

## Romania

### 176. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 27, 1969.

#### SUBJECT

Romanians Fish for High-Level US Visit

In the attached message (Bucharest 139),<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Davis reports a conversation with Romanian party and state chief Ceausescu in which the latter urged that US-Romanian "political relations" be developed, referred to his meeting with President Nixon two years ago<sup>3</sup> and expressed hope that the President might some time visit Romania. He also expressed the hope that President Johnson might visit Romania.

I doubt whether Ceausescu would expect this invitation to be taken up, at least any time soon and I think Dick Davis is right in supposing that the Romanians are fishing for a high-level but less than Presidential visit.

I believe this is well worth considering as is the possibility of more or less regular political consultations. This kind of activity, if carried on without excessive fanfare, would be in the category of deterrence diplomacy along the lines of what we have been doing with the Yugoslavs. There are of course pitfalls: if you overdo the deterrence you may bring on the thing you are trying to prevent; if we invest too much of our prestige in our relations we have more of it to lose if things go badly. But given skill and the built-in restraints, both here and in Bucharest, I think the State Department can be encouraged to pursue Ceausescu's overture.

My candidate for a trip some time would be Governor Scranton.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I —8/69. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt routed the memorandum through Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> Dated January 27; not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Nixon discussed the visit in *RN: Memoirs*, pp. 281–282.

## 177. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 1, 1969, 5:30–6 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Situation in Europe

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Romania:*

Gheorghe Macovescu, First Deputy Foreign Minister  
Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador to the United States

#### *U.S.:*

The Secretary  
Geroge R. Kaplan, EUR/EE, Romanian Affairs

Recalling that he had met both President Eisenhower and Secretary Rogers late in the Eisenhower administration when he was Minister here, Mr. Macovescu expressed his personal condolences as well as those of President Ceausescu.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary replied that, as the youngest member of the Eisenhower Cabinet, he had had a special feeling toward the late President who had been something like a father to him.

Mr. Macovescu said that his government desired above all a better atmosphere and peace in Europe and was pursuing the avenues it considered appropriate toward this end. He noted that he would be visiting Dutch Foreign Minister Luns in The Hague immediately following his Washington trip.

The Secretary said that we, too, not only want peace but are willing to go half way and more to achieve it. He said that a new administration has a certain initial advantage and can therefore take a fresh look at the important problems of achieving it. He noted, however, that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Mr. Brezhnev's ideological justification had ominous overtones.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Brezhnev doctrine<sup>3</sup> was not a justification but rather an explanation. The Romanian Government, he said, simply does not accept this doctrine and has stated its views repeat-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on April 4. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; parts 2 through 4 are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> Former President Eisenhower died on March 28. Macovescu attended the March 30 state funeral as the representative of his government.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 72.

edly. The Secretary said that, while the Brezhnev doctrine may indeed be an explanation for one situation, it could as easily be construed as justification for all situations.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Romanian delegation had signed the Budapest declaration on March 17<sup>4</sup> in good faith, feeling that it provided an excellent starting point in the quest for an improved atmosphere in Europe. Romania wants to play a role in working toward the abolition of blocs and the prevention of Czechoslovakia-type situations. Equally important, of course, is to build something tangible for the future. In this connection, he emphasized that the military arrangements agreed to in Budapest were not directed against anyone. The Secretary asked how this could be the case. Mr. Macovescu replied that prior to these arrangements, the Warsaw Pact had no actual working regulations. The Soviets could do whatever they wished. Now, all members know their obligations. It would now be impossible, for example, for the Soviets to decide unilaterally that maneuvers would be held anywhere in the Warsaw Pact area. Mr. Macovescu stated categorically that the subject of maneuvers had not arisen in the Budapest meeting.

The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion in Budapest concerning Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Macovescu replied that, although there had not, the Romanian Government takes every opportunity to inform the Soviets that they would be well-advised to remove their troops and renounce solutions to international problems by force.

Mr. Macovescu said that he had been instructed by President Ceausescu to emphasize that Romania did not want any special help from the United States but would on its own renounce any pressure to subscribe to any policy dictated from outside Romania. He reiterated that Romania intends to decide its own destiny by itself. The Secretary noted that it would probably be just as well in these circumstances for the United States to stay quiet. Mr. Macovescu agreed.

The Secretary said that we have already told the Soviets on a number of occasions that another Czechoslovakia would make any improvement in bilateral relations utterly impossible. Dobrynin knows this. The Secretary said that both he and the President respect the Romanian attitude and detect obvious concern over it on the part of the USSR. Mr. Macovescu said that President Ceausescu had been absolutely clear in his public statements and in his contacts with the Soviets that, while Soviet-Romanian friendship is desirable, Romania had

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<sup>4</sup> For extracts of the relevant portions of the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact appealing for a Conference on European Security, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 1035-1037.

no intention of strewing flowers in the path of the Soviets should they decide to enter Romania. He added that his country's policy was more realistic than courageous.

The Secretary asked if the Soviets had given any assurances to the Romanian leadership that they would not invade their country. Mr. Macovescu replied that the question had a certain academic quality inasmuch as the Soviets had given such assurances to the Czechoslovaks.

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### 178. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1969, Ambassador to Romania Richard Davis reported that in the course of a discussion with Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu, the latter had extended an invitation for President Richard Nixon to visit Romania. Davis characterized the invitation as "hardly surprising," and noted that the Romanians, "in pursuit their policy of develop[ing] good bilateral relations with all countries have increasingly used technique of visit exchanges." He endorsed such a visit as promoting improved bilateral U.S.-Romanian relations. (Telegram 983 from Bucharest, May 20; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69) The United States agreed to a visit in June and set the dates for August 1–3. The Romanian visit became the last stop on a Presidential trip to the Far East from July 23 to August 1. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed the background and the visit in *White House Years*, pages 151–158.

**179. Intelligence Information Cable<sup>1</sup>**

TDCS DB-315/02773-69

Washington, July 7, 1969.

## COUNTRY

Rumania/USSR/Eastern Europe

## DOI

June-July 1969

## SUBJECT

Comments of a Rumanian official abroad concerning Rumanian reaction to President Nixon's projected visit to Rumania, and considerations affecting the Rumanian decision to invite the President

## ACQ

July 1969

## SOURCE

*[9 lines not declassified]*

1. In early July 1969 a Rumanian official stationed abroad commented concerning the Rumanian reaction to the announcement made on 28 June 1969 that President Richard M. Nixon planned to visit Rumania in early August, and the various considerations which had affected the decision of the Rumanian Government (GOR) to extend the invitation to the President. He stated that his remarks reflected the "official" views of the GOR. The Rumanian official said that the Rumanian leadership is very pleased that President Nixon made a positive response to the invitation. He commented that the President's decision to visit Rumania in the immediate future and to stop in no other Eastern European country had exceeded the most optimistic expectations of the Rumanian leadership: the Bucharest regime had judged that in the event President Nixon decided to visit Rumania, the trip probably could not be arranged until the last quarter of 1969 at the earliest, and that the stop in Rumania undoubtedly would be within the context of a tour of the general Eastern European area. The Rumanian official said that the GOR had assumed that any visit to Rumania would almost certainly be accompanied by similar stops in Moscow and, probably, Belgrade; the fact that Rumania has now been singled out for special attention by the United States is source of major gratification for the GOR.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I —8/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA and sent to agencies in the Intelligence Community.

2. In response to a query as to whether the GOR had any fears that the President's visit might adversely affect the delicate position Rumania occupies in Eastern Europe and its relations with the Soviet Union, the Rumanian official replied, "absolutely not." With respect to Rumania's relations with the Soviet Union the Rumanian official stated that before making the decision to invite President Nixon to Rumania, the GOR leadership had carefully weighed the risks involved. The GOR concluded that, should there be an adverse Soviet reaction, any retaliatory gesture from the Soviet Union would be outweighed by the "moral and psychological" benefits of the President's visit. The GOR judges that the Soviet Union will not carry out any form of "retaliation" such as the cancellation of the projected visit of Soviet leaders to Rumania in the late July 1969,<sup>2</sup> because this would only be construed by world public opinion as an admission of Soviet weakness. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* The Rumanian official stressed that there had been no such threat concerning the visit of Soviet officials, and that he had only cited it as an example.) The Rumanian official added that the GOR has no intention of "balancing" President Nixon's visit by granting concessions to the Soviet Union, either within the framework of CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) or the Warsaw Pact, e.g., agreeing to the holding of Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Rumanian territory.

3. In discussing the Rumanian thinking prior to the extension of an invitation to President Nixon the Rumanian official stated that once the GOR had decided that it was worthwhile to accept the risk of Soviet displeasure at the action, the GOR had attached little weight to the possible adverse reactions on the part of the other Warsaw Pact countries other than Czechoslovakia. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the GOR judged that on a whole the liberal cause in Czechoslovakia would be well served by the Rumanian invitation to Nixon, regardless of whether or not he accepted it. The GOR reasoned that the invitation might create difficulties for the pro-Soviet Husak regime in the CSSR, and this in turn would aid the liberal cause.

4. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

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<sup>2</sup> The Soviet leaders eventually visited Romania July 6–8, 1970, to sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.

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**180. Memorandum for the Files<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 12, 1969.

**SUBJECT**

The President's Conversation with Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan  
July 11, 1969, 12:30–12:55 p.m.

The Ambassador extended greetings from President Ceausescu, who wanted the President to know that he was very much looking forward to Mr. Nixon's visit and was pleased to have had such a quick response to the Romanian invitation. The President told the Ambassador that he too was glad to be making the visit, that he had had good talks in Bucharest on his previous visit although he had not had a chance to see very much. He hoped this time to see something of the people. The President noted that great interest had been displayed in the press in connection with his forthcoming visit, although the implications mentioned in the newspaper articles were not always justified.

The President said he had three basic reasons for making the trip. First, we want good relations with all countries and do not wish to draw any lines between countries to which this applies and those to which it does not. Secondly, there were matters which deserved further discussion, including the question of trade in which the Romanians are interested. Thirdly, the President liked the people he had met in Bucharest and retained a warm impression of them. The President mentioned in this connection that in addition to the president and the Prime Minister, he had especially liked Foreign Minister Manescu. The President noted the symbolic effect of his visit, that he would be prepared to discuss bilateral matters and the friendly relations between us. Ambassador Bogdan expressed agreement.

The President then stated that when he met with President Ceausescu he wanted to see him alone in a face-to-face meeting with only Mr. Kissinger present on our side. The President added that our Ambassador would not participate in this discussion. The President continued that he was open on the subjects to be discussed and he was most interested in hearing Mr. Ceausescu's views. The President observed that in the other places where he will stop during his forthcoming trip, he would likewise be listening to what the leaders have to say. The President noted that he recalled Mr. Ceausescu as a very

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I —8/69. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt.

direct person and Mr. Bogdan interjected that Mr. Ceausescu said the same of Mr. Nixon. The President went on to say that there will no be record of the conversation and that nothing would leak out from it.

The Ambassador said that the Romanians for their part would do all they could along the same lines.

The Ambassador then informed the President that the Soviet leaders had postponed their scheduled visit to Bucharest on the 14th of July. He was instructed to tell the President that the Soviet leaders had recently informed the Romanian leaders that due to their schedule but in view of the great importance they attribute to the signing of the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty, they (the Soviet leaders) propose to come to Bucharest in the fall.

There ensued a brief discussion of some of the arrangements for the President's visit.<sup>2</sup>

The President then noted that this would be a most significant first in that he would be the first American President to go to Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union since President Roosevelt went to Yalta. The President added that he wanted it to go well and hoped it would set a pattern. At the same time we had no desire to embarrass the Romanians. The Ambassador commented that the Romanians, after all, had asked for it. The President noted that he himself had made the decision to go at the time his trip was first discussed. Mr. Kissinger commented that he had been startled when the President first mentioned it. The President concluded the conversation by reiterating that he considers the President a strong person and straight shooter.

Photographs were then taken of the President and the Ambassador.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfeldt were present at this conversation.

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<sup>2</sup> In a July 11 conversation with Bogdan, Kissinger underlined the importance the President's staff attached to getting precise information and agreements on the schedule for the Nixon visit. (Memorandum for Record, July 12; *ibid.*) Kissinger reiterated this concern in a July 16 telephone call to the Romanian Ambassador. (Memorandum for Record, July 16; *ibid.*)

**181. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Improving Relations with Romania

*I. Introduction*

At the request of the White House,<sup>2</sup> the Under Secretaries Committee has examined the following eight propositions in the economic field for improving US-Romanian relations: accession to GATT; accession to IMF/IBRD; trade missions; port security regulations; Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees; agricultural credit sales; export controls; and trade agreements and MFN.

Each of these propositions is discussed in detail in the enclosed paper.<sup>3</sup>

In addition we have looked at the civil air agreement (now in negotiation) and the possibility of certifying Romanian canned hams for import into the United States, to determine their possible utility in connection with your trip.

Consideration of all of these propositions has been in the context of the record since 1960, during which period we have concluded: (a) a comprehensive claims and financial settlement (1960);<sup>4</sup> (b) broad-gauged arrangements for cultural, educational and scientific exchanges (1960–68); (c) an agreement to take specified steps to improve trade and economic relations (1964);<sup>5</sup> (d) a joint undertaking to expand scientific cooperation (1968); and (e) arrangements for cooperation in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-270, U/DM 1-19, U/DM 14. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> On June 30 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson requesting the Under Secretaries Committee "to recommend a series of propositions that might be put to the Romanians on such items as export controls; accession to GATT; accession to IMF/IBRD; trade missions; port security regulations; Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees; agricultural credit sales; trade agreements and MFN. . . . It will be desirable to consider this subject before the President's Briefing Book for his trip [to Romania] is completed." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The report is entitled "An Examination of Possible Ways to Meet Romanian Desires for Improved Economic Relations."

<sup>4</sup> Dated March 30, 1969; 11 UST 317.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to a Presidential Determination of June 15, 1964, that made Export-Import Bank credit guarantees available to Romania for purchases other than agricultural products. See Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1964, pp. 26-27.

peaceful uses of atomic energy (1968). Now in various stages of negotiation are a consular convention, the aforementioned civil air accord, the establishment of United States and Romanian cultural centers, and publication of an *Amerika*-type magazine.

Our examination indicates that the prospects for effective action on our part and impact on the Romanians vary markedly from item to item. Nevertheless, to obtain an overview of their potentiality and the possibility of developing a combined package of several items, we discuss them below in order of their importance.

## *II. Possible Items for Use with Romanians*

*MFN.* The one action on our part that would demonstrate most clearly to the Romanian leadership that we mean to improve relations would be the granting of MFN status. Communist Romania has demonstrated by its increasingly independent foreign policy actions of the past five years that it merits special treatment in United States policy towards Eastern Europe. Despite Romanian assistance to North Vietnam, there is widespread admiration in the United States for its assertively independent posture and defiance of the USSR. Alone among the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe, Romania (a) has taken a neutral stand in the Arab-Israeli dispute, (b) recognized and exchanged ambassadors with the Federal Republic of Germany, (c) did not participate in and opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (d) attacked the Brezhnev Doctrine, and (e) has taken a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

Your decision to seek authority to grant MFN to Romania would represent a modification of NSDM 15<sup>6</sup> and would raise problems in Congress, where Chairman Mills has been unwilling to support full MFN for Eastern European countries. Although there is probably considerable sympathy for Romania on Capitol Hill, there is recognition that the Romanian communist state is run by a tightly centralized repressive regime. Widespread support for liberalized trade with Eastern Europe nevertheless exists, and your support for MFN for Romania would have an important effect on Congressional attitudes. Such a decision would raise the question whether to seek (a) broad authority to grant MFN treatment to Eastern Europe and the USSR while exercising it at this time only for Romania, and (b) authority to grant MFN to Romania alone.

In return for MFN, the Romanian Government should agree to (a) satisfactory arrangements for settlement of commercial disputes, (b) agreement for the establishment of sales and service organizations in

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 3.

Romania by US firms, and (c) agreement on consultative procedures for problems that arise in the course of trade. Another important United States concern, although not of an economic nature, is to help dual nationals and others in Romania eligible for emigration to the United States to leave Romania. Despite Romanian pledges, progress has been slow. Only some 100 of approximately 2,500 individual cases have been favorably resolved. You might wish to couple an offer of MFN with the recommendation that Romania act to release these individuals, indicating that such action would increase Congressional receptivity. A clear undertaking to fulfill obligations to United States bondholders would also be a welcome Romanian commitment.

*Export Controls.* We can liberalize our export control treatment of Romania. Romania is now in Category W, which is more lenient than that for most Comecon countries (category Y) but more stringent than for NATO allies and Yugoslavia (category V).

It would be possible by Presidential directive to shift Romania to category V, provided Romania gave appropriate guarantees concerning re-export, trans-shipment, and disclosure of technical data. Alternatively, it would be possible, while retaining Romania in category W, for you to direct the Department of Commerce to expedite *special* licenses for the export of some or all of approximately 250 items that are available under general license to Yugoslavia and other V countries. The appropriate guarantees could be secured in each case. Such action would not require modification of NSDM 15.

Romania is aware that it is in category W and would probably prefer to be shifted to category V.

*Canned Hams.* Romania would like to export canned hams to the United States and has some prospect of building up a profitable market here. However, USDA has been unable on the basis of past inspections to certify that the Romanian plants meet the requirements of the Wholesome Meat Act. There have been recent informal reports that the Romanians have made substantial progress in meeting our standards. It would be possible to express gratification at these reports and state that a USDA Meat Inspection Team would be ready to visit Romania again as soon as the Romanians indicate that they feel they have met the requirements and are ready to receive them.

*Civil Air Agreement.* Negotiations for a Civil Air Agreement were recessed in December, 1968. Still at issue were provisions relating to PanAm's right to conduct business in Romania such as sale of tickets and repatriation of earnings. The Romanians requested the recess to consider how their rules could be changed to permit a mutually satisfactory agreement. If the Romanians refer to the Civil Air negotiations, they might be told that we would welcome an agreement as a symbol of further normalization of our relations and are ready to resume dis-

cussion when they feel they are ready with proposals that would meet our minimum requirements.

*Trade Missions.* We could encourage whenever possible private US trade missions to Romania and, if the Romanians are interested, send another US Government trade promotion mission. We can continue to welcome and to facilitate contacts by any trade missions which Romania would like to send to the United States.

*Port-Security Regulations.* The White House now has for action an Executive Branch proposal to make considerably more flexible the restrictions on entry of merchant vessels of communist countries, including Romania, into United States ports.<sup>7</sup> This is only of marginal interest to Romania.

*Accession to GATT.* Romania has applied to become a full contracting party to the GATT. The United States is supporting Romania's application and, at Romania's request to us, is a member of the Working Party considering it. Our role in the Working Party, however, is limited because we are unable to assume GATT obligations to extend MFN to Romania. We can do little to strengthen our general support for Romania's accession unless we get authority to offer MFN treatment during the course of the next few months while the application is under consideration and unless Romania becomes more forthcoming than it has been on the obligations it is prepared to assume for accession.

*Accession to IMF/IBRD.* Romania has taken occasional soundings, none of them recent, with regard to IMF membership, a prerequisite of IBRD membership. We do not know how serious Romanian interest is or whether she is willing to meet the obligations of membership, even the elementary requirement to disclose her gold and foreign exchange holdings. We can express our willingness to support Romania's application whenever the management and staff of the IMF are satisfied in their informal contacts that Romania would be able and willing to undertake the obligations of membership.

*Agricultural Credit Sales.* Romania has long been eligible for Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits for the purchase of agricultural products. However, as an agricultural exporting country, it has shown little interest in such purchases or credits even for non-food agricultural products.

*EXIM Bank Loans and Guarantees.* Under existing legislation Romania, as a direct supplier of North Viet-Nam, is not eligible for EXIM loans or guarantees so long as North Viet-Nam is engaged in armed conflict with armed forces of the United States. The Romanians are well aware of this prohibition. Although they put great weight on obtaining

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 8.

US credits, they would not consider stopping their supply of North Viet-Nam as the price for regaining eligibility for such credits.

*III. Alternate Ways of Handling Items with Romanians*

Depending on your judgment and the atmosphere and course of the talks, there are three alternative ways to handle the issues:

1. Discuss the issues with Romanians but make no commitments for further action.

2. Announce action commitments while in Bucharest on several items, such as MFN, civil air agreement, trade missions, and canned ham.

3. Hear Romanians out on these issues and, without commitment, indicate we wish to continue exploration of them with Ambassador Bogdan in Washington.

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**182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

Cooling Romanian Hopes for Economic Concessions

I noted that Bucharest's 1567<sup>2</sup> reports that Romanian officials have begun to speak with great optimism about possible US economic concessions—particularly MFN—as a result of the President's visit to Bucharest. I would appreciate your instructing Embassy Bucharest to try discreetly to cool down the Romanians a bit.

The Embassy should emphasize that the President's discretion in the field of East-West trade is limited, and that the Romanians should not anticipate dramatic developments at the time of the visit. Rather, they should set their sights on gradual improvements as a result of the visit.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I —8/69. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was sent on July 22.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 17; attached but not printed.

With regard to the encouragement reportedly given the Romanians by Dr. Emil Onaca mentioned in the same telegram, you should inform Embassy Bucharest that Onaca is one of the many well-meaning but obtrusive Romanian émigrés who have sought to press their services on the White House in connection with the Presidential trip. Onaca has no privileged relationship whatsoever at the White House and enjoys no special status; he is an American businessman of Romanian background who hopes to participate in expanding trade with Romania. He will not repeat not have a role in any aspect of the President's trip.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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### 183. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Bucharest, August 2, 1969.

#### Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu

##### PARTICIPANTS

President Nicolae Ceausescu  
Ion Gheorghe Maurer  
Interpreter

President Richard Nixon  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Colonel Burbec

Before entering the private talks, President Ceausescu invited President Nixon to stay over until Monday, to allow time for fuller discussions. President Nixon said he wished he could, but had to return to meet with Congressional leaders.

