ColombiaCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 31, 2003
Despite decades of drug and politically related violence, the market-based economy is diverse and relatively advanced. The country's population is estimated at 44 million. Crude oil, coal, coffee, and cut flowers are the principal legal exports, although illegal drug trafficking has created a large illicit economy. Economic growth for the year was estimated at 1.6 percent, while inflation measured over 7 percent. Income distribution was highly skewed, with 67 percent of the population living in poverty.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional mechanisms, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remained in many areas. A small percentage of total human rights abuses reported were attributed to state security forces; however, some members of the government security forces continued to commit serious abuses, including unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Some members of the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed serious abuses. Impunity remained at the core of the country's human rights problems. The civilian judiciary was inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case backlog, and undermined by corruption and intimidation. Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the authorities rarely brought high-ranking officers of the security forces charged with human rights offenses to trial.
Police, prison guards, and military forces mistreated detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons were harsh; however, renovation and new construction ameliorated some problems. There were allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions, particularly in "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones," and prolonged pretrial detention remained a fundamental problem. The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and the security forces sometimes interfered with public demonstrations and marches. A number of journalists were killed, and journalists continued to work in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation, in some instances from local officials, but primarily from paramilitary groups and guerrillas. Journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid reprisals. There were some restrictions on freedom of movement, generally because of security concerns and confined to narrowly defined geographic areas, particularly "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones." Violence and instability in rural areas displaced over 400,000 civilians from their homes. The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) may have exceeded 2.5 million. There were reports that security force members harassed members of human rights groups. Violence and extensive societal discrimination against women, child abuse, and child prostitution were serious problems. Extensive societal discrimination against indigenous people and minorities continued. Labor leaders and activists continued to be victims of high levels of violence. Child labor was a widespread problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem. Colombia was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
Paramilitaries continued to commit numerous unlawful and political killings, particularly of labor leaders, often kidnaping and torturing suspected guerrilla sympathizers prior to executing them. Paramilitaries also conducted kidnapings for ransom. Paramilitaries committed "social cleansing" killings of homosexuals and other "undesirable" elements. However, paramilitaries appeared to commit far fewer large-scale massacres than in 2001. Paramilitaries often interfered with personal privacy in areas where they exercised de facto control, and regularly engaged in military operations in which they endangered civilian lives by fighting in urban areas and using civilian dwellings as combat shelter. Paramilitaries displaced thousands through both terror-induced forced displacements of suspect populations and military operations that drove peasants from their homes. Paramilitaries regularly threatened and attacked human rights workers and journalists who criticized their illegal activities. Paramilitaries also recruited child soldiers.
Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, were responsible for a large percentage of civilian deaths attributable to the internal armed conflict. The rate of guerrilla abuses increased during the year, particularly as the FARC attempted to undermine the national elections and complicate the peaceful transfer of power between administrations. They engaged in a concerted campaign to destabilize municipal governments by killing 9 mayors and threatening to execute others, forcing nearly 400 mayors to submit their resignations. In addition to politicians, guerrillas killed journalists, labor union members, and numerous religious leaders. The FARC also continued to kidnap, torture, and kill off-duty members of the public security forces. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC and the ELN, kidnaped thousands of civilians to help finance subversion and put political pressure on the Government. Victims were held in deplorable conditions and often tortured both physically and psychologically. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, caused mass displacements both intentionally and as byproducts of military offensives, and caused thousands of civilian deaths and injuries through indiscriminate attacks on small towns and random terrorist bombings throughout the country. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, engaged in widespread recruitment of minors and used female conscripts as sex slaves.
In April the Executive Director of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW) testified that both the FARC and the AUC committed similar abuses and crimes, although their motives and goals were different.
The Government operated a protection program for threatened human rights workers, union leaders, journalists, mayors, and several other groups. The program provided a range of protection options, ranging from vehicles and armoring of offices to relocation and economic assistance.
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Political, unlawful, and some extrajudicial killings remained an extremely serious problem. The Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CPDDH), a prominent local human rights NGO (see Section 4), estimated that of the 28,230 homicides reported by the National Police, 4,416 were politically motivated. The DAS estimated that there were approximately 4,025 politically motivated homicides, the vast majority committed by nonstate actors. However, some members of the security forces continued to commit unlawful killings. The CPDDH reported that the security forces committed 59 political killings during the year, or 1.34 percent of the total. The Jesuit founded Center for Investigation and Popular Research (CINEP) reported that security forces were responsible for 92 intentional homicides of protected persons in the first 6 months of 2001. Most of the incidents cited by the CPDDH and CINEP were under investigation by military and/or civilian authorities at year's end. Civilian courts tried an increasing number of cases of military personnel accused of human rights violations (see Section 1.e.). Members of the security forces sometimes collaborated illegally with paramilitary forces, and the authorities continued to investigate past cases of alleged collaboration with or failure to prevent massacres by paramilitaries. Investigations of past killings and massacres proceeded slowly. There were no published reports that police or members of the armed forces committed social cleansing killings.
On September 25, near the village of Brisas de Yanacue, in the municipality of Cantagallo, Bolivar department, army troops broke into a private residence before sunrise and killed Florentino Castellanos and his 9-year-old son. Castellanos's wife, Mongui Jerez, was seriously wounded, losing an arm and a leg. Army troops mistakenly suspected that FARC guerrillas were sheltered in the family's dwelling. At year's end, the Procuraduria General (the Procuraduria) and the military were investigating the incident to establish basic facts and determine if the military should transfer its investigation to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia).
On December 8, the Fiscalia indicted 8 members of the army's Ninth Brigade, including a colonel and a captain, for the August 24 killing of FARC deserter Robinson Castro. The suspects allegedly killed Castro to steal $250,000 (728.1 million pesos) in cash he had intended to turn over to Government authorities.
Authorities continued to investigate the April 2001 killing of policeman Carlos Ceballos, who had testified in the investigation of illegal wiretapping by the Medellin GAULA anti-kidnaping force (see Section 1.f.).
The CPDDH reported that 2,452 persons were killed in massacres during the year. The CPDDH defines a "massacre" as the killing of 3 or more persons outside of combat in the same general location within a 24 period. The MOD reported a much smaller figure, with 361 persons killed in massacres during the year. The National Police registered 680 victims of massacres. Both the MOD and the National Police define a "massacre" as the killing outside of combat of 4 or more persons in a single incident. The CPDDH reported that state security forces killed 86 persons in massacres during the year, although it released no information on specific incidents. There continued to be reports of acts of negligence or deliberate omission by state security forces that facilitated massacres. In 2001 a military trial court exonerated the soldiers involved in the August 2000 killing of six children by an army unit in the town of Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department; however, the Superior Military Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration. No decision had been reached at year's end (see Section 1.g.).
There was no significant progress in investigations by the Fiscalia and the Procuraduria of a March 2001 paramilitary massacre in San Carlos, Antioquia department, which resulted in the deaths of 13 persons. CINEP and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) charged that police and military troops withdrew from the area of the attack 3 days prior to the massacre, and permitted a truck carrying 15 paramilitary hostages to pass unchallenged through a military roadblock. On June 6, the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of army Lieutenant Emilio Suarez and 28 enlisted personnel for participating in the 1997 kidnaping and killing of two suspected guerrillas near Santa Ana, Antioquia department, and for subsequently staging a mock combat intended to cover up the crimes.
On November 5, retired army Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Plazas, former director of intelligence for the army's 13th Brigade, was sentenced to 40 years in prison for his role in the 1998 kidnaping and killing of Jewish businessman Benjamin Khoudari. The Bogota Supreme Court had still not ruled on appeals by two other persons of their convictions for aggravated kidnaping and murder in the case.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the possible involvement of public security forces in the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, as well as the July 2000 killing of Elizabeth Canas, a key eyewitness. The Procuraduria also was conducting an inquiry into Canas's death. No progress seemed likely in either investigation.
There was no ruling in the trial of retired army Colonel Bernardo Ruiz, former commander of a military intelligence brigade, for allegedly ordering the 1995 killing of Conservative Party leader Alvaro Gomez. Two civilians were convicted of the killing and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, while four other persons were acquitted.
The Supreme Court had not yet ruled on an appeal by five army officers and four suspected paramilitaries of their 1998 convictions for the 1988 Nuevo Segovia paramilitary massacre in which 43 persons were killed.
On May 23, the Council of State overturned on a technicality the Inspector General's 1994 order dismissing Brigadier General Alvaro Velandia from the armed forces for involvement in the 1987 kidnaping, torture, and killing of Nydia Erika Bautista, an M-19 guerrilla. The Procuraduria was appealing the decision at year's end. The Association of Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons (ASFADDES) and the Bogota office of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) condemned the decision. ASFADDES and Bautista's relatives had already presented the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). No progress seemed likely in an investigation of the case by the Fiscalia.
Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups, including instances of both passive support and direct collaboration by members of the public security forces, particularly the army, continued. Evidence suggested that there were tacit arrangements between local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, since paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas despite a significant military presence. Some members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups--passing them through roadblocks, sharing intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even joining their ranks while off duty.
The military high command stated repeatedly that it would not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and paramilitaries, and that the armed forces would combat paramilitary groups. Although state security forces doubled operations against paramilitaries during the year and quadrupled the number of paramilitaries captured since 2000 (see Section 1.g.), security force actions in the field were not always consistent with the leadership's positions. In addition to active collaboration, the military often was accused of failing to respond in a timely manner to warnings of impending paramilitary massacres or selective killings. The military generally cited lack of credible information, available manpower, and adequate mobility to explain these failures. Impunity for military personnel who collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
An investigation continued into the January 2001 paramilitary massacre of 27 civilians at the village of Chengue, near the town of Chalan in Sucre department. On November 12, a specialized criminal court in Sincelejo found army Sergeant Ruben Dario Rojas "not guilty" of facilitating the massacre. The Fiscalia appealed the decision. The same specialized court had yet to rule of the culpability of army Sergeant Euclides Rafael Bossa, although the evidence against the two suspects was similar. The Fiscalia formally linked paramilitary leader Nidia Esther Veilla to the crime. The Procuraduria filed formal disciplinary charges against nine members of the public security forces, including former Navy Admiral Rodrigo Quinones, for possible culpable omission in failing to prevent the massacre. Quinones resigned from the armed forces effective December 31.
In December the authorities released two gunmen arrested for the August 2001 killing of Yolanda Paternina, local lead prosecutor in the Chengue case, for lack of evidence. Two CTI investigators working undercover on the case already had disappeared in April 2001 near the town of Berrugas and were presumed dead.
On May 3, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia formally charged 72 paramilitaries for killing 20 persons in the April 2001 massacre in the Alto Naya region, bordering the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Fifteen paramilitaries pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the crimes. Three others were convicted of killing and sentenced to 26 years in prison. The Procuraduria was conducting a disciplinary investigation into allegations that the army may have been negligent in preventing the massacre. According to prosecutors, no active duty service members were implicated in the commission of this crime.
The Procuraduria was investigating army Brigadier General Eduardo Herrera and Police Colonel Guillermo Aranda for possible misconduct related to the July 2001 kidnaping by paramilitaries of 43 men near Peque, Antioquia department. Seven of these men, who the AUC forced to herd cattle, were later found dead. At year's end, it was still unclear whether their paramilitary kidnapers killed them or the FARC did on the assumption that they were paramilitary collaborators.
The Procuraduria found no evidence of misconduct by any member of the public security forces related to the October 2001 paramilitary massacre of 24 persons near the city of Buga, Valle del Cauca department. The Fiscalia continued its criminal investigation; however, the investigation's closure seemed likely. The Fiscalia also was investigating allegations of army complicity in a series of paramilitary crimes in and around the "peace community" of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department in 2000 and 2001. In two separate incidents in 2000, paramilitaries massacred five residents of San Jose and six residents of the nearby community of La Union. In March 2001 paramilitaries again entered San Jose and threatened members of the community. In July 2001, paramilitaries entered La Union, killed one resident, and drove out hundreds of others. On March 30, presumed paramilitaries killed a member of the San Jose peace community on the road between San Jose and the regional capital of Apartado. On October 20, paramilitaries entered La Union, "disappeared" one resident, and drove out hundreds of others, who were displaced to San Jose. To prevent further terrorist attacks on the community, the military established a permanent presence in the mountains surrounding La Union. La Union's residents had not returned by year's end. Although peace community leaders accused the army's 17th Brigade of involvement or acquiescence in many of these incidents, prosecutors uncovered no evidence of military complicity.
An investigation continued of army Colonel Victor Matamorros and army Captain Juan Carlos Fernandez regarding allegations that the two actively collaborated with paramilitaries between 1997 and 1999 in the department of Norte de Santander. Matamorros and Fernandez were the commander and intelligence chief, respectively, of an army battalion based in the departmental capital of Cucuta. Over a period of 5 months in 1999, 15 major paramilitary massacres occurred near the Norte de Santander towns of La Gabarra and Tibu. On April 8, a court in Cucuta convicted Giovanni Velasquez, a paramilitary, of aggravated murder for his role in the massacre.
In March 2001, the Fiscalia charged former Tibu military base commander Major Mauricio Llorente, former Tibu police commander Major Harbey Fernando Ortega, and 13 policemen with murder and complicity with paramilitaries in one of the 1999 Tibu massacres. An investigation continued into a related massacre of six persons near the town of Los Cuervos. The Procuraduria continued its disciplinary investigation of a police official for possible involvement in the Los Cuervos massacre; however, it closed its investigation of the Tibu massacre after finding no evidence of negligence or complicity by any member of the public security forces. The Fiscalia continued to investigate the 1998 paramilitary massacre of 19 persons in Puerto Alvira, near the town of Mapiripan, Meta department. In March 2001, the Superior Military Tribunal confirmed a lower military court’s decision to close the military's investigation of the case. The Procuraduria formally exonerated Major General Agustin Ardila, Major General Jaime Humberto Cortes, Brigadier General Freddy Padilla, Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui, and Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Sanchez of any wrongdoing related to the massacre at Puerto Alvira. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of 21 members of the public security forces for alleged collusion with paramilitaries responsible for approximately 160 social cleansing killings in northeastern Antioquia between 1995 and 1998. The Procuraduria was investigating 26 officials on disciplinary charges related to the same events. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of General Jaime Humberto Uscategui for alleged collusion with paramilitaries related to the 1997 Mapiripan massacre. In November 2001, the Constitutional Court overturned on jurisdictional grounds Uscategui's April 2001 military court conviction for dereliction of duty in failing to prevent the massacre (see Section 1.e.). The Fiscalia also was prosecuting 11 other defendants, including 3 members of the armed forces, for offenses related to events at Mapiripan. The Fiscalia continued its investigation into allegations that former General Rito Alejo del Rio collaborated with paramilitaries in the Uraba region of Antioquia department while he was commander of the army's 17th Brigade from 1995-97. Del Rio was arrested on these charges in July 2001, but subsequently was released based on a controversial ruling that there were jurisdictional flaws in the arrest warrant. On December 5, the Procuraduria closed its disciplinary investigation into similar allegations after finding insufficient evidence of the alleged crimes.
The trial continued of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie for alleged collaboration with paramilitaries who killed 11 persons between 1993 and 1994.
Former navy intelligence informant Jimmy Alberto Arenas was convicted of murdering 63 persons in Barrancabermeja between 1991 and 1993 and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On July 29, the Government concluded an amicable settlement of claims related to the 1992 police killings of eight children and one adult in the Villatina neighborhood of Medellin. As part of the settlement, the Government agreed to construct and equip the community with a modern health center, fund the establishment of an employment-generating local small business, and indemnify the victims' families. Shortly after his inauguration, President Uribe instructed foreign ministry officials to reach friendly settlements in all pending cases in which state responsibility seemed clear. On October 17, the Government began serious negotiations on five cases.
Paramilitaries committed numerous political and unlawful killings, primarily in areas they disputed with guerrillas and generally in the absence of a strong government presence. The MOD reported that paramilitary forces were responsible for the deaths of 397 civilians as of November 30. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that it had received reports of 329 unlawful killings by paramilitaries as of October 31. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), a well-known local NGO (see Section 4), paramilitaries were responsible for the deaths of at least 930 civilians in the first 6 months of the year. Paramilitaries targeted journalists (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see Section 4), labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists, indigenous leaders (see Section 5), local politicians, and others they suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas.
The Fiscalia continued investigations into numerous killings committed by paramilitaries in the Magdalena River port city of Barrancabermeja, Santander department. During the year, army personnel concentrated on combating paramilitary influence in the region. Of the 54 confirmed members of illegal armed groups captured by the army battalion in Barrancabermeja, 48 were paramilitaries. The battalion also captured 66 persons involved in gasoline theft, a multi-million dollar criminal enterprise dominated by paramilitaries. The Fiscalia was investigating the September 2001 killing by presumed paramilitaries of Congressman and House of Representatives Acting Peace Committee Chairman Jairo Hernando Rojas.
Paramilitaries also killed members of the armed forces and national police who attempted to hamper their illegal activities. For example, on June 14, paramilitary gunmen interrupted an English class at a night school in the town of Pamplona, Norte de Santander department, and killed local police chief Major Sergio Gutierrez. Gutierrez had received death threats warning him to cease efforts to dismantle a local paramilitary organization. On November 19, 12 armed men killed 2 police investigators working on an operation to combat paramilitary extortionists in the town of La Ceja, Antioquia department. On December 3, 15 paramilitaries from the Central Bolivar Block stopped a bus 12 miles outside the town of Concepcion, Santander department, removed 3 unarmed police officers dressed in civilian clothes, and killed them. The three officers were traveling to the town of Malaga to testify in a criminal case against paramilitaries.
