

# Eastern Mediterranean

## Greece

**239. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Greece  
(McClelland) to the Country Director for Greek Affairs  
(Brewster)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, January 2, 1969.

Dear Dan:

I've been wanting to get off a good letter to you for a long time, but as I expect you're aware, performing satisfactorily as DCM in Athens involves a good deal of generalized activity—attending to personnel questions, administrative problems, American community relations, representational work, and the like, which limits the time I can devote to important policy matters such as the "\$64 question" of where do we go from here in US-Greek relations? (Such secondary issues as the Georgopapadakos and Father Panteleimon cases,<sup>2</sup> which arise periodically, also take up a great deal of time.) Now that we have an excellent Political Counselor in the person of Arch Blood, it is also better, I think, that I not get too directly into the business of policy recommendation, which is more properly the bread and butter of relations between POL and the Ambassador. I don't mean to imply by this that the Ambassador doesn't welcome my views and give me ample opportunity to present them, but simply that a lot of other matters inevitably land in my lap related to the operation of the Mission which prevent me from giving the sort of undivided, intensive attention to policy questions which should underpin valid judgments on them. With this preamble, let me nevertheless deliver myself of some thoughts about the future of our relations with Greece which have been accumulating over the weeks and which your letters of November 26th

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence to and From Athens. Confidential; Official-*Informal*. A notation on the letter reads: "A very good think piece by R. McClelland."

<sup>2</sup> The reference to Georgopapadakos was not identified. Bishop Panteleimon had refused to officiate at ceremonies attended by junta officials and had been disciplined by the government-controlled Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church.

to Arch and of December 10th to the Ambassador prompt me to formulate.<sup>3</sup>

I detect a definite note of urgency, Dan, in your letters about receiving further, and hopefully, regular evidence of “concrete progress” on the part of the GOG in the well-known directions. Whereas I’m not sure what is specifically at the root of this (other than the commendable desire of an efficient and concerned officer such as yourself to get on with the show), I imagine that one element is the constant weight of Congressional, press and public pressure on the Department, generated and kept alive by the police-state aspects of the present Greek regime. I sincerely wish we could be more responsive and helpful to you in relieving this pressure with more precise, frequent and reassuring evidence of moderation and relaxation on the part of the GOG. As you well know, though, our leverage in this touchy area is very limited. About all I can call attention to positively at the moment in this respect is the fact that the Strasbourg fiasco<sup>4</sup> seems definitely to have made the regime somewhat more gun-shy and to have caused them, advisedly, to pull back on the almost uninterrupted series of trials they have been conducting. (And incidentally, there is no evidence that the Strasbourg mess was the result of anything more sinister than the general obtuseness of the Greek police in respect to public relations and the lack of proper coordination between them and the Foreign Ministry people in preparing this undertaking.) I think it’s encouraging, however, in terms of the GOG’s increasing awareness of the importance of its foreign image, for example, that they decided *not* to execute Panagoulis; sent Theodorakis back to the Peloponnesian mountains; and postponed (possibly indefinitely) the trial of old General Argyropoulos.<sup>5</sup> These moves could, of course, be more in the nature of a tactical retreat than indicative of any fundamental policy changes. Still, I believe that they are manifestly beginning to “wise up.”

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<sup>3</sup> Copies of the letters are in the Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Correspondence to and From Athens.

<sup>4</sup> Apparently a reference to the resolution adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, September 26, 1968, calling for an end to martial law and parliamentary elections in Greece and recommending that the Council consider suspending Greece from membership at its January 1969 session.

<sup>5</sup> Alexander Panagoulis, who was convicted of an August 1968 attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos, had his death sentence commuted. Mikis Theodorakis, the composer and anti-junta activist, was released from prison during a December 1968 amnesty but rearrested in April 1969. General Archimedes Argyropoulos was convicted by a military court of planning civil unrest in the event that national elections scheduled for May 1967 had been rigged.

If anything is clear at this juncture, in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's December 14th speech,<sup>6</sup> and even more so of the Stamatelopoulos-Ladas hassle,<sup>7</sup> it is that the Papadopoulos government is indisputably in control of the country, and is accordingly going to proceed in the course of the coming months, or possibly even years, at a pace of its own choosing, which is likely to be slow and deliberate. The Prime Minister has won the first round with his recalcitrant hard-line Secretaries General (if, indeed, a really serious conflict has ever existed in this area) and seems to see eye-to-eye with General Angelis, who has emerged with the reorganized HNDGS in a very powerful and independent position. In the circumstances, what compelling reasons has Papadopoulos to act otherwise?

There are two potential lines of development (or a combination of the two) which could force him to do so: 1) the growth of *serious* and *organized* internal opposition (generated by protracted oppression and/or grave economic deterioration); and, 2) the rise of similarly serious opposition externally, including in particular, that of the United States, plus some of the other major NATO powers, like West Germany or Italy, where there are vocal domestic political forces opposed to the present GOG.

It must be conceded, on examining the situation dispassionately, that neither of these adverse developments is taking place, or at least shows any signs of doing so in sufficiently acute or immediate form to worry the GOG. Certainly no serious domestic political opposition is at present on the horizon. On the contrary, we are beginning to see some evidence of a willingness on the part of the old political forces to reach some sort of accommodation with Papadopoulos. Admittedly, this development is in a very incipient stage and could well break down or come to naught, particularly if Papadopoulos is not sincere, but proves merely to be "playing games" for his own tactical purposes. While the intellectual establishment remains unalterably and articulately opposed to the regime (and this is not a negligible factor because a potential leadership element is involved), there are a great many small people (perhaps even a majority), especially in the country but also in the cities, who don't find the present GOG too bad, in fact are often reasonably enthusiastic about it.

On the economic front conditions *could* go down hill seriously somewhere along the road, a year or two from now, if the Government

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<sup>6</sup> The Embassy provided an analysis of the speech in telegram 8308 from Athens, December 16, 1968. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 GREECE)

<sup>7</sup> Dimitri Stamatelopoulos and Ioannis Ladas, two members of the original conspiratorial group of military officers. Stamatelopoulos had become an outspoken conservative critic of the junta while Ladas, an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, was one of its foremost spokesmen.

persists in certain of its foolish and short-sighted policies such as indiscriminate borrowing at high interest rates to improve its balance of payments image. It will also have to guard very carefully against inflation which, paradoxically, could become a threat if confidence in the economy is restored to the extent that a boom in consumers spending takes place with the money now being cautiously held. But the economic oligarchy (and this represents a significant power factor in Greece) has unmistakably cast its lot with the regime and, for obvious reasons, is not going to try to undermine it (unless the Government tries to promote really radical, share-the-wealth schemes). We have the large projected Onassis investment, meanwhile, together with a concerted effort on the part of the GOG, offering concessions that no previous government has been willing to make, to attract the money of other wealthy Greek shipping operators. Quite conceivably this could succeed. Even Litton's investments seem at long last to be picking up.<sup>8</sup> And underlying these more striking economic indicators, the everyday things that matter to the bulk of the Greek population, such as the consumer goods price level, the absence of labor unrest and better treatment at the hands of the bureaucracy, remain not only tolerable, but probably more favorable than before April 1967.

As we all realize, at the same time, there are a variety of imponderables in the Greek equation—the Colonels' painful lack of a sense of humor, their public relations ineptitudes, their streak of anti-intellectual vindictiveness, their patronizing conviction that they know what's best for the Greek people in all respects, and the confused, pseudo-ideological pronouncements of the leader himself that pass for policy blueprints—all of which, if not tempered or corrected, could end by working against the Government. These must, however, be reorganized [*recognized*] for what they are: largely secondary, psychological manifestations that undoubtedly grate on the intellectuals but are hardly of a nature to rally people to counter-revolutionary barricades. One has to be careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees!

In summary, there are, to the best of our knowledge, no present or prospective internal developments, either political, economic or military, of a nature to seriously threaten or unseat the Papadopoulos government. The persistence of this situation, naturally, will depend on the regime becoming progressively less, rather than more oppressive, and on the maintenance of tolerable economic conditions. Yet it is fair to say, I believe, that Papadopoulos is smart enough to recognize these needs himself and the corresponding importance of working toward

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<sup>8</sup> In May 1967 Litton Industries announced that it had signed an agreement with the Greek Government to promote economic development in Crete and the western Peloponnese.

their fulfillment. There is the added factor that he manifestly features himself as a sort of a latter-day Greek savior, whose aspirations transcend going down in history as just another short-lived military dictator.

To turn now to the external side of the picture. While Papadopoulos is confronted with more trouble on this front than in the domestic one, again, none of it at this stage has reached dimensions which could seriously jeopardize his position. His greatest vulnerability, in my estimate, would be if Western Europe, with or without U.S. support, ganged up on Greece economically, or undertook to implement a thorough-going boycott say, of Greek shipping (e.g. the ITF initiative). The EEC action last year in refusing Greece any further project loans<sup>9</sup> was symptomatic of the sort of politically motivated move with economic implications which, if renewed and intensified, could be dangerous for the GOG. There is also the Strasbourg, Council of Europe, action against Greece which may well (provided Greece's opponents are able to muster a two-thirds majority, which is by no means a foregone conclusion) end with a recommendation for Greece's expulsion on grounds of violating fundamental human rights. But this remains only a recommendation, even if it does go through, and as such not binding on member countries. To become more than a matter of moral censure and develop any real teeth it would have to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and then translated into specific action against Greece on the part of individual countries. And, as we all know, Dan, from the tactical accommodation by a government of domestic Socialist agitation to the carrying out of concrete sanctions, particularly in the economic field, as a matter of national policy, is a long and difficult step. Such actions, moreover, cut both ways.

With regard, now, to the more important NATO forum. The shoddy image which the present Greek regime projects abroad by its police-state methods, does represent, certainly an irritant in NATO, and potentially, if they persist in these practices (such as the Thessaloniki Nestor-Zannas sentences), a divisive element which neither we nor Greece can afford to permit to reach seriously disruptive proportions. While the apprehension resulting from the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia will doubtless tend to overshadow criticism of Greece on internal political grounds, and highlight her strategic, military importance to the Alliance, the GOG's continued failure to make any progress toward representative, democratic government which we and Western Europe can point to as genuine, does represent a potential danger to NATO. It is also, in my view, one of the most convincing arguments to

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<sup>9</sup> The EEC suspended Greece's loan authority immediately after the coup although Greece could continue to utilize its existing loans.

use with Papadopoulos in attempting to persuade him to become more democratic: "Whereas we do not presume to tell you what's good domestically for Greece, it is our duty as friends and allies to point out that your internal policies could create serious friction within NATO and thus end by harming Greece and the Alliance. Given our strong common concern with deterring further Soviet encroachment in SE Europe by presenting a strong, united front in NATO, we believe you must do more about restoring individual and political liberties at home." It is along these lines, I'm persuaded, that our tactical handling of the present GOG should proceed. (The Ambassador's use of this line in his December 28th talk with Papadopoulos<sup>10</sup> drew the discouraging response, I'm sorry to note, that: "Well, too bad for NATO, until it changes its ideas." In other words, take us or leave us, as we are!)

Two complementary courses of action are open to us in this respect: 1) we can attempt to accelerate democratic progress within Greece; and 2) we can try to slow down the adverse reaction to the Greek situation in NATO. Neither will be easy, but our aim should be to bring these two lines of action into some tolerable policy balance. Up to the present we have concentrated primarily on pushing Papadopoulos rather than on enjoining our NATO friends to avoid initiatives which, however satisfying to their sense of democratic righteousness, do not make a notably constructive contribution to the solidarity which free Europe still badly needs. The use of the somewhat specious argument that Greece's present behavior is unworthy of true NATO membership is about as unrewarding as leveling the same charge against the Soviet Union (and a lot of other countries) with respect to their UN membership. Granted, we don't like the way they act and therefore should try to get them to mend their misguided ways. But the most effective way of accomplishing this is not by reading them out of the club but rather by keeping them in it so we can continue to influence them. I recognize, of course, that the best way to avoid trouble in NATO over Greece is to get the GOG to be less repressive; but I think we should also devote some attention to advising our NATO allies (and one thinks primarily of Norway and Denmark, who are the most vociferous) against allowing domestic politicking to prejudice international security.

In debating the ever-present question of how much, and what kind of pressure we should put on the GOG to return to democratic methods, I have always felt rather strongly, Dan, that we have generally ignored an important factor which might be described as the "legitimacy of the Revolution." To a large extent, we and the Western Europeans

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<sup>10</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 375.

have been inclined to treat what's going on in Greece now as a temporary and illegitimate departure from some democratic norm (and it might well be asked here: what democratic norm?), as a sort of shabby political aberration to be replaced by something better as soon as possible. Whereas this interpretation is doubtless objectively correct, from Papadopoulos & Company's subjective viewpoint, it is not only erroneous but keenly resented. (I know I'm sounding suspiciously like a confirmed Regime apologist at this point, Dan, but please hear me out.) Papadopoulos obviously regards his revolution as a desirable and necessary stage in Greece's political evolution to something better and more stable; and in order to achieve this greater good, (in his eyes), some price and sacrifice, in terms of temporary restraints on the past degree of liberty enjoyed in Greece (which he clearly regards as excessive to the point of being pernicious), are not only justified but beneficial. Meanwhile, our approach to him has been to act as though the whole enterprise, both means and ends were bad and misguided and should therefore be got over as rapidly as possible. While we may well be right (although a number of points here could be interestingly argued, such as the effect of the return to complete freedom of the press in Greece—on a possible Cyprus settlement, for example), Papadopoulos is convinced that he's right, and since he's in control of the country it behooves us, for tactical, if for no other reasons, to make some concession to his viewpoint. The added fact that we do not ourselves have any specific formula for a more successful political future in Greece to propose (and indeed would probably be well advised to keep out of the business of telling the Greeks what sort of government they should have) reinforces, in my opinion, the importance of at least acting toward Papadopoulos & Company as though we recognized some justification in what he is trying to do. Obviously we're not going to accept the legitimacy of government based on force (and over the long run I'm not sure that he does either), and are certainly correct in pointing out to him the fundamental advantages of government-by-the-consent-of-the-governed.

A definite time element is moreover involved in this whole process which, I think, must also be taken into account. As the lives of governments go, this one has only been in undisputed control of the country for just over a year now (since December 13, 1967),<sup>11</sup> which is not a very long time as historical perspective goes. The Metaxas dictatorship, as I recall, lasted for over four years.<sup>12</sup> The feeling that they need

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to King Constantine's attempted counter-coup against the junta.

<sup>12</sup> General and Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas seized power in August 1936 with the support of then King George II. He held power until his death in February 1941. A successor government was subsequently driven into exile in May 1941 by the German invasion of Greece.

some reasonable length of time (which I would be inclined to put at a minimum of a couple of years from now) has been emphatically and repeatedly expressed from the outset by this revolutionary group. And yet we tend to act toward them as though this whole slightly despicable affair should be brought to an end within a matter of months. While I realize that keeping them under a certain amount of pressure is conducive to forward motion and hence tactically desirable, I think we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that they want, and intend to take a certain amount of time "to achieve the aims of the Revolution," as they put it. Roufogalis developed the thesis to me the other night, for instance, that it should not be unreasonable for the regime to demand as much time to carry out its political plans as it has projected to implement its five-year economic plan. Although this is somewhat specious, it is characteristic of their thinking, and once more points up for me, at least, the necessity of conceding them some reasonable time-frame. If we don't, I fear we will simply generate irritation and resentment, as well as engaging in a good deal of lost motion. In advancing these arguments I do not mean to imply that we should stop reminding them periodically of the problems they create for their friends and allies, bilaterally and in NATO, by failing gradually to restore at least basic personal liberties. I do argue, however, that this should be done against a background of explicit recognition that the enterprise on which they are embarked has some *raison d'être* of its own and is entitled to a certain amount of time.

As Arch recommended in his tactical paper (enclosed with his letter of December 11),<sup>13</sup> I think the advent of our new Administration (and presumably, in due course, of a new American Ambassador) will afford us an excellent opportunity to start off on a footing which takes the foregoing considerations into account. The formula we developed in connection with the MAP restoration continues to be a good one, and we should certainly make quite clear at the outset that the US remains no less interested in a return to a democratic and representative process of government in Greece. We should also reiterate our conviction that the continued denial of fundamental human liberties is not only at variance with valid Western political ideals but contrary to the best interests of Greece in the long-run. At the same time, I believe we must admit the legitimacy of the aim of the Papadopoulos Government to change certain features of Greek political life to avoid, if possible, a return to the irresponsibility, instability and sterility of the past. We must also concede that this process will require a certain amount of time. Finally, we should express our own firmly held belief that

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<sup>13</sup> A copy of the letter is in the Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Letters to and From Athens.

whereas certain temporary constraints may well be required, the ultimate success of their undertaking will rest on convincing the Greek people of the necessity and desirability of the proposed reforms rather than on coercing them into accepting them. One supposes, after all, that Papadopoulos knows his Greek psychology as well, or better than we do, and hence will not act in a manner calculated ultimately to produce an explosion from which no one, certainly not he, would profit.

One last topic, Dan, in a letter which I'm afraid is now getting terribly long and rambling: that of the internal reaction in the United States to the Greek situation. While it is generally conceded that the Nixon Administration will be more relaxed about Greece, and probably less inclined to badger the GOG, the Congressional opposition (Fraser, Edwards & Co.)<sup>14</sup> will remain pretty much what it has been in the past, and might even become more activist since it will be sharpened by party differences. It seems to me, though, that if the new Administration takes a firm and reasonable stand on Greece from the beginning (recognizing that what really counts on balance is Greece's strategic loyalty to us more than the internal form of its government), there's not very much that the liberal minority in Congress can do about it other than make noise. I hasten to admit, however, that this is easier said than done, and all very well for me to advance from the safe distance of Athens out from under the gun of the Congressional pressure to which you fellows in the Department are regularly subjected. Still, I doubt (especially if Papadopoulos helps us a little, by mitigating the state of siege and gradually bringing some of the key articles of the Constitution into force, which he, incidentally, shows every sign of intending to do)<sup>15</sup> that opposition on the Hill would go to the lengths of advocating further suspensions or cutbacks in the MAP for Greece. With the Middle East as jittery as it is and the Soviet suppression of Czech freedoms still being actively pursued, it would not make any policy sense to jeopardize the strategic support we receive from Greece. I would therefore hope that under the new Administration we could successfully complete the process of delinking MAP from internal political performance. We shall have to keep our "cool" and continue the job of bringing our Greek policy into more realistic focus.

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<sup>14</sup> Congressmen Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota) and Don Edwards (D-California), both members of the House Committee on Foreign Relations.

<sup>15</sup> On July 11, 1968, the junta published the text of a 138-article Constitution. It was approved by plebiscite on September 29 and officially put into effect on November 11 with certain of its articles held in abeyance. For text of the 1968 Constitution, see D. George Kousalas, *Greece: Uncertain Democracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1973), pp. 103-152.

I hope you will find some of this of interest, and perhaps even useful, Dan; and I apologize for carrying on at such length.

With my very best to you.

Sincerely,

Ross

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## 240. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Rome, February 13, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Visit by Ambassador Mosbacher with King Constantine in Rome at his residence

### PARTICIPANTS

King Constantine of Greece

Ambassador Emil Mosbacher, Jr., Chief of Protocol

At the dinner Ambassador Ackley held for the advance party, I was given a message that King Constantine had suggested I might like to come over and have a drink with him afterward. I called and he was most cordial in his invitation that I do just that.

After dinner, I went to his home and spent a most pleasant hour and a quarter to an hour and a half in conversation with him. The Queen was present at the beginning and again for a few moments at the end.

Our talk covered subjects ranging from the fact that he is planning to get a Soling (an olympic-class sailboat), to the Americas Cup and the Greek position in regard to that. We did spend considerable time discussing the fact that he had had a number of emissaries from Athens over a period of time, including one or two of high rank. According to the conversation, he still has an interest in returning and they would seem to have considerable interest in having him do so. He indicated that it was a matter of negotiation as to the terms on which this could be brought about, the most important of which would be holding national elections. He expressed great fear that the strong right wing police methods of the ruling junta might bring about a commu-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Confidential. Drafted by Mosbacher. The date was added to the memorandum in an unknown hand. A copy was sent to Saunders.

nist reaction and precipitate Greece once more into civil war. He feels he still has the affection of most of the people, especially the young ones and recounted several anecdotes that would seem to substantiate this.

He did *not* make any request to see the President during his visit to Rome.<sup>2</sup> He did, however, say that down the line he would like to have further discussions with our people about the Greek situation. I asked him to inform me further of his desires for discussion and that I would try to see that any such request be passed along to the proper officials.

Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

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<sup>2</sup> President Nixon visited Rome February 27–28.

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## 241. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 1, 1969, 11 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Greek Ambassador's Call on the Acting Secretary; U.S.-Greek Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Christian X. Palamas, Greek Ambassador  
 Mr. Michael-George Mazarakis, Counselor, Greek Embassy  
 The Acting Secretary  
 H. Daniel Brewster, Country Director for Greece  
 Robert O. Homme, Staff Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary

After the opening amenities, Ambassador Palamas, in discussing the capabilities of NATO, noted that Greece, for one, places much greater reliance on the United States as a source of defense against possible aggressors than on NATO as an organization.

Turning to internal developments in Greece he stated that the April 21, 1967 revolution had averted the danger of another bloody round with the Communists. The new constitution was now in effect with the exception of certain articles relating to civil rights which are still to be applied. The new institutional structure for political parties was being built and he hence believed the present situation was transitional. Political life in the future would be governed by new rules. Internationally

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 GREECE–US. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster on March 3 and approved in U on March 5.

Greece still stood as a bulwark against Slav expansionism to the Mediterranean.

The Ambassador added that the delivery by the United States of certain major military equipment had been suspended immediately after the coup. In his view this policy had not yielded anything politically but had affected the strength of the Greek armed forces. Last October the suspension had been partially lifted<sup>2</sup> and he hoped that the new Administration could speed up the delivery of the balance of the heavy equipment. He also hoped that Greece would be treated sympathetically by the Administration in connection with new foreign aid allocations. Ambassador Palamas underlined that there was no anti-Americanism in Greece and that the U.S. could rely on Greece's strong commitment to its NATO obligations.

The Acting Secretary stated that the question of arms supplies for Greece was under active review. In reaching its conclusions, the U.S. would, among other factors, take into account the position of Greece in NATO, the strategic aspects of the problem, relationships with the Greek Government, and the traditional friendship for the Greek people. We were also watching constitutional progress and, as the Ambassador knew, had to reckon with certain elements of U.S. public opinion on this score. We would have to help each other in this matter and make progress on a reasonable basis.

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<sup>2</sup> Shipments of military aid to Greece were originally suspended on April 24, 1967. (Telegram 181282 to Athens, April 24; *ibid.*, POL 23–9 GREECE) President Johnson approved a partial resumption of assistance on October 8, 1968. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 371.

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## 242. Memorandum for the President's File<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 20, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Early-afternoon Meeting in the President's Office with Honorable Thomas A. Pappas (1:00–1:15 p.m.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President. No classification marking. Drafted by Butterfield.

Mr. Pappas and the President sat on the couches near the fire. The meeting was quite short—the following excerpts representing the essence of the conversation:

*On Greece*

Mr. Pappas—“I saw the King recently and he wanted to know what was going on at home . . . among the Greek people. I think the King should go back eventually, but meanwhile he should travel. It would be good for him and for the Greek people if he would travel.”

The President—“The King could do a lot for the people, psychologically, if he would go back.”

Mr. Pappas—“What Greece needs in the worst way is something like the Peace Corps. Couldn't you send a peace corps there, Mr. President?”

The President—“I'm not sure what all we have there, Tom, but we'll look into it.” (The President asked me to make a check on what we had in Greece at the present time and what, along the lines of a peace corps, we might be able to put there without a long delay.)

Mr. Pappas—“It would also be a wonderful gesture, Mr. President, if you would receive the Foreign Minister here in your office . . . just for a few moments.”

The President—“Certainly, I'd be delighted to see the Foreign Minister.”

*On Cyprus and the Greek-Turk Controversy*

Mr. Pappas—“Cyprus is a separate and very serious problem. It divides the Greeks and the Turks. The US *must* get the Greeks and Turks together as allies. Those are the two big problems—Cyprus first, the Turkish-Greek alliance second.

*On Italy*

Mr. Pappas—“I think there is a real danger that Italy will soon turn completely to the Left.”

The President: “Yes, I realize there is a strong Leftist element there and yet it's strange, for they have no real economic reason for turning to the Left and Saragat impressed me as being a good man.”

*On Ambassadorial Appointments*

Mr. Pappas—“Mr. President, whom have you selected to serve as your Ambassador in Greece?”

The President—“We haven't worked that one out yet, Tom.”

Mr. Pappas—“Well, you need the very best you can get—the very best there is for both Greece and Italy.”

Just prior to leaving the President's office, Tom paid the President high compliments on his successful European visit, and on his recent

(crackdown) statement on students.<sup>2</sup> He then asked the President if he would grant a favor—the favor being to permit him to serve later on in the year as national coordinator for all of the ethnic groups in America (referred to by Tom as “All-American Groups”). Tom said that he had hundreds of friends among the ethnic groups and that he had worked in this same area several times before. The President agreed that Tom would do a wonderful job in such a capacity and assured his visitor that he would keep the request in mind. He (the President) then turned to me and asked that arrangements be made to send an auto-graphed picture to Tom and his wife, Bessie.

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<sup>2</sup> References are to the President’s European trip February 25–March 2, and the President’s letter to the President of the University of Notre Dame, February 24. For text of the letter, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 141.

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### 243. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 31, 1969.

PRESENT

The President  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Maj. Gen. Walters

Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos  
Mr. Daniel Brewster

The Deputy Prime Minister recalled the President’s trip to Greece in 1967 as a private citizen and the good conversation they had at that time.<sup>2</sup> The President said that he also recalled it. Part of the conversation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Yellow Oval Room at the White House. Pattakos also met with Vice President Agnew and Secretary Rogers on April 1. Memoranda of those discussions are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE and POL GREECE–US, respectively. A record of a Pattakos–Laird conversation of April 2 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Greece, 121–333, 1969. A general report on Pattakos’s Washington visit is in telegram 5121 to Athens, April 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE)

<sup>2</sup> Nixon visited Greece in June 1967 during a trip to Africa and the Middle East. He met with King Constantine and other senior leaders of the junta on June 21.

had been in the garden and part of it in the Deputy Prime Minister's office. He later talked about his conversation with Tom Pappas.

Mr. Pattakos said that things were going well in Greece in spite of what the newspapers said. Greek policy toward the United States was frank and clear. They would continue to be friends even if the United States did nothing for them and they understood the stoppage of arms supplies. They knew the President and also knew that he was a good man. They understood what we were doing in Vietnam and realized that communism had to be fought. They, the Greeks, would fight against it even if no one helped them.

The President said there was a new Administration and we were conducting a review of our policies and programs particularly in the field of military assistance. This was being considered in the National Security Council of which Mr. Kissinger was the head. We were aware of the fact that Greece was a strong partner in NATO and had been helpful on Cyprus and other matters. In our dealings with other countries we were principally involved in external affairs rather than in political matters.

Mr. Pattakos repeated that Greece would stand with the United States. The U.S. was the Athens of modern times. It must be strong. He had mentioned these matters in a letter which he had written to the President. The U.S. must be strong in order to protect freedom. Greece would stand by her side. He recalled the ancient Greek soldier who had seized hold of a Persian ship and when the Persians cut off his hand he had grasped it with the other hand and then his feet and finally with his teeth at which point the Persians had cut off his head.<sup>3</sup> He told this story to illustrate the determination of the Greeks.

The President then asked Mr. Pattakos his opinion of the attitude of the Communist world today. Mr. Pattakos said they were as dangerous as ever and would do everything they could to lull the western world into a sense of security. He told the fable of Esops in which a Lion wanted to marry a man's daughter and the daughter was afraid of the lion so when the lion came to see the girl's father, the father explained that the girl was afraid of the lion's teeth and nails and that if he got rid of them then they could be married. The lion disarmed himself and when in this condition he came back to ask for the girl's hand, the father easily killed him.<sup>4</sup> This was what the communists were trying to do to the western world. They were using the students as a spearhead. They were only children, smoked marijuana and had little

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to an elaboration on a story found in Herodotus.

<sup>4</sup> Pattakos was apparently melding together Aesop's story of Androkles and the Lion with other Greek fables.

sense of reality. One should not pay attention to them but rather to the real danger of communism which was still seeking to conquer the world. The Deputy Prime Minister fired a blast at exiled Greek politico Andreas Papandreou, saying that he was a complete political eccentric and somewhat deranged. He was against everything and for nothing. Reaffirming Greece's determination to fight communism and support the United States Mr. Pattakos took his leave of the President.

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#### 244. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1969.

##### SUBJECT

Call on the Secretary by King Constantine of the Hellenes—U.S.-Greek Relations

##### PARTICIPANTS

His Majesty King Constantine of the Hellenes  
Ambassador Leonidas Papagos, Marshal of the Court  
The Secretary  
Suart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA  
H. Daniel Brewster, Country Director for Greece

The Secretary asked the King for his assessment of the situation in Greece and prospects for its future. The King described the steps he had taken while in Greece to move the GOG toward constitutionalism. He underlined the fact that he had never signed the decree abolishing the 1951 constitution and had insisted on the early appointment of a drafting committee for a new constitution made up of eminent jurists. The constitution had been voted on by referendum in September 1968 but no date for elections has been fixed. The Regent was appointed for a period until elections were held or until the King returned on the basis of an agreement with the Greek Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brewster and approved in S on April 7. King Constantine and Pattakos both attended the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Pattakos was the official representative of the Greek Government. In a March 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Walsh noted "that the King's visit to the United States carried the enthusiastic endorsement of Foreign Minister Pipinelis. We therefore see no alternative to Constantine's being accorded the treatment appropriate to his position, which is that of Chief of State of Greece." (Ibid., POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER)

The King then briefly described his meeting on March 31 with Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos which had taken place at the Greek Embassy. In response to Mr. Pattakos' statement that the King should not press for his return to Greece, the latter had replied he was not pushing for this, but thought he and the government should now start talking about the future of Greece. The King was surprised to hear Mr. Pattakos say that it was not possible for the Greek Government representatives to meet with the King because if this became public the government would be overthrown. The King had nonetheless asked Mr. Pattakos to tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that he still felt it would be useful for the two of them to meet. The King observed that the Prime Minister was under the strong control of the younger officers in the junta. The King also sensed that the Prime Minister was worried as to what the younger officers might do if Papadopoulos should win any eventual elections.

The Secretary asked for the King's views on what the U.S. attitude should be towards the Greek Government. The King responded that the U.S. should keep up strong pressures for constitutional evolution, because if there was no pressure on the Greek Government, it would just play for time, stay in power a long while, and continue the process of removing senior army officers. It would also take advantage of any opportunity to enhance its image, such as the fact that the President had had a private meeting with Mr. Pattakos at the White House reception but not with himself.

The Secretary noted that there was a limit as to what the USG should and could do in this regard. The USG had repeatedly been asked to become involved on different sides of international problems, (e.g., the Nigerian-Biafran issue) and the USG was very reluctant to do this. It would be inappropriate to become involved in what was a domestic matter. The Secretary continued that the USG respects the King's role as Chief of State and the importance of having a strong Greece as a member of the NATO alliance. This stance poses a dilemma for the United States on the issue of deliveries of military equipment to Greece.

The King stated that the Greek Government needs the equipment both for military strength and also for psychological reasons. He suggested the USG tell the Greek Government that it should either implement the constitution fully or there would be no military aid. He added that the Greek Government is extremely sensitive to United States views. Such a posture on military aid would also help the rest of the army who would then realize that the USG meant to link constitutional evolution to military aid.

The Secretary responded that we would be reluctant to tie our assistance to a NATO partner strictly to Greece's internal affairs. He added, however, that we had made clear to Greek Government officials that

we expected progress on implementing the Greek constitution and restoring civil liberties and that this had been our posture for the past 23 months.

Mr. Rockwell said that the question of the relationship between the King and the Greek Government was obviously a significant factor in the Greek problem. With regard to our military aid policy, it looked as if the Greek Government was not prepared to give up the essence of its position in exchange for military equipment. The Greek Government believes it has a mission to accomplish and does not seem prepared to make basic adjustments in its policies simply to obtain military aid. It is proceeding at its own speed. Mr. Rockwell's personal view was that pressures from within Greece would require the Greek Government in time to adjust its policies in a desirable manner. This would not happen overnight, and was something to be worked out between Greeks, including the King and the Government. The United States could not do this. The King dissented, saying that in another year the Government's control would be so tight that it could act as it pleased toward the Greek people. Only United States pressure could prevent this.

The Secretary noted that it was very difficult to put the question of MAP deliveries bluntly in terms of "either you do what we want or you do not receive MAP." We wanted to see Greece progress to constitutionalism but at the same time did not want to see Greece weakened militarily as a NATO ally. Although we had a basic interest in political evolution and constitutional development in Greece, we questioned whether our voice could be decisive in achieving these objectives. It was our policy not to intervene in domestic matters of this sort, and it must be for the King and the Greek Government to work out the political future of Greece.

The King said he now understood our policy and if this had been made clear to him when he was in Washington in September 1967<sup>2</sup> he might not have undertaken his action of December 13 and would have instead stayed in Greece to continue influencing the government. He went on to say that he was in touch with other Greek leaders abroad about steps to move things back to political normalcy. He hoped that whatever decision was reached by the USG regarding U.S. policy in dealing with the Greek Government, and particularly on the question of military deliveries, might be conveyed to him. He wanted to be sure to be in step with whatever the USG was planning because his actions would be affected in large measure by the United States stance. The

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 301.

Secretary noted this request but made no commitment that it would be feasible to meet it.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 4 memorandum for the files, Brewster noted a “delicate matter” that the King raised with Rogers. The King expressed deep regret that he was not given a private audience with President Nixon, like all other heads of state at the Eisenhower funeral. Complicating the situation, Pattakos had a private meeting with the President. The King told Rogers of “the great psychological problems the Greeks were having these days, and the control being exercised by the Greek Government.” The King regretted that the Greek people would read significance into the President’s slight against him. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GREECE)

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## 245. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 11, 1969.

### PARTICIPANTS

Panayotis Pipinelis, Foreign Minister of Greece  
 Christian X. Palamas, Ambassador of Greece  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
 Mr. Harold H. Saunders

The conversation opened with a brief exchange of remarks on the President’s briefing of the morning’s NATO meeting.<sup>2</sup> That led to the Foreign Minister’s saying that Greece is fully prepared to accept its obligation in NATO regardless of what help it does or does not get from the others. Dr. Kissinger commended that position.

The Foreign Minister felt that Greece is an important island of stability in the midst of serious change on either side. He said he is deeply concerned about the leftist movements in both Turkey and Italy. He felt that Italy is rapidly approaching the condition of Greece two or three years ago.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. Drafted by Saunders on April 22. Pipinelis was attending the NATO Ministerial meeting April 10–11.

<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to President Nixon’s address to the NATO meeting April 10. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 272–276. The President’s Daily Diary indicates he attended the NATO meeting from 2:06 to 2:50 p.m. and delivered remarks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

Dr. Kissinger asked what the situation in Greece is today. The Foreign Minister spoke of the energy and dedication of the present Government. He noted that, despite criticism from the outside, and despite perhaps a lack of sophistication on the part of the present government, it is made up of men who deeply believe in their mission of reform, eliminating corruption and simplifying administration. They are moving gradually back toward elections but they will take time.

Dr. Kissinger asked under what circumstances the King might return. The Foreign Minister said that is up to the Government. He suggested, however, that the King's return would probably coincide with the ultimate holding of elections.

The Foreign Minister then said that the King had regretted that he had not had a chance to meet with the President. Dr. Kissinger explained the "technical difficulty" since the President had had to limit himself to seeing heads of Government. He assured the Foreign Minister, however, that the President had "the highest personal regard" for the King. He said he himself had called the King to convey this regard before the King had departed and he had told the King that if he were to come to the United States on a private visit a meeting on a private basis could be arranged with the President. However, we just could not be in a position of being put in the middle of current political maneuvering in Greece. If the Government of Greece had asked us to receive the King, that would have been an entirely different proposition.

The Foreign Minister picked up this point and said that he felt it is not productive for the U.S. Government to continue to press the present Government for an early return to full constitutional Government. He noted that the Vice President and officials in the State Department had continued to press this point<sup>3</sup> and that the question of continued U.S. military assistance to Greece had become involved in it. He suggested that the U.S. Government should help its NATO partner with military assistance regardless of its political system. Dr. Kissinger said that he could report categorically that the policy of the President is for the United States not to involve itself in the political affairs of other countries. There was one qualification to that—when the political affairs of Greece became an issue which others in NATO used to weaken the alliance, then we had to take account of that. For the most part, the policy of the President is for the U.S. to concern itself only with the foreign policy of another country.

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<sup>3</sup> Memoranda of Pipinelis's conversations with Richardson, April 9, and with Agnew, April 11, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE and POL GREECE-US, respectively. The Department sent the Embassy in Athens an account of Pipinelis's visit to Washington in telegram 56593 to Athens, April 12. (*Ibid.*)

Dr. Kissinger in an exchange of pleasantries said that when he had visited Greece, he had concluded that perhaps the U.S. and Greece should exchange political leaders. Our leaders are pragmatists and Greece has many practical problems to be solved. The leaders of Greece are men who like to operate in terms of wide vision and the United States could use some of that.

The conversation ended with Dr. Kissinger's reassurance of the President's policy.

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#### 246. National Security Study Memorandum 52<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 26, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Military Aid Policy Toward Greece

The President has requested a review of our current military aid policy toward Greece.

The President has directed that a study be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East which presents arguments pro and con on the resumption of full military assistance.

This study should include an assessment of the present political situation in Greece as it affects U.S. interests.

This study should be forwarded to the Review Group by May 16.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-150, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 52. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**247. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (McClelland) to the Country Director for Greek Affairs (Brewster)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, April 28, 1969.

Dear Dan:

Arch and I have reapplied ourselves over the week-end to the important question raised in your letter of April 14th,<sup>2</sup> and reiterated in your telephone call of Friday,<sup>3</sup> of whether continuing the current U.S. policy of withholding delivery of suspended MAP items can still serve to impel the GOG to make more rapid and genuine progress toward representative government.

In summary, it is our conclusion that, whereas we can probably extract some further short-range, tactical mileage from a continuation of this policy (i.e. until a new Ambassador arrives and has been able to assess the situation, in other words, for perhaps another 3 months), we believe this would be unlikely over the longer range to have any appreciable effect on the pace and nature of internal political evolution in Greece. As was noted in NEA/GRK’s succinct March “Memorandum for the President” on the subject of “Policy on Military Deliveries to Greece”: “the Regime clearly . . . is not prepared to make basic concessions in return for a lifting of the arms suspension.” Persisting with suspension would moreover retain all the inherent disadvantages of this policy.<sup>4</sup>

A second part of our conclusion—and we regard this as an important concomitant—is that by abandoning the MAP withholding policy, we do not necessarily need at the same time to abandon significant leverage over the GOG which could be exerted in other ways. We believe that this conclusion is reenforced by recent evidence, in particular the exaggerated interpretation in the controlled Greek press of the significance of Pattakos’ visit, and to a lesser extent that of Pipinelis and General Angelis,<sup>5</sup> to Washington, together with the disproportionate reaction to the seemingly minor *Viewpoint* episode,<sup>6</sup> that it is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards Greece. Secret; Official-Informal.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation on April 25 was found.

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State memorandum was not found. The President ordered a study of military aid to Greece on April 26; see Document 246.

<sup>5</sup> Angelis accompanied Pipinelis to Washington April 9–11. A memorandum of his conversation with the Vice President is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US.

<sup>6</sup> This USIA publication had printed an article critical of the Greek junta.

not so much the intrinsic military content of the suspension policy (although this obviously plays some part) as it is the psychological evidence of political disapproval on the part of the U.S. which the withholding of arms represents, that exerts the real pressure on the GOG. It should be feasible, we think, to exercise such pressure, if perhaps less tangibly, through other means and avoid the obvious dilemma of simultaneously depriving the Greeks of the means of defending themselves which the fulfillment of their NATO commitments requires.

We therefore believe that while a restoration of the MAP items should take place after a suitable interval, it ought to be accompanied by some very specific political and psychological conditions. The principal of these is that it should be made clear to the GOG that the USG will not countenance any public acclaim of this action on their part as evidence of unqualified USG approval of the domestic political policies of the GOG. We would stipulate that when the decision is made to restore the balance of the MAP, the USG will issue a statement, as we did in October 1968,<sup>7</sup> to the effect that this action is primarily motivated by military considerations and is unrelated to the Greek domestic political situation. The USG's position in this respect remains one of continuing concern and of advocating more genuine and rapid progress toward constitutional normalcy and representative government. Arch and I believe that by following this course we could retain the essential advantages of keeping the GOG under psychological pressure to improve its political performance and also avoid the various disadvantages of continuing the MAP suspension policy.

As we have all previously recognized, there are several of these of a serious practical nature: the undercutting of the military effectiveness of the Greek armed forces; prejudicing joint planning with the United States; encouraging the GOG to acquire non-compatible equipment elsewhere; the diversion of limited resources from economic development; and possibly, risking restrictions on the free use of U.S. military facilities in Greece. Even more important, we believe that shifting our pressure from the questionable grounds of withholding military equipment to the diplomatic and psychological arena would avoid the danger of alienating the Greek military leadership (i.e. Angelis, Tsoumbas, Kostakos, Margaritis and Co.). Under present conditions the only potential source of meaningful internal pressure on the GOG toward political change is the Greek armed forces. We have every interest therefore of keeping them on our side. Supplying them with the weapons

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<sup>7</sup> At the October 21, 1968, daily briefing, Department of State Spokesman Robert McCloskey read a statement that certain types of military aid were being restored to Greece in light of NATO requirements and recent events in Eastern Europe (a reference to the crisis in Czechoslovakia).

they need to play an honorable and effective role in the defense of their national territory is an indispensable part of this aim. One of the critical aspects of the MAP withholding policy has indeed been its implicit affront to Greek military pride. If handled discriminatingly, this tactic can be effective, *up to a point*, but if carried too far, without really convincing justification, it could end by being seriously counterproductive. You know the arguments the Greek military put forward: "You Americans obviously fear the Russians as do we, so why do you cut off our weapons?", or the invidious conclusion: "Your actions clearly reveal that you do not consider the Greek officer corps sufficiently trustworthy to refrain from using these weapons against their own people." In addition, permitting the Greek military establishment to fall notably behind that of Turkey could have highly undesirable repercussions by prejudicing the current painstaking effort to improve Greek-Turkish relations.

We therefore believe that an important adjunct to the foregoing tactic would be to make clear to the Greek military leadership, as distinct from Papadopoulos & Co., that whereas we are restoring our arms deliveries in recognition of the value of Greece's NATO role, this action has considerably strained domestic political tolerances in the United States and does not at all signify uncritical acceptance of the GOG's internal policies. The Greek military should be informed that we will accordingly continue to press for a return to constitutional government. Here one could adopt the line that the failure of Greece to return to democratic practices increases the prospect of internal political instability which, in turn, tends to make Greece a less reliable strategic ally of the U.S. and in NATO. While we shall obviously have to be very careful in any such attempt to drive a wedge, however subtly, between the Greek armed forces and the "Colonels," it should undoubtedly be considered as a possible policy instrument.

In support of the psychological aspects of a policy of restoring the MAP and disassociating it from political performance, I have always felt, as you know, Dan (without, I'll admit, any very profound insight into the Greek psyche), that one is on firmer psychological grounds with a Greek in manifesting friendship and trust toward him than in treating him in a manner which casts doubt on his personal reliability. This is doubtless part of the old, if overused, business of "philotimo."<sup>8</sup> Having given concrete evidence of such confidence, it seems to me that one is then in a stronger position to criticize, with some expectation that the Greek will listen to, and possibly even accept such advice. At least the chances of his resenting it would appear to be less. I suspect, on the other hand, that the Greek also responds to the Middle Eastern

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<sup>8</sup> Dignity, self-esteem, or sense of honor. Literally "love of honor."

“carpet trading” approach; but I’ll have to rely on the last analysis on your superior familiarity with the Greek character to judge which technique is the best.

Another advantage of the course we recommend of restoring the MAP but also making quite clear that this does not imply acceptance, let alone approval, of the GOG’s domestic policies, is that it would retain many of the favorable features of the old withholding policy. We should clearly begin by disabusing the proponents of the present suspension policy of the notion that withholding MAP weapons has had any appreciable effect on the ability of the GOG to carry out a policy of internal repression. The GOG has always had more than enough of the type of weapons necessary for this purpose. By making clear that the resumption of full MAP deliveries does not imply political approval, we should be able to satisfy the domestic critics of this move within the United States (i.e. in Congress, the press and the intellectual community), as well as internationally in the ranks of our NATO partners.

If anything has driven home to me, Dan, the almost pathetic eagerness of the present GOG for evidence of U.S. approval, it has been the exaggerated lengths to which their controlled press went in attempting to interpret the fact that high officials in Washington were willing politely to receive, listen, and talk to Pattakos as conclusive evidence of unequivocal U.S. acceptance of the present GOG and all its works. Conversely, the disproportionately sharp reaction over the rather minor evidence of U.S. disapproval which the publication in the USIS’s *Viewpoint* Bulletin of the Department’s fairly mild effort to set the record straight brought home with equal force, and in a context unrelated to MAP policy, the GOG’s acute unhappiness over any public U.S. censure. One is frankly at a loss to understand why it is that a regime which is so relatively firmly in the saddle and not seriously threatened by any organized internal or external opposition, manifests such patent insecurity. One wonders what in the world might happen were the President of the U.S., for example, to issue a resounding official condemnation of the Greek regime. This almost lends credence to Andreas Papandreou’s contention that the junta would collapse as a result!

From our Athens vantage point we are not in a position to estimate how serious the flak would be which the Executive Branch would run into on the Hill in restoring the suspended MAP items or, indeed, how willing and able the White House might be at the present time to accept the repercussions. In the declining days of the past Administration, the Executive Branch was unwilling to incur these risks. If I recall correctly the substance of the position Mr. Katzenbach took in a memorandum to the President on the subject, the Department feared that the entire Foreign Aid bill might be jeopardized if it pressed for a restoration of full military deliveries to Greece. From what we hear

now, however, I gather that Congressional opposition on this score is perhaps not quite so strong or vociferous as it was in the past, although we've had quite a spate of antagonistic press stuff of late and have not noted any reluctance on Senator Pell's part to jump into the fray. Yet, with the increasingly unstable condition of the Middle East, the continuing Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia and the augmentation of the Russian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, I should think we could put up a strong case at this time for maintaining cooperative military relations with Greece.

I hope that these recommendations, Dan, will be of value to you in attempting to devise a workable alternative to our current unsatisfactory MAP policy toward Greece.

With all the best to you.

Sincerely,

**Roswell D. McClelland<sup>9</sup>**

P.S. I enclose an excellent memorandum of Arch Blood's which serves to underpin the central recommendations of this letter and corroborate the essential arguments which I have advanced.<sup>10</sup> George Warren, with whom this has also been discussed, is in basic agreement with our views.

**RDM**

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<sup>9</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>10</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Appointment for Andreas Papandreou

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30–2 GREECE. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster and cleared by Handley.

I have just heard that Henry Kissinger telephoned you to report that he has had a request to receive Andreas Papandreou.<sup>2</sup> I have weighed all the pertinent factors and decided on balance not to receive him.

Although I basically believe in maintaining an open-door policy on receiving visitors, this case seemed very special. Mr. Papandreou has attacked the U.S. role in Greece in public statements on a number of occasions. He might exploit an appointment to bolster his standing among potential Greek émigré leaders. He is a controversial person who, as head of the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement, last year entered into an agreement with a known Greek Communist, Mr. Brillakis. We estimate the majority of Greek-American opinion in this country is unsympathetic to Mr. Papandreou. The Greek regime at this point would be very sensitive to any recognition given by the Department or the White House to Mr. Papandreou.

I strongly believe that we should hold to the same line at State and at the White House on this subject. I would appreciate it if you would convey State's position on this matter to Mr. Kissinger.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> According to a May 8 memorandum from Saunders to Moose: "Larry Eagleburger . . . requested . . . [a] memorandum for the sole purpose of having the State Department recommendation in the file here. HAK has already decided not to see Papandreou." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70) A copy of the May 7 Department of State memorandum recommending against a Papandreou meeting is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten notation by Sisco at the bottom of the memorandum reads: "John, assuming Secretary agrees with my companion memo." The May 2 memorandum to Rogers outlined Sisco's opposition to receiving Papandreou. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE)

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#### 249. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Military Sales to Greece

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

State Department has just about completed a memo laying out your options with regard to our continuing military aid program in Greece.<sup>2</sup> However, there is one action that must be taken before the end of the fiscal year if we are to take full advantage of the funds appropriated for the FY 69 program.

As you know, our shipments of major military aid items were suspended after the April 1967 coup. Spare parts and non-major items (like trucks) continued to flow.

Last fall the Johnson Administration in a one-shot decision released about 40% of the equipment that had been withheld. This 40% consisted mainly of aircraft and a few ships. Items for the army which could be associated with political repression, such as tanks, were withheld. All of this was funded from grant military aid.

Now there is a possibility of concluding a \$20 million sales agreement for equipment other than that on the suspended list—the spares and other items that were never cut off. This money is available from FY 69 appropriated funds but will have to be allocated before June 30 if it is to be used.

We would not bother you with this issue except for the Reuss Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act.<sup>3</sup> This states the sense of Congress that foreign military sales authorized under the Act shall not be approved where they would have the effect of arming “military dictators who are denying social progress to their people.” The Amendment states that the President may waive this limitation if he determines that it would be important to the security of the United States.

In the future, we may decide on procedures under which you would personally make such determinations. For the moment, since this is a “sense of Congress” amendment, it is possible for State Department to make this finding. However, because of the political sensitivity of the military aid to Greece, we want to put the issue to you.

We can go in one of three directions in our Greek military aid program:

*Option 1: Cut it off altogether.* This would mean, in addition to maintaining suspension of major items, even cutting off the flow of non-major items which has gone on uninterrupted. Congressional liberals and friends of the Greek politicians silenced or exiled by the military government urge us to disassociate ourselves completely from the military government by totally suspending our military aid relationship. Even this sale of non-major equipment would meet some objections in

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<sup>2</sup> For the response to NSSM 52, see Documents 256 and 257.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Reuss amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, P.L. 90–629, approved October 28, 1968, see 82 Stat. 1322.

the Congress. The Reuss Amendment was written in response to these pressures. While such pressures do not seem to dominate the Congress, they are strong enough to prompt an effort to tighten restrictions, perhaps extending them to the grant aid program as well this year. At least, we may get some Congressional criticism from going ahead with this sale.

*Option 2: Shipping non-major items but continuing the suspension of major items.* This means continuing both the basic flow of non-major items and completing shipment of the major items released from the suspended list last fall—but not releasing anything more from the list. The rationale for maintaining the partial suspension last fall was to indicate our continuing displeasure over the slow pace at which the military government is moving back toward constitutional government. The rationale of the past Administration in trying to keep some pressure on the military government was to respond in some way to Congressional critics of the program while at the same time trying to maintain our NATO relationship with Greece.

*Option 3: Resumption of full military aid.* Since January 20, the Greek Government has mounted a persistent campaign to persuade us to remove the pressure for return to constitutional government and to resume a full military aid program. The Greek Foreign Minister argued this case when he was here for the NATO meetings; Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos stated the argument to you at the time of General Eisenhower's funeral; and Prime Minister Papadopoulos has written you urging it.<sup>4</sup> In NATO terms this makes sense, but in deciding on this course, we would have to consider its effect on all of those here and in Western Europe who are pressing to have Greece suspended from its formal membership in European organizations.

