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Diplomacy in Action

Policy and Program Developments


International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
March 2004
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Overview for 2003

U.S. Government international drug control programs made remarkable progress in 2003. Despite a "perfect storm" of conditions potentially favoring international criminal activity—the aftermath of war, violent insurgency, political turmoil, economic disruption, and endemic corruption—we further narrowed the global drug trade's field of operations. Our long-standing, international campaign to curb the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States advanced significantly in 2003. Together with our allies we limited drug crop expansion, strengthened interdiction efforts, destroyed processing facilities, and weakened major trafficking organizations. We furnished our partners critical training assistance to strengthen their law enforcement and judicial systems, while helping them reduce drug consumption in their own countries. We persuaded many once-reluctant governments to use the powerful instrument of extradition to deny notorious drug criminals the national safe haven they could once count on. Closer cooperation among governments and financial institutions has been sealing off the loopholes that have allowed the drug trade to legitimize its enormous profits through sophisticated money laundering schemes.

The Drug Threat

The drugs that threaten the United States are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Cutting off their supply has been, and will continue to be, our principal international counternarcotics goal. Although U.S. consumption has been on the wane recently, cocaine remains our greatest concern. An estimated 300 metric tons or more of cocaine HCl enter the country annually, aggravating addiction, fueling crime, and harming the economic and social health of the United States. Since all cocaine originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, we have devoted a significant portion of our resources to eliminating coca cultivation, disrupting cocaine production, and keeping it from reaching the United States.

Coca and Cocaine

Colombia leads the world in coca cultivation, with Peru and Bolivia trailing a distant second and third. Colombia is also the source of 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. and other markets. Under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), in 2003 the USG devoted the lion's share of its resources to attacking Colombian coca cultivation, while helping prevent a resurgence of coca in Peru and Bolivia. In 2003, the joint U.S.-Colombian aerial eradication program reported spraying a record 132,000 hectares of coca and nearly 3,000 hectares of opium poppy. Although USG survey data were not available at the time of publication, preliminary information suggests that the eradication program has not only contained the coca crop—an important achievement in itself—but may have brought it below last year's first reported declining crop (144,450 hectares) in a decade.

On average, between 213 to 256 hectares of coca are required to produce a metric ton of cocaine HCl. Thus, if all coca reported as sprayed were destroyed and if there were no losses in processing, the spray program theoretically could have kept as much as 500 metric tons of cocaine from entering the system. At U.S. retail prices of $100/gram, a metric ton of cocaine is worth $100 million if sold gram-by-gram on the streets of America's cities. Keeping 500 metric tons of cocaine out of the system would have deprived the criminal economy of as much as $50 billion in 2003.

There was also encouraging news from Bolivia and Peru, for decades the two leading sources of cocaine, until eclipsed by the explosion of coca cultivation in Colombia in the 1990's. Total coca cultivation for both countries declined from an estimated 61,000 hectares in 2002 to 59,600 hectares at the end of 2003. In Bolivia, the government forcibly eradicated most of the crop in the Chapare region, the center of the illicit Bolivian coca trade. At the same time, however, coca cultivation increased by 4,500 hectares in the Yungas region, where most of the country's traditional, legal coca is grown. It is now also becoming a source for illicit cultivation. Even so, at 28,450 hectares Bolivian cultivation levels are barely half the 52,900 hectares registered during the peak year of 1989.

Peru's coca cultivation in 2003 fell to 31,150 hectares, the lowest level since the mid-1980's when we first were able to measure illicit crops with a high degree of accuracy. This 5,450-hectare reduction in Peruvian coca more than offset the increase in Bolivia, leaving open the prospect that the total Andean coca crop may be one of the smallest in years. Since 1995, our programs have caused coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia to drop by 73 percent and 42 percent respectively. Both countries, however, face growing domestic political challenges from cocalero groups that link coca cultivation with national identity and sovereignty. These farmers' unions, often abetted by trafficking interests, promote coca cultivation and consumption as an ancient, indigenous rite that must be protected against international efforts to destroy it. With large indigenous segments of the population in both countries becoming more politically active, all countries involved can expect to face growing resistance to extensive coca eradication.

Interdiction

On the interdiction front, 2003 was a good year. Colombia recorded especially impressive interdiction results. Colombian counternarcotics forces destroyed 83 HCl laboratories in 2003, surpassing their 2001 record of 63 HCl labs destroyed. They also captured more than 48 metric tons of cocaine/cocaine base, 1,500 metric tons of solid precursors and 750,000 gallons of liquid precursor processing chemicals. The reintroduction, in August 2003, of the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program, after a two-year hiatus because of the Peruvian shoot-down tragedy, boosted interdiction efforts. In the last four months of 2003, ABD operations resulted in the capture of three aircraft and a "go-fast" boat, the destruction of four aircraft, and the seizure of over five metric tons of cocaine.

Mexican authorities seized over 20 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride during 2003. Marijuana interdiction continued at an impressive pace, with authorities confiscating over 2,000 metric tons. In addition, authorities confiscated 165 kilograms of heroin, 189 kilograms of opium gum, and 652 kilograms of ATS drugs.

Bolivian counternarcotics forces, supported by the USG, nearly tripled cocaine seizures in 2003. At year's end, Bolivian forces had seized 152 metric tons of coca leaf, 13 metric tons of cocaine, 8.5 metric tons of cannabis, and nearly 1,100 metric tons of liquid and solid precursor and essential chemicals. In Peru, the USG helped the Peruvian government successfully identify and dismantle several international cocaine trafficking organizations responsible for maritime and air shipment of metric tons of cocaine to U.S. and European markets. In 2003, Peruvian government forces had seized approximately four metric tons of cocaine base and 3.5 metric tons of cocaine HCl.

Opium and Heroin

Limiting the cultivation of opium poppy, the source of heroin, presents its own set of obstacles. Unlike coca, which currently flourishes in only three Andean countries, opium poppy can grow in nearly every region of the world. As an easily planted annual crop with as many as three harvests per year, it is much harder to eliminate.

