Russia

Politically, economically, and socially, Russia continues to be a state in transition. While constitutional structures are well defined and democratic in conception, democratic institution building continues to face serious challenges, often due to significant limitations on the State's financial resources. The 1993 Constitution establishes a government with three branches and checks and balances, although it provides for a strong executive. The executive branch consists of an elected president and a government headed by a prime minister. There is a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly), consisting of the State Duma and the Federation Council, and a judicial branch. Both the President and the legislature were selected in competitive elections judged to be largely free and fair, with a broad range of political parties and movements contesting offices. President Boris Yeltsin was elected in 1996, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin took office in August. A more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December 19 in elections that were judged by international observers to be largely free and fair, although preelection manipulation of the media was a problem. On December 31, President Yeltsin resigned and Prime Minister Putin became Acting President. A presidential election is scheduled for March 2000. The judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack of resources and corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government throughout the Russian Federation. The FSB has broad law enforcement functions, including fighting crime and corruption, in addition to its core responsibilities of security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only limited oversight by the Procuracy and the courts. The military's primary mission is national defense, although it has been employed in local, internal conflicts for which it was prepared inadequately, and is available to control civil disturbances. More recently, internal security threats in parts of the Russian Federation have been dealt with by militarized elements of the security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic law enforcement. Many members of the security forces, particularly within the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit human rights abuses.

The economy has performed better than expected following the August 1998 financial crisis and the sharp devaluation of the ruble. Industrial production reached its 1997 level again in March and continues to grow. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the year was estimated at 1.5 percent, substantially higher than previously expected. At year's end, GDP was estimated at $75 billion (1.84 trillion rubles) for the first 6 months of the year. GDP per capita for the first 6 months of the year was $85 (2,086 rubles) per month. The inflation rate for the first 11 months of the year was 34.8 percent and was not expected to exceed 40 percent by year's end. Growth in industrial production is aided by high world prices for commodities such as oil, gas, and nickel. The ruble's devaluation also has given domestic producers a significant cost advantage over imported goods. However, greatly reduced domestic demand limits the scope of economic recovery. Real incomes shrank significantly during the year, and wage arrears continued to increase. Average wages were $66 (1,717 rubles) per month in October 1999, compared with $68 (1,123 rubles) per month in October 1998. Real consumer spending is still 11 percent below the 1997 average. Lack of investment also inhibits sustained economic growth. Although the ruble devaluation in August and September 1998 made Russian assets inexpensive, foreign investment has not increased. Domestic investment is being funded mainly from retained earnings. The ailing banking system also hampers domestic investment. The 1998 crash reduced the total assets in commercial banks by 52 percent. The public is wary of the private banking system, preferring to keep its money in state-owned Sberbank, where deposits have grown by 50 percent. The government statistics office estimates that the informal economy--barter and hidden commercial activity designed to avoid heavy tax and regulatory burdens--accounts for 24 percent of GDP. However, other authoritative sources believe it to be much higher. Corruption continues to be a dominant, negative factor in the development of commercial relations. Official unemployment was 11.7 percent in October, but actual unemployment was estimated at approximately 23 percent, with significant regional variation.

The Government's human rights record remained uneven, and worsened in some areas. Government forces killed numerous civilians through the use of indiscriminate force in Chechnya, and security officials' beatings resulted in numerous deaths. There were credible reports--and government officials admitted--that law enforcement and correctional officials tortured and severely beat detainees and inmates, and government forces reportedly raped civilians following the battle for the Chechen town of Alkhan-Yurt. Prison conditions continue to be extremely harsh and frequently are life threatening. According to human rights groups, between 10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary facilities annually, some from beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and lack of medical care. The Government has made little progress in combating abuses committed by soldiers, including "dedovshchina" (violent hazing of new recruits). Military justice systems consistent with democratic practices remain largely underdeveloped. During the year, the military procuracy reported decreases in the number of reported crimes and hazing incidents. Existing laws on military courts, military service, and the rights of service members often contradict the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees, elevating arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law. There were reports of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice system. Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military procurators.

Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. Police and other security forces in various parts of the country continued their practice of targeting citizens from the Caucasus and darker-skinned persons in general for arbitrary searches and detention on the pretext of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration requirements. Police corruption also remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through training provided by other countries, but remain largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent with standards of law enforcement in a democratic society. While the President and the Government have supported human rights and democratic practice in statements and policy initiatives, they have not institutionalized the rule of law required to protect them. Most abuses occur at lower levels, but government officials do not investigate the majority of cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or discipline the perpetrators.

The Government made little progress in the implementation of constitutional provisions for due process, fair and timely trial, and humane punishment. In addition, the judiciary often was subject to manipulation by central and local political authorities and was plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. However, there were indications that the law is becoming an increasingly important tool for those seeking to protect human rights. Nonetheless, serious problems remain. For example, the case of Aleksandr Nikitin, a retired Soviet Navy captain and environmental reporter, continued to be characterized by serious violations of due process, and there are credible charges that the FSB's case against him was politically motivated. St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets found Nikitin not guilty on charges of treason and espionage in December after the FSB for the eighth time filed espionage charges against Nikitin in July. Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Government technical regulations that require Internet service providers to invest in equipment that enables the FSB to monitor Internet traffic caused serious concern. While the Government generally respected freedom of the press, significant systemic problems persisted, and there were continued reports of government pressure on the media. Private media, which flourished through the first half of 1998, came under increasing stress in the months after the August 1998 financial crisis. Faced with major financial difficulties, many media organizations saw their already tenuous autonomy erode during the year. Federal, regional, and local governments continued to exert pressure on journalists by: Selectively denying access to information (including, for example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and filming opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories prior to publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and hearings; withholding financial support from government media operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to unduly influence the appointment of senior editors at regional and local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them. Foreign and Russian journalists were frequent victims of kidnapings for ransom by criminals in Chechnya and throughout the northern Caucasus.

The Federal Government took steps to mitigate the potentially discriminatory effects of the 1997 religion law, and religious organizations, despite the severe limitations of the beleaguered judicial system, are winning some important court cases. By July religious groups reported that they were reregistering their local organizations successfully, although problems persisted in some regions. However, there are numerous reports that religious organizations either were denied registration or experienced long delays in reregistration, as local authorities sought to obstruct the activities of religious groups. On November 23, the Constitutional Court upheld the provision of the 1997 religion law that requires religious organizations to prove 15 years of existence in the country in order to be registered. However, the Court also ruled that religious organizations that were registered before the passage of the 1997 religion law are not required to prove 15 years' existence in the country in order to be registered. Religious organizations and human rights experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to extend the period for reregistration, to prevent a scenario in which a large number of religious organizations are left unregistered and therefore legally vulnerable to closure by court order after year's end. No extension was implemented as of December 31. While the Federal Government promised to implement measures to discourage local authorities from attempting to close unregistered religious organizations, critics of the law fear that at least some religious organizations may be forced to close. Discriminatory practices at the local level are attributable to the increased decentralization of power, as well as to government inaction and discriminatory attitudes that are held widely in society. In addition, some regional governments have passed laws and decrees since 1994 that restrict the activities of minority religious groups, some of which have been subject to harassment as a result. Societal discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of religious minorities remained a problem. Although there were improvements in some areas, there were continued reports of religious violence in the Northern Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic incidents.

Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow) restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These restrictions, though successfully challenged in court, remain largely in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government. The presence of these restrictions, which increased following terrorist bombings in September, demonstrated the continued obstacles to the enforcement of judicial rulings. In September Moscow authorities expelled some 500 residents of the Caucasus from the city.

Government human rights institutions are still weak and lack independence but are becoming more active. Although Human Rights Ombudsman Oleg Mironov was not known previously for expertise in human rights, he has taken an increasingly active and public role in promoting human rights, speaking out on the religion law, the rights of psychiatric patients, and electoral rights. Mironov has established an office with 150 staff members, who are responsible for investigating human rights complaints and promoting human rights education. Activists report that the Presidential Human Rights Commission, chaired by Vladimir Kartashkin, was relatively inactive during the year. With few exceptions, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) documented and reported on human rights violations without governmental interference or sanctions. However, some local officials harassed human rights monitors and, in some cases, arrested them. Violence against women, trafficking in women and young girls, and abuse of children remain problems, as does discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minorities. There are some limits on worker rights, and there were reports of instances of forced labor.

Chechen separatists also committed abuses, including the killing of civilians.