I believe the real choice is between options 2 and 3 above. This choice will be the main subject of the NSC paper that will be coming to you in a few weeks. No one in the Executive Branch has recommended that we cut off our military supply program altogether. Although this is obviously in the minds of some of the Congressional critics of our maintaining a working tie with the military government, the majority of Congress seems to recognize the need to maintain that tie.

I lay these options out in this way because your acquiescence in this sale will foreclose option 1—the choice of cutting off even the supply of spares and non-major items which has never been interrupted. It would commit us to continue the flow of at least \$20 million in spares

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 243 and 245. The text of Papadopoulos's April 4 letter to the President and Nixon's June 3 non-committal reply were transmitted in telegram 90814 to Athens, June 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL GREECE)

and non-major items. I believe we have to do at least this much in order to preserve our NATO relationship with Greece, but you should be aware that there are those in the Congress who would prefer our getting out of the military aid business altogether in Greece.

*Recommendation:* That you concur in the finding that it is important to our security to maintain at least this minimal military aid relationship with Greece. Budget Bureau concurs. Then we shall hold a full-scale review for you of the choice between options 2 and 3.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The President drew a line through the approval/disapproval lines and wrote: "RN—approves option 3."

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## 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 19, 1969, 0143Z.

100283. 1. Ambassador Palamas paid farewell call on Sisco June 17.<sup>2</sup>

2. Sisco, saying he anticipates questions during his forthcoming testimony before Congressional committees, asked how Palamas would describe developments in Greece. Palamas replied that so far GOG has kept its promises and accomplished quite a bit in two years. It has stopped drift toward communism, preserved institution of monarchy in spite of King's counter-coup, and a new democratic constitution has been adopted which strikes balance between individual freedoms and state authority. Constitution is being applied although some articles remain suspended. It will be applied in full when implementing legislation is ready. But, said Palamas, one must have no illusions that all can be as it was before. It may be for example that the Army will undertake to engage directly in politics. Those critical of present regime should keep in mind that if present regime should go, it could be replaced by regime which those who dislike present regime would like even less. US would be well advised to avoid interference in Greek affairs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US. Confidential. Drafted by Vigderman on June 17; cleared in draft by Rockwell; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and by pouch to Nicosia and Ankara.

<sup>2</sup> Palamas was returning to Greece to assume the post of Deputy Foreign Minister.

3. To Sisco's question about election prospects, Palamas replied that those who press the government for elections are committing themselves to the consequences. Elections could involve a disruption of discipline which might in turn bring consequences which those who insist on elections would not appreciate.

4. To Sisco's question about the attitude of Greek people toward regime, Palamas replied that it is passive on the whole. One can understand this passivity when one considers situation which prevailed before. Fact remains economic situation is good, prices stable, social progress being made.

5. Sisco pointed out that if moving swiftly toward parliamentary democracy might cause disruption, moving slowly created difficulties in terms of the regime's gaining general support. Palamas responded that the present situation ought to be satisfactory to the U.S. and NATO. GOG had avoided war with Turkey. In fact relations with Turks had improved. No other GOG could have accomplished this. Palamas warned that if the present stability were to break down it would be much worse for everyone.

6. Sisco asked what problems would be posed by free elections. Palamas responded that the problem would be to contain the communist effort at disruption and to gain advantage from elections. The danger lies not with the 10 to 15 per cent of the Greeks who are the hard core support of the communist party but rather with those who cooperate with communists, concealing themselves under other labels.

7. Rockwell asked whether the GOG satisfied with American policy, apart from question of suspension of some military assistance. Palamas responded that U.S. military assistance policy very troublesome indeed. This apart, GOG feels wounded by unfairness of obloquy cast on it by such developments as recent article on torture in Greece in *Look* magazine.<sup>3</sup> In general, though, he thought that US policy on right track, alleging particularly that Pattakos had been told on occasion of recent visit to Washington that US policy towards Greece was one of non-interference and cooperation with NATO partner, leaving Greek domestic problems for Greeks to solve. Palamas added that the restoration of military aid would eliminate last obstacle to cordial relations.

8. Sisco noted that certain elements in U.S. proposed simple solution—cut off aid to Greece and thus cause GOG to topple. Palamas responded this a childish conception. Reaction in Greece would be strong, particularly on the part of the Army which would then have to consider other alternatives. Attempting topple existing regime would be bad for Greece, bad for US and bad for NATO. Sisco then noted oth-

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to "Greece: Government by Torture," *Look*, May 27, 1969.

ers suggested US should manifest its displeasure toward GOG by not helping it in the UN, condemning its behavior, and taking every occasion to say publicly that we were pressuring GOG to reform. Palamas said this would alienate GOG, shake its stability, reinforce communists.

9. In parting shot Palamas noted that Karamanlis still held great prestige but he doubted whether Karamanlis would move so long as he had to count so much on support of “foreign factors.”

**Rogers**

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**251. Memorandum From the President’s Military Aide (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Foreign Military Sales to Greece

1. The memorandum you sent to the President (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> mentioned the three general options we have in military assistance policy for Greece:

- a. cut it off altogether;
- b. ship non-major items but continue the suspension of major items;
- c. resume full military aid.

2. Your memo simply asked the President to eliminate “option a” and to concur in a credit sale of non-major items (which would be part of “option b”). The memo stated that we would leave the choice between staying at option b and going on to option c for the NSC Review which we now have scheduled for the last half of July. Nevertheless, the President jumped to option c.

3. After talking with Hal Saunders about this, I conclude that we should allow the NSC paper to come forward as scheduled. In the meantime, however, it is clear that the President is quite willing to see us go ahead with credit sale of non-major items. Since that is the only

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 249.

subject we addressed in this memo, I suggest that we consider the President's response an approval of this limited action.

4. *It is important that we respond to State's memo of June 11 (Tab C)<sup>3</sup> quickly so that negotiation of this sale can be completed before the end of the fiscal year.* Only if we meet that deadline can we take advantage of the funds still available under the Foreign Military Sales Act which expires June 30.

Recommendation: That you sign the memo at Tab A.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. In it the Department found that the Greek regime was a military dictatorship within the meaning of the Reuss amendment, but recommended that continued military sales to Greece were important to U.S. security.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed. The June 23 memorandum, addressed to John Walsh of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, informed the Department "to proceed as proposed in your [June 11] memorandum. The President agrees that the sale proposed is important to our security."

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## 252. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 19, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Your Letter on Prime Minister Papadopoulos' Concerns

I hope you will excuse the delay in replying to your interesting July 1 letter, but I did not receive it until July 9.<sup>2</sup> With regard to the points you report in that letter:

1. On the reply to Papadopoulos' letter to the President, it is possible that your informant talked with Papadopoulos before he had received the President's reply. But as you see from the President's letter (attached),<sup>3</sup> it was sent June 3, more than a month ago.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In it Agnew passed along observations from a "prominent Greek-American businessman" who had returned from Greece after having five conversations with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.) A July 3 letter from McClelland to Vigderman indicates the businessman was Tom Pappas. (Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence To and From Athens)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. See footnote 4, Document 249.

2. As far as the Prime Minister's offense at our not appointing an Ambassador is concerned, we understand the special reason for his concern. The appointment of an Ambassador will be seen by all Greeks as a US endorsement of the junta—which he wants—whether we intend it to be or not. He must know that his opposition is urging us to withhold the appointment to show displeasure with his government. The fact of the matter is that it has simply taken time to find the right man, as has been the case in several other important posts.

3. On Papadopoulos' desire to have an arms decision in the very near future, we are close to such a decision. The arms policy issue is scheduled for the NSC Review Group in mid-August and would go to the President as soon afterward as we can arrange for NSC discussion. Meanwhile, the President approved a sale of \$20 million in equipment at the end of June.<sup>4</sup>

4. Papadopoulos' offer of a timetable for elections is interesting.<sup>5</sup> I would suggest that we discuss how to handle this and other informal approaches of this kind in the context of our NSC review.

5. Sending a high level official to talk to Papadopoulos could be useful, depending on what posture the President decides to take in the course of our NSC review. We can discuss this during that review as well.

I shall be glad to discuss this subject further with you whenever you wish.

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 249 and 251.

<sup>5</sup> The sentence under reference in the Vice President's letter reads: "The Prime Minister told our business contact that he is willing to provide President Nixon with a timetable for elections, and that he would hold to such a timetable, but that his intentions in this regard must be kept a secret so that he can effectively rule the country in the interim period."

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**253. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 24, 1969.

**SUBJECT**

Your Query About Effectiveness of Greek Forces

You asked about a statement in the *Christian Science Monitor*<sup>2</sup> that "the Greek army no longer exists as a stable, organized force in being. It is divided and humiliated and its effectiveness as an instrument of the Greek nation is broken."

Attached is the Defense Intelligence Agency's judgment<sup>3</sup> that except for problems resulting partly from our suspension of arms, "there is no indication that any of the Greek Armed Forces have had their capabilities degraded as a result of the internal political situation."

CIA feels that there may be some damage to morale because of Junta interference with the officer corps, but that this would make little difference in a foreign war and has not affected the basic capability of the army.

State feels that the army might even be more effective than before the coup, because the junta has removed some dead wood at the top.

Stories like that in the *Monitor* appear regularly and often seem generated by anti-junta expatriates.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum, presumably made by Nixon, reads: "good."

<sup>2</sup> August 28, 1969.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

**254. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Message from King Constantine

Tom Evans in the attached memo has passed on to you a message from King Constantine.<sup>2</sup> The King requests that the newly appointed Ambassador to Greece<sup>3</sup> stop off for a chat with the King on his way through Rome. Constantine argues that this would not upset the Military Government in Athens because the Ambassador will be presenting his credentials to a Regent who is the King's representative in Athens. (Tab A)

I will take no action unless you disagree.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East—Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders on September 23. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was returned on October 6. In a note attached to Saunders's copy of this memorandum, Haig commented: "HAK—This looks like more dynamite. I suspect we should thank this fellow and tell him to let it drop." Kissinger minuted: "I agree. HK" (Ibid., Saunders Subject Files, Box 1234, Greece 6/1/69–9/30/69)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Evans's discussion with the King took place at a dinner party in Copenhagen, Denmark during the last week of July.

<sup>3</sup> Henry J. Tasca. The Senate confirmed his appointment on December 20, 1969.

255. Letter From the Chargé d'Affaires in Greece (McClelland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell)<sup>1</sup>

Athens, September 25, 1969.

Dear Stuart:

I have understandably been doing some thinking lately about Ambassador Tasca's forthcoming arrival and the conduct of our relations with Greece thereafter. Since I know you'll be involved in briefing him, and since the Greek NSC papers on which Alfred [Vigderman], and others, have been working in NEA/GRK strike me as having become unnecessarily tortuous and complicated, I thought perhaps it might be helpful to share my own, somewhat less complex thoughts with you.

There are two facets to the matter: policy and tactics. Under policy, as you well know, the two main issues are: the nature of our future military assistance to Greece, and constitutional advancement within the country. On the policy side, I continue to believe rather strongly that our best course would be to de-link military assistance from the question of internal political progress. For having examined the issue pretty exhaustively, I believe that the advantages of this course considerably outweigh the disadvantages, and that it should be possible to overcome the latter. The most compelling argument, to my mind, is that the MAP suspension policy has not been successful and has not produced the political evolution it was intended to promote. It helped, perhaps, at the outset, to prod the Junta into drafting the new Constitution; but there has been almost no genuine forward movement since that time.

Continuing the suspension, on the other hand, has had a number of increasingly adverse consequences. The most obvious one is that it progressively undermines the credibility of the Greek military deterrent in NATO. Less apparent, perhaps, is its tendency to alienate ranking Greek military officers whose good-will we may well need at some future stage of developments here. Although Greek "philotimo" is a frequently overdone national trait, it is nonetheless true that denying responsible Greek officers the weapons they need to fulfill their NATO obligations (which they take seriously), including the invidious implication they can't be trusted not to use them internally on the Greek people, has a particularly devastating psychological effect. General Angelis is a strong case in point. In my brief experience of dealing with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL GREECE-US. Secret; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to Vigderman.

Greeks, one of the most important things is to manifest friendliness, if not affection, toward them. If this sort of rapport has been established, it is then possible to be much more critical with a correspondingly greater chance that such criticism will be heeded and accepted. Another element of this equation which is seldom mentioned is the risk of allowing the Turkish MAP to get disproportionately out of line with the Greek one. The continued suspension of tanks, in particular, is having this result. The potentially adverse impact of this state of affairs on Greek-Turkish relations, and on the Cyprus problem, needs no elaboration. The Greeks don't mention this one (nor do the various "pro" and "con" lists drafted in Washington), but it's unmistakably in the back of their minds. Having very closely escaped the disaster of a Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in November 1967,<sup>2</sup> we cannot afford to relax on this score.

Naturally there are "cons" to adopting a policy of restoring the suspended MAP items. The most serious of these, in my view, is the U.S. domestic political one. You'll recall, Stuart, that when the issue of whether to restore the balance of the Greek MAP came up at the tail end of the Johnson Administration, the decision not to do so was based on the fear that if we took such action the opponents of the present GOG on the Hill would vote against the entire Foreign Aid Bill. We accordingly adopted the "intensive review" gambit we've been using ever since. We in Athens do not have enough of a feel for the power relationships between the present Administration and the Congress to judge whether a comparable situation exists now with respect to Greece.

I fully recognize that restoring the MAP for Greece will have to be accompanied by some form of continued pressure on the GOG to improve its constitutional performance, not only because we believe that this is an intrinsically desirable course if Greece is to achieve political stability, but because we must maintain a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the democratic opponents of the present GOG within Greece, in our own Congress, and in key NATO circles. Although I hope to obtain some clarification of this aspect of the problem from Ambassador Ellsworth when he visits us at the end of this week,<sup>3</sup> I'm inclined to doubt that restoring the MAP would create serious, or at least insurmountable, difficulties in NATO. The primary purpose of this Organization, after all, is to maintain an effective defensive alliance in which

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<sup>2</sup> For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 285–322.

<sup>3</sup> In a September 26 letter to Vigderman, McClelland reported: "We're in the midst of Ambassador Ellsworth's visit. He got a load of General Angelis this morning and had a good talk with Pipinelis later." (Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence To and From Athens)

Greece, willy-nilly, continues to play a necessary role. I can hardly imagine that responsible NATO member governments like the British, the Germans, and certainly the French, would tax us too severely for contributing to adequate Greek military preparedness, however unsatisfactory a government the country may have.

A U.S. decision to restore the full Greek MAP will unquestionably have to be matched by a parallel decision to make clear to the GOG that this move is based essentially on military and strategic considerations, and does not signify U.S. approval of their internal policies. (The formula we used in October 1968 of "remaining no less interested in constitutional progress" is still a perfectly useable one, in my view.) There will be no problem about doing this privately in conversation between Ambassador Tasca and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, or between the Ambassador and other ranking members of the Junta. The trick will be to get this key point over to the internal Greek Opposition and to the exercised parties in our Congress and in NATO. This might well call for a public statement, depending on whether the GOG tries to distort the significance of the decision. Or if we don't want to go this far, there are several other means (press backgrounders, planted queries, etc.) of disseminating our position. I would personally favor a somewhat bolder and firmer stand in this respect than we have taken in the past, for, despite our frequent assertions that we continue to "press" the GOG to make democratic progress, the pressure has been largely private and pretty mild. In sum, it should not exceed our ingenuity to devise some formula which would achieve the twin purpose of getting out from under the disadvantages of continuing the MAP suspension, and at the same time of indicating forcefully that the type of friendly and cooperative relations between Greece and the United States which we desire will continue to depend on further movement in Greece toward representative government. This would be easier to do, I think, if we had signified our confidence in them militarily.

Let me turn briefly now to the tactical side of the picture. I think it's very important that Ambassador Tasca be given the maximum leverage from the outset; and even if a decision to restore the MAP should have been taken before he arrives in Athens, this ought to be withheld temporarily from the GOG. He should indicate to them early in his talks that the final decision on this important matter will depend on the recommendations he makes to the President and Secretary of State after he has had an opportunity to review the whole question sur place. I believe the Ambassador ought, however, to be in a position to assure the Greeks that a definite decision will be reached by some specific, early date, such as December 1. I have serious misgivings about trying to string the GOG along much further, and certainly not beyond the end of the year at the latest. I would suppose, incidentally, that the business of Ambassador Tasca's confirmation by the Senate, (given Sen-

ator Fulbright's pronouncement), may tend to speed up the process of reaching an Executive Branch decision on the MAP question.

While I have no particular illusions that a tactic of this sort will produce notably greater political progress on the part of the GOG, it could serve to force Papadopoulos & Co. to improve somewhat on the constitutional timetable the GOG recently submitted to the Council of Europe.<sup>4</sup> Although it is not yet clear whether the GOG, if the initiative fails (which it apparently will), will maintain this timetable for use in other contexts, I think they probably will do so since the Junta is no less anxious, and probably even more so, to conciliate the United States than the Council of Europe. In many ways, their relationship to the U.S. is more important to them than their relationship to an essentially parliamentary, and hence rhetorical body, like the Strasbourg organization. We should also not overlook the GOG's concomitant offer, (related to Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention),<sup>5</sup> to permit free access by the ICRC to political detainees in Greece. It is curious that this almost equally significant offer was not conveyed to us (when Grigoriades came to see the Secretary) along with the constitutional timetable but seems to have been limited mainly to Bonn. If they make good on this matter alone, it could go a long way toward improving their shabby public image in the United States and in Western Europe.

I hope you will accept these views and recommendations for what they are, Stuart: an effort to focus attention as precisely as possible on the key issues which will confront Ambassador Tasca when he takes over the management of our relations in Athens. As you know, I myself have exercised pretty much of a holding brief during this interim period, but I believe it is time we came more actively to grips with the problem. I'm afraid that from a personal standpoint, our new Ambassador's job is not going to be either an easy or a particularly pleasant one. But he is happily a skilled professional, and this will be a great advantage.

What steps in the right direction we can prod this unattractive government into taking will be small, slow and unsatisfactory at best, but I think it's the only course open to us since we clearly do not propose to adopt either of the extreme courses of attempting actively to displace them or of accepting them as they are. As is so often the case in our trade, the result has to be a compromise.

With my warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

**Ross**

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<sup>4</sup> Pipinelis presented the timetable on August 25. It called for a multi-stage reintroduction of basic liberties to be completed with the election of a new parliament in mid-1971.

<sup>5</sup> For text, signed September 3, 1953, see 213 UNTS 221.

## 256. Minutes of the National Security Council Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 2, 1969, 3:10–4:14 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Military Assistance to Greece (NSSM 52)

### PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Stuart W. Rockwell

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

Edward W. Proctor

JCS

LTG F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

Treasury

Anthony Jurich

NSC Staff

Harold H. Saunders

Robert E. Osgood

Jeanne W. Davis

### SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

—Mr. Saunders should prepare a summary paper<sup>2</sup> which would project two courses:

1. Continue present policy, or
2. Resume military deliveries.

If latter, consider two general approaches:

a. a quid pro quo approach which would lift the embargo as the Greek regime takes steps toward constitutional government; or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 257.

b. resumption of full deliveries while avoiding public endorsement of the present regime.

—Scenarios will be prepared showing how Options 2a and 2b would work in practice.

—This paper will be circulated to the Review Group members who will decide whether it may be cleared for transmittal to the President for his decision or whether an NSC meeting should be held on the issue.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting, saying we have both a bureaucratic and a substantive problem. The bureaucratic problem was whether this issue need go to the NSC or whether, following the Review Group discussion, we could submit a memorandum to the President, subject of course to the right of appeal. He described the situation in which the U.S. has delivered \$100 million in equipment under grant assistance, plus \$47 million in excess stocks and \$36 million in sales. We have suspended military items amounting to \$52.6 million.

General Unger commented that that was generally correct.

Mr. Rockwell pointed out that we have not, in fact, *made* \$36 million in sales.

Mr. Kissinger asked what we are proving by withholding the \$52.6 million worth of equipment.

Mr. Rockwell said that following the coup we were uncertain where the new regime was heading. We were concerned about the possibility that tanks marked with American flags might be paraded through the streets of Athens by what might turn out to be a fascist government. We had arbitrarily decided to continue to furnish some spare parts and ordnance items but to hold back major items of heavy equipment including tanks, aircraft, etc. We later came to envisage the suspension of these items as a means of pressuring the government toward a more constitutional situation. He noted this had not been particularly effective.

(Mr. Kissinger was called from the meeting at this point and returned 10 minutes later. During his absence there was a general discussion of the source of the \$36 million figure for sales and of possible alternative sites for U.S. bases in the Mediterranean. When he returned, Mr. Rockwell resumed.)

Mr. Rockwell said at the time of the Czech crisis<sup>3</sup> when we were calling on our NATO allies for support, it was decided to release to Greece some military equipment directly related to its NATO responsibilities. Some equipment was still held back so as not to foreclose the

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia August 20–21, 1968.

options of the new administration and also because of concern over congressional attitudes.

Mr. Kissinger asked why should Congress object more to release of the \$52.6 million worth of equipment than they had to the \$100 million worth—was it because the former included tanks?

Mr. Rockwell thought provision of this equipment was considered symbolic of the U.S. attitude toward the present regime. Those members of Congress hostile to the regime have made maintenance of the embargo a symbol of the U.S. attitude, which had had significant influence on both sides in US-Greek relations. He thought personally it would have been simpler to release all suspended items at the time of the Czech invasion.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the program goes on year after year—is it voted on year after year? How would provision of the items be noted in the Congress?

General Unger replied that there is a requirement to report deliveries of such equipment.

Mr. Rockwell said Senator Pell plans to introduce legislation that no new funds should be authorized for Greece this year on the grounds that there was ample money in the pipeline.

Mr. Kissinger asked if any other country had been treated in this way. Have we ever before used military assistance program to reform governments? Is there any precedent that military assistance is reserved for constitutional governments?

Mr. Cargo and others cited the withholding of arms from India and Pakistan, acknowledging that this was during an actual war situation, and the situation in Peru.

Mr. Rockwell noted that the State Department opposed Senator Pell's resolution.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we do not give military aid to support governments but because a country is important to the U.S. He asked if the equipment is needed by Greece.

General Unger replied that it was.

Mr. Rockwell agreed that Greek implementation of its NATO program was held back by the fact that this equipment had been withheld.

Mr. Nutter noted animosity toward Greece among NATO countries, citing the attempt to throw Greece out of the Council of Europe, based partly on the preamble to the NATO Treaty which refers to "democratic governments," etc.

Mr. Cargo noted that this was more a question of NATO governments reacting to political pressures than any feeling about the preamble. He agreed anti-Greek sentiment existed in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in Italy and the UK.

Mr. Shakespeare suggested that, in line with the President's regional policy, we might ask NATO to review the military assistance to Greece to determine whether or not it is essential.

Mr. Cargo objected that that would be a highly divisive action in NATO in this context. He thought this was generally done as a part of NATO planning activity in determining force goals. He thought this would lead to an awful row in NATO.

Mr. Rockwell confirmed that it would be putting our friends in an extremely awkward position.

Mr. Cargo added that NATO was a political instrumentality which would not produce dispassionate judgments on a matter of this kind.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this equipment was required from a military point of view.

Gen. Unger and Mr. Nutter replied that it was, and Mr. Cargo added that MAP does not even meet minimal Greek priorities.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this was a one-shot problem or a continuing problem.

Mr. Rockwell noted that of course the funds were appropriated each year and Mr. Cargo added that the political issue would arise each time.

Mr. Kissinger noted that he had been horror-stricken in the Middle East Contingency Planning exercise to learn that Greece was the only possible staging site in the Mediterranean. He asked if we were jeopardizing this by holding up these items.

Mr. Rockwell thought that the Greeks would probably not deny U.S. access to Greek facilities on the grounds that they count on us for support and that their NATO position is dependent on U.S. assistance. They would be removing a prop that they count on for their security.

Mr. Kissinger pointed out that Italy relies on us but denies us transit rights for the Phantom aircraft being delivered to Israel.

Mr. Rockwell acknowledged that the Greeks might react with one specific incident.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Greeks might confine U.S. use of their facilities to NATO purposes. General Unger agreed it could happen.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what our situation would be in the Mediterranean in the worst circumstances.

General Unger replied we would have to rely on Turkey.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what the alternative to Turkey would be.

General Unger replied "none." Mr. Nutter added possibly Cyprus for communications.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the left in Turkey would likely be inhospitable to the U.S. If Tunis and Wheelus go we would be down to the short hair.

General Unger agreed that the security interest is paramount.

Mr. Kissinger asked if State agreed with this and Mr. Cargo and Mr. Rockwell replied that they did.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was true that most members of the Group were in favor of resumption of deliveries if we can find a non-costly way to do so.

Mr. Rockwell noted that, although Secretary Rogers had not focussed personally on the issue, he thought State would generally favor resumption and that the question was how it should be done.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could eliminate options 1 (cut off all military aid and mount a campaign for return to democratic government) and 3 (continue present policy).<sup>4</sup> He thought the President would not consider option 1.

Mr. Cargo said the consequences of Option 1 would be quite serious particularly in NATO.

Mr. Rockwell confirmed that State would not advocate Option 1 which he thought would greatly increase the chances of real danger to U.S. interests. He thought, however, that some Congressional opponents, some newspapers including the *New York Times*, and even some in government would advocate Option 1. With regard to Option 3 he said we had been continuing our present policy in the absence of any decision to do otherwise.

Mr. Kissinger said the President then has two real choices: to continue present policy or to resume military deliveries and, in the latter event, he could choose between Options 2,<sup>5</sup> 4 and 5.<sup>6</sup> He asked if the paper states well the arguments for and against various options. All

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to options B and A in the approved paper (NSCIG/NEA 69-35) submitted by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia to Kissinger on September 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological File, Greek Military Supply, 1/20/69-12/31/69)

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger is apparently referring to Option C in NSCIG/NEA 69-35: "A Two-Pronged Orchestrated Quid Pro Quo Policy." Release of specific U.S. military equipment would be linked to specific steps taken by the Greek regime toward the restoration of representative government.

<sup>6</sup> Kissinger is apparently referring to Option D in NSCIG/NEA 69-35, "Temporary Lifting of the Arms Embargo." It differed from Option C in that it allowed the embargo to be re-introduced if Greece did not make measured progress toward democracy. Option 5 is presumably Option A of NSCIG/NEA 69-35, "Continuation of Present Policy," withholding major military aid while maintaining a "cool but correct relationship with the Greek regime." This option contemplated privately urging the Greek authorities to make good on their promises of returning to a more normal political situation without endangering the U.S. military facilities in Greece by "pushing the Greek regime into a corner."

replied 'yes' except for Mr. Shakespeare who thought the paper did not state clearly enough the potential danger to U.S. interests in the Mediterranean.

General Unger submitted an additional paragraph for insertion on page 2 of the paper immediately preceding the paragraph headed "*Security Interests*," which gave more emphasis to this point.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the major argument for continuing present policy is that it gives us a lever on the existing government.

Mr. Rockwell agreed, saying also this was less painful to NATO. It was, however, opposed by some of the more vociferous members of the Congress and by Greek opponents of the regime.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there wasn't a risk that we would wind up by alienating everyone. That if we give them a substantial amount of military aid the opposition would protest while the Junta would consider we were discriminating against them.

Mr. Rockwell admitted that if we turn on the supply of tanks and heavy equipment it would be considered a sign of approval of the Greek government; however, he thought our security interests outweighed this disadvantage.

Mr. Cargo noted that the NATO problem was not too serious. NATO attitudes would not result in less support for Greece since the other NATO countries did not give assistance to Greece in any event.

General Unger commented that the NATO countries think Greece is a greater advantage to the U.S. than it is to NATO. He thought they looked on Greek and Turkish accession to NATO as a U.S. gift.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what the effect of Karamanlis' recent statement would be.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Rockwell said that we would have to wait to see what the political influence would be of Karamanlis' call on the military to overthrow the present government, particularly if the King should join such a move. He noted that the government has banned publication of Karamanlis' statement and that the Prime Minister has called a press conference.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the VOA would have to cover the Karamanlis story if its credibility were not to be completely shot in Greece.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this could be done on a one-shot basis, and Mr. Shakespeare replied that it could.

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<sup>7</sup> On September 30 Karamanlis issued a statement calling for the overthrow of the junta and expressed his willingness to head an interim government. For text, see *Greece Under the Junta*, pp. 116–118.

Mr. Rockwell thought that the regime would not be shaken to any real degree by the Karamanlis statement and General Unger noted that the possibility of a military takeover was considered in about the fourth order of probability.

Mr. Rockwell thought Karamanlis' statement would have most effect on the older members of the army who were fairly well isolated in any event. He commented that one reason for Karamanlis' action is the fear of the erosion of his own position as the regime becomes more entrenched.

Mr. Kissinger commented that Karamanlis' natural appeal is not to the army.

Mr. Rockwell noted there was some discontent in the army but it was not a major issue.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we would go about implementing Option 2.

Mr. Rockwell thought this would depend a great deal on the relationship which our new Ambassador would be able to establish with the Prime Minister and the government. He thought they might cooperate with a view to easing the problems step by step.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Greek government could afford to admit that they were changing their policies under U.S. pressure.

Mr. Rockwell replied that the government was already committed to return to constitutional government but they were in fact not meeting their stated timetable. He thought the success of Option 2 would depend on the powers of persuasion of our Ambassador.

Mr. Kissinger asked, "and if he does not succeed?"

Mr. Rockwell replied we would then have to decide whether to continue to withhold or release the suspended items.

Mr. Cargo asked if, once we had made the pitch, the Greeks do not respond, can we in fact resume deliveries?

Mr. Rockwell thought that if, indeed, the effort is a failure there would still be no reason why we could not release the equipment.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would then be going through the option 2 exercise to quiet American domestic opinion.

Mr. Rockwell said we would be attempting to use the leverage we had to bring about advantageous political change.

Mr. Kissinger said that if, in fact, aid is given in U.S. security interests, and the result of option 2 would be no aid, we would be hurting ourselves.

Mr. Rockwell thought we might be postponing delivery of aid but it would probably eventually go, depending on the Ambassador's view at the time.

Mr. Kissinger commented that option 2 would be an *effort* rather than a precise quid pro quo policy. If it fails we would probably still resume. In this regard he thought option 4 was more threatening than option 2.

General Unger thought option 4 would give the Ambassador a chance to establish rapport with the government and that it would in fact encourage the government to help us. He cited the question of F4 flights to Israel.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were a real difference between options 2 and 4.

General Unger replied that under option 2 we might release one-third of the equipment for one Greek step, two-thirds for a second Greek step, etc.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that this would create eternal haggling over the adequacy of the steps, the timing, etc. Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the time period for withholding aid. General Unger replied possibly two years, commenting that Greece and Turkey really needed the aid on a yearly basis.

Mr. Cargo thought we would get in an awful box by giving aid and then taking it away. He thought relations would deteriorate drastically.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we should go through the exercise. He thought we could not resume aid without telling someone, including the Greeks, that it is conditional. If we can't tell anyone, then we might as well resume, with the understanding that we could always stop. Option 4 gives us a chance to tell people of the conditional nature of the resumption. Can the Greek government accept such pressure either in a public statement or in private bilateral discussions? If the government did not move quickly, would we have an obligation to stop the program? Under Option 2 the \$52.6 million could trickle out. Under Option 4 he asked if the idea were to get the equipment as quickly as possible before all hell breaks loose. Once it is there, then what is there to cut off?

Mr. Nutter replied that we could of course cut off future military assistance.

Mr. Kissinger asked why not Option 2 or 5 if we wanted to go the reform route?

General Unger replied that he personally favored Option 5.

Mr. Cargo said Option 5 was unrealistic in the sense of refraining from public comment. If you do it, it would be necessary to stress U.S. security interests both to the public and to NATO. We would have to make it clear both publicly and privately to the Greeks that resumption does not constitute approval of the present regime. This would, however, fall short of saying "shape up."

Mr. Rockwell commented that releasing the equipment without *quid pro quos* would be inconsistent with U.S. policy. It would not be good for our image to say that we did not urge return to constitutional government.

Mr. Nutter agreed this would produce a yearly Congressional threat.

Mr. Rockwell commented in this regard that the present Greek government is probably not permanent.

Mr. Kissinger thought this suggested Option 2. He thought the trouble with Option 4 was that in order to justify release of the equipment we may have to say things that would be more galling to the Greeks than under Option 2.

Mr. Jurich asked if under Option 2 we would specify the stages of desired improvements to the Congress? He thought this would not stop Congressional criticism since the criticism was not that rational.

Mr. Rockwell replied that if the Greeks took certain steps, we would release the equipment regardless of Congressional criticism.

Mr. Jurich asked if, given the irrational nature of the Congressional objection, would we not be better off without giving them specifics?

Mr. Shakespeare thought Option 2 was interesting in theory but would be hard to handle. He thought the public relations implications would be difficult and there would be constant arguing whether or not the Greeks had done what they were supposed to do. He thought we were in effect asking the regime to bring itself down.

Mr. Rockwell agreed that all alternatives had some disadvantages and it was a question of which had the least.

Mr. Kissinger said he did not think we should pass on options which the President would not consider and asked if he could exercise this prerogative in not passing option 1 to the President. He pointed out, of course, that any principal officer could present the President directly with this option if he chose. He suggested preparation of a summary paper for Review Group clearance which would project two courses: (1) continue present policy, and (2) resume military deliveries in some fashion. If the latter course were accepted, there would be two general approaches. It would help the President make up his mind if we had a more precise description of these approaches.

Mr. Saunders suggested we could take Options 2 and 5 and prepare a scenario for our Ambassador.

Mr. Jurich asked if, under Option 5, we would refrain from public comment.

Mr. Cargo thought this was unrealistic.

Mr. Kissinger thought our comment could be that we give military assistance to Greece for U.S. interests, not Greek interests, noting

that we give aid to Yugoslavia but do not necessarily approve of the government.

Mr. Cargo thought some public comment would be required to the effect that we were giving military aid to further U.S. military or security interests in the Mediterranean and that it does not mean we approve of the regime. We would continue privately to urge steps toward representative government.

Mr. Kissinger commented that, in fact, the latter point would be none of our business.

Mr. Cargo confirmed that we would do this only privately.

Mr. Kissinger said we could take the position that we prefer to give assistance to governments we approve of, and that we do not approve of the present Greek regime, however, military assistance to Greece is in our interests.

Mr. Nutter thought under Option 5 we could merely avoid endorsement of the regime.

Mr. Rockwell thought the President need only approve the principle and need not approve the words used.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, but thought the President would want to consider how strong a statement we should make. He asked Mr. Saunders to prepare a summary along the lines discussed and circulate it to members of the Review Group, then we could either decide that the President could make a decision on the basis of the paper or that we should use the first half-hour of an early NSC meeting to discuss the issue. He asked if this were satisfactory.

Mr. Rockwell remarked that Secretary Rogers had not yet been personally involved in the paper.

Mr. Kissinger assured him that the Secretary would, of course, see the paper and that if he wished an NSC meeting it would of course be held.

Mr. Cargo agreed to this procedure.

Mr. Kissinger said we would then have the basic paper and a summary which would pose the questions of continue present policy or resume deliveries, and if we resume deliveries, how do we do it.

Mr. Rockwell thought that no one at the table had said we should continue present policy. He thought the consensus of the group was that our security interests require resumption of deliveries.

Mr. Shakespeare thought that the Congressional stir would be so great that we should carefully consider the timing of resumption, particularly with regard to any upcoming votes.

Mr. Saunders noted the page on Congressional attitudes in the basic paper and suggested we might ask for an elaboration.

Mr. Cargo agreed that the timing would have to be carefully considered but asked if this need go to the President.

Mr. Kissinger suggested we might give the Under Secretaries Committee a crack at this issue and that a brief operational scenario could be attached to the paper.

Mr. Nutter asked for a review of the mechanics.

Mr. Kissinger confirmed that the summary paper would come back to the Review Group members for clearance. They could either clear the summary for transmittal to the President for decision or could indicate their desire for NSC discussion. He confirmed that he had no interest one way or the other.

Mr. Cargo suggested State might indicate which option was favored by the Secretary. He also suggested that Option 5 be modified to include reference to an appropriate public statement that the U.S. action does not constitute endorsement of the present Greek government.

Mr. Jurich commented we should not use NATO interests as an argument.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

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## 257. Draft Memorandum for the President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy Toward Greece—The Issues

The NSC Review Group has discussed the issues and options laid out in the Interdepartmental Group paper at Tab C.<sup>2</sup> The following reflects the Group's view of the problem and discussion of the issues:

#### I. Background

A. *The "suspension" of military aid: What has it meant?*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Davis sent the draft memorandum on October 10 to those who attended the Review Group meeting of October 2; see Document 256. Davis asked for comments and concurrence and a recommendation on whether the issue warranted a full NSC discussion or could be handled as a memorandum to the President. It was handled as a memorandum to the President; see Document 261.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 256.

After a group of colonels took over the Greek government in April 1967, the Johnson Administration suspended shipment of major items under our military aid program. Equipment valued at \$52.6 million now remains suspended. However, the flow of other items and spare parts has continued at substantial levels:

1. From April 1967 through June 1969, the US delivered about \$100 million in equipment under *grant assistance*.

2. Grant assistance has been supplemented by \$75 million in U.S. *excess stocks* programmed for delivery at no cost to the Greeks and \$35 million in *sales*, including \$20 million on credit terms. These represent a significant increase over the pre-coup levels.

3. Overall, the value of U.S. military shipments programmed for Greece—while it dipped in the year after the coup—now stands at pre-coup levels, although a gradual shift from grant aid continues and the withholding of some major items of equipment (RF-5 aircraft, M-48 tanks, M-113 personnel carriers) has slowed modernization of Greece's armored units.

B. *The political parallel to "suspension."* All the while that the US was withholding major items of equipment, the Johnson Administration took the position with the Greek government and with the US Congress that full resumption of military shipments would be possible only as it was clear that Greece was returning to constitutional representative government. This policy was an attempt to bridge the gap between two conflicting interests—strategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and preserving Greece as a NATO ally and, on the other side, pressures on the Administration from a number of places including Congress to oppose military dictatorship.

C. *The sum of US pressure.* Thus, while the Johnson Administration did suspend some military aid shipments and have its Ambassador repeatedly urge return to constitutional government, the sum of actual US pressure was more symbolic than real. The US could have cut off the entire flow of military equipment and created an atmosphere in which American private investment and tourism declined sharply. Instead, it expressed dissatisfaction through repeated ambassadorial admonitions and partial suspension of military shipments without exerting enough pressure to risk jeopardizing the US-Greek alliance.

D. *The present situation.*

1. *In Greece.* The Greek government has promulgated a constitution, is slowly putting its provisions into effect but has not yet set a date for elections and the return to parliamentary government. The government seems firmly entrenched. Opposition is passive and not united. The government has so far shown little sign of being able to broaden its popular base and win active support.

2. *Outside Greece* expatriate opponents of the military government—most recently ex-Prime Minister Karamanlis—continue to press for return to constitutional government, either by urging opposition action in Greece or by urging US and western European action to isolate Greece. They continue to seek signs of US support.

3. *US-Greek relations.* The Greek government has in essence asked the Nixon Administration to stop pressing it to return to constitutional government. It says it will do so as soon as possible, but it argues that pressure from outside will not help and will only irritate US-Greek relations.

E. *The issues, therefore, are:*

1. What are US interests in Greece? (Section II)
2. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program? (Section III)
3. How does the nature of government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)
4. What are our options? (Section V)

## II. *What Are US interests in Greece?*

A. US *economic* benefits from Greece are relatively small. US direct investment by private firms is only \$155 million. We maintain a small surplus in our trade with Greece, but obtain no resources through trade that we could not obtain elsewhere.

B. Specific US *political* benefits from Greece are negligible aside from firm Greek support for a strong NATO and aside from a general interest in any government that is not a source of international disorder and is willing to do business according to general international practice. The present Greek government has little influence over other governments or in international forums. Opposition to military government in some quarters has turned our normal relationship with a NATO partner into a political issue.

C. In contrast to US economic or political interests some of our *strategic* benefits from continued close association with Greece are significant:

1. Greece's military forces (160,000 men) are capable of a conventional defense against attack by Bulgaria (159,000 men) without significant US assistance or the use of nuclear weapons. Besides defending Greece itself, these forces could help divert Warsaw Pact forces or substitute for US forces in a US-Soviet conflict. [*2½ lines not declassified*]
2. Greece could provide base and staging rights to the US for the Middle East. The US bases in Greece are both suitable and probably available for the staging of humanitarian, peace-keeping or military intervention missions into the Middle East.

With the increasing restriction on US use of its bases in Libya or Turkey, we have no other bases near the Middle East with comparable ease-of-access.

3. Greece also provides the US and NATO with a number of military facilities including communication links for the 6th Fleet and Turkey, [*1½ lines not declassified*] and logistics bases for support of the 6th Fleet. However, unlike staging rights to the Middle East, there are theoretical alternatives to these facilities, although they are subject to the unsteadiness of Italian policies and the willingness of Congress to appropriate either for new [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facilities or for satellite communications systems.

4. Voice of America depends heavily on relay stations in Greece for its Arabic and Eastern European broadcasts.

D. *Conclusions:*

1. Apart from general interest in the ability of a NATO partner to defend itself, the *main US interest in Greece* lies in maintaining unrestricted access to bases for US staging into the Mid-East *and*—unless unique—to communications [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facilities there.

2. Insofar as the military regime in Greece arouses hostility in some NATO capitals—as well as in the US Congress—and could over time become a source of international disorder, the US must recognize that the US freedom of maneuver is somewhat limited by the existence of authoritarian government.

E. *These conclusions raise two issues* which are examined in greater detail in the two following sections:

1. Do US strategic interests require a full-scale US military assistance program? (Section III)

2. How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)

III. *Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program?*

A. *Pro.*

1. US access to Greece will depend on a close political relationship and a continued sense of common objectives.

2. Because of Greek inability to produce or purchase all of the sophisticated equipment it needs, the Greek forces cannot be modernized without continued assistance from the US on major items of equipment, such as F-5s, M-48 tanks, etc.

3. A continuing military aid program, therefore, is one concrete way of demonstrating that a close political relationship exists. This is especially true as long as the Greek government is controlled by army officers.

4. A continuing military aid program is also necessary to assure Greece's ability to defend itself as well as to carry out its NATO responsibilities. A program of present dimensions affects that capability by . . . [Defense to fill in specifics.]<sup>3</sup>

B. *Con.*

1. A conventional attack on Greece by its Communist neighbors with or without Soviet support is extremely unlikely in the near future.

2. The most likely threat to Greek stability is internal disruption. The present Greek forces could fight a civil war, even one supported by its communist neighbors, without further help from the US.

3. Even if there were a conventional attack, the Greek forces could be maintained for a time at a level satisfactory to meet it without significant force modernization or the delivery of major items of new and sophisticated equipment. As long as spare parts continue to flow along with some new equipment on a sales or excess basis, the degree of degradation of Greek capability would not present too great a risk.

4. On the political level, it can be argued that even continued partial suspension of military shipments probably does not jeopardize US access to Greek bases. The US presence in Greece is a sign of the government's international "legitimacy" and contribution to NATO—international recognition that is valuable to the isolated Greek government.

C. *Conclusion:* Something close to the present level of military shipments probably is necessary to preserve US access to Greek facilities, but the most immediate issue is not so much the level as the political relationship it signifies. On purely military grounds, there is some flexibility in the level of US deliveries under grant military assistance, though continued delivery of spares is essential and some new equipment is important in preventing too serious degradation of Greek capability. A somewhat reduced program could maintain the conventional capability of Greek forces and US influence with the Greek government. However, at some very low level of US shipments, the Greek government might conclude that their benefits from the US could not justify the continued extension of liberal staging and base rights to the US.

IV. *How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests?*

A. Political stability in Greece is important to pursuit of US interests. If the present government does not over time gain active popular

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<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the original.

support, pressure for a change will increase. Failure of the present government to provide for orderly change will increase the likelihood of a sudden change which would probably increase instability.

B. As long as Greece remains divided between the military government and its opponents, the US is caught in the middle. Any move the US makes involves taking sides—whether intended or not—and therefore affects US ability either now or later to maintain the close political relationship necessary to pursue US interests. Although we have no desire to involve ourselves and might prefer to make clear that we ship arms solely in the NATO context, the following are facts we have to cope with:

1. Most Greeks have always believed that there is an “American factor” in Greek politics. Almost nothing we can say or do will change this view.

2. The junta considers some sign of US support important. The opposition feels that significant US pressure could remove the regime.

3. Whatever we do will be read in Greece as the US taking sides regardless of our intent.

4. What we do will therefore adversely affect our relations either with this government or with its successor.

C. The Administration’s attitude toward the Greek government can have some effect on the success of its general legislation in Congress and on the legislative authority for carrying on a military aid program in Greece. While the majority of the Congress has not been involved, resuming full military aid to Greece could, for example, disaffect some of the liberal Democratic Committee members who are traditional supporters of foreign aid and thereby affect the prospects for the Foreign Assistance Act. Some influential senators who oppose military aid in general have threatened to kill the appropriation for Greece altogether.

D. Continuing opposition to the junta in European capitals generates pressure to isolate Greece from the European Community. While not in itself crucial in the near future, this is a trend opposite to what the US would judge to be in its general interest.

E. *Conclusion:* Ideally, the US would like to maintain a normal NATO military aid relationship with whatever government is in control in Athens without prejudice to its interests. However, the situation in Greece is such that whatever the US does puts it in a position of taking sides and thereby prejudices either our present or future position in Greece as well as the cooperation of influential members of our own Congress in continuing general overseas programs. Finally, continuation of the present situation for long has within it the seeds of instability.

V. *What are our options?*

A. The *first choice* is between continuing present policy—symbolic suspension of major items, continued flow of lesser items and spares—and removing the suspension. The pros and cons of *continuing present policy* are:

1. *Pro:*

—This policy has enabled us to maintain the desired access to Greek facilities.

—It may have contributed to the junta's efforts to appear to be moving toward representative government.

—Even if it has not, it has enabled the US to straddle the fence between continuing basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for domestic political purposes.

—More important, it has enabled the US to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government. The civilian politicians who will presumably one day govern Greece again, are constantly looking for signs that the US has thrown in its lot with the military government. This policy permits us to maintain a posture that our military aid is exclusively for NATO purposes and does not constitute political endorsement.

2. *Con:*

—The junta is becoming more and more annoyed with the present policy. While it may not soon deny US access, it has already begun seeking additional sources of arms, and this will over time erode the cooperative relationship desirable to maintain that access.

—It has made clear that it will follow its own timetable regardless of the US position and that US policy is achieving nothing more than to irritate US-Greek relations.

—Storage costs for suspended items for FY 1970 are estimated at \$950,000.

3. *Conclusion:* The present policy of symbolic suspension will not hurry the return of representative government to Greece. It may not immediately jeopardize US access to bases and facilities but it increases the chances over time that the government in Athens will begin to harass or restrict that access. To continue the present policy is to take that risk for the sake of maintaining a semblance of disapproval of the military regime, primarily to maintain a bridge to a future representative government.

B. If the decision were to end the symbolic suspension of major items, a *second choice* would then remain *between two methods of resuming shipment of all equipment programmed.*

1. *Option 1: A quid-pro-quo policy, looking toward lifting the present embargo as the regime takes specific steps toward constitutional, representative*

*government.* [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab A.]<sup>4</sup>

a. *Pro:*

—This policy would tell the junta exactly where the US stands, thus putting an end to the no-answer situation of the past nine months. It would thereby release some of the tension created by present policy.

—At the same time, it would permit the US to continue straddling the fence between working with the regime and yet not appearing fully to endorse it. It would maintain the possibility of building a bridge to the next Greek government.

—If the Greek government, in response, moved steadily back toward representative government, this would gradually restore Greece's firm relationship with NATO and Western Europe.

b. *Con:*

—The Greek government might well interpret this as unacceptable pressure. It might prefer to do without the suspended items rather than jeopardizing its tenure for items that could be bought elsewhere.

—If the regime agreed, it would play up the fact of resumption and play down any conditions the US might impose on resumption. The US would be tagged with resumption without necessarily gaining any move in Athens impressive enough to justify resumption in the eyes of the Greek opposition.

—Moreover, the government's timetable might take so long to work out that we might feel the risk to our security interests too great for us to go on holding out for definitive progress.

c. *Conclusion:* This policy would be very difficult to make succeed. It stands a good chance of earning us the worst of two worlds—continued irritation of the military government, failure to move it and perhaps even publicity on US willingness to resume aid. At the same time, it offers US cooperation with the present regime as long as it progresses along the course which it professes to have mapped for itself, and it maintains enough distance between the US and the junta

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<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab A contained an illustrative list of possible steps. The first stage would include passage of a press law easing current restrictions on the press and admission of technicians into the government. The next stage would be abolition of the courts martial and establishment of a Constitutional Court. The third and final stage, allowing the United States to release such items as tanks and fighter aircraft, would include validating the suspended articles of the constitution and thus restoring civil liberties, holding municipal elections, and reactivating political parties although with some circumscription of their freedom of action.

to keep alive the potential for a reasonable relationship with a successor government.

2. *Option 2: Resumption of full military deliveries while avoiding public endorsement of the present Greek government.* [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab B.]<sup>5</sup>

a. *Pro:*

—It would assure US access to Greece, thereby securing our highest priority interests in Greece as long as the present government remains in power.

—It might prolong the regime's tenure while giving it the kind of security which could encourage it to relax its repressive tactics and begin working seriously toward an orderly transition to representative government.

b. *Con:*

—It would cast our lot decisively with the present government and jeopardize our interests when Greece returns to representative government.

—We would have no further leverage except to reimpose suspension, which would almost certainly cause a sharp reaction from the military government.

—There would be some Congressional opposition in the U.S.

c. *Conclusion:* This is the best way of securing our interests in the near term but it leaves us with very little reinsurance against the inevitable day when civilian government returns to Greece.

## VI. *Conclusions.*

A. The situation, US interests, US capability:

1. The present situation in Greece is adequate in the short term for preserving US interests, although it carries with it increasing risk over time that US access to Greece will be restricted.

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<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab B would have Ambassador Tasca announce to the Greek authorities that the MAP was being resumed in full, but explaining the U.S. desire to see a return to parliamentary democracy. Tasca would also explain that restoration was being made in good faith in the expectation that Greece would take substantive steps to reestablish democracy as soon as possible. U.S. public comment would stress the overriding U.S. strategic interests in Greece, but make clear that the United States would push for reforms. Subsequently, U.S. official public comments would express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the evolutionary process in Greece. These statements would be carried by the Voice of America. The "cool but correct" posture would continue until general progress was made in the restoration of political life in Greece and, until then, U.S. officials would avoid statements that gave the appearance of embracing the regime. Tasca would develop a relationship with the regime permitting him to "exercise influence for democratic reform without involving himself unduly in Greek internal affairs."

2. But the present situation has in it the seeds of instability and difficulty for us in pursuing our interests unless a gradual transition is arranged to a more broadly based government.

3. We are not going to change the situation in Greece much one way or another.

4. We want to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government. We also want to leave the door open to a cooperative relationship with future governments.

5. We do not want to take sides sharply in the present political dispute in Greece because that will jeopardize our position either with the present government or with future governments.

6. Anything we do in Greece will be read by one side or the other as taking sides.

B. The *elements of an appropriate policy* would, therefore, seem to be these:

1. the minimum movement from present policy necessary to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government without dramatically taking sides with it;

2. a US posture that assumes the importance of Greek transition back to representative government, thereby holding the door open to cooperation with the next government;

3. acceptance of a pace in transition that does not return Greece too quickly to the instability of 1967.

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**258. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, October 7, 1969, 1636Z.

15340. Delto 2176. For Sisco and Rockwell NEA from Lodge. Ref: State 166250.<sup>2</sup> Subj: Lunch with Caramanlis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE. Confidential; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. In telegram 169560 to Paris, October 6, the Department of State commented: "Obviously too soon to judge effect on internal developments in Greece of Karamanlis initiative and succeeding moves. As long as Karamanlis working at his objectives, he is keeping up desirable pressure on the Greek regime." (Ibid., POL GREECE-US)

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I attended a lunch of ten persons in honor of my wife and me at Caramanlis' apartment. Before sitting down, Caramanlis drew me aside and said the following:

1. The situation in Greece could still be saved but there was not more than between 3 and 6 months left. At the end of that time the situation would become impossible to change in a peaceful way. It would only be possible to change by violence.

