ACLD Minutes, November 17, 2003

Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy
Minutes of Meeting on 
November 17, 2003
Room 1406
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 

1. Attendance

Mr. Donahue stated that since the last meeting there have been many important developments in the Muslim world. The ACLD Working Group has been trying to keep informed on Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the rest of the Muslim world. All members of the Working Group are present at the current meeting, except Ms. Chavez-Thompson and Prof. Christopher Candland, whose teaching responsibilities kept him from attending.

Mr. Donohue introduced the first speaker, Mr. Richard Olson, who has been with the Department of State for 21 years and is currently the Director of the Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs (NEA/IPA).

Mr. Olson
Director of the Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs

The Meeting will focus on what we see as possibilities for success of administration policy in Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs has seven officers who provide support for the Middle East peace process and manage our bilateral relations with the Government of Israel (GOI) and with the Palestinian Authority (PA).

The difficulty is in knowing where to start in speaking of a conflict that is at least 100 years old. Perhaps the best place to begin is with the President’s speech on June 24, 2002, where he called for new leadership within the PA, for the establishment of a free and democratic State of Palestine, living in peace and security with Israel.

The most significant advance for administration policy since that speech was the adoption of the Roadmap, our plan for bringing about the two-state solution. The Roadmap was developed by the U.S.A., the EU, Russia, and the UN, (the Quartet). It was adopted at the Aqaba Summit, where President Bush met with Prime Minister Sharon and then-Prime Minister Abu Mazen, both of whom endorsed the Roadmap as the way forward and made various commitments. Most significant was Abu Mazen's speech recognizing Israel and the tragedies in Jewish history. Sharon also made commitments to the process. Aqaba was a highpoint and its immediate aftermath saw some progress, but we are at a very different place now.

Aqaba was followed rapidly by a ceasefire by Palestinian elements such as Islamic Jihad. This was not sufficient. There was no significant effort by the PA to dismantle the threats to security on their side. Likewise, there was not significant movement on the GOI side to remove outposts, freeze settlements, or release prisoners. A critical element was the failure of the PA to address the security issue. The peace process since Oslo has been characterized by the land for peace formulation, the notion that Israel will give up control over certain territory provided that the threats to its security are eliminated. But fundamental goals to ensure Israel’s security were not achieved. The PA security forces remained segmented as seven independent groups under the control of Yassir Arafat, not of Abu Mazen. This made it impossible for the PA to take necessary action against weapons depots, missile factories, etc. By the end of summer the GOI was taking action in Hebron in response to a suicide bombing. The cycle of reprisals continued up to the latest suicide bombing in Haifa in October.

On the political side, the Abu Mazen government collapsed. Among the key reasons were that Arafat continued to play an unhelpful role, that the security forces were not consolidated under the Prime Minister, and that Arafat played a role behind scenes to undermine the Abu Mazen government. After the collapse, an emergency government of questionable authority was formed under Abu Ala, by a decree from Arafat that he refused to submit to the legislative council. The legitimacy of that government has now been resolved with the present constitutional government under Abu Ala.

We are going to judge the PA government by its performance. Abu Ala does have a reputation based on his participation in the peace process in Oslo. The fundamental question remains can PA give Israel the security assurances necessary to move the process forward? Can it take the necessary steps to end the capacity of terrorist groups to undermine the peace process?

There have been some interesting signs lately. Two unofficial peace plans have been submitted for public debate, each the product of Palestinian and Israeli collaboration. The Geneva Initiative is a fairly detailed product of two participants in the Oslo peace process, both of whom are now out of government, meeting under the auspices of the Swiss government. As a matter of official policy, the US is still committed to the Roadmap and has not endorsed any other initiative.

The other recent initiative comes from a former Director of Israeli Security Service and a prominent Palestinian academic. Unlike the Geneva Initiative, it deals with broad principles rather than details.

