just *Sismik* but something like drilling.

The Secretary: The Greeks and Turks are beyond my comprehension. At the Security Council debate we had a resolution which was better for the Greeks. But it would have been a consensus resolution instead of a voted one and they didn't want that. At the end of ten days, the Greeks happily accepted less than they could have had earlier. It permitted the deepest voyage yet of *Sismik*. But I agree, we must use our influence to prevent Turkish unilateral action.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

194. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, November 3, 1976.

FUTURE CYPRUS POLICY

I. The Problem

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean remains highly volatile. Greece and Turkey eye each other in the Aegean and over Cyprus as adversaries rather than as NATO allies. Cyprus itself remains divided, with both ethnic communities leery of real negotiations. Since all parties have looked to the United States with expectation in this election year, the question now is whether we can use this to generate the kind of forward movement which has thus far eluded us. The paper that follows analyzes our current problems on Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean generally, and suggests possible approaches which might be undertaken in the months ahead.

II. The Current Situation

A. *Cyprus*: There has been no significant movement toward a settlement of the Cyprus problem since the coup against Makarios and the Turkish seizure of the northern forty per cent of the island in July–August 1974. Neither community seems willing to accept the risks it perceives as flowing from a serious negotiation. The Greek Cypriots know that any negotiated settlement will mean a permanent division of their island, possession by the Greeks of a far smaller land area than they held before mid-1974, and reduced power and prestige for the central government. Rather than accept such a result, the Greek Cypriots would rather stand pat and hope to mobilize the considerable international support they still enjoy to force a solution on Turkey.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots, content with the current status of the island, are reluctant to begin a negotiating process from which they will emerge with less than they now hold. The Turkish Cypriots know they will have to give up some territory, and they fear that whatever the constitutional solution, their physical safety and prosperity will once again become dependent on the good will of the numerically larger Greek-Cypriot community.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 1, Nodis Miscellaneous Documents, 1973–1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Nelson Ledsky and Raymond Ewing of EUR/SE. On November 7 Kissinger noted, “Hold for transition discussion.”

Under these circumstances, imaginative proposals or great flexibility will not be forthcoming from either community, though both will publicly acknowledge that the present situation is unstable and that further fighting could erupt at any time.

B. *Role of the United Nations:* The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force on Cyprus and, through the Secretary General, has provided a forum since April 1975 for intermittent discussion between the two Cypriot Communities. Secretary General Waldheim has used his “good offices” mandate in an effort to stimulate proposals and discussions of the most critical substantive issues. His success thus far has been meager. No serious intercommunal negotiating session has been held since February 1976; even Waldheim would admit that the prospects for fruitful talks between the two communities are dim unless a way can be found to sustain the process with support and ideas from the outside.

C. *Greece:* The events of 1974 pointed up Greece’s inability to protect Cyprus. This fact, together with the growth of tension in the Aegean, has tended to shift Greek political attention away from Cyprus to domestic concerns and the threat perceived to come from Turkey. Although the Caramanlis Government would prefer to have a satisfactory Cyprus solution, Athens is clearly prepared to live with the status quo rather than to give its blessing to an unpopular settlement—the only kind it thinks conceivable under present circumstances. Moreover, with most Greeks fully supportive of Makarios’ hard line, Caramanlis is not inclined to do anything very visible or imaginative with respect to the Cyprus issue.

This same trend toward inactivity manifests itself in Greek attitudes toward its security relationship with Western partners. In August 1974, the Caramanlis Government withdrew from the NATO military structure and imposed restrictions on US bases in Greece. Over the past two years, Caramanlis has told us repeatedly that he wants to return to the NATO fold, and have US military facilities remain in his country. For more than eighteen months we have been negotiating agreements designed to modernize and stabilize that presence. But the Greek Government has dragged its feet and not completed the negotiations, seemingly unable or unwilling to decide what course it wants to set for itself.

D. *Turkey:* The Turks would like to pretend the Cyprus problem no longer exists. They are pleased with how the events of 1974 turned out, and while they occasionally concede that some minor territorial adjustments on Cyprus may be possible, they are clearly in no hurry to make them. The Turks view their own current problems with Greece, the European Community and the United States as more serious—and entirely separate—from the Cyprus issue. Thus, the Turkish Government

has rejected any linkage between Cyprus and Turkey's security relationship with the United States. In July 1975, the Turks closed down US intelligence collection operations in Turkey and insisted on the negotiation of a new four-year Defense Cooperation Agreement. They now look to prompt Congressional passage of that Agreement in early 1977 as the test of US interest in maintaining a close and enduring security relationship with Turkey, without which, they contend, no movement on Cyprus is possible.