Our main heroin threat comes from poppy cultivation in Colombia and Mexico. Although between them Colombia and Mexico account for only between four to six percent of the world's estimated production, the bulk of the heroin entering the United States originates in these two countries. Mexico's geographical proximity to the United States allows cultivators and processors to supply some 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. heroin market, particularly west of the Mississippi River. Colombia supplies most of the rest of country east of the Mississippi. Since eliminating poppy cultivation in Colombia and Mexico can have a significant impact on the flow of U.S.-bound heroin, we have long-standing joint eradication programs in both countries.

Colombian law enforcement and alternative development programs eradicated 3,820 hectares of opium poppy in 2003, or 78 percent of the 2002-estimated crop. Of these, 2,821 hectares were sprayed and 1,009 hectares uprooted via forced and voluntary manual eradication programs. The 2003 cultivation and production data were not available at the time of publication, but we expect to keep the crop in check. In 2002, there were 4,900 hectares of opium poppy under annual cultivation down from 6,540 in 2001.

In Mexico, in the first 11 months of 2003, the Government of Mexico (GOM) reported eradicating almost 19,000 hectares of opium poppy. This is approximately the same annual level of opium eradication that Mexican authorities reported in 2002 and 2001. The 2003 cultivation and production data were not available at time of publication.

The other 90-plus percent of the world's estimated opium gum production takes place in Afghanistan and Burma, with Afghanistan accounting for nearly 80 percent of that figure. Each country offers unique challenges to opium poppy control. In Afghanistan, where a young government is recovering from the aftermath of war and a quarter-century of political misrule and economic chaos, poppy eradication is physically and politically difficult. Rugged terrain, and attacks by remnants of the Taliban regime present daily obstacles to the extension of government authority throughout the country.

For more than a decade, opium poppy has been Afghanistan's largest and most valuable cash crop. Taxes on the Afghan drug trade provided revenue to the Taliban regime and offered a degree of funding relief to a dysfunctional political regime that spent limited amounts on the populace. Until the final years of the regime, it ignored opium planting and used a tax on opium production and transportation and taxes on the transportation of heroin to prop up the regime. International pressure—and most likely a market glut of opium and heroin—led the Taliban to impose a poppy ban in 2000-2001, after which cultivation all but ceased. Drug stockpiles, however, continued to flow through traditional smuggling routes. Now Afghanistan has reemerged as the world's leading supplier of illicit opium, morphine, and heroin, with opium growing in 28 of the country's 32 provinces. The USG estimates the 2002-2003 crop at 61,000 hectares, nearly twice the estimate for the previous year. The International Monetary Fund calculates that the opium trade makes up between 40-60 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, with the farmers receiving approximately $1 billion a year and another $1.3 billion to processors and traffickers.

It is difficult to estimate precisely how much is earned from the narcotics trade and other illicit activities. The world financial community has only limited ability to track money that moves through the underground hawala system. However, given the street price of these drugs in Europe and further east, estimates of hundreds of millions of dollar are not out of order. Some of these proceeds may help fund elements hostile to the government of Afghanistan. Eliminating the opium crop without provoking extreme political and economic reactions poses one of the most serious drug control dilemmas the allied coalition faces.

Synthetic Drugs

Amphetamines. Demand for Amphetamine-Type Stimulants, such as methamphetamine, amphetamine, and MDMA ("Ecstasy"), is high throughout both the industrialized and the developing world. Amphetamines have displaced cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe, primarily in Central and Northern Europe, and Southeast Asia. The relative ease and low cost of manufacturing amphetamines from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates. Synthetics allow individual trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. Synthetics can be made anywhere and offer enormous profit margins.

Methamphetamine is also one of the fastest-growing drug threats in the United States today. Highly effective drug trafficking organizations, based in Mexico and California, control a large percentage of the U.S. methamphetamine trade. Though Mexico is still the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and ATS precursors—especially pseudoephedrine (PSE)—for the United States, U.S. counternarcotics authorities assess that a portion of the PSE imported into Canada continues to be diverted to the United States for the production of illicit drugs. Since the Government of Canada enacted new regulations controlling PSE and other precursor and essential chemicals in 2002, however, the numbers of both PSE imports and seizures have declined substantially.

Methamphetamine dominates much of the drug trade in Burma and Thailand, where heroin used to be the principal trafficking drug. Methamphetamine production in the U.S. is also widespread and active, as demonstrated by DEA's National Clandestine Drug Data reporting, as of January 14, 2004, of the seizure of 8,572 methamphetamine laboratories in 2003, with the largest numbers in Missouri (968), California (788), Arkansas (607) and Tennessee (551).

Ecstasy. There has also been great demand globally for MDMA (Ecstasy), the amphetamine analogue 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine. Clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, remain the primary suppliers of MDMA to the international market. Labs in Poland are the primary suppliers of amphetamines to the European market, with the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries among the heaviest consumers of amphetamine. Ecstasy has also been a very popular drug in the United States, where young people use it at parties to give them stamina for hours of dancing. In 2003, however, the Monitoring the Future Study that tracks youth drug trends noted Ecstasy use has plummeted. According to the latest data, lifetime use of Ecstasy dropped 32 percent, from 8.0 percent to 5.5 percent. Past year and current use were each cut in half (from 6.1 percent to 3.1 percent and 2.4 percent to 1.1 percent). This is especially encouraging news about a drug that for years has had an upward trajectory and the potential for widespread addiction.

Cannabis (Marijuana)

Cannabis (marijuana) production and consumption is a serious problem in many countries—including in the United States. More than 10,000 metric tons of domestic marijuana and more than 5,000 metric tons of marijuana is cultivated and harvested in Mexico and Canada and marketed to more than 20 million users in the United States. Colombia, Jamaica, and Paraguay also export marijuana to the U.S. The high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana, which is produced on a large scale in Canada (and has also been found within the United States), is a particular concern. This is not the "pot" of the 1970's. It is grown in laboratory conditions—with specialized timers, ventilation, moveable lights on tracks, nutrients sprayed on exposed roots and special fertilizer—all designed to maximize the THC levels in the marijuana. The resulting drug is particularly powerful, dangerous and addictive. Although in the past some have suggested that marijuana was harmless, the latest scientific information indicates that marijuana produces withdrawal symptoms and is associated with learning and memory disturbances.

Attacking Trafficking Organizations.

