There were reports of abuses of religious freedom, including reports of imprisonment and detention. The country experienced ongoing unrest, including protests calling for political reform, and violence between protestors and security forces. During the year, police arrested individuals, overwhelmingly from the Shia sect, for activities that were both political and religious in nature. There were reports of arbitrary arrest, excessive use of force, and detainee torture and mistreatment.
Domestic and international human rights organizations reported numerous instances of torture; the victims were overwhelmingly Shia. According to reports from victims, security officials used physical and psychological mistreatment to extract confessions and statements under duress or for retribution and punishment. In addition to physical abuse, detainees reported officials prevented them from praying and insulted their religious sect.
In the lead-up to Ashura in November, the Ministry of Interior briefly summoned and interrogated religious procession chanters Abdul Amir Al Biladi and Hussain Sahwan about their activities, allegedly accusing them of politicizing religious ceremonies by chanting political slogans. Also in November, Shia clerics Sayed Kamel Al Hashimi and Sayed Ahmed Al Majed were detained for investigation following allegations that they politicized their sermons. Al Hashimi was released November 29, while Al Majed was charged with establishing a terrorist organization, and at year’s end was in custody with four other defendants, pending trial.
On December 8, a court sentenced a 19-year-old blogger to two years in prison on charges of “abusing the Prophet’s wife and leveling highly derogatory insults against her character.” He was serving his sentence at year’s end, and his case will be heard by the Appeals Court.
In November the government revoked the citizenship of 31 Shias, including three clerics, citing a legal provision in the Citizenship Law that allows such revocations for individuals “causing damage to state security.” At year’s end, it was unclear if the 31 Bahrainis could appeal the decision or how the loss of citizenship would impact their dependents.
A number of prominent Shia clerics arrested in 2011 and associated with the political opposition protest movement remained in prison at year’s end, after their sentences were upheld. They include Secretary General Shaikh Mohammed Al Mahfoodh of the Amal political society; Abduljalil Al Miqdad, the leader of the unregistered Al-Wafa’a movement; and Shaikh Mohammed Al Safaf (also known as Mohammed Habib Al Miqdad), a prominent independent Shia cleric. A civilian appeals court overturned the sentence of Shaikh Abdul Atheem Al Mohtedi, a former member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, and he was released from prison.
There were several accusations of security forces engaging in “collective punishment” against predominantly Shia neighborhoods. This included claims of security forces temporarily restricting the movement of people and goods to and from villages, widespread accusations of excessive use of tear gas, and incidents of multiple arrests.
Although the government generally respected the right of citizens and foreign residents to practice their religion, it continued to exert a level of control over religious practices, including by monitoring both Sunni and Shia Muslims, censoring sermons, and preventing congregants from attending religious services. MOJIA announced on December 2 that it sent 18 written warnings to seven clerics, and that within a five-month period it had reviewed 221 religious speeches for phrases and sentences that “politicize” places of worship.
During the holy month of Muharram and leading up to Ashura, the government arrested or summoned religious scholars, matam managers, and clerics to question them about the topics of their lectures and chants during Ashura processions.
In August Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaikh Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa announced a decision to suspend Sayed Kamel Al Hashimi. Al Hashimi continued to lead Friday sermons in violation of the suspension. In August the MOJIA temporarily transferred Sunni cleric Shaikh Adel Hassan Al Hamad out of his mosque after expressing opposition to the government’s donation of land for a new Catholic church complex.
In November Ministry of Interior personnel set up blockades to prevent worshippers from attending a Friday sermon led by prominent Shia cleric Shaikh Isa Qassem. In the ensuing clashes, one young Shia died and several members of the security forces were injured.
The government did not usually interfere with what it considered “legitimate” religious observances, and permitted non-Muslim communities to maintain places of worship and display religious symbols. During periods of unrest, including those of a sectarian nature, security forces occasionally intervened in religious processions and funerals. The government permitted public religious events, most notably the large annual commemorative march by Shia Muslims during the Islamic month of Muharram, and others throughout the year.
In August the government donated land for a new church complex, making way for the transfer of the Catholic Vicariate of Northern Arabia from Kuwait to Bahrain.