##### *Private Meeting*

Ceausescu: According to Romanian custom, we listen to our guest, although we could reverse this.

Nixon: Either way you wish. We should discuss a whole range of subjects, including both bilateral and broader issues. Bilateral issues

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Nixon visited Romania August 1–3, following a trip to the Far East. There is no indication as to where the conversation took place.

would include: trade, cultural exchanges, and consular questions; we might consider these but leave more detailed matters involved to be worked out by the technicians. I would like to discuss with you such broad areas as world peace, east-west relations, Vietnam—where the Prime Minister was very helpful before—and other such problems. Do you have others?

Ceausescu: We should start here.

Nixon: First, I want to tell you that I have examined these bilateral matters and have instructed my staff to try to work out programs to deal constructively with these; and if you want to go into these briefly, I will do so constructively. It may be we can make an announcement, for example, of the Cultural Agreement. I understand both sides are ready to sign. I'm for it and would like to see more exchange between us.

Ceausescu: As far as problems are concerned, the relations between us have greatly improved. But by comparison with our verbal agreements, our formal agreements are small. Of course, I agree with the importance of the Cultural Agreement. It can be signed today or tomorrow, and may open other fields. But it represents only a portion. I attach great importance to cooperation in science and technology, because this field has a decisive part to play in the development of a country.

Nixon: I can have Dr. DuBridge arrange exchanges of views between our science advisers. I could send Dr. DuBridge on a mission to your country.

Ceausescu: I would welcome this mission.

Nixon: Perhaps you are interested in a scientific mission because I understand you have a son studying atomic physics in England.

Ceausescu: I have a chief of my home who is Director of Chemistry.

Nixon: Your wife.

Ceausescu: Yes.

Nixon: Dr. Kissinger will work with your Ambassador to arrange such a mission.<sup>2</sup>

Ceausescu: We are very much interested in exchanges in chemistry, as the U.S. is far ahead in this field. With regard to physics, we don't want nuclear weapons, but would wish to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Nixon: We will help you.

Ceausescu: The level of economic help we receive is low. First we can benefit from licenses to import equipment. This raises two prob-

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 186.

lems. First, granting the license and finding banks to guarantee credits to cover the purchase. Second, the opportunity for Romanian exports to earn enough to pay for the imports. This brings us to MFN treatment or at least some other procedures to facilitate Romanian exports.

Nixon: I have studied the problem and have some new steps to present. MFN status would require our Congress to act. This is a difficult problem now because of the Vietnam war. We know that the amount of Romanian goods shipped to North Vietnam is small. But it is still a political problem to get MFN passage.

Kissinger: The same problem applies to Export/Import Bank loans and guarantees to Communist countries. This can be waived administratively. The Fino Amendment<sup>3</sup> bars Export/Import bank credits to any country trading with North Vietnam.

Nixon: I want you to know I favor MFN treatment for Romania. Once the political problems of Vietnam war are gone, we will move expeditiously on this. I, that is the President, can now, without Congressional action, change the status of Romania on direct sales in several areas. I will do that. I will ease export licensing to Romania and Export/Import Bank questions where I can act administratively. Mr. Kissinger will follow up on this with the State and Commerce Departments. On MFN, the Fino Amendment, and the other questions, we'll get to that when the Vietnam war is out of the way.

Ceausescu: I salute this declaration. Romania *is* interested in developing relations with the U.S. and others. We have an intensive program of development, including a great effort on the part of the people to give 30% of total national income for investment. Of course, to keep up the high rate of development requires great effort. We want to use the experience of other countries.

Nixon: Romania must look to its own interests to the extent that such assistance can be obtained from the Soviet Union, West Germany and U.S. I do not say that if you are a friend of the U.S. you have to be an enemy of someone else. What relations you have with other countries is your business.

Ceausescu: Romania's foreign relations must include the Soviet Union, China, and capitalistic countries. These relations are conducive to the development of the country. We will talk later about relations with other socialist countries. We regard Romania's relations with the

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<sup>3</sup> It amended the operations authorization of the Export-Import Bank to block certain loans to Communist states. For the text of P.L.-90-267, approved January 2, 1968, see 81 Stat. 943.

U.S. as being between two countries which have different systems but which are willing to develop and expand their relations. We know what the U.S. is. Romania is a small country. If possible we shall be friends. We do not wish relations to be preconditioned. Our mutual interests will dictate our relations. We know no one wants to lose money in relations with Romania and we don't want that. We are a Communist country but we want to benefit. We want to build on this. We believe this is possible. What we can find in U.S., we will take. What we cannot take because of conditions, we will not take. We want to buy know-how and a heavy water plant, to equip factories to make synthetic rubber, electronics, computers and some other similar things. We have received some things from you indirectly. But one of your exporters was punished eight years ago for exporting something. We want to be in a position to have business men sell to us directly, not indirectly. We are not seeking to obtain special conditions, unusual conditions. Our system in this country is ours and we don't want to take over yours.

Nixon: My policy is: Any country can be our friend without being someone's enemy. We understand that differences in systems can present problems in working out financial arrangements. We will explore every way to make progress—we have made much progress with Yugoslavia in this matter.

Ceausescu: And with Poland.

Nixon: Yes, but this fell down because of political problems. I personally made the decision to visit Romania and I wanted frank discussions to see how we can have better trade and other relations, with Romania and with other countries. Bluntly, developments in Czechoslovakia set back some progress which had begun in more communications and trade between the U.S. and other Eastern European countries. I hope this visit can be a starting point for new relations; it could conceivably be an example for our dealing with other countries.

Ceausescu: I would like to emphasize that we don't conceive of our relations with the U.S. as being directed against others' interests. We have proceeded from fact that our relations with some countries does not mean we have to give up relations with others and may I express my satisfaction that we share the same point of view.

Nixon: I have a question for you. We are trying to negotiate arms control and an easing Middle East crisis with the USSR; we want good relations with the Soviet Union. We don't want to embarrass Romania. Do you consider that the Brezhnev Doctrine makes it difficult to have trade relations with us? We value Romanian friendship and do not want to put Romania in an embarrassing position with other neighboring countries. When this trip was announced, the Soviet Union did not approve. Tell me how far can our relations go without embarrassment to Romania or its President.

Ceausescu: Openly—without diplomacy—my answer: As far as Romania is concerned, relations with the U.S. cannot embarrass us in any way. I say this having in mind that our relations are based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They should not be made contingent on what Romania does with other countries. We developed relations with the Federal Government of Germany, France, England, Italy and others. With France we concluded a long term agreement to produce cars (Renault). On the occasion of President De Gaulle's visit, we concluded a long range agreement on electronics. All these did not cause or cannot cause embarrassment. The Soviet Union cannot object, as it has these relations with other countries as well—for example, the Fiat deal.<sup>4</sup> Development of relations in this spirit cannot cause problems for the future of Romania. It may cause problems for the U.S. with the Soviet Union.

I am aware of the big negotiations on the Middle East and disarmament; we are in accord with these negotiations. We do understand their importance. We are interested in favorable results. Now my frank opinion and also the opinion of some friends of the U.S.: we do wish that your talks should not be detrimental to other countries but aid in their development. Some of your allies may have told you this, if not I'll tell you, we are worried about the results of your negotiations with USSR. My opinion is not in a long-range perspective. People do not want settlements made behind their backs, but openly. Big country problems can be made beneficial to peace if made with the interest of other countries in mind. In this sense, the doctrine of limited sovereignty can't have applicability. We have good relations with the Soviet Union and appreciate its role. We also have good relations with Peking and other countries. Our decisions are made here in Bucharest, not in Washington, Moscow, Peking, Paris or London.

Nixon: Do you run any risk in this policy?

Ceausescu: What can we risk?

Nixon: It depends on how one interprets the Russian statement on limited sovereignty and how Russia interprets it.

Ceausescu: Russia has denied an intention to limit sovereignty. I want to discuss this. In all our discussions with the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, you call it, Romania was frank and explained our position clearly. We reached acceptable results. We are determined to work along these lines. The problem of the independence of Romania is not to be questioned. As to the feeling of the people, that was expressed today.

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<sup>4</sup> Congress had blocked an Export-Import Bank loan guarantee that would have supported the building of a Fiat automobile factory in Togliattigrad.

Nixon: That answers the question. The American press said this trip would embarrass Romania and be harmful. We do not want that. We want good relations with Romania and Russia. We do not want to break up the Warsaw Pact. We want good relations with all countries.

Ceausescu: I salute your answer. We knew you would say that for we never saw it in any other light. If we thought it would break up or weaken Romanian/Russian relations or bring pressures on our internal affairs, we would not have accepted the visit.

Nixon: If other Eastern European countries ask you about my policy, I hope you will tell them what it is. Our attitude towards them is the same.

Ceausescu: I want us to start from facts: relations with the U.S. cannot in any way impede relations with others. It is true that our Soviet friends were slightly disturbed with your visit. We advised them 36 hours before it was announced. They never commented officially. (Ceausescu then predicted that Russian predominance won't last, based on historical analysis.) The Soviet comrades find this difficult to accept. The Soviet Union was first in space. U.S. was first on the moon. There are changes in other fields.

Nixon: First today, second tomorrow.

Ceausescu: If other leaders understand that peace of earth can be done only if all countries are left to evolve and develop. Not through the use of force—things can't be changed by sheer force.

Nixon: I agree, others do not understand.

Kissinger: Yes. History indicates all things are not permanent. The post-war period shows many forces in action. A position of predominance is difficult to adjust to. President Nixon's theme on this trip was to develop new relationships.

Nixon: I have two subjects. First, policy in Asia—China and the Soviet Union. Second, where Vietnam negotiations stand. I want to get Prime Minister Maurer's view of this problem.

Maurer: On the question you put and the discussion which followed: I was reflecting that everything that has importance can give rise to apprehension, perhaps because of misunderstanding. No one takes stand against relations between states. The Russians were forced by world opinion to give up the limited sovereignty doctrine.

Ceausescu: I disagree with him. It is hard to accept the theory that they have abandoned limited sovereignty.

Nixon: The U.S. is a Pacific power and will continue to play a role in area. We have no interest in creating a bloc or other arrangements in Asia which can be interpreted as fencing off Communist China. We do not recognize Communist China and oppose its entry into the UN, not because of China's internal policy but because of its policies toward its neighbors.

Regarding the relations of the Soviet Union with Asian countries: Mr. Brezhnev said in a speech that the time is here for a collective security pact in Asia and that they will participate.<sup>5</sup> My answer to them—and it will be made public—is that what the Soviet Union does is its business. What we do is our business. It is wrong for the Soviet Union to arrange a cabal in Asia against China. In 25 years, China will have a billion people. If fenced off by others, it makes for a terribly explosive force that may destroy the peace of that time.

We know of the Soviet Union's quarrel with China. That is one we will stay out of. Our policy is to have good relations with Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish relations. One billion Chinese fenced in is a bomb about to explode.

Ceausescu: I'd like to express my view about what you said about good relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. We know that these relations have to be good to develop the cause of peace. From the point of view of Romania, good relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be welcomed only if they are not to the detriment of other states. We are lucky, we have no atomic bomb and are not an Asian country. We have no interest in Asia, it is far geographically. But I understand the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I know that the world is so small that if Asia does not have peace, this will affect Europe and the world at large.

One must understand that Asia cannot have peace or solve its problems without recognition of China's existence and drawing China into negotiations. The sooner this is understood, the better for all. The U.S. must give up its attitude toward China, both with regard to admission into the UN and to recognition. In fact, you recognize it. Its population is 800 million, and in the 1980s it will be one billion. Asia also includes India, Japan and Pakistan. All these countries must cooperate if there is to be peace. You declared no reservation about the domestic system in China. Your doubts spring from international affairs.

Nixon: China's attitude toward its neighbors.

Ceausescu: With India, the problem can easily be solved. For many generations, China has had no wars with its neighbors. Look only at the last 25 years.

Kissinger: I disagree on a historical point.

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<sup>5</sup> Apparent reference to Brezhnev's June 4 speech to the International Communist Party Conference in Moscow. For text, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 2, 1969, pp. 3–17.

Ceausescu: Go ahead.

Kissinger: If you look at Chinese history, independent of communism, it never had relations with others. It has no experience in dealing with others on an equal basis. This has nothing to do with its present internal policy.

Nixon: I can't change our China policy now but in the long view, as President Ceausescu said, China is a reality and no real peace is possible without China's playing a role. We won't join in a bloc to fence off China.

Ceausescu: I have no argument on history. China after the second World War has not threatened anyone.

Nixon: Korea?

Ceausescu: You know what happened there and I won't go into it. Anyway, China has withdrawn its troops—proof of its respect for the sovereignty of North Korea. I can tell you how leaders are thinking in China.

Nixon: That would be helpful and I'll keep it confidential.

Ceausescu: Prime Minister Maurer knows about this from his 1967 trip there. They have no intention of threatening the sovereignty of other countries. They have enough key internal problems. A rational policy toward China is to recognize her as an equal and give her a place in international affairs.

We concede Taiwan presents an obstacle to relations between China and the U.S.

My views of relations between China and most other countries are as follows: I think a revision of thinking and looking at developments in these countries is needed. They are all backward—their systems are feudal—they contain strong remnants of the feudal type. There is internal turmoil not because of foreign interference but of their own making. You know that internal forces have in the past sought external support to maintain themselves. France came to the help of the U.S. on the War of Independence. Why do I stress this? Because we should not support or assist backward forces. This can bring no good to the U.S. or the cause of peace. What is old must go—nothing can stop this progress. No doctor can save a man who in the end dies. The doctor may prolong his life—and this is good for the man. But for a country it is bad for the people.

In Vietnam, all your spending and support did not help to preserve the existing system. You spent about 25–30 billion dollars on the war. If you spend 2 billion dollars in Vietnam peacefully, you will have more development and will have made a friend. Why be afraid of socialism? It's an old concept. You must understand that each people will take that which helps them to better themselves.

Nixon: I agree there are many ways to get progress—many different approaches. There must be real economic progress. We have economic plans for Vietnam.

I would like to ask a question on the Soviet-China problem. We know they support Hanoi. Our intelligence tells us that there are two groups in Hanoi, one pro-Soviet and the other pro-Peking. We do not *know* this for we are not there. My question is, what is the reason for dispute? Is it ideological? National? Is there a chance of its ending? I ask because after Vietnam the U.S. may normalize relations with China; but we must ask whether the China-USSR problem is explosive enough to get us in a war.

Ceausescu: First, I would like for comments from Prime Minister Maurer on the preceding discussion.

Maurer: Very little is known about China, so much can be said. I believe that men who were there longer than I would still have difficulty in talking about it. I must mention one point, China is now developing; it has strong, powerful forces to raise mass living conditions. Chinese statistics on industrial development do not show much of course; in fact, no statutes are published. China should be helped. Our impression is that there are opportunities to do so. Courage is required. Ideas and actions concerning China should be revised. Maybe they were once justified, but changes in the situation make it necessary to reconsider, to find ways to draw China in. This is the most important problem today.

I would also like to say something about China's aggressiveness. President Ceausescu clarified this. Asia has the greatest need for change economically and socially. Two continents, Africa and Asia, most need economic and social aid—they are very backwards. It is difficult for people today to go through all the stages we passed through. We must contain the problem of change and not let it develop into an international question.

The question of USSR-China relations is difficult to answer. They are clouded by violent polemics, differences in ideology. Both progress in different ways. There are a number of conflicts—problems which instead of cooling down were blown up. The U.S. policy of not getting involved is correct; interference can be justified only to stop conflict. The most serious danger to the world is USSR-China conflict.

Our impression is that as certain objectives have been attained, China is thinking of action to develop negotiations with other countries.

Nixon: When I became President I asked the Chinese to meet us in Warsaw, and they refused.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Documentation regarding U.S. initiatives toward the People's Republic of China is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

Maurer: Americans should know the Chinese better than that; they have a peculiar mentality. China's orientation toward developing relations should be taken advantage of.

Ceausescu: China *is* a serious problem, but don't forget that other than Japan, China alone has solved its problem of food for its people. One hundred dollars annually per capita are earmarked for development—this makes 17 billion dollars. A major problem has been to assure more rapid development and progress of the economy and industry. You saw India, even that government passed nationalization of banks. So these policies should not be an obstacle for you in developing relations with countries with different systems than yours.

The problem of ideology is not crucial in the USSR-China dispute. My observation is that the real issue is national—the Soviet reluctance to concede China its proper place in international affairs. Chinese will not play a second class role. We believe that Soviet Union's thinking will come to understand reality. We think that there will not be a war. Of course, the unexpected can happen. We are in agreement with what you have stated. We should do nothing to sharpen the conflict. The U.S. would have nothing to gain from this development.

Nixon: I agree. I think you have played a proper role in this area by having relations with both; in the long run this is also our aim. With respect to our short run problems with China, we have taken actions like removing travel restrictions and allowing tourist purchases; we will take more in these areas. Frankly, if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China.

Ceausescu: It is not only our impression; we are certain of the reality of China's willingness to resume relations with other states. They have told us they will take actions to develop relations with other states. We must not look at public articles in the press but should take practical action. As to our willingness to mediate between the U.S. and China—the U.S. has every possibility to talk directly with the Chinese without mediation—I will say we shall tell our opinion to the Chinese, and of your opinion of this problem. We shall act to establish relations on the basis of mutual understanding.

Nixon: It is getting late. If you wish we can meet again tomorrow for an hour. I want to tell you first about our Vietnam position. I'll put it in perspective by saying if the war in Vietnam is ended on the right basis it will open many doors for better relations for trade with Romania and relations with China as we discussed earlier. We look at Vietnam through different eyes but our aim is the same: to gain peace and end the war. The next three months will be critical; they will determine whether the war can be ended by peaceful negotiations.

Tomorrow I want to tell you confidentially what is going on, where we are, etc.

Ceausescu: This is an important problem; we have not discussed how we look at it. You and I talked about it in 1967 and our points seem the same. Our basic interest is a peaceful solution by negotiation. We will discuss this tomorrow.

Nixon: We can talk at dinner. My time is at your disposal. Tomorrow we can make it for an hour and a half.

Ceausescu: I agree and will make good use of dinner tonight.

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#### 184. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Bucharest, August 3, 1969.

##### Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu

###### PARTICIPANTS

President Nicolae Ceausescu  
Ion Gheorghe Maurer  
Interpreter

President Richard Nixon  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Colonel Burbec

Ceausescu: I will listen to you, Mr. President, for according to our talks yesterday you have something to say about Vietnam.

Nixon: First, I appreciate the role the Prime Minister played in 1967 in trying to open channels of communications to resolve the Vietnam problem.<sup>2</sup> I was not in the government at that time but I am current on this. The actions were responsible and helpful. As we recognized in 1967, the problem in Vietnam is very difficult. We must recognize that neither side can win or suffer defeat. Some believe that Hanoi and the VC should take over and that the U.S. should get out of Vietnam.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> On Maurer's efforts, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 157.

Frankly, the U.S. can't do that; it is not just a matter of national honor. Leaving aside emotion, the U.S. committed over 500,000 troops, suffered 35,000 deaths and 200,000 wounded. To withdraw and let Hanoi take over would be a defeat for the U.S. and this, as President, I can't let happen. We can argue about whether we should have gone in or about how the war was conducted. The fact is we're there now and committed. We can't run away without giving the South Vietnamese the option to decide their own future. Hanoi says Thieu should get out and a peace cabinet should take over. We cannot accept that. You, Mr. President, suggest that the answer may be found in a coalition government. That would not be acceptable if it were imposed without giving the people of South Vietnam a chance to decide on it.

I have said what we can't do, and these we do insist on. We do not, however, insist on:

—The defeat of Hanoi.

—Hanoi's withdrawal without the opportunity to go to the people of South Vietnam and ask for support.

Look at what we have done:

—We stopped all bombing of North Vietnam.

—We withdrew 25,000 combat troops and an additional announcement on this subject will be made later this month.<sup>3</sup>

—We offered to withdraw all troops within one year if North Vietnam does likewise.

—And we have offered that the future of South Vietnam be determined by internationally supervised elections. President Thieu has offered to accept the VC in supervisory bodies and this is acceptable to me.

The international group would see to it that all groups in the country including the VC have a chance to participate, and if they get the verdict of the people to hold office. We do not propose to stop there. I said on May 14 that we are open to suggestions from the North but that they should talk substantively. If they don't like what proposals I have made, they should make suggestions. Look at our position: We stopped the bombing, have offered to negotiate seriously, will withdraw more troops, have offered elections in which the VC have an equal chance. Yet Hanoi has given absolutely no indication that they are willing to talk substance. True they have the 10 point program, but it simply tells the U.S. to get out and accept defeat. This we won't do. I am concerned by reports from Paris that the North Vietnam leaders have concluded that their best tactics are to continue to talk in Paris with no

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<sup>3</sup> The announcement was postponed to mid-September. For text of the President's September 16 statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 6, 1969, pp. 302–303.

substance and to continue to fight in Vietnam, thinking that public opinion will force us to capitulate and get out.

I never make idle threats; I do say that we can't indefinitely continue to have 200 deaths per week with no progress in Paris. On November 1 this year—one year after the halt of the bombing, after the withdrawal of troops, after reasonable offers for peaceful negotiation—if there is no progress, we must re-evaluate our policy.

Let me make one thing perfectly clear about North Vietnam. I don't hate the North Vietnamese. While I disagree with their government, I admire the courage of the people, their willingness to sacrifice. We want an equal chance for both sides; we want justice and peace for both sides. All we get from them is a take it or leave it position. There is nothing more important to me than to end this war on a fair basis. It will make possible the many Romanian-U.S. actions we talked about, could make possible U.S.-Chinese relations, and would help relations with the Soviet Union. All this is possible.

I want peace, but I will never accept defeat and will not have the U.S. humiliated by Hanoi. What may be necessary here is to open another channel of communications. (Kissinger notes<sup>4</sup> add here: "Get *any* help in it.")