Drug distribution depends upon well-organized, sophisticated trafficking organizations. Our common strategy targets the leadership of the main trafficking groups, focusing on the operations along the network that bring drugs to the United States. Working with our international counterparts, our goal is not simply disruption, but the eventual dismantling of these organizations—their leadership, the facilitators who launder money and provide the chemicals needed for the production of illicit drugs, and their networks. In addition to hampering the organizations' effectiveness, capturing key traffickers demonstrates—to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike—that even the most powerful drug syndicates are vulnerable to joint action by U.S. and host-government authorities.

Mexican drug syndicates oversee much of the drug trafficking in the United States. They have a strong presence in most of the primary distribution centers in the United States, directing the movement of cocaine, heroin, ATS drugs, and marijuana. In 2003, U.S. and Mexican officials developed a common targeting plan against major drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and the United States and developed secure mechanisms for data-sharing. Mexican Federal enforcement and military authorities damaged several important trafficking syndicates. They arrested, among others, senior figures in the Juarez cartel, the head of the Milenio cartel of Michoac´┐Żn, and the leaders of the trafficking group that controlled large-scale cocaine and cannabis trafficking through the Matamoros-Brownsville, Texas, smuggling corridor, as well as high-ranking members of other drug syndicates.

Institutional Reform

A long-standing element of our international drug control policy has been to encourage and assist governments to strengthen their judicial and banking systems to narrow the opportunities for their manipulation by the drug trade. In drug source and transit countries, law enforcement agencies have arrested prominent traffickers, only to see them walk free following a seemingly frivolous or inexplicable decision by a single judge. But the situation is gradually changing. In 2003, a number of countries continued to modernize their laws and professionalize their court systems through reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to major changes in the way judges are appointed. Though there are still instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well-known drug traffickers, the number of such cases is declining, as governments make basic reforms, such as giving judges better pay and greater personal protection.

Extradition

In 2003, the United States continued to encourage other countries to facilitate extradition to the United States, the sanction the drug trade and terrorist organizations fear most. The array of notorious drug criminals serving long prison terms in the U.S. is a sober reminder to even the most powerful cartel leaders of what can happen when they can no longer manipulate the judicial process through bribes and intimidation. Though the laws of several countries still prohibit the extradition of their nationals, that situation is changing, as governments fighting the drug trade realize the power of extradition. The number of drug-related extraditions to the U.S. from Colombia and Mexico has increased dramatically. In 2003, the Colombian government extradited 64 Colombian nationals and 4 others to the U.S., a 70 percent jump over the previous year's number. Mexico extradited 31 fugitives to the United States in 2003, up from a record 25 extraditions to the U.S. in 2002. However, the 2001 Mexican Supreme Court decision prohibiting extradition in cases with a potential life sentence remains an important obstacle to the extradition of some major drug traffickers and other criminals. In August 2003, the U.S. Senate ratified a major revision of the 1899 extradition treaty with Peru expanding the number of offenses subject to extradition and closing one more avenue for traffickers targeted by the United States.

Controlling Drug Processing Chemicals

Cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs cannot be manufactured without certain critical chemicals, many of which are subject to governmental control. Cocaine and heroin refining operations generally require widely available "essential chemicals." Substitutes for unavailable chemicals can be used for most of the chemicals used in the manufacturing process, but there are some indispensable chemicals—potassium permanganate for cocaine and acetic anhydride for heroin—for which there are few easily obtainable substitutes. Synthetic drug manufacture requires even more specific "precursor chemicals," such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals, used mainly for pharmaceutical purposes, have important but specific legitimate uses. They are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. Governments must, therefore, have efficient legal and regulatory regimes to control such chemicals, without placing undue burdens on legitimate commerce. The United States, other major chemical trading countries, and the UN's International Narcotics Control Board worked in 2003 to improve controls on cocaine and heroin processing chemicals, and those used for manufacturing synthetic drugs.

Bilaterally, we worked closely with the Canadian government in 2003 to curtail the diversion of drug processing chemicals to criminal interests in the United States. Pseudoephedrine (PSE), a common cold remedy and the main component in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, is legally imported into Canada from China, India, and Germany. U.S. counternarcotics authorities assess that a portion of those imports is diverted to the United States for the production of illicit drugs. Other precursor chemicals available in Canada and used in the production of synthetic drugs are sassafras oil, piperonal, and gamma butyrolactone (GBL). These precursors are used in the manufacturing of Ecstasy (medthylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA), methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), and gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB). Precursor smuggling from Canada, however, declined in 2003. New Canadian chemical control regulations, which became effective in January 2003, combined with a major bilateral enforcement operation, Northern Star, may be having an impact on chemical diversion from Canada to the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that illicit PSE seizure rates of 8.8 million tablets from Canada as of September 15, 2003, were significantly lower than the 22 million tablets intercepted in 2002.

Controlling Supply

Our objective is to reduce and ultimately cut off the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. We target drug supply at critical points along a five-point grower-to-user chain that links the consumer in the United States to the grower in a source country. In the case of cocaine or heroin, the chain begins with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies, for instance, in the Andes or Afghanistan. It ends with the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. The intermediate links are the processing (drug refining), transit (transport), and wholesale distribution stages.

Our international counternarcotics programs target the first three links of the grower-to-user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. The closer we can attack to the source, the greater the likelihood of halting the flow of drugs altogether. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply. If we destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drugs will enter the system. It is the equivalent of removing a malignant growth before it can spread uncontrollably into the rest of the system. Theoretically, with no drug crops to harvest, no cocaine or heroin could enter the distribution chain; nor would there be any need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.

But theory inevitably clashes with the economic and political exigencies of the real world. Massive (aerial and chemical) eradication is not legal in many countries. Even if eradication is feasible, destroying a lucrative crop, even an illegal one, carries enormous political, economic and social ramifications for the producing country. It means attacking the livelihood of a large—and often the poorest—sector of the population. Democratic governments that take away vital income without any quid pro quo seldom survive for long. Developing, implementing, and reaping the benefits of viable, long-term alternatives for the affected population can take decades. Therefore, we also focus upon the subsequent links: the processing and distribution stages of laboratory destruction and interdiction of drug shipments.