As a further reason and excuse for inaction on Cyprus, the Turks also point to their own shaky domestic situation. The country is governed by a weak four-party coalition, which contains two small but vocal ultra-nationalist parties. National elections will be held some time between the late spring and early fall of 1977, and most Turkish politicians insist that until they are over, nothing can or should be done to resolve the Cyprus issue.

E. *Congress*: Congress has been impatient with the lack of movement toward a Cyprus settlement. It acknowledges the importance of maintaining close security ties with Turkey and Greece, but is inclined to treat this as of lesser importance than righting the wrongs of Turkish actions on Cyprus in 1974.

F. *Western Europe*: Our Western European Allies remain deeply concerned about the Cyprus issue, the growing estrangement between Turkey and Greece, and the problem of keeping both in the Western Alliance System. They would like to see both Greece and Turkey stay in NATO, and maintain and re-cement close bilateral defense arrangements with the United States.

The European Community, and especially the British, who still retain two sovereign base areas in Cyprus, have worked closely with the United States this past year in seeking to stimulate negotiations on Cyprus. They are anxious to continue this cooperation, particularly in the first six months of 1977 when the British will rotate into the position as President of the EC Council of Ministers.

G. *The Aegean Issue*: Although the location of Greek islands a few miles from the Turkish mainland has long been a source of Greek-Turkish friction, Turkey did not seriously challenge the primary Greek position in the Aegean until the Greeks discovered oil in the northern Aegean in 1973. Since that date, the Turks have demanded an equal role in the Aegean in general and exploration of the seabed in particular. The Aegean problem heated up in the spring of 1974—before the Cyprus crisis—and again in the summer of 1976. A UN Security Council resolution in August 1976,² which both the Greeks and Turks ac-

² The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 395 by consensus on August 25. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, p. 322)

cepted, has helped create a framework under which the two sides are now negotiating. Greek and Turkish negotiators will meet in Paris and Bern during November and possibly December. Neither side has expressed an interest in US mediation or assistance, though such action at some future time—perhaps in conjunction with the Cyprus issue—should not be excluded. The Aegean problem remains potentially more explosive than Cyprus, but for now and probably till the spring of 1977, US action would not seem called for or desirable.

III. Working Assumptions

The objective conditions and attitudes in the area, as described above, point to certain conclusions which we would suggest be taken into account as future policies are formulated:

1. A Cyprus settlement will take a long time to achieve. The problem is old, difficult, and many-faceted. Meaningful negotiations, even if started now, are likely to continue for a year or more.

2. The longer it takes to begin real movement, the harder it will be to reach a settlement. The Turks and Greeks both admit that opportunities for a solution were missed in 1974 and earlier, and that with each month that passes, attitudes on the ground harden and make it more difficult for either side to make concessions.

3. There is no reason to believe domestic developments in either Greece or Turkey will help us start or sustain a Cyprus negotiating process. The Greeks are likely to be less willing in 1977 than before to play an active role on Cyprus; only a wild optimist would bet on the emergence of a stable, one-party government after the 1977 Turkish elections.

4. No settlement on Cyprus will be achieved unless outsiders stimulate and, at some point, push the parties immediately involved into concluding an agreement. The parties privately would welcome such outside stimulation and pressure, since they know they are not in a position to change a situation themselves which they know needs changing.

5. Those who help bring about a settlement can expect to be blamed by the parties, who will use outsiders as scapegoats to sell the resultant compromise to their own people.

6. Our friends in Western Europe have their own reasons to seek solutions and ease tensions on the southeastern flank of NATO. But the European Community mechanism is cumbersome and incapable of devising quick decisions or initiatives. Thus, we will doubtless have to formulate the new ideas and take the lead, while encouraging continued close EC support. Such a posture will help ensure that any solution has a better chance of acceptance, as well as permit the blame to be more widely shared.

IV. *What Do We Do Next?*

The election of Carter has unleashed exaggerated expectations in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. The Governments in Athens and Nicosia expect enlarged political and material support for Greece and Greek interests, and clear evidence of the new Administration's support for a Cyprus settlement close to that preferred by President Makarios and reflected in UN resolutions. The Turks fear that the new Administration, intent on fulfilling promises to Greek Americans, will adopt positions which could force Turkey out of the Western alliance system.

If unchanged by anything the US says or does between now and January, these differing expectations could in themselves foster further—and perhaps serious—deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey. This in turn could hamper a new President's opportunities for policy initiatives after January.

Under these circumstances, it would seem highly desirable for those who will take office in January to look at the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean very quickly, to decide in general terms what courses of action they would like to pursue, and then communicate these decisions rapidly to the parties in a manner most clearly calculated to win their understanding and cooperation. These steps should ideally be accomplished—or at least be well underway—before January 20. There follows a set of recommended procedures which would make this possible.