2. He had made his statement out of a "sense of duty" because he considers himself to be "permanently retired from politics." He had had an excellent reaction to his remarks.<sup>3</sup> Reports reaching him indicated that 80 percent of the people in Greece applauded what he had done. He would be willing to serve if elected, but he believed strongly that not only must the colonels go but that all the old parties and politicians must go too. There had to be a new constitution and a new political structure.

3. Greece today, he said, had the type of military dictatorship which occurs frequently in Latin America. And yet, he said, Greece is very different from Latin America. The colonels were ignorant of politics and frivolous and impulsive in political actions of which they obviously did not foresee the consequences.

4. I tried to draw him out on the question of whether the colonels would allow him to come back and conduct a political campaign. There was, I said, not much use in being popular if you could not run. After several attempts, I failed to get him to answer this in an even remotely intelligible way. Perhaps Caramanlis believes that if there was a great sentiment for him abroad, the colonels would be inclined not to prevent him from coming back to run.

**Lodge**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 256. In telegram 4516 from Athens, October 10, the Embassy expressed the view that the Karamanlis initiative was "aimed primarily at influencing forthcoming U.S. policy decision." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69—Oct 70)

**259. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Italy (Stabler) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell)<sup>1</sup>**

Rome, October 13, 1969.

Dear Stuart:

I refer to Rome’s 6315 giving an account of my talk with King Constantine on October 11 with respect to the Karamanlis initiative.<sup>2</sup> There were several other comments which the King made which I thought I would pass on to you.

1. The King referred to his various trips to see Pipinelis in Switzerland last summer.<sup>3</sup> He said that curiously enough, his calls on Pipinelis had taken place on June 28, July 28, and August 28. The first two had been entirely secret. However, the third one had leaked, possibly because by this time Pipinelis had moved to a hotel. In any event, shortly thereafter the regime had launched press attacks on the King and Queen Frederika, accusing them of being involved in a plot with the military to overthrow the regime. When the King had seen this, he had immediately called Pipinelis and told Pipinelis that he saw no reason for Pipinelis to remain in the government and that he should resign forthwith. He demanded that the attacks on him should stop immediately, or otherwise *the regime would force him “to the wall,”* in which case it was hard to know what the results might be.

2. The King also told me that some weeks ago the Greek military attaché, who has since been transferred, had called him at his house around midnight to say that General Angelis had heard reports that the King and his sisters were on the Ionian Islands. The King said he responded that he assumed the General was calling on instructions, that he was surprised at the regime’s bad intelligence if they did not know that unfortunately he was still in Italy, and that if indeed, he were in Greece, it would be none of the Attaché’s business. The King then recalled his talk with General Angelis in late June and the proposals

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30 GREECE. Confidential; Exdis; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to McClelland.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 6315 from Rome reported on the King’s pleasure with the Karamanlis initiative. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

<sup>3</sup> The Greek Foreign Minister, whose health was deteriorating, had spent much of the summer in Switzerland and reportedly held a secret meeting of Greek representatives abroad there August 26.

the King had made to him at that time (Rome 4079, July 2).<sup>4</sup> The King said he was still awaiting a reply from Angelis on these proposals.

3. The King also mentioned that he had not so long ago sent word to the regime that if there was to be a plebiscite to determine whether there should be a republic or a monarchy, he would insist that it must be entirely free and that he must be allowed to return and to address the people directly. He said he had added, for the purpose of teasing the regime, that if the people chose a republic, he would run for president and that, if he were elected, he would have Karamanlis as his Prime Minister and Andreas Papandreou as his Finance Minister.

4. Finally, the King again inquired whether I had passed on to Washington his hope to see Henry Tasca before he went to Athens.<sup>5</sup> I told him that I had done so, but that I had no indication of what Tasca's plans would be. The King laughed and said he assumed *that Tasca would not come to see him*. I did not disabuse him of this view. The King then noted that the Philippine Ambassador in Rome, who is also accredited to Athens, had called on him here before going to Athens to present his credentials. The Ambassador, according to the King, was going to make a particular point of informing the regime in this sense.

5. The King was very pleased that the astronauts were not going to Athens.<sup>6</sup> He said he was surprised by our decision, but was clearly happy about it.

Sincerely,

Wells

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 4079 transmitted King Constantine's version of meetings held with Pipinelis and General Angelis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 15-1 GREECE)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 254.

<sup>6</sup> The astronauts, who were making a world tour, visited Athens October 19-20.

**260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

Before making a decision on the question of whether to resume full military deliveries to Greece, I believe that we should attempt to persuade the Greek Government, in its own interest and in the interest of facilitating the release of the suspended military items, to take some meaningful steps toward political reform. I would have our Ambassador discuss the matter with the Greek authorities, in a friendly and constructive atmosphere, along the following lines:

a. The U.S. would like to have better relations with Greece and to resume fully military shipments, but this is not possible unless we get some help from the Greek Government.

b. Examples of the kind of help we have in mind would be such steps as abolition of the courts martial, establishment of the Constitutional Court, and validation of the suspended articles of the Constitution.

c. In continuing frank discussions the Ambassador would explore with the Greek authorities the need for a real improvement of the image of the Greek Government.

I further suggest that we should await Ambassador Tasca's reports, and his recommendations, before deciding what to do about the suspended military shipments.

**WPR**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69. Secret; Exdis.

## 261. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy on Greece

Attached is a paper on Greece cleared by the members of the NSC Review Group.<sup>2</sup> It details the issues and arguments fairly.

*The situation.* The Johnson Administration after the April 1967 coup suspended shipment of major military aid items. Equipment valued at \$52.6 million remains suspended. However, a flow of \$165 million in basic items has continued—about \$100 million in grant aid. The suspension was paralleled by the ambassador's urging the military government to move as quickly as possible back to constitutional government. The suspension of major items has slowed the modernization of Greece's armed forces, although it is far from being a "cut-off" of military aid. The government has moved gradually in implementing its new constitution but still has not set a date for elections.

*Your first choice* is whether to continue present policy—suspension of \$50 million in major items, continuation of lesser items—or to remove the suspension.

The *argument for continuing* present policy: It enables the US to continue basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for Congressional purposes and to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government.

The *argument for removing* the suspension: The Greek government is becoming increasingly annoyed with present policy. At the same time, we are becoming increasingly dependent on Greek bases. The main purpose of our military aid is to preserve our access to those bases.

If you wish to remove the suspension, there are *two options* (detailed at black tabs in Review Group paper; pros and cons attached to this memo);<sup>3</sup>

A. *Tacit "quid pro quo" policy.* Tasca would say that Greek movement toward a constitutional situation would make it easier for you to

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Document 257.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. The pros and cons of the two options are identical to those listed under Options 1 and 2 in Document 257.

remove the suspension. He would not link release of equipment with specific liberalizing steps. But as the government took steps, we would quietly release suspended items.

*B. Resumption of normal military shipments.* Tasca would tell Papadopoulos we were resuming full military aid in expectation that the government will re-establish genuine democratic forms as soon as possible. Publicly we would stress the overriding importance of US security interests while saying we will keep urging return to democracy.

The following views have been stated in the course of my review:

—*Secretary Rogers* (next memo)<sup>4</sup> believes that, before deciding to resume full military deliveries, Tasca should try to persuade the government to take some steps toward political reform. Tasca should say that the US would like to resume full shipments but this is not possible unless the government improves its image. He suggests awaiting Tasca's report before deciding.

—*Defense* favors full resumption while recognizing the desirability of managing this move to put the best possible public face on it and even to enhance the ambassador's influence in urging further progress toward constitutional processes.

—*The Vice President* suggests releasing some suspended items to show good faith and then asking the government to make some liberalizing moves to help minimize criticism both in the US Congress and among our NATO allies. He has learned informally through continuing, high-level contacts in the Greek-American community that Papadopoulos appears willing to give you secretly a schedule for reform, including a tentative date for elections.<sup>5</sup>

*The issue* is the degree to which release of the suspended items is made conditional on further Greek steps in implementing the constitution. Secretary Rogers' approach—while skirting a clear decision now—could give the Greeks the impression that we are making the release conditional. Defense and the Vice President lean toward unconditional release, while still trying to get some constitutional movement in return.

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<sup>4</sup> Document 260.

<sup>5</sup> In a November 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders noted the Vice President's contacts with various figures in the "Greek community" and recommended that Kissinger brief him personally on the President's decision on military aid. "The choice is probably between his getting some mileage with his contacts and Tasca being the bearer of the President's decision. I recommend splitting the difference—asking the Vice President to hold off until Tasca has touched down in Athens and then telling his contacts simultaneously with Tasca's first appointment with Papadopoulos." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69)

*My solution* would be to weave these options together to release the suspended equipment without condition but urge the government to make some moves to improve the public atmosphere for our action. It is the issue of conditional release which most alienates the Greek government.

*Recommendation:* That you authorize the following course of action which I would record in a decision memorandum:

1. Authorize Tasca to tell Papadopoulos he is prepared to discuss the resumption of normal military shipments, including suspended items.

2. Instruct Tasca to explain privately that you understand Papadopoulos' political problems and applaud his intentions to move to fully representative government as quickly as possible. You remain interested in his plans.

3. Instruct Tasca to say that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US political problems in releasing the suspended equipment. [But this linkage is not a condition.]<sup>6</sup>

4. The US would, after Ambassador Tasca's report of the government's response and your approval, begin shipping the suspended items gradually beginning with the smaller and avoiding a dramatic resumption.

5. After your approval, the following public line would be taken: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in our decision. The US will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation.

6. Tasca would attempt to develop a relationship with the government that would permit him to exercise influence for democratic reform and a relationship with the civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future leadership.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the original.

<sup>7</sup> Nixon initialed the approval option on November 11.

## 262. National Security Decision Memorandum 34<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 14, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Greece—Military Assistance

With reference to the memorandum of September 26, 1969, from the Chairman NSCIG/NEA to the Chairman, NSC Review Group entitled “US Policy Toward Greece: Military Assistance—Response to NSSM 52,” and the memorandum of the Secretary of State on this subject dated October 30, 1969,<sup>2</sup> the President has instructed that:

1. Ambassador Tasca tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that he is prepared to resume normal military aid shipments, including all items which have been suspended.

2. Ambassador Tasca make clear that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. [This linkage is conceived as a means of improving the atmosphere for removing the suspension of military shipments.]<sup>3</sup>

3. The US Government, after the President has reviewed Ambassador Tasca’s report of the Greek Government’s response, begin shipping the suspended items gradually, beginning with the less dramatic items.

4. After the President’s final review and approval, the following public line be taken with members of the Congress and press as necessary: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in the decision to lift the suspension. The US Government will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation.

5. Ambassador Tasca attempt to develop a relationship with Greek government leaders that would permit him to exercise influence for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Copies were also sent to the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Bureau of the Budget and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This version replaced a November 11 memorandum on the same subject that was rescinded by the White House.

<sup>2</sup> The report and its conclusions are summarized in Document 261, to which the memorandum of September 26 was attached (see footnote 4, Document 257). Secretary of State Rogers’s memorandum is Document 260.

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the original.

democratic reform and a relationship with civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future governments.

6. The Under Secretaries Committee assure the coordinated execution of this policy.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

### 263. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials by Greek Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Ambassador Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol  
Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA  
H.E. Basil Vitsaxis, Ambassador of Greece

The President welcomed Ambassador Vitsaxis and noted American admiration for Greece as well as real concern over certain internal problems. The President noted that he had visited Greece three times, most recently in 1967, and was aware of the antecedents of the present situation. The United States could not involve itself in Greek internal affairs; it was with Greek international relations and our own bilateral relations that we were properly concerned. If Greece could solve some of its internal problems, then it would be possible for us to have more complete relations. The President noted that Ambassador Vitsaxis had made an effective presentation of Greece's case before the Council of Europe and he knew how well qualified the Ambassador was to represent his country in Washington.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 GREECE-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Approved by WH/Kissinger per David White to HBrown 1/16/70." In a November 26 memorandum attached to a copy of this memorandum, Saunders, recommending clearance, wrote: "Neither HAK nor I was present, so we have to take Rodger's word for it." Saunders continued: "The President's crack at the press on p. 2 is the only questionable statement as far as distribution is concerned. But since the Department has this already, I think Secret/NODIS is probably tolerable." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235 Saunders Chronological Files, Greece, 10/1/69-12/31/69.

Ambassador Vitsaxis noted his previous service in the United States and his great love for this country. He assured the President that the Greek regime, having rescued Greece from the chaos being wrought by the Leftists, had a fixed timetable for a return to a viable democracy within the framework of the Greek Constitution. Last summer he had participated in drawing up this timetable. As scheduled, the new press law had just been released. In March, two of the three suspended articles of the Constitution would be made effective and the third in September. This would restore full constitutional life to Greece and make possible elections and organization of a new parliament.

Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the Greek Government had recently welcomed an ICRC team, knowing that its investigations would help it cope with the slanders and distortions being fabricated about conditions in Greece. He assured the President that there had been and would continue to be a steady, orderly, and inevitable move to democratic constitutional government.

The President said that he hoped Ambassador Vitsaxis would press this line not only with his diplomatic colleagues but, also, with the press. He conceded that sometimes the press applied double standards. Had a Leftist regime taken over in Greece, any suspension of civil liberties would have been defended by most of the press on the grounds that they were essential to stabilize the regime. He was pleased to hear that the government planned to move toward full restoration of civil rights, and he hoped they would move quickly. Systems of democracies differed and it was not for him to say that what we tried to make work in America was the system for Greece or any other country. But, a regime based on individual rights seemed the objective of most democratic systems.

Ambassador Vitsaxis said there were indeed many forms of democracy but only one standard for liberty.

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**264. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 17, 1969.

**SUBJECT**

Greece Adherence to Constitutional Timetable and NATO

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
Greek Ambassador Vitsaxis  
Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA  
Marion K. Mitchell, NEA/GRK

Ambassador Vitsaxis called at his request to explain the Greek Government's withdrawal from the Council of Europe<sup>2</sup> and to give his Government's "official assurance" that it will proceed with full implementation of the timetable for restoration of constitutional norms, which it had presented to the members of the Council of Europe and to the U.S.

Noting that he had received a personal message for the Secretary from Foreign Minister Pipinelis, backed up by a message from the Prime Minister, Ambassador Vitsaxis reiterated that Greece will not deviate from the program it has set for return to constitutional government. The dates given in the timetable will be respected, and in fact the Government will try to accelerate the program.

The Ambassador referred to Foreign Minister Pipinelis' speech before the Council of Europe in which Pipinelis had analyzed past efforts of his Government and had focused on future prospects. Although Pipinelis rejected the Council's demand for a date for Greek national elections, he reassured the Council that elections will take place and that democracy will be restored. He noted in this connection that the British had reversed themselves in Paris by demanding a date for elections as they had not done before, and he wondered at that. He also rejected a proposal by the German Government that Greece be suspended for a three-month term until it should meet the Council's demands. Mr. Pipinelis was quoted by Ambassador Vitsaxis as saying the Greek departure from the Council of Europe was "a bad thing."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 GREECE. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Mitchell and approved in S on December 24.

<sup>2</sup> On December 12 Greece withdrew from membership in the Council of Europe. The decision was taken after a majority of member states lined up in support of a German resolution suspending the Greek Government. Pipinelis' hour long speech of protest failed to sway member states, and the Greek Foreign Minister then announced the decision to withdraw.

Greece wants to be a member of European bodies. The only aspect of the Greek departure, which could be considered good, was that the foreign ministers of the participating countries will no longer face the unpleasantness of having to deal with the Greek case.

The Secretary noted some general apprehension that the Greek question may come to the surface in NATO. He pointed out that it had arisen repeatedly in his recent discussions in Brussels.<sup>3</sup> He was sorry that a solution other than the one arrived at could not have been achieved. He had been given to understand that there were a number of derogatory comments in the Human Rights Commission's report to the Committee of Ministers and he asked whether that report had been made public.

Ambassador Vitsaxis confirmed that the Commission's report had not been made public. He noted that the conclusions of the report were substantially: a) that the Communist danger the Greek Government cited as justification for suspending civil liberties in Greece had not been proved. (The Ambassador noted that had been only part of the Greek Government's argument. It had also pointed to the imminent danger of chaos just prior to the coup); b) regarding the second charge of the practice of "torture" in Greece, Ambassador Vitsaxis claimed that the Commission's conclusions had been badly construed in the press. He maintained that out of 250 cases put forward, the Commission singled out 30, which they considered could be examined *prima facie*. Of those 30 they pointed in turn to 11 in which "the presumption was strong" that these 11 principals had been mistreated. Further, Ambassador Vitsaxis said that one of the 11 was quoted by the newspaper *Libre Belgique* two days ago to the effect that his testimony about the Greek Government had been a lie and that he had never been tortured by the Greek Government.

Also with regard to press reports of disagreement between the Greek Government and the ICRC, Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the International Committee of the Red Cross had issued an official statement on December 5, 1969,<sup>4</sup> noting that it had visited a number of prisons in Greece and had met with no impediment on the part of the Greek Government.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Greek Government could make some substantial moves in the direction of return to constitutional government before the NATO spring meeting. He noted that

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to discussions held at the NATO Ministerial meeting December 4–5. Documentation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1969, CF 396.

<sup>4</sup> The report, which was leaked at the end of November, reported on 213 individual cases of the use of torture on prisoners. It is summarized in *The New York Times*, December 1, 1969.

the U.S. will not bring the Greek question up in that forum but he was afraid that others might do so. He pointed out that it is the impression of a number of countries that time is slipping by and that no real progress is being made in Greece.

Ambassador Vitsaxis said that between now and April some steps are contemplated. He wondered whether there was any way to satisfy Greece's critics other than to fulfill to the letter the pledges the Greek Government had made. He said that whether Greece satisfies these critics depends really on whether the critics want democracy in Greece or a change of government. In the event it is a change of government they want then that must be construed as interference in internal Greek affairs.

Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the draft law on political parties is now ready, and that the Prime Minister had declared that elections will be announced a year in advance. He said there had been a liberalization of the press, and promised to send a file documenting that point. As regards so-called political prisoners, he noted that some were still under administrative detention because they are considered dangerous. This is not a new situation in Greece. In 1952 there were three times as many in detention as there are now. Most of those still detained have been trained in Moscow and they can be released upon signing a paper that they will do nothing to disturb the public peace and security.

When the Secretary asked whether the Greek Government had thought of issuing a kind of White Paper on the Greek situation Ambassador Vitsaxis said he thought the speech of Foreign Minister Pipinelis before the Council of Europe might constitute such a document and he promised to forward it to the Department.

Regarding Greece's legal position in the Council of Europe, about which the Secretary inquired, Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that Greece is now out of the Council, it is no longer a member. He explained that according to the statutes a member which withdraws can exercise its rights of membership for one year following that withdrawal, but that Greece has abjured that right. Ambassador Vitsaxis would not say that Greece is permanently out of the Council of Europe. He noted that there had been a Council of Europe resolution expressing hope for the return of Greece when political life in Greece would allow that. His personal opinion was that there would be no difficulty in Greece's rejoining the Council at some future date, but he could not give any official position on that.

Ambassador Vitsaxis assured, in conclusion, that there has been no change whatsoever in Greece's attitude to NATO and that Greece will continue as in the past to uphold its NATO commitments.

**265. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Tasca—10:00 a.m., December 20

The main purpose of Ambassador Tasca's call—apart from the usual opportunity to have a photo taken—is to hear directly from you the policy you want carried out toward the military government in Greece. As you know, it is necessary to strike a delicate balance, and the Ambassador is the one man who can inject discipline so that our mission in Athens will speak with one voice.

You will recall that you approved the following instructions to Ambassador Tasca.<sup>2</sup>

1. He is to tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that we are prepared to resume normal military aid shipments, including all items on the suspended list.

2. At the same time, he is to make clear that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease our problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment.

3. Ambassador Tasca is then to report the Greek government's response and, after you have reviewed his report, shipment of the suspended items could begin gradually, beginning with the less dramatic items.

4. In general, the Ambassador would attempt to develop a relationship with the Greek government leaders that would permit him to exercise influence for democratic reform and a relationship with civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future civilian governments.

The key issue to be discussed with the Ambassador is the degree to which you see a linkage between (a) release of the suspended items and restoration of a normal relationship and (b) Greek movement toward fully constitutional government. This boils down to the question: If the government gives him little satisfaction about future movement, will we release the suspended equipment anyway?

My understanding of your position is that the answer is that the decision has been made to release the equipment and that Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 262. Nixon met with Tasca from 10:30 to 10:50 a.m. on December 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

Tasca is to use that decision to seek Greek cooperation in improving the atmosphere for that release. What the Greek government objects to most is the idea of a conditional release, while they seem willing to be cooperative.

*Talking points.* If this is an accurate statement of your views, then Ambassador Tasca should understand the following:

1. You regard the release of suspended equipment as unconditional.
2. You hope your decision will provide the basis for cooperation with the Greek government.
3. You hope one element in that cooperation might be improving—insofar as possible—the atmosphere for the release. (This has added importance in view of Greece's recent resignation from the Council of Europe.)<sup>3</sup>
4. The main reason for your decision is the overriding interest the US has in its military rights and installations in Greece.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 264.

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**266. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 12, 1970.

Dear Joe:

Now that Ambassador Henry Tasca has arrived in Athens,<sup>2</sup> I consider it appropriate that we initiate the necessary steps toward full resumption of military assistance to Greece, so that we are prepared for immediate supply of important items once the President sees the Ambassador's report on the Papadopoulos regime's attitude toward reform.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 73 A 1971, Greece 000.1, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Tasca presented his credentials on January 15.

There are several factors which I deem important enough to warrant this preliminary work by our staffs:

- (a) The overriding US security interests in Greece;
- (b) Greece's undiminished role in NATO (value of major military equipment currently suspended is \$52.6 million);
- (c) The effect of the suspension policy on the combat capability of the Greek forces committed to NATO; and
- (d) The paucity of MAP funds, requiring their use for valid military requirements instead of payment for storage and maintenance costs arising out of the suspension policy.

I therefore recommend that appropriate action officers in State and Defense initiate the first necessary steps toward full resumption of military assistance to Greece without further delay. The first actions would involve the selection of the initial items to be removed from the embargo when the new gradual policy actually begins to operate.

Sincerely,

G. Warren Nutter<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

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## 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, January 19, 1970, 1700Z.

226. Subject: Return to Greece of King Constantine.

1. Following his latest round of talks in Athens Archbishop Makarios flew to Rome January 18 to meet with King Constantine and returned to Nicosia same day. At my meeting with Foreign Minister Pipinelis today (other subjects reported septels)<sup>2</sup> he told me in confidence he had received word from Makarios that Constantine wishes to return to Greece and sets no conditions. According to Makarios' message

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 GREECE.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 224 from Athens, January 19, reported on efforts to promote a return to democratic government. (*Ibid.*, DEF 18–6 GREECE) Telegram 225 from Athens, January 19, reported on discussions about Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, POL 27 CYP)

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Constantine wishes to have a confidential talk with “someone” in GOG (presumably Papadopoulos himself) prior to his return. I gathered that the King wants some assurances from GOG in advance, but Pipinelis did not elaborate on what these might be. This was such fresh news, Pipinelis said, that he hadn’t yet had a chance to pass it on to Prime Minister.

2. Foreign Minister commented that King Constantine’s decision is a very important event and most timely. He believes it is a matter of urgency that the King return to Greece now. Pipinelis gave number of reasons to support his view that time is ripe for King’s return. I tried to sound him out as to what the timing might be, but he merely reiterated his view that the best time is right now.

3. *Comment:* King’s wishes are one thing and chances of authorization for his return by GOG are quite another. As Department is aware, single internal issue about which feelings run strongest among some key members of present regime is return or non-return of King Constantine to Greece. Certain “hard-core” members of Junta are dead set against any such return. Although it is possible that Papadopoulos personally favors King’s return (eventually if not now) he might have grave difficulty in trying to sell idea to his associates, and he would run serious risks if he acted on this issue without full backing of important military personalities. Makarios’ report that King now sets no conditions is of course measure of his eagerness to return and it also makes a favorable GOG response much easier. King’s comment to Ambassador Hill (State 004696)<sup>3</sup> that he thought US should resume heavy military aid shipments to Greece may have been intended as further indication of his flexibility.

**Tasca**

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<sup>3</sup> Dated January 16. (Ibid., POL 1 GREECE)

**268. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, January 26, 1970, 1615Z.

324. Subj: My First Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. This morning I paid my initial call on Prime Minister Papadopoulos. We had more than an hour of substantive discussion in which USG and GOG positions laid out frankly and fully. With complete frankness I outlined for Papadopoulos problems of mutual concern facing USG in maintaining and strengthening our general relations with Greece, and in preventing any erosion from affecting Greece's important contribution to NATO. Meeting was a cordial one and I think decks are now cleared for proceeding to more detailed discussion in our next meeting of the specifics affecting the problem of the Greek image in the US.

2. After brief exchange of amenities, I proposed that we begin what I hoped would be a series of frequent and frank discussions by outlining for each other the basic elements, as we each saw them, in the Greek-American relationship. The Prime Minister asked that I lead off. I said that first of all I would like to say that I brought the personal regards of President Nixon who had expressed to me his desire for a relation of friendship with Greek Government. I would do everything possible to work towards such a relationship within the fundamental context of Greece's role as faithful and important member of the NATO Alliance. The USG fully appreciates exceptional efforts made to fulfill this role on part of Greek people and Greek Government. It is fundamental aim of US administration for Greece to continue to play this role, the importance of which is further increased by growing Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> The position of the US in these respects is shown by continued flow of military assistance in recent years, as well as administration's position in supporting appropriation for military assistance to Greece in FY 70.

3. However I hoped Prime Minister appreciated strength of forces in US which might hamper seriously USG efforts towards these objectives. When thirty-eight Senators could vote against further appropri-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Limdis. A summary of this telegram was included in the President's briefing of January 27 (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

<sup>2</sup> On December 30, 1969, Ambassador Tasca submitted a report on Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean to President Nixon. The President, in turn, relayed it to Kissinger as an "excellent analysis." (Ibid.)

ation of military assistance to NATO ally,<sup>3</sup> situation was serious indeed. Letter from fifty Congressmen to Secretary of State<sup>4</sup> was another example extent feeling against Greek Government. Congress ultimately responsive to US public opinion and Greece's image with public appeared to be deteriorating. Public opinion is being strongly influenced by American press, which admittedly may have failed to appreciate fully precarious state of affairs in Greece prior to Army takeover. But regardless how well informed critics are, Prime Minister should fully recognize that USG basic position of good will towards NATO ally is under powerful attack in US. We realized they had problems, but I wished them to understand our problem as well, since latter were of mutual interest and fully relevant to our common objective of maintaining and strengthening our relations. I expressed the deep satisfaction of the USG with the firm assurance given Secretary Rogers regarding Greek determination to proceed on its path toward full constitution expressed by their Ambassador immediately after the unfortunate Council of Europe meeting in December.<sup>5</sup>

4. Prime Minister replied rather soberly that Greece's NATO role and especially relationship with America of utmost importance to Greece. While recognizing full well that Greece small country that should feel honored be able play significant role in Western defense, Greece's friends must also recognize that Greek Government will not allow its NATO role to be tied in any way whatsoever to Greek internal situation. This matter on which there absolutely no room for compromise. In fact, Greece attaches so much importance to its role in defense of West (much more than some of our European allies) that rather than let other countries meddle in Greece's affairs, country would go its separate way, if necessary putting its defense relationship with US on bilateral basis.

5. I told Prime Minister, in reply, that it firm position USG that internal Greek political situation not appropriate subject for NATO debate, and we would vigorously defend this position, on this he could rely.

6. Turning to internal situations in US and Greece, Papadopoulos said he could assure me I would not find it necessary to emphasize to him the problem posed for Greek-American relationship by US Congress, press and public opinion. While fully recognizing the problem, he would have to frankly say that it would not always be possible to

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to legislation banning military aid to Greece. It passed in committee but was defeated in the Senate.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a July 30 letter calling on the United States to take action to achieve the fall of the junta.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 264.

listen to “our great friend” on questions of internal political development in Greece. He would gladly do so when possible, but GOG would basically have to decide for itself how things progress. The Prime Minister compared himself to man walking through a minefield. This minefield was 1968 Constitution and steps toward its full implementation. He was sure that I, as a former naval officer,<sup>6</sup> would appreciate that plotting course through loaded mines required greatest of care and caution.

7. In reply I said our common objective of friendly relations and of maintaining a strong NATO could require our best efforts. I fully understood that Greece would have to determine its own policies in their national interest and my comments were made in the sense of what related to our common interest. It seemed to me that our aims could best be served by frequent and frank discussions. The Prime Minister responded that he held identical views on this subject. He would like to make it clear he available any hour of day or night for consultation. He would provide me with number to private line on which he might be reached at any time, and we would like to propose that I set the date myself for another meeting which he hoped would take place over dinner at his home. However, if this were in any way embarrassing to me, his feelings would not be hurt if I wished to make other arrangements. I said that I would be most pleased to accept his invitation and I would call him within a few days to set an exact date.

8. I think initial frank, even blunt, exchange with Prime Minister cleared air and meeting ended quite cordially. I see no reason why our next meeting, which I am glad to see he wishes be on more informal basis, should not begin come to grips with specific problems in Greek-American relations.

9. Prime Minister raised specific problem regarding May Ministerial meeting of NATO, which I will cover in separate message.<sup>7</sup>

**Tasca**

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<sup>6</sup> Tasca served as a staff officer in the Mediterranean during World War II.

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 325 from Athens, January 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)

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**269. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, March 2, 1970, 1618Z.

970. 1. The speed with which the Greek regime carries out its publicly expressed desire to put the 1968 Constitution into full effect is likely to be very much affected by the relative strengths of the forces within the regime which favor a return to constitutional government, as opposed to those who prefer to prolong the present regime indefinitely. In this context the present Greek regime should not be viewed as a personal dictatorship but rather as collegiate in its make-up. Prime Minister George Papadopoulos plays the main role, but he by no means enjoys a free hand. He has shrewdly manipulated the other key players in the regime so that his freedom of action has been steadily increased. Those who collaborated with him most closely on 21 April and 13 December 1967 still count very heavily in terms of influence and political power, but Papadopoulos has managed to consult with the Revolutionary Council as a whole less and less and to broaden his base by relying more on civilian ministers and senior army officers such as General Odysseus Angelis, while keeping a wary eye on the young commanders of combat units.

2. Furthermore, in understanding the regime it is essential to keep in mind that its leaders and supporters consider themselves a revolutionary regime empowered to make revolutionary reforms, and not merely as another coup group taking power as an interim measure prior to handing affairs back to the politicians.

3. At this time the Greek regime functions roughly as follows:

A. Papadopoulos is the undisputed leader.

B. Next in line of authority are his fellow Revolutionary Council members, Vice Premier Stylianos Pattakos and Minister of Coordination Nicholas Makarezos. They are often joined by Vice President Patilis (who "saved Thessaloniki for the revolution" on 13 December 1967), and Lt. General Odysseus Angelis, who is the highly respected commander of the Hellenic Armed Forces, to form the top five.

C. After the top five we would place the three members of the twelve-man Revolutionary Council who elected to remain in the army and who fill key functions as follows:

(1) Colonel Mihail Roufogalis, who is the most intimate friend of Papadopoulos and who as "coordinator" of the Greek Central Intelligence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2 GREECE. Confidential; Limdis.

Service acts as Papadopoulos' Chief Counsel in affairs dealing with the security of the revolution,

(2) Colonel Antonios Lekkas, who screens army personnel assignments and keeps an eye on the senior generals, and

(3) Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis, who as Director of Military Police is responsible for the reliability of the army, who transmits to the Prime Minister the views of the younger unit commanders, and who in turn explains the revolution's policies and actions to these officers.

D. The six other members of the Revolutionary Council, who in December 1967 were persuaded to resign their army commissions and become secretaries-general but not ministers, are probably still next in political power. They derive power from their prestige as members of the Revolutionary Council and resist Papadopoulos' tendency to overlook the Revolutionary Council as a corporate body. Constantine Aslanides, the Director General of Athletics, who is establishing a considerable reputation for himself in this field, figures prominently in this group.

E. They are however being challenged by the civilian ministers who may in the long run have greater influence in shaping the future of Greece than any of the above outside the top five. The Prime Minister consults the Council of Ministers for hours at a time each week, and the Council not only thrashed out the 1968 Constitution article by article, but is doing the same with its enabling legislation, which will be the law of the revolution. Some of the new civilian secretaries-general are being drawn from what appears to be an embryonic political party loyal to Papadopoulos. Among the ministers, Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinellis enjoys considerable freedom of action in foreign affairs, as does Finance Minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos in matters of budget and taxes.

F. Senior army officers who hold senior commands or staff positions or have left the army to assume key jobs in civilian agencies provide Papadopoulos with a core of executives. They look to Papadopoulos for guidance and they tend to support his moves toward implementing the Constitution. This group includes the directors of the State and Armed Forces radios, directors in the Prime Minister's and Regent's offices, the directors of the Central Intelligence Service and of the National Security Directorate and the Citizens' Commissioner.

G. Important policy decisions are usually made by the top five, taking into account the pressures of the various "constituents" of the revolution. The most important of these "constituents" are:

(1) The officers who now command the combat companies and battalions, mainly those officers who pulled guns on their superiors on 21 April or 13 December, and who have reason to fear for their careers, if not their personal safety, should the regime falter. They very much fear that the King will return with vengeance in his heart. Their cur-

rent slogans are “no elections, no King, and forward with the aims of the revolution.” They are especially against elections because they associate them with a return to the status quo ante, and with both the loss of their present influence and perhaps even the return of old politicians and retired officers. These younger officers tend to form loose associations by cadet school classes, and from among the Revolutionary Council they feel closest to the class of 1943 and Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis. They also share a common interest with the Regent, Lt. General George Zoitakis, who perhaps may not look forward to the King’s return either, and has shown a concern for the “purity of the revolution.”

(2) Army officers who did not take a direct part in the revolution, but who generally support Papadopoulos and appreciate the enhanced status of the Army since 12 April 1967. They may resent the assertiveness of the younger unit commanders, but they lack the power to confront them.

(3) Civilians who have embraced the revolution, including some publishers and journalists, virtually all the mayors, village presidents, etc., who were appointed by the regime, who are enthusiastic executors of new public works and who look confidently to playing a part under the new Constitution. The ties between the village and town leaders and the army officers are generally strong—the army officers having spent many years at army posts in the countryside.

4. Papadopoulos has gradually widened his own base of support so that he is already somewhat less vulnerable to a challenge by a member of the Revolutionary Council. He has thus far weathered the storm of Revolutionary Council member Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos’ resignation, but Stamatelopoulos remains a threat on the sidelines around whom disgruntled revolutionary officers could coalesce. Today Papadopoulos must cater more to the commanders of army combat companies and battalions. He is still their acknowledged leader and will probably continue to be so as long as he does not do things which seem to threaten their positions or weaken the army. However, he must continually demonstrate that his regime promotes clean government which does not discredit the army, and that the army receives the arms and other support to fulfill a defense mission which the younger officers deployed along the frontier with communism feel very deeply. On several occasions, notably just before his December year-end speeches in 1968 and 1969, he was forced to delay his speeches and modify portions of them in deference to the pressures of the revolutionary officers. Thus, these officers have shown at times an ability to provide very compelling collective pressure.

5. I believe that Papadopoulos is clearly in charge, that he represents the best choice among the available leaders within the regime,

but that his room for maneuver depends on his ability to cope with his less politically minded colleagues—some of whom carry guns. His future may well be influenced by factors beyond his control. I believe this is what he meant when he told me that he must pass through a mine field in his progress toward implementing the Constitution.

6. In sum, our best current information is that the tenure of the present regime is not likely to be seriously challenged inside Greece for some years. Every ambassadorial colleague I have spoken with shares this view. American interests would seem to be best served by encouraging Papadopoulos to implement the 1968 Constitution as rapidly as possible, and by using our influence to strengthen his hand against any opposition to that course from among his revolutionary colleagues.

**Tasca**

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**270. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1970.

Dear Henry:

I have read your letter of February 27th with great interest.<sup>2</sup>

Let me try to state very simply my understanding of the mandate, and what is expected back here.

I understood the NSC decision of November 14, 1969 (NSDM 34)<sup>3</sup> to mean that it was decided, in principle, that we were prepared to lift the suspension of arms shipments. This decision to resume shipments was not conditioned on concrete steps by the Greek Government in the direction of constitutional democracy. But you were to make clear to the Government that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease U.S. problems in speeding the release of the suspended

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards Greece. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. In it Tasca recounted a conversation with Shakespeare and requested clarification regarding the implementation of the policy outlined in NSDM 34.

<sup>3</sup> Document 262.

equipment. The suspended shipments were to be resumed, but only after the President reviewed your report of the Greek Government's response to your representations about movement toward a constitutional situation, beginning with the less dramatic items.

My understanding was that in accordance with this mandate you would explore this whole matter in a cooperative way with the Greek Government, and we would await your report of that exploration. When that phase was over, you would then be in a position to recommend when Papadopoulos should be informed that we had decided to lift the suspension of shipments, and to recommend, as well, the speed with which deliveries should be resumed, and what items ought to go beginning with the less dramatic items.

Some of this scenario, thanks to your efforts, is now behind us. I suggest that you could bring it nearer completion by immediately taking the following steps: Send us (a) a succinct synthesis of all your conversations with the high-level people; (b) your evaluation of the current attitude of the Greek Government with special reference to the prospects of its moving in a constitutional direction; and (c) your recommendations as to when and how the arms embargo should be lifted.

We would then bring your evaluation and recommendation to the attention of the White House, following which we should be in a position to transmit to you the appropriate go-ahead to inform Papadopoulos of our plans.

We not only do not believe it is necessary, but believe it undesirable and contrary to what was contemplated by the November NSC decision, for this whole matter to be reassessed in the context of a broader study of the Mediterranean. If this were your recommendation, you would in effect be asking the President to reassess a decision which had already been made.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**271. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, March 7, 1970, 1047Z.

1076. Subject: Meeting with Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis.

1. On March 4 I had a private talk with Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis who was a prime mover in the 21 April 1967 Revolution, is a key member of the Revolutionary Council, and as director of military police is responsible for the reliability of the Greek army. His organization acts as the eyes and ears of the regime in the armed forces and investigates any signs of anti-regime conspiracies involving the army—including both active and retired officers. I would stress the sensitive nature of his comments to us.

2. I took the opportunity to speak with him very frankly about the importance of meaningful progress toward implementing the 1968 Constitution, and the detrimental effect to Greek prestige abroad of apparently arbitrary arrests and the detention of retired army officers who have distinguished military and anti-Communist records.

3. In a far-ranging discussion of the security aspects of implementing the 1968 Constitution, I was able to lead him over such issues as the ability of the regime to maintain security without martial law by the strict enforcement of existing civil laws. Ioannidis accepted that martial law could gradually be dispensed with, although he avoided committing himself to a date. He said that martial law is now applied less and less, and that period of calm “without bombs” would permit the regime to end it. He tried to justify martial law as preventing the return of petty political quarreling and thus promoting reconciliation of old hatreds. He agreed with my analysis that the 1968 Constitution included strong safeguards against abuse by irresponsible political elements and provided a framework in which new political institutions could safely evolve.

4. Ioannidis made the point that many of the younger army officers are very forceful in expressing to him their fears and anxieties about any return to the past. He said that implementing the Constitution means to him the holding of elections. The country is not yet ready for elections which the younger officers would certainly oppose as a return to the past. The regime does not want rigged elections, and he does not believe that Prime Minister Papadopoulos wants to be the leader of a political party.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US. Confidential; Limdis.

5. Ioannidis then developed the theme of reconciliation of old divisions within the country and said that a dialog was now becoming possible between the regime and its opponents—namely the old politicians. However, by way of criticizing the old politicians as selfish, he said he had recently had an indirect approach from Evangelos Averof<sup>2</sup> proposing the rule for a few more years without elections by the present regime plus Averof and Spyridon Markezinis—but excluding all the other politicians. Throughout, Ioannidis showed a strong desire that the 21 April revolution should appear in history as beneficial to Greece and that the democratic successor to the present regime should be strong and healthy.

6. Ioannidis made a strong case for the Greek army's need of new and modern weapons. He said that the Greek people would make sacrifices if necessary to buy them. However, no matter what happened about military aid, the United States could count on the love and respect of the Greek people.

7. I described to Ioannidis the harm that was done to the prestige of the Greek regime by acts in the name of security which aroused protests abroad from cultural, scientific, or journalistic groups, among which fraternal bonds are strong. Ioannidis acknowledged the argument, but vigorously defended himself as follows:

A. The thirty cashiered officers who are being held by the military police are not being held without charge. The charges, however, have not been made public, which is perfectly legal by Greek military law—when a conspiracy against the security of the state is under investigation—and even by Greek civil law when the court so orders.

B. His action in detaining rather than bringing the arrested officers to a speedy trial is “moderate” and humane. “Due process of law” would mean a court martial which would deprive these officers of their pensions and no doubt hand down severe prison sentences—to the great hardship of these officers and their families.

C. As a further example, he said that ex-deputies John Tsirimokos and Cleanthis Damianos had confessed to putting out with Averof an illegal anti-regime publication and to conspiring with Averof to burn down the military court house. Because of a regime desire to reconcile old differences, however, none of these politicians would be court-martialed—and Averof might have legally received twenty years for his part had he been brought to trial.

8. In response to my strong plea for an Easter amnesty—in the spirit of resurrection—for the anti-Communist officers now detained,

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<sup>2</sup> Evangelos Averof was a former Greek Foreign Minister and leader of the ERE.

he said he would consider so recommending, but that these officers had already benefited from a previous amnesty (for their 13 December 1967 acts). When released then they had signed statements forswearing any intention of opposing the regime by force. He stressed, however, that such acts of magnanimity must be at Greek initiative, and for Greek reasons and not appear to follow foreign pressure. I concurred fully with this thought.

9. I told him that I would not intervene in matters of internal security—which is a Greek problem—but as the representative of an old ally, I wished to give him friendly advice as to the need to strike a balance between the security needs of the country, which might call for someone's arrest, and the damage to Greece's reputation abroad, which the arrest might cause. It might be better at times to accept a minor security risk rather than arrest someone and then creating hostile feelings toward Greece among her allies.

10. Ioannidis spoke of the need for greater economic and educational progress before democracy could be restored, but listened attentively to my counter arguments on the need for giving youth a chance to participate more directly in national and public life as equally important as economic progress in protecting against a resurgence of communism.

11. In general, Ioannidis impressed me as tough within a modest and polite exterior. He appears to see issues in fairly stark black-and-white terms, to hold very strong convictions about what is best for Greece and to be a man of considerable tenacity and self-confidence. His expressions of good will toward the United States and his advocacy of reconciliation of all anti-Communist elements in Greece seemed very genuine. On arrival he said that the way to persuade a Greek to do something is to let him believe it is his own idea. I believe that Ioannidis' receptivity to some of the points we subsequently discussed augers well for his taking up at least some of them as his own.

**Tasca**

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**272. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 90<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 24, 1970.

## GREECE

NSSM 52 (April 26, 1969)<sup>2</sup> called for a review of our current military aid policy towards Greece and an assessment of the present political situation there as it affects US interests. The decision resulting from that study (NSDM 34, November 14, 1969)<sup>3</sup> may be summarized as follows:

The United States is prepared to resume full military aid shipments to Greece. Our Ambassador is to make clear to the Greek Government that movement towards a constitutional situation would ease United States problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. The Ambassador is to report to the President the Greek Government's response to his efforts to influence the Greek Government in the direction of a constitutional situation, and, in compliance with NSSM 90, recommend the degree of speed with which we should move in resuming military shipments.

*Developments since November*

There have been few significant developments towards the restoration of a constitutional situation in Greece since the issuance of NSDM 34, and the tide of sentiment against the Greek regime in Western Europe (and in some Congressional circles in the United States as well) is not falling. On the other hand, the loss of Wheelus Air Force Base has increased the strategic interest of the United States in Greece even beyond the high levels described in NSSM 52.

*Probable Future Developments*

Without disregarding the lessons from Greece's volatile past, we anticipate as the most probable development for the foreseeable future a period of relative stability within Greece and as regards Greece's relations with her neighbors.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90. Secret; Nodis. This section of the response to NSSM 90, "U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward Mediterranean Area," February 26, was prepared by the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. The Chairman of the Group, William Cargo, forwarded it to Kissinger with the explanation that it was being handled separately from the rest of the response to NSSM 90 because of its more restricted classification.

<sup>2</sup> Document 246.

<sup>3</sup> Document 262.

On the Greek domestic level we foresee no radical political development in any direction. At best we anticipate a slow and spotty political evolution which may give back to the Greek people some measure of political freedom and of political activity. As far as we can see, political opposition within Greece, and its counterpart abroad will not change the situation decisively. The present Greek leadership, in one form or another, will be around for some time to come. As long certainly as economic prosperity continues, the attitude of the mass of the Greek people will probably continue to be colored by their abhorrence (based on experience) of civil strife, and by unwillingness to risk very much for ideological principle.

Greece's economic prospects look good for the long run. Like any developing country with fairly limited resources Greece has a number of economic problems, the most crucial being that of its balance of payments. Servicing on borrowing to cover that endemic deficiency will in the middle run put a considerable squeeze on the Government and perhaps even cause some revamping of its current ambitious development plan. Given Greece's trading patterns and experiences, it is fairly certain that it will not embark on any adventurous course but will follow traditional methods in facing its problems.

GNP grew by 8.3% in 1969. This may be too high a rate for continuing sound growth, but Greece will probably continue to try for substantial rates of increase and probably has the capability of achieving it. Per capita income is now almost \$800, and the regime hopes to increase this to over \$1,000 by 1974.

A potentially serious problem of both economic and political dimensions is the discrepancy between the urban and rural sectors. If the regime should face serious trouble in the future it would most likely come from that imbalance and the problems inherent in resultant urbanization.

On the international scene we can expect Greece to continue to display a strong sense of identification with the West and particularly with the United States. Whoever controls the Mediterranean determines Greece's orientation. As long as the United States is dominant or holds its own in the Mediterranean, Greece's traditional ties and security considerations reinforce one another.

At the same time Greece will continue to try to improve or "normalize" its relations with all its immediate neighbors especially as far as trade is concerned. It will also continue to try to enhance its relations with Turkey. These are small ways it has of reducing its necessary dependence on a great power and it can be expected to follow this course, especially as the US military grant aid program comes to an end.

As Greece pursues these aims it will show somewhat greater independence, but almost certainly within the framework of its NATO

commitment. The nature of that independence, and how much will eventually remain of the unique access the United States today now enjoys to Greek facilities, will depend to a large extent on United States attitudes and the manner in which Greece is weaned from past high levels of dependence on the US.

*Implications for the Future*

Since his arrival in Greece in early January, Ambassador Tasca has had his first round of discussions with Greek officials, emphasizing the value to them and to us of moving ahead to implement the new Greek constitution. He has pointed out the difficulties under present circumstances of trying to maintain and strengthen ties on a bilateral basis and within the NATO alliance.

Subject to Ambassador Tasca's evaluation and recommendations, our conclusions are that:

—for the foreseeable future we will be dealing with the current regime in Greece in one form or another;

—the regime will continue to give top priority to Greek defense needs and its economy will be able to sustain the present level of defense spending (just under 25% of budget expenditures) while still maintaining respectable economic growth;

—the Greek Government has shown some intention, and ability, to slip the net of our arms embargo by negotiating to purchase arms from West European sources, notably France. To the extent Greece succeeds, our current policy of withholding arms will no longer exert major influence on internal Greek developments;

—the considerations which led to the decision to resume arms shipments in principle are even more impressive today than they were in November, particularly as a result of the denial to us of Wheelus, the Middle East situation, Turkish sensitivity regarding US fleet visits and continuing Soviet activity in the Mediterranean. In other words Greece is essential to NATO and Greek real estate is important to United States interests elsewhere in the area.

**273. Report by the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, March 31, 1970.

REPORT ON GREECE

*Contents*

I. Background

1. Internal Situation in Greece
2. Relations Between the U.S. and Greece; Greece's Other Foreign Relations

II. Present U.S. Policy Toward Greece

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary

*I. Background*

1. *Internal Situation in Greece.* After almost three years the military-backed regime which seized power in April 1967 in a bloodless coup retains firm control over the country. Such domestic military intervention has however been a recurrent phenomenon in modern Greek history. The present government enjoys the predominant support of the Greek armed forces; and opposition to it, both internal and abroad, which is concentrated mainly in intellectual circles and among ex-politicians, appears marginal. While the regime is certainly not popular, it enjoys widespread public toleration, a situation aided by favorable economic conditions and a popular fear of any recurrence of the violence of the 1940's. There is a strong internal security apparatus operating presently under martial law which however is applied in special, defined cases relating to the protection of the state. A new government-promulgated constitution was adopted by referendum in September 1963, but it is not yet in force pending completion of implementing laws. These are promised by the end of 1970. The present Greek leadership has also embarked on an ambitious and long-range "revolutionary" program aimed at reforming the structure of Greek political and social life, with heavy emphasis on Christian virtues, law and order, and stamping out what they regard as the corruption and irresponsibility of the past.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. The report was submitted to the President as an attachment to an NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum, May 21, not printed.

2. *Relations Between the United States and Greece.* Friendship between the U.S. and Greece is still deep, indeed unsurpassed in my experience of our relations with the peoples of other countries. It rests on the broad foundation of over two million American citizens of Greek extraction; some 25 years of close economic and military association, begun under the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which contributed about 3.5 billion dollars to Greece's postwar rehabilitation, economic progress and defensive reinforcement; substantial U.S. private investment in Greece and an expanding market in it for U.S. exports; and a strong identity of views on the defense of the Free World against further communist encroachment. In consequence Greece is a resolute member of NATO, has committed forces to the defense of the Alliance's S.E. flank, and granted the U.S. valuable facilities in support of our strategic objectives in the increasingly critical Eastern Mediterranean region.

*Greece's Other Foreign Relations.* The Western Europeans, especially those countries with influential socialist parties and narrow governmental majorities, have been politically antagonistic toward the present Greek regime. This reaction culminated in forcing Greece to withdraw from the Council of Europe in December 1969 on the charge of having violated political and human rights. While this European pressure may have played some part in engendering constitutional progress in Greece, on balance it appears to have been psychologically counterproductive. Having driven Greece out of the Council of Europe, the Europeans are now showing signs of shifting their attack to the more critical NATO forum. They have however not allowed such moral indignation to prejudice bilateral trade with Greece, which happens to be a substantial net importer of EEC goods. France's attitude has been characteristically apolitical; and the GOF is willing to sell Greece Mirage military aircraft and possibly tanks. The Soviet Union has bided its time politically with respect to developments in Greece, and otherwise maintained a business-as-usual stance. The present Greek Government, shaken by the November 1967 Cyprus crisis, has made a concerted effort to improve relations with its important Turkish neighbor by working constructively toward a solution of the unstable Cyprus problem. Greek relations with Yugoslavia are good; tolerable with Bulgaria; and the GOG has recently made overtures for commercial relations with Albania. The GOG, finally, plans to establish full, de jure diplomatic relations with Israel soon.