Our programs require the flexibility to shift resources to those links where we can achieve both an immediate impact and long-term results. As our experience over the past few years in Peru and Bolivia has demonstrated, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can deliver truly remarkable results. We work closely with the governments of the coca-growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca within the context of each country's unique situation—a difficult task given the high price of coca and generally depressed markets for many replacement crops. Alternative development programs play a vital role in countries seeking to liberate important parts of their agricultural sector from reliance on the drug trade. They offer farmers opportunities to abandon illegal activities and become part of the legitimate economy. In the Andean region, these programs provide funds and technical assistance to strengthen public and private institutions, expand rural infrastructure; improve natural resources management, introduce alternative legal crops, and develop local and international markets for these products.

Despite a host of obstacles, alternative development programs in Colombia were responsible for the manual eradication of more than 8,400 hectares of coca and 900 hectares of poppy in 2003. In Peru, the programs focused on rehabilitating 170 kilometers of highway and bridges to improve market access for isolated communities. In Bolivia, they created employment alternatives for 25,000 families formerly raising coca in the Chapare. Over a two-year period, these families' annual farm family income has risen, and crop yields have increased by approximately 25 percent. In Ecuador, the northern border area alternative development projects led to the construction of 30 potable water systems, land titling initiatives for farmers; and support for indigenous communities. Though the full impact of many alternative development programs will not be felt for years, progress to date suggests that eventually legitimate, economically viable agriculture can replace today's illicit cultivation.

Illegal Drugs, Spraying, and the Environment

Sooner or later, questions arise over the environmental risks of regular spraying of illegal drug crops. Colombia is at this time the only country that allows regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy. The Colombian government has authorized the herbicide that is being used to conduct aerial eradication in the growing areas. The only active ingredient in the herbicide used in the aerial eradication program is glyphosate, one of the most widely used agricultural herbicides in the world. It has been tested widely in the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere in the world. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in September 1993. EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and around aquatic areas. It is one of the top five pesticides, including herbicides, used in the United States.

Environmental Consequences of Illicit Coca Cultivation

One must weigh the environmental impact of approved herbicides against the devastating potential of all aspects of coca cultivation. Over more than two decades, coca cultivation in the Andean region has led to the destruction of approximately six million acres of rainforest. Working in remote areas beyond settled populations, coca growers routinely slash and burn virgin forestland to make way for their illegal crops. Tropical rains quickly erode the thin topsoil of the fields, increasing soil runoff, depleting soil nutrients, and, by destroying timber and other resources that would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, decreasing biological diversity. The destructive cycle continues as growers regularly abandon non-productive parcels to prepare new plots. At the same time, traffickers destroy jungle forests to build clandestine landing strips and laboratories for processing raw coca and poppy into cocaine and heroin.

Illicit coca growers frequently are negligent in their use of fertilizers and pesticides. Largely ignorant about the consequences of indiscriminate use of strong chemicals, they dump large quantities of highly toxic herbicides and fertilizers on their crops. These chemicals include paraquat and endosulfan, both of which qualify under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States.

Most destructive are the toxic chemicals that are used at each stage of cocaine production. USG studies conducted in the early 1990s in Bolivia and Peru indicated that one kilogram of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the soil and contaminate waterways, poisoning water systems and dependent species in the process.

The Battle against Corruption

Fighting the drug trade is a dominant element in a broader struggle against corruption. Drug organizations possess and wield the ultimate instrument of corruption: money. The drug trade has access to almost unimaginable quantities of it. No commodity is so widely available, so cheap to produce and so easily renewable as illegal drugs. They offer enormous profit margins that allow the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historical precedent. For example, assuming an average U.S. retail street price of one hundred dollars a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine is worth $100 million on the streets of the United States; twice as much if the drug is cut with additives. That same metric ton typically would have cost around $3,000,000 ($3,000 per kilogram) when it left Colombia. Few legitimate businesses can boast of a 30-fold return. At $100 per gram, the approximately 100 metric tons of cocaine that the USG typically seizes each year could theoretically be worth as much as $10 billion to the drug trade—more than the gross domestic product of some countries. Even if only a portion of these profits flows back to the drug syndicates, we are nonetheless speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars.

To put the scale of these sums into perspective, in FY 2004 the State Department's budget for international drug control operations was approximately $1.01 billion. That equates to roughly 10 metric tons of cocaine. The drug syndicates have lost that amount in a single shipment, with the only immediate consequence to the drug trade being the punishment of those responsible for the loss.

Though corruption may be a much less obvious threat than the challenge of armed insurgents, the weakening of government institutions through bribery and intimidation potentially poses just as great a danger to democratic governments. Guerrilla armies or terrorist organizations openly seek to topple and replace governments through overt violence. The drug syndicates, however, seek to undermine governments covertly to guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. They do so by co-opting key officials. A real fear of democratic leaders should be that one day the drug trade might take de facto control of a country by essentially buying off a majority of key officials, even the president. With a government secretly on its payroll, a criminal organization has an open field ahead of it. Though such a scenario has yet to happen, in the recent past there have been some close calls. By keeping the focus on eliminating corruption, we can prevent the nightmare of a government entirely manipulated by drug lords from becoming a reality.

Next Steps

Successfully confronting the international drug trade is a complex, dynamic process that does not get easier over time. The drug trade is nothing if not resilient. It learns quickly from its mistakes. Every year, natural selection leaves us with a slightly more astute adversary. Our successes force it to become smarter and more sophisticated in order to survive. We have seen this already in the difficulty of targeting the hundreds of small, hard-to-target drug syndicates that filled the void left by the destruction of Colombia's two dominant cartels.

Yet the drug trade is far from omnipotent. It is vulnerable on many fronts. It needs raw materials to produce drugs, complex logistics arrangements to move them to their destination, cadres of professionals to run the technical and financial aspects of its operations, and some means of making its profits legitimate. Above all, it needs the protection of a reliable core of corrupt officials in all the countries along its distribution chain.

Unrelenting attacks at all of these vulnerable points keep the drug trade on the defensive. Step by step we have methodically hurt the drug trade at every stage. The media often overlook the day-to-day accomplishments of governments and law enforcement agencies against the drug trade. The regular drug seizures, the steady destruction of jungle drug labs and airstrips, the arrests of corrupt officials, and the improved performance of better trained police and judiciaries seldom make the front page. But these are the crucial, daily victories that are the key to success. Our experience has shown that cumulative effort and sustained cooperation with committed allies pay off. They are the weapons that ultimately will weaken the drug trade to the point where it no longer poses a serious threat to the security or health of the United States and its allies.