The 1997 Khasavyurt Accord established an uneasy peace in Chechnya following the 1994-96 conflict. However, on August 8, the status quo was broken when armed groups from Chechnya carried out an insurgent raid on neighboring Dagestan. Deadly terrorist bombings throughout Russia, allegedly the work of Chechens, were cited by the Government along with insurgent attacks in Dagestan as justification to launch a brutal assault on Chechnya to reassert federal control. Russian troops launched a full-scale attack on Chechen separatists in Chechnya starting in September, shelling cities, killing numerous civilians, and displacing hundreds of thousands of persons.

On February 3, Chechen republic president Maskhadov announced the suspension of constitutional law and declared a state of Islamic Shari'a law in the region. According to press reports, a shura (council) of prominent figures came into being on February 10 to help oversee Shari'a law. In the process, the Maskhadov government stripped the region's legislature of most of its responsibilities and abolished the region's vice presidency.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no confirmed political killings by agents of the Government; however, an undetermined number--between 10,000 and 20,000--of detainees and prison inmates died, some from beatings by security officials, but most due to harsh conditions in detention (see Section 1.c.).

During the conflict in Chechnya in the fall, the military used indiscriminate force against areas containing significant civilian populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see Section 1.g.). On November 25, drunken soldiers opened fire on a Chechen kiosk and killed one woman, Larisa Titiyeva, and injured two others. Authorities in both the army and the Interior Ministry together with local authorities were investigating the case at year's end.

In December human rights NGO's and some pro-Moscow Chechen authorities alleged that government forces carried out extrajudicial killings in the village of Alkhan-Yurt in Chechnya. According to these allegations, government forces engaged in a looting spree in Alkhan-Yurt after they captured the village from Chechen fighters in early December. According to some accounts, government troops killed between 19 and 41 civilians through mid-December. The Ministry of Defense at first denied that there were extrajudicial killings in Alkhan-Yurt but later announced that the Chief Military Procurator's office was investigating the incident (see Section 1.g.).

Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that up to 40 Ingushetiya-bound internally displaced persons (IDP's) were killed in a convoy attack on December 3 near Goity, southwest of Groznyy. Survivors of the incident reported that the assailants, who were masked, wore Russian armed forces uniforms. Some survivors claimed that the assailants were government troops. However, government officials publicly denied such suggestions and claimed that Chechen fighters carried out the attack as a provocation. At least one government official claimed that the site of the convoy attack was not under federal government control at that time.

According to unconfirmed press reports, police in the Nogai okrug killed two Nogais (see Section 5).

A number of government officials were murdered. Some of these killings appear to have been politically motivated, while the majority were linked to private financial or commercial dealings. A number of law enforcement officials also were killed as a result of their attempts to stem crime.

On April 9, in St. Petersburg local Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov was murdered near his home on the Griboyedova channel embankment. While the LDPR considered the killing to be a political murder, many observers believed that it was business-related.

On October 20, St. Petersburg legislative assembly deputy Viktor Novoselov was killed when a bomb was detonated on top of his car. Novoselov's driver also was injured as a result of the bombing. Press sources speculated that the murder was politically motivated since Novoselov was set to testify at a hearing later that day about the date of gubernatorial elections, and his testimony might have proved embarrassing to St. Petersburg administration officials.

In December prior to the Duma elections, a campaign worker for former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was killed by unknown assailants.

According to an international labor organization report, on January 27 unknown assailants murdered Gennady Borisov, a leader of the Vnukovo Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union, at the entrance to his apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists began picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being paid for 4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged illegal practices involving the company's shares (see Section 6.a.).

Politically related violence at times resulted in death and injuries. For example, in April and May the republic of Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (in the northern Caucasus) held its first presidential elections in post-Soviet history. The campaign period and elections were filled with incidents of violence aimed at the major candidates, as well as a high number of election irregularities that strongly suggested electoral fraud. The ensuing victory of Vladimir Semenev, which was upheld by local authorities, renewed the protests that now threaten the republic's territorial integrity. On September 7, eight persons were wounded and one died as a result of injuries during clashes between supporters of Semenev and his rival Cherkessk mayor Stanislav Derev (see Sections 1.c., 3, and 5).

On November 23, the supreme court of Kalmykiya found Sergey Vaskin and Vladimir Shanukov guilty of the June 1998 murder of Kalmykiya newspaper editor Larisa Yudina. Both men were sentenced to 21 years in prison. A third man, Sergey Lipin, received a lesser sentence for concealing information about the crime. The trial began in July. Yudina's murder was widely believed to be regional government retribution for her news stories investigating high-level corruption in the republic and criticizing Kalmykiya president Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (see Section 2.a.). In his August 16 Duma confirmation hearing, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin testified that the FSB continues to investigate who may have ordered the killing.

In July 1998, the Ministry of the Interior announced that four hired killers who were apprehended in the Kyrgyz Republic had confessed to the August 1997 killing of St. Petersburg deputy mayor Mikhail Manevich. Media reports at the time of Manevich's murder suggested that Manevich, who was chairman of the city property committee, was killed by individuals whose financial interests were threatened by his property privatization program. The person or persons who ordered the murder have not been identified. The FSB has expressed confidence in its ability to solve Manevich's murder, but former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak said that he no longer believed that the murder would be solved.

In January authorities arrested a sixth person from the Ministry of Defense, Deputy Chief of the Special Paratroopers' Detachment Major Konstantin Mirziayev, in connection with the 1994 murder of journalist Dmitriy Kholodov. In July Kommersant Daily reported that the Procurator General charged three officers of the airborne troops, one former officer, and another man in the case. A trial is expected in military court in the spring 2000.

No one has been charged yet in the November 1998 murder of State Duma Deputy Galina Starovoytova, who was murdered in what press reports characterized as a professional killing. Press reports at the time of the murder suggested that Starovoytova was killed to prevent her from revealing information on official corruption. Duma Deputy Yuliy Rybakov sent an official inquiry to the FSB, which replied that a politically-motivated murder is still the main scenario that it is investigating.

There has been no progress in the investigation of the 1995 murder of Russian Public Television (ORT) Director Vladislav Listyev. However, ITAR-TASS reported in March that investigators believe that his murder may have been connected with the division of the ORT's advertising market.

Reports of violence continue in the Northern Caucasus. On February 20, an explosion in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, killed one person and narrowly missed a group of Russian soldiers. On March 21, a bomb in downtown Groznyy killed one person and injured eight others in an apparent attempt to kill Chechen president Maskhadov. According to press reports, the bombing was the fourth attempt to kill Maskhadov since he became president in 1997. Chechen officials later claimed that the bombing was aimed, in conjunction with the Gennadiy Shpigun kidnaping, at destabilizing the political environment and discrediting the government (see Section 1.b.).

On March 19, an explosion in the central marketplace of the North Ossetian regional capital of Vladikavkaz killed at least 53 persons and injured about 100 more. Russian media reports attributed the explosion to a bomb. President Yeltsin and North Ossetian president Aleksandr Dzasokhov both criticized the explosion as an attempt to destabilize the republic and the Northern Caucasus region as a whole. President Yeltsin sent then-Interior Minister Sergey Stepashin to Vladikavkaz and ordered then-Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to launch an investigation into the bombing.

Since the Vladikavkaz marketplace bombing, a wave of similar attacks unsettled the situation in North Ossetia. In May three bombs in the Sputnik military housing compound killed 4 persons and injured 15. On June 3, an antitank mine killed one person and injured two others near the Baku-Novorossisk oil pipeline.

On May 23, gunmen injured Danilbek Tamkaev, an adviser to Chechen president Maskhadov, and killed his brother when they shot at his car in Groznyy. On May 25, a bomb hit the car of Chechen mufti Akhmad-hadji Kadyrov in Groznyy and killed five of his bodyguards.

On August 31, an explosion at the Manezh shopping center in Moscow resulted in the death of 1 person and injuries to 40 more. On September 4, a powerful car bomb exploded on a military base in Buynaksk, a town in central Dagestan. The bomb was detonated near a military housing facility, and as many as 64 persons were killed and 145 were injured. Most of the victims were family members of officers serving in the region. On September 9, an explosion leveled an apartment complex in Moscow and killed 94 persons. Early in the morning of September 13, a bomb blast destroyed an apartment building in Moscow, killing at least 118 persons. On September 14, authorities arrested two men in connection with the bombing and were seeking another three suspects. In the following week, authorities detained more than two dozen suspects, detained illegal residents and aliens, and confiscated over 6 tons of explosives, drugs, and weapons. Government officials implied that Chechnya-based Islamic extremist groups were responsible for the bombings but have not presented any evidence or pressed charges against any individuals by year's end. Human rights activists argued that the authorities detained and discriminated against persons from the Caucasus in conducting their investigation (see Sections 1.d. and 5). On November 3, Moscow police reported that they had filed charges against a suspect in the bombings who they believed was loyal to militants in Chechnya.