Mr. President, you implied yesterday that they do want peace on reasonable terms. We have had no indication of this. This is our problem. Dr. Kissinger negotiated with the North Vietnamese during the Johnson Administration. He may have something to add. If we can find an answer it will be a breakthrough to finding peace all over the world.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I can add one or two things to what you said. We have no thought of humiliating Hanoi. We will not try to achieve at the conference table what was not achieved at the battle field. A political solution must reflect the balance of political forces. We object to the other side's position because they want us to destroy Thieu and thus destroy their enemy. They are asking us for a U.S. defeat. President Nixon said the other side will not negotiate seriously. I'll give a brief example to you: The other side has offered the ten points. We agreed to talk about them together with other proposals. But at every meeting they treat us as if we are school boys taking examinations in their 10 points, and discuss nothing else. At last week's private meeting, after every statement by us, they said we had no right to say it for we have said it before. They demand something new. What we are asking is that we both recognize the existing balance of polit-

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

ical forces. We would still have disagreements, but they could be resolved rapidly.

Nixon: I know you know the people of North Vietnam and you know me. I think that what is needed is a recognition of the fact that they are now making a grave mistake if they think they can wait us out. You can be assured we want nothing but a fair settlement, but it takes two to achieve this.

Ceausescu: Certainly the problem is serious, and as you said, it is a hindrance to the solution of other problems. In our view, a continuation of the war will lead to an unforeseeable situation with very grave consequences. It was good the bombing ceased but you need to go farther. I think here the problem is not the war with North Vietnam but the war which takes place in South Vietnam with internal forces of South Vietnam. A government has been created in South Vietnam by the NLF. We gather this government is ready to accept the creation of a new government to start ending the war, settling it through an understanding between all forces in South Vietnam. I will not discuss the history of how you got into Vietnam. If a political solution is wanted, it then appears that the idea of a government built on a wide base is acceptable and equitable. In our discussion with representatives of the NLF, they said they wish to arrive at an equitable solution and not in any way to humiliate the U.S. They wish to maintain relations with the U.S. after.

Nixon: When was your last discussion?

Ceausescu: About four weeks ago. About five days ago with their ambassador, the Front ambassador. They asked me, both the representative of the Front and the ambassador from the PRG, to use our relations with the U.S. to assist in reaching a solution as quickly as possible. In my opinion, they want a solution equitable and acceptable to both sides.

Nixon: How do we get them to talk? They won't talk to Lodge in Paris. We will not accept their negotiating on a take it or leave it basis. Maybe we need a very private channel.

Kissinger: They think they can make us lose without us noticing it.

Nixon: The least we can do for all people in South Vietnam is not to impose anything on them.

Kissinger: They refuse to talk to Thieu, which was the agreement at the time of the bombing halt. This makes it difficult to get a balance of forces, which is all we want.

Ceausescu: I want to ask two questions. If you don't want to answer, I understand. We will not convey your answers to anyone. First, is the U.S. ready to accept and favor a coalition government on an equal

basis with the government of South Vietnam to resolve the problem of South Vietnam?

Nixon: Only if the coalition is the result of elections and not negotiation. There could be a coalition in the sense of setting up the machinery for organizing an election.

Kissinger: I must explain this point. The other side says we have proposed elections run by the government of South Vietnam. We actually propose an electoral commission with both sides represented, and an international commission.

Ceausescu: Why not accept a coalition government which bears the responsibility to end the war immediately and prepares for elections, because these can be conducted only without fighting. Elections in time of war are of little value.

Nixon: In addition to an internationally supervised cease fire. You are absolutely right, no election is possible during fighting. I want to emphasize why we cannot agree to a coalition (a hard word for us) . . .

Ceausescu: Change the word . . .

Nixon: A coalition government to supervise setting up an election. We have said that we prefer a mixed commission. That's a start.

Kissinger: The other side excludes our side by definition in a coalition government.

Nixon: We can't dump our people.

Kissinger: We recognize that the NLF exists; we want them to recognize that the Thieu Government exists. We believe this commission makes possible the establishment of a balance of forces through elections which could produce a government to end the war. We do not want to destroy the balance of forces.

Nixon: We do not ask the Front to disappear. They must not ask that Thieu disappear. I think that if we can start there we can make a settlement.

Maurer: I would like to know if I have the correct understanding. The mixed commission, in the American point of view, should watch over a cease fire and organize under international supervision the elections. Then after the elections they will have a government elected representing South Vietnam.

Nixon: Correct.

Maurer: I want to make sure I understand a number of things as seen by the U.S. Will the elections take place while American troops are still in South Vietnam?

Kissinger: That depends on Hanoi. We offered an international commission to supervise the withdrawal of all outside forces, the U.S. as well as North Vietnamese. We believe it is best if all outside forces are withdrawn.

Nixon: I suggested this be done in one year, and that elections be held with all forces gone.

Maurer: The reason I asked for clarification was that the whole context of your discussions shows you know Romania wants the war to end. If Romania did something to help this solution it did it as a result of its interest, and this interest is stronger today because we may now see a new opening in relations between states. Of course, it is difficult to review the history, the rights and wrongs of the war. This is not useful. We must find a flexible, subtle solution. This requires an inventive spirit. President Ceausescu stressed one idea which you should consider. If you don't arrive at a solution to end the war peacefully, what will you do then? We find in all this that the major interests get more involved—even interests not willing to get involved get involved. Therefore it appears flexibility is required from the stronger. President Ceausescu and I have talked with the heads of Vietnam. I have spoken with the leaders of North Vietnam, and a little with South Vietnamese leaders. I observed two very important things in these people. First, they must be masters of their own solutions and these must not be imposed from the outside. I'm thinking of those who support the effort. Secondly, they want to gain a solution without closing the door to future relations with the U.S. It is possible that the best idea is to find a man who could most appropriately provide the best flexibility and inventive spirit. I hope President Ceausescu also believes that talks can yield results. Patience is difficult for the U.S., but it is, in my opinion, advisable.

Nixon: I have one very frank question. Does North Vietnam believe they should talk in Paris and fight in Vietnam, figuring that the U.S. will quit in a year or so, or do you think they want a settlement?

Maurer: On this point, absolutely frankly, it appears possible they think the former. But this fighting is costing them. In our discussions they appear to want a solution. This is clearly my own idea and I cannot guarantee that they are the thoughts of the North Vietnamese. I think they are oriented towards finding a solution.

Ceausescu: I have two problems. It is certain that South Vietnam and the PRG want to reach a peaceful solution and not to be tied to North Vietnam under present conditions. And North Vietnam and South Vietnam know that there is little chance for the war to end quickly in the present way. They stick to the position that a solution must have a finality conducive to self-determination. With a broadly based government composed of religious, cultural and other forces, one can't think this will bring unification with North Vietnam overnight. The commission as proposed by the U.S. is no solution. It leaves two governments in South Vietnam with the right to administer the territory under their control. This will not create conditions suit-

able for a solution. My idea is for a government coalition, maybe called by some other word, which may include all forces in South Vietnam. I know from what they told us that the PRG is not rigid in these matters. A broadly based government would facilitate a solution in a reasonable way.

Nixon: Were they rigid about the exclusion of Thieu?

Ceausescu: I asked them frankly if they were willing to accept members of the Thieu Government. They said this is a problem to be discussed. I think this problem must be looked at with more flexibility and in a practical way.

Nixon: It takes two to be flexible. They say no.

Ceausescu: I asked this for in a day or so they will come and ask your opinion on that point. I can't see an encouraging thing in your reply on this point. Are you ready to withdraw all troops from South Vietnam?

Nixon: If North Vietnam does also—tomorrow.

Ceausescu: It is difficult to tell which troops are from the North.

Nixon: Yes.

Ceausescu: Half of the North Vietnamese government is from the South.

Nixon: Some in the South were born in the North.

Kissinger: Some say the easiest way is to change the Northern and Southern governments.

Nixon: I want to sum up to be perfectly clear. We are flexible and willing to talk in another channel but only if they have an intention to settle. When you ask if we will dump Thieu and form a coalition government, the answer is no, and we are rigid on this. We do not ask the Front to eliminate people from their government. We will work to get a subtle peace. We cannot and will not just pull out. Second, we cannot and will not continue indefinitely to talk in Paris with no progress and while the fighting continues in Vietnam. I know the consequences referred to by the Prime Minister, but if it is necessary to end the war by that route it will be because we have no other choice. We would be willing to work out solutions having the Front represented on the government to the extent its popular support and its strength justify it. As you know, you can only win at the conference table what was won on the battlefield. Another point—one very delicate and not for publication, but for your use as you want: If we can end the war, my plan is for an economic assistance program for South Vietnam and to make it available to North Vietnam if they want, as North Vietnam recovers from the wounds of war. This is good for North Vietnam and peace in the area. You can see that we are flexible. I want you to realize that only on Thieu are we rigid.

Maurer: You also set a condition, the preservation of the Thieu Government. This is a blind alley; why not try some other way?

Nixon: We say that Thieu and the Viet Cong should submit their courses to the public.

Ceausescu: This is not a solution conducive to ending the war. I think in the long run there are two elements. Thieu on the one hand the PRG on the other—out of this a new government should emerge.

Nixon: No, not a government, but an instrument to conduct elections. Until elections, the Viet Cong have control over their land and Thieu over his.

Ceausescu: This is no solution.

Nixon: Let's say this in conclusion. I've conducted negotiations over the years—labor negotiations, for example—very tough ones, I know we never settled until both sides were willing to talk. Time is running out. We appreciate President Ceausescu and the Prime Minister's interest. Possibly as we mediate, you may have some ideas. We want to end the war and we will be reasonable. I want to establish a channel of communication with you on these matters. This can be done through the embassy but where they are matters of highest importance, they should be transmitted through Dr. Kissinger. What you said to me remains in this room. What you send me will be in confidence. I may contact you in that way.

Kissinger: If you want to communicate with me, you can do so through your embassy.

Ceausescu: On special problems, I'll send someone.

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## 185. Editorial Note

On his return from his visit to Romania with President Richard Nixon, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger stopped in Paris on August 4, 1969, for talks with French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and President Georges Pompidou. Among the topics discussed was Nixon's visit to Romania. Kissinger characterized the public reaction to the President's visit in his talks with Chaban-Delmas:

"The Romanian visit was characterized first by the overwhelming warmth of the reception accorded President Nixon. It was clear of course that this reception was in part inspired and staged by the government. But even if the reception had been a 100 per cent artificial one

created by the government, it would still remain an extraordinary sign of the independence of the Romanian government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, a second element in the reception gave it an added dimension. The second element was the emotional, joyful, human quality of the reception. It is difficult if not impossible, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, for any government to create an emotional response by thousands of people. Yet, in fact, the streets of Romania were lined with hundreds of thousands of people at all times waiting for a mere glimpse of the Presidential automobile. They did not merely line up along the boulevards coming in from the airport, nor only around the guest house where the President stayed, but they waited hour by hour for the mere appearance of the President anywhere. Thousands stood in the rain for hours. These manifestations seemed impossible for a government to create simply by fiat, so that the first impression of the Nixon entourage was the Romanian people welcomed in an emotional way this first chance to greet the President of a nation which for many of them still stands, as it did in the 19th century, as a symbol of democracy and freedom of the individual."

After Kissinger described in general terms the various discussions in Romania, he asked Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff to "describe the conversations between the various advisors":

"Sonnenfeldt said that a number of bilateral questions were discussed between the advisors. First of all the subject of a new consular convention. Secondly, there was discussion of the landing rights and connections for airlines serving the United States and Romania. And third, there was discussion of the Most Favored Nation treatment which the Romanians would like to receive from the United States. Sonnenfeldt said there was no agreement reached on any of these items but that the two governments did agree to continue talking on each of the three points.

"The second area of discussion among the advisors was the Middle East. Assistant Secretary Sisco outlined the American position for the Romanians and we found nothing new in the Romanian responses on the Middle East.

"Third, at the meeting of advisors there was a general review of the Nixon Administration's approach to Asian policy, to the SALT talks, and to European issues in general. But there were no conclusions reached between the two groups on these points except that both agreed that results on specific issues were preferable to a large-scale conference on European problems.

"In general both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt stated that there was nothing new in the Romanian positions expressed to the United States, however both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt agreed that Romania believes that its ultimate protection against the USSR is helped most by a

progress of East-West conferences and negotiations because they feel that in a situation of détente the Soviets would be inhibited." (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 675, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. III Jan 69–31 Oct)

The same day, Kissinger met with President Pompidou. After a brief discussion of Vietnam, Kissinger gave Pompidou his impressions from the President's visit to Romania. He "started by observing that some critics who seemed to support the interest of the USSR more than even the USSR supports its own interests have repetitiously claimed that President Nixon's trip would be an empty enterprise. They characterized the trip as a mere publicity stunt lacking in any substance whatsoever. Dr. Kissinger observed that this certainly was not true in light of the actual record of results. He then repeated for President Pompidou the presentation which he gave to Chaban-Delmas in which Dr. Kissinger described two separate meetings—one of principals and the other of advisors, and the agendas of both of those meetings. Dr. Kissinger described the Romanian leaders as tough, unsentimental, and nationalistic. The only point Dr. Kissinger made in addition to those told to Chaban-Delmas was the fact that in President Nixon's discussions with the Romanians, European issues as such were never raised. NATO, for example, never came up. Pompidou asked whether President Nixon's visit increased the prospects of a Russian invasion either in our minds or in the minds of the Romanians. Dr. Kissinger replied that that question had never been raised by the Romanians, but that the Romanians had volunteered the information that they would fight if a Czechoslovakian-type invasion were attempted. The Romanians, according to Dr. Kissinger, were uneasy about any potential US-USSR deal under which peace would be achieved in Eastern Europe at the expense of other European countries. On this point Dr. Kissinger said the Romanians and the US had no disagreement whatsoever. Therefore, the Romanians' uneasiness was unfounded.

"Pompidou then asked whether we anticipated any relaxation on East-West trade, and he asked further whether there was any Nixon Administration position or principle concerning the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine. Dr. Kissinger responded that with respect to East-West trade the US wants to deal with each Eastern European country on the basis of their political acts vis-à-vis the US, i.e., we are not adopting generalized positions on East-West trade. Dr. Kissinger added with respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine that the Nixon Administration is not in a position at this time to take any action because of the law which states that any nation trading with or helping North Vietnam cannot receive Most-Favored-Nation treatment. As long, therefore, as the war in Vietnam continues and the East European countries help North Vietnam, the Nixon Administration cannot take any actions with

respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine in Eastern Europe. He added that with respect to Romania, we have agreed to review our policy on export licenses; we have agreed to send a scientific team to Romania to improve the exchange of scientific information and personnel. We have also agreed to review the applications already made by Romania to join certain international organizations.

“Pompidou then asked whether this Romanian trip will be followed by other Nixon trips to other Eastern European countries. Dr. Kissinger responded by saying that no trips outside the United States are planned for the remainder of this year. Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said that the only unequivocal Eastern European invitation now outstanding is one from Yugoslavia to which President Nixon has responded by agreeing to go there during his first term in office. The precise dates for such a visit have not been decided.

“Pompidou then stated that France approves of the Nixon visit to Romania, and that in his judgment the Romanians’ popular response is explained first of all because it was government inspired and government controlled, and secondly, because it demonstrates the Romanian taste for Western culture and their desire for economic freedom. Therefore, the warmth of the reception is most reassuring, but it is also very dangerous. Pompidou went on to say that he thinks the same change is taking place in Hungary. Dr. Kissinger then said that he agreed with President Pompidou and asked whether Pompidou thinks that the USSR might increase its friendliness with the US in Eastern Europe.

“President Pompidou then wondered why it is timely for the USSR, France, England and the United States to be talking about Berlin. Dr. Kissinger said we are not pushing hard.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; *ibid.*)

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#### **186. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 7, 1969.

On our trip we made a number of commitments as you may recall which involve following up. For example with Ceausescu, he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu. No classification marking.

wanted a group to come in and give him some advice on irrigation, also, I told him that we would have DuBridge come over with a scientific group. DuBridge, incidentally, is going to Yugoslavia in September and it might be that that would be the time that he could make this move. I think Hardin and possibly Hannah might go to Rumania on the irrigation project. We don't want to place too heavy a hand here, but this kind of visit will not get much publicity and would be enormously helpful in letting Ceausescu have some little goodies that he can tell his associates about as to how dealing with the U.S. really pays. This of course is only one example.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Romania.]

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger relayed the President's desires to Hardin in memoranda of August 11 and 29. Kissinger also sent a memorandum outlining the President's interest in promoting trade with Romania to Stans on August 11. Copies of the memoranda are *ibid.*, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69.

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## 187. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1969, at 11:10 a.m., President Richard Nixon met with a group of departing United States Ambassadors at the Western White House in San Clemente, California. After introductions, he spoke individually with each Ambassador, including Leonard C. Meeker, who was departing for Romania. According to a memorandum of conversation from the meeting:

"The President commented on his recent visit to Romania and pointed out that Ceausescu was a tough, hardline Stalinist Marxist who was both straightforward and unbending. He remarked that his discussions with Ceausescu in Romania were straight-from-the-shoulder exchanges without the usual platitudes associated with diplomatic intercourse. He commented that Maurer is more affable and soft-spoken than Ceausescu but nonetheless was also a wily Communist who probably lacked the charisma and toughness of Ceausescu. The President stated that he was interested in ensuring that we opened up as many channels of intercourse with the Romanians in the cultural, scientific and trade areas as appear practical in the overall context of relationships with Eastern Europe. He told Ambassador Meeker that he was sending Dr. DuBridge to Romania with the view toward broadening scientific and technological exchanges. He wished Meeker to keep a sensitive reign on Romanian attitudes towards the expansion

of relationships with the United States. The President remarked that the Romanian people were warm and genuine in their reception of him and that during his visit they were not conducting staged responses. Rather they were involved in a spontaneous and genuine pro-Americanism. He said the Romanian people were warm-hearted, much like the people of Italy with perhaps many of the same characteristics. At the same time he cautioned that they are part of a disciplined, hard-line Communist system.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69)

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### **188. Editorial Note**

On September 3, 1969, Richard Moose of the National Security Council staff commented on behalf of the National Security Council on several legislative referrals from the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in a memorandum to J.F.C. Hyde, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference (BOB). With regard to the draft Romanian Trade Act of 1969, Moose noted: “The President has decided that for present he has sufficient latitude to pursue the goal of improved trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe without seeking any change in the Export Control Act or further authority to extend MFN treatment.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

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### **189. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 18, 1969, 4:50 p.m.

#### **SUBJECT**

President’s Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ROM–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dubs. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger approved it on October 6. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers. Both the President and Manescu were participating in the UN General Assembly meeting.

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The President  
Secretary Rogers  
Dr. Kissinger  
Mr. Adolph Dubs, EUR  
Mr. Peter Sebastian, Interpreter

*Romanian*

Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu  
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan  
Mr. Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Manescu said he was grateful for the opportunity of meeting with the President. President Ceausescu had asked him to convey to the President best wishes and also wishes for good health and happiness. President Nixon's visit to Romania was still very fresh in the memory of the Romanian people. Romania continues to believe that the visit was very useful and that it contributed to a better understanding between the two countries. As the President knows, the Romanian people gave him a very warm welcome. This should be regarded as a token of the friendship between the two countries and the friendship of the Romanian people for the President personally.

President Nixon said that he has fresh and pleasant memories of his visit to Romania. He carries a special place in his heart for the Romanian people. Upon returning to the States, he was told by TV viewers of his welcome in Romania that many wished to go to Romania for a visit. The President recommends that they do. We are following up on the conversations with President Ceausescu, particularly in the fields of science and trade, as well as other fields.<sup>2</sup> Some matters will take time to implement but they are being followed up. The visit to Romania was worthwhile because, in the first instance, it provided an opportunity to meet and to know one's opposite numbers, as well as the Romanian people. The visit will be doubly useful if it can be followed up with cooperation in new fields. We believe that the follow up to the Romanian visit will prove to be an important example of how nations in Eastern Europe can have good relations with the United States, without harming their relations with other countries. This is also a Romanian principle. Now is the time to test it. Achieving our goals through visits of this kind could mean a great step forward—as has been noted in the UN speech today<sup>3</sup>—to an open world and to open communications with different nations and peoples even though they have different economic and political systems.

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 186 and 188.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the President's address, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 724–731.

Foreign Minister Manescu thanked the President for his remarks. Mr. Manescu said that from the very beginning both sides considered the President's visit to be part of an honest effort to improve relations. Neither thought of directing the visit against others. Of course, comments of a different nature are not lacking.

President Nixon said that the whole world had speculated about the visit but that President Ceausescu and he knew what the visit was all about.

Secretary Rogers, noting that there were many rogues in the world, said that speculation was all the greater because the visit was an honest attempt to advance relations between the two countries.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that it often happens that truth arouses the most suspicion. He said that he had listened to the President's speech today with great interest. Everybody had looked forward to it. In connection with the world's problems, he would like to take the liberty to make two points. The United States should be open minded regarding the problems of the world today and seek to broaden opportunities for better relations with the Soviet Union. Romania hopes this will be achieved. However, such an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations should not be achieved at the expense of smaller states.

President Nixon agreed. He said that we believe that any U.S.-Soviet détente, or whatever one wished to call it, should not take place at the expense of other nations. The United States wants good relations with the Soviet Union but also the best possible relations with other nations. As the Foreign Minister knows, this matter was discussed frankly between President Ceausescu and himself and he wished to reiterate his views today. The President said he had today in the UN stated for the first time as an American President that the United States would be glad to exchange views even with Communist China if that country changed its policy of self-isolation. We are prepared to talk with the Chinese in the same spirit that we talk with the Soviets. Some will say that this statement is directed against the Soviets. This is not true. Romania of course has the same policy. It is now the position of the United States Government that the search for good relations should proceed with all nations on the basis of reciprocity.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that he now looked forward with great interest to Gromyko's response tomorrow.<sup>4</sup> With regard to China, bearing in mind the universality of the UN, and with regard to Viet Nam, the world expects from the United States, from the new Administration, and from the President proposals that are not only acceptable but, indeed, proposals which cannot be rejected.