Demand Reduction

Drug "demand reduction" refers to efforts to reduce worldwide use and abuse of, and demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The need for demand reduction is a fundamental and critical part of controlling the illicit drug trade. Escalating drug use and abuse continue to take a devastating toll on the health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability of all nations. Recognizing this problem, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD#25) on International Drug Control Policy addressed rising global demand for illicit drugs as the principal narcotics-related threat to the U.S. A key objective of that policy urged the Secretary of State to expand U.S. international demand reduction assistance and information sharing programs in key source and transit countries. The NSPD also noted that international drug trafficking organizations and their linkage to international terrorist organizations constitutes a serious threat to U.S. national security. Demand reduction efforts aimed at reducing worldwide drug consumption therefore took on increased importance and served the national interest due to its potential for reducing the income that criminal and terrorist organizations derive from narcotics trafficking and for reducing crime/strengthening security in foreign countries that are key strategic allies of the United States.

Foreign countries are requesting technical and other assistance from the USG to address their problems, citing long-term U.S. experience and efforts on this issue. Our response has been a comprehensive and coordinated approach in which supply control and demand reduction reinforce each other. Such assistance plays an important role in helping to preserve the stability of societies threatened by the narcotics trade.

Our demand reduction strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at "critical decision points" in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and media campaigns to increase public awareness of the deleterious consequences of drug use/abuse and community-coalition building. This latter effort involves the development of coalitions of private/public social institutions, the faith community, and law enforcement entities to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for "best practice" research studies to use these findings to improve similar services provided in the U.S. and around the world.

In 2003, INL funded bilateral training at various locations throughout the world on topics such as community/grassroots coalition building and networking, U.S. policies and programs, science-based drug prevention programming, and treatment within the criminal justice system. INL training enhanced Muslim-based networks of counternarcotics/civil society organizations. This involved collaboration with Muslim faith-based organizations to augment prevention, intervention, aftercare and violence reduction services in Afghanistan, southern Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan. INL also continued to sponsor sub-regional demand reduction training in Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic and Southeast Asia. In September, INL co-sponsored with the Government of Italy the 5th Global Drug Prevention Network (GDPN) summit in Pomizia, Italy. The purpose of the summit was to develop an enhanced communications system for coordinating the participation of 7,000 drug prevention organizations from over 70 countries.

INL funded comprehensive multi-year scientific studies on pilot projects and programs developed from INL-funded training to learn how these initiatives can help assist U.S.-based demand reduction efforts. Three comprehensive research best practice studies that documented effective treatment approaches, strategies, policies and technologies were completed in 2003. Research on prevention programs in selected Latin American countries that have developed promising prevention and antiviolence modalities from INL-funded training will be completed in 2004.

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

How Much Do We Know? The INCSR contains a variety of illicit drug-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government's best effort to sketch the current dimensions of the international drug problem. Some numbers are more certain than others. Drug cultivation figures are relatively hard data derived by proven means, such as imagery with ground truth confirmation. Other numbers, such as crop production and drug yield estimates, become softer as more variables come into play. As we do every year, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, even the best are ultimately approximations.

Each year, we revise our estimates in the light of field research. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes such field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know With Reasonable Certainty. Cultivation—the number of hectares under cultivation during any given year—is our most solid statistic. For nearly twenty years, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the extent of cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What We Know With Less Certainty. How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. To add to our uncertainty, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. Therefore, we are estimating the potential crop available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

Harvest Estimates. We have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. In all cases, however, multiplying average yields times available hectares indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest. The size of the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old) is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates. The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures obviously affect production.. (See the various INCSR chapters for specific information.)

Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve. Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, these illicit drug statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.

Status of Potential Worldwide Production

The yield figures in the INCSR are theoretical. They are estimates of potential production—the quantities that the United States Government estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs. These estimates do not always make allowance for losses, so actual production is probably lower than our estimates. The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production. In Southeast Asia, opium poppy cultivation and potential opium production decreased dramatically in 2003. The cultivated area fell 36 percent to 66,030 hectares from 102,650 hectares the previous year. Potential opium gum production fell 17 percent to 684 metric tons from 829 metric tons in 2003. If all the opium gum were processed, this quantity could yield approximately 65 metric tons of heroin,

Opium poppy cultivation nearly doubled in Southwest Asia in 2003, with the bulk of the crop now cultivated in Afghanistan. The year-end total was 61,000 hectares of opium poppy, potentially yielding 2,865 metric tons of opium gum or 337 metric tons of heroin.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts. Data for 2003 were not available at the time of publication for Colombia or Mexico. Though no specific data was available, there are reports of opium poppy expansion in Peru.

Coca Cultivation. Worldwide coca cultivation figures were not available at time of publication, since the annual survey for Colombia, the largest producer, was not complete. It is likely, however, the 2003 crop will be smaller than last year's total of 144,450 hectares. In Bolivia, there were 28,450 hectares of coca detected. Because of weather conditions, surveys in Bolivia now cover the period June-June, rather than January-December. Peru's coca crop dropped from 36,600 hectares at the end of 2002 to 31,150 hectares in 2003. It is likely that there is coca in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown. Ecuador has negligible amounts of coca.

Cocaine Field Estimates

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data: it is a figure representing potential production. It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug. In fact, the amount of cocaine HCl actually making it to market is probably lower. Efficiencies vary greatly from country to country

The United States Government estimates that in 2002, 680 metric tons of cocaine were potentially available from Colombia, 140 metric tons from Peru and 60 metric tons potentially available from Bolivia. Figures for 2003 were not available at publication time.