## II. *Present U.S. Policy Toward Greece*

For the lack of other tangible leverage—U.S. economic aid having been terminated in 1962<sup>2</sup>—and as a mark of official USG disapproval,

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<sup>2</sup> For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 320–338.

the USG stopped the delivery of certain “high visibility” military equipment items to Greece following the April 1967 coup. While this tactic may initially have contributed to internal political progress on the part of the GOG, notably the promulgation of the 1968 Constitution, it has not otherwise appreciably accelerated a return to democratic government. On the other hand it has produced several side-effects increasingly adverse to U.S. security interests: (1) tended to strengthen the radical anti-democratic faction within the Greek revolutionary government against Papadopoulos’ seemingly more moderate constitutionalist approach; (2) by undercutting Greece’s military potential has degraded the credibility of NATO in Soviet eyes on the strategic south-east flank; (3) prejudiced U.S.-Greek military cooperation and thus weakened U.S. influence over Greece’s military dispositions; and (4) led the GOG to look elsewhere for military equipment with good promises of satisfaction. At the same time, the U.S. MAP curtailment policy has been popular with domestic and foreign opponents of the Greek regime, particularly in Western Europe and the U.S. Congress and has kept lines open to sincerely democratic elements whose views and support cannot be ignored. On balance the evidence does not sustain their unrealistic thesis that more drastic pressure on the Greek Junta, by the U.S. in the first instance, would lead to the Colonels’ rapid demise. They appear to be firmly in the saddle.

### *III. Conclusions and Recommendations*

1. *Restore Suspended Equipment and Continue U.S. MAP for Greece at Adequate Level.* Since the U.S. MAP withholding policy has proved ineffective in accelerating a return to democratic government in Greece, and is beginning to undermine the country’s NATO-committed defensive strength, it should be abandoned. I also recommend that future year U.S. military aid to Greece be maintained at a level calculated to strengthen Greece’s contribution to NATO. Such a policy constitutes a necessary element of the U.S. objective of preventing further Soviet penetration of the key Eastern Mediterranean area. If U.S. aid is not forthcoming, either as grant or sales, the Greek Government will obtain such military equipment elsewhere. The resulting diversion of scarce foreign exchange could retard Greece’s economic development and thus favor the ascendancy of anti-democratic forces in Greece. Regional political equilibrium requires a fair balance between U.S. military assistance for both Greece and Turkey.

2. *Continue to Press Greek Regime to Return to Constitutional and Representative Government.* Concurrently, we must continue to press the Greek regime to return to the form of representative government which best meets Greece’s needs. American friendship is more important to the GOG than military equipment; and the GOG’s failure to make internal political progress is eroding this friendship in the U.S. We should

therefore substitute this leverage for the questionable tactic of restricting military aid. Restoring the MAP first and then pressing earnestly, as an ally and friend of Greece, for progress toward effective implementation of the Constitution promises to be the most advisable course psychologically.

3. *Prospects for Further Constitutional Progress.* The return to constitutional government in Greece will be slow since the GOG is master of its own house and will be exceedingly careful to keep the reins of control firmly in hand. The Papadopoulos Government, in accordance with its avowed aim of restructuring Greece's political life, gives evidence of planning to adhere to this course. The GOG is nevertheless still apprehensive over holding parliamentary elections which are therefore very unlikely for some time to come. This process will require a continuous and intimate dialogue between ourselves and the GOG at the highest levels, and with key elements in Greece outside the present establishment.

4. *Future U.S. Policy Toward Greece.* There is no feasible alternative for the U.S. to pursuing the dual policy of supporting Greece militarily and pressing it politically in the interest of U.S.-Greek friendship to return to constitutional government. Since the GOG is neither running the country into the ground nor following foreign policies contrary to U.S. national interests, the policy of partial MAP restriction, coupled with quixotic public criticism, tends to be self-defeating. While the state of affairs in Greece is not without serious inadequacies and certain dangers, especially of political polarization, real improvement is possible. Insofar as American influence may be a key factor, the necessary rapport toward this end has been established with the present Greek leadership.

[Omitted here is the body of the report, consisting of 25 pages with a 3-page annex on tactical handling of the decision.]

**Henry J. Tasca**

**274. Letter From Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, April 9, 1970.

Mister President,

A year has elapsed since my last written communication with Your Excellency.<sup>2</sup>

During this period, Greece has proceeded along the road towards state normality with steady steps. It has also been able to proceed satisfactorily in its economic development, due to the untroubled internal order. In the first sector, the achievements have been in accordance with the dictates of the rules of national security in combination with the promises given. In the second, they have been commensurate with the potentialities offered by Greek reality.

In the meantime, the United States of America have effected a new approach of the great problems of mankind, under your Presidency, and have given a new content to their historical mission, with a high sense of responsibility, broadness of spirit, and constructive realism.

Your February 18 Report to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970's,<sup>3</sup> and on a new strategy for peace, sums up this significant fact in a manner extremely eloquent and explicit, and endows the United States with a moral stature which is quite unprecedented.

I have studied your Report with the utmost attention, and am addressing the present letter to you for the very purpose of expressing the great satisfaction felt by the Greek Government for the principles defined in it. As the Government of an allied and friendly nation—one which has suffered the ordeals of war as few others have, and bears a sincere love for peace—it shares these principles without reserve.

Our attention was particularly drawn by your enlightened observations concerning the aims of the Atlantic Alliance, which remain basically unaltered (“the defense of Western Europe against common challenges, and ultimately the creation of a viable and secure European

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. No classification marking. A typed note at the bottom of the last page reads: “Official Translation, The Prime Minister’s Office,” and a handwritten note by Tasca on the first page reads: “Given to HJ Tasca personally evening of April 15—See Athens Exdis 1342, 17 Apr.” No indication of the method of transmission to the White House was found. Telegram 1342 from Athens, March 23, reported on discussions between Tasca and Papadopoulos on the state of Greek-U.S. relations, including Papadopoulos’s comment that he might send a letter to President Nixon. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE-US)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 249.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116–190.

order”), by those observations concerning the duties of the Alliance members, and by those concerning the new form of internal relations which should prevail within the Alliance.

A more responsible participation on the part of the friends of the United States in their own defense and progress is indeed imperative. Every nation is in duty bound to mobilize the resources and energies of its people, and any economic assistance it gets should simply be a means of helping and supplementing its own efforts.

The declaration of the principle of partnership, dictated by the circumstances of our times, is proof that, in fulfilling their mission in world history, the United States possess the priceless faculty of taking that course of action which is most appropriate for the benefit of all mankind, in every historical era.

Greece notes with concern the difficulties in harmonizing the defense policies of the Atlantic Alliance, which have arisen in recent years. So far, she has fulfilled her obligations towards NATO faithfully, and remains devoted to it without reserve.

Greece is aware that the crucial geographic position which she holds in the outposts of the Western World as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean—an area teeming with dangers—creates additional duties for her. Greece believes that she fulfills these duties successfully, and that she provides ample proof of this.

Greece considers that the interests of both the Western World as well as her own make it imperative for her to give first place to the problems of security in connection with her economic development. In the post-war period, she faced repeated armed attempts against her independence. *In 1967, in the midst of anarchy, she would have slipped towards communism, had she not been restrained by the Revolution, which was not brought about for the satisfaction of personal ambitions, or for the imposition of a regime removed from the fundamental principles of the Free World.*

Having first made the public financing sound, the Greek Government set the basis for a promising economic development which is now proceeding undisturbed, and has carried out *a series of decisive social reforms, benefiting both the weaker strata of society as well as the whole.*

At the same time, the nation is being led with steadfastness *toward political normality and parliamentary government* on the basis of the November 15 Constitution, voted by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people. *Most of the institutional laws which are indispensable for its full implementation have already been voted.* Those remaining will have passed by the end of the present year.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1903 from Athens, April 17, Tasca wrote: “I invite the Secretary’s particular attention to second paragraph of page 3.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

In addition, the remaining few suspended articles of the Constitution are being put into force, one after another. Thus, the articles already implemented are: *Article 13*, concerning the inviolability of domicile; *Article 14*, concerning freedom of the press—censorship of which has been abolished since December last—and *Articles 18 and 19*, concerning the rights of assembly and association. Article 10, concerning the Habeas Corpus, will be put into force in the course of this present month, and *Articles 111 and 112*, concerning the adjudication of crimes and the jurisdiction of courts martial, in the course of the present year.

The Greek Government has no intention whatsoever to deviate from the full restitution of political normality, or to slacken its pace. As I have repeatedly declared in my speeches, the aim of the Revolution is to *create wholesome economic conditions in Greece*, to reorganize the Administration, and to accomplish the necessary social reform so that the regime may henceforth function normally, and so that the national effort which was undertaken may be turned into good account.

The application of a broad program of *civic training of the Greek people was begun last month*, with the publication of a special systematic work written by Mr. Papaconstantinou, sociologist and historian, and former Secretary of Education. This book is being *distributed to all state functionaries and organized classes*, and will be the basis for free and elucidating discussions. A translation of its Table of Contents will be sent to you. Through this, it is plainly manifest how genuinely democratic is the training of the Greek people which is effected by the Revolution.

I am happy because your Report to Congress, which was of such historic importance, has provided me with the opportunity to bring the above mentioned thoughts and assurances to your consideration, and I remain,

Yours sincerely,<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The translation of the letter is unsigned.

## 275. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, April 11, 1970, 1244Z.

1747. For the Secretary and Dpty Asst Sec Davies (NEA). Subject: Signs of Constitutional progress in Greece. Ref: Athens 1342 and 1613.<sup>2</sup>

I wish to invite your particular attention to our telegram 1743 of April 10<sup>3</sup> reporting Prime Minister Papadopoulos' announcement that key Article 10 of Constitution on habeas corpus is now in force and laying down specific timetable for completion by end of year of laws necessary fully to implement the Constitution and thus open way for ultimate elections. This represents concrete response to one of points (Athens 1342, para e) I urged upon him in my confidential message of some weeks ago. It also reinforces validity of basic course of action recommended in my March 31 report on Greece for the President which you have doubtless already seen.<sup>4</sup> As noted in my recent telegram no. 1613 of April 4, it further strengthens my conviction that we must not be deflected by temporary setbacks and aberrations arising from GOG actions from our central aim of pressing Papadopoulos to move ahead with implementing the Constitution. While I realize that this progress may be erratic and not always as clear cut as might be desired, we have no feasible policy alternative, in my view, but to continue along course of keeping the Government's nose firmly to the Constitutional grandstone. The Prime Minister's April 10 move encourages me to believe that ultimately we can be successful.

**Tasca**

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70 Secret; Exdis. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1342 from Athens, March 23, Tasca reported that Papadopoulos had told him that he might send a personal message to Nixon. (*Ibid.*, POL GREECE–US) For the message, see Document 274. In telegram 1613 from Athens, April 4, Tasca reported he was having doubts about "this strange and inept government," particularly in light of its prosecution and conviction of the publisher, editor, and managing editor of *Ethnos*. Tasca stated that this case, while not conclusive evidence of political retrogression, suggested that the United States should support Greek moderates and lean harder on the government to achieve constitutional progress. (*Ibid.*, POL GREECE)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, POL 29 GREECE)

<sup>4</sup> Document 273.

**276. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1970.

SUBJ

EUR Position with respect to the possible Resumption of Shipments of Heavy Military Equipment to Greece

I am setting forth below the likely effects upon Western Europe of the possible resumption of heavy military shipments to Greece. Given the importance of this question to our position in Europe as well as the cohesion of NATO, the formulation of alternative courses of action relating to the implementation of this policy should take account of these consequences.

Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in U.S. military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.

*1. Continued Trouble about Greece in NATO*

The Junta has been severely damaging to NATO's image in Western Europe, particularly among young people. Nevertheless, by strenuous backstage maneuvers by some of the Governments concerned, discussions of the Greek situation have been kept to a minimum in NATO fora. NATO members have recognized that open discussion either of the Greek issue or the policy of individual NATO members towards Greece would be explosive and divisive and could lead to a walk-out by Greece; the resulting constitutional question for NATO because of the absence from the Council of a Member State could be serious. Indications are that, for the foreseeable future, sentiments among NATO countries on the Greek issue will run so high that it would be dangerous and possibly permanently damaging to NATO if discussion of Greek internal matters were allowed to arise in any NATO meeting.

*2. Immediate Consequences for the Spring NATO Meetings*

If the Greek question were to be brought into prominence by a U.S. decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meeting of May 26–27 and the June 11 DPC Ministerial level meeting, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Tasca's Report on Greece. Secret. Drafted by Tibbetts and Streator on April 21 and cleared in EUR.

some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, the side effects of indirect attacks in proposed communiqué language, in ministerial statements and in corridor discussions would dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters. We could in effect anticipate Donnybrooks and expose the U.S. Delegations to highly emotional debates.

### 3. *Adverse Effects on a possible Spanish Link to NATO*

Preliminary discussions have already made it clear that our attempts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped, if at the same time the Greek question becomes active because of the resumption of shipment of heavy arms. Some NATO Members believe that to have both the Greek issue and the Spanish link prominent unduly emphasizes the issue of NATO's relationship to "dictatorships." For the near future, it appears wise to soft pedal the Greek issue if we wish to promote acceptance of a NATO relationship to Spain.

### 4. *Modalities of handling a Decision to resume Arms Shipments to Greece*

a) *NATO Consultation*: If we *consult* our NATO colleagues, we must take it for granted that much—or most—of the advice given will be negative. A NATO endorsement of our resuming arms shipments to Greece will be out of the question. Therefore, to consult in the North Atlantic Council would cause difficulties. If resumption is decided, however, the Allies, as a matter of courtesy, should be informed in advance.

b) *U.S. Announcement to NATO that it intended to resume Arms Shipments*: If we were to *inform* but not *consult* our NATO colleagues of our intention to resume arms shipments, we would, of course, relieve them of any responsibility for our decision. Attracting to ourselves the lightning in this way would not, however, really spare NATO, since in a number of Western European countries criticism of the U.S. tends to spill over into general criticism of NATO because of the dominant role of the U.S. in NATO, accusations that the U.S. does not take into account the wishes of its NATO partners in the formulation of its policies, and finally, accusations that NATO is a U.S. tool in the latter's support of dictatorships and "repressive" policies. However, this course would be less difficult than to consult.

c) *Timing to minimize adverse Consequences for U.S. Policy in NATO*: As indicated above, it is imperative that no announcements be made about the possible resumption of heavy military equipment deliveries before the NATO meetings scheduled now for May 26–27 and June 11. Laying the groundwork with our NATO colleagues before those dates could bring on the very discussion we wish to avoid.

The Italian regional and local elections are scheduled to take place on June 7. It would be desirable that news of any possible resumption of shipments by us not be announced before that date because inevitably the Communist and other anti-NATO candidates in the election would have a field-day citing the Greek issue.

To inform our NATO colleagues of the resumption of arms shipments at a time when we would attract a minimum of attention and potential Parliamentary critics are away on vacation would be best for NATO and minimize the sort of debate which will lacerate Greek feelings; the ideal time would be, therefore, in early or mid-August. If we wish to avoid the particular problem of the Scandinavian Parliaments but cannot wait for August, we should at least wait for June 22–23, when the Scandinavian Parliaments have risen for the summer.

### 5. Background

a) *Depth of Feeling concerning the Greek Question in the European Area:* Feeling concerning Greece in Western Europe runs deep and hot in most Western European countries except Spain and Portugal. Sentiments hostile to the present Greek Government spread over the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Western Europe democratic countries; it is particularly intense among Social Democrats, intellectuals and young people. None in high public positions in these countries can risk supporting the regime publicly, and many increasingly feel constrained by public pressures to openly oppose it.

Recent liberalizing moves by the Greek Government have not yet made any significant impact in alleviating anti-Greek sentiments, at least in part because they have been obscured by Greek regime actions that appear to negate what otherwise might be regarded as advances. Moreover, we expect that for some months at least skepticism concerning the extent and effects of these liberalizing moves will be widespread in Western Europe. Generally speaking, over the last three years the Greek Government has handled its public relations atrociously insofar as Western European opinion is concerned. Thus, under the best of circumstances, it will take some time for European opinion to change in a favorable direction, and if political democracy is not restored, the majority of West Europeans and their leaders will continue actively hostile. Since Greece already has been read out of the Council of Europe, liberal activists in Western Europe will now tend to turn their efforts to inspire action against Greece in NATO, with attendant risks to the future effectiveness of the Alliance.

b) *Individual Country Positions:* Norway and Denmark have been particularly opposed to the Greek Junta from the beginning. In both countries there is increasing Parliamentary pressure upon the Government to move against Greece in NATO. *The Netherlands*, along with

Norway and Denmark, has also disassociated itself from a military subcommittee report recommending military assistance to Greece; in all three of the *BENELUX* (Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands) countries the present Greek regime is highly unpopular. Dutch officials, for example, are increasingly pessimistic about their ability to contain Parliamentary pressures for action against Greece at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.

Public and Parliamentary opinion in *Italy* is also strongly anti-Greece, particularly among the Government parties. In the *U.K.* Labor Party and in *Germany* among the German Social Democrats, anti-Junta feeling is also strong; Conservative parties in both countries are more realistic. Given the fact there is almost certain to be an election in the *U.K.* this year, the British Government can be expected to be reluctant to take the lead in action which appears to favor Greece, although the British Government thoroughly agrees as to the undesirability of NATO discussion of Greece. Of the Western Europeans in NATO only *France* and *Portugal* can be described as more or less favorable to the Greek Government, and there is a good deal of anti-Greek sentiment among the French public, recently fanned by outspoken opponent and leading journalistic figure Servan-Schreiber.

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**277. Letter From the Country Director for Greece (Vigderman) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1970.

Dear Henry:

The Under Secretaries Committee met on Thursday<sup>2</sup> to consider recommendations to the President following the receipt of your report.<sup>3</sup>

Under Secretary Richardson presided, Art Hartman was Secretary, and in attendance were Joe Sisco, Frank Shakespeare, Warren Nutter, Robert Pranger, Rodger Davies, Margaret Tibbetts, General Chapman and me.

The discussion seems to have led to the following conclusions: (I need to stress that what the group concluded can only be tested following the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Resumption of Military Aid to Greece. Secret; Nodis; Official-*Informal*. Cleared by Hartman (S/PC) in draft.

<sup>2</sup> April 30.

<sup>3</sup> Document 273.

circulation of a paper which is now in preparation.<sup>4</sup> The precision of decision which is set down here may be somewhat misleading.)

1. It was agreed that there should be no public disclosure of the decision to resume aid until after the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting which takes place on June 11.

2. The timing of the announcement of a decision to resume aid would have to be appraised thereafter in the light of the then existing Congressional situation. (Opportunity to attack and danger to Administration measures, particularly Foreign Military Aid bills.)

3. In the context of the delivery of the President's reply to the Prime Minister's letter, you might be authorized (a) to tell the Prime Minister that the President was taking him at his word on constitutional reform, (b) explain our strategy for avoiding a divisive NATO discussion, (c) advert to the Congressional problem, and (d) say that we hope to have a decision some time in June, and, finally (and without commitment) suggest to the Prime Minister that once we have the NATO and Congressional problem behind us, we will be in a position to examine in a very positive spirit the question of resuming arms shipments, including a public announcement.

Sincerely,

Alfred G. Vigderman<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 278.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**278. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Deliveries of Suspended Military Shipments to Greece

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation reads: "Haig—FYI action—Saunders Info—HAK." The enclosures are attached but not printed here. Enclosure 1, Ambassador Tasca's report, is Document 273; Enclosure 2, Papadopoulos' letter to President Nixon, is Document 275. Ambassador Tasca was informed of the recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in telegram 82138 to Athens, May 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I) See also Document 277.

The Under Secretaries Committee has been asked to consider courses of action for carrying out the recommendations in Ambassador Tasca's "Report on Greece."

*Background*

Last November you instructed Ambassador Tasca to tell the Greek Prime Minister that you were prepared to lift the suspension of all items of military aid.<sup>2</sup> At the same time our Ambassador was to make clear that movement by the Greek Government toward a constitutional situation would ease our problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. Ambassador Tasca was to report the Greek Government's response, and, following your review and approval, we were to begin to ship the suspended items at a gradual pace beginning with the less dramatic items.

Ambassador Tasca's report has now been received (Enclosure No. 1). Ambassador Tasca has also transmitted a letter to you from the Greek Prime Minister (discussed below) which bears on the question of movement toward constitutional normality in Greece.

*Ambassador Tasca's Report*

Ambassador Tasca concludes:

- that our policy should be based on the assumption that the present regime in Greece is here to stay,
- that the withholding of military equipment has proved ineffective in accelerating the return to democratic government and is indeed beginning to undermine Greece's strength,
- that if the United States does not provide Greece with military aid, the Greek Government will turn to other countries to buy the military equipment Greece needs, thus creating logistics problems for the Greeks, and weakening United States ties with the Greek military establishment and government.

We should therefore

- lift the suspension on the delivery of military equipment and continue grant military aid for Greece at an adequate level.

At the same time we should continue to press the Greek regime to return to representative and constitutional government. The regime attaches primary importance to the approbation of the United States and the American people. We should use this far more positive tool in dealing with Athens, rather than the unrelated and counter-productive one of restricting military aid. Forceful, persistent, but friendly persuasion will be our best tactic.

The Ambassador is satisfied that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward, albeit at its own often reluctant pace,

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 262.

with its program to implement the constitution and return Greece to a more representative form of government. He also doubts that progress towards representative democracy will be sufficiently dramatic or rapid to satisfy fully Greece's vocal critics here and abroad. Only the fixing of a date for elections would suit them.

*Developments in Greece Since November*

The Greek Government has taken some positive steps in the direction of the restoration of civil liberties. But the Greek Government has only a very primitive understanding of what it must do to improve its image in Western Europe. It tends to announce measures which would earn it credit at precisely the moment when it is attracting hostile criticism to itself for its arbitrary behavior in suppressing political opposition.

We agree with Ambassador Tasca that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward with its program to return Greece to a more representative form of government, though its progress so far is slow and the record is spotty. This conviction is not shared by some of Greece's NATO partners (chiefly the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch) nor, broadly, by certain elements in the Congress, some of whom show intense concern on this question. These critics assert that the Greek Government has retrogressed instead of making progress toward constitutionalism and that the United States (and NATO) should disassociate itself from a regime which has earned so much moral obloquy.

*The NATO Problem*

Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in United States military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.

If the Greek question were to be highlighted by a United States decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meetings of May 26–27 and June 11, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, indirect attacks on Greece could harmfully dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters.

Public opinion in Western Europe generally with respect to Greece has not improved in recent months; and there is already mounting political pressure upon some NATO governments (Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands) to raise the question of Greece in NATO, alleging that the undemocratic nature of the regime is a matter of concern to the Alliance. Together with the British, Germans and Italians we have

made démarches in the Scandinavian and Benelux capitals to stress the need to avoid raising Greece in NATO. We are hoping that these démarches will succeed but we cannot be sure.

With respect to NATO, we conclude therefore:

a) The damage to NATO from an increase in United States military aid to Greece can be reduced if the decision is announced after the May and June NATO Ministerial Meetings.

b) Our efforts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped if consideration of the link comes at a moment when the Greek question is active, simply because of the emphasis the two issues would give to NATO's relationship to two "dictatorships."

c) In order to avoid implying that our NATO partners can share the responsibility for the decision to resume arms shipments, it is better to *inform* our NATO partners rather than to *consult* with them since we could never secure a favorable NATO verdict on this question.

d) A disruptive and noisy NATO discussion on the subject of Greece would complicate our Congressional problem by highlighting Greece as a weakness of the Alliance rather than as a positive element.

#### *The Congressional Problem*

The problem with Congress raised by the resumption of the shipment of the suspended military equipment is at least of equal gravity, posing a major public relations problem for the Administration vis-à-vis the Congress. Severe emotional attacks both in the Congress and the press are anticipated. It seems inevitable that the decision to lift the suspension of arms shipments will trigger an effort on the part of Congressional critics to restrict the freedom of the Executive through amendment of one or another pieces of legislation then before the Congress. The targets for such action might include the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Second Supplemental Appropriation.

The intensity of public feeling in the United States and among our allies in Western Europe and the consequent impact on the Congress suggests the virtue of a joint State-Defense presentation of the decision on the resumption of arms shipments to the Congressional leadership, augmented by the Chairman and ranking minority members of key committees.

#### *The Prime Minister's Letter*

The Greek Prime Minister has transmitted a letter to you (Enclosure No. 2) relating to the restoration of parliamentary government in Greece. The key language in the letter is the Greek Prime Minister's assertion that "the situation is being led with steadfastness toward political normality and parliamentary government on the basis of the November 15 constitution. . ." In another place the Prime Minister asserts that the "Greek Government has no intention whatsoever to deviate from the full restitution of political normality or to slacken its pace."

A suggestion for your reply is enclosed at Enclosure No. 3.<sup>3</sup>

It is not yet clear the degree to which the exchange between you and the Prime Minister can be used to help persuade critics of the regime that the regime does in fact firmly intend to return the country to parliamentary democracy. The effective use of the exchange depends in part on the Prime Minister's willingness to agree to the publication of the text of the two letters or, alternatively, the substance of the letters.

*Recommendations*

The Under Secretaries Committee recommends:

1. That no announcement be made public concerning the resumption of arms shipments before the NATO Ministerial Meeting and the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers are behind us (the latter meeting takes place on June 11).

2. That after the June 11 NATO meeting, we will resume the shipment of the arms now withheld (and make a public announcement of our decision) unless it appears that the resumption of arms shipments would seriously jeopardize any of the legislation in the Administration's foreign aid program, and also taking into account other Congressional foreign policy considerations.

3. That Ambassador Tasca be authorized to inform the Greek Prime Minister of the decision along the following lines:

a) that the President was taking him at his word on the question of constitutional reform.

b) that the President is prepared to resume the normal shipment of military equipment to Greece, including all the items which have been suspended.

c) that there is a serious problem with some elements of Congress who are in a position to attack and perhaps to endanger foreign aid legislation which neither the Greek Government nor the United States Government would like to see endangered; this is a fact of political life in the United States which must be recognized.

d) that we will keep the developing Congressional situation under intensive review in order to choose the earliest appropriate moment at which it will be possible to begin the resumption of arms shipments, and to make a public announcement that we are doing so. As is obvious, premature advance speculation from Greek sources about the President's intention to resume arms shipments will necessarily delay the resumption of arms shipments to Greece.

As regards *timing*, it is proposed:

a) that Ambassador Tasca speak to the Greek Prime Minister in the sense of these instructions promptly after you have authorized Am-

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

bassador Tasca to transmit to the Greek Prime Minister your reply to the Prime Minister's letter.

b) that when a decision has been made as to an appropriate time to proceed to resumption of the shipment of the military equipment on the suspended list we would inform selected Members of Congress as well as our NATO partners shortly before the public announcement.

ELR

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**279. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Greek Resistance Journalist Wants to See You and Mrs. Nixon

Mrs. Eleni Vlachou, a prominent Greek newspaper woman widely known for her disapproval of the present Greek government, is in Washington this week and is asking to see you and Mrs. Nixon. State would like to have your views on both of these appointments.

Mrs. Vlachou was well known as the owner of two Athens dailies which she suspended in protest immediately after the 1967 coup. Thereafter arrested for insulting the new government, she evaded authorities and went into exile in London where for two years she has been lobbying hard against the junta, both in speaking engagements and in her writings. (I see from the *New York Times Book Review* yesterday that she has just published a book called *House Arrest*.) Her contact in Washington—also an anti-junta personage—is Elias P. Demetracopoulos, a not-too-responsible journalist and leader of the Greek resistance movement in this country. He has been trying to arrange prominent appearances for her on the Hill, at the National Press Club and on “Meet the Press.”

She is apparently here to ascertain the true U.S. feeling about the situation in Greece, presumably for future writing in Europe. State (attached)<sup>2</sup> feels that on the one hand, open reception by high government

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Confidential. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

officials here would cause some unhappiness in Athens; on the other, they believe that hearing her out would signal that this Administration is willing to listen to all sides. They have therefore recommended (1) that she not see the Vice President (which she is trying to do) because of the possibility of journalistic exploitation by her of such a meeting; (2) that she not see Mrs. Nixon (Mrs. Nixon should not be subjected to this kind of problem); but (3) that a meeting with you would pose no difficulties.

*Recommendations*

1. I feel that this is not the kind of situation which we want to involve Mrs. Nixon in and recommend against the appointment.<sup>3</sup>

2. I do not see the necessity of your seeing Mrs. Vlachou either. I doubt you have much to say to the exiles or want to be exploited for their purposes. I recommend *against* your seeing her.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Kissinger initialed the approval option.

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger initialed the approval option on June 15 and added in a handwritten note: "In other words neither of us sees her."

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**280. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 10, 1970, 1536Z.

2965. Subject: Pipinelis' meeting with King Constantine.

1. At our meeting today Pipinelis gave me a fill-in on his meeting with King Constantine in Rome. He said this was frank and complete account and he requested I respect his confidence.

2. Prior to his departure for Rome Pipinelis had informed Prime Minister Papadopoulos of his intention to see King. He told him he would review agenda of NATO meeting with King and would indicate position of Greek Government on various items on agenda. This was cause of lengthy meeting. Pipinelis commented that he found the King very well informed regarding the various items on the agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis.

3. He then suggested to the King that he seek a meeting with Prime Minister since time ripe for his return to Greece, pointing out to King regime now firmly established, economy booming in extraordinary fashion, and his return important with respect to future stability of country and firmness of timetable for return to parliamentary democracy. In an aside, FonMin told me he greatly concerned that King come back to guarantee that Papadopoulos's commitment to return to parliamentary democracy, which he is deeply convinced is sincere, be backed up by King in Greece on throne, since disappearance of Papadopoulos could be catastrophic for future of Greek democracy.

4. King said he eager to meet with PM. In reply to my question why King did not come out publicly for arms aid to Greece, which we knew he favored, FonMin said that King ready and eager to back up arms aid to Greece, but that this must come after a meeting with PM reviewing entire situation but based upon an implementation of the 1968 Constitution.

5. Pipinelis then revealed that meeting between the two almost took place last year but that PM backed out at least minute. During their December meeting last year Pipinelis again suggested to King a meeting with PM. He said he had made clear to King that meeting would not necessarily lead to immediate action. King was also informed of opposition on part of younger, middle grade officers to his return. When asked by King what he should talk about, Pipinelis told King there was nothing regarding his return to talk about since Constitution contains necessary provision regarding return of King.

6. Pipinelis firmly denied any differences with King or any instructions by Papadopoulos in the nature of an ultimatum. He believes hostile press deliberately seeking to drive deeper wedge between King and the regime.

7. In reply to my question as to where a meeting between King and Prime Minister might take place, FonMin said "early aboard some ship, as absolute secrecy must be preserved."

**Tasca**

**281. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 12, 1970, 1608Z.

3034. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. I met with Prime Minister Papadopoulos today accompanied by Admiral Richardson,<sup>2</sup> whom PM expressed desire to see. The PM expressed his fears regarding Soviet intentions in Eastern Mediterranean, particularly possible effort on part of Soviets to open up Suez by driving Israelis back from Canal. PM also said that in his view major target of Soviets in this decade is Africa, particularly North Africa. PM was also concerned that in face of rising Soviet threat cohesiveness of Alliance shows signs of serious weakness as reflected in political attacks on NATO member Greece inspired ultimately by political warfare tactics of Soviets, as well as in increasing weaknesses of military contribution to common defense on northern flank. PM said in reply to Admiral Richardson's expression of appreciation for facilities granted US Navy in Crete that there was no need to mention or even thank Greece for these facilities now. Our interests were common and it was in Greek interest to make these facilities available.

2. In reply we stressed importance of Greek contribution within a strong alliance, whose cohesiveness is indispensable to NATO strength. PM countered by saying that cohesiveness was important but could be purchased at disastrous price if prerequisite for Scandinavians of bringing back Papandreou were to be fulfilled, a possibility which he completely excluded. PM asked where would cohesiveness principle be for Scandinavians if US were to request NATO assistance in extreme contingency arising out of Middle East conflict.

3. I told PM I might be leaving for US in next several days on consultation. He said he would never again raise question of US military assistance because he questioned seriously whether US had the capacity to overcome resistance to aid to Greece, such a denial of aid being a high priority Soviet political warfare objective against the US. Greece would be faithful to the alliance but it would buy to the extent necessary the arms it needed to defend the country against communism, however costly these might be.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral David C. Richardson, Commander of the Sixth Fleet.

4. In reply I noted President's deep preoccupation with Vietnam and the repercussions from his great and courageous decision to move against Hanoi's forces in Cambodia,<sup>3</sup> a problem which would not have arisen had his predecessors acted to move against the use of the Communist sanctuaries to attack our own and allied troops in South Vietnam. I also pointed to the problem of NATO cohesiveness, the maintenance of which is an objective worth supporting. Finally, I stressed again the importance of public opinion in the US, particularly as it affected the Senate.

5. At this point I sought to put question of military aid into perspective, noting our mutual obligations under the Alliance and stating that no country could stand alone. Thus, it most important that we keep strategic aspects of our friendship continuously in foreground. An alliance of free countries required above all patience and understanding for success. This was more important than military requirements, vital as the latter might be.

6. *Comment:* I found PM deeply friendly as usual towards the US, but clearly depressed by inability of US to act at a time of great danger to the West. His attribution of our inabilities to Soviet political warfare tactics may appear far-fetched, but the fact is he does not understand what he appears to see as our political incapacity to face up to public opinion in face of the growing Soviet threat, while taking into consideration the great dedication of Greece to NATO and even more its friendship with the US, and its status as a country publicly committed to a democratic course. I think we should take very seriously indeed his statement that Greece will purchase arms elsewhere (particularly from France). With French attitude toward the Mediterranean and the Arab-Israeli crisis being what they seem to be, in addition to the other reasons set forth in my report to the President, I fear we may even lose a good deal of the flexibility which we have enjoyed to date in this most friendly country. This is not to mention the loss of bases for the US which are important to the balance of payments equilibrium and currency stability.

7. Request Dept pass this message to USMission NATO.

**Tasca**

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<sup>3</sup> On April 30 President Nixon announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia to destroy the North Vietnamese Army's line of communications. The decision set off a serious protest in the United States. For the text of Nixon's statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 405-410.

## 282. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### SUBJECT

Your Talk with Ambassador Tasca—Wednesday, June 17

*Background.* You decided in principle last November<sup>2</sup> to resume normal military shipments to Greece but asked Ambassador Tasca to work out the delicate relationship between resumption and Greece's return to constitutional government. This relationship is important in blunting liberal criticism in NATO and in our Congress.

Ambassador Tasca has sent you a report<sup>3</sup> (in your NSC book) recommending that Prime Minister Papadopoulos be told that your decision to resume has been made and that actual shipments will begin as soon as we are in a position to claim Congressional support. He believes the government can then be encouraged to continue toward elections.

Secretary Rogers came back from the Rome NATO meeting feeling that implementation of the Tasca report should be delayed because of the strong feeling against Greece in NATO capitals.

The *tactical issue* is how to stage resumption so as not to trigger a sharp reaction in NATO capitals or a further attack on the Foreign Military Sales Act.

—Many in State argue that we must wait until both the authorization act and the appropriation have passed.

—Tasca is arguing that we move as soon as the Hartke amendment to the act is voted on and, presumably, defeated. [This would prohibit aid to Greece. Tasca argues that we should interpret its defeat as a Congressional green light and quietly go ahead.]<sup>4</sup> He feels, as far as NATO is concerned, that we just have to argue hard the importance of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret. Sent for information and action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to a June 16 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger: "Ambassador Tasca has received word—presumably from Secretary Rogers—that the President would like to see him 'some time after Thursday.' The Ambassador is not pressing this, but of course wishes to do what the President would like. He does feel that he should get back to Athens quickly since he is without a DCM right now and the embassy is in the hands of the second team." Saunders suggested that the President speak briefly with Tasca after the June 17 NSC meeting. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 262.

<sup>3</sup> Document 273.

<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the original. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted this amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971 banning sales to Greece. The amendment was defeated in the Senate on June 29, 50–42.

Greece to maintaining a strong US–NATO position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ambassador Tasca has been working while here on an inter-departmental memo to you detailing a plan for carrying out his proposal, including a message from you to Prime Minister Papadopoulos. This memo should come to you in a few days and will be useful in preparing your decision memorandum.

*The points to make to Tasca today are:*<sup>5</sup>

1. You still favor early resumption, as you told him last November.
2. You will want to hear Secretary Rogers' views on Congressional and NATO opinion but will make a decision in a few days.
3. You will clear a reply to Prime Minister Papadopoulos as soon as you get the inter-departmental memo.

*The points to make at the NSC*<sup>6</sup> *are:*

1. Greece is increasingly important, given Soviet pressures in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. You will be making a decision on this issue shortly and would like to have the inter-departmental memo *this week*.

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<sup>5</sup> A note attached to the memorandum reads: "Mr. President—Henry wants the following item added to the points you should make to Amb. Tasca: 'You want him to return to Greece immediately. You do *not* think it advisable that he appear before the Senate For. Relations Committee.' a. 2:30 p.m." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 283.

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### 283. Editorial Note

On June 17, 1970, the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with President Richard Nixon to discuss U.S. policy toward the Mediterranean, with particular reference to Italy and Greece. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:11 to 4:44 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Ambassador Henry Tasca, who was in Washington for consultations, attended.

The meeting began with a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, who stressed U.S. interest in the southern flank of Europe, the security of Israel, and the security of oil shipments for Europe from the Middle East. Helms then noted that the Soviet Union in the 1950s provided arms to radical Arab states and in the 1960s estab-

lished a naval presence in the Mediterranean. Helms stated that the Soviets were planning to stay in the Mediterranean. After noting the Soviet provision of air defense to Egypt and the continued strength of the Communist Party in Italy, Helms turned to Greece and Turkey:

“In Greece and Turkey—Turkey is firmly committed to its NATO ties and is almost certain to remain in NATO. But while they will exert more vigorous influence in the Alliance, they will probably continue to expand their relations with Moscow, particularly in the economic field. Moscow has played both sides in the Cyprus situation.”

The President then called upon his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, who stated that while the NSC had made an extensive examination of the whole area, the discussion at the meeting on the operational side would concentrate on Italy and Greece. Kissinger noted that the United States faced a number of questions including the following: “To what extent that we continue to seek containment of Soviet power, can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from a security point of view?”

After a discussion of Spain, North Africa, and Malta, Secretary of State William Rogers raised the issue of NATO and Greece:

“Brosio is very worried about the future of NATO. He wanted to head the Scandinavians off to avoid a Greek walkout. It was a tough meeting. The Dane was concerned about the U.S. giving military aid to Greece. We urged the Greeks not to walk out. The Dane finally decided on a milder speech than he earlier planned. The Greek thanked me and agreed to ask his government to move as much as it can. The Norwegians and Danes wanted us to get the Greeks to do something visible before we go ahead with military supply.

“President: The decision has to be in two different parts: NATO-related arms, and arms related to internal defense.

“Rogers: The decision is as to timing. It’s possible that Norway and the Danes may leave. If we could get the Greeks to do something, we’d be O.K. They have already said they will stop the military courts and return to civilian rule. If they could announce this, that would be all that’s needed for us.

“Amb. Tasca: They will do it.

“President: The idea is not to blackjack them but to work out a deal privately.

“Tasca: We want to avoid a situation where those who are against us charge that we haven’t done anything.

“President: [To Sec. Rogers]: Do the Europeans understand the dangers in the situation?

“Rogers: Yes, they understand. Any weakening will be a source of great concern.”

The President then led the discussion toward the issue of U.S. military posture, especially if the United States received a request for support from Lebanon or Jordan. The President then returned to Greece as follows:

"President: What about the King of Greece? What's his situation?

"VP: It's hard to judge, but . . .

"Tasca: He's had many faults in the past. There is great opposition to him among the younger and middle officers.

"President: What do they want?

"Tasca: They want a Republic. The Army is more of this mind than the others because of their background. They think the King might put in older exiled officers. If the King was prepared to make a statement that he wants the Greeks to have arms, that could help reconcile the various groups.

"President: I know him reasonably well. He has strong qualities. His father was a decent man. He has good points but was pulled and hauled by the radicals. He's idealistic but he was exploited. Could he be persuaded to do that? The symbol of the King is good in Greece. In his self-interest, he doesn't have the political sophistication to know that those outside really don't support him. If he could get a statement on arms, action on arms, and go ahead with a promise to have a constitutional government by the end of the year. . . .

"Tasca: They never had made a promise before to do this by the end of the year.

"Rogers: The NATO people don't believe they'll do it.

"VP: What is the Soviet attitude?

"Tasca: They are knocking on two doors: They're trying to discredit this government, and at the same time they're trying to queer its relations with the U.S. to get us out of Greece.

"VP: Who stimulates the public relations figures in the U.S.? The Greek-American Committee is amazed.

"Tasca: The International Red Cross tell us—they have free access—that they don't believe the torture stories. This may have been in the first 18 months—on Communists who were in the '40s civil war—but not anymore now.

"Rogers: We have to realize that regardless of the facts, the young people in Europe believe them. We can't afford to lose them all. The Europeans say they haven't done anything.

"Tasca: They do have serious problems. They don't understand their image problems abroad.

"VP: I don't believe there are groupings of 'young people,' 'poor people.' These constituencies don't exist. They are diverse.

“President: One thing is relevant: The USIA people say that the only major U.S. paper they see in Europe is the *Herald-Tribune*. That’s basically the *New York Times* and *Post*. The TV in Europe is state-controlled and leftist-oriented. What is involved is a barrage of propaganda unfavorable to the U.S.—and also a negative picture of the Greeks. The idea is that the U.S. shouldn’t give arms and then the Greeks would change. They’d change alright, but the wrong way. In 1947 I visited Greece as a young Congressman. I talked to guerrillas—who were probably properly coached—and I came back convinced that the Greek-Turkish Aid program should go forward. I got a barrage of cards and letters saying, ‘Don’t give arms, give food to Greece.’ The left was against giving arms. The major difference is that in the 1950’s it was unfashionable to support Communists but it is no longer so. People now say they don’t care about the security of Europe; they want the Greeks to be pure. I don’t know what would happen at the lower levels in Europe. I know what I’d do—we need the Greeks because of 10 divisions, and the Mid-east. We don’t like the government but we’d like its successor less. We can’t do this, of course. Papandreou is a cold-eyed tough guy of the left. We have to do it right. Constantine should come back for his interest and Greece’s interest and tell them we believe they should move and say they will move.

“VP: Has the media and opinion effect really been examined? The media here are not representative. Couldn’t this be true in other countries, too?

“President: The American leader class—the intellectuals, the media, etc.—they have a viewpoint that makes them no longer fit for leadership. The strength of America is in the ‘hard-hats’—the stevedores, the working people, some in the colleges. But American opinion in a hard decision could be with you. It’s not so in Europe. Luns, who’s a tough man, said that on TV.

“Rogers: One thing of the difference between the young and the old: The young don’t remember the war and they have no sense of history.

“President: Tasca, you go back and try to get it done. If we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; we’ve got to lead. We’ve got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we weren’t there, they’d be terrified. We look all the more important because the Europeans can’t sell security to their own people.

“Rogers: All they really ask us to do is do it wisely—not the Danes and Norwegians—but they help us by taking our problems into consideration.

“Tasca: We care about it but we want to talk and bring the Greeks along. The Greeks are very friendly.”

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The discussion then turned to the role of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-028, NSC Meeting—The Mediterranean 6/17/70) The full account of this NSC meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

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## 284. National Security Decision Memorandum 67<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 25, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

Based on the NSC discussion of June 17<sup>2</sup> and the memorandum from the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, "Resumption of Deliveries of Suspended Military Shipments to Greece,"<sup>3</sup> the President has approved the following as the principal elements in a course of action to implement the decision to resume arms shipments to Greece:

—Prime Minister Papadopoulos may be told in advance and in strictest confidence of the U.S. intention to resume military shipments after, in our judgment, such resumption will no longer seriously jeopardize the Foreign Military Sales bill and assuming legislative authority for such resumption.

—In this connection, he may be told that our target for resumption is about September 1.

—The Prime Minister should be further informed that in connection with the resumption it is anticipated that there will be further specific steps which we can cite as further evidence of progress toward full constitutional government. The Prime Minister can be told that the U.S. takes at face value and accepts without reservation his assurances on moving toward parliamentary democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-217, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 67. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 283.

<sup>3</sup> Document 278.

The U.S. Ambassador in Greece should be given discretion on the question of timing of (a) the delivery of the letter from the President to the Prime Minister; (b) advice to the Prime Minister of our intention to resume shipments; and (c) informing him of the necessity of specific further evidence of progress toward constitutional government in Greece.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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**285. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, July 6, 1970, 1615Z.

3586. Ref: State 105703.<sup>2</sup> For Assistant Secretary Sisco From Ambassador Tasca.

1. While I appreciate fact that there widespread belief both within Executive branch and Congress that Greek Government would be in far better position to normalize its relations with its allies if King were to return, I would like you to have some thoughts of mine on the practical problems involved. I think these might be useful for you and your colleagues in NEA when the subject is raised by members of Congress and others.

2. Question of regime normalizing its relations with King runs into three important obstacles, most formidable of which is that there is widespread animosity within regime towards King. Feeling runs so high that Papadopoulos could only normalize his relations with the King at this time by running risk of endangering his own position and at the least his program for Constitutional progress. From what we know of internal situation within regime there are substantial number of coup group members who simply will not agree to King's return at this time. If they were convinced Papadopoulos working to bring King back, it might no longer be possible to carry them along on question of Constitutional implementation, to which they have only reluctantly agreed at best.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 2, it reported Sisco's meeting with the Under Secretary of the Prime Minister. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE)

3. Regime, I am convinced, is firmly entrenched, and it is only through regime that we can hope to achieve our objective of making Greece again fully acceptable to European governments and peoples and American public opinion; and for this reason alone question of King's return involves serious problems for us. But, in addition, it should be remembered that King is not the unifying force he may appear when removed in time and space from the Greek scene. Constantine was always highly controversial, and he opposed the very progressive forces which we would like ultimately to play a role again in Greece's development. It is not only the left which would be incensed by US efforts promote King's return but the solid majority of progressive moderate opinion. They consider King as bearing large share of responsibility for breakdown in democracy prior to coup, and quite rightly so.

4. Finally, even on right of political spectrum and within army King is by no means the unifying force he might be. Serious doubts are entertained about Constantine by a number of influential rightists (Eleni Vlachou is one example that comes to mind); and in middle grade of Greek army officer corps, King is thoroughly unpopular. He has in fact showed consistent immaturity in action and lack of the intellectual qualities that would enable him to deal with delicate situation in Greece today. His continuing flirtation with enemies of regime is typical, and we should bear in mind that regime leaders are intelligence officers by profession and are quite well informed on King's activities.<sup>3</sup>

5. In addition to his activities which displease regime, perhaps even more important is King's failure to speak out in favor of full military assistance for Greece, so that Greek people may be defended against external aggression regardless of type of government which they may have at moment.

6. Having said this, I would like to make it clear that I am not implying that King has no role to play in Greece. But this role can only come about when and if regime feels it must regularize its relations with the monarchy. It may well be that we will have to play an intermediary role between King and regime. However, based on my analysis of situation, this can only take place to extent climate improves in regard to King, and even then we must act only with closest agreement

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3758 from Athens, July 13, Tasca reported that during a July 11 meeting with Papadopoulos, the two men discussed the future of the monarchy. The Greek Prime Minister expressed strong personal dislike for King Constantine but stressed his own monarchism. Tasca concluded that abdication might be the regime's answer and that "Prime Minister's almost totally negative attitude on King may reflect belief that at this point King is mainly Trojan Horse for regime opponents." (Ibid.)

Prime Minister Papadopoulos. Despite his faults, King may be needed in this situation at some point. (As Department aware King, in interim, is being kept financially by regime; and Constitution provides for his return after elections.) But our first requirement must be that he return under conditions that do not prejudice US interests here. In no case should it ever appear that US instrumental in any way in his return. I have King very much in mind as I follow the Greek scene, and I think you can count on me to give you every indication of opportunities that may arise for using his position to further our interests here.

Tasca

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**286. Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, July 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

*[less than 1 line not declassified]* Action to Support U.S. Policy Aims in Greece

1. In my report of March 31,<sup>2</sup> I analysed the Greek situation and submitted my recommendations. Essentially, I proposed—

- a. Restoral of the suspended portion of MAP for Greece and the future maintenance of MAP at adequate levels, and
- b. Continued pressure on the Greek Regime to encourage the earliest possible implementation of the 1968 Constitution.

2. Basic assumptions—The present Government is firmly in control of the Greek internal situation, the opposition within Greece has no effective short-range means at their disposal to effect the overthrow of the present Government, Soviet long-range policy towards Greece aims at separating Greece from NATO, isolating Greece from its natural allies in Europe, denying use of Greek soil to the U.S., thus neutralizing Greece as a U.S. ally, then hopefully leading Greece into the neutralist camp and ultimately the Communist sphere of influence à la the Arab world.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Document 273.

### 3. Supplementary assumptions—

a. Papadopoulos, as the leading figure in the collegiate Greek Regime, has the greatest breadth of those in his group. I believe he sincerely intends to implement the constitution and restructure Greek political life, though he has not been explicit as to the timing of the last step—elections.

b. Some of the other Revolutionary officers are less enthusiastic than Papadopoulos about implementing the 1968 Constitution. (For a discussion of the dynamics of the present Regime, see my telegram Limdis Athens—970 of March 2, 1970.)<sup>3</sup>

c. In addition to our quiet diplomacy and personal persuasion, to advance the date of full implementation of the 1968 Constitution, and to influence the Greek Government to take other public steps to improve its reputation at home and abroad, [*1½ lines not declassified*]:

(1) To influence Greek authorities to relax security restrictions, to reduce resort to and hopefully to end martial law, and to adhere to its commitments to implement the 1968 Constitution.

(2) To influence the Greek authorities to avoid other repressive measures which do political damage to Greece without filling a decisive security need.

(3) To promote the concept of a reconciliation of the various non-Communist factions within Greece.

4. The time has now come to move even more positively in direct support of our aims here in Greece as well as in opposition to the well identified Soviet and other Communist tactics. Specifically, I therefore recommend that the Department obtain interagency approval for a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] program which would embrace these five points—

a. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] steps to facilitate implementation of the 1968 Constitution by convincing doubtful elements within the Regime of the practicality of this move, encouraging those elements who are already disposed in that direction and building up momentum in public media in Greece and abroad for a sincere implementation of the Constitution.

b. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] steps to counter Communist efforts to exploit the Greek issue to split NATO and to isolate Greece by breaking her economic, political, and military ties with Western Europe and North America.

c. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] steps to assist in rebuilding democratic institutions in Greece through the provision of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] advice and assistance and the persuasion of key Revolutionary officers that elections under the 1968 Constitution will be in their long-range interest. (It is in U.S. interest to see healthy institutions created and a return to the chaotic period of 1966 avoided.)

d. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] steps to encourage closer ties of Greece with the non-Communist Western world, ties which have been strained in the period since April 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Document 269.

e. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to expose Communist and Soviet tactics and duplicity and to thwart Soviet purposes in Greece.

5. The above program would not be expensive. Indeed it is not today a question of large sums of money. Rather we need approval of a modest program (of perhaps \$35,000 in FY 1971) designed to keep matters in Greece moving in such a direction that we may avoid much more serious and disturbing problems at a later date.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In a July 14 message to Tasca, Sisco and Davies indicated “interest” in the proposal and requested a more detailed analysis of the “types of activity and what you have in mind.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972) In his August 5 reply, Tasca outlined a series of steps that could be taken to employ the Greek and foreign press to build support for implementation of the 1968 Constitution and to expose Communist propaganda operations. He also suggested providing advice to junta leaders on the creation of viable political and economic-social movements to support their continuance as a force in a restructured democratic state. (Ibid.) In an August 19 memorandum to Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), James Gardner (INR) reported that a message to Tasca had been approved authorizing implementation “of those parts of the Ambassador’s proposal that are aimed at leading the regime toward regular constitutional practices and those that are directed against Communist forces. It disapproves those that are designed to popularize the regime with the Greek people or to arouse perhaps unjustified hopes among the Greek people about the future course of the regime. The response also concludes that none of the approved actions is so unusual or serious as to require interagency consideration in the 40 Committee.” (Ibid.)

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## 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 27, 1970, 1647Z.