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<sup>4</sup> For text, see UN doc. A/PV.1756.

President Nixon said that he and President Ceausescu had had a long and frank discussion on Viet Nam. We have one view, President Ceausescu another. The President said he wished to emphasize one point and that is that the United States over the past ten months had taken several important steps with regard to Viet Nam. The bombing of the North had been stopped. The decision had been announced to withdraw sixty thousand troops. The United States had further proposed internationally supervised elections in which all elements in South Viet Nam could participate, including the Viet Cong. Up to this point there has been no reaction or any little step whatsoever from the other side. A year ago people were saying that we should stop the bombing and that negotiations and peace would follow. Then they said that the United States should withdraw its forces and progress in the talks would be made. Then people said that the United States should make a positive offer and spell out its position. The United States had done all these things and nothing happened. Now the United States is being asked to withdraw all its forces and to impose a coalition government upon South Viet Nam without elections. We can disagree about what ought to happen in Viet Nam. We are not saying that we are altogether right and the other side altogether wrong. We believe, however, that we have gone as far as we can or should go. It is time for the other side to respond to our initiatives and to undertake meaningful negotiations toward a political settlement. We do not wish to ask the Romanian Government to become involved, although we recognize that it was very helpful in 1967 in connection with the negotiations. According to reports reaching him, said the President, the other side apparently believes that it can continue the talks in Paris without being responsive to United States' initiatives. The other side also seems to believe that the talks can drag on and that the war will continue and that the United States will tire of the struggle. The other side appears to think that because of political weakness in the United States, the U.S. will make a political settlement which will give the other side what it wants, that is, the control of South Viet Nam.

The President said he could not emphasize one point too strongly. Such an assessment would constitute a grave misjudgment of his character. The President said he wants peace. He had insisted on every reasonable concession to move the negotiations toward peace. But if after all this we only get the back of the hand, a posture of talk and fight, that is a situation we cannot tolerate indefinitely. This does not mean that the United States will make threats or issue ultimatums. The President did not believe in them. But we have reached a point where the other side should respond to initiatives that the United States has undertaken in good faith. We realize that our views may differ from those held by the Romanian Government, but we also know that the

Romanians wish us to be honest so that our actions can be accurately appraised.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that the President should have no doubts about that. The President had had an opportunity to talk to President Ceausescu and therefore understands that there are differences of opinion on this issue. The President should know that Viet Nam is the only problem between the two countries. Apart from this there are no outstanding issues.

The President said that this was right and if this problem could be removed the way could be opened to move forward on such matters as MFN, export controls, and other issues.

Foreign Minister Manescu expressed his emphatic agreement. He added President Ceausescu regarded the cessation of bombing, the talks in Paris and the withdrawal of United States troops as important steps towards world peace. The President should know that Romania had not discussed America's views "in only one direction." As is probably known, the Romanians conveyed these views to the Vietnamese, and this was not an easy job.

President Nixon said he appreciated this fact. He noted that we are now at a very critical juncture. The President said he believed that President Ceausescu, who has good relations with all parties, could be helpful in an effort to break the bottleneck.

Foreign Minister Manescu said he would convey the President's views to President Ceausescu. The Foreign Minister said he hoped that the United States would do something which could not be rejected by the other side.

The President replied that the Romanians should talk to the other side and tell them to do something that could not be rejected by the United States. The United States has now taken significant steps but has received nothing in return.

The President then referred to the coming Davis Cup Tennis matches between Romania and the United States. He congratulated the Minister on Romania's victory over the British team and noted that he was receiving the Davis Cup team on Monday at 10:30 and would be delighted if the Foreign Minister could attend if he happened to be in Washington.

Foreign Minister Manescu again thanked the President for the time given to him.

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**190. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1969, 12:15 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt  
C. Fred Bergsten

## SUBJECT

Romanian Accession to GATT

Ambassador Bogdan called on Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Bergsten to emphasize Romania's desire for early conclusion of its application for GATT membership. The issue had a great deal of political importance for Romania. His government appreciated the support already given the application by the United States and hoped that the issue could be decided at the meeting of the GATT working party next week.

The Ambassador understood the reasons why the United States was holding up approval over the Romanian "entry fee." However, he was dubious that the European Community would agree to significantly relax its quantitative restrictions against Romanian exports. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible for Romania to commit itself to any specific rate of import growth. His government was willing to accept the language proposed by the Community to govern Romania's accession. He thought this was a sufficient "entry fee." It would not represent a precedent for other countries just as Poland's terms of entry were not a precedent for Romania.

Mr. Bergsten replied that the U.S. strongly supported Romanian accession. Our present position was admittedly delaying the process. However, it was aimed at maximizing the real economic gains to Romania of GATT membership by using the occasion to attempt to persuade the EC to liberalize its quotas on Romanian goods. We could not promise success in that effort, but we felt that it justified some little delay.

The Ambassador was grateful for the consideration given his views and reiterated his government's interest in early resolution of the issues.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bergsten. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Romania joined the GATT on November 11, 1971, following 3 years of negotiations.

## 191. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 26, 1969.

### Financing Romanian Imports from the United States

This paper is an initial response to the directives of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee requesting a study of proposals to alleviate the financing problem involved in expanding Romanian imports from the United States.<sup>2</sup>

There are two ways in which Romania might finance increased imports from the United States: 1) by increased exports to this country, or 2) by freer access to export credits.

The prospects for export expansion are not good. Currently, Romanian exports to the United States are running about \$4 million per year and, in fact, have been declining since 1967. (Romanian imports from us are roughly three times as large.) Romanian exports consist largely of food products, residual fuel oil, footwear, furniture and other wood products. The fact that Romanian exports to the United States are subject to the high Smoot–Hawley tariff of 1930<sup>3</sup> is one major impediment. It is difficult for them to compete against countries which enjoy the current MFN rates that have been reduced substantially over the last thirty-five years. In addition Romania does not produce the type and quality of goods which would have wide appeal in the United States. Moreover, some of their potential exports are in sensitive categories—e.g., footwear, textiles and oil. Their debt service requirements for the purchase of a catalytic cracking plant, a TV glass plant and other major equipment purchases in the United States are another obstacle to increased import financing.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Romanian Desk Files: Lot 72 D 406, FT-Foreign Trade. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper.

<sup>2</sup> In an October 7 memorandum to Richardson, Kissinger tasked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee with studying proposals from the Department of Commerce and the Romanian Government for financing increased U.S. exports to Romania. "The Under Secretaries Committee," he wrote Richardson, "should study these proposals, as well as any other methods, such as government action, government persuasion or private arrangements to facilitate the financing of Romanian imports from the United States within the framework of existing legislation. It should develop a course of action for the agencies involved and monitor its implementation. Periodic progress reports should be submitted for the President's information." Richardson informed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee of the White House's request in an October 23 memorandum, NSC-U/SM-47. Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70.

The possibilities for any kind of normal United States export financing are also very limited. The Export-Import Bank is prohibited by law from financing, guaranteeing or insuring credits with respect to U.S. exports to Romania, and this has the effect of discouraging private financing. Existing law also rules out the use of P.L. 480. Under present circumstances, the best possibility seems to be in the joint venture field, which might be pursued further.

With the above as general background, it is proposed that we consider acting for the present along the following lines:

1. *Long-term credits from private banks*

If by long-term credits the Romanians mean loans having maturities over five years, there is little we can do to encourage United States commercial banks to undertake such financing without the customary governmental guarantee and participation. Commercial banks usually will not and in most cases cannot by the very nature of their liabilities extend export credit over five years. This is true whether the export is going to the United Kingdom (for example) or to Romania. Even export credits from three to five years are rarely without some type of United States Government guarantee and participation in the financing.

It is possible that the Romanians would be interested in credits up to five years. We might indicate to them that the United States Government is prepared to encourage American banks to undertake this type of financing of Romanian projects, despite the lack of United States governmental guarantee, in important cases that the Romanian Government identifies to us. The role of the United States Government would necessarily be limited to providing specific reassurances as to the non-applicability of the Johnson Act<sup>4</sup> and informal encouragement based on the official character of the Romanian Government sponsorship of the particular project.

We might ask a group of American banks, say, ten, to form an informal consortium to finance Romanian imports from the United States. Each bank's exposure would be limited to a modest amount, say, \$1 million, for a total of perhaps \$10 million. The formation of such a consortium would not result in any dramatic increase in U.S. exports to Romania, but, as the banks gained experience, they might be willing to increase their exposure. In the absence of the political risk guarantees,

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the Tariff Act of 1930, approved June 17, 1930, see 71 Stat. 590.

<sup>4</sup> The Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, prohibited financial transactions with any nation in default of its obligations to the United States. (18 U.S.C. 955) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments that were members of the IMF and the IBRD from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516)

the American banks would probably require higher rates of interest than European banks. Such lending would be subject to the ceilings of the Federal Reserve's Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program.

In effect the United States Government would be asking the banks to view the financing of exports to Romania without the negative bias implied by existing legislative restraints, but the banks would still have to make their own estimate of the risk and profits involved in financing trade with Romania as against trade with industrialized free world countries.

### 2. *Joint Romanian-American Bank*

Such a project might make financing exports to Romania less unattractive but it would not get around the basic problem of loaning United States money without some type of United States Government guarantee and participation. A joint bank, on the other hand, might be useful in attracting United States capital for joint ventures. Much, however, would depend on the extent to which both sides, and especially the Romanians, are prepared to think in non-orthodox banking terms.

It is suggested that a subcommittee including Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the Export-Import Bank and State develop as many specific financing patterns as possible, along the lines of this and the previous section, consulting informally with knowledgeable people in the private banks.

### 3. *Transactions of economic cooperation*

This area is, of course, closely related to the previous two. The customary position of the Government has been to tell the Romanians that they are free to explore joint ventures with American firms that may be interested. We might go a step beyond this, and say to the Romanians that if they will confirm their serious interest in the list of industrial areas they gave us, or in some modified list, the United States Government, perhaps through the Department of Commerce, will undertake to arrange a series of conferences in Washington or at appropriate points in the United States between Romanian representatives and American industry representatives to explore the extent to which joint ventures in these industries may be practical.

Attached is a study of the Romanian proposals on financing.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the paper entitled "Study of Romanian Proposals for Financing Imports from the United States."

## 192. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 18, 1969.

### SUBJECT

US-Romanian Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Romania*

First Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu

Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan

Mr. Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

#### *United States*

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff

Macovescu opened the conversation by expressing his thanks for having had the opportunity to talk at length with Dr. Kissinger.<sup>2</sup>

He then conveyed to the President and Mrs. Nixon the good wishes of President and Mrs. Ceausescu and of Premier and Mrs. Maurer. The Romanian leaders, he said, wished the President great success in the coming year.

The President expressed his appreciation and in turn extended good wishes to the Romanian leaders and their wives. The President said that he had the warmest memories of his trip to Romania and of the Romanian people.

Macovescu then handed the President a letter from President Ceausescu<sup>3</sup> and said that he had also brought, as a gift, an album of photographs and moving pictures of the President's visit to Romania.

The President expressed his gratitude and said he would respond to Ceausescu's letter.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 704, Country Files—Europe, Macovescu (Romania). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Red Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger and Macovescu held talks December 16–17. Memoranda of their conversation, together with a summary prepared for the President's use, are *ibid.* Kissinger also held a telephone conversation with the President on the points regarding Vietnam and China that had been developed during his talks with Macovescu. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Dated December 13; in it the Romanian President expressed his pleasure at the progress in bilateral relations, particularly in the area of economic cooperation. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> The December 29 letter was passed by hand to Ceausescu by the Ambassador following instructions contained in telegram 1934 to Bucharest, January 6. (*Ibid.*, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69) No copy of the letter was found.

The President then went on to say that we were trying to cooperate at the highest level on the matters discussed between himself and President Ceausescu. Some of the matters take time, but we would do all we could within the inhibitions of our legislation. The President stressed that we did not like blocs and that we would deal with each country on an individual basis. Romania had been fair to us and we would act in the same way toward Romania. Wherever we can, we will be cooperative.

Macovescu responded that Romania acted in the same spirit and would do its best to develop its relations with the United States. He expressed his gratitude for the assistance that Dr. Kissinger had already given to him on several of the problems he had come to Washington to discuss.

Macovescu, who had been speaking in English, then changed to Romanian and spoke through the interpreter. He said in his discussions with Dr. Kissinger and also with others in Washington<sup>5</sup> he had sensed the desire on our side to develop relations. Ceausescu's message to the President was explicit in also stressing the desire of Romania to develop relations in all fields. It was also a personal message to convey the desire of Ceausescu for the best possible personal relations with the President. Macovescu said he had asked Mr. Kissinger's assistance in certain specific fields and it had been promptly forthcoming. He was hopeful that in the future Romania could receive similar assistance. The Romanian Government wanted to have good relations based on concrete realities, relations which would not be disturbed by momentary circumstances.

Macovescu went on to say that the President's visit had produced a great impression with the people and leaders of Romania and that prospects for the future of our relations were very good. Romania wished to develop such relations, as Ceausescu had told the President, with all states, including its neighbors. It was making constant efforts to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Macovescu went on, the course of relations with the Soviet Union was not always favorable. Lately the Romanians had noticed a certain Soviet reticence concerning Romania's external policy. This was not dramatic but in day-to-day relations the Romanians noted that a certain reserve was particularly manifest in economic matters. Macovescu said that this situation explained Romania's effort to obtain coke for its steel in-

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<sup>5</sup> The Department of State reported on Macovescu's conversations in telegram 210734 to Bucharest, December 19. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ROM)

dustry in the U.S. [The President had noted in his opening remarks that we understood the importance of coke to Romania.]<sup>6</sup>

The President asked whether the Soviet reserve of which Macovescu had spoken had occurred since his visit and whether Romanians saw a connection between Soviet policy and the President's visit. Macovescu replied that he could not say that the President's visit marked a specific stage in the Soviet attitude since there had been evidence of it for a long period of time. In the last two months, however, it had become more accentuated. The attitude, Macovescu commented, was not aggressive but rather one of reticence and reservation. The President said he had asked the question because other countries might develop reserve toward us if they thought that their relations with the Soviet Union would be adversely affected by improved relations with us. We think of Romania as a test case. The President stressed that we wanted our friendship to help, not to hurt and we had no desire to make things more difficult for our friends.

Macovescu said that the Romanians were acting in the same spirit. They had no desire to cause difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations through their relations with the U.S. He added that no representative of the Soviet Union had ever commented officially or unofficially at any level on the President's visit. There had been rumors about the Soviet reaction but none of these had ever been substantiated. He repeated that no Soviet comment was ever received by the Romanians.

Continuing, Macovescu said that in the context of the previous point the Romanians had a general concern for security in Europe. The Romanian Government was extremely interested in European security because it had no desire to see a repetition of Czechoslovakia or the application of any doctrine like the Brezhnev Doctrine. Consequently the Romanians seize every opportunity to organize action on European security. This was not directed against anyone in Europe or outside. It was Romania's constant concern to see that European security should not be directed against any power outside Europe, especially the U.S. To be more specific, Macovescu went on, when a socialist country started talking about the first session of a European security conference the Romanians supported from the very beginning the idea of U.S. and Canadian participation, assuming they were willing to participate. After the Prague Foreign Ministers' Conference this position had now become a joint one of all socialist countries so that there is no point even in discussing this matter any further. The socialist countries had advanced certain specific proposals for the first session of a European

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<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the original. Documentation regarding White House efforts to procure coke for Romania is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971.

security conference. Macovescu continued that there could of course be much talk about such matters as agenda, time and place, but his main point was to request that the U.S. Government give due attention to facilitating the eventual achievement of an organized system of security. Perhaps the process would be a long and tedious one but the Romanians' hope and goal was to live in freedom and independence like any other nation. Romania wants the system to be the product of the participation and responsibility of all states and not a bloc to bloc arrangement. This, Macovescu said, was the second message which President Ceausescu had wanted him to convey.

The President said that we were open-minded. The real problem is what to discuss. At high levels, discussions are not useful unless there are serious problems on the table. Otherwise an illusion of security would be created when security does not really exist. It was dangerous for countries to think they have security when they do not. The President said we would examine any proposal that would lead to useful discussions.

Macovescu thanked the President and said that in behalf of President Ceausescu he wanted to reiterate once more the request for support for the Romanian economy, which is the basis of Romanian independence. The President reiterated that we wanted to help to the extent possible. He said we understood the difficulty of the Romanian position and did not want Romania to run risks like those which some of its neighbors had run. For this reason, the President said, we intended to be discreet in our relations with Romania.

The President then asked whether, since he had seen Ceausescu, relations between the Soviet Union and China had become more normal. He added that while we had to get our information on this subject from the newspapers, the Romanians could observe it more directly.

Macovescu said that since the President's visit Premier Maurer had been in the Far East and twice met Chou En-lai on the way to and from Hanoi at the time of Ho's funeral.<sup>7</sup> In addition Ceausescu and Maurer had seen Brezhnev more recently<sup>8</sup> and there have been other contacts with Soviet officials. As regards Sino-Soviet relations, one could not really speak of normalization; but certain changes were under way. The Chinese had indicated that they were willing to meet the Soviets half way but a thorough normalization was a long way off. The Romanians had urged similar statements on the part of the Soviets. It was clear that strong suspicions remained on both sides.

The President said that we wanted good relations with both countries. We did not want the Soviets to interpret our efforts to normalize

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<sup>7</sup> North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh died September 2.

<sup>8</sup> December 3–4, during the meeting of Communist Parties at Moscow.

relations with China as antagonizing policy, just as we did not want them to see our policy toward Romania as hostile to them. He realized, the President said, that this was contrary to what the press said. He went on to say that blocs lined up against each other were very dangerous. We viewed this matter differently after World War II. Of course alliances were still important, but we were now in a different period. We now seek normal relations with all countries on a case by case basis, although some relationships will be more normal than others. He hoped this approach would be reciprocated.

Concluding, the President reiterated that he had the warmest memories of his visit. He said that he himself would not be able to return to Bucharest very soon, but that his children certainly would. He asked Macovescu to convey his good wishes to President Ceausescu. Macovescu said he would do so and that the President's family would be received in Romania with the greatest pleasure and with the same warmth as the President himself. In leaving he wished the President good health which, he said, the job of President required.

(The conversation was cordial throughout. Macovescu's substantive points were made with the greatest care and precision. At the conclusion of the talk the President escorted the Romanian visitors into the hall.)

HS

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**193. National Security Council Under Secretaries Study  
Memorandum 47B<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 17, 1970.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Under Secretary of the Treasury  
The Under Secretary of Commerce  
The Under Secretary of Agriculture  
The President of the Export-Import Bank

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-252, U/SM 45-49, U/SM 47. Confidential.

## SUBJECT

Financing Romanian Imports from the United States: Status Report

With reference to my memorandum of December 9, 1969 (NSC-U/SM 47a)<sup>2</sup> the following is a summary of action taken on five proposals made by the Romanians to increase their ability to finance imports from the United States. It was found that two suggestions made by the Romanian Embassy, PL-480 assistance and Exim financing, are not possible under current legislation. The third proposal, credits from American banks of five years and longer duration, was found to be commercially infeasible for any nation for which no U.S. Government guarantee can be given.

Of the two remaining suggestions, we are actively working on the Romanian request for assistance in joint ventures. A list of American firms doing business in fields of interest to them has been prepared by the Department of Commerce and delivered to the Romanian Embassy.

The other, that of a joint Romanian-American Bank, is now under consideration in Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. U.S. domestic law would limit the permissible scope of the latter proposal. The Johnson Act (18 U.S.C. 955) prohibits certain types of financial transactions, i.e., other than financing of normal export transactions, with countries such as Romania which are in default on debts to the USG and which are not members of the IMF and the World Bank. Also, the antitrust laws might limit the ability of two or more banks to form a consortium in connection with the establishment of a joint Romanian-American Bank. To clarify the legal issues, we have asked Justice to give us an opinion on the possible application of both the Johnson Act and the antitrust laws to the consortium formation of a joint Romanian-American Bank.

In addition to the legal problems, the commercial attractiveness of such a proposal to U.S. banks remains unclear. An informal sounding of Chase Manhattan, which has probably had the longest and most extensive financial connections with Eastern Europe, brought a skeptical and negative reaction to the proposal.

**ELR**  
*Chairman*

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<sup>2</sup> Under cover of a December 9 memorandum, Richardson forwarded a copy of the Department of State paper (Document 191) to the listed recipients. (Ibid.)

**194. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Disaster Relief for Romania

State and AID are working on providing emergency relief assistance to Romania in the wake of serious flooding in Moldavia and parts of Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with standing foreign service instructions Ambassador Meeker offered US emergency assistance to Romanian authorities, for which they expressed great gratitude. In response, the Romanians presented a long shopping list which (in addition to the usual items) includes large amounts of seeds and construction machinery. The total request would have a multi-million dollar price tag. Ambassador Meeker has supported the Romanian request and recommended that it be delivered by the US Air Force.

State and AID consider that the request is well out of proportion to the need, and wish to keep our assistance more within the normal range of disaster relief. To this end, the dispatch this evening of a large quantity of tents, blankets and basic cooking utensils has been authorized, by commercial carrier. The cost for this immediate assistance will be approximately \$120,000. An additional donation of medical supplies (\$65,000) is under urgent consideration.

The inclination not to accede to the much larger request is prompted by several factors:

—the US is the first (and so far the only) country to offer material assistance (the President's message of sympathy was also the first received,<sup>3</sup> and since then only Israel, Iran, the UK, Yugoslavia and Italy have sent similar messages);

—a response to the full request would involve a heavy expense;

—US flood relief in comparable disasters has never exceeded this amount, even in the case of more friendly countries, and this assistance is very generous even by those standards;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70. Limited Official Use. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Between May 12–25 torrential rains caused the Danube River to rise to its highest levels since 1840. The flooding inundated 248 communities, caused significant damage in another 853 communities, and left 144 dead in its wake.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

—finally, a much larger and more direct US involvement could arouse Soviet suspicions at a time when Soviet-Romanian relations are quite unclear. (Ceausescu was suddenly summoned to Moscow to confer with Brezhnev, apparently without resolving the acute issues that prompted the meeting.)