Consumption Data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data. For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by United States Government agencies. There is no way to vouch for their reliability. They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems. They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

Marijuana Production

According to USG estimates, net marijuana production in Mexico in 2002 was 7,900 metric tons of cannabis from 4,900 hectares of cultivation. Figures for 2003 were not available at the time of publication. In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, cultivation is estimated to be about 4,000 hectares. We recognize that there may be considerable amounts of undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia, and on the African continent, though there is no evidence that any of this cannabis significantly affects the United States. As we gather more accurate information, we will report significant findings in future INCSRs.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
1996-2003
(All Figures in Hectares)

 

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

Opium

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Afghanistan

61,000

30,750

1,685

64,510

51,500

41,720

39,150

37,950

India

 

 

 

 

 

 

2,050

3,100

Iran

  

 

 

 

 

 

  

  

Pakistan

     

622

213

515

1,570

3,030

4,100

3,400

Total SW Asia

61,000

31,372

1,898

65,025

53,070

44,750

45,300

44,450

Burma

47,130

78,000

105,000

108,700

89,500

130,300

155,150

163,100

China

   

   

   

    

   

   

   

   

Laos

18,900

23,200

22,000

23,150

21,800

26,100

28,150

25,250

Thailand

 

750

820

890

835

1,350

1,650

2,170

Vietnam

 

1,000

2,300

2,300

2,100

3,000

6,150

3,150

Total SE Asia

66,030

102,950

130,120

135,040

114,235

160,750

191,100

193,670

Colombia

  

6,500

6,500

7,500

7,500

6,100

6,600

6,300

Lebanon

  

 

  

  

  

  

  

90

Guatemala

    

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Mexico

  

2,700

4,400

1,900

3,600

5,500

4,000

5,100

Total Other

  

9,200

10,900

9,400

11,100

11,600

10,600

11,490

Total Opium

127,030

143,522

142,918

209,465

178,405

217,100

247,000

249,610

Coca

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Bolivia1

28,450

24,400

19,900

14,600

21,800

38,000

45,800

48,100

Colombia

  

144,450

169,800

136,200

122,500

101,800

79,500

67,200

Peru

31,150

36,600

34,000

34,200

38,700

51,000

68,800

94,400

Ecuador

  

  

   

  

  

  

  

  

Total Coca

59,600

205,450

223,700

185,000

183,000

190,800

194,100

209,700

Cannabis

  

  

  

  

  

  

   

  

Mexico

  

3,900

3,900

3,900

3,700

4,600

4,800

6,500

Colombia

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

Jamaica

   

  

  

  

  

   

317

527

Total Cannabis

5,000

8,900

8,900

8,900

8,700

9,600

10,117

12,027

1Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
1988-1995 (All Figures in Hectares)

    

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

Opium

  

  

  

   

  

  

  

  

Afghanistan

38,740

29,180

21,080

19,470

17,190

12,370

18,650

23,000

India

4,750

5,500

4,400

  

  

  

  

  

Iran

  

  

  

    

  

  

  

  

Pakistan

6,950

7,270

6,280

8,170

8,205

8,220

6,050

11,588

Total SW Asia

50,440

41,950

31,760

27,640

25,395

20,590

24,700

34,588

Burma

154,070

154,070

146,600

153,700

160,000

150,100

143,000

104,200

China

1,275

1,965

  

  

  

  

  

  

Laos

19,650

19,650

18,520

25,610

29,625

30,580

42,130

40,400

Thailand

1,750

2,110

2,110

2,050

3,000

3,435

4,075

2,843

Total SE Asia

    

177,795

167,230

181,360

192,625

184,185

189,205

147,443

Colombia

176,745

    

  

  

1,160

    

    

    

Lebanon

6,540

20,000

20,000

20,000

3,400

3,200

4,500

na

Guatemala

150

    

440

na

1,145

845

1,220

710

Mexico

39

50

438

730

3,765

5,450

6,600

5,001

Vietnam

5,050

5,795

3,960

3,310

    

    

   

   

Total Other

11,779

25,845

24,838

24,040

9,470

9,495

12,320

5,711

Total Opium

238,964

245,590

223,828

233,040

227,490

214,200

226,225

187,742

Coca

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Bolivia

48,600

48,100

47,200

45,500

47,900

50,300

52,900

48,900

Colombia

50,900

45,000

39,700

37,100

37,500

40,100

42,400

34,000

Peru

115,300

108,600

108,800

129,100

120,800

121,300

120,400

110,400

Ecuador

  

  

  

  

40

120

150

240

Total Coca

214,800

201,700

195,700

211,700

206,240

211,820

215,850

193,540

Cannabis

  

  

  

     

  

  

  

  

Mexico

6,900

10,550

11,220

16,420

17,915

35,050

53,900

5,003

Colombia

5,000

4,986

5,000

2,000

2,000

1,500

2,270

4,188

Jamaica

305

308

744

389

950

1,220

280

607

Total Cannabis

12,205

15,844

16,964

18,809

20,865

37,770

56,450

9,798


Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
1996-2003 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

     

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

Opium Gum

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Afghanistan

2,865

1,278

74

3,656

2,861

2,340

2,184

2,174

India

  

  

  

  

  

  

30

47

Iran

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Pakistan

  

5

5

11

37

66

85

75

Total SW Asia

2,865

1,283

79

3,667

2,898

2,406

2,299

2,296

Burma

484

630

865

1,085

1,090

1,750

2,365

2,560

China

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Laos

200

180

200

210

140

140

210

200

Thailand

  

9

6

6

6

16

25

30

Vietnam

  

10

15

15

11

20

45

25

Total SE Asia

684

829

1,086

1,316

1,247

1,926

2,645

2,815

Colombia

      

  

  

  

75

61

66

63

Lebanon

      

  

  

  

  

  

  

1

Guatemala

  

  

  

    

  

  

  

  

Mexico

      

47

71

21

43

60

46

54

Total Other

  

47

71

21

118

121

112

118

Total Opium

3,549

2,159

1,236

5,004

4,263

4,453

5,056

4,285

Coca Leaf

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Bolivia1

17,210

19,800

20,200

26,800

22,800

52,900

70,100

75,100

Colombia2

     

     

     

583,000

521,400

437,600

347,000

302,900

Peru

     

52,700

52,600

54,400

69,200

95,600

130,200

174,700

Ecuador

     

     

     

     

     

  

  

  

Total Coca3

17,210

72,500

72,800

664,200

613,400

586,100

547,300

552,700

Cannabis

  

  

   

   

  

  

  

  

Mexico

  

7,900

7,400

7,000

3,700

8,300

8,600

11,700

Colombia

  

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,133

4,133

Jamaica

  

  

  

  

  

 

214

356

Belize

  

  

   

     

  

  

  

  

Others

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

Total Cannabis

3,500

15,400

14,900

14,500

11,200

15,800

16,447

19,689

1Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.
2Since leaf calculation is by fresh leaf weight in Colombia, in contrast to dry weight elsewhere, these boxes are blank.
32002 and 2001 totals do not include Colombia. See footnote 2 above.