119968. Ref: Athens 3994 and 3996.<sup>2</sup> For Ambassador from the Secretary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vigerdman on July 24 cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Tibbetts, Eliot, and Springsteen; and approved by Rogers.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3994 from Athens, July 22, Tasca warned Sisco that putting excessive pressure on Papadopoulos for liberalization would play into the hands of extremists within the ruling group. (Ibid.) Telegram 3996 from Athens, July 22, reported on efforts by Tasca and Ellsworth in discussions with Papadopoulos to secure Greek political cooperation within NATO in an effort to head off further challenges from the Nordic states to the regime. (Ibid.)

1. I have read your telegram reporting your meeting with the Prime Minister in company with Ambassador Ellsworth, as well as your message to Sisco on what we can and should expect from the Greeks in connection with the resumption of the suspended arms shipments.

2. I do not need to tell you how serious is our continuing problem in NATO because of the Scandinavian drive in various ways to get at the Greeks. In this connection, I am concerned that Papadopoulos has reacted to the latest complication in NATO created by the Danes to announce that he will postpone further constitutional progress until the issue with the Danes is resolved.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that the Prime Minister does not yet really fully comprehend our own deep need for speed and conviction in Greek moves in the direction of political normality. We cannot accept a link between action on the DPC report and further constitutional progress.

3. Our second problem is of course domestic and Congressional opinion. The situation remains as before. In the Senate we have had another demonstration (too close for comfort) of the strength of the minority which would cut off shipment of military items to Greece.<sup>4</sup>

4. Our decision to resume arms shipments reflects our willingness to accept a considerable risk in our relations with our other allies as well as with the body of our domestic critics. We believe it is reasonable to expect that the Greek Govt should be willing to accept some risk on its part to help create the atmosphere in which we can live with these risks. I hope that we can have some indications very soon of specific steps the Greek Govt can take which would be incontrovertible evidence of relaxation. Lifting of martial law and the announcement of a date for municipal elections come to mind as steps which should not greatly disturb the course of the "revolution" and would have considerable impact.

5. We are relying on the excellent relations you have established with the Greek Govt to permit you to discuss this with the members of the regime on a friendly, helpful and firm basis. I fully appreciate the special delicacy of your job.

**Rogers**

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<sup>3</sup> The Danish Government raised the issue of the suitability of Greece for NATO membership.

<sup>4</sup> Apparent reference to the defeat of the Hartke amendment.

**288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1970, 2041Z.

129729. For Ambassador from Secretary. We note with interest GOG has announced, with some fanfare which has been well noted in our press, release of 500 prisoners.<sup>2</sup> I have reviewed carefully your telegrams on your talks with Papadopolous in which you have pressed him to take two steps as a means to help us go ahead on the announcement of the raising of the suspension of the arms embargo. In view of this step on the prisoners, I would like you to go back to Papadopolous and tell him that if he can move quickly on one, not necessarily both of the above steps, this would provide us with sufficient help that we could then announce at the end of the month the lifting of the suspension. Either lifting of martial law or announcement of municipal elections combined with announcement of release of prisoners should provide us with enough ammunition to go ahead on decision with respect to arms you have already given him. I leave to your ingenuity how to put this to PM to avoid implication that we are establishing direct conditionality.<sup>3</sup>

**Rogers**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I. Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Silva, Davies, Tibbetts, and Eliot; NEA, EUR and S, and approved by Rogers.

<sup>2</sup> On August 18 the junta announced it would release 500 Communist prisoners.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4600 from Athens, August 20, Tasca reported that he had had discussions with Papadopoulos on the issue of the lifting of martial law even before receiving the Secretary's telegram. "Indications that I have received have definitely been on the discouraging side. Nevertheless I intend to make another direct approach." The Ambassador added that he feared that he had pushed Papadopoulos as far as he safely could "without seriously risking provoking adverse reaction." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

**289. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, August 26, 1970, 1746Z.

4723. Ref: State 137363.<sup>2</sup> Department please pass White House.

1. I saw PriMin Papadopoulos last night and discussed with him in detail question of further liberalization measures by GOG. In this context, I referred to greatly improved relations between our two governments as shown by exchange of presidential letters,<sup>3</sup> the role of U.S. regarding action by the Council of Europe, our attempt to persuade opposing countries in NATO that DPC report on Greece<sup>4</sup> should be treated as defense not political issue, as well as efforts in Senate regarding both Pell and Hartke amendments, and finally, imminence of action on military aid issue. I pointed out problem not supply of military aid but totality of relations between administration and Congress and ability of Congress to exert its power at any time on individual issues of high priority to U.S. national interest. I stressed our concern was in consolidating our friendship and that I spoke as friend of PriMin and government. I repeated again we had to take public opinion into account, and GOG should realize their actions of crucial importance insofar as they affected public opinion. I noted President had recently specifically designated Apollo XIII astronauts to visit Greece. Finally, as evidence that U.S. has sought to give positive assistance to creating favorable image for GOG abroad, I added we had made clear to all NATO governments that only way to progress was to work with present Greek Government.

2. Within this context, I reported the Secretary of State and USG very pleased with release of 500 prisoners. We hoped that they would now decree entry into effect of Articles 12, 111, and 112 coupled with a specific statement that remaining "shadow of martial law" removed. I added opinion that combined with release of detainees, such action would sound most convincing note to opposition abroad that new regime here to stay and that progress lay through not against them. It would be especially helpful, I continued, if such an announcement came before the DPC meeting in September. I added that in any event we considered that meeting did not present an insurmountable problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 137363 to Athens, August 22, provided instructions for Tasca to use in his discussion about regime liberalization with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to the Nixon–Papadopoulos exchange of letters. See Document 274.

<sup>4</sup> For information.

3. PriMin began his reply with preface that what he had to say would unfortunately have to be unpleasant. GOG was unable understand U.S. posture, particularly delay of USG in regularizing relations. Resumption of military aid (i.e., suspension of embargo) did not depend on public opinion or action of Congress. It required simple decision by USG. Moreover, USG had been able to conclude an agreement with Franco Spain,<sup>5</sup> and undertaken Cambodian operation without being blocked by hostile opinion of a minority in Congress. Why had USG hesitated on Greece? Even worse, we had taken the place of Denmark and the Scandinavians in seeking to pressure Greece and to intervene in Greek internal affairs. He asked how Denmark with one regiment could be allowed to exercise so much influence. Did U.S. really care more about Denmark in NATO than Greece? Greece had its public opinion also and if he told Greek people arms, urgently needed for NATO defense, were being withheld by USG because of GOG internal policies, Greek people would be upset with U.S. and react negatively. It was for this reason that he had not to date made arms issue clear to Greek people. If President favored strong relations with Greece, why did he not deal with the minority frankly and straightforward? Bulgaria was building up military strength and gap growing greatly. He was really fighting to move forward toward constitutional government. Did we want him to be replaced through the type of pressure we were exerting? What would take his place? We might have someone else tougher to deal with. Had we really thought this through? PriMin continued that DPC a matter for NATO and that U.S. action on this matter essentially a NATO matter not a bilateral question, since in U.S. interest to keep Greece in NATO. If NATO wished to expel Greece through DPC, then that was decision for its members.

4. As for my specific question, he emphasized there was nothing further to tell USG at this time. When time came for action, he would tell us and Greek people, implying that he would not inform U.S. Government before he told Greek people.

5. In my comments on his lengthy statement, which was made with obvious emotion, I repeated positive aspects our relations, my conviction that we were at a key turning point, and my sincere hope he would understand my comments as coming from a friend conveying a message from President Nixon, the same man who told me last December prior to my departure for Greece that he considered PriMin Papadopoulos a friend of America and his friend and who had expressed his disagreement with action by Council of Europe against

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the cooperation agreement signed August 6. For text, see 21 UST 1667. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

Greece. With regard to Denmark, we were in an alliance and it was only natural for U.S. to try to keep alliance together and to eliminate or reduce divisive factors. I asked PriMin again whether he could tell me anything about martial law and Articles 12, 111, 112 of the 1968 Constitution. He said he had nothing more to add and that next move was up to the United States (meaning clearly the elimination of the embargo on arms shipments to Greece). I said we had confidence in PriMin Papadopoulos' leadership and that we believed in the constitutional direction he had charted for Greece. Finally, I said that objectively I saw no reasons to doubt there would be further progress along the lines we had discussed earlier and that I was essentially optimistic regarding future developments.

6. *Comment:* (A) I believe PriMin and new establishment which he leads greatly annoyed with our delay in lifting embargo and decidedly unhappy about what they regard as our initiative in putting pressure on Greece to move forward toward constitutional government. They see us taking on role and all the qualities of the Danes. It is this aspect which they find particularly obnoxious. PriMin obviously under great pressure by the new establishment to take strong position against U.S. at this time (see septel)<sup>6</sup> regarding internal liberalization, which important members of revolutionary group consider moving far too rapidly. These people are not eager to see a date fixed for elections at this time, nor do they wish to see the King returned, nor are they happy about the release of Communists from prison camps.

(B) As I suggested in my report to the President, the retention of the arms embargo is counter-productive and can only serve to weaken moderate forces within the new establishment. Since the embargo is not favored even by strong internal opposition to the regime, I would hope that we could forthwith eliminate embargo, citing the Senate victory, exigencies in the Middle East, and the implicit obligation of the U.S. not to deprive Greece of arms available and needed to defend itself if attacked by the Warsaw Pact or if obliged to go to the aid of its NATO allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, both contingencies which are totally independent of the progress of the present regime back to parliamentary government—a course already accepted as the fixed goal of the GOG.

(C) At this time I should think that our position on lifting of suspension would be largely determined by our assessment of our strategic needs in Eastern Mediterranean. At stake are goodwill and privileged U.S. military position in Greece upon which we now rely heavily.

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<sup>6</sup> Tasca reported on "signs of growing tension within the regime" over U.S. pressures in telegram 4724 from Athens, August 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

Moreover, as I pointed out in my report to the President, I consider the embargo a hindrance to our efforts to persuade GOG to implement 1968 Constitution. In any event, I have made abundantly clear to GOG importance of Greek constitutional progress to public opinion in the U.S. and NATO.

Tasca

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**290. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, August 27, 1970.

1. In the course of an informal discussion with the Prime Minister on 8 August, which was reported in Athens 4388,<sup>2</sup> I told the Prime Minister that speaking personally it was my view that if the GOG fixed an election date—although I had nothing specific in mind—we would want to be as helpful as possible and appropriate in helping him in his efforts to prevent a return to the chaos of pre-April 1967 situation.

2. I did this as a means of laying the ground work for our proposal that we provide advice [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the organization of political parties, etc., which would have the effect of encouraging the regime to implement fully the 1968 Constitution.<sup>3</sup> Such a statement in itself would have the positive effect of helping to assure him that we are not leading him down path of elections with the hidden aim of reestablishing an unimproved version of the pre-April 1967 political system.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972. Secret. No time of transmission is indicated on the message.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4388 from Athens, August 10, reported that Tasca had stressed the need to end martial law and hold early elections to Papadopoulos. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 286.

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**291. Note From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1970.

Mr. President:

In view of the Middle East situation<sup>2</sup> this is an ideal time to proceed rapidly with the announcement of resumption of U.S. military assistance to Greece. It will also assist in creating a favorable climate in the event we have to call on Greek cooperation should a contingency occur.

**Henry A. Kissinger<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> On August 26 fighting broke out between Palestinian and Jordanian forces. Beginning on September 6, a series of Western airliners were seized by terrorists and flown to Jordan where the crews and passengers were held hostage. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 45.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1970, 1951Z.

150171. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. Please inform Prime Minister Papadopoulos that public announcement of the resumption of deliveries of suspended military items will be made on Tuesday, September 22<sup>2</sup> and that instructions have been given U.S. military services to arrange for expeditious delivery of the items which are now to be released for shipment to the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vigerdman on September 11; cleared by Davies, Springsteen (in draft), Pranger (DOD/ISA), Sisco, Eliot, and Johnson; and approved by Rogers. Haig wrote on the telegram: "HAK—looks OK—Greeks told now but announcement held until NATO DPC meeting over on 22nd." Kissinger also initialed the telegram.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 12, 1970, p. 413.

GOG. You should ask the PM to keep knowledge of our intention confidential until the 22nd.

2. If queried why September 22 was chosen, you may tell him we wished to avoid complicating the arrangements which now seem to be successfully in train for dealing in the DPC on Sept 18 with the report on Greek forces. We wished to avoid taking public action which would no doubt unravel the delicate and carefully worked out compromise.

3. You may also tell the PM that we will be informing Congressional leaders and our NATO allies sometime after Sept 18 and before the 22nd, asking them to keep announcement in confidence until public announcement is made.

4. The press release which will be handed to news media on Sept 22, approved at the highest level, reads as follows:

5. *Begin Text.* United States policy towards Greece has been under review by this Administration for the past 18 months. During that time the United States has continued to withhold major items of equipment in the Military Aid Program for Greece, a policy established by the previous Administration shortly after the coup in Greece in April 1967.

6. The Administration has now decided to resume normal military shipments to Greece. The resumption of such shipments will enhance the ability of the Greek forces to carry out their responsibilities in defense of the NATO area, and thus contribute importantly to the cohesion and strength of the southern flank of NATO. Greece offers strategic advantages to the NATO alliance and to the United States which are of great importance to the security of the West. This importance has been sharply underlined in recent months by events in the Eastern Mediterranean. The decision to resume the shipment of suspended items rests entirely on these considerations.

7. Although the United States had hoped for a more rapid return to representative government in Greece, the trend toward a constitutional order is established. Major sections of the constitution have been implemented, and partial restoration of civil rights has been accomplished. The Government of Greece has stated that it intends to establish parliamentary democracy. The United States shares the concern of its NATO allies for steady progress toward restoring the country to political government. This is a policy to which we remain firmly committed. *End Text.*<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy. Tasca reported on Papadopoulos's initial positive reaction to the policy change in telegram 5164 from Athens, September 17. He suggested a Presidential or Secretary of State visit to Greece and Turkey. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70) The U.S. decision was formally conveyed to Vitsaxis by Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies on September 21. A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 GREECE.

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**293. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, October 4, 1970, 1129Z.

5509. Subject: Meeting with Greek Prime Minister. From SecDef Laird.

1. This morning I met for more than hour and half with Prime Minister Papadopoulos in company with Chairman JCS, CNO and Ambassador Tasca. Meeting was quite cordial and also quite frank. I began by conveying message of friendship from President Nixon, and explained that purpose President's visit to Mediterranean<sup>2</sup> was to underline resolve of US administration to honor its commitments to its allies and to negotiate from position of strength with Soviet Union. Unfortunately, in some areas Soviets seemed to be talking in one way and acting in another. Mediterranean one area where this was case, and President wished allies in Mediterranean be aware importance we attach to peace and stability in this area.

2. Prime Minister replied warmly, endorsing the recent US moves in the Mediterranean and Mid-East and indicating they were convincing evidence of US resolve. He noted US and Greek goals of preventing Communist aggression identical. He said we could be assured that every weapon put into a Greek soldier's hands was as good as in hands of an American soldier. Greece had no territorial designs or ambitions of its own, and importance of strengthening Greek Armed Forces related entirely to Greece's NATO role. Greece giving its limit in men and matériel for defense effort, and it expected same total commitment from other members Alliance. Greece could not however meet all of its needs, particularly since country in front line of NATO defense, facing three Communist neighbors. It expected help from its NATO allies in the common interest of the Alliance, but even without such help it would do its best to live up to its commitment.

3. To this I replied that from very beginning I personally made clear in my testimony before Congress<sup>3</sup> that I favored resumption arms shipments to Greece. Now happily this had been done, and we would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69—Oct 70. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 OSD.

<sup>2</sup> The President visited Italy, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. September 27–October 4.

<sup>3</sup> See *The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1969), pp. 128–129.

be working closely with his military to do the best possible job of strengthening and modernizing the Greek Armed Forces within the limitations which existed; and I hoped that Greek MAP would not be affected too adversely by our Cambodian and other requirements. I agreed that we must all stand fast by our NATO commitments and we would certainly live up to ours. Admiral Moorer took occasion of this meeting to mention to Prime Minister importance of Sixth Fleet facilities in Greece to our common interests.

4. I mentioned fact that within US Congress there is some opinion not as concerned as it should be with the vital importance of NATO. Some elements in US reflected also, as he knew, some hostility towards the present Government. For example, some members had asked him about existence of martial law. I believed however that we had enough support in Congress to permit us to maintain our policy regarding military cooperation with Greece. We intended to stick by this policy, and he could be of help to us in this regard. However, I wished Prime Minister to clearly understand that US administration not in business of telling its NATO allies how to run their affairs, and internal Greek situation entirely a matter for Greeks.

5. Prime Minister's reply was that Government had said what it intended to do. Its friends would have to be content, as regards return to more liberal form of government, with evidence of liberalizing measures as they were taken. Prime Minister made it quite clear that he not prepared make any predictions about timing of future moves, although he also made it clear that Government's aim of returning to fully constitutional rule remains fixed. He said that he hoped that this would be sufficient for Congressional critics but if not, that would not be Greece's problem. In any case his Government intended arm itself as best it could to carry out its NATO role.

6. Prime Minister then went on to say that at risk of seeming to interfere in our internal affairs, it seemed to him that Congress too had responsibility to uphold US commitment to NATO. Congressional attitude reminded him of man who hired guard for his farm only to discover that man had black hair. Owner then refused to give guard rifle and let him enter on duty since he wished have blond. Man said in fact he had blond hair but it had been dyed. Owner said, "Fine, come back in two months when dye has grown out and you can have rifle to guard my property." In meantime owner's crop stolen. In interchange on applicability of the parable to the current situation involving Greece, Prime Minister replied that unfortunately it happened to be true story.

7. Additional substantive matter I raised was importance Greek-Turkish cooperation in NATO and its relation to Cyprus problem. Prime Minister said his position was that Greece could never live at ease and in security without friendship of Turkey. Greece making every effort

in this direction, but unfortunately Turkey still mistrusted Greece. He hoped this situation would gradually improve. I said I most impressed both in Turkey and in Greece with degree of awareness of common Communist threat to both countries, placing Cyprus issue in secondary position, and I found it encouraging that both countries took such realistic view of situation.

8. In closing, Prime Minister asked that in any statement we might make about my visit to Athens, we be careful not to give impression that significant decisions taken during my conversations with his government, particularly if such remarks might encourage speculation that discussions related to Greek internal political matters. In Greek atmosphere this would immediately lead to press and old politicians jumping to conclusion elections had been agreed on. On other hand, he hoped that we would not by our silence indicate that our meetings had ended in disagreement.

9. My impression from meeting with Prime Minister is that he remains totally committed to NATO, and friendship with the US. He believes that US administration will stand by its policy on military cooperation with Greece. While he recognizes Congressional problem, this cannot be decisive factor in how fast and in what specific ways Greece moves towards more liberal form of government which basically an internal Greek matter, to be decided by the internal political needs of Greece. I think he appreciates that while we take essentially same view of situation, in warning him of Congressional problem our aim is to protect our ability to continue and strengthen our military cooperation with Greece. I recognized special needs of Greece as regards its internal political development relating to Soviet and Communist threats resulting from its geographic position.

10. Saturday morning I also called on Regent [Zoitakis], Chief of Armed Forces Angelis, Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos and Coordination Minister Makarezos. I was given particularly useful military briefing by Angelis (septel),<sup>4</sup> and my meetings with other senior officials were marked by warm atmosphere. I saw Prime Minister and his principal associates again at lunch Saturday hosted by Ambassador and at dinner hosted by Prime Minister.

11. Please pass SecDef, CINCEUR and US Mission NATO.

**Tasca**

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<sup>4</sup> The Embassy reported on Laird's discussions with Greek officials in telegrams 5542 and 5568 from Athens, both October 6. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69—Oct 70)

**294. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Sale of Phantom Aircraft to Greece

In my memorandum to you of May 26, 1970 (enclosed)<sup>2</sup> I indicated that we thought there were compelling arguments favoring the sale of F4(E)F Phantoms to Greece but that we believed the decision on the sale should await the resumption of normal military assistance relations with Greece.

On September 22 we announced the lifting of the partial embargo on military aid shipments to Greece. Other reservations about the sale which existed in May of this year appear to have been largely overtaken by events. The provision of Phantoms to Israel subsequent to our May memorandum has canceled out any difficulty we might have otherwise faced on this score in providing them to the Greeks. The sale of Phantoms to the Greeks will nevertheless likely stimulate a probable Turkish request for the provision of these expensive aircraft under grant aid. But the seriousness of Greek negotiations for the purchase of high performance aircraft from France likely makes the Turkish problem inevitable whether or not we sell Phantoms to the Greeks.

The military case for selling Phantoms to Greece remains strong. We will, in the circumstances, proceed to inform the Greeks of our willingness to sell these aircraft to them. In any case, deliveries will likely not begin before two years from the date of acceptance of the offer to sell.

**Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**295. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 13, 1970.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Under Secretary Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Under Secretary, Greek  
Foreign Ministry  
Basil Vitsaxis, Ambassador of Greece  
Michael Cottakis, Chef du Cabinet  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Under Secretary Palamas opened the conversation by saying he brought a message of friendship from Greece, from the government and from the people. Lately, he felt, there had been some rather hopeful developments. Always there has been friendship in Greece for the United States, although there have been some rough spots in our relationship. However, the re-establishment of full military shipments and the visit of Secretary Laird had been important demonstrations of U.S. interest in the area. There are really two important sides of the problem in that area—the NATO element in Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean and then the problems beyond in the Middle East. The Greek government considers it an asset that U.S. policy shows strength in both parts of this area. Greece feels that this will help improve the political climate in the Balkans. It is not possible to separate the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The Greek people, owing to the trip of the President to the Mediterranean, know that the Americans have decided to play a strong role in this area and are pleased that the USSR will have to take that into account.

Dr. Kissinger said he felt the Under Secretary's statement of the situation was generally correct as was his characterization of the purpose of the President's trip.

Under Secretary Palamas said there were two points on which he wished to know Dr. Kissinger's views. The first was how he viewed NATO as a factor in the Mediterranean.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. In an attached memorandum requesting Kissinger's approval of the memorandum of conversation, Davis recommended distribution to the Department of State. Kissinger, however, initialed the box disapproving distribution.

Dr. Kissinger said he wished to say at the outset that the U.S. greatly appreciated the cooperation of Greece in the recent period. The sense that we could count on Greek cooperation helped us in the formulation of our own policy. Going on, he felt that it is difficult to distinguish NATO Europe and the Middle East. The U.S. remains committed to NATO. We will, as was said at Naples,<sup>2</sup> not unilaterally reduce our commitment without consulting with our allies. With the increase in strategic weapons, the forces available to NATO should be strengthened rather than reduced.

Under Secretary Palamas asked whether Dr. Kissinger expected the same view from the allies. He said that Greece's troubles in NATO seemed to be starting to subside, even with the Scandinavians. This is one more aspect among recent developments which is favorable. The key question in Greek minds is whether in a crisis the NATO Council would be a good vehicle for decision.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Under Secretary had an alternative organization in mind.

The Under Secretary said that he did not. Greece always felt the alternative would be what the U.S. could do by itself.

Dr. Kissinger said that personally he found it hard to imagine that if Greece was attacked we would let assistance be vetoed by Denmark, for instance.

Under Secretary Palamas replied that Greece trusts the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger said it was incredible to him that the U.S. would stand idly by while Greece was being attacked.

Under Secretary Palamas said that at the same time Greece is trying to smooth its relationship with its neighbors. He then asked how Dr. Kissinger viewed the situation in the Middle East.

Dr. Kissinger said it looked as if circumstances favored the extension of the Arab-Israeli cease-fire. The U.S. certainly does. He did not feel that any country would want to be responsible for breaking it, even the UAR.

Under Secretary Palamas said the Greek communities in the Arab world give Greece an unusual position there. There are twenty-five thousand in the UAR. There are technicians in Libya, and the Libyans have asked for technical assistance in maintaining some of their aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger said there are many problems in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli problem is the most immediate, but there also the problems of the future of the Persian Gulf and of the various radical

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's September 30 statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 786–787.

movements in the area. During the Jordan crisis, one of the purposes of the U.S. was to demonstrate that we could not be pushed out of the area.

The Under Secretary asked whether Dr. Kissinger felt the Suez Canal would be opened.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Kissinger replied that he thought it would be if there were a peace settlement. He could not exclude its opening without a peace settlement. There is some chance that Israel might be interested at some point.

The Under Secretary said that Greece is not directly involved in the Middle East problem. It is not possible to find a general solution of the problem but there might be sectors of the problem which are susceptible of solution. He felt that the situation is improved now in Jordan and that it was good that Hussein's hand had been reinforced. When the Under Secretary noted the difficulties caused by the Fedayeen, Dr. Kissinger replied that it is difficult enough to negotiate with governments; it seems all but impossible to negotiate with non-governmental forces such as those.

Under Secretary Palamas noted the possibility of turning the West Bank into a Palestinian state, and Dr. Kissinger replied that there was some fear that the Palestinians would try to destroy Israel if they had their own state.

The Under Secretary said it will be important how the UAR develops. Greece has its own information that there is an increase in anti-Soviet feeling there.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that it is hard to imagine that the Nationalists in the UAR are anxious to trade British imperialism for Soviet imperialism.

The Under Secretary agreed that there had been a natural reaction against the Soviets, "who are everywhere."

Dr. Kissinger asked how the Under Secretary would explain the violations of the standstill agreement in the UAR. Dr. Kissinger said he could not understand why the UAR had not waited until a deadlock had developed in the talks before violating the agreement.

When the Under Secretary asked whether the violations were important, Dr. Kissinger said that they were "massive." There are large numbers of sites that did not exist before the cease-fire came into effect; there are sites that had been started before the cease-fire and had been completed since; there are sites that were completed before the cease-fire but which had had no missiles in them and now did have

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<sup>3</sup> The Canal had been closed since the June 1967 war between Egypt and Israel.

missiles in them. At first, Dr. Kissinger said he thought that the violations were technical, but as time passed and our knowledge of them became clearer it became impossible to describe them that way. Also, these violations, we think, would have been impossible without the Russians. Moreover, there has been no attempt at concealment.

The Under Secretary asked how Dr. Kissinger evaluated the Soviet move.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the Soviets must feel that an Israel alive is better than an Israel dead. The Soviets, however, may not know how to apply enough power to push Israel back without killing Israel.

The Under Secretary said that the Soviets, it seemed to him, wanted to avoid war but not to have peace. Greeks are concerned about the increase in pressure on Greece as a result of Mid-Eastern developments. There is the question of the Straits and the need of the Soviets for free communication. He feared that the enhanced Soviet position in the Middle East would bring Greece under increased pressure as the Soviet need to keep open its lines of communication became more pressing. It has always been a Soviet dream to be in the Mediterranean. The fleet was not so dangerous but it was a base for Soviet operations.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the fleet is dangerous to Israel and a nuisance to the U.S. The U.S. could probably destroy the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean at some price.

The Under Secretary said that the question of the Soviets having a permanent establishment on the ground in the Mid-East is of important concern to Greece. Dr. Kissinger replied that we are going to be very insistent in any peace settlement to bring to their attention the inappropriateness of such a permanent Soviet establishment.

Changing the subject, Dr. Kissinger said that we sometimes tend to harass the Greeks about their internal problems, "which I will not do." At the same time, he hoped that the Greeks would remember U.S. problems. The U.S. ability to work with Greece is affected by the internal climate in the U.S., and that in turn is affected by developments in Greece. The Under Secretary said that the U.S. has a friendly government in Greece. Governments change but people remain friendly. There is a real feeling of friendship among the people of Greece.

Dr. Kissinger, concluding the conversation, said that when he was in Greece in 1961 he enjoyed himself very much, and the conversation ended with a series of pleasantries.

H.S.

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**296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1970, 2147Z.

177500. From Secretary for Ambassador. Subj: Next Steps.

1. Now that the arms embargo has been lifted, and the Greek Government reassured by our recent actions and by the visit of Secretary Laird and others of the deep concern we have for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, we should have reached a new and more friction-free relationship.

2. I hope this new relationship will permit us to be even more persuasive than we have been up now in influencing the Government to move in the direction we wish to see it go. Though criticism of the regime has lately been rather muted, it seems bound to arise again in serious proportions and in a way which will once again threaten the smooth functioning of NATO and create difficulties on the Hill. These considerations are apart from our long-range policy interest in the development of a more broadly based and supported government in Greece, which offers a better prospect for long-range stability than a government whose stability depends on the survival capability of one clever man.

3. We have publicly been taking the regime's promises at face value as I believe we should. But now we are faced with an instance of failure to meet a commitment in an important particular—the lifting of martial law, promised for last month. Palamas has now promised that martial law will be lifted before the NATO meeting in early December. I believe it essential that the Greek Government be reminded of its default and that it take action very soon and in no case later than the end of November to get rid of martial law.

4. More disturbing is the recent gambit announcing the “election” of a “small parliament.” As you suggest (Athens 5815)<sup>2</sup> this seems a move away from rather than toward meaningful elections. It provides ammunition to the persistent skeptics about the regime's intentions, since it involves the pseudo-election of a pseudo-parliament. We have been freely repeating Papadopoulos' assertion that by the end of December 1970 all the laws necessary to the implementation of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vigerdman; cleared by Davies, Tibbetts, Sisco, Eliot, Folger (H), and Abshire; NEA, EUR, S, and H and approved by Rogers. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 19, it reported on the Greek Government's announcement of the creation of a “small parliament.” (*Ibid.*, POL 14 GREECE)

Constitution will have been promulgated. They may indeed achieve this desirable goal, but if the move back to representative democracy is to be put off into the indefinite future by means of a transparent and almost cynical imitation of the real thing, we shall be in a bad case. I hope you will find an early opportunity to canvass this subject with the Prime Minister and let him know how strongly we feel about this.<sup>3</sup>

**Rogers**

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<sup>3</sup> Tasca reported a discussion he had with Pattakos in telegram 6856 from Athens, December 23. The junta leader had indicated that martial law would remain in force for some time. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

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**297. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1970, 0217Z.

WH2108. During the President's discussions with Lopez-Bravo in Spain,<sup>2</sup> Bravo expressed an interest in improving Spanish relations with Greece. The President assured Lopez-Bravo that he would attempt to be as helpful as possible in facilitating the improvement of relations between the two governments.

In view of the foregoing, the President would like you, sometime in the near future, to find a convenient excuse to visit Spain with the view toward meeting with Lopez-Bravo. From your perspective as U.S. Ambassador to Greece you could exchange ideas on how best to assist in the improvement of relations and in making Greece feel that in the Mediterranean area they have a friend in Spain.

This exchange with the Spanish is to be held exclusively between you, the President and myself. Would you please check your calendar and give me your views through this channel as to the feasibility of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970–Europe, Mideast, Latin America. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> The President was in Spain October 2–3. For his discussion with Yugoslav President Tito, see Document 221. Additional documentation on the trip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

making a trip to Spain. I will then make arrangements for you to see Lopez-Bravo. I would also be grateful for any ideas you might have on steps which you or we here in Washington might be able to undertake to be helpful in this matter.<sup>3</sup> Best wishes.

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<sup>3</sup> In an unnumbered backchannel message, October 29, Tasca outlined a briefing he could deliver to Lopez Bravo on Greek affairs and the general situation in the Mediterranean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Subject File, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970—Europe, Mideast, Latin America) In telegram 57 from Athens, November 4, Tasca suggested a visit during the last part of November or early December. (Ibid.)

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## 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 10, 1970, 2225Z.

184935. Subj: Palamas meeting with the Vice President.

1. Greek Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Palamas, accompanied by Ambassadors Vitsaxis and Cottakis, called on the Vice President October 21. After exchange of amenities Palamas made special point of praising Vitsaxis as one of their most effective ambassadors who, he said, enjoyed the admiration and respect even of his colleagues in the Greek diplomatic service.

2. Palamas said that Greek-American relations had reached an excellent plane now that the U.S. had removed the arms embargo. It remained only to continue to foster the excellent existing relationships.

3. The Vice President responded that both our governments were convinced of the necessity of safeguarding the Mediterranean area from Soviet efforts at encroachment. With this in mind, the Vice President had urged on the President to speak strongly and favorably about our Greek friends during his Mediterranean trip. Palamas replied that along that line the recent trip of Defense Secretary Laird had been very helpful indeed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Vigderman; cleared by Kent Crane (Vice President's office); and approved by Curran (S/S). Repeated to Nicosia.

4. The Vice President expressed amusement at comments Palamas had made to Secretary Rogers concerning the Danes' interest in proposing a candidate for NATO Secretary General.<sup>2</sup> Palamas replied that Lord Hume had asked Palamas what he thought of the current position of Greece within NATO. Palamas said he told Hume that he felt things were definitely improving and that Greece's antagonists were now adopting a less aggressive posture. He added that Greece may have waited too long to leave the Council of Europe, because that action had seemed to startle other Europeans into a new sense of reality and it had certainly not hurt the Greek regime in any way. Finally, Hume had asked about elections in Greece and indicated an early resolution of that problem would be most helpful to Greece's friends abroad.

5. The Vice President remarked that we, too, were hoping the Greek Government would continue to move toward elections. We had no wish to interfere in the interval affairs of Greece. Nevertheless, if the Greek Government were to move in the direction of elections, it would help to undercut the criticism of the regime here in the United States, as well as in NATO. At the moment, opposition elements are deliberately trying to misconstrue the administration's friendship with Greece as evidence that we condone "repressive" governments and actions abroad—and by implication perhaps also at home. Thus any steps taken toward popular participation in government in Greece would not only help the Greek image, but also Greece's friends. The Vice President said all reports indicate that the Government is in firm control, that most people are happy and that progress is being made; so the only problem the Greeks have is with their image. Palamas responded his Government was concerned that when elections are held, the old Greek politicians would allege that they were not held under fair conditions. Starting from that premise the former politicians would try to undermine what had been accomplished and recreate the confusion of the past. Palamas was certain the current government would never allow a confused and unstable political situation to reemerge, so prior to elections a sound democratic system must be developed within a framework of stability.

6. The Vice President said he was concerned about the image of Greece in the United States citing the impression left by the film "Z."<sup>3</sup> He wondered why the Greeks did not counter such propaganda by making movies presenting a truer picture of the situation in Greece.

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<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of their October 12 conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the film by Greek director Constantine Costa Gavras, based on the novel by Vassilis Vassilikos.

Perhaps famous Greek-American movie makers like Spyros Skouras would be willing to help if asked. The Vice President added that our own administration has considerable difficulties with the press, so he in no way meant to imply criticism of the Greek Government's handling of their image problems, but rather hoped he might be suggesting a useful idea to them. Palamas explained that the incident upon which the film "Z" was based actually happened during the rule of Prime Minister Karamanlis. The Vice President said this was not common knowledge, although he certainly knew the true origin of the events depicted. He felt it was insufficient to try to counter the effects of a film like "Z" by simply making an announcement that it was a distortion. The opposition drills home its points by repetition, and we must be prepared to do the same thing. We must not sit by complacently just because we are in the right. Continuous efforts must be made to counter socially destructive activities by our vocal opponents—not only in Greece, but in the United States as well. Palamas concurred in this general appraisal and Vitsaxis said that the Greeks' record in fighting both fascism and communism just in the past generation alone had had a tremendous beneficial impact on the history of the Western world and should make excellent material for a film.

7. Palamas mentioned how pleased the Greek Government would be if the Vice President were in a position to accept an invitation to visit Greece in the spring. An invitation would be promptly forthcoming whenever the Vice President considered it possible to accept such an invitation. Without making a firm commitment, the Vice President responded that a visit to Greece in the spring was certainly a most interesting and delightful idea.

8. *For Nicosia:* President Makarios extended a similar informal invitation to the Vice President during the White House dinner commemorating the 25th anniversary of the UN and received the same generally favorable response.

9. The meeting closed following a brief discussion of the existing instability in Italy, the situation in France, and the importance of the forthcoming elections in the United States.

**Rogers**

**299. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, November 23, 1970, 1631Z.

6356. Ref: State 190828.<sup>2</sup> For the Secretary.

1. As you know, I remain skeptical about prospects of future role for King in Greek politics for variety of reasons including his own behavior and extent of feeling against him among key leaders here. At same time I recognize that 1968 Constitution provides role for him and I can envisage circumstances in which his return might occur. There is good evidence, as [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has reported, that there have been occasional contacts with King involving individuals in or close to present government.

2. As Embassy and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have reported, however, there is considerable internal ferment within government at present, outcome of which remains uncertain.<sup>3</sup> Some of forces involved naturally consider King as one element to be reckoned with in arriving at future political establishment and are interested in exploiting him in their own interests. Others probably continue to regard him as hostile to “purposes of revolution” in view of his aborted December coup. Fluid situation means that any move by forces outside of Greece which can in any way be interpreted by Greeks, on whatever side, as evidence of U.S. “manipulation” of situation or of particular direction of U.S. interests is bound to have adverse ramifications.

3. Consequently I do not believe timing would be propitious for you to have conversation with King in Brussels. Since one of purposes of such meeting would be, as refTel states, to show interest in alternative other than present establishment, and meeting would receive publicity, we could anticipate that all elements of political spectrum here would unite in criticism asserting such conversation involves interference in Greek domestic politics. I would have no objection, however,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated November 20. In it, Rogers requested Tasca’s views on whether he should meet privately with the King during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> The Embassy reported on possible divisions within the Greek regime in telegrams 6212 from Athens, November 13; 6385 from Athens, November 24; and 6467 from Athens, November 30. (All *ibid.*)

to discreet contacts with him being arranged for purpose of our having independent assessment of his views on present situation.<sup>4</sup>

**Tasca**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 6922 from Athens, December 30, Tasca suggested that Ambassador Martin set up a meeting with the King when he returned to Rome and discuss the points made in paragraph 1 above. (Ibid.)

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### **300. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, December 15, 1970.

60. Ref Athens 059.<sup>2</sup>

1. Pursuant to guidance contained in your several messages,<sup>3</sup> I met with Foreign Minister Lopez-Bravo on December 9 and had a long and useful private discussion with him.

A. The Foreign Minister greeted me cordially and opened the substantive discussion by recalling his meeting with President Nixon in Naples in September,<sup>4</sup> and by commenting on his luncheon about the same time with King Constantine, whom he had found to be clearly interested in establishing rapport with the Spanish Government and in seeking advice as to how he should proceed to get back to Greece.

B. Explaining my mission in detail following the outline of referenced message, I expressed the President's interest in closer cooperation between Greece and Spain for defense against Soviet expansion, detailing the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey not only to Soviet ambitions in the Mediterranean but also in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Foreign Minister followed this explanation keenly.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970—Europe, Mideast, Latin America. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Transmitted to Kissinger at San Clemente on December 28. Received in the White House at 0021Z on December 16.

<sup>2</sup> Dated November 30. It reported Tasca's itinerary. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 297 and backchannel message WH2209 from Kissinger to Tasca, November 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970—Europe, Mideast, Latin America)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 297.

C. Since he had opened the discussion by referring to King Constantine, I also took up that theme remarking that the question of the King was for Greece to decide, that the King might play a constructive role in the future, but that his future is clouded by the stormy history of the monarchy in Greece as well as events of the recent past, and that he would have to work very hard to get back on his throne. I explained frankly the King's problems in Greece and how important it was for the King coming out clearly for U.S. military aid to Greece, for implementation of the 1968 Constitution and in opposition to violence as a means of overthrowing the present regime. The Foreign Minister sought out my views on the durability of the present Greek regime, its popular support and the morale of the armed forces. He was surprised to learn of the very impressive economic growth record this regime was building up.

D. On the Arab-Israeli problem I noted the capabilities of Greece and Spain in the Middle East and underlined that both countries, concerned as they were with the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, had a common interest in helping the Arabs and Israelis reach a peace settlement. I stressed that such a settlement would be a major step toward limiting and diminishing the Soviet threat. The Foreign Minister said that he agreed and then asked whether I thought the peace talks would be resumed at an early date. I replied, giving him details of our position as outlined recently by Assistant Secretary Sisco to various Ambassadors in Washington.

E. I repeated at several points that we were hopeful that Spain would see fit to strengthen her ties with Greece within a framework of supporting the eastern defense flank in the Mediterranean. I also told him I had reason to believe Prime Minister Papadopoulos would be quite receptive to deeper relations with Spain. On completion of my exposition and our ensuing discussion, the Foreign Minister said that he had found it all impressive and that he himself would seek to visit Greece in the near future. He added that he would be getting in touch with me at an early date on this matter.

F. The Foreign Minister turned briefly to Morocco<sup>5</sup> and asked my views on the strength of the nationalist Istiqlal party, clearly concerned about that party's agitation for the expulsion of the Spanish from the enclaves and for pressing a claim in the Spanish Sahara. I said that I thought that King Hassan was firmly in control and the King was a real friend of Spain and the best leader we could hope for. I also added that I was certain that as with Greece and Turkey, the United States was keenly interested in strong and friendly relations between Morocco

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<sup>5</sup> Tasca had served as Ambassador to Morocco from 1965 to 1969.

and Spain. The Foreign Minister said he fully agreed and considered Hassan the best possible leader in Morocco, in fact he was expecting the Moroccan Foreign Minister to visit him shortly in Madrid for a friendly exchange of views.

G. In summary, I believe the Spanish Government would be definitely interested in a program of closer cooperation with Greece. In fact, I detected gratification on the part of Lopez-Bravo that the United States was encouraging Spanish Government to take such an initiative which would demonstrate Spanish desire to be a major, positive force in the area. On the other hand, prior to my departure from Greece, I mentioned briefly to Prime Minister Papadopoulos that I was going to Spain on a visit and that the United States would like to see a closer relationship between these two countries in the struggle against Soviet attempts to subvert and expand their influence in the entire area. He indicated that he would welcome such closer cooperation.

H. My overall impression was that Lopez-Bravo was flattered by the President's action in sending me to discuss this subject and that the mission should produce effects beneficial not only to relations between Greece and Spain, but also to our own relations with each of these countries.

2. I briefed Ambassador Hill<sup>6</sup> fully before and after my discussion. He preferred not to accept my invitation to accompany me, saying he thought Lopez-Bravo might be more forthcoming if I went alone. He was somewhat concerned that one of the Embassy secretaries had inadvertently let others in the Embassy know of my appointment with the Foreign Minister. However, we agreed that there was no need to provide anyone with information as to the purpose or substance of my visit, and that my appointment could be passed off as a normal enough, informal exchange of views, given the fact that I have friends throughout Europe who invite me to drop in to see them when they hear I am in town.

3. As to next steps, I plan with your approval:

A. To give Papadopoulos a briefing on what I told Lopez-Bravo.<sup>7</sup>

B. To stimulate some intelligence exchange and contact, and,

C. Providing you think it feasible, to look into the matter of off shore purchase.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Greece.]

<sup>6</sup> Robert C. Hill, Ambassador to Spain.

<sup>7</sup> In backchannel message 61 from Athens, Tasca reported that he would be meeting Papadopoulos within a week to discuss his visit to Spain and asked for instructions. Kissinger wrote on the telegram: "Proposed agenda in Athens 060 seems excellent. No suggestions from here." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970—Europe, Mideast, Latin America)

I would appreciate any suggestion or comment you may have.<sup>8</sup>  
With warm personal regards.

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<sup>8</sup> In backchannel message WH2251 to Tasca, December 28, Kissinger approved plans for a briefing of Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)

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### 301. National Security Study Memorandum 116<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 26, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Greece

The President has directed a review of progress in executing the decisions made by him in June 1969 in connection with the resumption of full military shipments to Greece. The principal question to be addressed is what options the U.S. now has vis-à-vis Greece in the light of recent developments there.<sup>2</sup>

A paper should be prepared in the NSCIG/NEA and submitted to the Senior Review Group by January 29, 1971.<sup>3</sup>

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1265, Saunders Subject Files, Greek Military Supply, 1/1/71–12/13/71. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1521 to Athens and Rome, January 2, the Department authorized Ambassadors Tasca and Martin to pursue contacts with King Constantine. (Ibid., Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971) Kissinger was informed of Tasca's intention in a January 7 memorandum from Richard Kennedy. Kissinger noted: "I want to take up with President. Totally, utterly unacceptable. Sisco will either lead in or there'll be a show down." (Ibid.) A January 8 memorandum for the record by Kennedy stated that Kissinger instructed Haig to call Sisco and inform him that "this is contrary to policy and any such instructions should have been cleared by the White House." (Ibid.) In telegram 17382 to Athens, February 2, the Department instructed Tasca that in view of the fact that "question of calls on King seem to be an element to be considered . . . visits must be deferred until [the NSC] review completed." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> In a January 27 memorandum from Davis to recipients of this memorandum, the due date was changed to February 16. (Ibid.) See Document 306.

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**302. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, February 8, 1971, 1555Z.

624. Subj: U.S. policy towards Greece: U.S. security interests should be our main concern in coming year.

*Summary:* As year 1971 begins, fluid political situation produced by Prime Minister's announcement of liberalization measures in April seems to be hardening. Number of uncertainties remain, but broad outline of future situation has begun to emerge. We view Prime Minister's December 19 speech (Athens 6808)<sup>2</sup> as logical outcome of developments following his announced course of liberalization measures. Prime Minister may have run into serious trouble in moving ahead at rate he proposed. He now seems to have overcome, at least temporarily, his opposition within the regime. We regard his statement that there will be no change in political situation in 1971 as assuaging the hard-line opposition and a call for army to back him in his effort to maintain and consolidate his leadership. If he succeeds in latter efforts, progress towards constitutional government may resume at satisfactory rate. And we should not exclude completely possibility of significant steps towards democracy in 1971 should circumstances permit Papadopoulos to reinforce his position by moving in that direction. Outside public pressures on Greek Government, however, are likely to have little effect in 1971.

In these circumstances U.S. policy should continue to focus on our security needs in Greece and take into account strategic situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Fact that Greek foreign policy complements that of U.S. in this respect works to our advantage. Quiet, private pressures on Greek Government during coming year should be directed principally to questions of release of remaining prisoners held without trial or for non-violent minor anti-regime activity, and to complete lifting of martial law. If marked pressure for organization of early elections sometime in 1971 were effective, which we doubt, it would probably produce crisis within regime of sufficient proportions to jeopardize Prime Minister's position. If Papadopoulos were replaced, it would be by another person or persons already in regime. While we cannot now be sure how it would affect U.S. interests, we are skeptical whether

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 21, 1970, it provided a summary and analysis of Papadopoulos's December 19 "State of the Union" year-end speech. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)

U.S. interests would be as well served. Until situation evolves to point where we have better prospect to influence events constructively, protection of our security interests should be chief objective and primary concern of U.S. policy toward Greece. On this basis Greek policies toward U.S. and in foreign policy field will continue to concern us more than internal political situation and its possible liberalization, although the latter continues to be a primary objective of American policy. *End summary.*

1. In his December 19 “State of the Union” message, Prime Minister Papadopoulos announced release of about half of political detainees and held out prospect for release of all detainees by end of April 1971. However, he not only did not hold out any promise for political evolution during 1971; he specifically stated that martial law would not be lifted for offenses against state security nor would there be any political change during year. On surface, making such a statement publicly might seem to be gratuitous, as well as unnecessary, regardless of Government’s intentions. It does reinforce charge of Greek Government’s critics that present regime has no intention of returning to parliamentary situation. We find, however, that Prime Minister’s declaration, “no change in 1971” flows naturally from the series of [statements?] that began with his preceding major speech on April 10, 1971 [1970].<sup>3</sup>

2. At that time Prime Minister announced several liberalizing measures and held out prospect for considerable more late in year. He also announced major reshuffle of Government, strengthening his own personal position but giving no rewards to his colleagues in the revolution. (These former colonels still generally hold office at the secretary general level.) Although we were gratified to see Papadopoulos take lead in direction of return to more democratic situation, many of his colleagues obviously were displeased. Moreover, three years having elapsed since coup, his compatriots’ festering personal ambitions were beginning to erupt. Soon afterward Papadopoulos was attacked almost openly in Greek press by regime dissident Stamatelopoulos,<sup>4</sup> particularly on grounds of his having ignored views of his loyal associates while bringing such individuals as former Communist Georgalas<sup>5</sup> into Government in key positions. Criticism of Papadopoulos’

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<sup>3</sup> In this speech, Papadopoulos announced that articles regarding human rights in the 1968 Constitution would come into effect immediately and that the government would establish a “Consultative Committee” to serve as a parliamentary substitute. Elections for a portion of the committee’s membership took place on November 29, and the Prime Minister announced further nominations to the group on December 31.

<sup>4</sup> Dimitri Stamatelopoulos, a dissident former junta member, in a May 11 article in the daily *Vradyni*.

<sup>5</sup> George Georgalas, appointed Under Secretary to the Prime Minister and Director of Communications in June 1970.

personal life and particularly of interference by his wife in government affairs<sup>6</sup> began to mount among Government's supporters.

3. Situation reached crisis stage in early autumn. Papadopoulos reportedly submitted his resignation only to have it refused when his colleagues found there was no qualified replacement who could maintain essential support of army. This incident may have marked beginning of strengthening of Papadopoulos' hand, enabling him to continue as Prime Minister with authority to arrive at, and implement his own decisions. However, it appears that as price for establishing his preeminence, he was compelled to give his revolutionary colleagues equal voice in any decisions involving elections or return of King, and possibly in some less critical areas. When martial law was not lifted in September, it became apparent that Prime Minister had been obliged to retreat to more defensible position in order to manage his adversaries within the Government. His critics presumably were able to convince at least some elements in army that Papadopoulos was moving too swiftly towards return to civilian rule, thereby jeopardizing the future careers of all who took part in coup and the officer corps in general.

4. Another direct challenge to the Prime Minister occurred in early November, but again Papadopoulos held his position. Certain of his colleagues, particularly Stamatelopoulos and Makarezos, tried to create other centers of power as a first step toward his replacement. Charges of his personal corruption, again in part centering upon the activities of his wife, as well as efforts to upset certain economic arrangements with Onassis and other businessmen, were made. There was a flurry of speculation about a potential role for Karamanlis and even King, but momentum was lost and Papadopoulos weathered storm by skillful exploitation of differences among his adversaries.

5. Prior to December 19 speech, Prime Minister is believed to have told his revolutionary colleagues in categorical terms that henceforth he intended to make his own decisions on the course of the regime (but again with the exception of scheduling elections and any matter relating to return of King). We believe that at this juncture Papadopoulos sounded out extent of his personal support within army, decided it was secure, and acted accordingly. Certainly his December 19 speech was very much addressed to army, as well as to his colleagues, as we interpret it as skillful ploy to maintain his position against those who would like to oust him by giving assurances to army that there will

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<sup>6</sup> In 1970 Papadopoulos divorced his first wife and married his long-time mistress, Despina. She made her first public appearance as the Prime Minister's wife at the March 25 national day celebrations. Questions about the canonical legitimacy of the marriage had been raised by junta members in an August 1970 attack on Papadopoulos.

not be precipitate return to civilian rule. This need to ensure continuing support from the army we believe motivated Papadopoulos' explicit statements on political progress and martial law during 1971.

6. We are now entering a period in which Papadopoulos will try to consolidate his power. (We already have report he is planning Cabinet reshuffle in near future.) We are skeptical whether he will be able within next twelve months to make moves in constitutional field that will change the attitude of Greece's critics abroad; but Papadopoulos is very much an improviser, and we do not exclude possibility that he could make some dramatic move forward if he sees an opportunity to strengthen his own position in this way. In any case, we do not believe that we should now assume that we are necessarily in for a long period of one-man rule. Should Papadopoulos succeed in disarming his opponents within regime by continuing to play his cards only after assuring their trump value, by beginning of 1972 or even earlier, he may make further moves in direction of constitutional government. In our judgment he remains the one individual within the present government most likely to move toward democracy, and we continue to see no prospect for any external opposition forces to affect regime's position in short term.

