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Diplomacy in Action

Policy and Program Developments


International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
March 2008
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Overview for 2007

This year is the 25th occasion for publication of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Over this period, a fundamental shift has occurred in the world’s understanding of both our shared drug problem and the need for concerted international efforts to fight narcotics cultivation, production, trafficking and use. When this report began 25 years ago, the attention of the world community was often distracted by an unproductive blame-game between “producer” states in Latin America and Asia and “consumer” states in Europe and North America. There was little perception that we faced a common enemy and shared common objectives in international drug control. Instead, too often, there was a perception that without demand, supply would end, and that transit countries need not worry about addiction among their domestic populations. We now know that the lure of such incredible profits, as the drug traffic generates, makes this a trade that circumvents such a simple formula. Those who want to supply drugs make it their business to encourage demand by paying transit state residents in drugs instead of money and manipulating prices to get and keep addicts. Drug abuse and addiction is widespread in most transit countries; at least to some extent, drug supply creates its own demand. We all face a thinking, well-financed enemy and we must all, every legitimate nation-state and international authority, work together to thwart this network.

Understanding that demand is a key element of this problem, the United States has greatly increased its spending on drug treatment and avoidance programs over the decades, and has invested in cutting-edge medical and social research on how to decrease demand. We are proud of the results and have worked with the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and countries all over the world to share programs such as drug courts, early intervention, and school drug testing.

We work with our allies to fight drug cultivation, processing and trafficking, and the laundering of drug proceeds, on a global scale. In 2007, clear indications of success in pushing traditional traffickers out of business, and meeting demand reduction needs, were evident but much more remains to be done. Throughout the world, countries that seek to stabilize their democratic gains find themselves besieged by criminals who can financially undermine legitimate law enforcement and economic institutions. The environment is equally under siege, as drug traffickers practice deforestation and chemical dumping in fragile ecosystems.

Record levels of Afghan opium cultivation have led to an increased flow of heroin to Europe, Russia and the Middle East, which undermines those societies as well as the consolidation of democracy and security in Afghanistan. Cocaine and cannabis pose considerable risk to societies in the Americas, and increasingly to fragile transit nations in West Africa. According to the 2007 World Drug Report by the UN Office of Drugs and crime, “Global demand for cocaine has also stabilized, although the decline in the United States is offset by alarming increases in some European countries . . . [T]he production and consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) has leveled off, with a clear downward trend in North America and, to a lesser degree, Europe . . . [T]he health warnings on higher potency cannabis, delivered in past World Drug Reports, appear to be getting through. For the first time in years, we do not see an upward trend in the global production and consumption of cannabis. [Finally,] opium production, while significant, is now highly concentrated in Afghanistan’s southern provinces.”

The ultimate success of international drug control efforts will hinge, in large part, on two factors: sustained international political will and effective capacity building. States must continue to confront illicit drug use, production, and transshipment with the energy and determination that reflects how seriously these threats affect their own societies and national security. The world community has made tremendous progress on this front since the first publication of this report 25 years ago, most notably in the form of the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention. Over the past quarter-century, the topic of international drug control has evolved from a second-tier diplomatic concern to a pressing priority for international statecraft, discussed at the very highest levels of government and handled daily through a range of international institutions and legal tools that have evolved during that time.

In 2007, for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) celebrated the 20th anniversary of its Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is comprised of senior officials from all 34 OAS Member States. Over the years, CICAD has fostered numerous policies and programs to implement concrete, effective drug control cooperation among the major hemispheric drug control and trafficking countries affecting the narcotics problem in the U.S., as well as in Europe and elsewhere. As another example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was formed in 1989 as an inter-governmental body to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering, and more recently, to combat terrorist financing. The FATF has helped generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these fields, and its recommendations are widely recognized as the preeminent international standards for effective anti-money laundering regimes. More recently, to expand upon the cooperative framework established under the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention, two additional UN treaties concerning all forms of transnational organized crime and public corruption have been negotiated and have entered into force.