A. *Phase One—Fact-Finding (late November)*

Despatch a small, high-level, fact-finding team to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia led by someone who enjoys the President-elect's confidence. This team, which might have Congressional representation, would aim at reassuring Demirel, Caramanlis and Makarios of the President-elect's strong interest in maintaining close and friendly relations and of his intention to undertake a detailed review of our policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. The team would solicit suggestions as to how new policies might be formulated, and would seek answers to the following critical questions:

a. *Greece:* How does Greece, with whom we have been negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement since early 1975, wish to arrange its security relationship with the US and NATO? Does the present draft document provide an acceptable basis for that new relationship? Is Greece prepared to play an active role in the search for a Cyprus settlement? What, if anything, can be done to help Greece and Turkey achieve an Aegean settlement over the longer term?

b. *Turkey:* Will the Turkish Government accept that a linkage, which it has long resisted, exists between the Cyprus issue and the US-Turkish security relationship? Would the Turks prefer that we

proceed with the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement in its present form, on condition that an acceptable Cyprus settlement follows? Or would they be prepared to be flexible on Cyprus now, before the Congress acts on the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement? Will the Turks be willing to sit still and allow action to be undertaken by the US or perhaps others with respect to Cyprus between now and the Turkish elections in 1977? Do the Turks want us to do anything on the Aegean? If so, what?

c. *Cyprus*: What role does Makarios wish us to play in seeking a Cyprus settlement? What are his minimum requirements and what timetable does he have in mind? These same questions can be put to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.

B. *Phase Two—Additional Consultations (December)*

1. Ask the three US Ambassadors in the area to return to the US for a detailed briefing session involving the President-elect or his designated representative. These sessions would focus on a review of recent and future domestic developments in Turkey and Greece, the Aegean situation, the two-year record of the Cyprus negotiations, and prospects for relations with all three countries.

2. Arrange a series of talks with our principal European allies on the Cyprus issue and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, aimed at determining what policies our allies would like us to adopt with respect to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus and what roles they wish—or can be induced—to play with us in the months ahead.

3. Discuss these same issues with the leadership of the new Congress, particularly with respect to passage through Congress of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the companion agreement still under negotiation with Greece.

C. *Phase Three—Implementation (January)*

1. *Greece*: Once a consensus is reached in Washington on how to proceed with the US-Greek security relationship, this should be communicated immediately by the outgoing Administration to the Athens Government. If the decision is to proceed with DCA negotiations, the US team should be despatched to Athens at once in an effort to complete talks in time to submit the DCA to Congress by late January. If the US decision is to proceed in some other fashion, the Department should be tasked to develop a new framework agreement for US-Greek defense cooperation which can be communicated to the Athens Government as soon as it is developed. Any conclusion with respect to the US-Turkey security relationship and our policy toward Cyprus should also be communicated to the Greek Government at the same time in an effort to enlist maximum possible understanding and cooperation from Athens.

2. *Turkey*: If the new Administration agrees to support the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement in Congress in its present form, this should be communicated promptly to the Turkish Government (the Greeks should be told as well in accordance with 1 above) in a manner most likely to win their active support for any Cyprus initiatives we might take in early 1977. If any other decision is reached by the new Administration, this too should be communicated promptly to Ankara, almost certainly by a high-level envoy who would explain the basis for the new Administration's concerns, solicit Turkish understanding and outline a scenario for the remainder of 1977 covering defense cooperation, Cyprus and other matters which the Turkish Government should be urged to accept and support. A major selling job will clearly be required, since the prospect of Turkish elections will make that Government reluctant to underwrite any changes in the US-Turkish security relationship or imaginative moves on Cyprus which can be portrayed domestically as signs of Turkish weakness or capitulation.

3. *Cyprus*: An envoy should be despatched to Cyprus to see President Makarios and Denktash to outline what policy we intend to follow with respect to Cyprus in 1977. A timetable and strategy should be sketched, and Makarios and Denktash should be told what role we would like them to play in ensuing developments.

4. *European Allies*: We will want to talk directly with our key European allies about our new policies. If these are consistent with what, from our earlier consultations we know our European allies will actively support, then the consultations should be broadened to develop the specific programs to pursue together. On Cyprus, for example, we could discuss the possible expansion of our previously expressed principles, consider whether one or more mediators might be named, discuss the possibility of making a joint territorial proposal, joint constitutional proposals, etc.

All of our decisions with respect to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus can then be incorporated in a policy statement by the new Administration to be issued in Washington in late January or February, soon after the inauguration of the new President. Nothing in it will come as a surprise to our allies, and everything in it will have been the subject of consultations with the Congress and with all the parties involved. This is the best formula for getting off to a smooth start in what will almost certainly be a difficult foreign policy area for 1977.