In November 2001, AUC leader Carlos Castano issued a public statement promising the cessation of large-scale paramilitary massacres. Based on the observations of diplomatic observers and the national press, many AUC-affiliated paramilitary groups appeared to change their operations accordingly, significantly reducing the number of massacres perpetrated by paramilitaries. For example, according to the MOD, paramilitaries had killed 54 persons in 11 massacres as of November 30, compared with 281 victims in 42 massacres in 2001. The National Police released a similar figure, reporting that 59 persons were killed by paramilitaries in massacres during the year. However, the CPDDH released a much larger figure, reporting that paramilitaries killed 1,549 persons in massacres.
For example, on August 22, members of the AUC's Calima Front, which is deeply involved in drug trafficking, kidnaped and killed eight men near the village of Barragan, in Valle del Cauca department. Two days later, army troops killed two paramilitaries believed to have been involved in the killings.
Prosecutors continued to investigate massacres committed by paramilitaries in 2001 in the municipalities of Penol, Antioquia department, Frias, Magdalena department, Sabaletas, Valle del Cauca department, and a remote region of Boyaca department. There was no significant progress in any of these investigations. The Fiscalia continued to investigate a series of attacks in November 2000 in which paramilitaries killed 27 fishermen in the La Cienaga de Santa Marta area, Magdalena department.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate two different massacres near Trujillo, Valle del Cauca department, in 1989-90 and 1994. The authorities held one accused paramilitary in custody and had outstanding arrest warrants for three others. One paramilitary suspect was killed while in custody.
The Fiscalia reopened an investigation into the 1990 killing of presidential candidate and former M-19 guerrilla Carlos Pizarro after AUC leader Carlos Castano confessed to the killing in memoirs published in 2001. In June prosecutors requested that Castano be tried in absentia and sentenced to 60 years in prison.
Paramilitary "social cleansing" killings of homosexuals, prostitutes, drug users, vagrants, and persons with mental disabilities were reported in Barrancabermeja, Cucuta, and other cities. The CCJ reported that paramilitaries committed at least 212 "social cleansing" killings in the first 6 months of the year. For example, on June 14, paramilitaries executed two men on the outskirts of the town of Giron, Santander department; a note attached to one of the bodies attempted to justify the killings on the grounds that the men were common criminals. On September 14, paramilitaries in the town of Soledad, Atlantico department, killed 19-year-old Mario Paut as a presumed vagrant because he had broken a 9 p.m. curfew. Paut had left his home at 10 p.m. to buy diapers for his 1-month-old infant.
During the year, guerrillas, particularly the FARC, appeared to have committed a higher percentage of the nation's unlawful killings than they did the previous year, often targeting noncombatants. The MOD attributed 70 percent of civilian deaths, or 916 killings, to guerrillas between January and November. The MOD had attributed 51 percent of civilian deaths in 2001 to guerrillas. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that as of October 31, it had received complaints of 324 intentional killings by guerrillas, 193 by the FARC, 20 by the ELN, and 111 by unidentified guerrillas. However, the CPDDH reported that guerrillas were responsible for only 452 civilian deaths during the year, or 10 percent of the total. The CPDDH attributed 382 killings to the FARC and 53 to the ELN. The CPDDH attributed the deaths of 3,882 civilians to unidentified illegal armed groups.
Guerrilla targets included local elected officials and candidates for public office (see Section 3), civic leaders, business owners, peasants opposed to guerrilla activities, religious leaders (see Section 2.c.), indigenous people (see Section 5), labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), and teachers (see Section 2.a.). Some communities controlled by guerrillas also experienced social cleansing killings. Guerrilla offensives often caused significant civilian casualties (see Section 1.g.) and prompted significant displacements (see Section 2.d.).
Many unlawful killings committed by guerrillas were politically-motivated. The security chief for ex-president Andres Pastrana claimed to have thwarted 92 attempts on Pastrana's life, the vast majority by guerrillas, during Pastrana's 4-year-term that ended on August 7. The FARC also attempted to assassinate candidate and current President Alvaro Uribe at least 12 times (see Section 3).
Smaller guerrilla groups also committed politically motivated unlawful killings. For example, on April 27, seven members of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) killed a 16-year-old girl in the town of San Calixto, Norte de Santander department, for consorting with local military personnel.
The FARC committed more large-scale massacres than it did in 2001. The Ministry of Defense attributed 85 percent of civilian deaths in massacres during the year, or 307 total killings, to guerrillas. In 2001 the MOD attributed 36 percent of such deaths to guerrillas. The CPDDH reported that guerrillas killed 280 persons in massacres during the year, only 11 percent of its much larger estimate of massacre victims. According to the CPDDH, the FARC killed 241 persons in massacres and the ELN killed 31. The CPDDH blamed the deaths of an additional 691 persons on unidentified illegal armed groups.
On September 15, the FARC abducted 22 coca-leaf pickers near the town of Vista Hermosa, Meta department. After 4 days of torture, the guerrillas killed 11 coca-leaf pickers and buried them in a mass grave, apparently because the FARC suspected they were paramilitary collaborators. On August 10, near the town of La Gabarra, Norte de Santander department, the FARC shot and killed seven peasants who refused to be forcibly recruited. On August 31, near the town of Corralito in the Montes de Maria region of Bolivar department, the FARC killed eight farm workers whom it accused of being paramilitary collaborators.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the February 2001 killings by the FARC of seven ecotourists in Purace national park, bordering the departments of Huila and Cauca. Eight senior FARC leaders were identified as suspects in the case.
An investigation continued into the FARC's May 2001 killing of seven peasants near the village of Alto Sinu, Tierra Alta municipality, Cordoba department. Prosecutors ordered the arrest of Jhoverman Sanchez, leader of the FARC's 58th Front.
There was no progress in the investigation of the ELN's killing of nine peasants in the village of La Cristalina, located near the town of Puerto Wilches, Santander department, in retaliation for their vocal opposition to a Government proposal to create an ELN safe haven in the region in anticipation of potential peace negotiations. Little progress was made or seemed likely on investigations into killings committed by the FARC in its former safe haven ("despeje"). For example, no arrests were anticipated for the FARC's killing of seven residents of the former despeje town of La Macarena, Meta department, in the week following the abolishment of the FARC safe haven. Five of the victims were killed reportedly for failing to fully cooperate with the FARC, and two others were killed for attempting to steal FARC commander Mono Jojoy's custom bed and prize pig following his departure.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the killings of 20 persons, including 8 police officers and the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte, Antioquia department, during a March 2000 FARC attack on Vigia del Fuerte and Bellavista, Choco department, located on opposite sides of the Atrato River. On April 8, the authorities charged three members of the FARC with killing and terrorism. They were in custody and awaiting trial at year's end.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the FARC's December 2000 killing of Congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay, his mother, and five other persons in Caqueta department. No progress was expected in arresting the senior FARC leaders accused of ordering the crime. However, on June 5, a court sentenced--in absentia--Manuel Marulanda, alias "Tirofijo;" Jorge Briceno, alias "Mono Jojoy;" and 3 other members of the FARC Secretariat to 396 years in prison for the 1997 kidnaping and killing of Turbay's older brother, then-Senator Rodrigo Turbay.
On November 5, the Fiscalia ordered the arrest of eight members of the FARC's 57th Front for the January 2001 killing of Henry Perea, mayor of the town of Jurardo, Choco department. Perea had been pulled from his office and shot in broad daylight. No arrests appeared imminent.
On July 30, prosecutors indicted nine senior FARC leaders for the September 2001 kidnaping and killing of former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo near Valledupar, Cesar department. The FARC apparently killed Araujo when it became clear she could not maintain the pace required for the FARC to outrun military efforts to rescue her. On November 18, the Fiscalia ordered the arrest of two other FARC leaders for their involvement in the crime. The FARC executed guerrilla soldiers who attempted to desert. For example, on June 3, near the town of Yondo, eastern Antioquia department, the FARC killed two female soldiers who planned to desert.
Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs, artillery, and antipersonnel landmines, and continued their practice of using gas canisters to attack small towns, killing civilians indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.).
b. Disappearance
The law specifically defines forced disappearance as a crime. More than 3,800 cases of forced disappearance have been formally reported since 1977. Very few have been resolved. The great majority of victims of forced disappearance have never been seen or heard from again.
The CPDDH reported that state security forces were responsible for 10 forced disappearances during the year. The CCJ reported four such cases in the first 6 months of the year. The Procuraduria investigated 105 members of the state security forces on disciplinary charges related to forced disappearances (see Section 1.a.). In 35 cases, the allegations were credible enough for the Procuraduria to open a formal investigation. One army captain was formally charged, two police agents were found guilty and sanctioned, and one police agent was exonerated.