These international agreements reflect some overarching lessons learned from our efforts to combat the illegal drug trade over the past quarter century, namely: that international crime extends far beyond drug trafficking to include many different threats to U.S. and international interests, and can be combated through common strategies and legal mechanisms; and that combating and preventing corruption is absolutely essential to preventing criminal networks from achieving greater success and power. Working through these multilateral fora and through traditional bilateral diplomacy, the United States will continue to encourage states to fully implement their political commitments in keeping with the goals set by international law.

Political will is essential for achieving progress against illicit drugs, but it is not self-actualizing. Sustainable progress requires sufficient capacities for enforcing the rule of law and implementing the objectives of committed governments. To assist this process, the United Sates is committed to enhancing the capacity of governments to uphold their international commitments in practice. The United States cannot by itself arrest every drug criminal, provide for every alternative development project, disrupt the finances of every drug trafficker, or dismantle every drug trafficking organization. In this regard, the goal of the United States is to assist governments to become full and self-sustaining partners in promoting the goals of the UN Drug Control Conventions.

Controlling Supply

Cocaine, ATS, marijuana and heroin are the drugs that most threaten the United States and its international allies. The USG’s goal is to reduce and ultimately cut off the international flow of illegal drugs. Our primary strategy targets drug supply at critical points along the grower-to-user chain that links the consumer, in the case of cocaine or heroin, with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies. Intermediate links are the processing (drug refining), transport and wholesale distribution stages.

The cornerstone of U.S. supply reduction strategy remains source-zone eradication. We continue to strongly believe that drug crops are the weakest link in the drug production chain; coca and poppy crops are detectable from satellite imagery, easily destroyed, and—unlike some people and institutions—immune to corruption. They require adequate growing conditions, ample land, and time to reach maturity. We have a much more realistic chance eliminating drug crops in the ground than we do of capturing traffickers, who are armed, difficult to track, and ingenious in their delivery methods.

However, even the most thoroughly executed crop eradication campaigns will not achieve sustainable results, unless backed by effective police forces that can detect and arrest traffickers, and courts that can prosecute them. Since drug cultivation flourishes in environments where state authority is weak and economic development is low, support for law enforcement institutions must be mainstreamed into overall efforts to achieve sustainable development. In many cases, as we have seen in Afghanistan and parts of the Andean countryside, these law enforcement institutions and licit economic networks need to be created from scratch. Building institutional capacities in such environments is a tough, long-term process that does not lend itself to quick results, particularly if such regions are in the midst of civil conflicts. It requires long-term sustained funding and commitment from host governments and the international donor community. One of the more encouraging trends of recent years is that there has been a growing international appreciation for the linkage between development and law enforcement, and an increasing awareness that drug-induced corruption and lack of law enforcement and criminal justice institutions can hinder social and economic development. The United States believes that law enforcement and criminal justice institutional development is an integral component of broader development strategy, and we are encouraged that the broader international community has increasingly supported this mainstreaming approach over recent years.

Perhaps the most acute and crucial challenge of achieving sustainable development in territories where drug-cultivation takes place is the need to integrate otherwise marginalized regions into the economic and political mainstream of host countries. The term that is most often used for this by the United States, the United Nations and other international actors is “alternative development,” but it may be more accurate to think of such assistance as support for “alternative livelihoods,” because alternative development goes far beyond crop substitution, the usual assumed meaning. In some situations, crop substitution is neither feasible nor desirable. In some areas, the same soil that supports illicit drug crop cultivation does not have adequate nutrients to support licit crops. Licit crops rarely produce the same income as drug crops, and in some cases, farmers will need inducement to pursue non-agricultural pursuits. Even more powerful forms of compensation include access to credit, security, and government services such as roads, schools, health centers, electricity and water. Establishing these programs on the ground is a lengthy, sometimes frustrating process, and implementation of these alternative development assistance programs is often slower than the process of training and equipping law enforcement personnel. However, if implemented correctly, alternative development is good policy and good politics. Without it, crop eradication alone will never amount to more than a temporary palliative, and will not achieve sustainable reduction of illicit narcotic crops.

