1. Introduction: The Role of Women's Issues in Afghan ReconstructionBasic Principles of U.S. Policy Notwithstanding these absolutes, in Afghanistan, as elsewhere around the world, the United States will not seek to impose its culture on other societies. Our approach is to engage with other governments and civic leaders, consult with local and regional experts, and devise individual strategies that best address a country’s specific needs and goals. That, we believe, is the best way to exercise effective American leadership on international women’s issues. The reconstruction of Afghanistan is an Afghan-led effort because international assistance efforts can only work if they are acceptable to the Afghan people. Local involvement in identifying local needs is essential to any lasting improvements. In this respect, U.S. policy is consistent with the judgment recorded in March 2002 by a group of prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs,) based on their own fact-finding mission to Kabul: "[T]hose who bore the brunt of the conflict and Taliban repression are dedicated to ensuring that the reconstruction process is led by Afghans and that it reflects the needs and priorities of Afghans." [Filling the Vacuum: Prerequisites to Security in Afghanistan, Report of the Consortium for Response to the Afghanistan Transition, March 2002, p. 42] The United States opposed the Taliban’s treatment of women for years. The war on terrorism and the overthrow of Al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan have given the women of that country a unique and unanticipated opportunity to reclaim their futures. The Bonn Agreement signed by Afghan representatives in December 2001 underscores the centrality of democratic principles and human rights in its provisional arrangements, including the protection of the rights of women. U.S. officials now work closely with the whole panoply of their counterparts, both in Afghanistan and in the international agencies and donor communities, to ensure that the needs of Afghan women and their children receive high-level and high-priority attention. Broader Afghan Context In this connection, Secretary Powell’s remarks about overall U.S. policy toward women are particularly applicable to the situation in Afghanistan: Women are the most vulnerable group when conflict erupts and social structures break down…. In societies torn by violence, maternal and infant mortality rates skyrocket. When the men and boys go off to fight, the women struggle to care for family members left behind, and to find ways to provide for their basic necessities.... For all these reasons, much of our crisis response activity is geared to meeting the needs of female victims of conflict, and we make a point of involving the women who are on the receiving end of our assistance in the shaping and carrying out of our relief programs. These include special food programs, psychosocial trauma counseling, mother-child care, and women’s and girls’ education. A different, and equally important, Afghanistan-specific aspect of the global campaign for women’s rights is the cultural context in which this campaign must operate. We are keenly aware of the traditional constraints on women as practiced in much of Afghan society, as well as of the many internal and external efforts over the years to change that situation. In particular, we pay close attention today to a range of experts, activists, and other members of Afghanistan's diverse community of women. On one frequently posed question—the burqa—a number of these women, from varied backgrounds, have advised against a simple equation of progress with removing that traditionally modest Afghan female attire. Rather, they say, one should focus much more on the major practical issues of education, health care, and employment. The implication for U.S. policy in Afghanistan is that alertness to such authentic local judgments about priorities and cultural sensitivities should be part of our engagement on women’s issues—at least as much as in our engagement with the process of democracy-building or of economic development. In sum, the U.S. focus on Afghan women and children is an integral part of our overall approach to rebuilding their whole country. This approach is one that President Bush has compared, in its goal of promoting the long-term promise of stability, prosperity and freedom, to the post-World War II Marshall Plan in Europe. That combination of generous vision and sustained hard work, the President noted, crowned a military victory with "a moral victory that resulted in better lives for individual human beings." Today, despite obvious historical and cultural differences, Afghanistan is a prime case in point for such a broad-based, long-term approach. Scope of This Report This six-month report is thus the first of its kind, and therefore necessarily preliminary. In that sense it is a bit like a snapshot of a moving target. Both the reporting and the reality of our efforts on behalf of Afghan women, children, and refugees need to be viewed as a work in progress, one whose true measurement will most accurately be assessed by historians. The report will refer specifically to certain significant areas that by nature will need to be considered in greater detail at a future occasion. In addition, it should be noted that there remains considerable regional and urban/rural variation in the condition of women and children in Afghanistan—but only anecdotal or impressionistic information, as opposed to systematic data, about such differences. In general, some of the most dramatic improvements so far in education, health, and other indicators have come in the cities, particularly in the capital of Kabul, where the logistics of international assistance pose less formidable problems. That sweeping generalization, however, hardly does justice to the country’s complex reality. In some remote areas, for example, such as Badakhshan, there have been relatively rapid gains in schooling and health care for girls. Conversely, in some major cities, even where the security situation is comparatively quiet, as in Herat, attempts to advance women’s social status continue to confront grave obstacles from entrenched local traditions or political resistance. The discussion below makes reference to these fragmentary accounts as appropriate, but the picture is unavoidably and admittedly sketchy at this stage. A more considered discussion of these important local dimensions of the subject is projected for subsequent reporting, as the required raw data become available. Second, this report is not intended to represent an exhaustive description of all activities related to its subject matter. This is so in two different respects. For U.S. government activities in Afghanistan, the report strives to provide an accurate and authoritative picture of the overall direction of U.S. policy, with specific segments and features, as well as numerous illustrative examples. It does not include a detailed account of every separate project in any given area. In some of these areas (e.g., rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure), there exists a wide array of individual programs funded and managed by different Departments or Bureaus, primarily inside the Department of State and USAID, but also including components of the Departments of Labor, Education, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Defense, and others. Additional details for most projects, particularly about annual funding levels and requests, can be found in the Appendix to this report. Also, the Appendix provides a more specific listing by name of individual NGOs (or other implementing partners) involved with particular U.S.