Religious figures also were kidnaped, tortured, and killed during the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).

In January Chechen field commander Salman Raduev told reporters that he had ordered the April 1997 railway bombing in Pyatigorsk that killed 2 persons and injured 20, but that the 2 Chechen women on trial in Stavropol for the bombing were not those responsible and had confessed only after being tortured by authorities. An FSB spokesman denied these claims.

On February 24, the Supreme Court countermanded the decision of a Moscow oblast court in the 1995 murder and kidnaping of legislator Sergey Skorochkin. The Supreme Court returned the case to the Moscow court for a new trial. In November 1998, a jury found four suspects not guilty and two others guilty only of kidnaping. In December 1998, the Moscow oblast procurator's office appealed the Moscow oblast court sentence.

On April 20, the Moscow Military Court began hearing the case against Valeriy Radchikov, former chair of the Russian Fund of Invalids of the War in Afghanistan, and 2 alleged accomplices, in the November 1996 Kotlyakovo cemetery bombing that left 14 persons dead and about 30 wounded. At the hearing the two accomplices recanted their previous testimony against Radchikov, which they said had been made under pressure from the police and the procuracy. When the Court questioned Radchikov, he claimed that an investigator from the Procurator General's office had pressured him to incriminate former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, former presidential administration head Anatoliy Chubays, and former federation council chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.

There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding hostage in Chechnya for 2 months (see Section 1.b.). Chechnya's deputy procurator general told Interfax in March that his office had finished an investigation of the case, arrested four unnamed suspects, and passed their cases to the republic's supreme Shari'a court. He also claimed that another four unnamed suspects in the case already had been sentenced to death. For his part, then-Interior Minister Stepashin charged in a January interview that Arbi Barayev--a prominent Chechen warlord--was involved in the case.

Meanwhile, no formal charges have been filed in the investigation into the December 1996 attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) compound in Novyy Atagi, Chechnya, during which six ICRC workers were killed and one was wounded.

There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen republic Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen official Shadid Bargishev, the 1996 murder of U.S. businessman Paul Tatum, or in the 1990 murder of Orthodox priest Aleksandr Men.

Chechen separatists killed a number of civilians (see Section 1.g.). There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen separatists tortured and killed a number of civilians (see Section 1.c).

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of government involvement in cases of politically motivated disappearances. Kidnaping frequently is used by criminal groups in the Northern Caucasus, some of which may have links to elements of the former insurgent forces. The main motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom, although some cases have political or religious overtones (see Section 5). Many of the hostages were being held in Chechnya. The Chechen interior ministry's chief of staff said in August that the ministry registered 76 kidnaping cases in the first half of the year but added that the real number of cases was higher. Otherwise, there were no reports of disappearance as a precursor to a political killing, although a number of persons remained missing at year's end.

On February 23, Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations with ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Groznyy.

On March 5, unknown assailants abducted Major-General Gennadiy Shpigun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--from his airplane at Groznyy airport. Although the motives behind Shpigun's kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that his role in the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity. Although Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest warrants for six unnamed assailants, Shpigun remains missing.

U.S. missionary and university instructor Herbert Gregg was kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. The kidnapers tortured Gregg and cut off one of his fingers during his captivity in order to extort ransom (see Section 5). In January Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that they had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the Gregg case. Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed Gregg on June 29. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections 1.a. and 5).

Geraldo Cruz Ribero, a New Zealander and ICRC medical administrator, was kidnaped in the Kabardino-Balkariya capital of Nalchik on May 15. Russian and Ingush interior ministry forces freed Ribero late in July. A Russian Interior Ministry official told reporters that his counterparts had arrested four persons--three Chechens and a resident of Kabardino-Balkariya--in connection with the kidnaping.

According to press reports, in December authorities arrested Salavdi Abdurazakov, a Chechen who is suspected of organizing the 1997 kidnaping of five Russian television journalists in Chechnya. Abdurazakov reportedly was sent to Moscow immediately for judicial proceedings.

Chechen authorities frequently have claimed that they are fighting kidnapers actively. New Chechen laws call for jail terms or public executions of kidnapers.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture, violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment; however, there are credible reports that law enforcement personnel regularly use torture to coerce confessions from suspects, and that the Government does not hold most of them accountable for these actions. For the most part, the Government does not hold perpetrators accountable for these actions. There are also a few claims of abuse of psychiatry by authorities. Institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through training provided by other countries but remain largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent with law enforcement in a democratic society.

Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups, have documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and correctional officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. An Amnesty International researcher has described the practice of torture as "widespread." Numerous press reports indicate that the police frequently strike persons based on little or no provocation or use excessive force to subdue those whom they arrest. Observers noted that persons attempting to vandalize a foreign consulate in St. Petersburg on two separate occasions in March and May were beaten severely with fists, feet, and nightsticks by police. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and the press suggest a pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by police against persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Police also have used excessive force in dealing with demonstrators. In September after terrorist bombings in Moscow, law enforcement officers detained and beat persons from the Caucasus. Police also increasingly targeted defense lawyers for harassment, including beatings and arrests, and intimidated witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police plant drugs and other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and detain persons based on their political views and religious beliefs, and conduct illegal searches of homes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.). Police extort money from suspects, their friends, and their relatives (see Section 1.d.). Government forces in Chechnya killed numerous persons and injured many others. In one incident in November, government troops opened fire on doctors and other medical staff at a psychiatric hospital, injuring three persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in other villages.

In October Ministry of Justice troops stormed the Vyborgskyi paper mill in Leningrad oblast and opened fire on workers who had barricaded themselves in the factory's administration building. The workers were protesting the mill's new foreign ownership. Minister of Justice Yuriy Chayka admitted to the Duma later that month that the troops' actions were "lawful in form, but digressed from the law in content" (see Section 6.c.).

According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia released in November, torture by police officers usually occurs within the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of four forms: Beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks; or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists, which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are difficult to substantiate because of lack of access to medical professionals, and because the techniques used often leave few or no permanent physical traces. The HRW research appears to support the conclusions reached in Amnesty International's 1997 report on torture. Amnesty International also reported the use of "press-camera," a system whereby violent prisoners are coopted by guards and used to control or punish other prisoners. The coopted prisoners are permitted to torture prisoners (sometimes to gain confessions) or deal with "difficult" prisoners. The "crucifixion of Christ" involves the victim being secured in a spread-eagle position to either a metal cot or prison bars, to which powerful electric shocks are applied. These allegations have been corroborated by other credible sources.

Torture is forbidden by Article 21 of the Constitution; however, since "torture" has never been defined in a subsequent law or the Criminal Code, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can be accused of "exceeding" granted authority, a far milder violation of the Criminal Code.

Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate defense of the accused. Law enforcement organs are expected to meet an unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4 percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with democratic practices and international standards for due process.

Sergey Pashin, a judge in a Moscow appeals court, has stated repeatedly that in the cases that come before him, confessions often have been beaten out of suspects. He also charged that "witnesses" often have been beaten to force them into testifying, when in fact they may have no knowledge of the case. As Pashin told the press in the fall, he estimates that out of 1,200 official torture complaints received in the country annually, only 20 criminal investigations are opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. In a letter to then-Minister of Internal Affairs Stepashin in the fall of 1998, Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov reported that 50 percent of prisoners with whom he spoke claimed to have been tortured. In April 1998, the Permanent Human Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential committee, concluded that torture was "common" among representatives of the Ministry of Interior, and that it was "widespread and systematic," especially in the pretrial stages of law enforcement. Yakov Pister, head of the administration of the Procurator General's office, testified to the Chamber that the Criminal Code has no definition of torture, and that no statistics were gathered on the use of torture. He blamed police reliance on torture as a means of gathering evidence on a lack of professional training. HRW researchers confirm that no centralized information on torture is available in the country, and that regional human rights groups are able to document cases in some regions but not others.

HRW noted that the quality of criminal investigations is low and that they can drag out endlessly. Assuming that they are aware of their rights under the law, defendants often are not granted access to defense attorneys or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention conditions are so miserable that defendants sometimes confess simply to be moved to relatively easier prison conditions. Retractions of extorted confessions usually are ignored. The accused can spend many months or even years in pretrial detention because the current criminal procedure code allows judges to send cases back for investigation an unlimited number of times.

Caucasus Press reported on June 22 that authorities beat and arrested 14 Azerbaijani citizens in Moscow in June. The newspaper Express reported that day that some 34 Azerbaijanis were beaten and arrested as a part of a police search for 6 prisoners who escaped from an Irkutsk penal colony.