The 2011 BICI report documented the government’s demolition of 28 mosques, one matam, and one shrine, out of a total of 53 damaged Shia religious structures identified by the Al Wefaq National Islamic Society. By the end of 2012, the government had neared completion of the reconstruction of five: the Imam Ali Mosque in Zayed Town, Um Al-Baneen Mosque in Hamad Town, Imam Ali Mosque in Sadad, Fatima Al-Zahraa Mosque in Zayed Town, and Al-Rasool Al-Adam Mosque in Hamad Town. The BICI Follow-up report outlined the government’s plans to rebuild 18 additional mosques. Construction did not yet begin at year’s end, but the government coordinated with stakeholders and the Jaafari Endowments Administration, secured and registered titles to previously untitled land, allocated the budget for new construction, and ordered building permits. Nine of the additional demolished mosques, all in the village of Nawaidrat, will be consolidated into four new mosques.
Members of the Shia community independently built simple structures for worship or rebuilt mosques in some locations without acquiring a property deed or building permit at the sites of some religious structures the government demolished in 2011. The government demolished some of these unlicensed structures, including privately-reconstructed structures of the Abu Talib Mosque in Hamad Town. Local media reported that authorities demolished buildings under construction at the sites of the Fadak al-Zahra and Imam Hassan al-Askari mosques in Hamad Town and Al- Sajjad mosque in Karzakan. Citizens of Nawaidrat village reconstructed the Moa’amen Mosque without government interference.
Bahrain TV did not broadcast Friday sermons from Shia mosques, while broadcasts from Sunni mosques appeared regularly on Bahrain TV.
Public officials such as parliamentarian Jassim Al-Saeedi repeatedly insulted Shias. In November he described Shia religious cleric Isa Qassim as a “terrorist and terrorism sponsor” and verbally attacked Shia Ashura religious practices. The parliamentary legislative committee met in November at the request of the public prosecutor to discuss lifting Al-Saeedi’s parliamentary immunity; the committee voted down the request.
Following the 2011 dismissals of 2,200 public and private sector Shia workers during the period of unrest, the government undertook efforts to reinstate these workers to their former positions in accordance with the BICI recommendations. The government claimed that as of December 2012, 98 percent of dismissal cases were resolved. Labor organizations disputed this, arguing that many reinstatements were not to equivalent positions.
Sunni citizens often received preference for employment in sensitive government positions, in the managerial ranks of the civil service, and in the military. Shia politicians and activists asserted that the government and certain business elites discriminated against Shia citizens in employment and promotions. Senior civil service recruitment and promotion processes often favored Sunni candidates. Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shia neighborhoods were inferior to those in Sunni communities. Shia politicians and activists asserted that the government’s naturalization and citizenship processes favored Sunni applicants over Shia applicants.
Shia continued to assert that they were unable to obtain government positions, especially in the security services, because of their religious affiliation. Only a few Shia citizens held significant posts in the defense and internal security forces, although more were in the enlisted ranks. There were allegations that the government allowed foreign Sunni employees of the security services that had lived in the country for fewer than 15 years to apply for citizenship. Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 15 years and non-Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 25 years are eligible to apply for citizenship. There was a lack of transparency in the naturalization process, and there were numerous reports that the citizenship law was not applied uniformly.
Shia were employed in some branches of the police, such as the traffic police, but were not in the riot police responsible for responding to demonstrations and civil unrest. According to the government’s November 2012 BICI Follow-Up report, the Ministry of Interior developed an employment plan to recruit Bahraini citizens from all governorates and sects. According to the Follow-Up Report, the ministry hired100 female and 255 male employees in the first round of community policing recruitment. They will perform police work in all ministry departments. However, the fair implementation of this initiative could not be verified because a statistical breakdown of new recruits by sect was not made available.
Shia citizens were underrepresented in the Ministry of Education in both the leadership and the ranks of head Islamic studies teachers who supervise and mentor other teachers. Although there were many Shia Islamic studies teachers, school authorities discouraged them from introducing content about Shia traditions and practices and instructed them to follow the curriculum.
Curriculum specialists in the Islamic Studies Department at the Ministry of Education’s Curriculum Directorate were all Sunni. The curriculum directorate formed a separate committee of Shia teachers and clerics, along with members of the curriculum directorate, to develop the Islamic studies curriculum for the Jaafari Institute, which is the only publicly funded institution in which teachers can legally discuss Shia beliefs and traditions. There were five registered Jaafari hawzas (religious schools) and five registered Sunni religious schools.
The government funded, monitored, and exercised control over official Muslim religious institutions, including Shia and Sunni mosques; religious community centers; Shia and Sunni religious endowments; and the religious courts, which represent both the Shia and Sunni-affiliated schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs reviewed and approved clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shia communities.