The law prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely serious problem. According to the Free Country Foundation, an anti-kidnaping NGO (see Section 4), during the year there were a total of 2,986 kidnapings; 936 were attributed to the FARC, 776 to the ELN, 180 to paramilitaries, including the AUC, and the remaining to smaller groups such as the EPL (People's Liberation Army) and common criminals. Elite government anti-kidnaping units known as GAULAs and other elements of the security forces freed 693 hostages and forced the release of 190 others. However, despite government efforts, the Free Country Foundation reported that at least 62 persons died in captivity during the year, including 3 children. Thirty-eight of these persons were killed by their captors. On January 29, then-President Andres Pastrana signed a new anti-kidnaping law that provides for 40-year jail sentences. At the same time, Pastrana announced disbursements of approximately $2 million (5 billion pesos) to strengthen the GAULAs.
Some members of the state security forces were involved in kidnaping for ransom. For example, on May 14, police arrested two members of the National Police and an official from the Fiscalia for participating in the kidnaping of shoe magnate Esteban Rangel. On September 20, the BBC reported that some kidnap victims alleged they were abducted by members of the police either at roadblocks or after having been flagged down by police cars. The report noted that victims were uncertain whether they had been kidnaped by corrupt police officers or guerrillas using stolen police uniforms.
Paramilitaries were responsible for the majority of forced disappearances. The CPDDH attributed 439 forced disappearances during the year to paramilitaries, or 60 percent of such violations. The CPDDH also reported that 277 persons were forcibly "disappeared" by unidentified armed groups. According to the Free Country Foundation, paramilitaries were responsible for 180 kidnapings, or 7 percent of all kidnapings during the year in which a perpetrator was identified. Paramilitaries generally abducted persons suspected of collaboration with guerrillas, whom they almost always killed (see Section 1.a.). In April and October, presumed paramilitaries abducted persons near the town of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department (see Section 1.a.). Authorities continued to investigate the October 2001 paramilitary kidnaping of 13 fishermen near the Cienaga de Santa Marta, Magdalena department. Three of the victims escaped, and at least six were confirmed dead. The four victims still missing were presumed dead.
Paramilitaries sometimes abducted government employees investigating paramilitary crimes (see Section 1.a.). No further progress seemed likely in the April 2001 disappearances of two CTI investigators near Berrugas, Sucre department, who were working undercover on the January 2001 Chengue paramilitary massacre (see Section 1.a.). An investigation continued into the 2000 abduction of seven members of the CTI near Minguillo, Cesar department. The whereabouts of the CTI employees were unknown, and they were presumed dead. Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing policy and major source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. The FARC continued to kidnap persons in accordance with its so-called "Law 002," announced in March 2000, which requires persons with more than $1 million (2.95 billion pesos) in assets to volunteer payments to the FARC or risk detention. The Free Country Foundation reported that guerrillas committed 75 percent of the 2,986 kidnapings reported during the year in which a perpetrator was identified. The Foundation reported that the FARC kidnaped 936 persons and the ELN 776. In addition, the FARC often purchased victims kidnaped by common criminals and then negotiated ransom payments with the families. There were many reports that guerrillas tortured kidnap victims (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). Several released kidnap victims claimed that the FARC had been holding more than 200 persons in the former despeje before the zone's abolishment in February.
According to the Free Country Foundation, merchants, government employees, and cattle ranchers were among the guerrillas' preferred victims. However, the largest category of kidnaping victims was children, over 384 of whom were kidnaped during the year. In 2001, for example, the FARC kidnaped 11-year-old Laura Ulloa from her school bus in Cali, and did not release her until April 5. It was suspected that a ransom was paid for her return. In October 2001, the FARC kidnaped 18-month-old Mariana Ossa in a middle class neighborhood of Medellin. Although Ossa's parents paid a ransom for her release in July, she was not released until December 22. The FARC kidnaped several mayors' children to pressure the mayors into resigning (see Section 3).
According to the Free Country Foundation, 1,714 kidnapings during the year, or over 57 percent of the total, were economically motivated. During an April 2 newspaper interview, ELN Supreme Commander Nicolas Rodriguez, alias "Gabino," stated that the ELN expected to receive payment for the release of kidnap victims. Gabino added that kidnap victims "have a specific economic value" and that "the Government must understand that, if there are funds for a peace agreement, these funds must be applied to resolving the situation of these kidnap victims." The Government immediately rejected Gabino's demand.
On August 19, the ELN kidnaped 27 tourists from a resort near the town of Bahia Solano, Choco department. At year's end, all but three had been released, most in return for ransom payments or IOUs accompanied by death threats for noncompliance. Victims reported that the group, which included retired persons and children, was forced to hike 12 hours a day through jungle swamps on meager rations of bananas and rice. Many of the victims contracted malaria or other serious illnesses and one elderly victim died of a heart attack and was buried in an unmarked grave.
Guerrillas sometimes demanded ransom payments before returning the bodies of kidnap victims who died in captivity. For example, in April relatives of a merchant kidnaped near the town of Pensilvania, Caldas department, paid the FARC nearly $2,000 (5.9 million pesos) to recover his body.
Guerrillas also kidnaped foreigners for ransom. According to the Free Country Foundation, 31 foreigners were kidnaped during the year. For example, on April 19, the FARC abducted two Canadian citizens and one French citizen whose helicopter made an emergency landing in a remote region of Narino department. They were released on July 30. Government authorities believe a ransom was paid. In October 2001, the FARC kidnaped Dutch student Roelant Jonker near the village of Santa Cecilia, Choco department. Jonker was released on June 12 in return for a ransom of approximately $8,000 (23.6 million pesos). On May 22, a combined team of army, police, and DAS personnel rescued 64-year-old Maria Luisa Trevissan de Bachetti, an Italian citizen and owner of a Venezuelan steel plant, from a joint FARC/ELN team holding her hostage in the town of Maico, La Guajira department. Trevissan de Bachetti had been kidnaped on April 19 in Venezuela. The guerrillas were demanding $10 million (29.5 billion pesos) for her release.
The FARC committed numerous politically motivated kidnapings in an attempt to destabilize the Government and pressure it into a prisoner exchange. According to the Free Country Foundation, there were 208 politically motivated kidnapings during the year. On April 15, HRW published a letter to FARC leader Manuel Marulanda that called for an immediate end to targeting political leaders.
On February 20, FARC operatives hijacked an airliner on route from Neiva, capital of Huila department, to Bogota, forced it to land on the Bogota-Neiva highway, and kidnaped Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem, Chairman of the Senate Peace Commission. The hijacking was apparently planned for the express purpose of kidnaping Senator Gechem. Gechem's cousin, Diego Turbay, former chairman of the House of Representatives Peace Commission, was killed by the FARC in 2000. Gechem's kidnaping led then-President Pastrana to declare a definitive end to stalled peace negotiations with the FARC and abolish the FARC's despeje in the south.
On February 23, 3 days after the despeje was abolished, the FARC kidnaped presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign manager, Clara Rojas, on the highway between Florencia and San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta department. On July 23, the FARC released a videotape of a thin, tired Betancourt, apparently recorded on May 15. In early October, a Bogota television news station received a message from the FARC stating that Betancourt was in good condition.
On April 11, the FARC committed a daring daylight kidnaping of 16 members of the Valle del Cauca departmental assembly from the assembly's headquarters in downtown Cali. FARC operatives dressed in army uniforms announced that the building was being evacuated because of a bomb threat and hurried victims into a waiting bus painted in army colors. Although four victims were rescued by the military in the following week, 12 victims remained in captivity at year's end. On August 28 and December 27, the FARC released videos of the 12 remaining captives, who appeared to be in good health.
On April 21, the FARC kidnaped Guillermo Gaviria, governor of Antioquia, and Gilberto Echeverri, departmental peace commissioner and former national Minister of Defense, while the governor was leading a peace march through the eastern Antioquia town of El Vaho.
The FARC continued to hold captive former members of Congress Orlando Bernal, Luis Eladio Perez, and Consuelo Gonzalez, kidnaped in 2001, and Congressman Oscar Lizcano, kidnaped in 2000. All four former members' terms expired while they were in captivity. The FARC also held former Meta governor Alan Jara, who was kidnaped in July 2001 while riding in a U.N. vehicle with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) director and other government officials.
The FARC continued to hold nine victims of a mass kidnaping carried out in July 2001 from a luxury apartment building in Neiva, Huila department. The captives included the wife and two children of a congressman. On April 5, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recovered the bodies of two police officers, both killed by the FARC. One of the bodies was that of Corporal Jose Norberto Perez, the father of Andres Felipe Perez, a 13-year-old boy who died of cancer in December 2001 after having pleaded with the FARC to release his father so that the family could be reunited before the boy's death.