The Moscow Times reported on September 1, that the local procurator's office has been unaccountably slow to resume investigation of the case of Aleksey Mikheyev, who jumped out of a third-story window to escape torture by Nizhniy Novgorod police in September 1998. Mikheyev, now paralyzed from the waist down as a result of his fall, said that he was tortured repeatedly with electric shocks. He was forced to confess to the murder and rape of a young woman (who turned up 2 days after the torture occurred); police also attempted to extract confessions to five other unsolved murders.

In April 1998, Olga Smirnova testified before the Human Rights Chamber of the President's Political Consultative Council that she had been raped and beaten over the course of a 10-day detention in 1994 at a Moscow police station. Police were trying to force her to testify as a witness in a criminal case of which she had no knowledge. She said that she tried three times to file a complaint with the district procurator's office, but that her complaint was rejected each time. Valeriy Abramkin of the Moscow Center for Promotion of Criminal Justice Reform (MCPCJR) said that the Moscow procurator's office finally ordered an investigation into the case, but as of the end of 1998 it had not been completed. Although the MCPCJR continues to follow this case, no new information was available as of September 1.

Under the Operation Clean Hands program, created in 1995, MVD officials continued to work to combat police crime. By the end of 1998, more than 34,000 citizen complaints had been lodged against police officers. Over 2,100 cases have been initiated against police personnel. Of that number, 922 were group crimes and 127 included civilian perpetrators.

Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not limited to the practice of "dedovshchina" (the violent, sometimes fatal, hazing of new junior military recruits for the armed services, MVD, and border guards), continued during the year. Press reports citing serving and former military personnel, the Military Procurator's Office, and NGO's monitoring conditions in the military indicate that this mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods in the face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment has resulted in permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline soldiers whom they find to be "inattentive to their duties."

According to the Central Military Procuracy, there were 818 reported cases of military commanders assaulting their subordinates in 1998, an increase of 100 percent over the previous year. In July the Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported a 40 percent increase in bribe-taking in the first half of the year, compared with the same period for 1998, while abuse of military position or authority increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence. In general, incidents of brawling increased roughly 23 percent and hooliganism, or disorderly conduct, increased 17 percent. However, the MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes during the year, and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. In part, the reductions were attributed to a reported decline of roughly 30 percent in military service evasion. Offenses against military service declined about 28 percent, and premeditated murder dropped 22 percent. Specifically noted were some 20 criminal investigations aimed at general officers and admirals on charges of graft. The MMPO also reported that it opened over 14,000 investigations of allegations of abuse of office during the year, 11,000 of which went to trial.

Both the Soldiers' Mothers Committee and the MPPO also have noted an increase in the number of reports about "non-statutory relations" in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean their subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful conditions throughout the military and to the widespread placement of inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in primary troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee expressed concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened during the period of military service by such incidents.

In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of the year, just on the aircraft carrier cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov." Similar activity, including the theft of military hardware and weapons by sailors seeking to escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy nuclear cruiser (and flagship) "Petr Velikiy."

Other reported abuses of military personnel included the practice by officers and sergeants of "selling" soldiers, most often linked to units in the Northern Caucasus Military District. The 10-year-old Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Servicemen and Their Families has worked actively throughout the Northern Caucasus region, successfully rescuing 42 ethnic Bashkiri conscripts who were sold by NCO's and officers, but has been reluctant to act on behalf of ethnic Russian captives or soldiers from other ethnic groups. One person reportedly was held for 7 years. The Committee also reports that in many instances, the army apparently was not even aware officially that these men had been abducted from their units. There were also reports of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice system. Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military procurators (see Section 1.e.).

There were similar incidents in the armed forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In June 44 ministry soldiers in the Far East went absent without leave after enduring repeated systematic abuse and beatings not only by senior servicemen, but by officers as well. Military investigators determined that 20 of these soldiers had injuries of varying severity and also found that over 50 conscripts from the same small garrison had illnesses caused by neglected injuries. Among those implicated were the unit commander, chief of staff, the deputy commander for personnel, the deputy commander for supply, and the unit's medical officer.

The MMPO continues to cooperate with the Soldiers' Mothers Committee to investigate allegations of abuse and recently established telephone and postal "hot lines" to receive reports directly from soldiers. Nonetheless, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not reported, due to fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and deliberate efforts to cover up such activity.

According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45 percent of those committing or attempting suicide were driven to it by either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions of military service. Nonpayment of wages was also a factor, particularly in cases of suicide among officers. The Mothers' Rights Foundation and the Soldiers' Mothers Committee believe that many of those who reportedly committed suicide were driven to do so by violent hazing or abuse. The Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that the vast majority of hazing incidents are never reported. In incidents brought to the attention of the military or civilian authorities, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of the cases there was an official finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action was taken as a result.

The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main reason for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence of selection committees during the conscription process. In one Moscow-region unit cited by the Soldiers' Mothers Committee, 46 percent of the newly arrived conscripts had physical or psychological health problems, which should have exempted them from military service. The rise in the number of draftees unfit for military service also allegedly is contributing to crime within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common, including the reported "purchase" of unwarranted medical deferments by potential conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many categories of legal deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its antidraft evasion efforts and cracked down on conscription abuses during the year. In January and February, these efforts resulted in the detention of 1,633 servicemen absent without leave. Those who turn themselves in voluntarily and have a "good reason" for being absent without leave are given reduced sentences, with the assistance of the military procurator's office.

Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the military, principally due to insufficient funding. As of April, the number of armed forces personnel without housing was 93,400, and a further 43,200 need housing on military bases.

Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the military leadership has made only superficial efforts to implement substantive reforms in training, education, and administration programs within units to combat abuse, at least in part due to lack of funding and the leadership's preoccupation with urgent reorganizational issues and the fighting in Chechnya.

There is still no law providing for the constitutional right to alternative civilian service, and the proposal for all-volunteer armed forces has been put off indefinitely, in the face of the current economic crisis and the Government's inability to sufficiently raise military pay. Although some regional authorities are attempting to introduce alternative service programs, national legislation necessary to implement the constitutional right to alternative service has yet to be passed by the Duma. Without such legislation there is no legal basis for any current alternative service program, beyond the constitutional language itself. As a result, the courts often rule against the individual based upon the legal requirements relating to military service.

The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment during the Soviet-era has ended. However, human rights groups charge that psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives and their practices. Further, authorities apparently occasionally still abuse the practice of psychiatry for other purposes: In St. Petersburg, six members of Sentuar, a local Scientologist organization, were hospitalized forcibly in June for a 3-week psychiatric evaluation. The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human rights organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in "deprogramming" victims of "totalitarian sects." In such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual techniques to "treat" persons who had been members of new religious groups (see Section 2.c.).

Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric hospitals were used to punish dissidents), told Time magazine in 1998 that military, police, and state security agencies often use internal, closed-door tribunals to deal with whistle-blowers by sending them to psychiatric institutions. He said that "more and more" policemen and military and intelligence officers sought out his organization after they had been labeled mentally ill.

There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen separatists tortured a number of civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).

Politically motivated violence also occurred. In October according to the St. Petersburg police two activists from Stepashin's campaign to the State Duma were assaulted in connection with their electoral activities. Their injuries did not require hospitalization (see Section 3).

On August 3, in Yekaterinburg, the apartment of independent television company Channel Four Plus President Igor Mishin was destroyed by a bomb. Mishin, who was not in the apartment at the time of the explosion, reportedly had rejected requests by gubernatorial candidates to "alter the company's position" in their favor, instead maintaining an independent posture in covering the elections. No arrests were made in this incident by year's end (see Section 2.a.).

On February 2, a bomb seriously injured a paratrooper in Dagestan. On April 24, a bomb exploded outside a building housing two Western consulates in Yekaterinburg. While no one was injured, the building was damaged severely. On June 22, a bomb exploded near the Ministry of Interior in Moscow. On June 28, an antipersonnel mine injured 11 persons in Vladikavkaz.

After the Karachayevo-Cherkesiya supreme court ruled the results of the May 16 presidential election valid, supporters of Cherkessk mayor Stanislav Derev (who had received 20 percent of the vote) attacked the jeep of former commander in chief of ground forces Vladimir Semenev (who had received more than 70 percent of the vote). On the night of September 8-9, three explosions, reportedly grenades, went off near the homes of Semenev supporters. On the night of September 14-15, after ethnic Karachay president Semenev was inaugurated, two Karachay-owned cafes were bombed. On October 11, an aide to President Semenev was injured seriously during an attempted murder, but it cannot be confirmed whether this attack was politically motivated (see Sections 1.a., 3, and 5).

Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued an official protest early in July on behalf of ethnic Ingush refugees trying to return to the Prigorodnyy district of North Ossetia. Up to 70,000 Ingush refugees fled the Prigorodnyy and Vladikavkaz areas in 1992, when interethnic fighting broke out between Ossetian and Ingush inhabitants. According to Russian media reports, just over 10,000 of the refugees have been able to return so far. According to a June report by the Ingush branch of the Memorial human rights group, ethnic Ingush refugees have faced systematic harassment while trying to return to the Prigorodnyy district (see Section 2.d.).

Incidents of societal violence apparently based on religious belief also occurred. For example, according to press reports, in August between 10 and 15 youths burst into a Moscow Hare Krishna temple, beating followers and giving at least 1 person a head laceration severe enough to require hospitalization. In May two bombs exploded near a Moscow synagogue, and in July the director of a Jewish cultural center was stabbed (see Section 5). An unexploded bomb was discovered in another Moscow synagogue in July. Religious figures also were kidnaped, tortured, and killed in the Northern Caucasus (see Sections 1.a. and 5).

Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life threatening. The penitentiary system is administered centrally from Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Education all maintain penitentiary facilities.

Conditions for detainees and prisoners in most government facilities remain extremely harsh, particularly in pretrial detention facilities (SIZO's) where overcrowding is rampant and the authorities frequently employ physical abuse and torture to coerce confessions. Most detainees face extremely harsh and even life-threatening conditions. Russian news agencies reported in June 1998 that Procurator General Yuriy Skuratov had written to then-Minister of Interior Stepashin that human rights are "systematically and massively violated" in the nation's prisons. According to the MCPCJR, the 1998 economic crisis worsened underfunding for prisons. Some prison directors have been forced to find unusual solutions in order to feed their inmates, such as using prison labor to run small businesses.

According to the 1995 law On the Detention of Those Suspected or Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison population.

The country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded. According to the MCPCJR's analysis of government statistics during the year, the total number of persons held by the penitentiary system in May was 1,038,000, up from 1,009,863 in January 1998. The number of detainees in the 191 pretrial detention centers went up from 275,000 in January of 1999 to 285,600 over the first 4 months of the year. According to May data, 731,400 convicts are held in correctional labor colonies (ITK's). The January 1999 MCPCJR analysis showed that pretrial detention centers are overcrowded on the average 2.3 times over capacity, i.e., 2.3 persons are being held in space designed for 1. On average SIZO detainees have 5.2 square feet per person, compared with 12 square feet per person required by law. (Statutory space requirements for other penal facilities range from 6 to 15 square feet.) In May 85,000 persons had no personal sleeping spots in SIZO's. In one example, a Volgograd SIZO accommodated 4,800 detainees in a space designed for 1,500, averaging 1.2 square feet per person in communal cells. Similarly, in 1998 a SIZO in the Urals held 8,000 persons in facilities designed for 3,500. According to 1998 data, in "Kresty," St. Petersburg's largest SIZO, 5 to 15 prisoners were held in cells that were built 100 years ago to hold 1 prisoner. The situation is less severe in ITK's. As of January, ITK's were only 1.1 times over planned capacity, and correctional labor colonies for prisoners serving life sentences were only 1.05 times over capacity. Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International. In 1998 the occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112 percent. As of January, there were 39,800 women held in correctional labor colonies, according to the MCPCJR.

Under such conditions, prisoners sleep in shifts, and there is little, if any, room to move within the cell. In most pretrial detention centers and prisons, there is no ventilation system. Poor ventilation is thought to contribute to cardiac problems and lowered resistance to disease. Cells are stiflingly hot in summer (up to 40 degrees centigrade, or 104 degrees Fahrenheit, according to the MCPCJR) and dangerously cold in winter. Prisoners report that matches cannot be lit in many SIZO cells during the summer because of a lack of oxygen.

Health, nutrition, and sanitation standards in penal facilities remain low due to a lack of funding. Head lice, scabies, and various skin diseases are prevalent. This situation was aggravated by the country's economic crisis and resulting budgetary problems. The MCPCJR reported that in the first half of 1998, actual government budget disbursement for food for prisoners was $23 (142 rubles) per prisoner per month. This amount represented 63 percent of the Government's guideline of $36 (225 rubles) per prisoner per month. After the August 1998 financial crisis, this sum shrank to $0.88 (22 rubles) per prisoner per month, and some regions received no money at all in August and November 1998. Prisoners and detainees typically rely on families to provide them with extra food.

According to statistics provided by the MCPCJR, the 1998 planned federal budget allocated $1.25 billion (at the precrisis exchange rate, or 7.8 billion rubles), or 61 percent of what was required by the penal system. Only $983 million (at the precrisis exchange rate, or 5.9 billion rubles), or 46 percent of required funding actually was granted. Even if the budgeted allocations for 1999 were disbursed in full, they only would provide 60 percent of the amount needed for maintenance of penal institutions. Many penal institutions also supplement significantly their budget allocations with income from prison labor. In many cases, prisoners produce much of their own food. Increased funding appears very unlikely.

According to the MCPCJR, conditions in penal facilities vary among the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food, clothing, and medicine. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned with the tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded the tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the MCPCJR. Other support is offered by NGO's and religious groups.

Inmates in the prison system suffer from inadequate medical care. In March the Human Rights Chamber again stated that over 10,000 prisoners and detainees die each year. In August 1998, Yuriy Shcherbanenko, a senior official of the Procurator General's office, told colleagues at a conference that the level of medical services in prisons was far below international standards and even elementary sanitary norms. Every year 10,000 persons die in prisons, he said. Common causes of death in prisons include typhoid, cardiovascular diseases, and tuberculosis.

Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far higher in than the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human rights experts to be not only a national, but an international, health threat. In June 1998, the Government's main sanitary doctor, Gennadiy Onishchenko, told journalists that tuberculosis rates in the prisons were five times the national average. The MCPCJR reports that as of January, 92,000 detainees had tuberculosis in the active form. Each year an estimated 35,400 prisoners contract tuberculosis. Due to a shortage of space in specialized tuberculosis care facilities, about 2,000 infected inmates live among healthy prisoners. Another 15,000 are kept in isolated sections of regular penal institutions. HIV/AIDS infection rates also are a source of concern. The MCPCJR reported that as of January, 2,300 prisoners (compared with 2,000 in September 1998) were infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Space shortages do not allow for separate facilities for prisoners with AIDS. Then-Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov said in October 1998 that the number of HIV-infected inmates increased 500 percent since September 1997.

The tuberculosis epidemic in prisons became particularly urgent in mid-1998, when doctors drew attention to the presence of a new multidrug resistant form of tuberculosis, known as MDR-TB, in the country. They said that the strain was concentrated primarily among prison inmates. As of March, approximately 20,000 prisoners with tuberculosis were infected with a multidrug-resistant strain. In 1998 Doctors without Borders, Medical Emergency Relief International, and the Public Health Institute of New York sent a joint letter to President Yeltsin warning that the country had become "an international incubator of a new illness." Alexander Goldfarb, director of the Soros Foundation's anti-tuberculosis program in the country, stated in August 1998 that in recent years the supply of anti-tuberculosis drugs seldom met more than 20 to 25 percent of prison requirements. Prison personnel often administered incorrect dosages of medicine, encouraging the development of drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis. Currently about 12 percent of tuberculosis infected inmates have a multidrug resistant strain that is especially difficult to cure.

Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel disciplined for use of excessive force are not released publicly. While reliable figures are extremely difficult to establish, Russian human rights groups have in the past estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates die each year in penitentiary facilities. Some die due to beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, or lack of medical care. The Ministry of Internal Affairs does not break down its statistics to specify how many of the 21,000 personnel dismissed were punished for abusing detainees or convicts. The Procuracy General receives approximately 1,000 complaints of torture per year. The HRW 1999 report on torture quotes a procuracy official as saying that this figure "does not reflect the number of such incidents." The press often reports on innocent individuals mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.

Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common. There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers, homosexuals, rapists, rape victims, child molesters, and others are to be "untouchable" and treated very harshly, with little or no protection from the prison authorities.

There are five basic forms of custody in the criminal justice system: Police detention centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's), correctional labor colonies (ITK's), prisons designated for those who violate ITK rules, and educational labor colonies (VTK's). Responsibility for operating the country's penal facilities falls under the Ministry of Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences (GUIN). Conditions in police station detention centers vary considerably but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not fed and have no bedding, sleeping place, running water, or toilet.

Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial, sentencing, or appeal are confined in pretrial facilities (SIZO's). The GUIN has 178 SIZO's. Convicts on occasion are imprisoned in SIZO's because there is no transport to take them elsewhere. Conditions in SIZO's remain extremely harsh; they fall far short of minimum international standards and pose a serious threat to life and health. Cells are overcrowded and prisoners must sleep in shifts due to insufficient numbers of beds.