7. Security services have nipped in the bud every attempt to mount active resistance in Greece, and even such signs of resistance as have been manifested (bombings, pamphlets, etc.) have not lifted the apathy of the Greek people to calls for resistance to the regime. Externally, Communist opposition has become more fragmented. Theodorakis' performance since he was allowed to leave Greece<sup>7</sup> has not been impressive, and Andreas Papandreou has increasingly discredited himself both by his irresponsible calls for violence, which have alienated many of his followers, and his more open cooperation with the Communists, which has perhaps done him even more harm with Greek people. While European Socialist opinion remains adamantly opposed to regime, Greece's withdrawal from Council of Europe is only positive accomplishment of European opponents of regime. Attempts to mount campaign against Greece in NATO have had only indifferent results and future prospects do not at this point look much better. Karamanlis has not been willing to make himself the focal point of non-Communist opposition. The King's failure to rally support on December 13, 1967 and ambivalent attitude since have likewise prevented him from becoming a symbol of resistance. What could seriously bother the

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<sup>7</sup> Theodorakis had been released on orders from Papadopoulos and flew to Paris on the personal aircraft of French political leader and journalist Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Papadopoulos claimed that Theodorakis had agreed to refrain from political activity as the price of his release.

regime is an agreement between major elements of ERE and CU to join forces with Karamanlis and the King in an appeal to the Greek people and particularly the army. But this remains only a prospect. If such a combination were formed, however, it would be possible to speak of the beginning of a real opposition.

8. We cannot be sure what is in Papadopoulos' mind, although it is worth noting that within Government he seems to be key individual who publicly expresses intention of returning to democracy. He also apparently has better grasp on risks of clinging to arbitrary authority than some of his colleagues. Moreover, relatively hard line in his December 19 speech probably gives him greater flexibility for deciding whether and when to take new or relax existing security measures. This assumption borne out by reiteration of similar line in his January 22 speech.

9. There are obvious risks for Papadopoulos in his chosen course of putting himself squarely at head of Government. Serious misstep could give his opponents opportunity to challenge his preeminence again, and we can envisage certain circumstances in which he could be replaced. His reaction to unfolding events will test his ability to maintain leadership or acquiesce in return to collegial rule. It is premature therefore to seek to judge now whether he is in fact stronger than before, though his tactical position may have improved. We do not think that U.S. likely to improve its position here or benefit in any other way from any such change in regime leadership, nor are we able at this time to take seriously claims by Stamatelopoulos or others that they would move faster in restoring democracy. Such assertions may be tactical ploys linked to personal ambition. If Stamatelopoulos and his adherents, for example, did make a move to restore collegial rule, we consider it likely to be in combination with group of individuals who would be less disposed towards return to democracy. While this does not imply that alternate leadership would be anti-U.S. or anti-NATO, our view is that it would not improve Greece's image abroad or reduce our problems here. Some of officers who criticize Papadopoulos, for instance, are outspoken in opposition to parliamentary system.

10. If our analysis is accurate, we believe best U.S. posture is one of continued private pressure, particularly on such questions as maintenance of martial law, which becomes increasingly difficult for Greek Government to justify on security grounds after four years of rule. We should hold out publicly no prospects for concrete programs [*progress*] towards constitutional government in 1971 but leave no doubt that we continue to expect that Greek Government to evolve in this direction. We can best press constitutional issue privately, however, and in general terms, which means for present staying away from most delicate

issues of elections and return of King. Public pressure will not be effective in present circumstances, and it could precipitate crisis between Papadopoulos and those whose views on return to democracy appear less favorable from U.S. standpoint.

11. We should continue to urge Greek Government to clear up question of administratively held political detainees completely by end of April as Prime Minister promised, subject to caveat of no deterioration in security situation. We should also urge release of persons sentenced for minor and non-violent political offenses, speedy resolution of case of those arrested in December and prompt trial or release for persons arrested for political offenses in future. This would eliminate one of principal targets for foreign critics.

12. We think such a posture is best calculated to safeguard our principal interests which are our own security and our strategic position in Eastern Mediterranean. We should increasingly cite these as foundation of U.S. policy towards Greece, and we should continue to be cautious in any predictions of future Greek political developments, particularly in the area of elections. Prime Minister promised that all important institutional laws for implementation of Constitution would be gazetted by beginning of 1971, and this has now been done. Only remaining step which Government could take is application of constitutional articles concerning political parties and Parliament, which means holding elections. It would be unrealistic to anticipate any such developments in 1971, although we do not completely exclude outside chance that Prime Minister could make some move in this direction if his position of leadership remains secure. For example, a move for local elections might be manageable in certain circumstances.

13. Greece is well aware of its importance to Alliance in the face of growing Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean. Greek Government undoubtedly feels that army must play strong role in present situation. This view not only based on changing strategic situation but on events throughout world during past year or so. Martial law has been applied in such countries as Canada, civil disturbances have plagued Italy, Turkey, and numerous other countries, and even such a figure as General de Gaulle was unable to control internal dissidents.<sup>8</sup> None of this has been lost on Greek Government, which has smug attitude about degree of law and order in Greece, and it makes for even less propitious climate in which to press for restoration of parliamentary government. The apparently prosperous economy and steady economic development also contribute to this smugness and at same time

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to student unrest and massive labor demonstrations in France in May 1968.

provide present regime with justification for maintaining authoritarian government.

14. From here we judge that Greece will be even more important to us in coming year on security grounds. Our concern about negative aspects of Prime Minister's speech should not distract us from our essential aims or cause us to lose sight of nature of our primary interests in Greece. Greece remains basically friendly to U.S., is a strong supporter of NATO, and holds a key position in Eastern Mediterranean. We must live with facts that our ability to influence internal developments is limited not only by internal situation, including government's increasing confidence, as reflected in Prime Minister's speech, that it need no longer defer to outside pressures of the kind that had been typical in Greek history, but also by the development, both in this area and throughout the world, of new kind of nationalism. Finally, [garble—thrust] of American foreign policy, as evidenced by Nixon Doctrine,<sup>9</sup> has not gone unnoticed here. The Greeks will welcome the opportunity to play a vital part in the implementation of this new approach of responsibility and self-reliance on country's own strength and resources in the first instance.

**Tasca**

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to President Nixon's statement regarding the U.S. role in Asia during a July 25, 1969, press conference. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 544–556. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 29.

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### 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, February 19, 1971, 1101Z.

794. Subject: Report of visit of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff consultants Lowenstein and Moose. Ref: Athens 705.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USNATO.

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 12, it stated that the Embassy was preparing a report on the mission of Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers James Lowenstein and Richard Moose. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LEG 7 LOWENSTEIN)

1. As reported reftel Embassy has prepared detailed airgram<sup>3</sup> on visit of Lowenstein and Moose. Ambassador has now decided that this matter sufficiently urgent that telegraphic transmission essential, both because of indications from Washington that important hearings may soon take place before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and because, according to this morning's press, Lowenstein and Moose have already made preliminary report to Committee which will be followed by published report.<sup>4</sup> While we regret having to burden Department's communication facilities with this lengthy message, we feel that circumstances warrant it. Recently air pouch material has taken minimum of two weeks.

2. *Summary:* Two staff consultants of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, visited Greece from February 1 to February 7 for purpose of reporting to Committee "on general situation in Greece, considerations affecting continuing military assistance programs, and status and future prospects of U.S.-Greek relations." Lowenstein and Moose (hereafter referred to as Staff Del) had extensive contacts with opposition elements in Athens, most of which were arranged without assistance or even knowledge of Embassy. These contacts, however, soon became public knowledge and, together with unhelpful press reports, adversely affected willingness of Greek Government officials to meet with Staff Del. An interview with Prime Minister Papadopoulos, suggested by Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Palamas, failed to materialize; and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Angelis, who had promised to see Staff Del if Prime Minister were not available, bluntly told Embassy that he would not see them because of "inadmissible" character of Staff Del's mission.<sup>5</sup> The Staff Del did on last day meet with Undersecretary to Prime Minister Georgalas, but he was obviously under instructions to take tough line that did little to refute opposition claims of lack of constitutional progress.

3. During their visit, Staff Del sought views of various Mission elements and listened to them attentively and politely. However, from their line of questioning, from fact that Staff Del particularly sought out some of the most outspoken critics of regime, and from remarks made by Staff Del to Mission officers and others, it is apparent that—despite their assurances to the Department to the contrary (State

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<sup>3</sup> Airgram A-83 from Athens, February 23. (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> 92d Congress, 1st Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Greece: February 1971. A Staff Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

<sup>5</sup> The Greek decision to cancel the meeting with Papadopoulos, and Angelis's refusal to meet them, was reported in telegram 597 from Athens, February 5. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

13721)<sup>6</sup>—they came to Greece to make case against Greek Government and probably also against administration's policy. Although we can only speculate on content of report Staff Del will produce, we expect that its main thrust will be that Greek Government does not enjoy support of Greek people, is not moving toward constitutional government, and in fact has not kept what promises it has made as regards restoration of personal liberties. It must also be anticipated, as now announced by Senator Fulbright, that report will be published.

4. Staff Del may also argue that U.S. Government is mistaken in tying its security interests in Eastern Mediterranean to such a regime, possibly alluding to Greece's desire to maintain friendly relations with Arab countries as being a factor inhibiting Greek support for any U.S. policy involving Israel. Staff Del may also attempt to show that U.S. Government is poorly informed on situation in Greece because Embassy does not have sufficient contact with opposition elements.

5. We believe that Staff Del had developed general lines of its case before coming to Greece. They obviously had had contact with Greek exiles and came supplied with voluminous notes and lists of persons to see. Embassy attempted to refute arguments put forward or implied by Staff Del where we found them to be mistaken or biased. Occasionally there seemed to be emotional involvement on part of Staff Del regarding conditions in Greece as evidenced by such statements as that conditions in Greece are more oppressive than in Poland, and some of this tone may creep into their report. (Greek Government did not help situation by heavy-handed surveillance of Staff Del.)<sup>7</sup>

6. Since we anticipate that the report will be critical of U.S. policy and will have a bearing on future Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, we are giving a detailed chronology of Staff Del's activities in Greece, questions put to Mission officers, and their responses. This material should be useful to the Department in preparing for any hearings on Greece that may be called by Senate Foreign Relations Committee. *End summary.*

[Omitted here is the 20-page body of the cable providing a detailed chronology of the visit.]

<sup>6</sup> Dated January 26. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, LEG 7 LOWENSTEIN)

<sup>7</sup> Reported in telegram 643 from Athens, February 9. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970-31 Dec 1971)

**304. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1971.

Dear Henry:

On 24 February 1971, we received [*1½ lines not declassified*] a report credited to a reliable source and reflecting comments in mid-December 1970 by General Angelis following his conversation with the President in Naples last fall.<sup>2</sup> General Angelis told our source, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the Greek regime would probably make certain “cosmetic” gestures toward greater democratization but that they were not about to introduce basic changes that could result in loss of control. This would be true even in the absence of foreign pressures.

In this latter connection, General Angelis said that he did not anticipate pressure from the U.S. Government. He based this view on his conversation with the President last fall, saying that Mr. Nixon had made a special point of seeing Angelis and had told him emphatically that the important thing was that the Greeks had twelve divisions in NATO.

General Angelis seemed not to be concerned about Greek developments but rather about the mood prevailing in Europe and in some degree in the U.S. He deplored a spirit of indecisiveness and of turning to the left.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] comments that the President's meeting with General Angelis has been a remarkably well kept secret, although it is likely that General Angelis' report along the above lines may well have been accepted within the inner circle of the regime as the last word on U.S. policy. Our representative suggests that this should be considered in any estimate of the probable effect on the Greek Government of various courses of action the U.S. might follow in pressing for an early return to parliamentary government.

I am making no other dissemination of this information.

Cordially,

**Richard Helms<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 78–07173A, Records of the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Box 1, Folder 8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Karamessines on February 27.

<sup>2</sup> The report was not found. Nixon and Angelis met during Nixon's September 29–30, 1970, visit to NATO headquarters in Naples. No record of the conversation was found.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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**305. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, March 5, 1971, 1628Z.

1034. For Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies from Ambassador Tasca.

1. I would hope in light of continuing pattern of his remarks that you would review the conclusions in your letter of December 4<sup>2</sup> that we do not have enough evidence to support representations to friendly governments regarding Andreas Papandreou's calls for violence against Americans in Greece. Since that time, Papandreou has repeated his call for "dynamic resistance" against the Greek regime and its U.S. supporters on at least three occasions (Deutsche Welle, December 10; Munich Radio, December 22; BBC, January 3). In addition, we have recent report that main obstacle to Papandreou's group cooperating with Communist resistance group PAM is that latter will not agree to campaign of violence [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

2. I realize the problems raised for the Department by making representations about Papandreou to a government which depends on liberal support, such as Canadian Government, but American lives are at stake. Leaflets are again being distributed calling for violence against American installations. There were, as you know, four bombs planted recently, intended to destroy American automobiles, and on the evening of February 26 we received another bomb threat which fortunately did not materialize. Papandreou in a letter to Senator Case associated himself by implication with the bombing attempt not only on the Embassy but also with that on September of Defense Laird while he was meeting with the Prime Minister here.

3. I believe that we could raise this subject with the Canadian Government without making representations. The facts of Papandreou's calls for violence against the installations and representatives of a friendly country should be of concern to a government which has granted him residence, particularly since the Canadian Government has only recently had firsthand experience with senseless violence. I think the least we should do is bring the facts to their attention.

**Tasca**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

### 306. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 116<sup>1</sup>

NSCIG/NEA 71–10

Washington, March 8, 1971.

#### Policy Toward Greece: Summary

The dilemma of United States relations with Greece has broader implications than the simple contraposition of our desire to preserve important security interests in Greece with a wish to see a restoration of representative government in Greece.

The continued unreserved participation of Greece in the North Atlantic Alliance and the concomitant availability of Greece's strategic geography to the Alliance plays an important role in providing the United States and the Alliance with the ability to respond quickly and effectively to events in the Middle East and offers the U.S. and the Alliance the tactical flexibility necessary to serve as a deterrent to Soviet adventurism in the Eastern Mediterranean. But pressure on the Greek regime to move more quickly toward the restoration of parliamentary democracy could lead to a loosening of Greek ties to NATO and the U.S.

Conversely, the failure of the Greek regime to take steps which would convince its critics within the Alliance and in the U.S. Congress of its intention to restore representative government in Greece and the failure of the United States to adopt a more visibly energetic policy of encouraging that restoration could lead to reactions within the NATO Alliance, in European and American public opinion, in European parliaments and in the U.S. Congress which could develop into real obstacles to the continuance of a cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Greece.

Military aid to Greece, curtailed by a partial embargo for 41 months, was restored in full in September 1970 in accordance with NSDM 34 of November 14, 1969 and NSDM 67 of June 25, 1970.<sup>2</sup> Although the decision was made on the basis of U.S. security interests, our interest in the return of representative government in Greece was clearly stated.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 116. Secret; Nodis. This response to NSSM 116 (Document 301) was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and submitted to Kissinger by Chairman of the Group Sisco. Davis sent it to the members of the Senior Review Group on March 11 indicating it would be discussed at the March 22 SRG meeting. It was discussed at the March 31 meeting of the SRG; see Document 310.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 262 and 284.

A Greek commitment was clearly made to take certain key steps in the direction of constitutional order. This commitment took the form of a timetable made public in April 1970.<sup>3</sup> The commitment was also frequently privately stated to U.S. officials as well as in an April 1970 letter from the Greek Prime Minister to the President.<sup>4</sup> To a great extent the Greeks met the letter, if not the spirit of the commitment. With one key exception—martial law remains in force. In addition, it now appears as though the prospect for a return to parliamentary government has receded farther into the future. In any event critics of Greece in NATO and in the Congress remain unconvinced that the regime plans ever to return the reins of government of a freely elected parliament or that the regime will abandon the repression of which it has been accused.

The Greek regime remains in firm control of the country. A healthy and burgeoning economy continues to dampen any incipient grass roots movement against the regime. Although the Prime Minister has faced some threats from within the regime to his continued primacy he appears at least for the time being to have overcome them.

To the extent possible, we should chart a course in our relations with the Greeks which would both preserve our security relationship and make it possible to exert as much influence as possible for the restoration of civil rights in Greece and for a return to a more normal political situation. Serving both these objectives severely limits the viable options available to us, eliminates the possibility of attempting to use Military Aid as leverage as well as the possibility of adopting a position of indifference to internal Greek affairs.

### *Options*

In theory we have action alternatives ranging from a severe (and high risk in terms of the Greek regime's attitude) approach at one end of the spectrum to a strict policy of non-concern for internal Greek affairs (with high risk in terms of NATO and Congressional attitudes) at the other. Practically, our options are more limited and can be expressed as two alternatives: do somewhat more or do somewhat less.

Option II calls for a somewhat more energetic application of our present two-pronged policy, calculated to preserve access to security facilities in Greece while exerting as much pressure on the regime as is possible without jeopardizing those interests. This course of action has the advantage of providing evidence to our critics in Congress and

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<sup>3</sup> The timetable was first made public to the Council of Europe in August 1969; see footnote 4, Document 255.

<sup>4</sup> Document 274.

within the Alliance that the U.S. is concerned with and working toward the return of representative government in Greece. It would enhance our ability to control attempts by some allies to introduce divisive debate on Greece into the Alliance. At the same time, the very nature of the ad hoc approach to selecting pressure points makes the risk of applying the policy manageable. Ambassador Tasca believes pressure to lift martial law should continue as should our efforts to seek a reduction or commutation of sentences against political prisoners.

Option III, our present essentially passive policy, has assured access to facilities in Greece but has not proved effective in either satisfying our critics or in moving the Greek regime. To do somewhat less is to move in the direction of Option IV, to drop all attempts to influence events in Greece, which, though it would offer the best assurance of continued access to Greek facilities, would significantly elevate the risk of serious division in NATO and arouse strong reactions among some elements of the Congress.

[Omitted here is the body of the response to NSSM 116, and three annexes entitled "Pressures for United States Policy Changes," "Greek Options in the Face of Increased Pressures," and "King Constantine of Greece: His Role in United States Policy Toward Greece."]

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### 307. Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research<sup>1</sup>

RNAS-6

Washington, March 16, 1971.

#### GREECE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-GREEK RELATIONS OF JUNTA'S CONTINUATION

The military regime in Greece enters its fifth year in power in April 1971. This paper, prepared at the request of the Greek Country Directorate, examines the directions in which the junta may move in its effort to institutionalize its values and political authority. Some of the strains that may envelop US-Greek relations along the way are also examined.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Background Briefings 1971, Greece, 1/1/71–3/31/71. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The paper was prepared by Gene Preston (INR).

*Abstract*

The original members of the April 27 movement have demonstrated impressive cohesiveness over almost four years in power, and Prime Minister Papadopoulos has proven to be a tenacious and effective leader. The Greek economy continues buoyant, and resistance to the regime is divided and ineffective both within the country and abroad. The regime's confidence in its ability to remain in power and to manage Greek affairs over the longer term has been increased by its success in having normalized relations with the US without the restoration of parliamentary government. The Prime Minister's determination and energy, the military's desire to preserve its perquisites and influence over government decisions, and the need to restrain centrifugal forces beginning now to emerge among the original supporters of the coup, together with the current absence of effective foreign pressures, suggest that Papadopoulos may be readying an institutional framework that will govern the junta's course for some years to come. In the pursuit of permanency, the regime may move in one of four principal directions of political development: these include institutionalizing the status quo or gradual shifts toward a more repressive, populist, or democratic system. Each of these possibilities can be evaluated in terms of five measurements of Greece as an ally: its degree of cooperation with US military needs, its overall diplomatic support of the US, its willingness to accept the status quo or a negotiated settlement for the Cyprus problem, its influence—intentionally or inadvertently—upon US prestige with the Greek people, and its financial demands on the US. The findings, based on varying weights for each of the five factors, are that the populist political model would be most costly to the US over the next five years. The range of costs among all four models is not extreme, however, and the US could probably do business with any one of them. Although American prestige is likely to be eroded regardless of political development in Athens, US influence should continue to be a significant force upon the regime.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the issues outlined in the Summary.]

**308. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting on Greece—March 22

*Purpose of the Meeting*

The NSSM 116 exercise which culminates in this meeting was launched to review our posture toward Greece.<sup>2</sup> As you recall, there was a flurry of activity at the end of the year in which State began thinking in terms of getting closer to King Constantine, partly as a means of showing displeasure over the fact that the military regime in Athens had not met all of its pledges on progress toward constitutional government.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of this meeting, therefore, is to inject as much precision as possible into our strategy toward Greece. The objective of the meeting, therefore, is to develop an exact statement of what we are trying to do and what we are not trying to do.

*The Papers*

At the Tabs in this book you will find the following three papers:<sup>4</sup>

—*Analytical Summary*. This paper outlines the IG paper and discusses the current problem in setting policy toward Greece, as well as the options in selecting a general posture and the options vis-à-vis King Constantine. This summary also provides a guide to the few pages you will want to read in the IG paper.

—*IG Paper*. This contains two real options in connection with our general policy toward Greece and an extensive discussion of the role of the King. The first paragraph of the Analytical Summary provides a guide to the pages you need to look at. A recent cable from Ambassador Tasca commenting on the paper is included.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Senior Review Group Files, Meeting of March 19, 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. For the minutes of the Senior Review Group meeting, see Document 310.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 301 and 306.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 301.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1280 from Athens, March 18, is not attached. A copy is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971.

—*Senate Report*. This is included to give you the flavor of the Moose–Lowenstein report which is probably reflective of the current mood on Capitol Hill.<sup>6</sup>

*Talking Points for Opening the Meeting*

1. There is no crisis in Greece and the choice among options is fairly narrow. However, it seemed worthwhile to review the situation since it has turned out somewhat differently from what we anticipated when the President made his decision to resume a normal military assistance relationship last June.

2. You find on reading the IG paper that the choices are really relatively narrow. Since the basic assumptions underlying policy have changed, you would like to focus in the meeting on discussing whether the basic elements of our strategy are still valid. The tactics will have to be left to the State Department, but it does seem worthwhile here to discuss basic objectives.

3. You would like, therefore, to aim at some sort of statement of what it is we are and are not trying to achieve in Greece.

4. You would like to divide the discussion into two parts:

—the question of our general posture toward the military government;

—the question of our posture toward King Constantine.

*General US Posture Toward Greece*

*Background.* The IG paper does not really distinguish clearly between the two main options that it suggests. Option II is what Ambassador Tasca says he is doing now—prodding the regime privately on issues related to return to constitutional government. Option III is what the IG paper says is our current policy—a “passive” policy of prodding only modestly when the opportunity arises. We need to arrive at a fairly precise statement of exactly what is going on and what we will try to do within what limits. The following *talking points* are suggested:

—The IG paper outlines four options, but it points out that only Options II and III represent a real choice. Can we all agree on that?

—What is the difference between Options II and III? The IG paper describes Option III as our present policy, while Ambassador Tasca has sent in a cable [copy on top of the IG paper]<sup>7</sup> saying that Option II reflects accurately the policy he has been following. Can someone

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 303.

<sup>7</sup> Brackets in the original.

describe exactly what it is we are doing now and what the real distinction between these two options is?

—Can any amount of US prodding really change the pace of the regime's movement toward constitutional government? If the answer is that our influence is marginal, then why should we keep prodding?

—If our influence is marginal, is there some distinction to be made between pretending that we can achieve real progress and simply trying to change the regime's behavior on those smaller tactical questions which affect its image abroad?

—If our influence is marginal, are there strong arguments against dropping back entirely into a passive mood of showing no concern whatsoever for the state of government in Greece?

—Is it fair to summarize what we want to do as follows: We do not expect to be able to change the pace of events in Greece. We will do enough prodding to keep the regime aware of our concern for progress toward constitutional government but not enough to jeopardize our interests. If this is a description of our policy, then is it correct to say that we are really choosing Option II rather than Option III?

—If we are choosing Option II, then this raises such questions as whether the President should write a letter to the Prime Minister or whether we should more actively pursue the King. Let's move on to the question of the King's role.

### *The Role of the King*

*Background.* The IG paper ends up with at least the State Department favoring having Ambassador Tasca not only pay a courtesy call on King Constantine but discussing with him ways to mend his fences and improve his position in Greece. The issue, therefore, is not so much whether the Ambassador pays a courtesy call on the King—most ambassadors accredited to Athens have—but what he says if he does. The following *talking points* are suggested:

—Is it absolutely essential that the Ambassador call on King Constantine? Is it simply a matter of courtesy?

—If it is a matter of courtesy, can the Ambassador restrict himself to a discussion of developments in Greece without getting into the business of talking about the King's improvement of his position in Greece and his potential return to Greece?

—The IG paper characterizes the King as very ineffective. Why should we want to stick our necks out to help him return to Greece? Do we really want to create any implication that we are encouraging him to go back?

—Can we agree that if Ambassador Tasca calls on the King he should limit himself to a survey of developments and stay away from the subject of the King's return? Are there arguments to the contrary?

*Summary*

The ideal would be to have something like the following consensus expressed:

1. We will continue to pursue a relatively low level Option II strategy. This will be limited by the judgment that we do not feel we will be able to change the course of events but that there is some value in continuing to encourage the regime to improve its image in the US and in Western Europe.

2. The US cannot say definitively now that it has an interest in the return of King Constantine to Greece. Therefore, the US should not now get into the business of encouraging his return.

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**309. Editorial Note**

On March 25, 1971, President Richard Nixon held a wide-ranging discussion of domestic and international affairs with Attorney General John Mitchell and Greek-American businessman Tom Pappas. According to a transcript of the conversation prepared by the editors specifically for this volume, after a discussion concerning the naming of a new Ambassador to Italy, in which Pappas proposed Henry Tasca, the discussion turned to Greece:

Pappas: "Nobody could save Greece but Tasca. He says I know what the President wants, he says, and I'm going to do it. And I don't give a damn what the State Department or anyone else says. [unclear] lose Italy. I don't like it, but you've got to live with it. You got the generals or the Commies.

Nixon: "Listen, I'm with you all the way, and incidentally, I must say, you know, I'm watching the Spain situation very closely.

Pappas: "And it needs watching desperately."

After a discussion of Spain, the conversation returned to Greece:

Pappas: "I know what these people promised. I believe that they feel embarrassed. I believe that by 1972 they will have set up their affairs so that they can start parliamentary procedures. I think that by the end of the year an announcement of some kind, I have no authority on that. Nobody told me that they were going to do that.

Nixon: "That would be very helpful if they would.

Pappas: "Yes.

Nixon: "You see, look, I am the best friend they got.

Pappas: "I know that."

Nixon: "And, if I had not been in this office, they'd be put right down the tubes.

Pappas: "Right.

Nixon: "Now, I've defended and John knows all this and the NSC and all the rest, everybody wants to kick the Greek around. And they said, 'Well, the Danes.' And I said—

Pappas: "Who are the Danes.

Nixon: "What are you going to do—exchange one battalion for 20 divisions?

Pappas: "20 divisions.

Nixon: "Or whatever it is, 15? We're with them, but they don't make it any easier for us.

Pappas: "I know, I told them that.

Nixon: "Well, keep on telling 'em."

The President then outlined a scenario for an approach to the junta.

Nixon: "We understand what they have to do. Make it appear something else. See. You tell 'em strong. Take a look here, boys, we, you have American politics, you know they've got a very good friend here, but they're hanging all this up.

Pappas: "I'm going to tell them in no uncertain terms. I'm going to tell them in a nice way. Because I've tried my best to guide them, to do everything I possibly could. And I said to [unclear] the strongest of martial law, but don't call it martial law, you can't have that, martial law. And I think that Tasca's done a good job. Now, Greece is going along well, and I think things can go along the road to a semblance of [unclear]. I think by 1972 they will have parliamentary program. Of course, the King's not helping them either, unfortunately.

Nixon: "We haven't done anything about that. I'm sorry about that, he's a nice fellow.

Pappas: "He's a nice, young—

Nixon: "But you think he should stay out of it?"

Pappas: "Oh, absolutely.

Nixon: "Can't come back?"

Pappas: "I believe—

Nixon: "He can't come back?"

Pappas: "Not now. Not now. Not now. He'll be against his own image.

Nixon: "Yeah."

The conversation then turned to Yugoslavia and Turkey. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Among Nixon, Mitchell, and Pappas, March 25, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 473–10)

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### 310. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Greece and Pakistan

#### PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Defense

Mr. David Packard

Mr. James S. Noyes

JCS

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. David Blee

VP Office

Mr. Kent Crane

NSC Staff

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Keith Guthrie

#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

##### *Greece*

1. The SRG agreed that there was not much scope for the United States to influence internal developments in Greece but that the United States Ambassador and other U.S. officials should, when appropriate opportunities arise, prod the Greek Government about returning to constitutional government. However, the U.S. should not make any public show of pressure against the Greek Government.

2. The SRG agreed to seek Presidential approval for Ambassador Tasca to pay a courtesy call on King Constantine. The call would be arranged through the Greek Foreign Office.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 149, Senior Review Group. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the conference room of the Western White House in San Clemente. There is a briefer account of this meeting in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086R, Executive Registry, Subject Files, G–6, Greece.

*Pakistan*

1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan.

*Greece*

Dr. Kissinger: I have read the IG paper<sup>2</sup> and have noted the four choices presented. The IG seems to have come down on Options 2 and 3 although the distinction between those two is not self-evident. I think that what we are doing is carrying out Option 3 while Ambassador Tasca says that our present policy is Option 2. I don't care how we label our policy as long as there is agreement on what we are doing. There is no acute crisis in Greece now. Our choice remains the one we have always had: how to keep in touch with the Greek Government without losing our future options [in Greece]<sup>3</sup> or losing too much at the present time in our relations with other countries.

Mr. Packard: If we push them [the Greeks] along, we might save some trouble later. I don't know what we can do other than what we are now doing.

Mr. Johnson: That is our [the State Department's] feeling.

Dr. Kissinger: An additional point is that when the President saw General Angelis, he didn't exactly send him charging out to undertake reform.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Johnson: I know of only one issue, but it is the very, very major one of whether Ambassadors Martin, Lodge, or Tasca should see the King.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's decide first on the basic line to follow with the Greek Government. Is it correct to sum it up by saying that we want to prod them without any public show of pressure?

Mr. Johnson: I think that is okay.

Mr. Packard: Okay.

Dr. Kissinger: We also should recognize that our scope for action is not very great.

Mr. Packard: I think we should keep pressing them.

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: Could we say that the policy is one of private prodding and public persuasion?

Mr. Packard: We are not doing anything to them publicly.

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<sup>2</sup> For the Summary of the NSSM 116 Response, prepared by the IG/NEA, see Document 306. See also Document 308.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 304.

<sup>4</sup> All brackets, with the exception of the ones describing omitted material, are in the original.

Mr. Johnson: Perhaps it is more correct to say that we will take advantage of every opportunity that presents itself to exert pressure. Didn't the Greeks make some commitment to the President [about returning to constitutional government]?

Mr. Blee: That was to the Council of Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: They told Tasca they would do certain things.

Mr. Johnson: My briefing says something about commitments to the President.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we find out what is meant by "commitments to the President"? I remember only two Presidential conversations on Greece. One was at the Eisenhower funeral.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Johnson: Here it [the reference to a Presidential commitment] is on page 4 [of the NSSM 116 study]: "The commitment of the Greek regime to a schedule for the return of constitutional guarantees . . . was first made in a 'timetable' presented to the Council of Europe in August 1969. In a letter to the President of April 9, 1970, the Prime Minister wrote . . ."<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Blee: Lifting of martial law is the only item the Greeks haven't carried out.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Setting an election date apparently triggers other matters [related to the return of constitutional government] although it [the NSSM 116 study] doesn't say why.

Dr. Kissinger: What we are saying is that when the Ambassador has a chance, he should press the Greek Government on this.

Mr. Johnson: Not only the Ambassador but other U.S. officials, including particularly those on the military side.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: That is being done.

Dr. Kissinger: With some delicacy.

Mr. Packard: We can tell the Greeks that if they don't show some movement, our ability to help may be jeopardized.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. Denmark is going to join Norway in attacking the Greek regime at the next NATO meeting.

Mr. Packard: I don't think the President needs to weigh in.

Dr. Kissinger: My certain conclusion is that the President is not going to press hard.

The next question is what to do about calling on the King. From what I have seen, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. What are you proposing?

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 255.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 243.

<sup>7</sup> This quotation is not in the Summary printed as Document 306. For Papadopoulos's letter, see Document 274.

Mr. Johnson: That Ambassador Tasca pay a courtesy call. This would be handled through the Greek Foreign Office. This is the standard procedure. The Foreign Office won't be happy, but they will have to say yes.

Dr. Kissinger: This seems the most straightforward way of handling it.

Mr. Johnson: Have we sent you a memo on this?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me check this with the President. He wasn't eager when [Ambassador Gardner] Ackley wanted to call on the King a year ago. I will explain that it is the normal thing and that it is not Martin or Lodge who will be involved but our Ambassador in Athens, who will be paying a call as a matter of courtesy as arranged through approved Greek Government channels. Let me check. I think it is likely he will approve.<sup>8</sup>

Lt. Gen. Knowles: It would be abnormal if the Ambassador doesn't call, wouldn't it?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know what utility the King has. He might be of some use during a transition, but the opposition wouldn't want him back. I am sure Papandreou wouldn't want him.

That is all I have.

[Omitted here is discussion of Pakistan.]

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 315.

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### 311. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, April 23, 1971, 1635Z.

1920. For the Secretary.

1. Recently I have taken a major initiative to move the Papadopoulos regime along toward full implementation of the 1968 Constitution. Papadopoulos is influenced by the opinions of leading busi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis.

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nessmen and I have found it especially effective to use carefully selected industrialists as part of that effort.

2. Greek industrialist Athanassiadis-Bodossakis, whose mining and industrial projects are doing very well and earning Greece substantial amounts of foreign exchange, enjoys a strong position with Prime Minister George Papadopoulos. He was not been demanding economic concessions from Government and, on the contrary, has willed considerable personal property—including his own residence—to the state on his death.

3. With the above in mind, early in April I secured his confidential cooperation to help this initiative and briefed him on the considerations which argue for progress toward elections. Thereafter he sought a discreet meeting with the Prime Minister.

4. Just before Greek Easter, Bodossakis gave me a summary of his private talk with Papadopoulos. After noting the improvement in GOG relations with the USG, he warned Prime Minister that the US administration faced strong criticism of its policy toward Greece in the US press and Congress. Such criticism would persist until elections were held in Greece.

5. Prime Minister replied that he appreciated Bodossakis' arguments, and that, if progress continued to be made in country and if everyone "remained in his place," he hoped to be able to make the key decision no later than the fall of 1972.

6. Bodossakis also told Prime Minister that he had sounded out various army unit commanders in Greece on the subject of political evolution and found them sharing his views. *Comment:* This opinion is somewhat more optimistic than Embassy's present assessment. We believe Papadopoulos enjoys wide support among the officers but that among the younger revolutionary officers the slogan persists of "No King, no elections."

7. Bodossakis told me that, in his view, the further relaxation of martial law at Easter was another step in the right direction.<sup>2</sup> He himself felt elections would be held in 1972. He also noted that the issue of King Constantine remained very sensitive and USG should deal with it warily. Constantine is highly mistrusted by Papadopoulos and his intimates. Bodossakis, therefore, speculates that the Prime Minister may decide to hold national elections and then follow up with a plebiscite on the return of Constantine. A plebiscite would go against Constantine and perhaps lead to a further regency. Constantine's son, Prince Paul, might be retained, but this was by no means certain as

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<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to Papadopoulos's decision to permit some 250 political figures to return to Greece.

with the passage of time and further erosion of the institution of the monarchy, he might also be dispensed with.

8. The Prime Minister's apparent consideration of elections in 1972 represents a welcome and we believe significant reading of his present intentions. It is the first time we have seen him discuss the touchy question of a date for elections. It also highlights the high value he puts on actions needed to improve his government's relations with USG. We believe he faces strong resistance to elections from within his regime, but he is proving to be an able maneuverer in coping with his colleagues on political problems. We will continue our private pressures, but clearly the whole effort could be torpedoed by premature publicity which would put Papadopoulos on the defensive. Hence my desire to restrict severely knowledge of the above initiative and its progress.

Tasca

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**312. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, April 23, 1971.

1071. 1. I hope you have seen my telegram, Athens 1920<sup>2</sup> to Department (Nodis) describing the discreet efforts we are making via confidential intermediaries to stress to Prime Minister Papadopoulos the need to take steps toward elections by the fall of 1972.

2. For your own information, and for the President if you find it appropriate, we have been couching arguments to Papadopoulos in terms of his reciprocating the expressions of friendship and good will which the President has shown to him. Our intermediary in one instance spoke directly of the delicate and difficult elections coming up in 1972 and the criticism which President Nixon faces in some quarters over his policy toward Greece. He urged Papadopoulos to keep all this in mind and pointed to the *desirability* of real political progress to-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, and Latin America, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is no time of transmission or receipt on the telegram.

<sup>2</sup> Document 311.

ward elections in Greece to remove a troublesome and contentious element before the U.S. elections. My intermediary reported that the Prime Minister had received the above with interest and had shown a wish to be as cooperative as he could. Specifically, Papadopoulos replied that he hoped very much he could be helpful, that progress continued to be made in Greece and that if everyone "remained in his place" he hoped to be able to make the key decision within the framework of President Nixon's schedule.

3. While all this is encouraging and I intend to pursue energetically the opportunity it represents, I must also point out the pitfalls ahead. Young Revolutionary Army officers still follow the slogan "no King and no elections," and there are many in Papadopoulos regime who lack his political sense as to evolution and prefer to dig in where they are. This means that we must be careful not to embarrass him further by public statements appearing to put him under foreign pressure and thereby undermining his prestige with his colleagues.

4. Similarly, we must treat the issue of Constantine with care and always with out prime objective of the implementation of the Constitution foremost in mind. [2½ lines not declassified] All this could change, but Constantine has not yet seized any of the opportunities to make his peace with the regime. I see signs of disillusionment among even Royalist circles with him and with his prospects. [3½ lines not declassified] But with all the above in mind I recommend that whatever the USG does in its relations with Constantine be closely coordinated with me. A mis-step with Constantine could set back our whole effort to get the Constitution fully applied. This effort requires reconciliation of the nationalist elements—not further divisions—and must go forward in harmony and in accordance with existing realities in Greece.

5. I have written to you in this private fashion to report the aspects of the problem that are politically sensitive for the administration. The basic intelligence information in this letter has been reported via regular Department of State channels.

With warm regards.

**313. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Letter to Deputy Secretary Packard Requesting Review of U.S. Military Activities Planned in Greece—ACTION MEMORANDUM

*Discussion*

We are being asked by the military services to approve or at least consider an increasing number of new activities (homeporting, additional exercises, naval air station, Special Warfare Training Unit deployment, fleet marine force training base, etc.) involving Greece. These activities are for the most part bilateral although to a degree they fall within the NATO framework. The rationale supporting these new projects is linked to the Soviet fleet buildup in the Mediterranean, contingency planning for Middle Eastern crises, and our commitment to maintain strength within NATO including the southern flank.

At the same time those members of Congress critical of our policy toward Greece can be expected to view with concern any increase of U.S. military operations. In the opinion of certain critics we are successfully achieving our military/security objectives at the expense of our political goals. While there appears to be little anti-American resentment among the Greeks as a result of U.S. military presence now, the consequent risk of a continuing buildup cannot be overlooked. A comprehensive overview of anticipated military requirements involving Greece would provide perspective in the totality of our relations with Greece.

*Recommendation*

That you sign the attached letter to Mr. Packard<sup>2</sup> requesting a comprehensive review of military planning involving Greece.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Def 15. Confidential. Drafted by David Rowe and George Churchill (NEA/GRK) on May 6, and cleared in EUR/RPM, PM/ISO, and NEA/RA. Johnson initialed the memorandum and wrote: "Return to NEA." In an attached handwritten note to Sisco, May 11, Davies explained that the Department of the Navy had been going forward with plans for an increased military presence in Greece without the knowledge of either the Department of State or White House staff. When questioned about this activity by Johnson, Zumwalt replied that during the fall of 1970 Moorer and Laird had briefed the President on this possibility following their return from Athens (see Document 293) in the presence of Secretary Rogers and Johnson and had been told to "go ahead" by Nixon. No record of this conversation was found.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached.

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### 314. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 29.1/71

Washington, June 7, 1971.

[Omitted here are a table of contents and picture of key junta leaders.]

#### PROSPECTS FOR GREECE

##### *Conclusions*

A. The military junta appears firmly in control. The leaders show great cohesion; opposition groups are weak and fragmented. The junta's decisive base of power lies in the Greek Armed Forces, purged of potential opponents and awarded new perquisites.

B. The regime claims that its mission is to purify the nation's political and social life. But its reforms have been few, and it remains a military dictatorship, though a more permissive one than in its early days.

C. The government has promulgated a new constitution, but refuses to put into effect such key provisions as parliamentary elections and guarantees of civil liberties. Partly in response to foreign pressures, the leaders are likely, over time, to decree new measures giving the appearance of greater liberalization. They will probably not, however, do anything which they believe might lead to their loss of their ultimate political authority.

D. Thanks both to favorable outside developments and to reasonably good domestic management, the Greek economy is booming. Formerly difficult balance of payments problems have been eased; foreign investment, tourism, and exports increased.

E. Sporadically attempting to mollify its foreign critics, the regime still seeks the best possible working relations with its NATO allies, and especially with the US. Foreign criticism continues, though it appears at the moment to have lost momentum. The regime's leaders calculate that the US and NATO need Greece as much as Greece needs them, and probably see their present relations with the US and the larger NATO powers as satisfactory.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1265, Saunders Subject Files, Greece, 9/1/71-12/31/71. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA prepared this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with it with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

F. Despite the regime's several strengths, certain contingencies could weaken or even topple it—among them a falling out within the junta, a serious setback in a conflict with the Turks over Cyprus, or the economic repercussions of a recession in Europe.

## DISCUSSION

### *I. The Junta*

#### *A. Who They Are*

1. On 21 April 1967 a group of Greek Army officers staged a surprise coup; the same group has since ruled the country. They had originally drawn up plans for a takeover a decade or so earlier, and finally carried it out in a period of political uncertainty when many feared the possibility of a communist-influenced government coming to power. There were probably several hundred officers involved, mostly majors and colonels.

2. Of these, a dozen or so members of the so-called Revolutionary Council (RC) rank as the most important. The RC's leading figures are Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos, Coordination Minister Makarezos, and (a more recent and very important addition to the top group) General Angelis, the present Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Most of the remaining RC members have become civilian Secretaries-General, i.e., supervisors or watchdogs in various government ministries.

3. At the time of the coup the Prime Minister was, with Pattakos and Makarezos, one of a triumvirate. Since then, Papadopoulos' stature and power have increased very considerably and his colleagues' relative stature has declined, though his authority over his RC colleagues is far from absolute. Moreover, after ruling Greece for four years, Papadopoulos remains a somewhat enigmatic figure; he has shown himself to be tenacious of purpose, but he is regarded by many Greeks as "complex" or even "devious."

4. The colonels' origins and background give some clues as to the type of rule they favor. They come from small towns, are mostly from the lower middle class, and are generally unsophisticated. All graduated from the Greek military academy in the early 1940s and have had little education or experience outside the army. They believe in the firm hand of traditionalism, in authority and obedience; they are horrified by the antics and styles of much of the youth in Western Europe and the US. Not for them the permissiveness which they feel leads to radicalism. Accompanying this attitude is a militant anticommunism which is in part the product of their participation in the bloody Greek civil war of 1946–1949.

5. Beyond this, their political outlook and biases are less precise. Self-proclaimed "revolutionaries," their announced mission is to pu-

rify Greek political life, to instill new standards of morality and social responsibility in the Greek people. But in four years their actual reforms have been rather few in number. They have purged the church of some unsavory clerics and have made efforts to improve the educational system, especially through rural school construction and expanding technical and vocational training. They have cracked down on tax evasion, formerly a Greek national pastime. But for the most part the junta's efforts have been hortatory; in public speeches, news releases, new textbooks, and the like, the colonels continue to urge the people of Greece to reform themselves and adopt new high moral standards. They have sought no significant changes in Greece's social or class structure. The established economic community continues to enjoy official favor and to thrive. The regime also favors international capitalists such as Onassis and Tom Pappas.

6. Their regime remains an authoritarian one, despite some changes in the nature of their rule since seizing power. The most notable change has been the promulgation of a new constitution. Though somewhat less liberal than the preceding one, it nonetheless provides for a basically democratic form of government, albeit with much stronger executive powers. The constitution reflects in part an effort to mollify the regime's foreign critics, but its most important provisions go into effect only when decreed by the government.

7. The regime shows extreme reluctance to issue some of these decrees. Several critically important sections of the constitution remain in limbo, notably those calling for free parliamentary elections and those protecting civil liberties. Some of the latter provisions have been activated through implementing legislation, but their effect has been vitiated since martial law remains in force. Greece is still a military dictatorship, though a somewhat more permissive one than in the early days of the regime. Thus it has permitted some of its less hostile critics to speak out, but it shows no signs of softness towards those it thinks dangerous. Precensorship of the press has been abolished, and a few newspapers have been openly critical of some aspects of the regime. However, severe penalties are still inflicted on journalists who write something the military rulers consider subversive. The detention camps were closed in April 1971, and almost all the political prisoners held there were released. However, the regime continues to arrest political critics on various charges.

8. We can make no precise assessment of how much popular support the regime has; free elections and public opinion polls are not permitted in Greece. The government is almost certainly less popular in the cities than in the more conservative rural areas from which the colonels come and where they have sharply increased government development spending. In the 3 years following the coup the investment budget increased by 79 percent as compared to 33 percent in the 3 years

prior to it. Whether the bulk of the Greeks are enthusiastic or not about the ruling regime, they accept their government; they have no choice. Further it has benefited a large number; for example through the cancellation of farmers' debts. The groups whose interests have directly suffered, such as former politicians and some journalists, form a relatively small proportion of the total populace. In any case, Papadopoulos' decisive base of power lies in support from the military—purged of dissenters and awarded attractive new perquisites—and in the efficient activity of the police and the security services.

9. There is evidence of some disagreements among the RC members, though reports of such are generally fragmentary. A group of more puritanical, hard-line officers seems strongly to oppose liberalizing the political system, releasing political prisoners, allowing greater public freedom of expression, preparing for the King's return, or setting a date for general elections. We do not know the exact lineup in the RC on these matters, though Papadopoulos is often alleged to be in conflict with the hard-liners. But it is far from clear that Papadopoulos himself is as determined an advocate of liberalization as he wants to appear. The principal differences in the RC may well center around personal rivalries and involve conflicting personal ambitions. Nonetheless, it remains true that the military officers who seized power have so far shown great cohesion, with no major splits, purges or arrests—in distinct contrast to most comparable groups which have seized power elsewhere.

#### *B. Their Strengths*

10. The military rulers of Greece have a fair amount going for them. Their claims with respect to the corruption, unpopularity, irresponsibility, and ineffectiveness of the preceding Greek governments, though exaggerated, are not unfounded. Many Greeks who would vote against the regime in free balloting probably appreciate the relative stability and peace and quiet which prevails in the country. The turbulence in neighboring Turkey as compared to the quiet in Greece is seen to justify the junta's firm rule. However much publicity they receive abroad, opposition and resistance groups are small, ineffective, poorly organized, and mostly in exile. Despite recurring terrorist threats and bombings, the regime appears to have the internal security situation under control. The favored armed forces, the police, and the purged and intimidated civil service show no signs of transferring their loyalties. In the eyes of the Greek people, the regime has at least the passive backing and probably the active support of the US. This is a matter of great importance, since the "American factor" is still regarded in Greece as a potent determinant in the country's political life.

11. Further, Greece is now enjoying considerable economic prosperity, owing in part to the stability prevailing under the regime and

to economic policies followed by Coordination Minister Makarezos. In April 1967, Greece was in the midst of a recession, which had been brought on in part by political uncertainties and a series of strikes. By 1969, Greece had fully recovered. Gross national product at constant prices rose over eight percent in that year and only slightly less than that in 1970. Prices have remained relatively stable.

12. In part this improved situation—particularly in the balance of payments—resulted from developments outside the control of any Greek government. West Germany has recovered from a mild recession, permitting a large number of Greek workers to find jobs there in the last two or three years, and to send home substantial remittances, amounting to \$343 million in 1970. Greece's booming tourist trade—amounting to \$194 million in 1970—has been little affected of late by the bad publicity given the junta in North America and Western Europe. The closure of the Suez Canal and the world-wide shortage of tankers have boosted revenues earned by Greece's large shipping fleet—though this may have been offset by losses sustained by ship repair and bunkering facilities. In any case, foreign exchange reserves are now 14 percent higher than the pre-coup level.

13. But economic recovery has been due to more than fortuitous circumstances. Another important factor in easing Greece's balance of payments problem has been a sharp rise in exports, resulting partly from new government policies designed to make Greek goods competitive on the world market, and to prepare the country over the long term for entry into the European Common Market. In agriculture, the regime has encouraged increased exports of such profitable crops as fruit and vegetables in place of wheat and tobacco. Financial incentives have been provided to export industries, and industrial policy has encouraged the inflow of foreign capital.<sup>2</sup> Fiscal incentives and other forms of support have been given to encourage further growth in tourist facilities and in the shipping industry.

14. The regime has followed basic policies favorable to economic growth: a) reliance on free enterprise; b) observance of their agreements for adherence to the Common Market; c) use of normal monetary and fiscal controls rather than more direct intervention in the economy; d) removal of balance of payments restraints on growth through borrowing. Since early 1968, the regime has been implementing, as a guideline, a five year plan based on that of Andreas Papandreou, with such ambitious long-term goals as raising income levels to those of advanced countries, improving income distribution, and increasing social services.

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<sup>2</sup> In 1970, some \$51 million came in under the investment law. This compares with about \$48 million in 1966, the last year before the coup. [Footnote in the original.]

15. On more specific structural problems of the Greek economy, the regime is making more headway than any government since the Karamanlis era, but is still hampered by such traditional obstructions as bureaucratic inertia, shortages of trained personnel, and vested interest groups. These basic problems include fragmentation and small size of land holdings, rapid displacement of the rural population to the cities and related regional imbalances, and a distorted investment pattern. Success in the economic field does not of course automatically bring about political popularity. Nonetheless, the current economic boom has made the regime more palatable even to those Greeks who wish a return to parliamentary rule.

*C. Their Weaknesses*

16. The regime remains vulnerable in many respects. Though it has showered the Greek people with considerable laudatory propaganda about itself, it does not appear to have acquired a mass following; the public appearances of the leaders inspire little enthusiasm. Most of the old regime politicians continue to shun them. The cooperative relationships with the principal business leaders are probably based on expediency rather than on any deep-seated identification with or loyalty to the present government. Indeed their ties with figures like Onassis have probably alienated many smaller businessmen, particularly those involved in the import-export field. The latter, though sharing in the general prosperity, are relatively less favored than are the tycoons.

17. The junta's stated goal of purifying Greek political life is probably sincerely meant, but it is also unrealistic and utopian. It has made the leaders quite vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy, since the private lives of some of the colonels are anything but models of probity. The means used by the regime to achieve its lofty aims have included, among others, censorship, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, and—according to its bitterest critics—police torture. In any event, there is a considerable gap between the colonels' words and their performance, a fact frequently pointed out by foreign critics and almost certainly known to most Greeks.

*II. The Junta and the World*

*A. Turkey and the Cyprus Dispute*

18. The regime's Cyprus policy has been a cautious one; it has sought no more than to prevent the situation from leading to Greek-Turkish hostilities. Thus it acceded to Turkish demands that most regular Greek troops be removed from the island, and forbade anti-Turkish propaganda in the Greek media. But the situation on Cyprus remains volatile; no real reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities there is in sight, and major trouble is always a danger.

The new Erim government in Turkey has taken a hard line—particularly on the subject of intercommunal talks—which may raise the level of tensions considerably. Were the situation to heat up, there is very little that the Athens Government could do alone to restrain Archbishop Makarios and his Greek Cypriot followers. However, Athens has about 1,700 military personnel on the island, including 950 in the Hellenic Army contingent and some 600 officers and non-commissioned officers serving with the Greek Cypriot National Guard. They could play an important role under certain circumstances, such as providing a measure of control in the event of Makarios' assassination.