One of the primary factors we are looking at is the demographic challenge presented by the regional situation. Many Israelis are intensely aware of it, and it is the subtext for the discussion taking place in Israel now. In the next ten to fifteen years the population of Jewish Israelis in the Holy Land west of the Jordan will become a minority and Muslim Arabs will be the majority. This change will have profound implications: it will either be increasingly difficult for Israel to remain a Jewish state or to remain a democracy. Either the Jewish minority will have to adopt characteristics and methods distinctly anti-democratic in order to remain in control, or the identity as a Jewish state will have to be sacrificed to the principle of democracy. This is the primary motivation for the President’s move toward the two-state solution to the problem. Meanwhile, the separation barrier, settlements, and terrorist attacks logically work against the two-state solution.

I will stop here for questions.

Q. What is your reading on the public position taken by four former GOI defense ministers against Sharon?

A. There is no official position. The action indicates the degree of ferment in Israel. There is a de facto ceasefire right now. Many in the Israeli body politic are beginning to think of political solutions rather than of the immediate security situation. People are beginning to question whether there is a need for a more active political track. I don't want to be overly optimistic, but there is an opportunity.

Q. We have followed the question of Arab employment in Israel with concern, along with the prospect for strategies that might bridge the situation, like creating EPZs along the Green Line. Does the current situation call for more emphasis on creating employment opportunities within Palestine?

A. One of the most severe consequences of the last year is that Palestine has been under effective closure, with people unable to work in Israel. The Occupied Territories have become largely dependent on foreign assistance for social services and even food. The Palestinian economy must be revived and employment generation has to be a part of that. The US has urged the GOI to lift the closure wherever possible consistent with security. There has been some lifting in the last two weeks. There have been some successful initiatives on the border, successful because they take security concerns into account. We would want to pursue both of these efforts.

Q. What observation can you make on the economic viability of the two-state approach? Is a Palestinian state viable solely based on the Palestinians working within Israel?

A. Generally, our policy would be to favor economic integration throughout the region, not just between Israel and Palestine. But the US would not accept that as a formal position in final status negotiations. In terms of defense, the separation barriers being built by Israel are cutting off Palestinian farmers from their fields, a problem supposedly addressed by installing gates. The fundamental objection of the U.S. is how the fence runs, and that it involves the confiscation of Palestinian land.

Q. What would be an analogy to the economic integration of which you speak?

A. In a number of places, an important part of conflict resolution has been economic integration. One can look at Europe after WWII, or perhaps the Balkans today.

Q. Please comment on the problem of agricultural development in Gaza; the requirement of passing their produce through Israeli middlemen is causing them to suffer disadvantageous prices and spoilage. What has happened to the Gaza airport?

A. Gaza airport has not operated for the past three years and has been effectively destroyed. The agricultural problem is significant for Gaza and the West Bank. Products shipped across the Green Line are subjected to a panoply of security measures. These can result in spoilage and losses. There are technical means to address the security issues and avoid these losses, but first there must be the political will to do so. This goes back to the need for security issues to be addressed.

Q. What information or reporting do you get on trade unions in the West Bank, especially their constructiveness?

A. The Palestine General Federation of Trade Unions is active on the West Bank and our consular personnel are in touch with them. An ILO mission was there last summer and briefed us. The trade unions’ influence is not terribly large because most people are focused on the conflict as it affects their everyday lives. For this, the more important organizations are Fatah and Islamic Jihad.

Q. We have a Labor Officer stationed in Israel. Could you tell us if she is charged with reporting on Palestine as well?

A. No. Only three officers in all the Embassy are charged with reporting on PA and Gaza. Palestinian affairs are covered out of the Consulate General in Jerusalem. All of the officers in Jerusalem have responsibility for Palestinian issues.

Q. Is the Roadmap still viable?

A. We see the Roadmap as the way forward: the two-state solution, with both parties taking care of their respective obligations. We remain committed to the Roadmap. It lays out three stages: (1) confidence building; (2) laying out a Palestinian state with provisional borders; and (3) the establishment of the Palestinian state. It contains nothing on the final issues of refugees, Jerusalem, or borders (unlike the two recent plans, Geneva Initiative, etc). We see the Roadmap as a way forward and it is up to parties to resolve final status issues. But any forward movement will be rapidly undone by terrorist activities-- leading to tightened security measures and further isolation.