Guerrillas kidnaped journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The whereabouts of three American missionaries kidnaped from eastern Panama in 1993 remained unknown, and they were presumed dead.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were reports that the police, military, and prison guards mistreated and tortured detainees. The Military Penal Code directs that trials of members of the military and police accused of torture be held in civilian, rather than military, courts (see Section 1.e.). The Procuraduria received 103 complaints of torture by state agents during the year. CINEP reported that state security forces tortured 16 persons during the first 6 months of the year; 14 of these cases were attributed to the army and 2 to the police.
The Fiscalia was investigating accusations publicized during the year by the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP) that members of the Cali GAULA collaborated with paramilitaries in abducting and torturing individuals suspected of involvement in kidnapings.
Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano, Captains Alvaro Hernando Moreno and Rafael Garcia, Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four noncommissioned officers remained on trial at year's end for torturing 12 marines with asphyxiation and electric shock in 1995.
CINEP reported 42 cases of torture by paramilitaries during the first 6 months of the year. Victims of paramilitary killings often showed signs of torture.
Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. CINEP reported only three cases of torture by guerrillas during the first 6 months of the year; however, the bodies of many persons kidnaped and subsequently killed by guerrillas showed signs of torture and disfigurement. Numerous former kidnap victims and hostages taken by the guerrillas during combat reported severe deprivation, denial of medical attention, and physical and psychological torture during captivity (see Section 1.b.). The MOD reported that guerrillas tortured or mutilated and killed soldiers and policemen after they surrendered (see Section 1.g.).
Prison conditions were harsh, particularly for prisoners without significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary and health conditions remained serious problems. The National Prison and Penitentiary Institute (INPEC) reported that the nation's daily food allowance per prisoner was only $1.25 (3,500 pesos). Private sources continued to provide the majority of most prisoners' food. In June 2001, based on a lawsuit filed by prisoners incarcerated in Valledupar, Cesar department, the Valledupar Supreme Court ordered INPEC to improve prison conditions in the department. Many of INPEC's 10,000 prison guards were poorly trained or corrupt. On March 6, prison guards at the Valledupar penitentiary beat an unruly prisoner in his cell so severely that he died 36 hours later. The Fiscalia placed the six guards under arrest on suspicion of murder. The Office reportedly was investigating allegations of prison guard brutality in other installations as well.
Only four prisons--Valledupar, Acacias, Popayan, and Combita--met international standards for acceptable conditions for prison facilities. Two more prisons designed to meet these standards were under construction in La Porada, Caldas department, and Palo Gordo, near Bucaramanga, Santander department. In other prisons, inmates paid to eat, drink, sleep on a mattress, wash clothes, or make telephone calls. Many inmates in such facilities also were forced to pay protection money to fellow inmates or corrupt prison guards.
According to INPEC, overcrowding remained a serious problem. In October the country's prisons and jails held approximately 52,900 inmates, 16 percent over their intended capacity of 45,500. The country's largest prisons had some of the highest occupancy levels. For example, Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's largest, held over three times as many prisoners as it was designed to hold.
An estimated 17.8 percent of the country's prisons were between 40 and 80 years old, 3.5 percent between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4 percent more than 201 years old. The Ministry of Justice made some progress in implementing a plan announced in 2000 to expand prison capacity by 18,000 beds by 2003. Since the announcement, the Government renovated 17 of the country's 151 penitentiaries, including some of its largest, expanding prison capacity by 6,400 beds.
The Government sometimes failed to prevent deadly violence among inmates. For example, on July 12, a routine cell search in Bucaramanga's La Modelo jail revealed plans for a mass escape led by ELN inmates and sparked a large riot that resulted in the death of one inmate and serious injuries to four others. INPEC reported 8 major prison riots, compared with 19 in 2001. However, unlike the previous year when 61 inmates died in such uprisings, only 3 lives were lost in these disturbances.
There were no large-scale prison escapes; however, a total of 223 prisoners did escape from the country's prisons during the year. These escapes were divided roughly evenly between classic escapes and abuses of administrative privileges such as 72-hour passes. Nevertheless, these numbers represented an improvement over 781 escapes registered in 2000. Enhanced external security, which prevented paramilitaries and guerrillas from breaking out imprisoned comrades, and the revocation during the year of the policy permitting the issuance of 72-hour passes to favored prisoners, accounted for the improvement. Several failed escapes were elaborately planned, such as an effort by paramilitaries, discovered in October, to tunnel out of Bogota's La Picota prison.
During the year, the authorities moved high-level narcotics traffickers to the new high security prison at Combita, where they endured the same spartan conditions as other prisoners. The renovation of the high security wing of Bogota's La Picota prison also was completed, ending many inmates' relatively comfortable prison lifestyles.
There were separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts of the country there were separate women's prisons. Conditions at women's prisons were similar to those at men's prisons, but were far less violent. According to the Criminal Procedure Code, no one under the age of 18 may be held in a prison. Juveniles were held in separate facilities operated by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).
There were no separate facilities for pretrial detainees, who made up an estimated 43 percent of all prison inmates. According to INPEC, 981 pretrial detainees were held in overcrowded police jails, despite court orders that they be transferred to long-term detention facilities. Failure on the part of many local military commanders and jail supervisors to keep mandatory detention records or follow notification procedures made accounting precisely for all detainees impossible.
The ICRC continued to have routine access to most prisons and police and military detention centers. The ICRC continued to have ad hoc access to civilians held by paramilitaries and guerrillas. However, the FARC and ELN continued to deny the ICRC access to police and military hostages (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention; however, there continued to be allegations that authorities arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily. Many such allegations originated in "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones" established by presidential decree, where security forces were granted expanded powers to establish public order.
President Uribe issued Decree 2002 on September 10 by authority of his August declaration of a "State of Internal Disturbance" (see Section 1.f.). In addition to authorizing the creation of "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones", the decree granted the police and armed forces the power to make arrests, intercept communications, and search private residences without written warrants, and to do so without judicial authorization in exigent circumstances. However, on November 26, the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the decree that granted police powers to the military, emphasizing that prosecutorial officials must determine when personal liberty interests can be infringed upon in the interests of public safety.
The Constitutional Court's decision was consistent with its April 11 ruling striking down the National Defense and Security Act of 2001, which had threatened to infringe on the due process rights of persons detained or investigated by the military (see Section 1.e.). Among other things, the Act had not specified the maximum period detainees might be held by the military before being turned over to civilian authorities.
The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Even in Rehabilitation Zones, anyone detained by law enforcement authorities must be brought before a senior prosecutor within 36 hours of his or her detention. A senior prosecutor must then rule on the legality of the detention within an additional 36 hours. Despite these legal protections, there continued to be allegations of arbitrary detention.
Conditional pretrial release is available for minor offenses or after unduly long periods of investigative detention. In the case of most felonies, detention prior to the filing of formal charges cannot exceed 180 days, after which a suspect must be conditionally released. In the cases of crimes deemed particularly serious, such as murder or terrorism, authorities are allowed up to 360 days to file formal charges before a suspect must be conditionally released.
Paramilitaries in the city of Barrancabermeja, Santander department, exercised illegal "social controls," such as curfews for children, ad hoc punishments for domestic violence and petty crimes, and the issuance of paramilitary-produced identification cards to bona fide local residents.
The FARC pressed the Government to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law; however, both the Pastrana and Uribe administrations rejected the idea. Families of kidnap victims, particularly relatives of 12 Valle del Cauca Assembly members kidnaped in April and still held by the FARC (see Section 1.b.), pressed the Government to participate in a one-time humanitarian prisoner exchange. During the year, guerrillas continued to hold at least 47, and as many as 102, soldiers and police who either were captured in combat or kidnaped while off-duty. The ICRC was not permitted access to them (see Section 1.b.).
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not practice it. However, there were numerous instances of individuals pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases included persons from all walks of life, including politicians, journalists, human rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and others (see Sections 2.a. and 4). The threats came from various quarters: some individual members of the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups, narcotics traffickers, and other criminal elements.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the civilian justice system was independent of the executive and legislative branches in both theory and practice; however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and prosecutors was common. Impunity remained the single greatest problem threatening the credibility of the Government's commitment to human rights. The university-affiliated Corporation for Judicial Excellence, which was preparing a study on impunity, reported that the overall level of impunity cited by a variety of governmental and nongovernmental sources was between 80 and 95 percent.
Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation, particularly when handling cases involving members of the public security forces or of paramilitary, guerrilla, and narcotics trafficking organizations. Violent attacks and threats against prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges continued. Prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases often lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect them and thus were unwilling to testify, hindering chances for successful prosecutions. For example, in December two prosecution witnesses failed to appear at the trial of three members of the Irish Republican Army who were accused of training members of the FARC. One of the witnesses could not be found, and the other said that he feared for his life.