19. There are periodic talks between the Greek and Turkish Governments on the Cyprus issue. Both Athens and Ankara would of course find it difficult to arrive at a mutually acceptable formula, and even more difficult to impose it on unwilling Cypriots. This would be particularly the case with the Greeks, who would almost certainly have to make unpalatable and hitherto unacceptable concessions to the Turks, perhaps even an agreement to partition the island between the two countries. Such a solution would not be popular in Greece, where the goal of union of the whole island with the mother country ("enosis") still has strong emotional appeal, but the junta probably has enough strength to repress any public protests over the issue in Greece.

20. Athens has apparently not worked out a *modus vivendi* with Ankara to insure an untroubled succession to the 86-year old Athenagoras, the Ecumenical Patriarch resident in Istanbul, in case of his death or resignation. The prestige of Greece is intimately tied to the Patriarchate, and Turkish authorities hold a virtual veto over the succession election. If controversy should attend the first patriarchal succession in more than 23 years, relations between the two governments could be seriously worsened, even to the point of jeopardizing the continued residence of the 20,000 Greek citizens in Istanbul.

*B. Europe, NATO, and the United States*

21. From the first, the conduct of foreign affairs has been a vexing task for the junta. Most Greeks place a very high premium on maintaining good relations with the US and with West European states. They also want to maintain an honored place in NATO and other West European multinational organizations. The colonels were probably surprised as well as chagrined at the hostile reactions in the Western World to their seizure of power. The temporary suspension of some US military aid, the harsh criticism (particularly by The Netherlands, Norway and Denmark) in NATO meetings and other European bodies, the sequence of events which finally led Greece to walk out of the Council of Europe, the denunciation of the junta by much of the press and many prominent political figures in both Europe and the US have seriously disturbed the regime's leaders. Such protests, and the pressures they

have generated, have been one (though not the only) cause of the steps taken towards the restoration of constitutional government. At least for the moment such criticism appears to have lost momentum, although attitudes, especially in the more liberal circles of Europe, remain basically unchanged.

22. Athens is sensitive to outside criticism, and has made some concessions to it. But it is not likely to make any fundamental shifts in domestic policy in response to such attitudes. Its leaders probably calculate that there are limits, with respect to actions against them, that their NATO allies would choose to take, and that the latter need Greece as much as Greece needs them. With the US and NATO bases already in Greece, the inhospitable attitudes of the other states in the eastern Mediterranean to US use of facilities, and the rising Soviet air and naval strength there, the government believes that Greece is an area of primary strategic importance for NATO and US forces, including the Sixth Fleet.

23. Though Athens has sought to normalize and improve its generally cool relationships with Eastern Europe and the USSR, it has not threatened to turn Eastward if ties with the West were loosened. In bargaining with the US, the junta has not used threats—say to close the airfields or to shut certain installations. While resisting US pressures toward political liberalization, the government has not responded by suggesting possibly harmful moves against Washington. Rather the leaders seem to share the sentiments of many of their countrymen and feel there is a special tie—cemented by the large and sometimes prominent community of Greek descent in the US—between the two countries. Thus while continued frictions and difficulties will manifest themselves, a rupture of Greek-American relations is unlikely.

24. At the same time, the colonels will seek to retain the best possible relations with France and West Germany, both as shields against criticism from some of the smaller NATO powers, and as alternative sources of military supplies were US equipment to become unavailable or too expensive.<sup>3</sup> While the present Greek regime would probably walk out of NATO altogether rather than accede to political pressures stimulated by its critics in NATO, there now appears no serious likelihood of its being forced to do so. At least for the present the junta probably views relations with the US and most other NATO countries as on the whole satisfactory and sees no need to change its present course.

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<sup>3</sup> Most equipment in the Greek Armed Forces is of US origin, and Athens, knowing the logistical problems of servicing equipment from different sources, would like to keep it that way. Nonetheless, the Greeks are mindful of the previous partial cut-off of arms supplies, of the reduction of US grant aid programs, and of the competitive prices being quoted by European arms manufacturers. [Footnote in the original.]

*The Arab World and Africa*

25. Impelled by such factors as the need to broaden diplomatic support for Greece and concern for Greeks living abroad, the junta has made efforts during the past two years to improve its standing with Arab and sub-Sahara African governments. Greece has entered a supply and training agreement with the Libyan Air Force and has exchanged high-level visits with several West African countries.

*III. Prospects and Contingencies*

26. In more than four years of power, the leaders have shown themselves adept in maintaining their control. Their prospects for continuing to do so now appear good. Such factors as their own cohesiveness, a passive populace, a contented army, an efficient police, no strong foreign pressures for change, and a booming economy all point towards their continued survival. But any of these and other favorable ones could change unexpectedly, bringing on a new situation. Some combination of internal failures, outside developments, and foreign pressures could cause serious trouble for the leadership; it is even conceivable that the entire military regime might be ousted altogether. For example:

a. The cohesiveness that has characterized the military leadership since the 1967 coup could erode in time or fracture suddenly over some major issue. In such circumstances Papadopoulos might be replaced by another member of the junta or by another secret army clique; or the present system might give way to some form of "collective" leadership with no single individual exercising much influence over events.

b. If over time resistance groups in exile and the traditional party politicians now inactive were able to coordinate their efforts and organize popular support, they might pose a threat to the junta, encourage divisions between it and the armed forces, or at least constitute a source of serious harassment, possibly by terrorist tactics.

c. The Greek economy and political system will remain heavily dependent on developments taking place outside the country or over which its government has no control. For example, a serious setback in a conflict with the Turks over Cyprus could lead to the junta's downfall. A serious recession in Europe would sharply reduce worker remittances from West Germany, cut tourist revenues, contract a principal market for exports, and bring on depressed economic conditions in Greece, with consequent trouble for its rulers.

d. In addition, the regime—already an international pariah in the eyes of some groups and smaller countries in Europe—would be vulnerable were it to face concerted opposition from the principal European powers. It would be very much more so were it to encounter active hostility from the US Government as well. In such circumstances the junta's survival could be seriously threatened.

27. Over time, the junta will probably seek to increase at least the appearance of greater popular support. To this end it might ordain the establishment of one or more political parties, perhaps including a putative opposition one. It may permit the election of a new parliament. Such measures would offer many advantages; Papadopoulos could hope, in so doing, actually to broaden his base of public backing at home and to spike the guns of his critics abroad.

28. But such measures would more likely be tokens of the government's good intentions than an actual turnover of power to a civilian government. Thus any new political parties would probably be tame affairs, manned by politicians pledged to the continuation of the "revolution" and to the primacy of the colonels. Similarly a new parliament would probably be designed to provide the regime with little more than a constitutional facade.

29. Another kind of move—less likely—would be to seek some kind of rapprochement with exiled King Constantine, even allowing him to return. The King is, to the regime, a known and distrusted quantity. The junta seized power without his prior knowledge and against his wishes. After several months of wary coexistence, the King (who had formerly played a very active political role in his own right and who would probably seek to do so again) tried to throw them out; his counter-coup failed and he was exiled, though Greece officially remains a monarchy. Whatever Constantine were to promise as a price for his return, in the junta's mind there would always be a danger that he would begin demanding a truly free press or elections, or start soliciting support from civilians and military men of prominence. This would pose a real threat, a fact which makes his return at the regime's behest doubtful.<sup>4</sup>

30. In any case, the leaders will probably be guided in their decisions principally by concern for their continued tenure in office. While taking any number of measures to enhance their public image or to pursue specific political or economic policies, they will be highly unlikely, on their own, to do anything which they thought could lead to their loss of ultimate authority over Greek political life.

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<sup>4</sup> The 1968 constitution provides for the monarch's return after elections are held. A possible resolution of the problem would be the deposition of Constantine and the recognition of his young son as King. [Footnote in the original.]

**315. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Calls on King Constantine

You will recall that at the last SRG on Greece<sup>2</sup> it was generally agreed that Ambassador Tasca could pay a strictly protocol call on King Constantine.

At *Tab A* is an instruction to Ambassador Tasca to work out an appointment through the Greek Foreign Office. It instructs him to limit his conversation to an exchange of courtesies, solicitation of the King's views, briefing on the internal Greek situation as Tasca sees it and explanation of the present US posture. The instruction rejects the idea of Ambassador Tasca's offering King Constantine explicit advice on his role in the present Greek situation. If the subject arises, it tells Ambassador Tasca that he should simply suggest that the King maintain a statesmanlike stance above party politics. [You will note that this telegram has been signed off by Secretary Rogers and is a telegram from him to Ambassador Tasca.]<sup>3</sup>

At *Tab B* is a memo I sent to you earlier in connection with a call on the King by the regular liaison officer who maintains occasional contact with him from the embassy in London. You approved provided the King approves of US military assistance. He did last September, but I have added your thought to the telegram [see notes at *Tab B*].

*Recommendation:* That you clear the message at *Tab A* if it squares with your understanding of the President's wishes.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Thru Haig."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 310.

<sup>3</sup> All brackets in the original.

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger initialed the approval option.

**316. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 21, 1971, 1632Z.

3086. For Asst. Secy. Sisco from Ambassador Tasca. Subj: Contacts with Opposition. Ref: State 099827.<sup>2</sup>

1. I fully share your view on the usefulness of contacts with the opposition for the reasons you give. It is my intention to continue to see various former politicians at the residence on a regular basis. We have also invited a substantial number of the opposition to our Independence Day party on July 2.

2. As you point out, our contacts with the opposition must be handled in such a manner as not to impair our good working relations with the Government which are essential to the promotion of our important security interests in Greece. We must also avoid letting these contacts be exploited by the hardliners or the opposition for purposes that do not accord with our interests. The Greek Government will always be sensitive to Embassy contacts with the opposition, but I am confident that by judicious handling we can avoid undue difficulties, especially since, as you note, the Prime Minister is seeing members of the opposition.

3. My contacts and those of other officers of the Embassy with opposition figures are generally known around Athens diplomatic, political and press circles and some of my meetings have been noted briefly in the press. As we continue with further meetings, I would expect additional press reporting and we will discreetly try to stimulate some, but I suspect news interest will gradually wane.

4. I realize that contacts with the opposition have become a bone of contention with some Congressional, press and public critics of the present Greek Government, but I cannot help feeling that it has been to a large extent a fabricated issue and that it is not the real issue. We have never lost touch with opposition figures and we have always been aware of their views. My door has always been open. The real issue concerns the present two-pronged policy towards Greece. Regardless of the extent of Embassy contacts with the opposition, Greek and foreign opponents of the present Greek Government will continue to ag-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 7, it instructed the Embassy to increase its contacts with opposition figures in order to better display U.S. efforts to promote democracy to both Congress and the press. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)

itate for a shift in U.S. policy that would imply the application of sufficient U.S. pressure to force return to parliamentary government with or without the consent of the present ruling establishment in Greece. It would set this target as a priority ahead of broader political-military considerations regardless of the practical problems of implementing such a policy. Needless to say, such a policy would be fraught with great risks to security interests, with quite doubtful chances of success on the political side.<sup>3</sup>

**Tasca**

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 25 backchannel message to Kissinger, Tasca commented: "I attach great importance to the way in which these contacts are handled, as in this area there may be greater hazards to our interests than would be noticeable at first glance." He asked for Kissinger's "personal attention" to the issue. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971) Tasca's concern was apparently stirred by a June 2 meeting between Sisco and Demetracopoulos. (Telegram 3136 from Athens, June 23; *ibid.*) In a subsequent message to Davies (telegram 3470 from Athens, July 11), Tasca outlined his meetings with opposition figures. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE)

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**317. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek Affairs  
(Silva)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 25, 1971.

SUBJ

Conversation—Fragments and Impressions—Athens, May, 1971

*The Consensus:* As the Embassy was reluctant to have me see anyone in the government and left me totally to my own devices (with some caveats as to who in the opposition I ought not to see because of "the Ambassador's sensitivities") I was inevitably left with calls in Athens on persons whom I previously knew<sup>2</sup> (and their friends) who inevitably were in opposition to the present regime. Most of them were Center Union/Venizelist/liberals. The following views were generally held by all of them—they are not reported as facts but as indicators of mood and opinion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Pol 30. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Walter J. Silva served in Athens from July 1964 to October 1966.

*On Violence:* Everyone matter-of-factly expected increased violence and accepted the need for it as the only way out of the present impasse. It was generally believed that the violence was necessary because of the indifference to or complicity of the U.S. in the situation.

*On Anti-Americanism:* It is difficult to judge how wide or deep anti-American feelings run among those people with whom I talked. Without exception they blamed the U.S. for making the situation possible. They are disillusioned at our cynical abandonment of principle and to some extent disenchanting with us as the “leaders of the free world”—one University professor asked, “What free world? Spain, Portugal, Latin America, Greece?” Without exception, however, they described the Greece of the future as still allied closely with the U.S. and NATO. Most of them saw the future relationship between Greece and the U.S. as quite different from that which obtained in the past. Greece must, they felt, make its own decisions based on its own self-interest and its own self-interest does not include over-dependence on the U.S. The decisions of the U.S. are obviously made entirely on the basis of what the U.S. believes to be in its own interest without regard for the welfare of other countries. Greece is the example. We will always be friends but the relationship must be as equals. In a few instances I was told that there was in fact wide-spread hatred of the U.S. among Greek intellectuals and cultural leaders. But they observed, once things got back to normal in Greece, we could expect that most of them would come around again. “The Greeks don’t hold grudges” (sic!!). There are too many close ties between us.

A few University students both in Athens and in Thessaloniki—probably fairly representative—had rather interesting views. Anti-Americanism exists certainly but only as part of the anti-establishment posture of Greek youth. Students are not even anti-regime particularly. This government like all governments before it—is corrupt and despotic—the whole system must be changed. If the government lifted martial law the students would burn down the University. On the other hand I heard reports of small groups of far-leftist “maoist” students whose first order of priority is the overthrow of the regime. Though much of the talk is probably bombast, many of them are seriously plotting violence directed against the regime and against the Americans whom they identify with it. They lack the resources at the moment, but it would not take much to get them to go to work.

*On the Embassy:* The constant inescapable theme, right left and center, is that the Embassy, and most particularly the Ambassador, supports the regime. American policy toward the regime is seen as the product of the position of the Embassy, which can always be counted on to come to the defense of the regime. In many cases the condemnation was carried higher and laid at the doorstep of the administra-

tion. The President and Mr. Kissinger were cynics without scruple ready to sacrifice the Greek people to the needs of their "cold war politics." But in any event, they observed, the Ambassador was to blame. He cannot but know what is going on in Greece. If he could not get the administration to change its policies then he should resign. There was nobody in the Embassy they could talk to. "None of them want to hear the truth." A couple of people described Jim Potts<sup>3</sup> as the evil genius behind the present situation. They saw special meaning in his reassignment to Greece at this time since he had served earlier in Athens and they assumed knew Papadopoulos in his earlier KYP incarnation.

*On Corruption:* Every educated Greek I talked to made a point of the corruption of the regime. One person asserted he had it on unimpeachable authority that the last time Minister of Mercantile Marine Holevas went to Japan he placed an order for his *third* tanker. All the members of the government are on the take. Even Pattakos, I was told, has bank accounts in Switzerland. The corruption permeates the whole system. At the highest levels the deals are made with the economic oligarchy, with Bodossakis, Andreadis, Angelopoulos and others of that ilk who are further enriching themselves through their close relationship with the government. In the middle reaches of the government bribes are the order of the day. In the villages, army officers are guilty of the pettiest chicanery and venality, stealing lepta, as one man put it, while their bosses in Athens steal millions of drachma. One University professor philosophized that rather than cleansing the Greek body politic the regime had introduced the new "favlokratia" (political corruption) to levels and sectors of Greek society previously untouched—it permeates the society, the church, the school system, the military, to a degree hitherto unknown and they have set democracy in Greece back another decade.

*The Prisoners:* I met several of the wives of prisoners. They are a remarkable group, reinforcing my view that the finest thing Greece has ever produced has been Greek women—both in marble and in the flesh. Wives of University professors and military officers, they were all young, relatively well-educated and possessed of enormous courage and dignity. They would of course like to see the Department of State and the Embassy take up their husbands' cases with the regime. Mrs. Papanicolao (wife of Col. Nicholas Papanicolao who was arrested early on presumably for complicity in the King's counter coup) described his treatment calmly, in detail. As soon as he was arrested the beatings began. He managed to escape from the room in the suburban hotel

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<sup>3</sup> James M. Potts, member of the Political Section of the Embassy in Athens.

where he was being held and got as far as the court yard—his plan was to get to the American Embassy where he hoped to find sanctuary. He didn't make it. He was taken to another room where he was manacled high on the wall for a total of twenty-five days (with a three day break to heal his wrists) during which he was deprived of water and food for long stretches and subjected to intensive psychological pressures. A loud speaker blared continuously suggesting that his colleagues had told all and implicated him to save themselves, that his wife was taking advantage of his absence by bedding down with some of his old friends, etc. He was beaten regularly with a cane on his legs and ribs. Other wives described similar treatment their husbands had reported receiving usually at the hands of the military police.

On the question of the manner of arrest, Mrs. Maronitis, wife of Demetrios Maronitis, former professor (ancient Greek literature) at the University of Thessaloniki, replied that the military police arrested her husband in the dead of night in mid-March and without a warrant. She and her husband both asked the arresting officers for a warrant, referring to PM's assurances on Article 10 of the Constitution. There was none, either for the arrest or for the ensuing search of their home. Her husband was a member of PAK, she was told, and they wanted to find evidence of his collaboration. They went through all his papers and found nothing, confiscated all the books and articles he had written in order to search for references which might prove him Andreas' [Papandreou] man.

*The Universities:* The Professors I saw of both the universities were uniformly pessimistic about the general situation, unhappy with U.S. support for the junta, highly critical of the condition of the universities. One of them called his university a time bomb set in the dark—no one knew when it would go off. The students seem quiescent, the work load is great, the value of the degree generally recognized—but the great majority are rabidly anti-junta. All that is lacking for an explosion is leadership and opportunity. Through their Commissars in the Universities for regime manages to control the universities entirely—retired General Polyzopoulos at Thessaloniki University is fundamentally a decent man but he is the junta's man in the University and gets into everything. The result is a totally intimidated faculty which will be cautious and avoid any innovation or discussion which might be interpreted by the government as somehow counter-revolutionary. Classes are still enormous, contact with the students virtually impossible and as a result the schism between faculty and students grows. Both universities in order to do what they are set up to do should drastically reduce their student bodies. Otherwise the education this generation of Greeks is getting will continue to be mediocre at best. One young professor at a medical school insisted that the graduates do not deserve the title of MD and it is a crime to turn them loose on the public.

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**318. Memorandum by Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 25, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of the Interior  
The Secretary of Agriculture  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Secretary of Labor  
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare  
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development  
The Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT

Official Visits to Greece<sup>2</sup>

I remain concerned at the failure of the Greek regime to carry out its commitment to move ahead toward a constitutional order, and as you know there is also Congressional concern over developments in Greece. Thus, in order to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation of our attitude in this matter, both within Greece and in the Congress, I consider it desirable to limit visits to Greece by senior U.S. Government officials to those cases where overriding need clearly exists.

I would therefore appreciate if we could be kept informed of proposed visits by any senior officials of your agency to Greece, and consulted before accepting invitations or scheduling such visits.

**William P. Rogers**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In a November 18, 1969, letter for Nutter, Sisco had requested that the Department of Defense clear all official, including general officers', visits with the Department of State. In a December 4 reply to Sisco, Nutter had agreed to clear all civilian visits but insisted that military officers would not be subjected to this clearance. (Both are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Greece, 121–333, 1969)

**319. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, July 11, 1971, 0855Z.

3469. 1. Mrs. Tasca and I called upon the King and Queen of Greece July 8.<sup>2</sup> After exchange of usual pleasantries King welcomed me and said it was a tradition for royal family of Greece to have close and excellent relations with US Ambassador to Greece.

2. I opened by stating my pleasure with opportunity of meeting him and the Queen. US policy towards Greece was clear and based upon the two sound principles of security and democracy. We believed there was no better alternative.

3. I described Soviet threat in the Eastern Mediterranean and importance of Greece to NATO security and to our bilateral security interests which had to take priority over all other interests. Greece was a member of NATO with obligations in the NATO area under the NAT. Those who opposed military aid to Greece were willy-nilly undermining Greek membership in NATO as it could not be accepted that the Greek people should be deprived of the means of defending themselves.

4. The second pillar of our policy was to promote a return to democracy. Since I had arrived in Greece I had seized every opportunity to make clear to the regime that the maintenance of strong bilateral relations depended upon a solid majority behind the President's policies. This required an early return to parliamentary government in Greece. The American people, I observed, simply feel differently about Greece for historic and philosophical reasons than they do about other countries; hence the great US interest in early return to democracy.

5. Our policy involved working with PM Papadopoulos and had to take account of the realities of the power situation in Greece. The vehicle at hand must be the 1968 Constitution which was basically sufficiently democratic in approach for it to be key element in evolution. The withholding of military aid would be and had been counterproductive. There had been much misunderstanding publicly regarding US policies and the American Embassy in Athens, some in good faith but some also in bad faith.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to his departure for Rome, Tasca discussed his visit to the King with Palamas. He reported on this meeting in telegram 3367 from Athens, July 6. (Ibid.)

6. The King said he was pleased to hear my views. He had been puzzled by Barbour's reference to Wayne Hays and latter's implying King opposed military aid.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary he considered that military aid was highly essential to Greece's national defense. He could not recall having talked to Wayne Hays on the subject and seemed even doubtful where he had seen him. The King considered the 1968 Constitution fully adequate but said he and opposition could not support it publicly until some agreement reached with GOG on its implementation. (He may have been referring to operation of constitutional court and setting date for elections.) He added that military aid should somehow be tied to progress on the constitutional front in some general, not specific way.

7. I countered by saying GOG was firmly in saddle (point he accepted), and was now in its fifth year. I repeated that military aid basically was not a useful element of pressure; it had been tried and failed; the GOG could get attractive military credit from French who were eager to sell arms to Greece. Moreover, there was a growing nationalistic feeling, particularly among some of younger officers. Pressure would strengthen these officers against Papadopoulos, and excessive pressure might even bring a new military group to power who were not bound to the traditional concepts governing the country as were present top military rulers.

8. In fact, I continued, our main influence had to be quiet persuasion with the PM on the basis of (1) his desire to see the aims of the revolution achieved through implementation of the 1968 Constitution; (2) the indispensable link between democracy in Greece and strong relations with the US. Under present circumstances these relations were undermined by GOG failure to implement fully the 1968 Constitution. If the foregoing were correct, I said, then opposition leaders in good faith should concentrate on bridge-building to PM through the 1968 Constitution. After all, none of them wanted to go back to 1967, to which King expressed his agreement by nodding, and perhaps the differences between the enlightened opposition and the PM were not really so great. If this were so, I continued, pointing to PM's contacts

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<sup>3</sup> Robert Barbour, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in Italy. Citing the King's reputed comments, Congressman Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, introduced an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill for 1972 that would have cut all aid to Greece. The Hays amendment was defeated in committee by a 14-12 vote but the Congressman reintroduced it once the legislation reached a vote in the full House where it won passage and subsequent Senate approval. The amendment banned aid to Greece unless the President affirmed the assistance was "in the overriding requirements of the national security of the United States." For text of the relevant portion of P.L. 92-226, amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, approved February 7, 1972, see 86 Stat. 27. President Nixon signed the waiver for assistance to Greece on February 17.

with politicians from last parliament, perhaps present phase may be one of reconciliation, in which case all should consider how to encourage PM to move ahead on this basis and tailor their activities accordingly. I may have persuaded the King in this sense.

9. King had earlier asked whether I knew what Papadopoulos wanted. Before I could answer, he said it was unlikely anyone could answer this question. I noted that one could take the position of recent article in *London Observer* and come out with convincing line that PM planned to do nothing, or one could look at the public and private statements of the PM and at the fact Cabinet had met nearly every Friday last year working out the implementing legislation for Constitution. I thought it was the better part of wisdom to proceed on the assumption that the PM intended to implement the 1968 Constitution and to encourage action in that direction. I noted that the Constitution provides for return of King.

10. The King said he agreed with my comments on 1968 Constitution. He realized clearly the obstacles to his return, but he indicated he was willing to talk to PM. Latter, however, had had no contact with him for two years in spite of King's expressed interest in opening such a dialogue. King noted that his return should be based upon an agreement to implement the Constitution with elections, but he was willing to be reasonably flexible on a date. He observed that his return would legitimize the Government and would be generally helpful.

11. I asked him what happen in 1967. He explained he had visited Washington in September and had asked for help during a meeting with President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow. He said he made plain all he was seeking was moral support since US force would have been unthinkable; the President told him that he could count on his moral support if he moved against the junta.<sup>4</sup> He had decided to move in December because he could not get the junta to agree to a specific program for return to parliamentary government. The result had been a disaster because the effort had failed. He assumed full responsibility for failure. He would not go into details, but one of reasons for failure he mentioned was his determination to avoid bloodshed.

12. Since that time had had gone to Washington for Eisenhower funeral and found Vice President Agnew sympathetic and understanding. However, he was greatly disappointed because he had been unable to see President Nixon, particularly since latter saw Pattakos.<sup>5</sup> King again returned to the need for evolution now, noting risks in delay, and mentioning especially danger of younger officers ousting PM.

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<sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 301.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 243 and 244.

13. I agreed, adding my assessment that if PM fell, his successors might well talk somewhat, perhaps a great deal less, about democracy. I repeated again that our major influence would have to be quiet and effective persuasion. I asked whether King did not think that US public posture which appears to pressure the government strongly on the return to parliamentary government might not inflame nationalistic sentiment among younger officers, thereby undermining the PM's policy of close ties with the West in general and US in particular. The King nodded agreement.

14. During the course of our conversation the King expressed the view that the Greek armed forces would like to stay out of politics and to restore full military discipline. He spoke highly of General Angelis, who had been military aide to his father, and thought General Zagoiannakos, head of Third Corps, who had been his aide for two years, a real comer. King was aware that some in Greek armed forces, particularly younger officers, fear his return on ground that it will affect their future. I said this was also my impression. He hoped we could help to dissuade officers of this idea. He seemed to be convinced that if he returns, bygones must be bygones and no distinction should be made which could be divisive; it would be completely contrary to the interest of Greece, and he wanted to look forward. In this connection he commented that efforts should be made to persuade middle grade officers to support the 1968 Constitution and to support PM if he decides to proceed with its full implementation.

15. King spoke in highly derogatory terms of Andreas Papandreu who was beyond consideration for any future role in Greece as far as he was concerned. He recalled father's sad comments on Andreas who King said blackmailed father, a son who threatened to keep grandchildren from him if he did not comply. This was principal reason for failure to form coalition government just prior to Kanellopoulos Cabinet which overturned by April 1967 coup. Coalition might well have prevented this disaster. [*5½ lines not declassified*]

16. In concluding our discussion we agreed that our talk had been quite useful in creating a better understanding of our positions and interests. I asked him to give our Counsellor of Embassy in Rome Barbour any further thoughts he might have to pass on. They would reach me.

17. King asked about latest events in Cyprus. We both agreed there was no alternative to continuation of intercommunal talks. King said good relations between Greece and Turkey vital. I agreed and praised PM's attitude in this regard. King was critical of Makarios' trip to Moscow<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the condensed English text of the communiqué from Makarios's visit to the Soviet Union, June 2-9, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, No. 23 (July 6, 1971), pp. 9-10.

and his seeking to enlist Soviet aid, although King said his own relations with Makarios were excellent. He did not think Makarios' opening to Communists significant as Greece would never go in that direction. This was generally true, I agreed, but Soviets followed salami tactics and would be happy with modest first-slice gains such as somewhat lessened accessibility of Greek facilities to US military, i.e. of profiting from stress in Greek-US bilateral relations. Their economic aid to Turkey supported my point on the matter, and they stood to gain from delay in solution from present Greek situation.

18. *Comment.* I believe meeting was useful. King seemed pleased with meeting. I found him unquestionably strongly pro-US, pro-West and anti-Communist. He is interested in returning to Greece and profiting from his past mistakes which he freely acknowledges, although he still does not sound altogether like constitutional monarch. If he were to return, he might provide some guarantee against any untoward political deterioration here. My feeling is that we should pursue course of reconciliation under 1968 Constitution and see pragmatically where chips finally fall regarding King's future. After all, picture of King and Queen hangs over Prime Minister Papadopoulos' desk, as well as in each of the monarchs' offices throughout the country, and full implementation of 1968 Constitution provides for his return. Even though I continue to believe that his chances of being accepted by present establishment remain relatively small, Greeks are volatile, sentimental and unpredictable people.

19. Department may wish to repeat to American Embassy Rome.

Tasca

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### 320. Memorandum for the President's Files<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 4, 1971.

RE

Meeting between the President, U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca, and General A. M. Haig, August 4, 1971 (2:56 p.m.–3:49 p.m.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Haig. The memorandum was not initialed by Haig because it was retyped by the White House staff on August 11. A tape recording of this Nixon–Tasca conversation is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8.

In welcoming Ambassador Tasca the President complimented him on his excellent performance in testifying before the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Tasca replied that he was confident that the House action designed to prohibit military grants or sales under the Foreign Assistance Act would not necessarily inhibit the President.<sup>3</sup> The President would be able to take the actions necessary to insure that U.S. security was not jeopardized by a cessation of military shipments to Greece. Ambassador Tasca stated that the House Committee understood that the President would exercise the waiver and intentionally provided for this contingency in the draft amendment.

The President then noted that the compulsion in Washington to inflict changes in government upon Greece was on the whole self-defeating. At the same time, he noted that it would be especially helpful if the Greek Government were to announce elections sometime in the future and improve its stance with respect to martial law. He suggested that Ambassador Tasca consider informing the Greek Government that President Nixon, who remained their staunch friend, would welcome in the near future some significant step towards the liberalization of the regime.

The President then commented that he had finally authorized the Vice President to visit Greece and that the visit would take place some-

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<sup>2</sup> For a sanitized text of Tasca's August 3 testimony, see *Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 1st session*, pp. 303-322. In a June 25 memorandum to Haig, Saunders reported that the Department of State was inclined to bring Tasca back from Athens to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "because some critics in Congress have tried to drive a wedge between Tasca's policy and State Department policy." Saunders noted that Tasca was "closer to the President" and therefore the White House would be involved by inference. Haig saw no objection to Tasca testifying and noted: "Tasca can take care of himself." In backchannel message 1087 from Athens to Kissinger, June 29, Tasca offered to testify to refute critics of the administration's policy in Greece. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, Latin America, 1971) Sonnenfeldt advised Haig on July 1 against "an open hearing on Greek policy." Saunders, however, recommended to Haig on July 2 that since the House Foreign Affairs Committee had also requested that Tasca testify, they should agree rather than risk a confrontation with the Congress. (Both memoranda are *ibid.*, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970-31 Dec 1971)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Hays amendment; see footnote 3, Document 319. According to a transcript prepared by the editors specifically for this volume, Tasca told the President: "I tried to get across to them the point that much as we don't like the kind of government they've got, there's no alternative to our policy and the only way we're going to get to democracy is through them, because they're firmly in the saddle. And so we're going to have to work with them. If you want security [and] democracy, you're going to have to work with these fellows." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554-8)

time in October.<sup>4</sup> The President suggested that Ambassador Tasca might wish to indicate to the Greek leadership that the Vice President's visit would provide an outstanding opportunity for making an announcement on the government's intention to conduct elections. Ambassador Tasca answered that he was not confident that such an approach would succeed and suggested that perhaps the elimination of martial law would be more palatable to the Greek leadership. President Nixon reiterated that the Ambassador should discuss this matter with the Greek leadership, emphasizing the President's staunch friendship and support for their regime but also making it clear that our own domestic problem here made some movement necessary if we are to retain the kind of flexibility necessary to provide military and economic assistance to the regime. Ambassador Tasca said that he would undertake this mission.<sup>5</sup>

The meeting adjourned with Ambassador Tasca expressing his appreciation to the President for his continuing support.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 3175 from Athens, June 24, Tasca reported that he had been informed of the Greek Government's displeasure that a forthcoming visit by Agnew to Europe did not include a stop in Greece. Tasca had suggested attention to the Greek desire for a vice presidential visit. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

<sup>5</sup> A transcript of this portion of the conversation, prepared by the editor specifically for this volume, reads: "Tasca: I've gotten the word to him [Papadopoulos] through some of his very close business friends that he ought to help [you?] between now and the end of 1972. It would be useful for him to fix a date for elections. Nixon: Absolutely. You tell him that when you get back. First of all, I'd put it to him this way: you say he's got a friend here but it's damned important." The Ambassador then turned to the possibility of an Agnew visit to Greece and the President told him to inform the Greeks that "It would be a great thing, a really big thing . . . if they could make a symbolic [gesture?] before he came." Nixon then returned to his need for some political help from the junta if he was to continue battling Congress over issues relating to Greece. (Ibid., White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8)

<sup>6</sup> In an August 6 letter to Nixon, Tasca stated that he believed his Congressional testimony had reinforced the administration position on Greece before Congress and indicated his desire to continue to serve the President in "an assignment of equal importance . . . with similar challenge." In an August 6 letter to Kissinger, the Ambassador described himself as a "lightning rod" for critics of the President's policies. In an August 25 reply to both letters, Kissinger responded with "good wishes on your return to what is one of our most challenging diplomatic assignments to say the least." (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

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## 321. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 6, 1971.

### PARTICIPANTS

Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by saying with some emotion that if he could go to Peking he could not understand all the fuss about not allowing people to go to Greece. If you are a dictator, he said, it is only safe to be the enemy of the US. It is none of our business how they run their government. He could understand the necessity for some cosmetics to keep our allies happy. But Greece is certainly freer than its northern neighbors.

Ambassador Tasca replied with equal emotion, "You ought to see some of the instructions I get." He noted the last instruction that he should see some members of the opposition and make sure his meetings got to the Greek Press.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Kissinger with even more emotion said, "How the hell would we like it if the Greek Ambassador here started running around with Senator Fulbright and publicizing that?" Then he said, "That Sisco operation is the worst disaster I've seen."

Ambassador Tasca said that it is difficult to carry out instructions such as the ones he sometimes gets.

Dr. Kissinger suggested that Ambassador Tasca, the next time he gets an instruction that he doesn't feel is in line with the President's policy, send a message to the White House by the back channel. Such instructions do not represent the President's policy. We will try to monitor the outgoing cables better here.

Ambassador Tasca said he couldn't agree more. He described it as the "surrealism" of diplomacy.

Dr. Kissinger said that the Vice President would probably be coming to Greece in October.

Ambassador Tasca said that if we are to achieve the policy objective we want, we should "work it my way." Sisco had written him

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 4/1/71-8/31/71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on August 13. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to instructions in telegram 99827 to Athens, June 7; see footnote 2, Document 316.

urging him to see Rowland Evans, the columnist, and Tasca had been decent to him only to have Evans write in the most derogatory fashion. Tasca said that he had become a political target and he had to have the support of the people here in Washington. He noted that the exiled Greek journalist, Elias Demetracopoulos, was orchestrating a campaign against him. Demetracopoulos had told him (Tasca) he would get the Ambassador out of Greece.

Dr. Kissinger, again with emotion, said that there is no question of Tasca's being pulled out of Greece. Of course, we want constitutional rule in Greece, but it is "indecent to suck around Sadat" and then to beat the Greeks over the head.

Ambassador Tasca said that the Greek government had let 2,500 people out of jail during the year, and there is now considerable freedom of the press. He noted that the press had printed the Moose-Lowenstein report.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Kissinger at that point said that he had to go to another meeting. But he assured Ambassador Tasca that it was not the US policy to give the Greek government a hard time.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 303.

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## 322. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 6, 1971, 10 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Deputy Secretary of Defense Meeting with Ambassador Tasca

### PARTICIPANTS

*Department of State*

United States Ambassador to Greece—Ambassador Tasca

*Department of Defense*

Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard

Director, NESAs Region—Brigadier General Devol Brett, USAF

Country Director, NESAs Region—Mr. Charles W. Quinn

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75–157, GR–7 Greece. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Pentagon. Drafted by Quinn and approved by Brett.

As in the case of his courtesy call on Secretary Laird,<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Tasca reiterated his recent activity with Congressional Committees and Congressman Hays (see attached Memcon covering these matters).<sup>3</sup>

After Ambassador Tasca reviewed his concern over Congressional reaction on the Greek issue and the role being played in this matter by Elias Demetracopoulos, the self-styled Greek resistance leader, Mr. Packard asked the Ambassador what DOD could do to counter this situation. Ambassador Tasca indicated that we should be aware of such activities by Demetracopoulos.

Ambassador Tasca expressed a preference for a resolution expressing the sense of Congress rather than an amendment curtailing military assistance to Greece. Mr. Packard agreed that the latter course of action was counterproductive.

Mr. Packard then handed Ambassador Tasca a letter relating to the Hawk missile system.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Packard indicated that there was a lack of political support for overriding the Army's position on the availability of this system. However, the Ambassador might wish to suggest to General Angelis that the Greeks might again talk to Raytheon and this might set the stage for more discussions on this matter with the Greeks.

Mr. Packard expressed some concern over the ability of the Greeks to finance the acquisition of F-4 aircraft.<sup>5</sup> Ambassador Tasca suggested the possibility of the FRG assistance to Greece on the F-4.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Packard agreed to look into the matter.

Ambassador Tasca raised the possibility of an air defense survey team to look at Greek air defense requirements. The possibility of providing some air defense expertise to the Greeks will be considered at the appropriate time, probably after September. General Brett indicated

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<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>4</sup> Dated August 6, it explained that due to a shortage of the upgraded HAWK system, DOD prioritization for assignment would go to U.S. military units. However, the Department had no objection to Greece approaching Raytheon Corporation to acquire "completely new equipment." (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75-157, GR-7 Greece)

<sup>5</sup> In a July 22 letter to Angelis, Packard had indicated the readiness of the United States to sell F-4 aircraft to Greece subject to working out details of financing. (Ibid.)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 4542 from Athens, August 30, Tasca reported that he had discussed the possibility of German financing with FRG State Secretary for Defense Mommsen. In telegram 4717 from Athens, September 8, Tasca suggested that President Nixon directly intervene with Chancellor Brandt to secure financing. In telegram 4849 from Athens, September 15, Tasca suggested further moves that might be made to secure West German cooperation. In telegram 117514 to Athens, September 27, Under Secretary Johnson ruled out a presidential appeal while supporting Tasca's objectives. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970-31 Dec 1971)

that in view of the presence of (4) F-4 squadrons in Europe, USAFE might be tasked for this survey. In any event the team might be deployed to Greece under a NATO aegis. Mr. Packard suggested some consideration might be given to the Redeye. Previously we had been reluctant to release this item.

Mr. Packard inquired about Greece's relations with Libya, particularly its military training programs. Mr. Packard was informed that the arrangements have been established that will enable the Libyans to acquire F-5 spares which will make it possible for the Greek F-5 maintenance team to carry out its maintenance contract with the Libyans.

Ambassador Tasca expressed concern over the fact that in the past visits of high level U.S. military personnel to Greece had created some problems for him in that such visits conveyed the idea that the U.S. supported the current Greek regime. Mr. Packard assured the Ambassador that DOD policy and procedures are in effect that will enable such visits to be conducted in accordance with the Ambassador's policy. Military to Military visits will be the rule unless the Ambassador desires to make an exception.

Ambassador Tasca also expressed concern over the Cyprus situation in view of the range of cards that Archbishop Makarios might be able to play in "heating up" the situation.

In conclusion Mr. Packard expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for the hospitality and substantive talks during his recent Athens visit.

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**323. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Straightening Out Our Policy Toward Greece

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A notation by Haig on the memorandum reads: "Hal-OBE. HAK has held."

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As a result of Ambassador Tasca's two visits in the White House, there is again a confusing set of signals on Greece:

—The President apparently told Tasca that he wanted him to persuade Papadopoulos to set a date for elections in connection with Vice President Agnew's visit.<sup>2</sup> Tasca went away wondering whether the President's policy had changed so that he was now supposed to be pressing the Greeks for major concrete steps toward a democratic government.

—Your talk with him<sup>3</sup> left him with the clear impression that we were not supposed to be beating the Greeks over the head. Since he prefers this policy himself and since it is easier to carry out, the reason for his great pleasure in his talk with you was his relief in feeling that perhaps he had some relief from the pressures of what the President had said.

Now Tasca has sent you the back channel message at Tab B<sup>4</sup> suggesting a trip by Robert Murphy in early October to make a general pitch to Prime Minister Papadopoulos on taking some convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before our 1972 elections.

I, at least, am not sure how to put these two positions together. The attached memorandum for the President is one possible way of trying to get these positions into balance.

*Recommendation:* That you send the memo at Tab A to the President unless you have a more precise sense of what our policy really is. [It may be that it will be better to kill this memo and sort the issue out in connection with a separate memo on the Vice President's visit.]<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 320.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 321.

<sup>4</sup> Tab B, attached but not printed, is backchannel message 1099 from Athens, August 13.

<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the original.

**Tab A**

**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Greece

After talking with you, Ambassador Tasca has suggested the possibility of a visit to Greece by Robert Murphy. By Tasca's design, Murphy would go to Greece ostensibly on a business trip but he would see the Prime Minister and develop the theme that it would be useful if the Prime Minister could take some clear and convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before the 1972 U.S. elections.

This suggestion brings us back to the familiar question that plagues our Greece policy—what balance should be established between accepting Greece as it is and attempting to move it further to fully constitutional government. We know that our position in our own Congress and in NATO would be made easier if the Greeks were to continue to move. On the other hand, it seems that there is little we can actually do that will budge them on a matter the Greek leadership considers vital to its political survival.

There would be no harm in a Murphy visit if he were simply to explain your general problems. But, if we are really going to go all out to try to trade the Vice President's trip for some significant political move, then we must be fairly sure that we have some chance of success. Otherwise, the Vice President's trip, along with our general relationship, may be soured.

Since I did not sit in on your meeting with Tasca, I am not sure exactly what you had in mind when you spoke with him. I realize the Vice President thinks he may have some chance of creating a trip for a political move, but I need to know whether this is what you wish to have done or whether you prefer just to let this situation go along fairly much as it is on the assumption that there is little we can do to change it.

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<sup>6</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson on August 17. A note on the covering memorandum to another copy of this memorandum reads: "Hal [Saunders]—Haig decided memo to the President not necessary *but* neither could he enlighten me re. what our Greek policy is! I assume memo went to Henry [Kissinger] but I am not absolutely sure. SH [Samuel Hoskinson]" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 4/1/71–8/31/71)

### 324. Editorial Note

In a September 20, 1971, meeting in the White House, President Richard Nixon made reference to aid to Greece in the context of a discussion on aid to South Vietnam.

“Now on Vietnam we can well understand that they’ll say ‘That’s different, there are Americans fighting there.’ With Greece it’s a straight foreign aid proposition. And so they say we should cut off aid to Greece. Why? Because Greece doesn’t have a leader democratically elected. And, when I was checking into this, when I heard all this yacking about [South Vietnamese President] Thieu, that he wasn’t going to be elected—I just checked. In the ninety-one countries in which we provide aid there are only thirty of them today that have leaders that are there as the result of a contested, democratic election.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, September 20, 1971, 3:01–4:40 p.m., Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 76–4; transcript prepared by the editors specifically for this volume)

### 325. Telegram From the Vice President’s Party to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, October 18, 1971, 2310Z.

Vipto 36/5590. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, October 16, 1971, 5:30 p.m.<sup>2</sup>

*Summary.*

Warm but intense two hour meeting between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos highlighted by discussion of link between strength of NATO and Greek domestic politics. Emphasizing that he came in true friendship without slightest intention to criticize or intervene, Vice President asked Papadopoulos to explore with him means of making domestic policies less vulnerable in effort to disarm critics and strengthen Alliance. Vice President promised he would not reveal

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> At 10 a.m. that morning the Vice President had been Papadopoulos’ guest at a briefing on NATO and defense issues at the Greek Pentagon Center. The meeting was reported in telegram Vipto 38 from Athens, October 19. (Ibid.)

publicly that he had discussed domestic politics while in Greece, if Prime Minister so wished. Prime Minister gratefully accepting Vice President's pledges of friendship, secrecy, and non-interference, agreed to discuss problem further in subsequent talks.<sup>3</sup> Remainder of conversation devoted to discussion of Communist threat, necessity for NATO, and special friendship between Greece and United States.

2. The Vice President began by thanking Prime Minister Papadopoulos for the warmth of his welcome in Athens; describing the history of Greek-American relations from World War Two through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Korean War; and extolling the close links between the two countries ("the best friends come out of adversity"). His primary purpose in the talks, the Vice President added, was to discuss the security relationship between the two countries and find out how the Prime Minister viewed the Alliance, its cohesion and progress.

3. The Prime Minister agreed that the bonds between the American and Greek people had been forged in history. The warmth of Greek feeling about the Vice President's visit, he continued, was due not only to the origin of the Vice President's father, but also to Greek respect for America's position as the leader of the free world and protector of the threatened ideals that both countries hold dear.

4. The Prime Minister began his review of Greek attitudes toward the NATO Alliance by quoting statement "if you love peace, prepare for war." He next cited the saying of the ancients that the strength of a people is measured by the strength of their belief in what they are called upon to defend. The Prime Minister said that he was anxious about both the state of preparations and the strength of beliefs within NATO. There were elements within the NATO Alliance that did not take the threat seriously and others that did not believe in it at all.

5. The situation was far from hopeless, the Prime Minister continued. What the NATO countries had to do was activate what President Nixon described as the silent majority, prepare for the ultimate threat and maintain faith in the U.S. as the cornerstone of the NATO Alliance. American leadership, rather than dollars, was the absolute necessity in the current situation. In fact, U.S. leadership had in the past often been more effective when dollars not at issue.

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram Vipto 37 from Athens, October 19, reported: "By mutual agreement Vice President met privately Sunday, October 17 with Prime Minister Papadopoulos at his house for three hours. Earlier meeting in Persepolos with King Constantine main focus of discussion. Substance both conversations will be reported personally." (Ibid.) Regarding the meeting with the King on October 15 and Papadopoulos on October 17, see Documents 326 and 328. In an October 26 memorandum to the President, Agnew forwarded his observations on the talks and enclosed copies of the memoranda of conversation with the King and with Papadopoulos concerning the King's future. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1329, NSC Unfiled Material 1971 11 of 12)

6. The Vice President said that he felt Prime Minister's perception of the threat was reasonable. Too many people in the U.S. believe that you can talk the threat away by advocating unilateral disarmament. Some of these people have deep-seated guilt complexes and believe that the tough problems of the past could have been solved without bloodshed. Though wrong, they have considerable influence with a generation of American youth brought up in an atmosphere relatively devoid of stress and marked by plenty. Some of the youth believe the benefits will continue even if they do not defend them.

7. President Nixon is a careful and experienced leader who is fully aware of the dangers, Vice President continued. However, his efforts to gain better communications with our adversaries are being misconstrued by our enemies and misunderstood by some of our friends. The Vice President wished to assure the Prime Minister that the U.S. was not naive and that the President had no intention of giving the game away. Mr. Nixon recognized that the U.S. has the burden and the honor of free-world leadership at this point in history and that to maintain this he must convince significant elements within the U.S. that his course is correct. This major task of persuasion is made more difficult because of certain currents running within the intellectual community and the press. During this difficult time, with all the problems caused by the Vietnam War, the President needed all the support he could get in Congress and among the people.

8. Greek and American goals, the Vice President continued, are the same. We must concentrate on the means by which to achieve these goals. Realizing that the attitudes of some of our mutual allies toward the Communist threat had softened, the paramount requirement is still unity. Criticizing our allies certainly would not help.

9. The Vice President said that his credentials as a friend of Greece were not subject to question both because of his background and philosophy. He had not come to Greece to criticize or intervene in her political affairs. Rather, his primary interest was to determine whether the Prime Minister saw any means of stopping the erosion of support for the NATO Alliance. How do we change the sincere but misguided opposition in Congress to aid, the Vice President asked. How do we persuade our critics that they are wrong? The Vice President assured the Prime Minister that these questions were not posed as criticism of the GOG.

10. Accepting without question the Vice President's credentials as a friend of Greece, and respecting his refusal to interfere, Prime Minister said he would love to be able to tell the Vice President and the NATO Allies that Greece would hold elections tomorrow. However, if the elections meant a return to the economic and political stage of 1967, they would have no purpose. There is another course beside elections,

the Prime Minister continued, which does not involve the surrender of our principles. Principles were most important. If a man with a gun entered the room and demanded that we throw down our weapons, we would do so unless we felt he threatened the basic principles that guide our existence. Then we would fight. We are now on a course that will lead us eventually to complete implementation of the 1968 Constitution. However, situation is complicated by internal and external factors. If it had not been for shouts of critics in U.S. Congress, Prime Minister continued, martial law would have been lifted everywhere but in Athens and Thessaloniki by now and would have been ended throughout the country by next April. To lift martial law now, however, because of pressure from abroad would be to encourage the critics of Greece, the Communists, and subversive elements.

11. Prime Minister said that he did not believe that any measures he took would end the struggle waged by the liberals outside the country against the Greek Government. Even if he lifted martial law, so-called friends like Representative Hays and Senator Hartke would always find reasons to attack the Greek Government. Faced with this situation, there was no other course but the one he had chosen. Prime Minister wanted personally to assure Vice President and President Nixon that the sincere objective of his government was to stay in power for the shortest possible time. When the revolutionary organization launched their movement, they kissed their children goodbye with a firm belief that they would see them only once again—just before they were shot. The risks were enormous, the Prime Minister said, and they were ready to sacrifice their lives. “Given this background, how can the leaders of Greek Government break oaths, tell lies or act as cowards?”, Prime Minister asked. The only thing that could force the Government out was realization that it was leading Greece astray.

12. Americans and Greeks, Prime Minister said, are tied by common ideals rooted in the traditions of ancient Greece; imagine how the Greek people feel when accused of censorship and detaining large numbers of political prisoners. The U.S. Embassy in Athens knows how many detainees there are. There would be fewer if more would cooperate. Mr. Zygydes<sup>4</sup> for example has been granted the right to appeal but has refused it. If he appealed, his request would be considered favorably. As for censorship, pick any newspaper and look at it. These lies against us have made us wary of others and liable to withdraw into our shell.

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<sup>4</sup> John Zygydes, a leader of the Center Union Party.

13. Vice President said he was convinced beyond question that the Prime Minister was a sincere patriot. In 1967, "the name Papadopoulos was not exactly a household word," and some felt he was "the man with the gun" of the earlier anecdote but the people had been reassured when he promised that return to constitutional government would be achieved as soon as conditions would allow. Any student of the 21 months of dissension and instability that characterized Greek history between 1965–67 could see logic behind the sudden events of 1967.

14. A considerable amount of time has passed since then, however, Vice President added. He said he could not question Prime Minister's judgment on when the time would be ripe for the return of constitutional government; however, the difficulty was not so much in what has been done on this score but in "what appears not to have been done."

15. Vice President knew Papadopoulos as a military man would seek to avoid frontal action when attacking would decimate his forces. Rather, he might think about flanking attacks which would disarm his enemies without great cost and buy time.

16. Prime Minister Papadopoulos had said U.S. leadership was more important than provision of dollars; however, Vice President stated U.S. would remain for the foreseeable future the major source of dollars to underwrite the defense of Greece within NATO. Would not our mutual efforts to strengthen NATO be furthered if Greek domestic policy were rendered less vulnerable to attack? Although he had no concrete measures to suggest, Vice President said he would like to discuss matter in greater detail later, if Prime Minister agreed. If he disagreed and considered this entire subject none of Vice President's business, Vice President would understand. However, he was anxious to explore ways that the U.S. and Greece could better understand and help each other, and find ways of persuading critics that the path which Greece was on was correct.