The 1997 Amnesty International Report on Torture in Russia noted that "torture and ill-treatment occur at all stages of detention and imprisonment," but most often was reported in pretrial detention. These conditions have not improved. In February 1998, then-Justice Minister Stepashin admitted that "the pretrial detention centers are the most serious problem" in the prison system. Vyacheslav Budnov, the Interior Ministry official in charge of prisons was quoted in 1998 as saying that "this is a Russian paradox." Persons incarcerated in detention centers "have not gone to trial, but they are living in worse conditions than those already sentenced."

Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's convicts. According to January statistics of the MCPCJR, there are 719,500 convicts (of whom 39,800 are female) incarcerated in the ITK's. According to the MCPCJR, conditions in the ITK's are better than in SIZO's and prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the 122 timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards are common.

The country's "prisons"--distinct from the labor colonies or ITK's--are actually penitentiary institutions for those who repeatedly violate the relatively lax rules in effect in ITK's. Conditions in many prisons are extremely harsh. Although they are not as crowded as SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break down resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and starved.

Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for juveniles from 14 to 20 years of age. The MCPCJR's January statistics indicate that there are 20,000 persons in the 63 educational colonies. Conditions in VTK's are significantly better than in ITK's, but juveniles in VTK's and juvenile SIZO cells suffer from beatings, torture, and rape. The MCPCJR reports that such facilities have a poor psychological atmosphere and lack educational and vocational training opportunities. Many of the juveniles are from orphanages, have no outside support, and are unaware of their rights.

The President's Commission for Prison Reform monitors prison conditions and has prepared recommendations and legislation for reform. None of these efforts has led to any demonstrable progress.

The formal transfer of responsibility for managing the MVD's prison facilities to the Ministry of Justice on September 1, 1998 fulfilled one of Russia's obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. Neither government officials nor human rights activists expected this transfer to improve conditions in the near future, but, as the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch noted, the transfer was an improvement because it took the prisons "out of the hands of those whose main concern is to have good statistics on the number convicted." MVD official Vyacheslav Bubnov reportedly estimated that it would take at least 7 to 10 years before conditions approached European standards. Bubnov estimated that transfer of control to the Ministry of Justice would provide 20 percent of the solution to improving conditions at prisons, but that the rest was dependent on increased funding. In view of the Government's serious budgetary problems, increased funding appeared unlikely.

In recognition of the inhuman conditions present in detention facilities, on June 18, the State Duma passed an amnesty bill intended to free an estimated 94,000 prisoners in the course of 6 months, beginning on June 22. The amnesty was intended to grant freedom to prisoners held for minor crimes and for first-time offenders, specifically veterans of military service in defense of the Motherland, pregnant women, women with children, invalids, tuberculosis-infected prisoners, minors, and senior citizens. In order to qualify for amnesty, prisoners in most categories must be serving sentences of 5 years or less. The amnesty also included persons recently sentenced and tried. Prison activists and prison officials said that they did not expect that the amnesty would resolve fully the ongoing prison overcrowding crisis. The numbers of prisoners increased by 42,000 in just the first 4 months of the year; therefore, even a 94,000-person decrease would not alter the overall numbers. Moreover, some persons believe that the amnesty conditions are too demanding; the newspaper Noviye Izvestiya cited estimates by the GUIN that only 35,000 prisoners actually qualify for the amnesty. Human Rights Watch pointed out that without a change in the policy of the Procurator's Office of placing persons in detention and arresting them for minor crimes, in view of the time needed to obtain a court hearing there would not be any major improvement in the prison situation.

At a March 19 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy General developed a plan to address the "critical" state of the national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes in the Criminal Code, which could yield a prison population decrease of 400,000 over 1 year.

Prison reform activists, prison experts, independent observers, and Duma deputies agree that the country's Criminal Code is at the root of the penal system problems. According to Valeriy Borshchev, the country has the largest percentage of its population in jail in the world. The 1999 MCPCJR report states that for every 100,000 persons in the country, 760 are imprisoned.

According to the MCPCJR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN in the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the prison population is to change the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code is too severe and allows unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of restraint (as opposed to bail or release on the prisoner's own recognizance). According to a MCPCJR report during the year, Sergey Vitsin, deputy chairman of the Presidential Council on Judicial and Legal Reform commented that the Criminal Code does not distinguish between petty theft and larger-scale thefts and robberies. In an example cited by the MCPCJR during the year, one person was sentenced to 31/2 years in prison for stealing three chickens and 2 kilograms of meat.

Theft is the leading reason for incarceration and detention in the country. The director of the Pskov SIZO reported according to a 1999 MCPCJR report that 53 percent of his detainees are charged with theft. As an example, he told of a 16-year-old who had already spent 2 months in a Pskov SIZO simply for stealing some margarine, pasta, and bread. The MCPCJR reports that of the 21,000 minors incarcerated in the country, 52 percent are charged with theft and similar petty crimes.

Custody is used systematically as the only means of restraint. The MCPCJR called for more use of alternatives to custody, such as bail and house arrest. Moreover, the MCPCJR reported that detainees spend too long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or more. The Ministry of Justice concurs with the MCPCJR that limits must be placed on time in detention awaiting trial.

Moscow-based human rights groups make frequent visits to the prisons in the Moscow area, but they have neither the resources nor a national network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. The Constitution provides that the arrest, taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of crimes are permitted only by judicial decision. However, the Constitution's transitional provisions specify that these provisions do not take effect until a new criminal procedure code is adopted. The new Criminal Code that was passed in 1995 went into effect at the beginning of 1997. Under the 1997 code the maximum sentence for all offenses increased from 15 years to 30 years. Criminal proceedings continue to be governed both by the new 1997 Criminal Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code, adopted in 1960.

There are credible reports from throughout the country that police detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue proper protocols of arrest or for confiscated property. Moscow city law enforcement authorities frequently detained persons unlawfully for alleged violations of registration requirements, especially in response to the terrorist bombings in September, when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Police officers reportedly planted drugs or ammunition on some of these persons as a pretext for arrest (see Section 2.d.). Local authorities throughout the country detain members of religious minority groups, especially the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, for brief periods of time, although formal charges seldom are filed (see Section 2.c.).

In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours without a warrant.

The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This procedure generally is followed in practice. The MCPCJR reports that detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe it useless.

For example, Articles 47-49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that in certain cases the court, investigator, or procurator is to provide the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect cannot afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint a lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However, lawyers (advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does not in fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a result, in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no assistance during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-court assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained lawyers. Sometimes the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has to wait in line for days to get a meeting with the client).

A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994 and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal law on preventing vagrancy and social rehabilitation of the homeless. However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet any such law under consideration.

The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal investigation is conducted. The MCPCJR reports terms of pretrial detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to 10 months. However, in some extreme cases the MCPCJR reports detention periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor investigative and court work.

The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of criminal investigation to 6 months in "complex" cases. If more time is required in "exceptional" cases, the Procurator General personally can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of the Procurator's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty during the investigative period, although if a suspect informs the investigator that he is guilty, the period of the investigation usually is shorter than if he maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear exercising their right to request judicial review of their detention due to fear of angering the investigating officer.

There also were credible reports that persons have been detained far in excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses, in some cases so that police officials could extort money from friends or relatives. The situation has improved somewhat since the issuance of a presidential decree in 1997 that annulled a previous decree that had allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of detaining individuals in excess of permissible periods is still not uncommon, and this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.

The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial, results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted.

Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Some suspects actually serve the equivalent of their sentences while awaiting trial. Judges often do not dismiss cases involving improper investigations or indictments, particularly if the procurator's case has political support or the case is controversial. Instead, such cases often are returned to the procurator for further investigation.

Some authorities have taken advantage of the system's procedural weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for expressing views critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in the regions have been charged with libel, contempt of court, or interference in judicial procedures in cases with distinct political overtones. Others have been charged with other offenses and held either in excess of normal periods of detention or for offenses that do not require detention at all (see Section 4).

Under the 1993 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants can be detained for periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator General investigates the nature of outstanding charges against the detainee. This system is reinforced informally but effectively by collegial links among senior law enforcement and security officials in the various republics of the former Soviet Union. Human rights groups allege that this network is employed to detain opposition figures from the other former Soviet republics without actual legal grounds.

In August Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer filed a complaint in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July the FSB confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment, which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's official record of the search (see Section 2.a.).