Q. Can PA handle its security problem?

A. There is probably the capacity to do it, but what is lacking is political will. We want them to round up weapons, dismantle factories for home-made rockets. This will quickly bring about a situation where Israel can respond by opening the economy, closing outposts, and moving forward.

Q. We are just past the 20-year anniversary of Camp David. I was more optimistic then than now; there were fewer settlements, terrorists were less well organized, and the Israeli leadership didn't believe in a military solution.

A. It is a history of lost opportunities all round.

Q. Going back to the earlier trade issue, the U.S. has an FTA with Israel and another with Jordan, but none with PA. Is this a carrot being held back for a time when they behave better? Apropos lost opportunities, we frequently hear that everyone knows what a peace agreement would look like, if we could only get there. Is this true or a figment of certain imaginations?

A. Pres. Clinton’s Camp David negotiations of 2000 continued in a region at Taba in January 2001 (under the Clinton/Barak governments). The product of Taba and the other plans earlier discussed lay out similar formulae with respect to the two-state solution. The Geneva Initiative is probably based on the Taba negotiations. What is needed for a peace agreement is a formula, negotiations, and political will. The hardest to get is political will.

Q. I am concerned that economic development awaits a solution to the security issue. We recognize that widespread unemployment destabilizes the political situation and the security situation. We might recommend dealing with economic issues as one means of addressing the security problem.

A. We recognize economic concerns; this year we added $50 million to the $75 million previously budgeted for the PA. The problem is that it is difficult to move forward practically with economic development while the security situation is as it is.

Q. Is direct access of the Palestinians to markets for export something we are trying to develop or must it wait on a final resolution?

A. We are constantly urging Israel to relieve the problems at checkpoints as a way as relieving humanitarian concerns.

Q. In the two-state solution, is it assumed that the Hamas problem is solely the problem of the PA?

A. One of the reasons for the increase of Hamas influence has been their provision of social services that under a normal situation would be offered by the PA. The reason for the addition of $20 million to our support for the PA was to allow them to provide these services as an alternative to Hamas. We are also trying to get some donors in Europe to cut off funding for Hamas’ social activities.

Q. My simple-minded reaction to what you say about economic integration is to find it impossible to conceive of anything working without economic integration.

A. In that connection, one of our major responses is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Liz Cheney.

Q. My experience is that old problems never get solved; hopefully they become irrelevant. In the Irish situation, the development of the EU caused all parties to begin refocusing on that entity. It would do us all good to spend some time focusing on this problem of economic integration.

Secretary Powell has said that one of his top five goals is the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Since liberation, the Loya Jirga has met and elected an interim President. Congress provided even more U.S. aid to Afghanistan than the Administration had requested. It has made $1.7 billion available for FY04, in addition to the Administration's request. The hope is to use these funds to have an impact before June 2004 elections.

A Constitution recently has been drafted. An election for President in June 2004 is to be followed by legislative elections the following year.

Security priorities include building a national police force and a border security force to deal with infiltration from Pakistan by Taliban supporters and remnants of Al Qaida.

Taliban/Al Qaida have stepped up targeted attacks on the UN and NGOs. Security remains the USG's primary concern. The U.S. plan for building an Afghan army includes having capacity to train a 10,000-man army by January 2004. Collection of customs revenues, which will be the main revenue source for the central government, is a priority on which much more work remains to be done.

The USG is funding civil society building through NGOs as the centerpiece of democracy and governance promotion programs. The USG is also funding support for constitution-writing.

The USG is funding reconstruction of a road from Kabul to Herat. The first portion of that road—Kabul to Kandahar—has been completed. The United States is also building schools and clinics/hospitals. Funds will also go to health infrastructure building and to creating government capacity.