For these reasons, State/AID consider that our relief assistance to Romania should stay at the planned levels. In my judgment, the State/AID line is correct, and unless you wish to have more massive involvement considered, the relief program should proceed as now agreed.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Kissinger initialed approval of the “Proceed as now agreed” option.

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### 195. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 25, 1970.

#### SUBJECT

Lunch with Romanian Ambassador Bogdan May 22

At an abbreviated luncheon, Bogdan said he had not had advance notice of Ceausescu’s recent trip to Moscow<sup>2</sup> and, as usual, had first learned of it when the State Department called him to ask for his comment. However, that morning he had had some brief guidance from home, the upshot of which was that there was reason for cautious optimism about the prospects for bilateral Romanian-Soviet relations. Bogdan had no amplification except to express the view that the pending Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty (initiated but not so far signed) would not be modified to reflect the terms of the recent Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

I noted that Premier Maurer had seemed to indicate to Ambassador Meeker a certain uneasiness over Soviet intentions toward Romania in connection with US actions in Indochina.<sup>3</sup> Bogdan said that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it. A copy was sent to Ash.

<sup>2</sup> May 19.

<sup>3</sup> Meeker reported on a May 7 discussion with Maurer regarding Vietnam in telegram 1081 from Bucharest, May 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70)

his own candid opinion was that if the US had intended its move into Cambodia as a sign of strength, this had not been effective. The domestic US reaction and the limitations which the President had apparently imposed on the Cambodian operations in response to domestic pressures could be read by the Soviets and others as showing the inhibitions under which the President was now functioning in international affairs. This aspect of the situation did cause some uneasiness in Romania.

In the course of the conversation, Bogdan expressed appreciation for White House assistance with various commercial projects of interest to the Romanians. He also expressed gratitude for the President's message in connection with the Romanian floods, which were extremely serious.

At another point, Bogdan intimated that Romanian recognition of Sihanouk should be seen in the context of Romanian-Chinese relations. Soviet failure to recognize Sihanouk should also be seen in the context of relations with China.

On European questions, Bogdan rehearsed the well-known Romanian arguments in favor of a security conference. He stressed that the Brezhnev doctrine should of course be raised at such a conference, though in broad terms of relations among sovereign states rather than simply as a stick with which to beat the Soviets. I noted that the Rome meeting of NATO<sup>4</sup> would probably move further ahead on MBFR but that the conference idea would probably be treated as at the last NATO meeting.

Bogdan said his imminent return home is prompted by the forthcoming visit to Bucharest of Canadian External Affairs Secretary Sharp, Bogdan also being accredited to Ottawa. He would of course use the occasion for consultations.

HS

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<sup>4</sup> May 26-27.

**196. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Additional Romanian Flood Relief

Secretary Rogers has submitted his recommendation for additional flood relief for Romania. He proposes the following package (Tab A):<sup>2</sup>

- \$6 million in PL-480 Title II emergency aid to supply feed grains and dried milk;
- \$1.5 million in additional Commodity Credit Corporation credits for purchase of urgently needed seeds;
- Up to \$1 million in AID emergency contingency funds for medicines, seeds and other emergency purposes.

The Secretary states that this amount of \$8.5 million will not create serious problems for Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union, which has been holding back on its assistance. We would, however, work out the timing and manner of announcement with the Romanians in light of the Brezhnev trip to Bucharest and the signing of a new Soviet-Romanian treaty.

Thus far we have provided \$220,000 in blankets, cots, tents, and medicines and have helped finance transportation of goods by voluntary agencies. We will respond to a request from the multilateral World Food Program of the UN to supply \$2.4 million in flour, dried milk and vegetable oils.

Preliminary estimates put the total damage thus far at over \$300 million. Particularly damaging are the longer term effects on both agriculture and industry.

Our efforts thus far (we were the first country to respond) have gained us important political and popular credit in Romania, and the package suggested by Secretary Rogers, though well short of what the Romanians have asked for, seems highly worthwhile.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70. Confidential. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are Rogers's recommendations for emergency relief.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the additional assistance package suggested by Secretary Rogers. (Tab A)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The President initialed his approval of Rogers's additional assistance package. A handwritten notation indicates he gave his approval on June 24. The Department of State notified the Embassy in Bucharest of the President's decision in telegram 101714, June 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70)

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**197. Telegram From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 30, 1970, 0024Z.

WH01228. Subject: Romanians Want a Better Deal on Flood Assistance.

1. We are facing an issue with the Romanians which turns on the conversation the President had with Foreign Minister Manescu during his San Clemente visit.<sup>2</sup> The issue is the degree of generosity we should show the Romanians in connection with our offer of flood relief assistance.

2. Ambassador Bogdan came to see me on July 24 to urge that sympathetic attention be given to the Romanian request for some action to save the Romanians from having to pay some \$2.3 million, mostly in hard currency, for transportation costs involved in getting the \$6 million of PL480 emergency feed grains to Romania. Bogdan said he discussed this with you twice including on July 21,<sup>3</sup> and that you told him to follow up with me. All I could do in the event was to listen to Bogdan without being able to give him more than general

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Confidential. Sent to Haig for Kissinger, who was in San Clemente. According to a typed notation the message was received in the Los Angeles command center at 7:37 p.m. July 29.

<sup>2</sup> June 29. No memorandum of conversation was found. A June 28 briefing paper is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> No record of a discussion has been found.

assurance that we would try to be helpful, which I gather from Bogdan you had done also.

3. In Bucharest, meanwhile, Manescu called in Meeker<sup>4</sup> to make the same appeal which he said was based on his conversation with the President in San Clemente. The Romanians seriously need the greatest amount of feed grains, but are hard pressed to come up with the transportation costs. They reason that for them to pay these costs would effectively cut the \$6 million assistance by one third. When the assistance had been considered earlier, no one focused on the transportation costs.

4. In fact, we have been quite generous in putting together the current assistance program. In calculating the \$6 million figure, we had used a rate lower than the Commodity Credit Corporation rate, and thereby we assumed some \$300,000 extra costs. In addition, we had already offered to assume the differential cost (some \$1.2 million) on the 50 per cent of the tonnage that we require to be shipped on US bottoms (US flag carriers cost about double that of foreign carriers for these commodities). Thus, the \$6 million grant in fact amounts to a budgetary cost of \$7.5 million.

5. State has now come up with an option<sup>5</sup> to present to the Romanians—reduce the amount of grains granted from \$6 million to about \$5.2 million, but pick up the full cost of the 50 per cent of the tonnage that must be carried in US ships. The total budgetary cost to us would remain roughly the same, but the costs to the Romanians would be reduced to half, most of which would be in soft currency. However, Romanians would then receive \$0.8 million less feed grains. This alternative option is the best offer that the bureaucracy has been able to come up with. Agriculture particularly had balked at any greater budgetary costs in part because they could be accused by Congress of increasing what amounts to a subsidy for a potential grain export competitor.

6. The Romanians will probably consider this alternative inadequate because it would reduce the amount of the badly needed feed grains, but they would of course accept either this or the original proposal. The question therefore relates to the extent of the commitment to Manescu made by the President. But, the question is how generous we wish to be.

7. Bergsten's office and I have investigated other alternatives which would be viable if White House pressure was applied to the

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<sup>4</sup> July 17. Meeker reported on his discussion in telegram 1815 from Bucharest, July 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files, Europe, Rumania, Vol. III, Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

<sup>5</sup> Outlined in telegram 119058 to Bucharest, July 24. (Ibid.)

bureaucracy. We could continue the \$6 million grain offer and pick up the entire cost of ocean transportation. This would mean an additional budgetary cost to us of some \$3.5 million over either of plans offered by the bureaucracy. Under this, the Romanians would pay nothing.

8. The other possibility would have us pay the full transportation cost of the 50 per cent shipped in US bottoms (as under State's alternative), but would retain the full \$6 million grain offer (not reduced to \$5.2 million as in State's alternative). This would mean an additional budgetary cost to us of some \$1.15 million over either of State's proposals, the Romanians would still have to pay some \$1.15 million, probably in soft currency, for the other half of the transportation.

9. Please instruct whether you consider State's proposals (para 4 and 5) consistent with the President's commitment to Manescu, or whether you wish White House pressure applied in order to increase the generosity along the lines of one of the alternatives in para 7 and 8. This is a matter of some urgency.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Kissinger wrote on the message: "Take 4 & 5. It is something. HK"

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**198. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Visit to the U.S. of Romanian President Ceausescu

The Romanian Foreign Minister has advised us confidentially that President Ceausescu has decided to attend the U.N. General Assembly in New York, perhaps in time to address the G.A. on October 19 or 20. Following that, Ceausescu would like to confer with you in Washington, and then spend 4-5 days in a private visit to the U.S. Accompanied

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 936, VIP Visits, Romania, Ceausescu Visit. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the first page by Kissinger reads: "AI—Note P[resident] comment." Haig wrote: "Sonnenfeldt/Downey informed."

by his wife and one of his children, Ceausescu would like to go to the West Coast, visit a leading university and one or more industrial plants.

It is significant that Ceausescu considers it an acceptable risk at this point in his balancing act to undertake an extended visit to the U.S. He has just recently returned from a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow<sup>2</sup> (related to the FRG-Soviet treaty) where he was able to give the impression of at least basic loyalty to the Soviets. He has also been careful to continue cultivation of the other half of the communist camp, for example, his Defense Minister has recently returned from an extremely cordial visit to Peking and Pyongyang. In the latter part of September, Ceausescu is scheduled to visit neutral Austria. In short, he may feel that, with this ground work, he can afford to make a foray into the U.S. as part of his efforts to further delineate Romania's more symmetrical role.

In addition, Ceausescu probably considers that the attendance at the U.N. General Assembly of the heads of most of the Warsaw Pact governments provides him with adequate cover for his own visit. If Kosygin were to meet with you, this would offer Ceausescu even more protection. He can be expected in any event to underscore the "private" nature of the post-U.N. portion of his stay in the U.S.

In bilateral terms, Ceausescu's visit is certainly intended clearly to signal his interest in continuing the enhancement of relations so dramatically advanced by your visit last year. (When informing us of Ceausescu's decision, the Romanian Foreign Minister made special efforts to stress that the decision was taken independently of any decisions by Pact members, and we were being given advance and confidential information since the decision was not yet known to others in the Romanian establishment.) Though Ceausescu wishes expressly to confer with you on the Middle East and Asia (and will certainly press for a conference on European Security), his main emphasis will be on trade, economics and science. He will be seeking more tangible evidence of the direct and immediate benefits to Romania in return for the risk he is taking in these special dealings with the U.S. The Romanians have hinted lately that they expected higher levels of trade during the past year, and of course they continue to harbor hopes that some means will be found around the legislative restrictions which prevent credits and other incentives to greatly expanded trade opportunities.

This will be Ceausescu's first visit to the U.S., and he has said that he wants to see capitalism in action. While the impressions he acquires will obviously not result in any dramatic shift in the Romanian sys-

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<sup>2</sup> August 20.

tem, he should be offered a good exposure to American institutions and society. Precautions will have to be taken to avoid potential incidents by Romanian émigrés and others, for Ceausescu is not the usual sort of foreign guest. (I have asked the State Department to prepare suggested itineraries.) Special care will have to be taken to ensure that his visit runs along the narrow route between over dramatization (which could cause him trouble, and arouse Soviet sensitivities) and inadequate exposure which would fail to exploit the visit for our own best interests.

You had earlier indicated that you wanted Ceausescu to come to Washington during the U.N. meeting and that you would host a small dinner for him. His very tentative schedule calls for him to deliver an address before the General Assembly on October 19 or 20, then come to Washington, and then spend 4–5 days touring the U.S. In informing us of this planning, the Foreign Minister asked for any suggestions we would make regarding this program.

I think it best to ask Ceausescu to come to Washington after the final U.N. ceremonies are completed on October 24 when most, if not all, of the heads of government have gone home. In any event, your meeting with him should follow a possible summit with the Soviets at a decent interval. Therefore, I recommend that we reply to the Romanians along the following lines:

—That you are delighted at the prospect of seeing Ceausescu in Washington;

—Due to the complications of the presence of so many heads of government in the U.S. during the week preceding the October 24 celebration, we would prefer to arrange Ceausescu's visit to Washington after the ceremonies are completed;

—Assuming that he wishes to attend the final observances at the U.N. on October 24, you would be pleased to host a small black tie dinner for him on October 26 or 27.

#### *Recommendation*

That you approve a response to the Romanian inquiry along the above lines.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The President initialed the approval option; in a handwritten comment he added: "But give us more leeway—Tell him we are in the middle of a campaign & will arrange a date *before* or *after* his trip around the country—we will give him a *firm* date sometime around Sept 20."

## 199. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 26, 1970, 10:55 a.m.–12:55 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., DCM, Bucharest, American Interpreter

President Nicolae Ceausescu  
Dumitru Popescu, Member, Executive Committee, Romanian Communist Party  
Sergiu Celac, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Interpreter

The President began the talks by saying that he wanted to continue the discussion he had started with President Ceausescu a year ago.<sup>2</sup> He was glad to note that some progress had been made in the field of economic relations. He was sorry, however, to have heard about the disastrous floods that had hit Romania. Today he hopes it would be possible to explore other areas of cooperation as well as discuss questions of foreign policy.

President Ceausescu responded by noting that indeed there had been some results attained in the economic field. Since the President had mentioned the floods, he wanted to take this occasion to express the thanks of the Romanian people for the help given by the American people, for the sentiment of friendship displayed in this connection. It was true that the floods had caused unprecedented damages, but, thanks to the recovery efforts, most of the damage has been overcome.

So far as economic questions are concerned, Ceausescu noted, as he had said in Bucharest, that further development is hindered by a series of obstacles in American legislation. During his visit he has had useful sessions with American financial and business leaders, which have shown the existence of possibilities for substantial development of economic relations and joint ventures between American and Romanian firms. He realizes that the President and other American officials are encouraging the development of these relations and he thanks the President for this.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Barnes on October 27. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Ceausescu arrived in the United States on October 13. After he gave a speech at the United Nations, he toured California and visited Detroit, Niagara Falls, and Williamsburg, Virginia.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 183 and 184.

The President commented that since their meeting last August, as President Ceausescu was aware, instructions had been given to all agencies of the government—and Dr. Kissinger had concerned himself with this from the White House—to make decisions favorable to increasing economic cooperation with Romania whenever possible within the framework of existing legislation. “We shall continue to follow this policy. I believe,” the President said, “that as the war in Vietnam winds down to a close, the prospects of greater expansion of trade are very good. We think,” he continued, “that the area of credit is very important and have instructed the Export-Import Bank and the Secretary of Commerce to explore every area where through credit there could be increased trade.”<sup>3</sup>

The point about MFN is one raised by President Ceausescu last year. This will come. It is a problem having to do with the Congress because of the Vietnam war. The President said he could assure President Ceausescu he would move in that direction since it was one of his objectives to get MFN as soon as he could be sure of getting the necessary support in the Congress.

Ceausescu then took up the question of MFN by noting that it was one he had discussed during his visit here and also with a group of members of Congress (the IPU delegation) in Bucharest not long ago. He noted that these members of the American Congress seemed to have a favorable opinion regarding the extension of MFN to Romania, a sentiment which he welcomed. He added that he would remember with satisfaction that the President had said this problem could be solved in the not too distant future.

So far as credits were concerned, Romania, in order to assure its continued rate of growth, has to seek foreign credits. Ceausescu said he would like to be very frank as well as brief because he realized this problem was being discussed here in the United States. At present Romania is running a balance of payments deficit of \$300 million. Hopefully this can be liquidated over the next few years and a positive balance achieved. But in the meantime Romania would be interested in credits so as not to impose too many restrictions or too many demands on Romanian economic development. Romania would welcome credits from America under favorable terms, needless to say. Being a developing country, Romania should be accorded credit on a more advantageous basis. Credits are needed for industrial development as well as for starting the construction of dams and irrigation works.

The President inquired if road construction was also in view.

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 186 and 188.

Ceausescu replied that Romania wants to concentrate on drainage and irrigation works and dams, particularly in view of the floods of last spring, at least for the next five years. To be sure, there are road construction plans as well, but the credits are needed especially for the fields mentioned earlier, although any credits could of course be used in a variety of fields.

The President explained that he had inquired about roads because, during his talks with President Tito,<sup>4</sup> the latter had said how useful it would be if the countries of that area developed a system of roads to open up the countryside. What was President Ceausescu's opinion of the idea of such a highway network, including such countries as Romania and Yugoslavia.

Ceausescu said the idea was definitely of interest, but Romania had to use its limited resources for its most urgent needs and this was giving priority to dams and irrigation works, for which a sum of about \$3 billion equivalent had been budgeted over the next five years. In addition, he noted that a dam across the Danube is being constructed jointly with the Yugoslavs and one is being planned with Bulgaria, both dams thus serving as additional links with these two countries.

In addition, to a certain extent, it would be useful to have experienced American firms help develop tourist facilities in Romania, where there is already a beginning but still more could be done.

The President then addressed himself to Ceausescu's point of whether Romania could be considered as a developing country. He said he believed this is something that could be done. He would look into the question but, since this status had just been granted to Yugoslavia,<sup>5</sup> he saw no reason why it could not be accorded to Romania as well. "My decision," the President continued, "is that we will do this, but no announcement will be made until the bureaucratic procedures are completed, but I will give the President my assurance on this point."

Dr. Kissinger then noted that loans from the Export-Import Bank were excluded by the Fino Amendment, but White House influence has been used to put together a group of banks which could make private loans. In addition, CCC loans have been made to Romania. With the exception of Yugoslavia, Romania has the most favorable status here. For instance, some two hundred items have been taken off the export control list and recently sale of a hydrocracker was approved.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 221.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding Yugoslavia's treatment as a developing country, see NSDM 86 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 245.

Ceausescu referred to the fact that discussions had been held with many American companies regarding joint ventures in third markets in such fields as mining and petroleum, but such ventures presuppose credits. What Romania is interested in would be ways of combining Romanian and American experience with the expectation that the American partners would handle the financing. In other words, there are various ways of making use of credits besides the direct way.

The President responded by saying that he would direct the Secretary of Commerce to follow up on President Ceausescu's discussions with the business and financial community in New York and in other cities in order to see how appropriate action can be taken on the private side. Actually, the President noted, under our system the possibilities for credits and economic cooperation are greater in the private than in the public sector. In his opinion, it has been very useful that President Ceausescu should have talked with business and financial leaders. This will help direct investments to countries like Romania. In general, private companies have not invested in socialist countries, but if we can make a breakthrough this will be a new expanding type of cooperation which will be very helpful.

Ceausescu then turned to the problem of Romanian adherence to GATT. Romania has been holding discussion with GATT countries for two years and things have moved ahead. Actually the matter could be resolved if the United States would be more flexible. The question of a Romanian commitment to increase its imports from GATT member countries by a fixed annual quota is what has caused the difficulty. Although Romania's economic ties with these countries have doubled, it still does not want to have to commit itself so rigidly. The United States is now the only country insisting on such a formula. For Romania, adherence to GATT would create very favorable conditions for trade with the United States and with other countries. Romania would like this obstacle removed.

The President replied that he would look into the matter, with which he was not too familiar. In general, his attitude was sympathetic so far as increased trade, cooperation and credits between the United States and Romania was concerned. "President Ceausescu," he added, "can be assured that we will continue to explore ways to build on the progress already made."

Ceausescu explained that after adherence to GATT, Romania had in mind entering into discussions with the IMF and the World Bank, but wanted to decide the GATT question first since this will contribute to developing relations with the United States and others. Romania is interested in developing relations over a broad scale. Once more he wanted to express his thanks to the President for his interest, and to voice the hope that the President shares his view that the relations be-

tween the two countries could be a model of relations between large and small countries as well as between those with differing social systems.

The President responded by saying that this is what the United States has in mind with countries like Romania and Yugoslavia—that this kind of cooperation can be the basis for cooperation between countries with different systems, especially having in mind that this is a cooperation without strings, with no intention to influence the internal affairs of the other country.

The President then asked Ceausescu for his view of an important development that had occurred since their meeting, namely the Soviet-West German treaty.<sup>6</sup>

Ceausescu commented that the treaty needs to be looked at in terms of one's assessment of the European security situation. Romania considers that conclusion of the treaty was a positive step in the sense of normalizing relations between the USSR and the German Federal Republic, especially since it was in keeping with the idea of solving problems through discussions. Although West German-Soviet relations represent the major problem in Europe, this treaty by itself does not solve everything. It must be followed by improving relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and with other socialist countries on the part of the Federal Republic. At the same time, so that this tendency does not go too far in the other direction, Romania must insist on the participation of all concerned countries in assuring security in Europe. Thus, Romania believes that a European conference, in which the United States and Canada would take part, would give a new orientation to the situation in Europe. Romania would like the United States to be favorably disposed toward the realization of such a conference in Europe.

The President replied by stating that the United States had not indicated opposition to the idea of a conference as such. It did believe, however, that a conference should have a well considered agenda so that some definite progress could emerge. The matter is one which is under consideration. The President then said there was one point he would like to emphasize. After his talk to the UN,<sup>7</sup> some observers in the press had speculated that he was committed to develop with the USSR a condominium to the detriment of other countries. The President continued by saying that he wished to state American policy quite

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<sup>6</sup> Signed at Moscow August 12. For the text, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1103–1105.

<sup>7</sup> October 23. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 926–932.

directly. He had had a long talk with Gromyko.<sup>8</sup> There would be other discussions in the future. The purpose of these discussions with the Soviets would be to explore areas where the United States and the Soviet Union could reduce the level of world conflict and the burden of arms. Under no circumstances will the direction of any discussions be toward a result where the independence of any country, especially any country in Eastern or Western Europe will be compromised. The future of each country in Europe must be determined by itself not by the USSR nor by the United States.