Authorities detained or arrested a number of other environmental activists during the year. In October Vladimir Slivyak, director of the antinuclear organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference that Moscow police detained and questioned him for a few hours in September about his possible involvement in the August bombing of the Manezh shopping center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly had been framed on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of Chelyabinsk also was detained and questioned by police officers in September as she and four other activists were on their way to city hall to deliver a letter protesting the potential import of spent nuclear fuel into the country. Authorities charged all five with hooliganism. Reportedly authorities told another activist in Voronezh to report to the police station for an "informal conversation" on the topic of an antinuclear camp near the Novo-Voronezh nuclear power plant and threatened him with drug possession charges if he failed to appear. In November disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA Canada Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information about the specific charges was made public.

Based on this series of cases and the Nikitin and Pasko cases from previous years, environmentalists both in the country and abroad criticize the FSB for its active campaign of harassment, especially of environmental activists critical of past government abuses.

St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled on December 29 that Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain, was not guilty of charges of espionage and treason. Although prosecutors are expected to appeal the decision, legal observers believe that the legal foundations of the ruling were sound and believe that it may provide an important precedent in combating abuses by the FSB.

Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996 on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with Bellona, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the publication of a report detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste generated by the Northern Fleet, in which Nikitin had served. In December 1996, Nikitin was released from pretrial detention but was restricted to the St. Petersburg city limits.

Indictments cited classified decrees that were made available to Nikitin's defense team only at the beginning of the trial, which finally commenced in October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's detention. On October 29, 1998, the judge in the case returned the indictment to the prosecution for further investigation, as there was insufficient evidence to support the charges. Although Nikitin's defense claimed a qualified victory, this did not constitute an acquittal. The FSB was given another opportunity to solidify its case against Nikitin. On February 2, the Supreme Court upheld the St. Petersburg court's October 1998 decision to return the case to the FSB for further investigation. An eighth indictment filed against Nikitin in July is almost identical to the previous seven, according to Nikitin's lawyer. The trial against Nikitin resumed on November 23 in St. Petersburg. In his December 29 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the secret decrees used to charge Nikitin violated every citizen's right to access to the law and therefore was not binding under the Constitution. Moreover, according to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to the Criminal Code during the investigation and violated Nikitin's constitutional rights.

In July after 20 months in pretrial detention, military journalist and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for misuse of office but immediately was released under the prisoner amnesty. Pasko originally was charged with treason and espionage after conducting freelance reporting on radioactive contamination and passing to Japanese media a videotape of Russian Pacific Fleet sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. Both Pasko and the military procurator intend to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, and Pasko announced on July 22 his intention to appeal his case to the European Court of Human Rights. Nikitin's defense attorney said that Pasko's conviction is legally dubious, as the charge is based on a military code of conduct that technically has not been in force since 1990, although the military continues to enforce it internally. The trial was marked by a number of irregularities, including the judge's decision to remove one of Pasko's defense attorneys for contempt of court. Also a key witness recanted his earlier testimony, which he said had been made under pressure from investigators. As of year's end, Pasko resides in Moscow, unable to work as a journalist for Russian media in either the Far East or Moscow. The Committee to Protect Journalists and the Glasnost Defense Fund observed that, while the verdict was better news than expected, the case is still a powerful disincentive to investigative reporting.

In September press reports described Moscow authorities' use of the mass detentions of persons who appeared to be from the Caucasus as part of "Operation Whirlwind," the authorities' program to stem terrorism in response to the September bombings in Moscow (see Sections 1.a. and 5).

No new cases of arrest of human rights activists were documented during the year, although the Moscow Helsinki group stated that three human rights monitors participating in its regional reporting program were harassed (also see Section 4). No progress was reported during the year in the case of Yuriy Shadrin of Omsk, who was arrested in November 1996 on several unrelated charges. Released on December 31, 1996, Shadrin remains subject to arrest and trial. The same is true for Yuriy Padalko of Irkutsk, who was arrested in 1992 on what Human Rights Watch called "presumably trumped-up charges of libel, hooliganism, and other offenses."

Larisa Kharchenko, a housing adviser to former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, was detained in July 1997 in connection with a corruption case involving the former mayor. She was held incommunicado for 17 days and then charged with bribery and abuse of office. Her lawyer contended that the authorities do not have a case against her and that she was kept in jail and deprived of medical care in order to force her to testify against Sobchak. Kharchenko was released in mid-December 1997 but was instructed to stay in St. Petersburg pending further developments in her case. Doctors determined that, along with other medical complications, she had suffered a stroke while detained and classified her as legally disabled. No trial date was set for Kharchenko in 1998 or 1999. According to Sobchak, Kharchenko has left the country.

St. Petersburg authorities arbitrarily detained Scientologists for psychiatric evaluation (see Section 2.c.).

The Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited independence; however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective counterweight to other branches of government. The development of an independent judiciary continued. A 1996 law separated the courts of general jurisdiction from the Ministry of Justice and placed them under a separate agency, the Judicial Department, which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Although not entirely functional, the Department has assumed primary administrative and financial responsibilities for court management previously held by the Ministry of Justice. Reformers who sought to create the Department felt that the Ministry was not zealous enough in defending the interests of the judiciary, especially on budget matters. In the 1998 and 1999 budgets, the Department was funded independently of the Ministry. Judges remain subject to some influence from the executive, military, and security forces, especially in high profile or political cases. The judiciary still lacks sufficient resources and is subject to corruption.

The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court system, under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The arbitration court system consists of both city or regional courts as well as appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of Arbitration. A 1998 federal law provides for new judicial officers--justices of the peace, or magistrates--several thousand of whom are expected to begin serving in 2000. This new category of judicial officer is to be elected or appointed at the regional level. It is not yet clear whether justices of the peace are to form separate courts or to serve directly under the courts of first instance. Magistrates are to consider administrative and criminal cases, for which the maximum sentence does not exceed 2 years, and civil cases whose claims do not exceed a certain sum of money.

Low salaries and scant prestige make it difficult to attract talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges and raising the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.

In its 1998 budget the Government called for cutting spending on the court system by 26 percent. This was despite appeals by the Federation Council (upper house of Parliament) and leading judges, as well as presidential orders issued in July 1998, which had instructed the Government to make the "normal functioning of the judicial system" a priority. In response, the Supreme Court launched a legal challenge to the budget cuts with the Constitutional Court. On July 17, 1998, the Constitutional Court struck down the article in the 1998 budget that authorized the Government to reduce spending on the judicial system. The Court cited Article 124 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the federal budget must provide for the "complete and independent" functioning of the judiciary. Despite this decision, courts were not funded fully in the current fiscal year. However, the Duma and Federation Council passed and President Yeltsin signed by February the Law on the Financing of the Courts, which makes receipt of the judiciary's budget independent of the Ministry of Finance.

Cuts in the judicial system's budget raised concerns over the permanence of gains made in recent years in judicial independence. For example, according to the Constitution, courts should be financed only by the Federal Government. But because of federal budget cuts, district courts often seek additional funds from their local governments, leaving them more vulnerable to pressure from local politicians. A 1997 survey of 250 judges, conducted by the University of Toronto, found that about half were receiving financial aid from local governments. Many courts now lack adequate funding to cover such basic expenses as electricity, telephone charges, and postage. Because of unpaid debts, many courts lost their telephone and electricity service. Without money to mail subpoenas, courts often are forced to hold trials without key witnesses. A human rights organization reported that in Bryansk in November and December 1998 all courts closed and put signs on the doors saying that the closure was due to lack of funds. These and other kinds of disruptions in the work of courts are common throughout the country.

Progress was made during the year to improve the financing of the court system. In February a federal law on the financing of the courts of general jurisdiction provided for a mechanism to ensure that the courts received money allocated to them in the budget. The Council of Judges of the Russian Federation noted that as of October 1, the courts received 100 percent of the amount allocated to that date, compared to the only 47 percent of the budgeted amount that the courts received during the same period in 1998. Moreover, the 2000 budget is to increase funding for the judicial system and to fund it entirely out of the federal budget, so that courts are no longer dependent on local or regional authorities for funding.

Judges are subject to physical intimidation and bribery. Judges have been murdered in Moscow, Irkutsk, and Yekaterinburg, although there were no reports of judges who were murdered during the year. As judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a verdict and handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for intimidation. In January 1998, then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree that allowed judges to apply for permission to carry firearms. Many judges reportedly took advantage of the decree. In July chair of the Primorskiy kray arbitration court Tatyana Loktionova announced that Primorskiy kray governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in the court's activities. She reported that she and her colleagues feared for their personal safety. The governor has blamed the court for bankrupting the region's enterprises and destroying its economy and persuaded then-Prime Minister Putin to authorize an internal investigation of the arbitration court for possible illegal conduct.

In October then-Prime Minister Putin signed a decree providing for the establishment of the new Academy of Justice, the country's first judicial branch training organization.