The USG has stood up eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which include DOD, State, and USAID staff, in areas outside the capital. The PRTs support reconstruction, including the disarmament program being run by the UN.

With regard to labor programs, the USG is just beginning. NDI and USDOL are starting small programs, for example, to minimize use of child labor in export industries, such as carpet making.

Questions:

Q: It has been U.S. experience since WWII that the labor movement becomes involved in the reconstruction of countries. In Afghanistan, the AFL-CIO keeps hearing that this will happen, but there has been little sign of it to date. When might this change and how?

A: It's too soon to expect much. There are few labor organizations in Afghanistan, since there were few under the Taliban. Security impedes any activities, even in the capital and even for USG personnel.

Q: The ILO has expertise and contacts in Afghanistan, but its resources are not being called on.

A: The Solidarity Center in Colombo has been involved.

Q: The Solidarity Center has received little financial support from either the USG or the National Democratic Institute. Security is also a serious impediment to activity by the American Center for International Labor Solidarity in Afghanistan.

A: Political parties are highly fragmented, localized, and numerous. This does not bode well for labor union organization.

Q: Security problems are delaying labor initiatives by NGOs.

A: Provincial reconstruction teams may eventually ameliorate security conditions outside the capital.

Q: A labor expert sent to Afghanistan suggested that something similar to the Job Corps is needed when security conditions permit.

A: The Afghan government has begun an employment program with World Bank support. It has also begun a conservation corps, to be engaged in such activities as reforestation.

Q: State and DOL might look at Job Corps programs as a model. Part of the problem is that there is little non-agricultural work in Afghanistan.

Q: ILO has an office in Afghanistan, operates projects there, and is planning more. Total ILO project committed funding totals $12 million.

Q: What suggests that a sustainable democracy is possible in Afghanistan given its history and ethnic diversity? What suggests that a narco-state will not result?

A: USG programs are designed to encourage participation in government by all regions including traditionally disenfranchised regions. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are intended to permit distribution of aid benefits to all regions.

Q: Comparing the USG funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with the USG funding for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, it seems small. Is that all Afghanistan can absorb?

A: $1.7 billion is not the full amount of US funding for Afghanistan.

Q: Does the road building project generate local employment?

A: Yes. Asian Development Bank and Japanese road building projects also use chiefly local labor.

Q: How many local workers are being employed in road building projects?

A: I don't know, but I will get that information for you.

Mr. Donahue introduced the meeting’s third speaker, NEA’s Senior Advisor Thomas S. Warrick. Mr. Warrick introduced his colleagues Sahar Khoury and Robert Godec, who work with him on Iraqi reconstruction under NEA/IR Coordinator Ambassador Robin Raphel and NEA DAS Philo Dibble.

Mr. Warrick gave a political update. Administration activities in Iraq were led by the CPA under the direction of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who led an interagency team of several hundred Americans focusing on the reconstruction of Iraq. The team operated out of a former palace of Saddam Hussein located in the “Green Zone,” an area secured by the U.S. military. Mr. Warrick noted that during a recent visit to Iraq during Ramadan he had been impressed by the vibrant Iraqi life outside the Green Zone as well, where he had seen hundreds of Iraqis shopping in open markets and carrying on normal life as in any large city in the Arab world.

He noted however that the Iraqis continue to be preoccupied with security concerns.
There were stories of incidents involving people who cooperated with the CPA. The need to provide better security was illustrated by the recent assassination of two judges in Najaf and Mosul. There was a major ongoing effort to return responsibility for security to Iraqis, since they were best at ensuring security for their fellow Iraqis. Efforts also continued to root out former regime loyalists.

The Iraqi people recognize that they have been liberated. Economic life was returning, but not as fast as we would like. In this context, a recent decree, liberal for the region, sought to increase foreign investment. Oil production was excluded for the present, and land ownership was also restricted to Iraqis. However, the opening of trade regimes was enormous. A flat tax of 15% was being imposed, as the only possible method in current circumstances. Meanwhile, a tariff “holiday” was in force until the end of the current year.