That is why we will continue, the President added, in the future to attempt to explore ways we can talk with the People's Republic of China again because it is necessary to have avenues of communication with all nations in the world if we are going to have a world safe from the danger of a nuclear war.

Ceausescu remarked that the President had approached these problems in an open fashion. So far as a European security conference was concerned he would reply in the same frank spirit. Discussions with other States concerned had led Romania to conclude that it was very necessary to adopt an agreement renouncing the use of force. Similarly an engagement to develop freely economic, technical, scientific and cultural relations was also very urgent, as was the creation of a permanent organ of the conference, permitting thereby the establishment of a permanent base for the solution of European problems. Therefore Romania desires that the United States have not only a favorable attitude but that it actively contribute to the convocation of a conference as urgently as possible.

With reference to the President's mention of comments about his speech to the UN, Ceausescu said he had had several exchanges of opinion with representatives of a certain number of States, especially in Europe. He added that he felt he must tell the President frankly that a certain concern exists in this regard. He himself did not know of course to what extent this concern might be well founded. The fact was that the President's speech was directed more at the USSR rather than at all countries. The second notable aspect about the speech was that it did not contain any reference to future American relations with the People's Republic of China. Ceausescu paused to say that he was only mentioning some of the remarks he had heard in passing from his various interlocutors in recent days.

Certainly, he added, we in Europe understand the necessity that there exist good relations between the United States and the Soviet

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<sup>8</sup> A memorandum of the October 22 conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files—Europe, USSR, Vol. IX 1 Aug 70–31 Oct 70.

Union. He went on to say that he would like to inform the President that after their meeting of a year ago, Romanian relations with the USSR had improved. A treaty of friendship had been signed.<sup>9</sup> In general, he could say that relations with the Soviets were much better than they were a year ago. The same goes for the other European socialist countries. In November, treaties will be signed with Bulgaria, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic.<sup>10</sup> Certainly this does not mean that Romania is pursuing a policy contrary to the interests of its people or its interest in cooperating with all countries. This is a part of Romania's entire active policy. Ceausescu added that he would particularly like to mention Romania's relations with Yugoslavia which are especially good and which it is Romania's intention to develop still further. These ties are such as to assure broad possibilities of having an exit to the Mediterranean and other areas.

While hoping for agreements, say on arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Romania would not want such solutions to have a detrimental effect on other countries. Therefore it is the feeling of countries like Romania—the small and middle sized ones—that in seeking solutions of these problems these countries not be consigned to one side but in some form or other be given a chance to participate therein and to have a chance to make their contribution.

The President stated that he agreed completely with Ceausescu's sentiments. He added that one must recognize that relations between the United States and the USSR are necessary if it is to be possible to have solutions to other problems such as the Middle East and Europe. Without Soviet cooperation, it would be impossible.

The President assured Ceausescu, however, that under no circumstances would the United States cooperate with any country, including the USSR, at the expense of another country or American relations with that country. This would be contrary to American tradition. He could also assure Ceausescu that the American position was clear, namely that the United States wants good relations with all countries of Eastern Europe. It rejects the idea that two great powers should sit down at a summit meeting and determine the future of smaller countries. That is wrong and the United States will not proceed on such a course.

Ceausescu responded by saying that he could only welcome this declaration of the President's. He went on to express his hope that the

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<sup>9</sup> Signed July 9 in Bucharest.

<sup>10</sup> For texts of the treaties with Bulgaria, November 19; Poland, November 12; and the German Democratic Republic, December 22, see 855 UNTS 221, 71 POD 253, and 71 EGD 24, respectively.

United States, speaking of Europe again, would encourage Greece and Turkey to arrive at still better and more comprehensive understandings in the Balkans, because in his opinion and that of the Yugoslavs, this would help establish stability in that part of the world.

The President recalled that President Tito had emphasized this same point and had spoken very warmly about Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and his own friendly and cooperative relationship with President Ceausescu.

Ceausescu noted that shortly after his return to Europe he was scheduled to see President Tito, on November 3 to be exact. The President mentioned that he had invited Tito to visit the United States some time next year.<sup>11</sup>

The discussion then moved to the question of relations with China. The President said that he wished to express appreciation for the fact that since his last meeting with Ceausescu the Romanian government had conveyed American views to the effect that the United States would like to start discussions with China. He added that the United States cannot begin by establishing diplomatic relations. That is a step for later on. Rather a beginning must be made by having some type of talks. Public talks in Warsaw, he realized, might be quite difficult for the Chinese because the Chinese and the Soviets have their differences and talks in Warsaw might come to the attention of the Soviets. The United States is ready to have discussions with representatives of the Chinese government in other channels, in other capitals for instance. What he was suggesting, the President explained, was simply that the United States is open to discussions in formal channels like Warsaw or in any other channels.

Ceausescu commented that the President had earlier said that two great powers should not make decisions for others. This was something very good. Yet a continuation of the current situation where the Chinese are left to one side in the discussion of major problems is not helpful in finding equitable solutions to these problems. Of course, the improvement of relations between the United States and China would have a favorable influence on international life. The first thing to bear in mind is the need for China to be present in the United Nations. This can take place before establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

The President responded by saying that, as Ceausescu knew, this was a problem which was very difficult for the United States because of our ties with the Chinese Nationalist government. The President

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<sup>11</sup> Tito visited Washington October 28–30, 1971. See Documents 232–234.

stated his belief that there must be preliminary steps. One has to begin somewhere. A start cannot be made at the highest level of action. The United States is ready to have discussions on other subjects with the People's Republic of China whenever they are ready.

Ceausescu remarked that Romania has especially cordial relations with China. Since his last meeting with the President, there have been several fairly high level delegations which have visited China and discussed many subjects including relations between China and the United States and China's presence in the UN. It is important to note from these discussions the point that China desires to have improved relations with the United States and is ready at any moment to occupy its place in the UN, including this year. This morning, Ceausescu added, he had just received a message from Chou En-lai on behalf of the Chinese leadership, thanking him for the clear Romanian pronouncement at the UN in favor of China's taking its place there. He believes that the United States should take the first steps in that direction, especially after the Cambodian events.<sup>12</sup> Such steps could open the way to increased contacts with the Chinese. Ceausescu then said he must tell the President frankly that the Chinese have some of the same feelings of concern, some of the same doubts as those he had mentioned earlier regarding problems being solved by only two large countries.

The President commented that the other side of the coin was that the Soviets do not look with much sympathy on American moves to normalize relations with China.

Ceausescu replied why should they not. Otherwise things would be impossible. The Romanians have told the Soviets more than once that there should be good relations between China and the U.S. A lack of understanding of this problem will not help solve it. Ceausescu said he did not believe that an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations would be directed against the USSR or others. He noted that he had had lots of discussions with Chinese leaders and knew how they thought. He was convinced that they are not pursuing such a goal.

The President stated that American policy is one of wanting friendly relations with both the USSR and eventually with Communist China. We do not intend to play one against another. Our desire is to have independent relations with each, not directed against the other. The President added that this seems to be President Ceausescu's

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<sup>12</sup> Reference is to the entry of U.S. forces into Cambodia in an effort to destroy North Vietnamese forces and logistics. The President made the announcement in an April 30 television address to the nation. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 405–410.

viewpoint as well. He then remarked that President Ceausescu's continued role as a peacemaker is very useful in regard to U.S.-Chinese relations. He can talk to both parties which is very helpful and in the end, in the President's opinion, this will produce results.

Ceausescu commented that Romania had been active in persuading the Chinese to improve their relations with Yugoslavia and now, after 15 years, those relations were good. To speak frankly, Romania particularly appreciates the Chinese policy in terms of its stress on the independent development of every country. So far as the future is concerned, Romania will greet any step toward improvement of relations with China and he will inform the Chinese leadership about his discussions with the President. He inquired if the President had some still more concrete suggestions regarding a real improvement in relations with China, adding at the same time that he agreed that a beginning is needed.

The President replied that a start could be made with the relaxation of trade barriers, with the relaxation, too, of restrictions on exchanges of people, and on travel. Of course, short of full diplomatic relations, there could be an exchange of high personal representatives. All this was open for discussion.

Ceausescu said as the discussion ended that he would like to take up during dinner the subjects of Vietnam and the Middle East, and even that of Korea.

After the advisers had joined the principals, the President informed them that he and President Ceausescu had had a very good talk, particularly on bilateral relations in the economic sphere. They also talked about European security and other world problems, having actually started where they left off last year. They had noted that considerable progress had been made as a result of the talks in Bucharest and hoped that more progress could be made along these same lines.

Ceausescu stated he was in agreement with what the President had said and noted the constructive spirit in which bilateral questions had been discussed, hopefully with good results.

The President commented further that in the matter of bilateral problems there are some areas where it is possible to take further steps as a result of today's talks. In this discussion it was noted that as a result of last year's talks, Romania had moved to a position next to Yugoslavia in terms of favorable economic relations with the United States. There is a lot left to be done; however, much progress has been made in a year and there are good possibilities to make progress in the future.

Ceausescu said he fully shared the President's views. He and his advisers had discussions with over 30 American firms in the last two weeks, which he hoped would lead to good results in terms of mutual

cooperation. He expressed himself as being especially satisfied with his visit so far and most particularly with his discussions with the President.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> At an October 27 meeting with Ceausescu, Kissinger, acting on instructions from the President, attempted to clarify points made about U.S. policy in Vietnam and with regard to China. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703—Country Files, Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971.

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## 200. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 30, 1970.

### SUBJECT

Classification of Romania as a Developing Country

In response to the request that General Haig made on October 27, we are submitting the following report on the measures which can be taken to carry out the President's commitment to classify Romania for certain purposes as a "developing country" (Less Developed Country or LDC).<sup>2</sup>

We assume that the Romanians are primarily interested in being classified as an LDC in order to receive generalized tariff preferences from the US. Implementation of our preference scheme will require Congressional authorization. We expect to submit a legislative proposal early in the next year. It is unlikely that the scheme will actually go into effect before late 1971.

Since many of the exports of Romania are similar to those of other LDCs, Romania's competitive position in the US market as well as in the markets of other donor countries would be adversely affected in the future if it is not a beneficiary of generalized preferences. The Romanian desire to be considered as an LDC is therefore understandable.

On purely economic grounds, Romania could be classified as a developing country for the purposes of generalized preferences since the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-259, U/SM 87-89, U/SM 87. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 199.

stage of its economic development is roughly comparable to that of Yugoslavia and several other countries which are considered LDCs.

Section 231(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA)<sup>3</sup> denies the President authority to apply tariff concessions or MFN treatment to the products of Communist countries other than Yugoslavia and Poland (both of which enjoyed MFN status when the Act was passed). Unless Congress is prepared to amend this legislative restriction, it would be unlikely that Congress would agree to permit extension of the benefits of generalized preferences to Romania since such preferences offer far greater benefits than those resulting from the granting of MFN treatment.

The Under Secretaries Committee recommended, and the President concurred (NSDM 86 of October 14, 1970),<sup>4</sup> that only Yugoslavia among the Communist countries should be granted beneficiary status in the proposed US preferences system, but that our position would be reviewed if additional Communist countries receive MFN treatment. We would expect to request Congress to give the President authority to add countries to the list of beneficiaries under certain conditions.

The Secretary has forwarded to the President recommendations to seek authority to negotiate MFN treatment for Romania and other Communist countries and to seek repeal of the Fino Amendment which prohibits Export-Import Bank lending to Communist countries which aid North Vietnam. With the President's concurrence, authority to extend MFN treatment generally or specifically to Romania could be sought in the next legislative session. Once authority to extend MFN to Romania is granted and legislation on generalized preferences has been approved which would not specifically exclude it, the President could decide to include Romania as a beneficiary of generalized preferences. Alternatively, a specific provision could be written into the bill on generalized preferences giving Romania beneficiary status despite the provisions of Section 231(a) of the TEA.

While we believe the Romanian President raised the developing country issue because of its significance regarding generalized preferences, there are other potential advantages for Romania in being classified as a developing country. The US gives preferential treatment to developing countries under our capital controls (Interest Equalization Tax and Foreign Direct Investment Controls), untying of aid procurement, and tax treaties. In international forums, such as the GATT, IMF, and IBRD/IDA, classification as a developing country is also important.

**Theodore L. Eliot Jr.**

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<sup>3</sup> 76 Stat. 872 (P.L.-87-794).

<sup>4</sup> For NSDM 86, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972, Document 245.

**201. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

On July 15, 1969, in preparation for the President's trip to Romania, the Under Secretaries Committee reported on steps which the United States could take to improve its economic relations with Romania.<sup>2</sup> Some of these steps have now been taken.

In addition, the President has decided that we should seek elimination of the legislative restrictions on OPIC's issuance of investment guarantees and insurance for projects in Romania. My memorandum of June 2 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the President of the Export-Import Bank conveyed the President's decision to seek such treatment for Yugoslavia.<sup>3</sup> The legislation to implement that decision should also cover Romania. The Under Secretaries Committee should develop a scenario for presenting the legislative request early in the next session of Congress.

In addition, the President has now requested that the Under Secretaries Committee re-examine the whole question of our economic policies toward Romania, both in regard to the actions mentioned in its earlier memorandum and in regard to other possibilities such as:

—Public and private statements by U.S. officials to encourage U.S. investment and trade in Romania and to show Administration encouragement for it.

—Relaxing our position on Romania's effort to enter GATT.

—Further liberalization of our export controls toward Romania.

—Any other appropriate and effective measures.

The Under Secretaries report should examine all those actions which the U.S. Government could take to give Romania treatment equal to that which we give, or plan in the future to give, to Yugoslavia. It should examine the implications of our defining Romania as a "developing country," expanding on Mr. Eliot's memorandum of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Boxes H-259 and 260, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda, U/SM 87-89, U/SM 87.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 181.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 219 and footnote 4 thereto.

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October 30.<sup>4</sup> It should inter alia consider actions that require changes in, or new legislation, and make recommendations on both the substance and the timing of possible actions. The report by the Under Secretaries Committee should treat all possibilities solely in the Romanian context, even though some may be the subject of separate recommendations and work in progress in broader contexts:

The Under Secretaries Committee should submit this report by November 30.<sup>5</sup>

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>4</sup> Document 200.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 202.

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**202. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

The Under Secretaries Committee has reexamined U.S. economic relations with Romania and has made recommendations on actions to give Romania treatment more closely comparable to that which we give to Yugoslavia. Since the issues involved are primarily economic, the Chairman has asked that I chair the committee on this matter.

In preparing these recommendations, we have been guided by the intention, expressed in your report to the Congress of February 18, 1970,<sup>2</sup> to “pursue . . . with vigor” those “cooperative programs in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields” set in motion during your visit to Romania last year and re-emphasized during your

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-270, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda, U/DM 1-19, U/DM 14A. Confidential. This NSC Under Secretaries Committee decision memorandum, NSC-U/DM 14A, was based on NSC Under Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum 87/D, November 27 (ibid.), requested by Kissinger on November 11 (see Document 201).

<sup>2</sup> See Document 7.

conversations with President Ceausescu when he visited Washington this year.

Romania's overriding concern is the preservation and enhancement of its relative independence from the Soviet Union, and to achieve this objective Romania has put great stress on trade and other economic relations with the West. Within legislative limitations we have taken several steps during the past year to improve and expand U.S.-Romanian economic relations, including liberalization of export control procedures, extension of CCC agricultural credits, encouragement of private bank export financing and promotion of joint ventures.

However, these initial steps have been modest in terms of actual impact on trade flow. The two overriding issues for expanding trade between our countries and providing Romania treatment roughly comparable to that of Yugoslavia are most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment and access to Export-Import Bank credits.

With regard to MFN tariff treatment, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that it would be better to request general discretionary authority to negotiate MFN status with any Communist country with which we have diplomatic or trade relations rather than to seek legislation restricted to Romania alone. This broad approach is deemed desirable even though the recommendation is made in the context of initiatives for Romania alone. The more general question of MFN as it affects other Communist countries involves additional issues that have not been addressed by the Committee but which will have to be considered before seeking Congressional authorization. In addition, in the case of Romania alone, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Interior recommend that, in order to convince Congress that a request for legislation on MFN should be granted, a more detailed plan should be developed in the form of potential negotiating packages that link our, and Romania's interests and objectives, with practical moves on both sides.

Export-Import Bank credits are now unavailable to Romania because of the Fino Amendment which prohibits such credits to countries giving governmental assistance to North Viet-Nam. State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, The Special Trade Representative, AID, Eximbank and USIA recommend the outright repeal of the Fino Amendment. If this does not prove feasible, amendment to provide Presidential discretionary powers should be considered. These agencies make this recommendation of a broad approach to the Fino Amendment, as in the case of MFN, only in the context of initiatives relating to Romania alone. Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Interior oppose repeal or amendment of the Fino provision and instead favor informing the Romanians that if they stop giving governmental assistance to North Viet-Nam, we would be prepared to offer Exim credits (in which case the Fino Amendment would be inapplicable).

Other recommendations agreed by the Committee but of secondary priority compared with MFN and Export-Import Bank credit, are that we:

- seek legislation separating OPIC from the Foreign Assistance Act and without the restrictive provisions of the Act in order to carry out the President's decision to eliminate OPIC restrictions on investment insurance and guaranties for projects in Romania.

- continue to liberalize procedures for export control but not seek to change the export control category for Romania.

- consider beneficiary status for Romania as a developing country for purposes of generalized tariff preferences *after* the negotiation of MFN status.

- postpone relaxation of capital controls until it is more clearly dictated and desirable.

- not seek at the present time eligibility for Romania for the untying of aid among developing countries.

- support but not sponsor IMF and IBRD membership for Romania if we are assured that it is willing and able to meet the obligations of membership. Before we commit ourselves, we would want also to be assured that Romania has made reasonable progress in settling the defaulted dollar bond claims.

- not consider Congressional authorization of a sugar quota for Romania.

- resume negotiations with Romania for an air transport agreement when Romania indicates a willingness to negotiate seriously.

- seek Romanian (and Yugoslav) eligibility for PL-480 Title I but not for U.S. foreign aid.

- include in the State of the Union message and Foreign Policy Report references to your visits to Romania and Yugoslavia and President Ceausescu's visit here, signaling our special relations and our desire to expand further our economic relations with them. Other high officials should also stress this policy when appropriate in their written and oral statements.

Since Romanian accession to the GATT seems close to resolution, the Committee does not see a need to make further decisions on this matter at this time.

After decisions have been made on individual issues we will be in a better position to develop a comprehensive legislative strategy for all matters affecting Romania.

Attached is a detailed report of the Committee with a separate discussion of each of the recommendations listed above.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

### 203. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 15, 1971, 3 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Romanian Ambassador—U.S.-Romanian Bilateral Relations

#### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan, Embassy of Romania  
Gheorghe Ionita, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Romania  
The Secretary  
Robert I. Owen, Country Director, EUR/BRY

Ambassador Bogdan had asked for the appointment to review various bilateral and international matters following his recent return from Bucharest where he had seen, among others, Romanian President Ceausescu. He conveyed President Ceausescu's personal best wishes to the Secretary for the New Year.

Bogdan said President Ceausescu was very satisfied with his visit to the U.S. and is determined to follow up in expanding our bilateral relationships, most particularly our trade and economic relations. As evidence of this Romanian determination, Bogdan stated that a special Romanian task force under the chairmanship of First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nicolae had been established to coordinate measures for increasing trade and economic relations with the U.S. As current activities, he cited the present visit to the U.S. of the Romanian machine-building ministry's delegation, discussions with RCA and Corning Glass on possible joint ventures, talks with Robert B. Anderson concerning possible cooperation in marketing and production, and a recent visit to the U.S. of the head of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry concerning the potential for tourism in Romania, Bogdan noted that agreement had been reached for Pan American to begin service between New York and Bucharest this coming spring, and that an Intercontinental hotel in Bucharest should be completed in March or April. He said 20,000 Americans visited Romania in 1970 and that the Romanians were hoping to expand this to 60,000 in 1971. They plan to enlarge and improve their tourist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ROM–US. Confidential. Drafted by Owen and approved in S on January 22. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II is *ibid*.

office activities here, feeling that a better public-relations effort is necessary. The Secretary noted the advantage in tourism advertising of focusing on one or more attractions unique to a given country rather than making general appeals which frequently are less competitive.

Bogdan said the Romanians hope to expand exchange visits, having in mind reciprocal visits by representatives of the Romanian Economic Council and of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisors, parliamentarians of the two countries, and regional officials (governors and mayors), to cite a few possibilities. Bogdan said he already had had an exploratory talk with Council of Economic Advisors Chairman McCracken.

Bogdan said there were two specific matters to which he would like to give a push, namely the Romanian interest in opening trade representation offices in Chicago and San Francisco, and in reaching early agreement on a U.S.-Romanian consular convention. He opined that remaining differences between the two negotiating sides were insignificant except for the questions of immunities and the taking of notariats and even these could be resolved readily if we both try a little harder. The Secretary agreed that we should move ahead promptly on the consular convention and assured the Ambassador of his personal support in this regard.<sup>2</sup>

To Bogdan's inquiry as to prospects for early action in response to the Romanian interest in acquiring MFN treatment and EXIM Bank facilities, the Secretary observed that the Department has submitted appropriate recommendations to the White House, that he favors and believes that the President favors assisting Romania in this regard, but that much depends on an assessment of the next Congress which would have to take legislative action. Bogdan responded only that although he is aware of the various complications and considerations he still has great confidence in the powers of the President. He said that, in other words, the President can get what he wants.

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<sup>2</sup> An agreement was signed at Bucharest on July 5, 1972, and entered into force on July 6, 1973. For text, see TIAS 7643.

**204. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

The Under Secretaries Committee has examined a dozen steps we could take to give substance to your commitment to President Ceausescu to increase U.S.-Romanian economic relations,<sup>2</sup> which Ceausescu emphasized in his last visit. The Committee believes there are two major issues which hold the key to whether we shall be able to do so—U.S. extension of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) to Romania, and Export-Import Bank credits to Romania.