According to a statement issued by the Supreme Court, as of July 16, terrorist organizations such as the FARC and the AUC had threatened judicial officials working in at least 368 courts in 231 municipalities. As of August 30, 408 judges and 396 prosecutors from 248 municipalities felt obligated to work out of offices in departmental capitals for reasons of security.
In March 2001, Bogota judge Lesther Gonzalez received threats that appeared related to important cases on her docket, including the 1995 assassination of Alvaro Gomez, the 1997 Mapiripan massacre, and the 1997 killings of three CINEP volunteers. Also in March 2001, Medellin judge Adalgisa Lopera fled the city with her family following a death threat. Judge Lopera heard paramilitarism, terrorism, and narcotics cases.
In April 2001, two undercover CTI employees investigating the January 2001 Chengue massacre disappeared in Sucre department. In December two gunmen arrested for the August 2001 killing of Yolanda Paternina, local lead prosecutor in the case, were released for lack of evidence (see Section 1.a.).
An investigation continued into the April 2000 killing of prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin in Medellin. Paramilitaries were suspected of killing her. One suspect had been charged in absentia; however, no one had been detained by year's end.
The civilian justice system is a separate and independent branch of government that uses a Napoleonic legal system incorporating some accusatorial elements. The military justice system, which is part of the executive branch, also relies on a mixed system, although accusatorial aspects predominate.
On December 16, Congress approved constitutional changes designed to convert the current mixed judicial system into a purely accusatorial system. The reforms will go into effect in January 2005, prior to which major changes will have to be made to the penal, criminal procedure, and evidence codes. After that date, judges, rather than prosecutors, will issue arrest warrants and decide pretrial motions. Cases will be tried in open court and decided on the basis of oral trial proceedings, rather than an exhaustive written dossier. Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio has predicted that the reforms will reduce the average investigatory phase of a case from 3 years to 6 months.
The judicial system was extremely overburdened. Based on information collected from 77 percent of the nation's courts, as of September the administrative chamber of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSJ) reported that the civilian judiciary suffered from a backlog of at least 1,14 million cases, approximately 140,000 of them criminal. These backlogs had created large numbers of pretrial detainees (see Section 1.c.) In October, the President of the Council of State complained that the Council was facing a 6 to 8 year backlog. The Fiscalia reported that approximately 220,000 arrest warrants were still outstanding.
The civilian justice system is composed of four functional jurisdictions: civil, administrative, constitutional, and special. The civil jurisdiction is the largest jurisdiction within the civilian justice system, and handles all criminal, civil, labor, agrarian, and domestic cases involving non-military personnel. The civil jurisdiction is divided into 31 judicial districts, each containing at least one judicial circuit encompassing one or more municipalities. A superior tribunal serves as each district's court of appeals. The civil jurisdiction's 436 magistrates are distributed according to the population of each district. The lower circuit and municipal courts, each staffed by a judge, a court clerk, and perhaps a few administrative personnel, are the basic cells of the civil jurisdiction. In the smallest towns, a single "all-purpose" judge rules on all cases.
Specialized circuit courts within the civil jurisdiction try cases involving crimes designated as grave threats to the administration of justice, such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism, paramilitarism, torture, and money laundering.
The Supreme Court is the highest court within the civil jurisdiction and serves as its final court of appeals. In addition to hearing appeals from lower courts, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in trials of the President, cabinet ministers, heads of independent government agencies, admirals and generals, and magistrates of the Supreme Court, Council of State, Constitutional Court, and CSJ.
The administrative jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is divided into 27 judicial districts with an equal number of tribunals. Each tribunal has from 1 to 23 magistrates, depending on the population of the district. Administrative actions such as decrees and resolutions may be challenged in the administrative jurisdiction on constitutional or other grounds. The Council of State is the highest court in the administrative jurisdiction and serves as the final court of appeals for complaints arising from administrative acts.
The Constitutional Court, which is charged with "safeguarding the integrity and supremacy" of the Constitution, is the sole judicial body comprising the constitutional jurisdiction of the civilian justice system. It rules on the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, and constitutional reforms. The Constitutional Court may also issue advisory opinions on the constitutionality of bills not yet signed into law, and randomly reviews the decisions of lower courts on "tutelas," or writs of protection of fundamental rights, which can be filed before any judge of any court at any stage of a judicial procedure as a legal defense of last resort. Courts must rule on the validity of a tutela within 10 days. Approximately 15,500 tutelas were before the Constitutional Court for possible review.
The final functional jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is the special jurisdiction. The special jurisdiction consists of the justice of the peace program, designed to encourage alternative dispute resolution at the municipal level, which has been implemented in less than 1 percent of the country's municipalities, and the indigenous jurisdiction, which grants indigenous leaders the right to exercise judicial functions on indigenous reservations in accordance with traditional laws (see Section 5.).
The CSJ is responsible for the administration and discipline of the civilian justice system. The CSJ is divided into two chambers: administrative and disciplinary. The administrative chamber supervises the civilian justice system's budget and determines its organization. The disciplinary chamber disciplines judicial officials and resolves jurisdictional clashes, such as those between the civilian and military justice systems. The Fiscalia is tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor General from a list of three candidates selected by the President. The Prosecutor General serves a 4-year term that overlaps two presidential administrations. The Office is independent of both the executive and judicial branches and is divided into national, regional, and local offices. The Office has its own corps of armed investigators known as the Corps of Technical Investigators (CTI). The Office has significant judicial functions; however, consistent with constitutional reforms passed in December, it will be converted by 2005 into a purely investigatory and prosecutorial agency.
The Prosecutor General created the Human Rights Unit in 1995. As of October, the Unit's 41 prosecutors had 1,369 open cases involving 1,618 suspects, including 173 members of the state security forces. The Human Rights Unit arrested 57 members of the state security forces during the year and filed charges against 25 for a variety of crimes including murder, torture, kidnaping, and collaboration with paramilitary groups. However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
In November HRW published "A Wrong Turn; the Record of the Colombian Attorney General's Office," a report that alleged that under the leadership of Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio, the ability of the Fiscalia to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses had deteriorated. The report accused the Prosecutor General of failing to support prosecutors who worked on human rights cases by not providing adequate protection for justice officials whose lives were threatened and by the dismissal and forced resignation of veteran prosecutors and judicial investigators.
In its December response, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia reported that for the first time in its history, Osorio had obtained a specific allotment in the national budget for the Unit. While it was true that 4 of the Unit's 41 prosecutors had been dismissed during the year, their replacements had equal or greater experience. Finally, the Unit was working hard to increase the protection available to prosecutors.
The Procuraduria investigates allegations of misconduct by public employees, including members of the state security forces. The Inspector General, whose term overlaps those of two presidents, is elected by the Senate to a 4-year term from a list of three candidates nominated by the President, Supreme Court, and Council of State. During the year, the Procuraduria received 395 complaints of alleged serious violations of human rights by state agents, compared with 502 complaints in 2001. A total of 235 of these complaints were lodged against the army, 3 against the navy, 8 against the air force, and 149 against the National Police. Of these complaints, 380 were still under preliminary investigation, 14 had reached the stage of a formal disciplinary investigation, and 1 had resulted in the filing of formal charges. The Procuraduria imposes administrative sanctions that range from letters of reprimand to dismissal and permanent bans from public office. It has no authority to impose criminal sanctions, but can refer cases to the Prosecutor General. The Procuraduria referred all cases of human rights violations received during the year to the Prosecutor General for investigation and reported that that the majority of these cases were investigated by the Fiscalia.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, or Public Defender, employs 923 public defenders nationwide to provide the indigent with legal representation in criminal cases. However, as of December, these public defenders were required to manage over 70,000 cases. In addition, the Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional offices throughout the country provide a legal channel for thousands of complaints and allegations of human rights violations (see Section 4). The Ombudsman, who reports to the Inspector General, is elected by the House of Representatives from a list of three candidates submitted by the President to serve a 4-year term that overlaps those of two presidents.
A criminal case begins with a preliminary investigation that can last up to 180 working days. If evidence is found linking a particular individual to a crime, the case moves into a formal investigative stage in which prosecutors have a maximum of 360 working days to file formal charges. Once formal charges are filed, the Government has 35 working days to bring a case to trial. Trials are open to the public. Judges question witnesses directly and determine the outcome of all trials. There are no juries.
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due process. Nevertheless, as of November 30, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office had received 1,270 complaints of denial of due process. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has the right to timely consultation with counsel. Attorneys from the Ombudsman's Office are required to represent indigent defendants; however, representation for the indigent has historically been inadequate. During the year, an estimated 90 percent of indigent defendants received no assistance from a public defender. Defendants have the right to be present at proceedings against them, present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf, and confront and question prosecution witnesses. Defendants also have the right to review government evidence relevant to the case. Defendants have the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court. The Constitution extends these rights to all citizens.