The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to pay for trial attorneys for them, and public defenders are poorly trained.

Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to a lawyer or that they were coerced into giving false confessions or statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of guilt.

In March the Supreme Court found Articles 218 and 220 of the Criminal Procedure Code unconstitutional. This finding permits defense attorneys to appeal the actions of the procuracy and investigative officials to a court, even during pretrial stages of criminal proceedings. The unconstitutional articles had restricted the conditions for pretrial appeals of the procuracy's actions and allowed appeals only to a supervising procurator, not a court.

In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate that in practice, the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly developed cases to the prosecution for additional investigation rather than risk confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover, in certain cases the Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no limitation on the number of times the case can be investigated. The Constitutional Court partly addressed this issue in an April 20 decision and held that part of the article of the Code providing for this practice was unconstitutional. This practice of repeatedly returning cases for further investigation greatly increases the time that defendants spend in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.). Adversarial jury trials, at the option of the accused in cases where there is a risk of a criminal penalty of 15 years or more, were introduced in 1993 and 1994 in nine regions, encompassing 23 percent of the population. In February the Constitutional Court held that in order for the death penalty to be applied, the accused must be given a trial by jury. The Court expressly stated that the death penalty could not be imposed anywhere until trial by jury was available everywhere. Since jury trials currently are provided in only nine regions, and funds to expand them throughout the country still are lacking, the decision in effect makes nearly impossible the legal imposition of the death penalty in the country. Despite plans to expand jury trials to 12 new regions, as of December the Department of Judicial Reforms of the State Legal Administration of the President failed to do so due to lack of funds. In December 1998, press reports indicated that the Ryazan governor and Ryazan duma chairman reported to the Supreme Court and the Presidential Administration that they had suspended the practice of trial by jury primarily due to the high cost of such trials. The trials reportedly cost the region between $2,400 and $3,900 (50,000 and 80,000 rubles) per year. A council of local judges appealed to the Procurator General and the Federation Council to overturn the decision of the Ryazan authorities.

The Ministry of Justice reports that 538 cases involving 772 persons were tried by jury in 1998. Of these, 165 resulted in acquittals. Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public reportedly favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to criminal justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to prefer trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.

The heads of several lawyers' associations reported during the year that defense lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment, including beatings and arrests. Dmitriy Baranov, vice president of the Association of Lawyers of Russia, in an interview with the newspaper MK-Yug (the southern edition of Moskovskiy Komsomolets) said that during the last year or two, defense lawyers were increasingly targets of police harassment. For example, in Rostov he said that there were a number of attempts to coerce lawyers into giving testimony against their clients. Professional associations at both the local and federal levels report that such abuses are increasing throughout the country. They charge that police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys and to cover up their own criminal activities.

There also were instances in which the right to due process and a fair trial were violated. For example, the arrest, detention, and September 1998 trial of Krasnodar human rights activist Vasiliy Chaykin was marked by numerous serious legal procedural violations. Chaykin was denied access to a lawyer of his choice for 1 month after his arrest. The rape charges against Chaykin rested on the testimony of nine young women, five of whom recanted the statements that they made to investigators, saying that they had been coerced by the investigating officer. The judge reportedly did not allow the court secretary to record these charges of police intimidation. Instead he threatened the young women with criminal action for giving false testimony; finally, all witnesses agreed to confirm their previous statements. Protests by the defense attorney about these procedures were ignored and not recorded by the court secretary. During the trial, Chaykin requested medical help, but the judge rejected his plea, and Chaykin suffered a heart attack several days later. The trial was postponed until Chaykin recovers. Chaykin was released on April 17 but remains restricted to his city of residence. As of year's end, there were no reports of developments in this case.

There were reports of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice system. Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military procurators (see Section 1.e).

There was no reported progress in the 1997 case of the beating of defense attorney Oleg Kolesnikov.

On February 3, Chechen president Maskhadov declared Shari'a (Islamic law) to be in effect in the republic of Chechnya. Maskhadov signed several decrees stipulating that all local legislation be brought into line with the Koran and Shari'a regulations. Maskhadov ordered the Chechen legislature and the Council of Muftis to draft a Shari'a constitution within 1 month's time (also see Section 2.c.). Maskhadov's action apparently was a political response to pressure from Islamist rivals.

Authorities in Chechnya continued their efforts to establish a new criminal code based on the Islamic Shari'a code. Although the code has not been enacted formally, elements of Shari'a law already have been cited in court decisions, and Shari'a punishments reportedly have been imposed.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Authorities continued to infringe on citizen's privacy rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a judicial decision. It permits the Government to monitor correspondence, telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization, and dissemination of information about a person's private life without his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal penalties. However, problems still remain, and no one has ever been convicted of violating those safeguards. In 1995 legislation was passed that gave broad authority for the FSB to utilize domestic surveillance and to conduct searches of private residences, with only limited oversight by the courts and the procuracy. These measures remain in force. There were reports of electronic surveillance by government officials and others. Moscow police reportedly entered residences without warrants during checks for illegal residents of the city (see Section 2.d.). Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer reported that the FSB confiscated personal correspondence, not covered by the warrant, during a July search of his apartment.

A senior official told a newspaper in November 1997 that the problem of abuse by governmental agencies was aggravated because the list of government agencies authorized to carry out wiretaps and undercover operations has been expanded and now includes, for example, tax authorities. He also noted that while the law provides that the Prosecutor General's office must authorize wiretaps and other undercover operations by state agencies, it does not allow prosecutorial oversight once those operations have begun.

Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies, present a serious threat to privacy rights and violate the Civil Code, the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995, granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications transmissions for investigative purposes. The original SORM required a warrant to carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the Constitution and other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB the same kind of monitoring power over Internet communication as it did for telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.

Internet service providers are required to install, at their own expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal. Those providers that do not comply with the requirements face either loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2 framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to Internet traffic without a warrant.

The first Internet service provider charged with refusing to comply with SORM-2, Bayard-Slavia Communications, and the St. Petersburg human rights organization Citizens' Watch filed complaints with the Volgograd procuracy in July. In enforcing SORM-2, the Volgograd FSB required providers to provide the FSB with a list of their subscribers and further information upon request. The Volgograd FSB charged Bayard-Slavia three times during the year with noncompliance. Bayard-Slavia Communications has demanded reversal of administrative noncompliance charges against it and confirmed its readiness to provide the required assistance to the FSB if a court orders it to do so. Citizens' Watch demanded the reversal of the Ministry of Communications order requiring SORM-2 compliance. Both complaints request that the FSB comply with the Constitution and the Civil Code.

Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and the FSB, have used their services' power to gather "kompromat" (compromising materials) on political and public figures as political insurance and to remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies, both active and retired, have been accused of working with commercial or criminal organizations for the same purpose.

There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB continue to exert pressure on citizens employed by Western firms and organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into becoming informants.

Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

The indiscriminate use of force by government forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000 persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.

Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are employing "high precision" tactics against separatist and terrorist targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low precision weapons.

In September and early October, government forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they were not supporters of Basayev.

Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's capital, Groznyy, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery, which destroyed numerous residential and civilian buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Groznyy, killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren. Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-Martan, 15 miles south of Groznyy, on October 3, which resulted in the deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed scores of civilians in Groznyy's downtown market and a local hospital. Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists. However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that special forces units had attacked a weapons market, but without using artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Groznyy's 150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign. On October 27, government forces subjected Groznyy to the heaviest attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116 persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27, government forces shelled the village of Samashki, killing at least 5 persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two large towns near Groznyy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.

According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in other villages.

Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of leaflets over Groznyy that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Groznyy after December 12 would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the city's inhabitants.

According to human rights NGO's, Government troops looted all valuables and foodstuffs from homes in regions that they controlled, particularly Sernovodsk, Ermolovskiy, and in the Naurskiy district. Refugees returning to their homes in Chechnya in late November discovered that they had been stripped by government soldiers.

On October 29, a government aircraft bombed a convoy of five vehicles with ICRC markings, according to ICRC officials. The bombing occurred at Shami-Yurt, west of Groznyy, and resulted in the deaths of at least 25 civilians and injuries to some 70 persons.

Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, representing the European Union Presidency, carried out a humanitarian fact finding visit to Ingushetiya on October 30. In late November, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata visited Chechnya and Ingushetiya. Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, Chairman in Office for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), visited the region, as agreed to by the Government at the OSCE summit in November. However, Vollebaek was not able to travel to Russian-controlled territory of northern Chechnya.

International organizations estimate that the internally displaced population as a result of the conflict fluctuated between 170,000 and 240,000, as individuals continued to cross back into Chechnya to check on their property or shop in markets. Reliable information on the number and status of displaced pe