17. Finally, Vice President assured the Prime Minister that he would not use the occasion to embarrass him. He pledged that when he left he would never publicize that he had discussed domestic questions while in Greece. The Vice President repeated that he had found in this discussion a link between the security of NATO and the domestic and the political scene in Greece. He asked again whether there were no measures which the Prime Minister could take which would weaken critics without jeopardizing attainment of his objectives. The Vice President said he had been criticized for coming to Greece because his visit would be seen by many as a sign of support for the present Greek Government. In reality, his deep concern was NATO and the preservation of the Alliance. Anything we could do to strengthen our position would be worthwhile.

18. Prime Minister said that he accepted the Vice President's pledge not to announce that he had discussed domestic politics. He would, however, like to talk more about this subject and discuss with the Vice President the strategies and tactics of "flank attacks." He would be most interested to hear how one could face reasonably an enemy who was deprived of reason.

19. The Vice President said he was most willing to discuss the subject further. He had no concrete solutions but thought a fresh point of view would be helpful. He felt that he and the Prime Minister had established communication without becoming enmired in diplomatic language. They should go on with their talks at an early opportunity.

Participants: Greek—Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Xanthopoulos-Palamas, interpreter; U.S.—Vice President, Mr. Sohmer, General Dunn, Mr. Platt (reporting officer), Mr. Barrington King (Embassy political officer).

**Agnew**

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### 326. Editorial Note

On October 26, 1971, President Richard Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew discussed the results of the latter's trip to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. Here follows the portion of the conversation related to Greece:

Agnew: "I think we did some good in these conversations. First of all, Constantine has matured a tremendous amount since he was here at the Eisenhower funeral. He's much more realistic about his situation. He wants to go back. Very much.

Nixon: "But, they don't want him?"

Agnew: "Uh, they don't want him except under certain circumstances and maybe not circumstances he can reach, but they were, he made a definite proposal. What he's suggesting is he'll go back and that Papadopoulos [will] come to welcome him, come to the palace and present his resignation as Prime Minister. He will have in his pocket a reappointment as Prime Minister. To provide a, something to cut out all this criticism about the steps to returning to democracy. Papadopoulos doesn't trust him very much. He's afraid of him.

Nixon: "Too soft. [Unclear]"

Agnew: "Well, he says he has consorted too much with—"

Nixon: "Émigré groups.

Agnew: "Yeah. But I think it's possible to solve the thing. I, I hit Papadopoulos head on with this.

Nixon: "Wish it were.

Agnew: "I think it looks encouraging. [Unclear]"

The President then referred to news summaries of the Agnew trip before returning to Greek issues:

Nixon: "I was goddamn mad, you know, and after you were there, the State Department was still extremely critical of the Greek Government and so forth. And I [unclear] and I must say Rogers was good at it too. But, I say anytime, I say 'Now look here, I'm not going to criticize the Greek Government. My interest is in what the government's attitude is toward the United States, not what it does in its own country. I would prefer that they do other things, but that's their, it's something I'm not going to get into.'"

After further discussion of this position, Agnew again brought up the issue of the King's future:

Agnew: "With the King—

Nixon: "I like him incidentally, he's—

Agnew: "Constantine?

Nixon: "Yes I do. He's precise.

Agnew: "Oh, yeah.

Nixon: "When I was out of office in '63. Well, he [unclear]—

Agnew: "It's a problem of non-communication. For example, the King wants them to send him a colonel of their choosing. To stay with him all the time in Italy. And send him some money. He says, I could use some protection. Then he recites a case to show that he is violently against Papandreou where . . .

Nixon: "He's the bad boy.

Agnew: "Yeah. He is a bad boy. He points out a case where he was king and George Papandreou was premier. Word came down that Andreas was consorting as a member of the government with the Communists. So, he braced George with this and demanded that George stop it and get rid of him. Also he has, the King has said, authorized us to say publicly, and this is something that the regime has never said, that he supports our aid to NATO, or aid to Greece. He says it would be an unpatriotic act for him to oppose aid to Greece.

Nixon: "Oh, good.

Agnew: "But that not generally, these things are not generally known. But I was able to tell Papadopoulos in these 6 hours of private conversations a lot of things, positions that the King took that he didn't really understand.

Nixon: “Do you think you [fazed?] him?”

Agnew: “I think we did, yes. He had a very conciliatory, I didn’t press him. I tried to get his confidence.

Nixon: “Yeah, yeah [unclear].

Agnew: “And I said . . .

Nixon: “How did the Ambassador [unclear]. What’s his name?”

Agnew: “Tasca, Tasca.

Nixon: “Oh, Henry Tasca. Of course, I forgot. I’m impressed with him. What’s the trouble? He just doesn’t—

Agnew: “He talks to you, he talks your game. He talks to someone else, he talks their game.

Nixon: “Ah!

Agnew: “It’s the old State Department routine.

Nixon: “Really? That’s—son of a bitch, I’m surprised at that.

Agnew: “I may be wrong, but that’s my—

Nixon: “I gave, he knows exactly what I, what I told him.

Agnew: “Going over there, he came back to me three times. They had a reception, and he and State wanted invite some people that the regime was on the ‘outs’ with, that had been highly critical of them, and I said: ‘No, don’t invite anybody that’s going to make them leave the reception. I’m going out to make friends, get as many people in as you can but don’t insist on people that they’re not going to get along with. After all, this is a state visit.’

Nixon: “Yeah.

Agnew: “He came back to me three or four times trying to cancel the reception. It was bad business. We stuck it out and finally we got only about five people that had no [unclear] and these were people who had greeted me on my arrival with a public statement asking me what the hell I was doing in Greece.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Agnew, October 26, 1971, Oval Office Conversation No. 601–36)

327. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 12, 1971.

SALE OF F-4E'S TO GREECE

On October 7, 1970, we informed the White House<sup>2</sup> that, consistent with the NATO commitments to modernize forces, State and Defense were agreeable to selling F-4E (Phantom) aircraft to Greece to replace obsolete aircraft and help Greece meet its NATO commitments. Mr. Packard officially informed the Greeks of this in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces dated July 22, 1971.<sup>3</sup> The Greek Air Force has now asked the Department of Defense for a letter of offer for 36 F-4's (two squadrons) and indicated that the Greek Government desires to buy 36 more at a later date.

The Department of Defense is currently preparing the requested letter of offer. We believe, however, that the cost of the planes (approximately \$90 million per squadron) will temper the Greek appetite and that the eventual sale will depend on our ability to provide substantial financing under our military assistance program for Greece.<sup>4</sup>

On October 22, the *New York Times* reported that the Vice President, responding to the press on board his aircraft in Greece, "dismissed as 'fantasy' an American press report that the Nixon Administration was preparing to provide Greece with Phantom jet aircraft." However, the transcript of the actual exchange shows that the Vice President simply denied that he had reached an understanding with the Greeks on the acquisition of Phantoms.

The question of sale of Phantoms to Greece, although not officially confirmed, has been a matter of press attention. The Greek request for negotiations is certain to become public knowledge, and some press and Congressional elements will charge that our decision to sell

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 GREECE. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Goold (NEA/GRK), Silva, and Davies; concurred in by PM, NEA, and S and by the Department of Defense. Rogers wrote the following note on the top of the first page next to Sisco's initials: "Please speak to me at your convenience on this. WPR." Eliot also initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to Kissinger, attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 157, GR-7, Greece.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 270 from Athens, January 17, 1972, the Embassy reported initial Greek shock at the costs of the purchase of F-4 aircraft. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 GREECE)

is further evidence of United States support for the present Greek regime. These elements may also conclude that the Vice President's recent visit to Greece figures in the decision to sell the planes to the Greeks.

We will respond to any criticism from the position that the sale of Phantom aircraft to Greece has been under routine consideration for some time as part of the NATO-supported effort to modernize the armed forces of Greece. The sale of Phantoms to Greece will allow Greece to replace obsolescent aircraft and to meet its NATO commitments more effectively.

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**328. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Vice President's Talks with King Constantine and Prime Minister Papadopoulos

During his trip to Turkey, Iran and Greece, the Vice President cabled accounts of all his official talks with the exceptions of his conversation with King Constantine and his second meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The main points of these two conversations are summarized below for your information, but should be closely held because of their sensitivity.

On October 15, 1971, the Vice President met with King Constantine at the latter's request. During the course of the conversation the King made the following major points:

—He described his strong support for U.S. military aid to Greece. He denied having ever told anyone otherwise and said he could not imagine any action more unpatriotic.

—His own position had deteriorated since he had last seen the Vice President at the Eisenhower funeral.<sup>2</sup> Despite the fact that he was always open to contacts, he had not been approached directly by any

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

member of the Greek Government for some two years. He thought that they believed he was conspiring against them but this was not true. To alleviate their concern he was willing to accept any Colonel they might appoint as his personal aide who could report on his activities or to even have a detail of several young Greek policemen guard him and provide the same function.

—The King suggested that a balance was badly needed in the visible relations the U.S. has with the regime in Athens and himself. Ambassador Tasca, for instance, could have visited him some two years earlier. One frequently sees pictures of admirals, generals and Cabinet ministers visiting Athens.

—He hoped to persuade the present Greek regime to return to normal political life and to persuade the people to further patience. But change was necessary and the time for force might well come. In that case, he would not seek material aid but would require a U.S. moral commitment to support him. The Vice President indicated in the strongest possible way that the U.S. would not support the overturn of the present GOG by force under any circumstances nor was any sort of moral commitment at all likely.

—If asked he would very seriously consider returning to Greece. He felt the need very strongly for Greece to have a king as a unifying power and that it was essential that the monarchy survive. He thought the most likely arrangement for his return would be a scenario in which he would be given a cordial reception. Papadopoulos would then resign and the King immediately would reappoint him and give him full backing. If Papadopoulos had any doubts he could have a letter of reappointment in his pocket when he resigned. After reappointment, Papadopoulos would infuse the government with new blood, with people whom both could trust and all could go forward to build for the future. The King asked the Vice President to mention his ideas on returning to Greece to the Prime Minister and to also say that he had no intention of bringing back the officers that had left the armed forces since his departure and that he contemplated no punishment for those who had taken part in the seizure of power.

During the afternoon of October 17, 1971, the Vice President met for three hours by mutual agreement with Prime Minister Papadopoulos to continue their conversation of the previous day. The following are the highlights of this conversation:

—The Prime Minister indicated that he was searching for some gesture that might throw the critics of his regime off balance and give the press a new focus. For example, he had considered bringing some very prominent person into his government but so far had been unable to find someone who could project the proper image and not, at the same time, impede the attainment of the objectives of his government.

—In reaction to the Vice President's suggestion that the return of King Constantine might suit the Prime Minister's purposes, the Prime Minister described this as impossible now and indicated that he is clearly disenchanted with the King. The Vice President laid out in detail and without attribution the ideas the King had expressed to him on how he might return. The Prime Minister did not see this as a feasible scenario. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that he was the protector of the monarchy and believed that it could be an important stabilizing influence for Greece in the long run.

—The Prime Minister indicated that the gradual process of implementing the constitution would continue. As of the end of last year, he had thought that it would take until the end of 1974 to prepare for elections, but now, because of the international situation, he could not say how long would be required.

—The Prime Minister said that in his opinion the pressure for return to parliamentary democracy in Greece would decrease in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere abroad over time. The Vice President expressed his doubt that this would be true in the strongest possible terms. On the contrary, he felt more, not less, opposition could be expected from the U.S. Congress.

—The Prime Minister made clear his determination to complete the "revolution" and the mission of his government as they saw it at all cost. If the U.S. Congress were to cut off aid, he would seek help elsewhere and if it were not forthcoming he would take whatever other solutions were necessary. The Government of Greece would not act adversely to Greek national interests, as they saw them, for any reason whatsoever. He understood the importance of NATO and its value to Greece, but he could not accept the responsibility to solve NATO problems at the expense of Greek national interests. If his allies chose to abandon him, he would rather struggle alone than to do what he knew was wrong for his country.

—The Prime Minister asked the Vice President to be absolutely sure of two points. First, he was completely aware that Greece cannot survive "if she finds herself a passenger on a ship manned by insane men whose captain is also mad, and which is therefore destined for the bottom of the sea." Secondly, he was totally aware of his responsibility not only to his country but to the world as a whole. He had always tried to have his advancement of national interest conform to broader interests.

**Alexander M. Haig, Jr.**  
*Brigadier General, U.S. Army*

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**329. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 8, 1972.

## SUBJECT

Homeporting in Greece

Under Secretary Johnson has written informing you (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> that State and Defense have reached agreement to go ahead with the "homeporting" of a carrier task force in Greece.

State has opened discussions with the Greek government and plans to notify Congressional leaders in the next few days.

*The Homeporting Proposal*

The "homeporting" of a carrier task force in Greece involves the permanent stationing of 6,000 naval personnel and some 3,100 dependents in Athens. Our current presence in Greece is about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Thus, homeporting involves a 150% increase in our presence.

As you know, the "homeporting" of a carrier task force in Greece could have significant political liabilities. Ambassador Johnson describes them as follows:

—It would significantly reduce our policy options in dealing with the Greek regime.

—It would presumably require an increase in MAP or a program of comparable benefit to the Greeks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed at Tab B is Johnson's December 30, 1971 memorandum to the President. Johnson noted that during the last 12 months, the Navy had been vigorously pursuing a solution to its personnel retention problems caused by family separations by homeporting selected combat units in overseas locations. The Departments of State and Defense had collaborated on a successful homeporting agreement with Japan for a U.S. destroyer squadron in Yokosuka. They were considering homeporting in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands and also wanted to begin negotiations with Greece to homeport one of the Sixth Fleet's carrier groups in Athens. A more detailed explanation of the issue is contained in a memorandum from Director of the Office of Political-Military Affairs Spiers to Johnson, December 23, 1971. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF POL GREECE–US)

—It would result in some criticism from the Congress and some of our NATO allies:

*The State/Defense judgment is, however, that these political liabilities are outweighed by the military advantages of the proposal.*

On the other hand, however, the homeporting proposal will have substantial strategic benefits:

—Our present force enables us to maintain 5 carriers continuously forward-deployed in peacetime: 3 carriers in the Pacific and 2 in the Mediterranean.

—*With the reduction to 12 carrier force level already planned by the Navy, we will be able to maintain only 4 continuously deployed compared to 5 at present.* This would probably mean a return to the pre-Vietnam war level of 2 carriers forward deployed in the Pacific.

*With homeporting, however, we would be able to maintain 5 carriers forward deployed in peacetime even with the planned reductions in our carrier force levels.*

*Another military benefit foreseen by the Navy is to improve the retention of Navy personnel to whom the absence from their families during deployment must be an important consideration.*

Given these military advantages, I agree with the State/Defense judgment that the homeporting proposal should be discussed with the Greeks. If the cost demanded is too great, however, we should be prepared to modify or drop the proposal.<sup>3</sup>

If you approve homeporting in principle, I will issue the attached directive to State/Defense starting preliminary negotiations with the Greeks. (Tab A)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon initialed the approval option.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 331.

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**330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1972, 1839Z.

24396. Subject: Soviet Démarche on Home Porting in Greece.

1. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Secretary February 10 and gave him following oral statement:<sup>2</sup>

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to address the U.S. Government in connection with its intentions to establish bases for the U.S. 6th fleet on the territory of Greece.

"Realization of such intentions would have serious consequences both militarily and politically. It would in fact constitute a step toward increasing tension in Europe, a step contrary to the trends which have appeared there of late.

"All this can hardly be reconciled with the statements by the U.S. Government about its favorable attitude to détente in Europe, as well as with those beginnings in Soviet-American relations which have recently appeared.

"Such actions on the part of the United States cannot but cause, of course, a corresponding reaction on our part, the more so that the matter entails establishment of new U.S. naval bases in immediate proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries. It should be clear to the U.S. Government that on questions concerning security of the Soviet Union we have the right to count on the same behaviour of the United States which the American side expects from the Soviet side."

2. Comment will follow.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 GREECE-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by John Matlock (EUR/SOV) on February 10 and 11; cleared by Rodger Davies, PM, and S/S; and approved by R.T. Davies (EUR). Repeated to Athens and USNATO.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 25138 to Moscow, February 11, the Department reported that Dobrynin had simply handed the text of his proposed oral statement to the Secretary without comment. However, he had returned the following day to meet with Hillenbrand and stressed the seriousness with which his government viewed the move. Hillenbrand's reply underlined the morale factors involved in homeporting. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 26653 to Moscow, February 13, instructed the Embassy to deliver a written reply to the Soviet démarche following up on Hillenbrand's informal reply. (Ibid.)

**331. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 17, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Homeporting in Greece

The President approves, in principle, the homeporting of a U.S. carrier task group in Greece.<sup>2</sup>

The President wishes the U.S. government to implement this decision in the following manner.

—These proposals shall be discussed with the Greeks in the near future.

—The State Department shall prepare a report as soon as preliminary negotiations with the Greeks are completed. This report should assess the Greek position and alternative approaches to further negotiations.

—The Department of Defense should evaluate the U.S. and friendly tactical air capability required in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the alternative approaches to meeting these requirements.

Upon completion by March 2, 1972, this work shall be forwarded for the President's consideration before further discussions or negotiations are held with the Greek government.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. III, Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 329.

**332. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, February 28, 1972.

Dear Rodger:

We have been considering some of the problems that are likely to arise in any hearings in the Congress on homeporting, particularly those of the Rosenthal Subcommittee.<sup>2</sup> The line of attack and of questioning seems quite predictable, and we should not lose sight of the opportunity this occasion affords to reiterate certain points that can be particularly helpful, both in meeting critics of Greek policy in the U.S. and in assuaging Greek sensitivities.

I have in mind in particular the recent sharp reaction here provoked by the statement of the Department press spokesman, Charles Bray, reiterating our disappointment about Greece's slow progress toward restoration of democracy.<sup>3</sup> More statements of this kind could begin to cause real damage to our relations. To the extent possible I hope in the hearings we will continue to emphasize, as you did in your excellent statement before the House Committee last July,<sup>4</sup> the key points (a) in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter we have carefully avoided interference in the domestic politics of Greece, and (b) in the final analysis only the Greeks can determine what kind of government they want. I am not suggesting, of course, that there should be any uncertainty as to where the U.S. stands on the issues of civil liberties and parliamentary rule, but simply that there must be no misunderstanding that the real need in this regard is for the Greeks themselves to act.

It would also be useful to highlight various other points for the record. In particular I have in mind the fact that for several years now

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 GREECE-US. Confidential; Official-Informal.

<sup>2</sup> The hearings took place March 7-8 and April 12-13, and 18. For text, see *Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-New York) was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe.

<sup>3</sup> At the March 13 press briefing, Bray noted that the homeporting agreement did not alter U.S. disappointment with the lack of democracy in Greece.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 1st Session* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 25-29.

there has been a continuing significant U.S. Navy presence in Greece through ship visits. The requirements for ship repairs in Greek shipyards are also increasing. Both points will bring out clearly that for some time we have relied heavily on Greek ports to sustain Sixth Fleet operations so that permitting homeporting for dependents to reside in Greece will not change the present situation in any major way. It is really a question of degree, particularly since homeporting will be on an austere basis. In the same connection I believe we should stress the administrative aspects of implementing homeporting.

The hearings can also provide the occasion to underscore the fact that the GOG will not in any sense control or influence Sixth Fleet operations; complete freedom of action in deployments will continue.

Finally, homeporting should be described in the context of our overall commitment to NATO. This will enable us both to emphasize that no further specific commitments to Greece are involved, and that we are not undertaking any new commitments beyond those already recognized under Article V of the NATO Treaty.

We should, of course, stress homeporting is to provide for families of men and officers of the Sixth Fleet and does not involve any new strategic considerations.

I hope the Embassy will have an opportunity to cooperate with the Department on the preparation of any statements for the record, and there may be other suggestions to pass along in this process. One idea that occurs to me (since in the past both you and I have appeared before the Rosenthal Subcommittee) is that this would be a first-rate occasion for Joe Sisco to carry the Department's position forward, particularly since he can address the problem from the standpoint of the broadest strategic considerations applicable to American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sincerely,<sup>5</sup>

**Henry**

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<sup>5</sup> Tasca added the handwritten notation, "Best," over the typed closing.

### 333. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, March 22, 1972, 1648Z.

1623. Department please pass DIA, CINCEUR, and USDOCO-SOUTH. Subj: Further Analysis of Papadopoulos' Assumption of Regency.<sup>2</sup> Ref: Athens 1584; Athens 1585.<sup>3</sup>

1. *Summary.* Facts surrounding dismissal of Zoitakis and Papadopoulos' assumption of regency still not clear. Most Greeks will not accept official reason for change, but there is in fact long history of friction between PM and former regent. Papadopoulos now absolute ruler of Greece. There are few if any precedents for assumption of regency by PM. Papadopoulos now has number of options open to him, including: maintaining present situation; moving against King or even proclaiming a republic; or using his increased powers to implement Constitution, while presumably assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country. In foreign affairs field GOG may become more demanding of its allies. However, Papadopoulos has favored close ties with US, and he may now be in better position resist pressures diversify sources of arms supply. First reaction here to Papadopoulos' move has been surprise at brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Opposition will see move as further proof Papadopoulos has no intention returning Greece to parliamentary rule. Papadopoulos has now made himself more of a target for those of his colleagues who resent his increasing monopolization of power. Key question is effect Papadopoulos' assumption of regency will have on unit commanders in army. *End Summary.*

2. Facts surrounding Papadopoulos' dismissal of Zoitakis as regent and his own assumption of regency in addition to position of Prime Minister (and Defense and Foreign Minister) are not yet clear. We doubt that most Greeks will accept Government's explanation that Zoitakis was obstructing legislation as real reason for his replacement. However, as we will examine later in this message, this may provide at least partial explanation. As we noted in our preliminary assessment, it is

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris, Rome, USNATO, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> On March 21 the Council of Ministers, chaired by Pattakos, stripped Zoitakis of his position and appointed Papadopoulos regent.

<sup>3</sup> Both dated March 21. The telegrams reported on the replacement of the regent. (Both in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)

possible Cyprus may also have played a role in dismissal of regent. Whatever real reasons for Papadopoulos assuming regency, key question at this point is what effect this move will have on Greek political life both domestically and internationally.

3. First fact is that Papadopoulos has now become absolute ruler of Greece. At time of coup power was in hands of group which called itself the Revolutionary Council. By autumn of 1970 a crisis between Papadopoulos and this group led Prime Minister to proffer his resignation as Prime Minister. However, after period of time he consolidated power by shuffling Government and removing ministerial powers from key opponents while consolidating his links with army unit commanders. We have now reached new state in which all constitutional powers of Crown and Prime Minister are in Papadopoulos's hands—and powers of Crown are not insignificant. Important question is how Greeks will view this dual role of Papadopoulos. Greek history offers few parallels.

4. Greece has had five regents in the last 48 years: Admiral Koundouriotis (January–March 1924), General Kondylis (October–November 1935), Archbishop Damaskinos (December 1944–September 1946), General Zoitakis (December 1967–March 1972), and now PM Papadopoulos. With the exception of Damaskinos, all had military backgrounds, and all were publicly prominent figures at the time of their appointments. Although in two cases (Kondylis, Damaskinos) same man briefly held regency and prime ministry simultaneously, they did so in parliamentary circumstances totally different from present situation: as PM, Kondylis assumed regent after parliamentary vote in October 1935 proclaiming Greece again a constitutional monarchy. He continued as regent though late November 1935 while GOG held plebiscite, results of which were foregone conclusion and until King could return from exile abroad. Damaskinos reluctantly served for few days as “caretaker PM” in 1945 during prolonged Government crisis. As we recall King George II also assumed prime ministry for some days in similar circumstances. In any event, Zoitakis served as regent longer than his three predecessors combined, and there is no historical precedent in Greece for removal of one regent and his replacement by another.

5. Nevertheless, Papadopoulos may have felt dismissal of Zoitakis was unavoidable, following series of semi-public and private clashes between the former regent and PM. As early as February 1968 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Papadopoulos expressed the view that Zoitakis lacked “some of necessary qualities required of a regent.” In August 1970 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a disagreement between Papadopoulos and Zoitakis reportedly stemmed from Zoitakis' fear that Papadopoulos was moving too rapidly toward release of political de-

tainees and other liberalization measures. Zoitakis apparently took no decisive stand in September 1970 confrontation between Papadopoulos and dissident members of the "Revolutionary Council," from which Papadopoulos emerged stronger than before; however, in late 1970 and early 1971 there were reliable reports (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*, e.g.) indicating that Zoitakis had made common cause with frustrated "Revolutionary Council" dissidents and had begun to adopt an increasingly hostile stand toward Papadopoulos' personal rule. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* reported in early February 1971 that Zoitakis had gone so far as to consult with dissident revolutionaries concerning the feasibility of ousting Papadopoulos; and Papadopoulos reportedly had learned of the consultations and was seeking to provoke the regent's resignation.

6. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* reported the failure of Zoitakis to clear his New Year's message with Papadopoulos before its release, Papadopoulos' subsequent sanctioning of press criticism against the substance of Zoitakis' message, and Zoitakis' efforts to inspire counter-criticism of the Prime Minister. In March 1971 Papadopoulos did not appear publicly with Zoitakis on Independence Day to take the salute. This non-event provoked much comment at the time and *[less than 1 line not declassified]* was occasioned by Zoitakis having told Papadopoulos shortly before Independence Day that he would no longer swear in cabinet officials if he were not given the opportunity to review names proposed and to veto those to whom he was opposed.

7. In June 1971, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* quoted then Minister of Coordination Makarezos as stating that he, Zoitakis, and the dissident secretaries general had agreed that should Papadopoulos again offer to resign (as he had done in September 1970), they would accept Papadopoulos' resignation and replace him with Makarezos. Differences continued to manifest themselves, but in August the Prime Minister temporarily patched up his differences with Zoitakis, clearing the way for the governmental reorganization of August 26. It is also well known that there has been considerable friction between wife of the regent and the influential wife of PM.

8. While there may have been in PM's view more than sufficient reasons for removing Zoitakis, why did he himself assume regency? Until we know the answer to this question it would be premature to venture any prediction as to future course Prime Minister will take. He has number of options. These include: (A) maintaining present governmental structure with Constitution suspended and full powers concentrated in his hands; (B) at some stage arranging for Crown Prince eventually to accede to Greek throne, in meantime maintaining himself as regent governing in his name; and (C) proclaiming a republic with himself as President with or without accompanying referen-

dum; and (D) using his increased powers to move towards constitutional implementation while, presumably, assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country.

9. A key question for USG is what effect Papadopoulos' becoming regent will have on Greece's foreign policy. We suspect overall result will be that GOG will be more demanding of its allies while at same time more conciliatory towards some of its potential enemies. On other hand, Papadopoulos has strongly favored close bilateral ties with U.S. and has been willing to see U.S. continue as principal arms supplier. Of possible interest in this regard is fact that Makarezos and Zoitakis have been fairly close, and that Makarezos has been one of chief advocates of Greece diversifying its arms supplies, particularly in direction of France. On Cyprus issue, Government may now be more able to speak with one voice, assuming, of course, that dismissal of Zoitakis does not reflect serious split within GOG over handling of Cyprus problem.

10. Reactions here to change in regents so far focus heavily on offensive and brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Point has been made to Embassy officers that Prime Minister made genuine tactical error in his manner of handling removal, i.e. nothing was done to save Zoitakis' face and in effect he left regency in disgrace. Given Zoitakis' original role on April 21, 1967, as well as fact he has been leading military personality, Papadopoulos' tactics seem particularly incomprehensible. Moreover, way in which Prime Minister moved on this occasion has not been characteristic of other changes in Government so that he is more vulnerable to criticism this time.

11. At this juncture, although we will be collecting reactions from former politicians as dust begins to settle, we would judge there will be almost universal reaction that this simply represents further move to reinforce personal dictatorship under Papadopoulos and proves that he has no intention of moving Greece toward parliamentary democracy. Wait-and-see attitude so far as impact on eventual status of Greece as monarchy probably will continue. At same time fact that removal of regent disclosed existence of first major falling out within original revolutionary group will be taken by some to mean that prospect of future falling out among members of present regime might precipitate crisis of proportions that would lead to other changes. Some may be encouraged to mount campaign of active resistance against Papadopoulos rule.

12. Within the revolutionary group we cannot ignore the possibility of the growth of opposition to the Prime Minister brought about by the increasing gap between him and the men who cooperated with him in achieving the 1967 coup. His military colleagues may be more critical of any missteps by Prime Minister in executing his absolute power,

but their attitude may be tempered by example of decisive way in which he dealt with Zoitakis. It remains to be seen how unit commanders will react and whether PM can continue to maintain their loyalty on which he must continue to rely.

Tasca

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334. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

Athens, April 21, 1972, 1137Z.

2222. Subj: Future of King Constantine and Greek Monarchy.

1. *Summary*: Chances of King Constantine returning to Greece appear increasingly dim, although we have no way to determine just what moves Prime Minister may decide to make. Papadopoulos may find it advantageous to keep Constantine dangling on string in Rome, both as means of neutralizing him and keeping his own options open. We now believe there greater likelihood that Papadopoulos will eventually declare republic but doubt that he will move precipitately in this direction. In any case, PM will assure himself of solid support in armed forces before making any move. For time being he probably has decided to do nothing. *End Summary*.

2. We view King's chances during Papadopoulos' tenure as poor, and even if a transitional government should eventuate, we doubt that his prospects would improve greatly. Although it is conceivable that institution of monarchy, embedded as it is in traditions of past 150 years of Greek independence, may survive in some restricted form, Constantine's personal prospects must be considered on different basis in light of his role before 1967 coup, in abortive counter-coup of December 1967, and legitimate apprehension that were he to return he could again present obstacle to independent course charted by Prime Minister.

3. We have been inclined to believe preponderant evidence supported conclusion that immediate interests of present regime were probably best served by leaving King in Rome, keeping him dangling about prospect of his possible return to Greece and in this way insuring that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis.

he would be reluctant to reengage himself in the political process in any overt way so as to avoid giving present regime any pretext for denouncing him. Regime would presumably have continuing interest in leaving him in this ambiguous status and not moving actively against him so that he cannot become vocal in behalf of, or rallying point for opposition.

4. On other hand, in light of dismissal of regent and assumption of regency by Prime Minister Papadopoulos, he is probably in improved position to move directly on issue since it is only question of his own tenure as regent that is involved. On this basis several courses of action merit attention: (A) to remove himself as regent in favor of King Constantine on basis of certain advance understandings limiting authority of monarch (we consider this quite unlikely); (B) to continue as regent on basis of arrangement anticipating accession of Crown Prince Paul when he comes of age (this has advantage of keeping issue on ice but leaves little room for political evolution); or (C) to eliminate institution of monarchy altogether on basis of popular referendum following declaration of republic with Papadopoulos as President (probably most likely choice). At same time we continue to believe it is prudent to assume that Papadopoulos (see Athens 1937)<sup>2</sup> wants to keep his options open until such time as he is prepared either to announce date for elections or decides to arrange referendum on issue of King.

5. In long run there are various circumstances that support our present conclusion that greater likelihood is for declaration of republic. Papadopoulos clearly wants a free hand in devising Greece's future political structure. Apparently even Zoitakis was obstacle in this respect, and history demonstrates that Greek monarchy would be even more so. Current two-part article by Former Deputy Stirooulos proposing new constitution providing for republican form of government suggests timing of such a move could come relatively sooner than we have previously been inclined to believe. There are number of risks, however, in moving rapidly, and articles may be no more than trial balloon or part of a process of conditioning; they also give Papadopoulos chance to make it seem as if something is happening without actual commitment to any action. Probably many Greeks, irrespective of political views, would like to see monarchy end. However, if choice is republic under presidency of Papadopoulos or monarchy, there is no assurance such republican sentiment would prevail and indeed

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<sup>2</sup> Dated April 6, it provided an assessment of the Greek political situation in the light of Zoitakis's dismissal. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL GREECE)

opposition might exploit opportunity as chance to register its anti-Papadopoulos stand.

6. In any case on assumption Papadopoulos will be compelled to begin at some point to build new Greek political structure he must settle question of monarchy one way or another at outset before elections can take place. In this sense issue of King appears to be massive impediment to elections under present Constitution.

7. We believe too much significance should not be attached to such points as omission of royal family from prayers on occasion of national holidays, removal of royal chair from cathedral, decrees downgrading way in which royal portraits shall be displayed in public buildings, etc. Greek regime tends to operate in rather capricious and free-hand fashion, and same significance cannot be attributed to such actions as would be case in monolithic state governed by all-powerful bureaucracy such as USSR. GOG runs such matters in essentially slovenly way and probably does not even have administrative apparatus organized to arrange details of this character on such a basis as to comprise first elements in policy decision involving eventual abolition of monarchy.

8. Among other considerations which are relevant is attachment that former political world continues to show for institution of monarchy, principally because they see the King as providing an orderly transition back to democratic future, but in some cases with an effective transfer of power away from Papadopoulos and his followers. Transitional role for monarchy would not serve interest of Papadopoulos and would seem to us to constitute additional negative factors favoring move to republic.

9. We have also been interested in observing general touchiness of regime with respect to publicity concerning official contacts of any character with King Constantine, including particularly those of U.S. Department will recall press play at time Ambassador Tasca visited King in Rome. Similarly, press reaction to presidential messages on occasion of Greek Independence Day both this year and last, as well as Christmas holiday greetings, has been sharply critical, and pro-government press has taken line that King Constantine effectively supplanted by mechanism of regency and that regent rather than King is proper recipient of such gestures of courtesy.

10. Last and probably most important is position of army on monarchy. Greek military is probably less divided than Greeks generally on this question. We have impression that military in general opposed to King, particularly at higher ranks. Senior officers who chose to side with Papadopoulos rather than King at time of attempted counter-coup would additionally be motivated by fear of retaliation should Constantine return and eventually regain influence. We believe

passage of time has severely eroded historical loyalty of armed forces to monarchy, but PM would unquestionably assure himself that he has solid support in military before raising issue of abolishing monarchy or deposing Constantine.

Tasca

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**335. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

Status of Homeporting in Greece

In case your discussions with the Soviets<sup>2</sup> touch the point of our respective military presence in the Mediterranean, I thought you should be up to date on the present status of the Navy's homeporting proposal for Greece. Also, it is not going smoothly and could either fail altogether or reach a point of friction with the Greeks. The main purpose of this memo is to give you a chance to inject any thoughts that may arise from your dealings with the Soviets.

*Background:* You will recall that the Navy's Greek homeporting proposal is justified purely as an administrative measure to improve morale and increase personnel retention. It will not substantially increase the number of ships deployed in the eastern Mediterranean or our military capabilities in the region.

We now have in Greece about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Homeporting, if fully carried out, would boost that permanent presence by some 3,500. The main elements of the original proposal were:

—*Phase I—Within Six Months After Agreement:* Assignment of a Carrier Task Force headquarters staff, involving some 56 personnel and 22 families (57 dependents) in Athens.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Concurred in by Odeen and Sonnenfeldt. "OBE" appears on the first page of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently at the Moscow Summit May 22–30.

—*Phase II—Six to Twelve Months*: Homeporting of a destroyer squadron (six ships) and a dependent support ship (reconfigured hospital ship), involving some 2,554 military personnel and 528 families (1,400 dependents) in Athens.

—*Phase III—Nine to Twelve Months*: Homeporting of a carrier and air wing and possibly a small number of miscellaneous support ships, involving some 4,500 military personnel and 800 families (2,100 dependents).

At the turn of the year, State concurred in Secretary Laird's decision to homeport in Greece,<sup>3</sup> subject to informal discussions (but not "consent") with appropriate Congressional leadership. State quickly laid on a scenario in January to (1) seek Greek agreement in principle and agreement that the arrangement be handled as an exchange of notes extending our 1953 Military Facilities agreement,<sup>4</sup> rather than as a new and separate agreement, and (2) brief Congress.

—Towards the latter part of January, Ambassador Tasca had secured Prime Minister Papadopoulos' assent in principle as well as that of General Angelis.<sup>5</sup> The general reaction in Athens was relatively positive, even among opposition who accepted the arguments for homeporting but took standard umbrage at the fact that the agreement would be concluded with an "undemocratic" government in Greece.

—State, with Admiral Zumwalt, then briefed Congressional leadership in late January. The big blasts have come in hearings run by Congressmen Rosenthal and Hamilton, respectively Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; they have been previously highly critical of U.S. policy towards Greece. They say they are not finished with the issue.

As the news began to filter to the press after the Congressional briefings, Ambassador Dobrynin made his oral *démarche* to Secretary Rogers and reiterated it to Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand (Tab A).<sup>6</sup> State instructed our embassy in Moscow to clarify homeporting as an administrative measure, noting it does not imply a change in the U.S. defense posture in the Mediterranean in any appreciable way (Tab B).<sup>7</sup> Palamas told Tasca that the Soviets had lodged a parallel protest in Athens but were told by him that Greece would act in its security interests. Greek spokesmen denied allegations that any U.S. "bases" were being established.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 329.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see 4 UST 2189.

<sup>5</sup> Tasca reported on his discussions with senior Greek officials in telegram 1158 from Athens, February 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 330.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 330.

The timing of the publicity on homeporting coincided with tensions on Cyprus. The Soviets also put that angle on it by linking our homeporting agreement with alleged NATO intrigues against Cyprus, a sentiment which also found its way into Sadat's public rhetoric. The Greeks again turned this publicly aside by denying that any bases were involved and reaffirming their friendly ties with the Arab states. It seems quite likely that, whatever the general Soviet purpose may have been, the Soviets were retaliating for the comments in the President's foreign policy report on Soviet facilities in Egypt.

*The Present Situation:* The present situation results primarily from discussions at a technical level between our Navy and the Greek authorities. It turns out that, as the Greeks look closely at what is involved, they are not anxious to have many more Americans crowding into the Athens area.<sup>8</sup> This may simply be a problem of what the domestic economy will bear, but it may also be concern over having a large fleet in the waters around Athens. In any case, the Hellenic Navy has agreed to homeport the staff of our task force commander in Athens, but this would simply be the twenty-two families described above as Phase I. For the main portion of the task force, however, they have said that congestion in the broader Athens area makes it desirable to carry out the bulk of the homeporting program in some other part of Greece. The Navy has said it would be willing to host a technical survey group to find some other such area. The farther that area moves from Athens, the less attractive and more expensive it will become for our Navy.

The Navy says it would like to go ahead and move its headquarters group into the Athens area, regardless of whether the rest of the homeporting plan is carried out or not. It will probably also want to send the survey group that the Hellenic Navy has invited. State and Defense may soon authorize those two actions.

At that point, however, the issues are reached which could become a source of friction between us and the Greeks. The U.S. Navy is not in a mood to take no for an answer and wants to be as close to Athens as possible. The Greeks apparently do not want the bulk of the exercise close to Athens and the temptation then will arise for our Navy at the service level to begin squeezing the Greeks.

The alternative, of course, would be to return to some of the other possible sites in Italy—Naples, Syracuse, Augusta. There is no indication yet that our Navy has come to that point.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The Embassy outlined Greek objections in telegram 2071 from Athens, April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)

<sup>9</sup> In a May 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders updated information on negotiations with Greece and secured Kissinger's approval to proceed with Phase I of the project. (Ibid.)

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**336. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 14, 1972, 1655Z.

3335 Subj: Further Comments on the Position of Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. Recent developments tend to confirm our earlier reports<sup>2</sup> that while PriMin Papadopoulos has ostensibly strengthened his position by taking over regency, he has in fact isolated himself further from his colleagues and stimulated further potential opposition within the establishment. He continued to be concerned about the loyalty of his combat unit commanders and has now taken steps to institute his own independent surveillance over the activities of these units (see [*less than 1 line not declassified*]). He has irritated both Makarezos and Pattakos, stripping them of their ministries in his effort to consolidate his personal power. In addition, it is becoming clear that while General Angelis is still loyal, he has an independent position. The PriMin tried to induce Angelis to take his man as deputy, but Angelis was able to insist on naming his own deputy. Further, the precipitous appointment of Colonel Roufogalos over some general officers as head of the intelligence service (KYP) seems to have been designed to pre-empt that position before the selection board assigned another officer there. This has not strengthened the PriMin's position in a critical area within the regime.

2. In my view, Roufogalis is unsuited for this sensitive position. He is emotional and impulsive whereas the Prime Minister needs even reporting and straight analysis. Moreover, Roufogalis is not particularly liked by his colleagues in the establishment.

3. Another indication, always reliable during my tour of duty here, that the PriMin feels insecure is the marked stepup in press and TV coverage of his meetings with top U.S. military. This appears to be message to his colleagues that U.S. military is supporting him. One recent example was awkward way in which he requested permission to have General Burchinal and himself photographed with myself at beginning of recent special briefing by Burchinal. Another recent example was insistence that General Ryder, newly arrived MAAG Chief, place wreath on tomb of unknown soldier with TV coverage, although this had not been included in original U.S. program.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Tasca discussed the stability of the Greek regime in telegram 2842 from Athens, May 19. (Ibid.)

4. Moreover, his health has apparently been bothering him, which led him to have a basic examination not long ago. This tended to coincide roughly with period of Burchinal briefing. He is deeply concerned about his personal safety and security precautions have obviously been increased in recent months, which contribute to his growing isolation.

5. His position is likely to be improved by recent military promotions. However, larger than usual number of retirements combined with stirrings among both officers in grade for lengthy periods and some indications of growing restlessness among younger officers, also probably increase his feeling of insecurity. It may be that it is this feeling of insecurity that leads him to some extent to take measures which in fact, by increasing his isolation, only serve to make situation worse.<sup>3</sup>

6. All of this must be measured against the background of a regime that has had its successes, notably in the economic field, but that as yet has failed to give a clear indication of the nature of the regime's basic objectives and measurable achievements against these objectives. The failure to implement the 1968 Constitution has been a key factor in this context. There is thus an atmosphere of attentisme in the country with a growing uneasiness that the regime lacks political direction and momentum.

**Tasca**

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<sup>3</sup> The Embassy provided an analysis of discontented elements within the Greek armed forces in telegram 5586 from Athens, September 29. (Ibid.)

**337. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 19, 1972, 1459Z.

3416. Ref: State 108826; Athens 3340.<sup>2</sup> Subj: Briefing of military students.<sup>3</sup> GOG reaction through General Angelis now appears to involve Prime Minister Papadopoulos more than I had first assumed. Reaction clearly in tune with character of Angelis. However, I now am inclined to believe PriMin has assumed leading role. His growingly serious opposition within the regime makes the alleged allegation of corruption very difficult to accept. With three officers directly involved and the High Hellenic Military Command, as well as Foreign Office and Greek Embassy Washington, it is now rather likely that incident will become widely known and certainly to his opposition within the regime. PriMin knows in fact corruption is occurring within his circle and that he is highly vulnerable on this issue with other leading and still potent conspirators of the April 21, 1967 coup. In my view, he again has acted unwisely and by his exaggerated reaction will find that incident may hurt his position far more within the regime than if he had played it down and accepted the Dept's eminently-wise handling of this case as a "misunderstanding."

**Tasca**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 108826 to Athens, June 17, instructed the Embassy to hold up delivery of a letter from Moorer to Angelis. Telegram 3340 from Athens, June 15, had suggested holding up the delivery. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–9 US)

<sup>3</sup> On May 10 three Greek officers attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College visited the Department of State for a briefing during which, according to the Greeks, an official of the Department of State criticized Greek arrest of student demonstrators and stated that the regime was "corrupt." The Greek Government withdrew the students and filed a series of protests with U.S. officials. In a June 12 letter to Rogers, Laird expressed his displeasure over the incident. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75–0125, Greece 000.1–333, 1972)

**338. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, October 13, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

Under your inspiring leadership, we have clearly strengthened our bilateral security relations with Greece, as well as the integrity of the southern flank of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, we have made unequivocally clear in every appropriate way our support for the return of Greece to some form of stable, democratic and representative government. I have traveled all over Greece and from innumerable contacts, I have been deeply impressed by the strong bonds of friendship which exist between our two countries. Incidentally, I have also been struck with the high quality and impressive leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church as a vital element in this friendship. Our present posture in Greece is such that whatever changes might occur in the internal political picture, there are no likely developments, in my view, which would jeopardize our vital interests in this country.

Tom Pappas, my dear friend, thought I should write to you regarding plans for the future. He has talked, I believe, to both you and John Mitchell on this subject. The last time I saw you, in the summer of 1971, you indicated you had another post in mind for me.<sup>2</sup>

Tom and John Mitchell both have indicated you would probably send me to Rome after my service here. If this should materialize, I would be pleased to undertake this assignment because I believe Italy's internal political problem is desperate, and also because it could affect Vatican attitudes, particularly through the Italian clergy, which in turn can influence internal developments in many Catholic countries.

I have been pleased to have had the opportunity to explain why the Nixon policy towards Greece was and remains the only valid approach to our relations with this country. As Tom knows, I should be happy to be helpful in any other way to you during the period ahead, particularly in explaining our completely valid policies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. No classification marking. Tasca sent a more detailed letter to Kissinger, outlining his qualifications for a posting in Rome, Paris, or Bonn. (Ibid.) In a backchannel message to Tasca, Kissinger acknowledged receipt of the two letters and stated that he had “put them in the right hands.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 320.

I would not want to end this message without a word about the wonderfully humane and understanding way in which Tom Pappas has contributed, at times with real personal sacrifice, in maintaining and strengthening the strong ties of friendship between the Greek and American peoples.

With warmest personal best wishes.

Sincerely,

**Henry**

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**339. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 31, 1972.

Dear Bill:

As you will recall, in my letter of 24 November 1971,<sup>2</sup> I recommended that we initiate negotiations with the Government of Greece for the incremental homeporting of a carrier task group in Athens. Following the Greek Government's January 1972 approval in principle of the concept, we have completed Phase I, which included the homeporting of Commander Task Force Sixty (CTF-60), Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve and staff, Destroyer Squadron Twelve, and the establishment of the U.S. Navy Fleet Support Office in Athens. I have now approved, subject to certain conditions, the Navy's plan and we are ready to proceed with Phase II which includes the homeporting of the USS *Independence* (CV-62), Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW-7), and the dependent support ship USS *Sanctuary* (AH-17) in Athens.

Phase II will involve approximately 5000 military personnel assigned to the afloat units and air wing, approximately 100 MILPERS (including one U.S. civilian) assigned to shore based support functions, and about 2550 dependents (1000 families). The military personnel can be accommodated within the Navy's share of the western European military manpower ceiling. This program, when completed (i.e., implementation of Phases I and II), will introduce a total of approximately

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75-0125, Greece 000.1-333, 1972. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 GREECE-US)

7100 MILPERS, 35 U.S. civilians, and 3800 dependents (1550 families) into the Athens area.

The existing support facilities—which have been able to accommodate Phase I—are now taxed to, if not beyond, their limits. Therefore, to avoid serious degradation of the quality of support, the implementation of Phase II will require the Navy to provide additional commissary, exchange, medical, dental and school facilities. The Navy proposes to homeport the dependent support ship *USS Sanctuary* (AH-17) in Athens to augment the existing medical and dental facilities. The Navy intends to lease or lease-construct the remainder of the required support facilities.

Since there is sufficient non-government housing available on the local economy, this should present no problem as long as the introduction of dependents is phased to ease their assimilation into the area.

There is a requirement for airfield support for the air wing, particularly during the carrier's maintenance periods or other periods of shorter duration when the carrier is in port. Since the carrier to be homeported will be CV configured (both attack and ASW mission capable), the Navy's operational concept envisions a satellite airfield operation, using Elefsis airfield as a logistic/maintenance adjunct to the carrier, in conjunction with the use of the Hellenic airfield at Souda Bay, Crete for the majority of air wing training. This concept of operations and requirements has been presented to the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force Command. Though no response has been received, Ambassador Tasca has indicated that he is optimistic that the airfield location problem will be successfully resolved since the GOG has approved the overall homeporting concept.

The concept for berthing the homeported carrier is merely a continuation of berthing arrangements traditionally employed during routine carrier visits to Athens. The carrier will anchor in Phaleron Bay and utilize the fleet landing there for support. There are, however, informal indications that Phaleron Bay may be developed into a tourist area and closed as an anchorage for shipping in the post-1973 time frame.

Costs associated with the full implementation (Phase I and II) of the Athens homeporting program are in consonance with those previously presented to you and the Congress. The costs, which include the *USS Sanctuary*, and estimated airfield and alternate fleet landing costs, are now estimated to be \$13.6 million one-time, and a six year average of \$10.95 million for annual recurring costs. The cost estimates previously provided to Congress were \$14.4 million one-time, and \$13.4 million annual recurring. The International Balance of Payments deficit attributable to this homeporting program is now estimated to be \$11.8 million as compared to the \$13 million originally estimated.

There are some weaknesses and uncertainties in this plan; however, I believe they can be resolved satisfactorily with time. The lack of an airfield confirmed for our use is a decided weakness that could ultimately entail additional facilities and costs. Resolution to the airfield requirement is, of course, subject to the outcome of the on-going service-to-service negotiations between the U.S. and Hellenic Navies. The carrier berthing is also somewhat uncertain over the long term if the Greeks should close the Phaleron Bay anchorage. Such an eventuality would, of course, be an overall Sixth Fleet matter as it would affect routine carrier or other large ship visits to Athens as well as a homeported carrier. Should a move to an alternate site be required, we might propose that the Greeks support the costs involved, at least in part.

I also appreciate the concerns that have been expressed regarding the inability of the existing support facilities to accommodate the personnel and dependents associated with Phase II. This problem—a lesson learned from Phase I—is clearly recognized. We must now clear the way for the Navy to proceed with development of the facilities that will be required so that they can be fully manned and operational prior to the introduction of the Phase II dependents.

In view of the uncertainties and concerns involved, I have conditioned my approval of the Navy plan. First, a resolution to the airfield issue must be accomplished before any leases for Phase II facilities can be executed. Second, adequate support facilities (including *Sanctuary*) must be in being, fully staffed and operational before Phase II dependents are introduced. Third, the Navy should revise its schedule to permit implementation of the carrier and air wing homeporting in March 1974, instead of July 1973 as proposed. This will permit careful planning for and orderly execution of Phase II. Should the Navy resolve the airfield and support facilities requirements well in advance of the March 1974 date, the Navy has been instructed to make a specific recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for an earlier implementation date. I have also cautioned the Navy that the overall costs should be kept in consonance with those presented to the Congress.

On the political side, the Athens homeporting program was expected to draw considerable press and Congressional interest and some criticism. We seem to have weathered the storm of Congressional opposition which was based on the overall concept of the program; therefore, the implementation of Phase II, though it can be expected to draw additional criticism, would not appear to be an issue at this point. I believe that we have already paid the major political price for homeporting in Athens.

Internationally, the Soviets, after their initial reaction, have been relatively quiet on this subject. They may, however, attempt to raise the specific issue in MBFR, having already raised the general issue of FBS

and forward deployed carriers in SALT II. We should not be deterred by speculation on this issue.

We also recognized that the influx of additional U.S. service personnel into the Athens area would create some problems in Greece. Currently, any civil incidents involving U.S. military personnel—homeported or not—become highlighted. We can reasonably expect this to continue for awhile as the number of U.S. personnel increase in the Athens area. I do not believe, however, that the reaction either here or in Greece has reached—or will reach—unmanageable proportions.

In summary, I believe that homeporting in Greece makes little, if any, sense unless we carry through with our plans to homeport a carrier there. I am also confident that the problem areas and uncertainties can be resolved successfully with time and that the Navy implementation plan is feasible if the implementation is delayed.

I strongly support the Navy's desire to move forward with the implementation of Phase II; therefore, I request your early and favorable endorsement.

I believe that we should move quickly to seek Ambassador Tasca's concurrence in this plan and to have him reaffirm with the Greek Government their previous agreement in principle and solicit their support to resolve the airfield problem. It is essential that we have GOG concurrence as soon as possible to permit early declassification of the plan.

I am prepared to discuss this matter with you, at any time, and have instructed my staff to provide whatever additional information you or your staff may desire.

**Melvin R. Laird**