The military justice system, as part of the Ministry of Defense, falls under the executive branch. To improve the accountability and independence of the military justice system, the military judicial code was amended in 2000 so that military prosecutors report directly to the director of the military justice system, rather than to their local unit commanders. The director of the military justice system reports directly to the civilian Minister of Defense. Nevertheless, impunity for members of the public security forces--particularly high-ranking officers--accused of human rights abuses or collaboration with paramilitaries remained a problem. Some military justice personnel investigating sensitive cases reported they were pressured to make particular rulings and threatened or harassed for not doing so.
The military justice system is composed of the Superior Military Tribunal, which serves as the court of appeals for all cases tried in the military justice system, and 40 military trial courts. The civilian Supreme Court serves as a second court of appeals for cases in which sentences of 6 years or more in prison are imposed. The military judiciary may investigate, prosecute, and try active duty military and police personnel for alleged crimes "related to acts of military service." Civil courts must try retired personnel, even for service-related acts committed before their retirement. The military penal code specifically defines forced disappearance, torture, and genocide as crimes not related to military service. Moreover, a presidential directive issued in 2000 raised "to the category of law" a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that defined all serious violations of human rights as being unrelated to military service. The military penal code also provides protections to members of the public security services who may feel pressure from commanders to violate human rights. For example, the code denies unit commanders the power to judge subordinates and extends legal protection to service members who refuse to obey illegal orders to commit human rights abuses.
Criminal investigations by the military justice system are designed to be completed rapidly. By law an investigation may last a maximum of 180 working days, after which a suspect must be brought to trial within 2 months. However, this rigorous timetable is suspended if a defendant appeals the court's jurisdiction or procedural rulings. This exception causes many cases in the military justice system to drag on for years. For example, jurisdictional appeals accounted for some of the delay in the military's investigation of the apparent air force bombing of the village of Santo Domingo, Arauca department in December 1998 (see Section 1.g.). The military justice system's formal investigation began in 2000, and was still in its investigatory phase when it was transferred to the civilian justice system in December.
Criminal procedure within the military justice system is similar to that within the civilian justice system, with the exception that the military justice system has already incorporated many accusatorial elements. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty and have the right to timely consultation with counsel. However, there is no military equivalent to the civilian public defender system; defendants generally must retain counsel at their own expense. Representatives of the civilian justice system--generally from the Procuraduria--have a right to be present at military trials.
The military judiciary demonstrated a willingness during the year to turn cases of military personnel accused of human rights violations or other criminal activities over to the civilian justice system. The Superior Military Tribunal reported that between August 1997 and December it voluntarily transferred 1,377 cases, 627 military and 750 police, to the civilian justice system. An independent review of the 627 cases involving military personnel revealed that 168 cases involved allegations of gross violations of human rights or collaboration with paramilitaries.
In September 2000, the President signed 12 decrees to reform and strengthen the military. The decrees sharpened the definitions, classifications, and punishments for crimes, required military officials to cooperate with civilian investigators who investigate such crimes, and mandated, with limited exceptions, the dismissal of service members convicted and imprisoned by either the civilian or military justice systems.
Presidential Decree 1790 of 2000 allows senior military commanders, at their discretion, to separate from service any uniformed members of the security services regardless of time of service. From October 2000 through the end of 2001, the military dismissed approximately 600 members; no figures were available on how many were discharged during the year under the authority of Decree 1790. No information was available from the MOD regarding the specific reasons for any of the dismissals, nor were the names of those dismissed made public. The MOD confirmed the claims of many human rights NGOs that a large number of those dismissed subsequently entered the ranks of illegal paramilitary groups.
When military officers were tried, convicted, and sentenced for human rights violations, they generally were not incarcerated in civilian prisons but were confined instead to their bases or military police detention centers, as permitted by law. Some performed administrative functions while incarcerated. The MOD reported, and the Fiscalia confirmed, that military and police prisoners charged by civilian prosecutors routinely were suspended from their duties and placed on half-pay. Officers and noncommissioned officers were removed from any command duties. Forty-one members of the military and 25 police officers reportedly were suspended at year's end.
To address concerns about escapes from improvised military detention facilities, in June a new high security military prison was inaugurated near Melgar, Tolima department. The civilian INPEC provided oversight of the military's management of the prison. Although the facility was designed to house up to 200 inmates, it was still not large enough to house all military prisoners, leaving some in facilities of questionable security.
The case of former General Jaime Humberto Uscategui, accused of failing to prevent a 1997 massacre in Mapiripan, Meta department, remained under investigation by the Fiscalia (see Section 1.a.). Although the Constitution dictates that generals accused of crimes related to acts of service must be tried by the Supreme Court, Uscategui would be tried by an ordinary criminal court because the crimes of which he was accused were unrelated to acts of service.
According to statistics provided by the CSJ, in cases of jurisdictional conflict between the military and civilian justice systems, the total number of cases assigned to military courts dropped from 50 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 2000. Over the same period, cases assigned to civilian jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 60 percent. Between January and September, the CSJ ruled on 39 jurisdictional disputes between the civilian and military justice systems, assigning 16 cases to the civilian justice system, 5 cases to the military justice systems, and abstaining from ruling on 18 cases.
The Government stated that it did not hold political prisoners.
The ICRC had access to the approximately 3,000 prisoners accused of terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and abetting insurgency.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law provides for the protection of these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice; however, at times the authorities infringed upon them.
On August 8, President Uribe declared a "State of Internal Disturbance"--upheld by the Constitutional Court on October 2--that granted him expanded emergency powers with the potential to abridge individual rights. On September 10, President Uribe issued Decree 2002, which allowed members of the public security forces to perform arrests, searches, and wiretaps without a written warrant. Oral authorization from a judicial authority was still required, except in exigent circumstances. Arrests, searches, and wiretaps made without prior judicial authorization had to be fully justified within 24 hours. On November 26, the Constitutional Court struck down's Decree 2002's grant of police powers to the armed forces, ruling that only prosecutorial authorities may determine when privacy rights can be infringed in the interests of public safety. Decree 2002 also authorized the creation of special "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones" in which military authorities can exercise exceptional powers, including limiting civilian movements and temporarily commandeering private property and individual services. Two such zones were created during the year, one in the department of Arauca and another encompassing portions of Bolivar and Sucre departments. In its November 26 decision, the Constitutional Court overturned a provision granting the military authority to conduct censuses in these zones. An investigation by the Fiscalia continued into extensive illegal wiretapping of human rights NGOs by the Medellin GAULA (see Section 1.b.). Prosecutors also continued investigating the April 2001 killing of police officer Carlos Ceballos, who testified in the case (see Section 1.a.). The Procuraduria was conducting its own disciplinary investigation into Ceballos's killing.
The Government generally did not punish family members for alleged violations committed by their relatives. However, there were complaints that some family members of guerrilla leaders were falsely accused of crimes. For example, on July 16, DAS officials in Bogota arrested Javier Carvajalino, brother of FARC leader Jesus Emilio Carvajalino, alias Andres Paris. Javier Carvajalino, a respected attorney with the Bogota district office of the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, was accused of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks in the nation's capital. The arrest was criticized not only by human rights NGOs, but by government officials as well, and on November 20, Carvajalino was released from custody following a decision by a senior prosecutor to close the case for lack of evidence.
Paramilitaries illegally monitored private communications in attempts to identify guerrilla collaborators. They also forcibly entered private homes when searching for suspected guerrillas. Paramilitaries caused forced displacement. Paramilitaries harassed, threatened, and killed individuals because of their membership in leftist political organizations, and also threatened and killed family members of known guerrillas. Children were also among the preferred kidnaping targets of guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). Former female guerrillas reported forced abortions and forced implantation of intrauterine devices (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
The country's 40-year-old internal conflict--among government forces, several leftist insurgent groups, and a right-wing paramilitary movement nominally supportive of the State--intensified during the year. The internal armed conflict, and the narcotics trafficking that both fueled it and prospered from it, were the central causes of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In her 2001 report, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson noted that all sides in the conflict failed to respect the principles of humanitarian law. She said that "the conflict has deteriorated to such an extent that combatants are disregarding the most basic humanitarian precept…the defenseless civilian population and children continue to be the principal victims of these actions." For example, in November 2001, the World Food Program reported that armed groups had been hijacking trucks carrying deliveries intended for displaced children.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office stated in its 2001 report that women, who by and large remain socially and economically disadvantaged, continued to be affected disproportionately by violence, particularly in war zones (see Section 5). The Ombudsman’s Office also noted a lack of government programs to address their problems. Female leaders of political and peasant organizations in various regions were the targets of abuse, threats, torture, and executions. Intrafamilial violence, sexual assault, and killing of women remained serious problems throughout the country (see Section 5). More than 30 percent of FARC combatants were female. Several observers criticized the use of female combatants in guerrilla organizations as sex slaves (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
Government security forces generally abided by international humanitarian law and respected human rights; however, some members of the security forces violated these standards and committed serious violations of human rights. Data gathered by CINEP indicated that during the first 6 months of the year, state security forces were responsible for the deaths of 30 civilians during combat operations. Paramilitary groups and guerrillas committed the great majority of abuses.