Romania has pushed very hard for most-favored-nation tariff treatment. It is also much interested in Export-Import Bank credits, which the Fino Amendment forbids to countries trading with North Vietnam. You have just decided in the broader East-West trade context that the Administration would not now take initiatives in these areas,<sup>3</sup> however, and none of the agencies proposes seeking authority for Romania alone. They believe that singling out Romania via special legislation would irritate Eastern Europe and embarrass Romania, and I agree; the Romanians apparently share this view as well.

You also decided that we not vigorously oppose Congressional initiatives on these issues, however, so you may get an opportunity to do something on them for Romania anyway. Senator Mondale<sup>4</sup> has already proposed a bill to drastically limit the Fino Amendment, and it could pass. When the Administration testifies on the bill on March 8, our spokesman could announce that, should the bill pass, we would plan to use the authority only for Romania. There is also a Javits/Mondale/Harris<sup>5</sup> bill which would authorize you to extend MFN treatment to the Communist countries, but it is part of a larger trade bill which is unlikely to go anywhere in the near future.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-270, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandum, U/DM 1-19, U/DM 14. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 202.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 23.

<sup>4</sup> Senator Walter F. Mondale (D-Minnesota).

<sup>5</sup> Senators Jacob K. Javits (R-New York) and Fred R. Harris (D-Oklahoma).

On the smaller actions, the Committee rejects several as either insignificant or too contradictory to our general policies to merit adoption:

- a further change in the export control category for Romania;
- granting of beneficiary status for Romania under our generalized preference scheme, when and if authorized by Congress, before we have given her MFN status;
- immediate relaxation of our balance of payments controls on U.S. capital flows to Romania, by categorizing her as a lower income country instead of a Communist country;
- establishing Romania as an eligible source for procurement under our limited untying of U.S. foreign aid, by treating her as a lower income country rather than as a European country;
- authorization of a sugar quota for Romania.

The Committee does propose some smaller measures:

- Our support, though not sponsorship, of Romanian efforts to enter the IMF and IBRD, provided Romania makes some progress in setting outstanding dollar bond claims;
- new Romanian air negotiations, provided Romania shows some sign of compromise;
- seeking Romanian eligibility for PL-480 Title I sales.

The first two of these are unexceptional, but require no decision by you now. The third could only be done by our seeking changes in legislation to eliminate the prohibition of sales to countries whose ships trade with Cuba; this would be good Romanian policy, but it would indicate a slackening of our Cuban embargo and I do not suggest it.

I agree with the Committee's recommendation, except for this Cuba issue and its rejection of a change in the export control category for Romania, which is based upon a judgment that: the trade effects would be small since only 180 items are involved; we already accede to most requests for licenses for Romania; some of the items involved are of security interest; and, most importantly, the maintenance of our export controls on technical data are required to avoid significant security risks vis-à-vis the USSR.

I believe that the Committee's recommendation under-emphasizes the favorable political effect of our placing Romania in the same export control category as Yugoslavia, which in fact you indicated to Ceausescu you would do in at least some areas, at least for goods. The Committee presents an option of treating Romania equal to Yugoslavia on exports of goods, but maintaining intact the data controls. The only objection to such a change is that it could allow some "strategic" goods to reach Romania—such as the hydro-cracking plant which you authorized late last year anyway.<sup>6</sup> And, even with the change, we would

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 14.

still maintain controls on the same 600 items controlled by other COCOM countries and some 375 items which we control unilaterally. The strategic risk thus appears minimal, and offset by the foreign policy gain. The Romanians know we have this review under way, and will be quite disillusioned if it results in no new step at all—hence I recommend this modest step on export controls.

*Recommendation*

That you decide now on two new steps for Romania: (a) that Administration spokesmen, in testifying on Congressional initiatives to authorize Export-Import Bank transactions in Communist countries, indicate that the Administration would now use such authority only for Romania, and (b) that you decide to set up a new export control category to equate Romania with Yugoslavia for exports of U.S. *goods*, while maintaining the present controls on exports to Romania of U.S. *data*.

Approve<sup>7</sup>

Disapprove

Other

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<sup>7</sup> The President initialed the approval option. Kissinger informed Richardson of the President's decisions in a March 9 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

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**205. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Romania

In previous memoranda to the agencies (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> I informed them that you had decided to oppose only in a very low key way legislative

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. No classification marking. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 23.

initiatives to liberalize trade policy toward Communist countries in regard to Most-Favored-Nation treatment. You also decided that our position on Romania should be handled in the same fashion.

Senators Mondale and Brooke have now introduced a bill<sup>3</sup> which would grant you *discretionary* authority to enter into a mutually beneficial commercial agreement with Romania providing Most-Favored-Nation treatment for that country alone.

I believe you should reconsider whether or not Administration response to this bill should continue to be opposition or whether in this case the Administration position should be no objection to this bill.

If the Administration does object to a Congressional grant of *discretionary* authority, it is likely to cause the Romanians to doubt your previous statements about wishing to improve economic relations. In addition, it would be very awkward and perhaps even impossible, under the legislation being proposed by the agencies, to grant Romania benefits of our tariff preferences scheme for developing countries unless we first grant Most-Favored-Nation status.

Romania is now nearing completion of its negotiations for accession to the GATT. Our opposition to this legislation would mean that our support for Romanian entry to the GATT would seem tepid, at best, despite our many statements in favor of increased cooperation with that country. Peter Peterson adds a further commercial consideration: our deteriorating export balance argues for using available alternatives, including carrots such as this, to promote a higher level of U.S. sales abroad.

There are good reasons not to change the current position. One depends upon your assessment of the domestic political effects so long as the Vietnam War continues. Another is to avoid legislation aimed at specific countries. We had at one point also been worried about the possibility of singling Romania out and thereby exacerbating her relations with the Soviet Union. However, I understand that Ambassador Bogdan does not consider this a danger.

On balance, I believe that our desire for improving relations with Romania argues for a change in the Administration position that would allow us to voice no opposition to a Congressional initiative conveying discretionary authority.

#### *Recommendation*

That you decide to allow the agencies to testify that the Administration has no opposition to Congressional initiatives to grant you dis-

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to legislation to amend and extend the Export Administration Control Act of 1949. (84 Stat. 931)

cretion to enter an agreement giving Most-Favored-Nation status to Romania. (Pete Peterson concurs.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The President initialed the approval option.

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## 206. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

San Clemente, California, August 31, 1971, 11:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC (notetaker)

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by welcoming Ambassador Bogdan to California. He asked the Ambassador what was going on in Romania. “You shouldn’t keep threatening your big neighbors like you are doing,” he remarked.<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador replied that sometimes it was necessary. He called Dr. Kissinger’s attention to the tactics a hedgehog uses against a bear: A hedgehog is really no competition for a bear, but when he’s in a fight he raises hell first, so that all the wood hears.

The Ambassador then stated that his President had instructed him to pass on to President Nixon the Romanian President’s considerations on the situation in Eastern Europe. But first of all, the Ambassador was to convey his President’s appreciation for the measures which the United States had taken on Romania’s behalf—on Most Favored Nation, EXIM-Bank, and GATT.

Dr. Kissinger then inquired if the Ambassador was going to announce his visit to San Clemente. The Ambassador replied that he had no strong feelings, but that he had thought it would have some publicity. Dr. Kissinger then suggested that they return to that question after the Ambassador finished his presentation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Soviet reactions to President Ceausescu’s June visit to China that included announcement of early August military maneuvers near the Romanian border. In a July 15 memorandum to Kissinger, the Department of State outlined Soviet moves and predicted a further heightening of tensions. (Ibid.)

In general, Ambassador Bogdan resumed, President Ceausescu felt that the trends in the world today were positive. Reason was prevailing more and more. America's normalization of relations with China, the Berlin agreement, and the possibility of a SALT agreement, were examples of this. Dr. Kissinger commented that there might be a Conference on European Security, too. Did Romania want a Conference on European Security? The Ambassador replied that it depended on how the Conference was organized; he suggested that perhaps there should be cooperation on that between the United States and Romania. Dr. Kissinger responded that he would be interested to talk with the Ambassador on some occasion about that.

At the same time, Ambassador Bogdan continued, President Ceausescu wished to invite President Nixon's attention to certain negative developments in Eastern Europe and in Soviet-Romanian relations. He was referring specifically to the reaction of the Soviet Union to the visit of Romania's state-party delegation to China. The Soviets made gestures and press attacks on them, directly and by proxy. The Romanian Government did not know what was discussed at the Crimean meeting, but it was safe to assume that they talked about Romania.<sup>3</sup> The Romanians had met with them at COMECON shortly before.

Dr. Kissinger then asked a series of questions exploring whether there was a parallel with Czechoslovakia's position in 1968. There were no pro-Soviet factions in Bucharest, the Ambassador indicated, and the Romanians would fight. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Hungarians were joining in the attacks on Romania; Ambassador Bogdan did not think it was of their own free will.

The Ambassador asked rhetorically why it was that Romania wished to direct the President's attention to this situation, including the military maneuvers and press attacks. The first reason was that frankness was important to any relationship. And secondly, the Romanian President had been a little surprised to see the lack of reaction in the West to these developments. Perhaps, it was only due to lack of awareness, the Ambassador suggested. Dr. Kissinger thought that was the reason. "Do you think the Soviets will attack you?" Dr. Kissinger asked. It was difficult to say, the Ambassador replied, but he thought his country's situation was basically better than 1968. Romania's position was stronger and her international situation was better; Romania had better assets in the international situation. But they wanted to avoid complacency, and this was why they wished to talk with the President. Even if the United States and Romania differed in their respective views about military blocs and other questions, President Ceausescu believed that the United States and Romania shared an interest in a more

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to an August 2 meeting of Communist Party leaders.

diversified world. Such a world is more stable, the Ambassador continued; it gives more freedom of action and room for maneuver for smaller and middle-sized nations. President Ceausescu knew that President Nixon had sought to encourage this, but Romania nevertheless had noted that at this juncture there was no response to these developments. Dr. Kissinger noted in reply that it would have been difficult for the United States to criticize the Soviets for not inviting Romania to the Crimea, and the military pressures (the maneuvers in Bulgaria) had been called off. But the United States was aware of the Soviets' other tactics, such as flying planes right up to the border and then turning. It looked like a war of nerves.

The Ambassador pointed out the necessity of taking precautions. But there was no need for Romania to give the United States advice, the Ambassador continued, because the President had already done a number of things—such as his visit to Romania, and the economic steps—which were a help to Romania. Other gestures were possible, he noted. The United States had a variety of means at its disposal. The U.S. was negotiating with the Soviets on many issues (Berlin, SALT, CES), and the Soviets would not want to jeopardize these talks. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the United States would make sure that the Soviet Union was under no illusions about the fact that if they attacked Romania, this would ruin détente for several years. "This is important," the Ambassador responded. There were other possibilities, too: The United States could help by getting the true facts before the press. The Soviets were accusing Romania of creating a Tirana–Belgrade–Bucharest–Peking axis, and so forth. [Dr. Kissinger interjected that Romania was formidable enough by herself, but when she was in league with the Albanians, too, that was serious! The Ambassador mentioned that the Albanians have a slogan: "We and the Chinese are 800 million strong!"]<sup>4</sup> The Ambassador referred to President Nixon's gesture of not opposing the new trade legislation, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that that had been a deliberate decision.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what else the United States could do concretely. The Ambassador replied that he would like, if possible, to be received by the President, perhaps in Washington. Dr. Kissinger noted that a meeting in San Clemente was not possible, but he told the Ambassador that he would recommend such a meeting to the President. He could not commit the President, but his own estimate was that the President would probably agree to it.<sup>5</sup>

Dr. Kissinger then informed the Ambassador that he could report back to President Ceausescu the following (and at this point the Am-

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<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the original.

<sup>5</sup> Bogdan met with the President on September 17. See Document 207.

bassador took out pencil and paper and took careful notes): (1) The United States has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania. (2) The United States will do nothing directly or indirectly that amounts to collusion that would enable a great power to abrogate the independence of Romania. (3) The United States will make clear in its way that unilateral pressures or military action is not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

Dr. Kissinger then added that he would discuss with the President what visible things the United States could do. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, the Ambassador characterized the Yugoslav attitude as close to the Romanian. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia<sup>6</sup> the Romanians thought of as a response to a longstanding invitation.

The conversation then turned to the question of press treatment of Ambassador Bogdan's meetings with Dr. Kissinger and the President. They first agreed that it was better not to announce at this point that the Ambassador had met with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger then commented that, since the President almost never receives Ambassadors except for presentation of credentials, it was important to have some special reason to cite for a Presidential meeting with the Romanian Ambassador. Otherwise every other Ambassador in town would feel slighted, or would immediately ask to see the President. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the meeting be set up on the basis that the Ambassador was carrying a special message from President Ceausescu. The Ambassador replied that unfortunately he was not authorized to say he was carrying a personal message, but he could check back with Bucharest and correct that. Dr. Kissinger then noted that a personal message alone might not be enough to explain a Presidential meeting. He suggested, and Ambassador Bogdan agreed, that the White House could simply announce, after the meeting, that the President received a message. When we announce it, Ron Ziegler could say that the meeting was for an exchange of views, and that the President used the opportunity to show his feeling for Romania, etc. We would check with the Romanians on the precise language.

Ambassador Bogdan then turned the conversation to some other political issues. He congratulated Dr. Kissinger on his trip to Peking,<sup>7</sup> noting that this would probably make it less interesting for Dr. Kissinger to hear about the Romanians' visit to China. On the contrary, Dr. Kissinger replied. He noted that President Ceausescu had received a good reception there, and then asked the Ambassador a series of questions about the Romanians' conversations and impressions. In reply,

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<sup>6</sup> September 22–25.

<sup>7</sup> Kissinger met with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials in Beijing July 9–11.

the Ambassador indicated that President Ceausescu had met with Mao, and had the impression he was still in command. The Romanians and Chinese had talked about the U.S. on a constructive basis. President Ceausescu had stressed the necessity of a political solution in Vietnam privately and in his public statement, and he had also pressed for this in the communiqué.

The Ambassador continued by saying that in the Romanian view the North Vietnamese had made an important step, in that in their latest proposal the POW's were not linked to a political settlement.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Kissinger, asked by the Ambassador whether he agreed, commented that he was not sure whether a people who fought so heroically were really capable of making peace. Maybe not, the Ambassador said; the Romanians, too, had heard the North Vietnamese say that with all the sacrifices they had made, they could not give up. But their (imaginary) fears of U.S.–PRC collusion may be alleviated by a political settlement in Indochina, the Ambassador suggested. The Ambassador expressed the view, in all humility, that the United States had stressed too much the possibility of help from the USSR. Even if the Soviets wished to help, they could not. Dr. Kissinger said he was inclined to agree, and that the U.S. had not stressed this avenue since the early months of the Administration. He thought that nobody really had any influence over Hanoi. The only real issue remaining was Hanoi's desire for us to put their people into power. We could not do that. Our position was a fair political process that left the outcome uncertain; but this was unacceptable to the North Vietnamese.

The only way to see is to discuss it with them, the Ambassador said. He asked Dr. Kissinger's estimate of the situation, and Dr. Kissinger replied that he was less hopeful than he had been a few weeks previously, because Hanoi would probably now want to wait out the outcome of all the current political turmoil in Saigon. Ambassador Bogdan mentioned that the Chinese were not so sanguine about Hanoi's prospects but it was difficult for them too, to do much about ending the war. Dr. Kissinger thought the Chinese knew what they were doing. The Chinese were disciplined, and thought in historical terms. To them, Indochina was not the main problem. The Ambassador thought that Japan might be, but Dr. Kissinger responded that the Chinese were more worried about "your ally," the Soviet Union. The Chinese were not building air raid shelters in China against us or Japan! Japan had hardly any airplanes. The Chinese had not built such shelters 15 years

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<sup>8</sup> The so-called "Seven Point Plan" of July 1971. For text, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971–1972, p. 25079. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, August 1970–January 1972.

ago at the height of U.S.–PRC hostility, and from that something could be deduced.

Ambassador Bogdan returned to the economic issues, reporting that the Romanians had spoken with Wilbur Mills on the MFN question, and Mills had told them that if the Administration told him it was interested in it, he would get it done. Dr. Kissinger promised to look into that, and said he would check with Peterson.

The Ambassador then mentioned that he would also soon be seeing the Secretary of State, as usual, for a tour d'horizon,<sup>9</sup> and to tell him what he had told Dr. Kissinger. The Romanian Government was also thinking of inviting the Secretary to visit Romania. Dr. Kissinger urged the Ambassador to explore this with the Secretary. The Under Secretary of State might be able to come earlier, but the Ambassador should certainly not exclude a visit by the Secretary. The Ambassador added that in the second half of October, Paul McCracken would be visiting Romania to see his counterpart, who is a high party and state official. He might bring a message from the President. Dr. Kissinger replied noncommittally.

After some pleasantries about the prospects and possible symbolic implications of Dr. Kissinger's visiting Romania for a vacation, the meeting ended.

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<sup>9</sup> Bogdan saw Rogers on September 3. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ROM–US.

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## 207. Memorandum for the President's File<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1971, 11 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan

### OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and Amb. Corneliu Bogdan. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.

Ambassador Bogdan had requested an appointment in order to convey President Ceausescu's concerns at recent Soviet pressures against Romania. The President made an exception to his usual practice of not receiving foreign ambassadors, and met with Ambassador Bogdan in order to symbolize our interest in Romania.

The President opened the conversation by assuring Ambassador Bogdan of the United States' strong interest in Romania and stating that he was always ready to hear the personal views of President Ceausescu.

The Ambassador began his presentation as follows: President Ceausescu felt that the general trends in the world today were positive. Reason seemed to be prevailing more and more. The President's moves to normalize relations with China, the Berlin accord, and the possibility of a SALT agreement were examples. Romania welcomed this. But Romania also hoped that there would be no agreements at the expense of third countries.

"You need have no such fears," the President said emphatically.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this. While these positive trends were hopeful, President Ceausescu wanted at the same time to invite President Nixon's personal attention to certain negative developments in Eastern Europe. Romania was very concerned at the campaign of threats and pressures which the USSR had been waging against her. This took the form of threats of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in neighboring Bulgaria, press attacks on Ceausescu's visit to Peking, the exclusion of Romania from a bloc gathering in the Crimea, and other harassments.

"What can we do?" the President asked the Ambassador. Any visible signs of the U.S. commitment to Romania's support would be valuable, the Ambassador replied. Favorable action on Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Romanian trade, or steps by OPIC to encourage investment in Romania, were possibilities. In short, anything that let the Soviets know that détente with the U.S. was dependent on their restraint vis-à-vis Romania.

The President began his response by asking the Ambassador to convey his very good personal wishes to President Ceausescu. He assured the Ambassador that Romania had our promise on MFN, and indicated that Dr. Kissinger would ride herd on these economic matters to insure that our promises were carried out. The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to repeat, on the President's behalf, the three principles of American policy which Dr. Kissinger had stated to Ambassador Bogdan in San Clemente on August 31.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Kissinger stated the

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 206.

following: (1) The United States has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania. (2) The United States will do nothing directly or indirectly that amounts to collusion that would enable a great power to abrogate the independence of Romania. (3) The United States will make clear in its way to the Soviet Union that unilateral pressures or military actions are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this statement and promised to report it directly to President Ceausescu.

As the conversation moved on to other aspects of European security, the President indicated that the U.S. was inclined to go slow on the convening of a Conference on European Security because we were not clear what substantively it would accomplish. We were interested in concrete talks on substantive issues, such as MBFR, the President said. On this we were willing to negotiate.

Dr. Kissinger added that anything that Romania could do to help cool things in Vietnam would be of great benefit to U.S.-Romanian relations. Our economic measures on Romania's behalf depended on there not being any increase in Romanian economic aid to North Vietnam. The President then emphasized that his patience with North Vietnam was running out. "Never underestimate what I will do when I am pressed."

The Ambassador then characterized Romania's position on Vietnam as being in favor of a political solution. President Ceausescu had made this point to the Chinese. At the same time, Romania thought that the NLF 7-point proposal<sup>3</sup> had been a constructive step forward.

The conversation ended with the Ambassador's thanking the President again for receiving him, and the President's asking the Ambassador again to convey his personal greetings to President Ceausescu.

Press photographers were invited in at the close. Mr. Ziegler announced the meeting at his late morning press briefing.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 206.

**208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Commerce Stans<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1971.

The President has considered your memoranda on the subject of Most Favored Nation treatment for Romania.<sup>2</sup> He has decided that the Administration should indicate favorable disposition for legislation empowering the President to authorize negotiation of Most Favored Nation treatment for Romania alone, on the condition that actual extension of MFN be withheld until an agreement has been reached on Romanian repayment of dollar bond debts. In addition, he has authorized the Secretary of State to send the attached letter informing Chairman Mills of the Administration's support for legislation giving the President authority to negotiate MFN with Romania.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to requesting broader authority to negotiate MFN agreements with communist countries in general, the President has decided that further study is necessary and no action should be taken at this time.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**209. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bucharest, December 30, 1971, 1519Z.

3934. 1. *Begin summary:* At New Year reception today President Ceausescu asked me to transmit his "personal appeal to President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Confidential; Exdis.

Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam."<sup>2</sup> He also asked that his greetings be conveyed to President, and his thanks for recent affirmative actions on Ex-Im Bank and MFN.<sup>3</sup> Action requested: I recommend brief response from President to Ceausescu, in appropriate form, to keep open channel of communication between two Presidents and to exert whatever influence is possible on Romania in relation to Indochina. *End summary.*

2. At annual New Year reception today, President Ceausescu took me aside immediately after his remarks to the diplomatic corps and began conversation at asking: "Why has the United States begun again the bombing of North Viet-Nam?" I replied that every action of war is tragic for humanity and for the cause of peace. I said the United States particularly desired a cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a peaceful settlement of the conflict through negotiations; in recent weeks, however, North Vietnamese forces have attacked Saigon, crossed the DMZ, and stepped up their military operations in Cambodia and Laos. I said current limited air strikes should be seen against this background, and assured President Ceausescu that they represented no change in US policy. Ceausescu then asked me to transmit his "personal appeal to President Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam." He said that conflicts could not be settled by resort to force. I said that it would be salutary for all parties concerned to act on this basis; unfortunately, we had not yet been able to engage the North Vietnamese in real negotiations at the Paris talks.