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
1988-1995 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

    

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

Opium Gum

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Afghanistan

1,250

950

685

640

570

415

585

750

India

77

90

  

  

  

  

  

  

Iran

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Pakistan

155

160

140

175

180

165

130

205

Total SW Asia

1,482

1,200

825

815

750

580

715

955

Burma

2,340

2,030

2,575

2,280

2,350

2,255

2,430

1,280

China

19

25

  

  

  

  

  

  

Laos

180

85

180

230

265

275

380

255

Thailand

25

17

42

24

35

40

50

25

Vietnam

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Total SE Asia

2,564

2,157

2,797

2,534

2,650

2,570

2,860

1,560

Colombia

65

     

  

  

  

  

  

  

Lebanon

1

  

4

  

34

32

45

  

Guatemala

  

  

  

  

11

13

12

8

Mexico

53

60

49

40

41

62

66

67

Total Other

119

60

53

40

86

107

123

75

Total Opium

4,165

3,417

3,675

3,389

3,486

3,257

3,698

2,590

Coca Leaf

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

Bolivia

85,000

89,800

84,400

80,300

78,000

77,000

78,200

79,500

Colombia

229,300

35,800

31,700

29,600

30,000

32,100

33,900

27,200

Peru

183,600

165,300

155,500

223,900

222,700

196,900

186,300

187,700

Ecuador

  

  

100

100

40

170

270

400

Total Coca

497,900

290,900

271,700

333,900

330,740

306,170

298,670

294,800

Cannabis

  

  

  

  

   

  

  

  

Mexico

12,400

5,540

6,280

7,795

7,775

19,715

30,200

5,655

Colombia

4,133

4,138

4,125

1,650

1,650

1,500

2,800

7,775

Jamaica

206

208

502

263

641

825

190

405

Belize

  

  

  

  