There had been rapid political evolution in the past few days. Agreement had been reached that a plan would be put together. Elected Iraqis, as proposed by Ayatollah Sistani, would draft a constitution. This would, of course, take time and require a transitional “bridge.” A Fundamental (or Basic) Law would guide this transition, ensuring basic rights, such as freedom of speech, provincial and local councils in the 18 provinces, and an independent judiciary (this last was a Iraqi tradition that predated Saddam Hussein). The Fundamental Law would also assure Iraqi control over Iraqi military and security forces. It would enter into force in February 2004, and continuing until its termination date, which coincided with the introduction of the new Iraqi constitution.

Meanwhile, elections for a National Transitional Assembly were being planned for May 2004. This Assembly was to elect new ministers. By March 15, 2005, a Constitutional Assembly would be elected, leading to a new Iraqi government by the end of 2005.

Mr. Warrick noted that some members of the Iraqi Governing Council were in Washington at present. He added that the Iraqi authorities were beginning to make decisions and to give guidance to CPA Chief Bremer.

With regard to the larger environment in Iraq, recent polling results were encouraging. The State Department had conducted a survey of over 1000 Iraqis throughout the country. To the question “Whom would you like to see in government?” responses had mainly endorsed a government of technocrats and professionals such as scientists, doctors, engineers, lawyers and teachers. Women and businessmen were also mentioned, and – to a lesser extent – religious leaders. Respondents had also emphasized the desirability of qualifications and experience.

At the same time, Mr. Warrick said Iraq had a long way to go in developing political parties. People had no confidence in them except in the Kurdish areas, due to their experience during the past years of self-rule. Particularly diffident were the Sunni areas, for example the cities of Falluja and Sulaimaniya.

Other political values which had been endorsed by those polled were free and fair elections, rule of law, power-sharing, freedom to criticize government, freedom of the press, and equal rights for women. Of least importance was a political role for religious leaders. The majority of those polled thus expressed support for democracy over Islamic government (except in the Shi’ite city of Najaf). And even those favoring an Islamic state also endorsed free and fair elections, rule of law, and free speech.

Mr. Warrick commented that many Iraqis were only beginning to understand what the above concepts were and what they signified. But Iraqis do know what they want. And those desires, he emphasized, corresponded to President Bush’s concepts of the basic demands of human dignity around the world.

Mr. Warrick said that he anticipated much jockeying back and forth between labor and employers, especially in regard to the expected privatization of state-owned enterprises.

In conclusion, Mr. Warrick said he evaluated Iraq as having a chance of doing very well in the long-term, after a period of initial difficulties.

Mr. Marshall asked who in Iraq wanted an Islamic state. Mr. Warrick said in the North roughly half the people wanted a Western style democracy, whereas in the South the division was one third for secular democracy, one third for an Islamic state, and one third for a hybrid (except in Najaf). He noted that preferences appeared to depend on experience and familiarity with the issues. Most Iraqis expressed a preference for the ultra-modern United Arab Emirates among regional states, and not for Iran: this boded well for the future. Nor was there any enthusiasm for a restored monarchy in Iraq – although there was a desire for a greater role for religious leaders.

Mr. Marshall asked if freedom of religion was to be part of the Iraqi bill of rights. Mr. Warrick replied that that while Islam would likely be the state religion, there would be tolerance for other religions.

Mr. Joyce inquired about existing Iraqi unions. Mr. Warrick noted they had been controlled under Saddam Hussein for the benefit of the state. He said that although the CPA had started a reform program for trade unions, information on this remained in the hands of the CPA. While factories had been shut down, workers continued to be paid. Workers in the oil industry were a problem, however, since previously they had enjoyed higher salaries than other workers, and now the CPA was paying them the same wages as others. The picture was more complex than in the past, with new actors as well as old Baathis. Mr. Joyce said he had the impression that the old Baathi unions had been reestablished. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) had also been involved. He asked who could be funding this activity, citing reports of Libyan and Syrian involvement. Who would know, he inquired. Mr. Dragnich, citing a past example of KGB money sent to London on the fall of the Soviet Union, explained that no one in the State Department followed this kind of issue any more. Mr. Joyce reiterated that someone ought to track it down. Mr. Warrick suggested the CPA was the best placed to know.