-supported assistance projects. The bulk of U.S. assistance is indeed channeled, as suggested in the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, through a wide range of such institutions. In order to avoid any impression of partiality, however, the narrative portion of this report alludes more generically to the NGOs involved with U.S. programs in Afghanistan. The coordination of these diverse efforts is a daunting task, directed by the appropriate departmental and interagency mechanisms, with overall guidance from the National Security Council. On women’s issues in particular, an important coordinating and operational role is played by the Department of State’s Office of International Women’s Issues, whose Senior Coordinator reports directly to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. The Administration believes that this coordination is reflected in the thematic presentation that follows as well as in the good results on the ground inside Afghanistan. The mandated focus of this report, however, and the vast amount of intricate but essentially extraneous detail on some projects that may be marginally relevant to it, do not permit this to be an entirely exhaustive account. Furthermore, this report appropriately concentrates on U.S. policies and programs. It alludes only tangentially to the very active and important multilateral and non-governmental dimensions of Afghanistan’s recovery efforts and overall situation, including that of Afghan women, children, and refugees. The United States has been by far the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghans for many years, and remains so today. From October 1, 2001, through May 10, 2002, this U.S. humanitarian contribution totaled $379 million. In material terms, to cite the largest component of this longstanding pattern, the United States supplied 80 percent of all food aid for Afghanistan through the World Food Program (WFP) in FY 2001—and the United States accounts for 76 percent of the corresponding total to date in FY 2002. More recently, the United States pledged $296.75 million for Afghan reconstruction at the Tokyo donors’ conference in January 2002. A request for $250 million in supplemental funds for Afghanistan was submitted to Congress as well. Yet the United States is by no means alone. At the conference in Tokyo, the international community pledged $4.5 billion for the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan, of which $1.8 billion are slated for expenditure in the coming year. Clearly, this will be a global effort requiring global resources. As of this writing, it appears that the most acute humanitarian aid requirements for Afghanistan are fully subscribed by the international donor community. The challenge ahead, however, is to achieve and maintain an adequate level of support for longer-term reconstruction and capacity-building programs in the next several years, so that this devastated country can be put on a realistic path out of its current highly dependent state. We must also ensure that the fate of women, children, and refugees remains a priority in Afghanistan’s overall reconstruction, even after the topic disappears from the daily headlines. As we work to meet these twin challenges, the United States intends both to play a leadership role, and to foster a concerted multilateral effort. The results of our ongoing efforts to address this important coordination issue, which by definition is a medium- to long-term one, will be presented in future reports. In the meantime, some initial promising steps in this direction have been taken by the international community, with strong U.S. political and material support. In March 2002, coordination of international efforts in Afghanistan was improved greatly by the creation, and endorsement by the UN Security Council, of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to oversee all pertinent activity in the country. In managing this plethora of programs, the UN Secretary-General has vowed that "human rights and gender issues will be central to the purpose and functions of the mission," and charged it to seek "advisory expertise … in the areas of human rights, the rule of law (judicial, police, and penal system) and gender equality." The United States collaborates closely on Afghanistan with UN bodies, and with many relevant NGOs, in order to exploit comparative advantages, avoid duplication of effort, and thereby optimize the results to the maximum feasible degree. A good example is funding for Afghanistan’s new Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The United States very actively supports this important ministry in many ways, as discussed below. But it is difficult to isolate this U.S. contribution in dollar terms, because most of our direct funding for Afghan government institutions has been funneled through the UNDP Afghan Interim Authority Fund. That body collects contributions for the Afghan government as a whole, and makes allocations to individual ministries as required. In addition to such overall financial support, USAID and other U.S. agencies have made smaller grants, cited later in this report, directly to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, earmarked for particular projects or infrastructure. Moreover, looking at the needs of, and potential resources for, this ministry in global perspective, U.S. allocations take into account confirmed contributions from other sources. This helps coordinate overall assistance for Afghan women, children, and refugees, and the Afghan reconstruction campaign as a whole. In the specific case of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, for example, U.S. funding takes into account a firm pledge from the government of Belgium for $500,000 in direct financial support for that ministry. More broadly, however, detailed description or analysis of non-U.S. programs in Afghanistan, or even of the numerous such programs focused on women, children, or refugees, is beyond the scope of this report. We understand that the World Bank is currently preparing tables organizing and summarizing data about various multilateral and bilateral aid projects in Afghanistan. In addition, a women’s organization is working on a detailed listing of the diverse NGOs currently active in that country. As these documents become available, we intend to refer to and make use of them in subsequent reports. Third, keeping the discussion of Afghan women, children, and refugees in context requires at least some initial examination of the overall security and economic challenges in Afghanistan today, and of ongoing U.S. efforts to meet them. A brief contextual presentation along those lines constitutes the next section of this report. Released on July 12, 2002 |