3. President Ceausescu asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to President Nixon. He said he wished also to express his appreciation for the President's action in authorizing Ex-Im Bank credit facilities for Romania, and to thank him for the affirmative declaration of the administration's position to Congress concerning the MFN legislation.

4. I recommend Department and White House consider desirability of transmitting suitable brief message from President to Ceausescu, responding to latter's communication. I believe it would be worthwhile to do this briefly in some appropriate form as maintenance of communications opened between two Presidents earlier and to make whatever helpful input we can on Southeast Asia. While Romania's general stand on Indochina problems has often been stated for the

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<sup>2</sup> The attacks were in retaliation for North Vietnamese shelling of Saigon and increased troop infiltration.

<sup>3</sup> The administration announced Nixon's decision to extend Export-Import Bank facilities to Romania on November 30, 1971. (Telegram 216475 to Bucharest, November 30; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

record—most recently in today’s *Scinteia*—there is probably utility in our doing what we can to weigh in with Ceausescu in occasional high level communications designed to draw Romanian position back a little toward more neutral ground. Opportunities here are not large, but it remains true that Ceausescu sees himself in somewhat independent position from which he wishes to judge international issues on basis of Romanian “principles.”

**Meeker**

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## 210. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 21, 1972, 4:15–4:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

President Nixon’s Meeting with Romanian Vice President Manescu

### OTHER PARTICIPANTS

#### *Romania*

Vice President Manea Manescu

Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan

Mircea Mitran, First Secretary, Romanian Embassy (Romanian interpreter)

#### *United States*

President Nixon

General Alexander Haig, Jr.

Herbert Stein, Chairman, CEA

Charles Schaller, Department of State (United States interpreter)

Vice President Manescu began the conversation by extending cordial greetings and good wishes to President and Mrs. Nixon from President and Mrs. Ceausescu. President Ceausescu remembered with great pleasure his meetings with President Nixon in 1967, 1969 and 1970. He had asked the Vice President to convey his positive assessment of the state of United States-Romanian relations, and his appreciation to President Nixon for everything the President had done to further these

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

relations. President Ceausescu had also asked the Vice President to transmit a letter,<sup>2</sup> which he now wished to do.

Vice President Manescu said that, especially since 1969, there has been a steady expansion in our bilateral relations in the political, economic, technical-scientific and cultural spheres. The large number of high-level visits between the two countries had done much to foster relations, and his delegation was a modest addition in this respect.

The Vice President stated that Romania particularly appreciated the way in which bilateral economic relations have progressed. The President's determinations that Export-Import Bank facilities and Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs would be made available for trade with Romania were highly welcome. For these steps and many others, and for the President's expression of "welcome and support" for MFN legislation for Romania, Romania was sincerely grateful.

Vice President Manescu said President Ceausescu very much hoped that matters could be speeded up where MFN legislation for Romania is concerned. It was important to Romania that this problem be resolved so as to enhance prospects for bilateral trade. Romanian public opinion is fully informed regarding the development of United States-Romanian relations. It heartily approves of our constantly improving relations but awaits resolution of the MFN question. The Vice President commented that he frequently visits factories and is asked by workers when Romania will receive MFN, adding that many of these same people were on hand to greet President Nixon warmly during his visit to Romania.

The Vice President said Romania wishes further expansion in its relations with the United States and with the West. As President Nixon knew, Romania's trade was now roughly 50 percent with the West and 50 percent with the socialist countries. This alteration in Romania's trade pattern from its previous orientation toward the East had not been easy, but had been deliberately undertaken as a contribution to East-West relations and détente. Romania's principles of national sovereignty, non-interference, equal rights, non-recourse to force or the threat of force are sacred to the Romanian people. They are principles which should be paramount in international relations, in all dealings between states. President Ceausescu is convinced that all who share Romania's attachment to these principles will support her.

Vice President Manescu said he wished to conclude with several observations on international issues. President Ceausescu is now in

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 211.

Africa and will visit eight countries.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of the trip is to bear the message of friendship to these countries, to develop Romania's relations with them, and to convey Romania's sympathy for developing nations.

Romania supports every effort for détente and cooperation between nations. Romanian public opinion was fully informed on all aspects of President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China,<sup>4</sup> including the complete text of the communiqué. President Ceausescu, the Romanian Government and the entire Romanian people judge this visit to be a great event of historic importance for international relations and détente. Realizing that the main purpose of the President's visit was to improve Sino-American relations, Romania nonetheless considers it most important for the entire world that the United States and China had expressed attachment to the five cardinal principles which govern relations between states. It was also highly significant that these two great nations stated that they do not accept policies of hegemony. These are the reasons why Romania welcomed the President's visit to the People's Republic of China.

The Vice President said that President Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union<sup>5</sup> will also be of historic importance if it is concluded in the same spirit of cooperation on the basis of these same principles, equality and peaceful coexistence. In the context of today's world, of increasing understanding between nations, it is important to eliminate through political means the various hotbeds of war such as Vietnam and the Middle East. President Ceausescu firmly believes that tensions in these areas can be resolved through negotiations.

Vice President Manescu stated that Romania is actively working for a conference on European security, believing that conditions now exist which suggest good prospects for a successful conference. President Ceausescu asked President Nixon's support on this question. He also shares in full the President's belief and hope that nations, working together, can progress toward a generation of peace.

The President thanked Vice President Manescu for his presentation. He asked that Manescu convey to President and Mrs. Ceausescu best personal regards from him and Mrs. Nixon. He well remembered the visit he and Mrs. Nixon made to Bucharest in 1969, and the warm reception accorded them by the Romanian people. History might record that the visit, the first by an American president to a socialist

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<sup>3</sup> Ceausescu left on March 12 for a 1-month visit.

<sup>4</sup> February 17–28.

<sup>5</sup> May 22–29.

country since World War II, marked the beginning of a new era in United States relations with socialist countries.

The President said President Ceausescu would remember that, during their talks in 1969 and 1970, the two presidents discussed United States relations with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China.<sup>6</sup> The President added that, speaking quite frankly, the leaders of some socialist countries had not welcomed his visit to China. They had apparently professed the view that the visit was in some way directed against the Soviet Union. Romania, however, is in the unique position of having good relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and President Ceausescu had correctly evaluated the visit as one aimed at contributing toward world peace and directed against no one.

The President wished to assure President Ceausescu that, as the United States seeks better relations with large socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, it will continue to pursue development of relations with smaller socialist countries like Romania. His forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union was being undertaken to improve United States-Soviet relations. It would not, in any way, be at the expense of other countries.

The United States would move forward on the MFN question as rapidly as possible. Prospects for progress here have improved as the Vietnam problem has receded, and Romania has top priority where consideration for MFN is concerned. In the meantime, Romania can count on the continued friendship of the United States and on our abiding interest in further development of bilateral relations in economic and other areas.

The President said that the eyes of the world may now be on meetings between the United States and large socialist nations. The United States, however, does not forget for one moment the importance of its relations with smaller countries. We would always believe that nations have equal rights, including the right to have their own policy without foreign domination, and equally important contributions to make to world peace and progress. The President said that he and Mrs. Nixon would always remember their visit to Romania, and President and Mrs. Ceausescu's visit to Washington. Romania would always have a special place in their hearts.

The President asked once again that Vice President Manescu transmit his best wishes to President Ceausescu, and his thanks for the letter which Manescu had brought. The President said he would be

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<sup>6</sup> See Documents 183, 184, and 199.

replying to the letter.<sup>7</sup> In conclusion, he expressed pleasure at having been able to meet with Vice President Manescu and the hope that the Vice President's visit to the United States would be pleasant and rewarding in every respect.

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 211.

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## 211. Letter From President Nixon to Romanian President Ceausescu<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 31, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter which was conveyed to me by Vice President Manescu on March 21.<sup>2</sup> I very much appreciate your expression of greetings and good wishes, and reciprocate them most cordially.

I remember with pleasure our discussions in Bucharest and Washington, and fully share your view that the good relations which exist between the United States and Romania have been further strengthened since our last meeting in October 1970. The visit of Vice President Manescu is an important contribution to the further development of Romanian and American friendship and cooperation, and to our valuable exchange of views at all levels. I was happy for the opportunity

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 210. A rough translation of the letter from Ceausescu to Nixon reads in part: "Dear Mr. President, . . . I am glad to note that since our last meeting, further progress has been recorded . . . [in] Romanian-American relations. . . . I have learned with satisfaction about the authorization given to the Export-Import Bank to ensure and guarantee the granting of credits to Romania to purchase goods and services from the U.S.A. . . . Certainly, the increase of our imports from your country raises, of necessity, the problem of creating favourable grounds so that Romanian exports to the American market would also increase to a corresponding extent, thus ensuring . . . [an equalization of] the balance of payments. I know and appreciate the efforts made by you, Mr. President, in this direction and also as regards the granting of the 'most favoured nation clause' to my country. I would be glad if these efforts would lead, within the shortest possible time, to the desired results." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres).

to meet with the Vice President during his stay in Washington and pleased that he could talk with a number of high officials of our Government.

It is my hope and expectation that United States-Romanian relations will continue to expand—in the economic field—and in other areas as well. In this spirit I made the determination last November that Export-Import Bank facilities be made available for trade with Romania and—as we announced during Vice President Manescu's visit—that Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs be made available for private United States investment in joint ventures in Romania and Yugoslavia.

It is also my desire that the United States Congress grant discretionary power enabling me to authorize negotiation of a commercial treaty with Romania including the power to extend Most Favored Nation tariff treatment. My views on this important matter were communicated to the Congress on December 14, 1971,<sup>3</sup> and we have been doing everything possible to further this objective since that time. I earnestly hope that the Congress will pass such legislation in the near future.

The United States will continue to pursue actively the goal of expanded relations with Romania. We believe the achievement of this goal is in the best interests not only of our two countries but also of peace and understanding in the entire international community. I want to assure you of my personal interest in seeing that this goal is achieved.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in sending warm personal regards to you and to Mrs. Ceausescu.

Sincerely,

**Richard Nixon**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 208.

**212. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

Ceausescu's Doubts about the Summit

Ambassador Meeker, when he delivered to Ceausescu the President's letter about the Summit,<sup>2</sup> had to listen (cable at Tab A)<sup>3</sup> to the Romanian President's "doubts" about the Moscow communiqué and US-Soviet basic principles.<sup>4</sup> Ceausescu's comments included:

—the SALT agreements did not take account of third state interests and offered no Soviet or US commitment not to use nuclear weapons;

—a resultant danger was that some third countries, for example India, would seek to acquire nuclear weapons and other cheap mass destruction weapons, such as lasers;

—the Moscow communiqué's language about US and Soviet respect for each other's interests implies a joint purpose to establish an "equilibrium" between the two powers. But such an equilibrium would be "fragile" and could be upset by third countries.

Ceausescu thought that international relations should be based on norms applicable to all countries and on international institutions with general participation. At the end of his discussion with our Ambassador, after asking that the President be thanked for his message,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

<sup>2</sup> In a June 28 letter Nixon wrote to Ceausescu with regard to the Moscow summit: "It is my firm conviction that this visit to Moscow will enhance the possibilities for obtaining greater security in Europe so that all countries there may determine their own destinies, free from interference and regardless of differences or similarities in their social systems. As I mentioned to Vice President Manescu on March 21, I am determined that as the United States seeks better relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, it will also continue to improve its relations with Romania. . . . As we build those relations, you can be sure that the United States will remain committed to the principle that nations have equal rights, including the right to develop their own internal and external policies, and that all nations have important contributions to make to world progress and peace." The letter was transmitted to Meeker in telegram 110847 to Bucharest, June 20. (Ibid., Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres.)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2189 from Bucharest, June 23. Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> For texts, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–642.

Ceausescu did express the hope that the Summit would turn out to be a positive influence.

Ceausescu's remarks reflect the Romanian unease, which will not be easily dispelled, that the Soviets may interpret some parts of the Moscow documents as a license to put more pressure on countries within their sphere of influence. The President's trip to Warsaw<sup>5</sup> demonstrated our opposition to any condominium concepts, and Secretary Rogers' visit to Romania this week<sup>6</sup> will also be helpful in that regard, perhaps easing some of Ceausescu's worries.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> May 31–June 1. See Documents 163–166.

<sup>6</sup> July 5–6. See Document 213.

<sup>7</sup> Kissinger wrote a note at the top of the page: "Have we seen Rogers' discussion?"

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### 213. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Belgrade, July 7, 1972, 1755Z.

Secto 198/3307. For the President from the Secretary. My visit to Romania reaffirmed the wisdom of your decision to visit there in 1969<sup>2</sup> and to have Ceausescu come to Washington in 1970.<sup>3</sup> The welcome of the President and the Foreign Minister was most warm and cordial and they seized upon this first visit by an American Secretary of State to further US-Romanian relations. We advanced that relationship by signing for the first time in 191 years a consular convention with Bucharest.<sup>4</sup> We also took steps to ease entry requirements, to permit greater travel freedom to Romanian diplomats in the U.S., and to speed consideration of loans by the EX-IM Bank.

Both the Foreign Minister and the President stressed in strong terms their wish for action by the administration on MFN for Romania.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State's Visit to Mid-East and European Countries. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 178, 183, and 184.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 199.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the convention, see 24 UST 1317.

They understand our difficulties but urged that receipt of MFN is essential to the further improvement of our relations.<sup>5</sup>

I saw President Ceausescu for almost four hours. The first two with a small group of advisers present were spent on Vietnam.<sup>6</sup> I will want to talk to you about this conversation when I return because I believe it may have considerable significance.<sup>7</sup>

I then met privately with the President where I reviewed your Moscow trip and other matters.<sup>8</sup>

The President and his government attach great importance to their relations with us and were appreciative that you took fully into account in Moscow their interest in maintaining equal sovereign power regardless of their social system or Pact membership.

**Rogers**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 4011 from Rome, July 12, contained a memorandum of Rogers's conversation with Manescu on July 6, in which the two discussed MFN in some detail. The telegram reads in part: "The Secretary . . . provided a detailed exposition of the status of MFN legislation for Romania, referring to his recent discussion of the matter with Ambassador Bogdan in Washington. As a consequence of that meeting, the Secretary had talked with Chairman Mills who thought the prospects were 'dim' in the period before the elections. . . . He explained that because of strong protectionist sentiment in an election year, riders of a protectionist nature would be attached making passage doubtful or the President's veto necessary. The Secretary expressed his confidence that passage could be secured after the elections. . . . Manescu said that the Secretary's presentation and the practical problems arising from our balance of payments difficulties and the closeness to elections were understood." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 133193 to Bucharest, July 22, contains a memorandum of Rogers's July 6 conversation with Ceausescu on Vietnam. (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger, met with Rogers on the morning of July 15. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 2666 from Bucharest, July 31, contained an account of Rogers's July 6 discussion with Ceausescu provided by Romanian interpreter Sergiu Celac. The telegram reads in part: "Secretary explained bilateral agreements reached in Moscow, and emphasized that they did not prejudice rights of other countries not represented at Moscow talks. He alluded to statement of basic principles and said that declarations included here should help promote U.S. and Romanian interest in equal rights for all states, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. Ceausescu said he had read Moscow documents with care; he saw that U.S. and USSR had given each other certain undertakings in nuclear weapons field, but for middle and smaller powers there was no commitment by great powers not to use nuclear weapons against them. Secretary replied that perhaps something to take care of this concern could be worked into a declaration on use or threat of force to be considered at CSCE." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—)

## 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Bucharest, July 13, 1972, 0925Z.

2482. Subject: GOR Request for USG Assistance. Ref: State 098387.<sup>2</sup>

1. On evening July 10, I called on Manea Manescu in his Council of State office to convey Department's reply to GOR's three "packages" of requests for assistance.<sup>3</sup> Making points enumerated in referenced instruction, I said USG had increased CCC line of credit by 40 million dollars to total of 61 million with 36-month repayment, but that sales of agricultural commodities with longer-term credit and with repayment in other than dollars was not authorized for Romania under existing legislation. I said that some interest has been expressed within Department of Agriculture in legislation that would authorize PL-480-type sales to Romania. However, it seemed not within realm of possibility that such legislation could be adopted this year, particularly in view of forthcoming US elections.

2. I told Manescu there was no existing legislative basis for government-to-government loan to Romania, and that any transaction of this nature would require action by Congress; it seemed to me that this would present many problems, and in any event could not be considered this year. In this connection I pointed out that EXIM Bank's authorized and pending credits for transactions with Romania are in neighborhood of 100 million dollars, and also that US has made Romania—alone among CEMA countries—eligible for OPIC programs.

3. Regarding package three, USG-GOR cooperation in African economic development, I said I understood that President Ceausescu raised this possibility during his private conversation with Secretary on July 6.<sup>4</sup> Pointing out that US economic activity abroad involves mainly US private corporations, I again urged Manescu to provide a list of specific projects or areas of special interest to permit Department of Commerce to bring them to attention of US private firms interested in such trade and investment opportunities. I went on to say that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files, Europe, Rumania, Vol. IV., Jan 1972—Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 2; it instructed the Embassy to inform the Romanian Government that it was not eligible for P.L.-480 sales. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO WHEAT 17 ROM-US)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1396 from Bucharest, April 28, Meeker reported that Manescu had presented an "appeal" for assistance in three areas. (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 8, Document 213.

whereas present legislation would not permit USG–GOR joint financing of aid activities, it might be possible to participate in multi-donor projects in Africa in which GOR was a participant. Referring to Secretary's conversation with President Ceausescu on July 6, I said that, if relations should be re-established between US and Sudan in near future, a US aid program might be resumed in that country and, if so, there might be possibility of some procurement from Romania in connection with such a program.

4. Manescu thanked me for presentation and said he would inform GOR leadership fully. He said he had hoped that I would be giving him a "more positive answer," but did not dwell on this disappointment. Instead, he said he understood fully difficulties of obtaining new legislation, particularly during election period, and said he hoped proposals could be re-examined after elections.

5. Manescu indicated that GOR gave highest priority to securing of long-term, low-interest government credits (second package) by stating this was of "great importance." He expressed appreciation for increase in CCC credits extended to Romania, but indicated that need for these was no longer pressing ("we will study our needs"). (*Comment*: Manescu did not refer to current agricultural situation, but we think in view of greatly improved weather conditions since mid-April that earlier pessimistic crop forecasts no longer appear warranted.) Finally, Manescu said GOR was currently working on a study of possible economic projects in Africa (specialists are now in field studying possibilities first-hand). When this study is completed, GOR will be in a better position to identify specific areas of possible cooperation with US—either on multi-donor government aid project or in joint ventures with US firms. Manescu also expressed interest in possibility of supplying goods and services for use in aid programs.

6. At conclusion of meeting, Manescu referred to Secretary's recent visit and continuing development of good relations between our two countries. However, he urged that both sides strengthen their efforts to do more to promote economic relations. He said that development of economic relations and trade is key to further development of relations in all other areas. He therefore hoped that 1973 would bring MFN and related disinvocation of Article XXXV of GATT.<sup>5</sup>

7. *Comment*: Although Manescu has been principally in Mangalia over past few weeks, undoubtedly deeply involved in preparations for national party conference, he has also visited Bucharest periodically and presumably could have arranged to see me earlier to receive

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<sup>5</sup> For Article XXXV of GATT (61 Stat. [5] and [6]), signed October 31, 1947, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1947*, p. 2955.

reply to requests for USG assistance. He attended Independence Day reception and was present at Ceausescu's lunch for Secretary. Thus would appear that Manescu preferred to postpone meeting until after Secretary's visit, being no doubt already aware of probable tenor of our replies to his three "packages."

**Meeker**

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**215. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1972.

SUBJECT

Letter from President Ceausescu

President Ceausescu has written you expressing his "entire satisfaction"<sup>2</sup> about the state of US-Romanian relations. He cites recent improvements, such as the US-Romanian Consular Convention, our extension of EX-IM credit, and increased exchanges of persons. He thanks you for your personal interest in relations with Romania. (Tab A)<sup>3</sup>

Citing his talks with Secretary Rogers in Bucharest July 6,<sup>4</sup> Ceausescu reiterates that he recognizes the "positive significance" of the agreements which you made in Moscow but says that they should be part of a "general trend" toward "new and fair" relations among all states based on "generally shared" principles of international law. He adds that he is thus particularly satisfied with your view, which is expressed in your letter of June 28 (Tab B)<sup>5</sup> and lifted verbatim by Ceausescu in his response, that "... nations have equal rights, including the right to develop their own internal and external policies, and that all nations have important contributions to make to world peace."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Nixon wrote "good" above "entire satisfaction."

<sup>3</sup> The letter is attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 213.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 212.

With this passage in his letter, President Ceausescu is in effect saying to you: “The ultimate test of the success of your Moscow Summit is whether the Soviets now leave us alone.”

Other, minor, points in the letter:

—Ceausescu believes that conditions are favorable to a quick settlement of Vietnam in the Paris negotiations;

—he feels it very important to make new efforts in the Middle East;

—he wants the establishment of a “lasting system” of security and cooperation in Europe and a CSCE to that end, which will be a “landmark.”

He looks forward to US-Romanian cooperation on a CSCE—an evident reference to plans for informal discussions this fall between our foreign ministries on the conference.

There is no need for any action on your part at this time.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Nixon wrote at the bottom of the second page: “K: Should reply to his letter—expressing ‘positive’ reaction to extent possible and warm personal comments re constructive role he has played in bringing about better East-West relations.” On September 20 Kissinger forwarded such a draft letter to Nixon. The President signed the letter, dated September 21. A note attached to the signed letter reads: “Letter delivered to Romanian Embassy. No copy of original to go to State.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres.)