Mr. Joyce asked if any workers had been included in the survey described by Mr. Warrick. The latter replied that the survey had included professionals but not workers.

Mr. Kamberis asked what were the relations between Ambassadors Raphel and Bremer, and with the NSC. And what was the CPA position on the 1987 Iraqi law banning labor organizing in the public sector? Mr. Warrick said he had not yet seen this, Mr. Kamberis added that the UAE seemed a bad model for labor concerns; Mr. Warrick clarified that he had not meant to characterize it as a “model,” but rather as a median of the kind of society desired by Iraqis. Mr. Joyce reiterated that the Baathi unions have resources and had regrouped.

Mr. Donahue noted that the CPA had allowed them (the Baathi unions) access to funds, and that they were publishing a newspaper and traveling. The WFTU had helped with the creation of the Iraq Confederation of Trade Unions. While recognizing that the CPA lacked the resources to monitor these people, he asked if they would be elected as representatives of the Iraqi trade union movement. He added that the Committee wanted to know why there had been no mention of trade unions in the 13-volume study on Iraq prepared by the State Department and recently mentioned in the press. Mr. Joyce added that he could not understand the national security aspect of communist infiltration in Iraqi labor unions. Mr. Warrick explained that the Iraqi Communist Party was different from other communist parties, because of Iraq’s history. Mr. Joyce protested however that now the Communists were proposing to join with the Baathis.

Mr. Doyle asked about plans for privatization of state-owned enterprises. Mr. Warrick said they were in a state of flux. This was a deliberate process, requiring more Iraqi participation. It would be easier to handle smaller enterprises first. He suggested that developments of the next few days on the political track might further delay this process. Tom Foley was the person leading the group in Baghdad concerned by this issue. Mr. Doyle observed that this was an extremely complex issue, but suggested it was necessary to know who the employer was before talking about workers. Mr. Warrick added that it was also necessary to know who will be the buyer. A certain caution was needed; mechanisms had not yet been worked out, and he thought progress in this area would be slow. Mr. Donahue wondered whether the CPA was reluctant to deal with unions because it saw them as obstacles to privatization.

Mr. Freeman asked if decision-making lay not with the Department of State, where did it lie? Mr. Warrick responded that it lay principally with the CPA, and then with the Department of Defense, and finally with the President. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Stabilization Group under NSC Advisor Dr. Rice gave policy advice. He noted however that the CPA had broad autonomy.

Mr. Joyce stated he had met with DOD officials three weeks earlier, but that they had known nothing about Iraq’s trade union movement. Mr. Warrick referred him to the CPA’s “Reachback” office at DOD, but cautioned that almost all information remained with the CPA in Baghdad.

Mr. Doyle suggested the Committee should make a statement criticizing the coupling of Iraq’s economic development with security and political considerations. It should also call attention to trade unions. Mr. Sweeney agreed that the points raised in the Committee’s questions had been most significant. Mr. Donahue agreed, noting that some items cried out for immediate comment. He suggested that the Committee’s Working Group draft a short report on these issues. He also called for another full meeting of the ACLD in late January or early February. Mr. Joyce stated that Iraqi workers should have a voice in their country’s affairs and especially in the governmental process. Mr. Sweeney added that the Iraqi public sector employees should have the right to organize.

The meeting was adjourned by Chairman Donahue, and Committee members left for the luncheon hosted by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner in the Department’s eighth-floor dining room.

I, Thomas R. Donahue, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy, hereby certify the accuracy of the attached minutes of the November 17, 2003 meeting of the Advisory Committee.

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Thomas R. Donahue Date