In December Amnesty International (AI) published "Colombia: Security at What Cost?", a report that alleged that the Government contributed to impunity by weakening the role of civilian human rights institutions, restricting the rights of civilians through security measures authorized by the declaration of a "State of Internal Disturbance" and Presidential Decree 2002, and drawing the civilian population into the internal conflict through policies such as its civilian informant program. The Government insisted it was not undermining civilian institutions and that enhanced security measures were necessary to establish a secure environment in which illegal armed groups could not infringe on human rights.
There were no reports during the year that the Government militarized public hospitals in conflict areas, which had increased the risk that the hospitals would become targets of guerrilla attack. There were no reports that the Government refused medical treatment to guerrillas. In 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled that state security forces could not maintain installations such as police stations next to schools, to avoid endangering the lives of students in case of guerrilla attacks; however, this practice continued in some communities.
Forced displacement is a crime; however, military counterinsurgency operations sometimes forced peasants to flee their homes and farms, and there was a very large population of IDPs (see Section 2.d.). NGOs and international governmental organizations sometimes blamed government negligence for large-scale displacements, as occurred in May in the department of Choco, where combat between the FARC and AUC along the Atrato River displaced at least 3,000 persons from the town of Bojaya and surrounding communities. The UNHCHR held the Government partly responsible for events at Bojaya, where 119 civilians died, since the Government appeared to have ignored warnings from the Catholic Church about large groups of paramilitaries traveling past military installations along the Atrato. On June 18, the Procuraduria opened a formal investigation into the conduct of the security forces before, during, and immediately after the Bojaya tragedy.
The ICRC reported that the Government, including military authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC. For example, in the weeks following the abolition of the former FARC "despeje," the ICRC was the only international organization granted access to the region. The military readily incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian law in standard military training. However, impunity remained a problem. According to military sources, local commanders often transferred or discharged soldiers accused of serious human rights violations, rather than initiate legal proceedings. It remained unclear how many suspected human rights violators were investigated or prosecuted after being dismissed (see Section 1.e.).
There was still no decision by an army judge regarding the responsibility of members of an army unit for the 2000 shooting deaths of six children in the town of Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department. The Superior Military Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration in April 2001 following an initial ruling of innocence based on findings that the children were caught in a crossfire between the army and ELN guerrillas. A decision by the Procuraduria was pending regarding a parallel disciplinary investigation of the case.
In October the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of two air force pilots involved in the 1998 bombing of the town of Santo Domingo, Arauca department. The pilots, who at the time of the bombing were supporting army units engaged in combat with the FARC, were ruled to have acted negligently. On October 31, the Constitutional Court ruled that a parallel criminal case being handled by the military justice system should be transferred to civilian court. The air force refused to accept responsibility for the incident. On January 25, presumed paramilitaries shot and killed Angel Riveros, a witness in the Santo Domingo investigation and community leader in Arauca department.
Some members of the public security forces--principally enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers--collaborated with or tolerated the activities of illegal paramilitaries. Reasons for collaboration or tolerance varied from ideological sympathy and perceived operational exigencies to corruption and participation in illegal paramilitary activities such as drug trafficking. On May 27, civilian law enforcement authorities arrested army Major Orlando Alberto Martinez for his alleged role in trafficking thousands of AK-47 assault rifles from Bulgaria to the AUC. On May 30, Martinez was dismissed from the armed forces based on the discretionary powers of Presidential Decree 1790 of 2000 (see Section 1.e.).
Civilian defense authorities and the military high command repeatedly emphasized official opposition to paramilitarism and the Government's commitment to combat paramilitaries and guerrillas with equal vigor. In the first 11 months of the year, public security forces killed 183 paramilitaries in combat and captured 1,214.
Paramilitaries were responsible for numerous violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. There were approximately 12,000 paramilitaries in the country, organized into several associations, the largest and most influential of which was the terrorist organization AUC. The AUC experienced a series of leadership crises during the year that led to its temporary breakup and a reduction in its membership. The largest of the paramilitary organizations that formally remained a part of the AUC was the United Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), which operated in the northern part of the country and was led by the principal organizers of the AUC, Carlos Castano and Salvatore Mancuso.
Following a November 2001 statement by Castano promising an end to paramilitary massacres, the number of massacres committed by paramilitaries appeared to drop dramatically. However, paramilitaries still committed massacres and were responsible for many selective political killings (see Section 1.a.), which frequently involved kidnaping and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Paramilitary groups used terror as a tactic to take support away from guerrillas.
Paramilitaries forcibly displaced civilians residing along key drug and weapons transit corridors or suspected of harboring sympathies for guerrillas. For example, on August 18, approximately 400 armed paramilitaries arrived in the villages of San Francisco and Puerto Matilde, located in a FARC-dominated region along the Cimitarra river in the municipality of Yondo, Antioquia department. Approximately 600 persons were displaced. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported receiving 1,528 complaints of forced displacement by paramilitaries as of October 31. Paramilitaries also prevented or limited the delivery of foodstuffs and medicines to towns and regions considered sympathetic to guerrillas, straining local economies and increasing forced displacement, particularly in the departments of Choco, Antioquia, Santander, Bolivar, Cesar, and La Guajira (see Section 2.d.). For example, in March, paramilitary violence and intimidation against persons transporting food and supplies to the town of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department, created a de facto blockade of the town.
Hundreds of civilians died during the year as a result of combat between paramilitaries and guerrillas. For example, the UNHCHR held the AUC partly responsible for the deaths of 119 civilians killed by a FARC cylinder bomb in Bojaya, Choco department, based on the fact that AUC fighters exposed the civilian population to danger by taking shelter in the town. Throughout the year, civilians in poor urban areas and rural districts were killed and wounded during exchanges of gunfire between illegal armed groups. For example, on May 30, four civilians in the "Veinte de Julio" neighborhood of Medellin, Antioquia department, were killed by stray bullets during a firefight between paramilitaries and leftist urban militias. In anticipation of potential peace negotiations with the Government, the AUC declared a unilateral cease-fire beginning December 1. Several unaffiliated paramilitary groups agreed to abide by similar cease-fires. On December 16, Congress amended Public Order Law 418 of 1997, which authorizes the President to negotiate with "illegal armed groups", to allow negotiations with groups, such as paramilitaries, that had not been granted "political status" by the Government. On December 26, the Government named six individuals to a special "exploratory commission" that, in cooperation with Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, was to make contact with paramilitary groups that had expressed an interest in seeking peace with the Government. However, not all paramilitaries abided by the cease-fire, and some continued to commit serious violations of human rights.
Although paramilitaries continued to recruit minors throughout the year (see Section 5), in December the Central Bolivar Block released a total of 19 child soldiers into the custody of a humanitarian commission headed by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) (see Section 5). Guerrillas failed to respect the injured and medical personnel. Both the FARC and ELN frequently executed wounded prisoners and threatened and killed doctors and nurses. On August 30, for example, a joint FARC/ELN unit attacked an ambulance outside the town of Morales, Bolivar department, seriously injuring three health care workers. On July 28, the ELN stopped an ambulance outside the town of Cravo Norte, Arauca department, killed the driver, and stole the medicine he was transporting. On December 31, the ELN issued a written communique in which it pledged not to attack ambulances, medical infrastructure, medical workers, and members of medical missions. According to the Free Country Foundation, guerrillas were responsible for the kidnapings of 29 doctors during the year, most for economic reasons (see Section 1.b.).
Guerrillas forcibly displaced peasants to clear key drug and weapons transit routes and remove potential government or paramilitary collaborators from strategic zones. For example, in early August the FARC forced the departure of at least 1,600 peasants from the village of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, which is located along the Guaviare river, a key transit route. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported receiving 2,202 complaints of forced displacement by guerrillas, including at least 1,500 instances of forced displacement by the FARC. Guerrillas also blockaded communities in areas in which they exerted control. For example, following a major landslide in the San Lucas mountain range of Bolivar department that destroyed several small communities, the ELN prevented government officials and rescue teams from reaching the area for nearly a week. On December 30, near the town of San Lucas, eastern Antioquia department, the ELN declared that no vehicle would be allowed to enter or leave the town. The following day, less than a mile outside of town and despite the presence in San Lucas of significant numbers of police and army personnel, the ELN enforced its order by executing five truck drivers who ignored its edict. Later on December 31, the ELN destroyed a major bridge linking San Lucas with the Medellin-Bogota highway. |