49

60

65

120

Others

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

Total Cannabis

20,239

13,386

14,407

13,208

13,615

25,600

36,755

17,455

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party
  1. Afghanistan

20 December 1988

14 February 1992
  1. Albania

Accession

27 June 2001
  1. Algeria

20 December 1988

5 May 1995
  1. Andorra

Accession

23 July 1999
  1. Antigua and Barbuda

Accession

5 April 1993
  1. Argentina

Accession

13 September 1993
  1. Armenia

20 December 1988

28 June 1993
  1. Australia

14 February 1989

16 November 1992
  1. Austria

25 September 1989

11 July 1997
  1. Azerbaijan

Accession

22 September 1993
  1. Bahamas

20 December 1988

30 January 1989
  1. Bahrain

28 September 1989

7 February 1990
  1. Bangladesh

14 April 1989

11 October 1990
  1. Barbados

Accession

15 October 1992
  1. Belarus

27 February 1989

15 October 1990
  1. Belgium

22 May 1989

25 October 1995
  1. Belize

Accession

24 July 1996
  1. Benin

Accession

23 May 1997
  1. Bhutan

Accession

27 August 1990
  1. Bolivia

20 December 1988

20 August 1990
  1. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Succession

01 September 1993
  1. Botswana

Accession

13 August 1996
  1. Brazil

20 December 1988

17 July 1991
  1. Brunei Darussalam

26 October 1989

12 November 1993
  1. Bulgaria

19 May 1989

24 September 1992
  1. Burkina Faso

Accession

02 June 1992
  1. Burma

Ratified

11 June 1991
  1. Burundi

Accession

18 February 1993
  1. Cameroon

27 February 1989

28 October 1991
  1. Canada

20 December 1988

05 July 1990
  1. Cape Verde

Accession

08 May 1995
  1. Central African Republic

Accession

15 October 2001
  1. Chad

Accession

09 June 1995
  1. Chile

20 December 1988

13 March 1990
  1. China

20 December 1988

25 October 1989
  1. Colombia

20 December 1988

10 June 1994
  1. Comoros

Accession

1 March 2000
  1. Costa Rica

25 April 1989

8 February 1991
  1. Cote d'Ivoire

20 December 1988

25 November 1991
  1. Croatia

Succession

26 July 1993
  1. Cuba

7 April 1989

12 June 1996
  1. Cyprus

20 December 1988

25 May 1990
  1. Czech Republic

Succession

30 December 1993
  1. Denmark

20 December 1988

19 December 1991
  1. Djibouti

Accession

22 February 2001
  1. Dominica

Accession

30 June 1993
  1. Dominican Republic

Accession

21 September 1993
  1. Ecuador

21 June 1988

23 March 1990
  1. Egypt

20 December 1988

15 March 1991
  1. El Salvador

Accession

21 May 1993
  1. Estonia

Accession

12 July 2000
  1. Ethiopia

Accession

11 October 1994
  1. European Economic
    Community

8 June 1989

31 December 1990
  1. Fiji

Accession

25 March 1993
  1. Finland

8 February 1989

15 February 1994
  1. France

13 February 1989

31 December 1990
  1. Gambia

Accession

23 April 1996
  1. Germany

19 January 1989

30 November 1993
  1. Georgia

Accession

8 January 1998
  1. Ghana

20 December 1988

10 April 1990
  1. Greece

23 February 1989

28 January 1992
  1. Grenada

Accession

10 December 1990
  1. Guatemala

20 December 1988

28 February 1991
  1. Guinea

Accession

27 December 1990
  1. Guyana

Accession

19 March 1993
  1. Haiti

Accession

18 September 1995
  1. Honduras

20 December 1988

11 December 1991
  1. Hungary

22 August 1989

15 November 1996
  1. Iceland

Accession

2 September 1997
  1. India

Accession

27 March 1990
  1. Indonesia

27 March 1989

23 February 1999
  1. Iran

20 December 1988

7 December 1992
  1. Iraq

Accession

22 July 1998
  1. Ireland

14 December 1989

3 September 1996
  1. Israel

20 December 1988

20 May 2002
  1. Italy

20 December 1988

31 December 1990
  1. Jamaica

2 October 1989

29 December 1995
  1. Japan

19 December 1989

12 June 1992
  1. Jordan

20 December 1988

16 April 1990
  1. Kazakhstan

Accession

29 April 1997
  1. Kenya

Accession

19 October 1992
  1. Korea

Accession

28 December 1998
  1. Kuwait

2 Ocotober 1989

3 November 2000
  1. Kyrgyzstan

Accession

7 October 1994
  1. Latvia

Accession

24 February 1994
  1. Lebanon

Accession

11 March 1996
  1. Lesotho

Accession

28 March 1995
  1. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Accession

22 July 1996
  1. Lithuania

Accession

8 June 1998
  1. Luxembourg

26 September 1989

29 April 1992
  1. Macedonia, Former
    Yugoslav Rep.

Accession

18 October 1993
  1. Madagascar

Accession

12 March 1991
  1. Malawi

Accession

12 October 1995
  1. Malaysia

20 December 1988

11 May 1993
  1. Maldives

5 December 1989

7 December 2000
  1. Mali

Accession

31 October 1995
  1. Malta

Accession

28 February 1996
  1. Mauritania

Accession

1 July 1993
  1. Mauritius

20 December 1988

6 March 2001
  1. Mexico

16 February 1989

11 April 1990
  1. Moldova

Accession

19 February 1995
  1. Monaco

24 February 1989

23 April 1991
  1. Morocco

28 December 1988

28 October 1992
  1. Mozambique

Accession

8 June 1998
  1. Nepal

Accession

24 July 1991
  1. Netherlands

18 January 1992

8 September 1993
  1. New Zealand

18 December 1989

16 December 2002
  1. Nicaragua

20 December 1988

4 May 1990
  1. Niger

Accession

10 November 1992
  1. Nigeria

1 March 1989

1 November 1989
  1. Norway

20 December 1988

1 January 1994
  1. Oman

Accession

15 March 1991
  1. Pakistan

20 December 1988

25 October 1991
  1. Panama

20 December 1988

13 January 1994
  1. Paraguay

20 December 1988

23 August 1990
  1. Peru

20 December 1988

16 January 1992
  1. Philippines

20 December 1988

7 June 1996
  1. Poland

6 March 1989

26 May 1994
  1. Portugal

13 December 1989

3 December 1991
  1. Qatar

Accession

4 May 1990
  1. Romania

Accession

21 January 1993
  1. Russia

19 January 1989

17 December 1990
  1. Rwanda

Accession

13 May 2002
  1. St. Kitts and Nevis

Accession

19 April 1995
  1. St. Lucia

Accession

21 August 1995
  1. St. Vincent and
    the Grenadines

Accession

17 May 1994
  1. San Marino

Accession

10 October 2000
  1. Sao Tome and Principe

Accession

20 June 1996
  1. Saudi Arabia

Accession

9 January 1992
  1. Senegal

20 December 1988

27 November 1989
  1. Seychelles

Accession

27 February 1992
  1. Sierra Leone

9 June 1989

6 June 1994
  1. Singapore

Accession

23 October 1997
  1. Slovakia

Succession

28 May 1993
  1. Slovenia

Succession

6 July 1992
  1. South Africa

Accession

14 December 1998
  1. Spain

20 December 1988

13 August 1990
  1. Sri Lanka

Accession

6 June 1991
  1. Sudan

30 January 1989

19 November 1993
  1. Suriname

20 December 1988

28 October 1992
  1. Swaziland

Accession

3 October 95
  1. Sweden

20 December 1988

22 July 1991
  1. Syria

Accession

3 September 1991
  1. Tajikistan

Accession

6 May 1996
  1. Thailand

Accession

3 May 2002
  1. Tanzania

20 December 1988

17 April 1996
  1. Togo

3 August 1989

1 August 1990
  1. Tonga

Accession

29 April 1996
  1. Trinidad and Tobago

7 December 1989

17 February 1995
  1. Tunisia

19 December 1989

20 September 1990
  1. Turkey

20 December 1988

2 April 1996
  1. Turkmenistan

Accession

21 February 1996
  1. UAE

Accession

12 April 1990
  1. Uganda

Accession

20 August 1990
  1. Ukraine

16 March 1989

28 August 1991
  1. United Kingdom

20 December 1988

28 June 1991
  1. United States

20 December 1988

20 February 1990
  1. Uruguay

19 December 1989

10 March 1995
  1. Uzbekistan

Accession

14 August 1995
  1. Venezuela

20 December 1988

16 July 1991
  1. Vietnam

Accession

4 November 1997
  1. Yemen

20 December 1988

25 March 1996
  1. Yugoslavia

20 December 1988

3 January 1991
  1. Zambia

9 February 1989

28 May 1993
  1. Zimbabwe

Accession

30 July 1993

Signed but Pending Ratification    
  1. Gabon

20 December 1989

    
  1. Holy See

20 December 1988

Not UN member
  1. Mauritius

20 December 1988

     
  1. Philippines

20 December 1988

 
  1. Switzerland

16 November 1989

Not UN member
  1. Zaire

20 December 1988

  

Other
  1. Anguilla

 

Not UN member
  1. Aruba

 

Not UN member
  1. Bermuda

  

  
  1. BVI

  

Not UN member
  1. Cambodia

  

  
  1. Central African Republic

  

  
  1. Chad

  

  
  1. Congo

  

  
  1. Djibouti

  

  
  1. DPR Korea

  

  
  1. Hong Kong

  

Not UN member
  1. Laos

  

  
  1. Liberia

    

  
  1. Liechtenstein

  

  
  1. Marshall Islands

  

  1. Micronesia, Federated
    States of

  

  
  1. Mongolia

  

  
  1. Namibia

  

  
  1. Papua New Guinea

  

  
  1. Samoa

  

  
  1. Sao Tome and Principe

  

  
  1. Taiwan

  

Not UN member
  1. Turks & Caicos

  

Not UN member
  1. Vanuatu

  

  



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