Based on decades of experience in illicit crop reduction and alternative development, there is convincing evidence that alternative development without some measure of forced eradication leads to little or no reduction in drug production. Similarly, programs that rely on voluntary eradication need to have a forced eradication component to signal political commitment to growers. There are no licit crops or activities that generate an income comparable to coca or opium poppy. Drug cultivators will only get out of the business when they are convinced that authorities will not tolerate it. The United States is firmly convinced that governments can derive no benefit from entering into negotiations with these illegal growers. If they are dealt with as legitimate lobbies rather as law-breakers, drug interests can grow emboldened, and this can lead to the creation or reinforcement of large, possibly well-armed groups capable of violence. Contrary to what might be expected, tolerance can lay the groundwork for civil insurrection, and once organized, these insurrections can be extremely difficult to put down in areas where institutional development lags behind.

For non-organic drugs, such as ATS, physical eradication is impossible. Instead, the U.S. and its allies must create a legal regime of chemical controls and law enforcement efforts aimed at thwarting those who divert key chemicals, and destroying the laboratories needed to create ATS. Our international programs focus on all the links in the supply-to-consumer chain: the processing and distribution stages, the interdiction of drug shipments, and attention to the money trail left by this illegal trade.

Cocaine

The rate of U.S. cocaine consumption has generally declined over the past 10 years, but held steady last year among teenagers. Cocaine continues to be a major domestic concern.

Coca Eradication: The October 2007 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) estimates that between 530 and 710 metric tons (MT) of cocaine departed South America toward the United States in 2006, an amount similar to the 2005 estimate. Since all cocaine originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the U.S. Government channels a significant portion of its international resources towards eliminating illegal coca cultivation (the raw ingredient in cocaine) within these countries. We actively support efforts by these governments to eliminate illegal coca within each country’s individual context. Alternative development programs offer farmers opportunities to abandon illegal activities and join the legitimate economy, a key tool for countries seeking to free their agricultural sector from reliance on the drug trade. In the Andean countries, such programs play a vital role in providing funds and technical assistance to strengthen public and private institutions, expand rural infrastructure, improve natural resources management, introduce alternative legal crops, and develop local and international markets for these products.

Colombia leads the world in coca cultivation as the source of roughly 90 percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. with Peru and Bolivia a distant second and third respectively. Cocaine trafficking to Europe from South America is becoming a serious concern, especially through transit states in West Africa. By the end of 2007, the Colombian government reported eliminating about 153,133 hectares of coca through aerial eradication and another 66,396 hectares through manual eradication. If harvested and refined, this eradicated coca could have yielded hundreds of metric tons of cocaine worth billions of dollars on U.S. streets.

Bolivia and Peru face challenges to implementing their coca eradication and cocaine interdiction activities. Politically well-connected and active cocalero (coca grower) associations link coca cultivation to issues of cultural identity and national pride and are stepping up efforts to challenge eradication efforts. Traffickers are continuing to exploit these growers’ unions for their own purposes.

Bolivian President Evo Morales, a former cocalero leader, continued to promote his policy of “zero cocaine but not zero coca” and to push for industrialization of coca. His administration continues to pursue policies that would lead to an increase in legal coca cultivation from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares —a change that would violate current Bolivian law and potentially contravene the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which Bolivia is a party. The GOB eradicated more than 6,000 hectares by the end of the year, nearly all of that in the Chapare region. USG-supported Bolivian counternarcotics units, as of September 30, 2007, had seized 13.8 tons of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) and destroyed 3,093 cocaine labs and maceration pits.

Peru eradicated 11,057 hectares in 2007. Cocaleros in Peru engaged in numerous violent acts to resist eradication. The Sendero Luminoso terrorist group has openly identified with coca growers and drug traffickers, and organized violent ambushes of police and intimidation of alternative development teams in coca growing areas.

Cocaine Seizures: Colombian authorities seized 191.3 metric tons of cocaine in the course of the year, and destroyed 240 cocaine HCl labs and 2,875 cocaine base labs. Bolivia seized 13.8 metric tons of cocaine and destroyed 3,093 cocaine labs and maceration pits; and Peru seized over 16 metric tons of cocaine.

Collectively, the eradication of coca and seizures of cocaine within the Andean source countries prevented hundreds of metric tons of cocaine from reaching U.S. streets and deprived international drug syndicates of billions of dollars in profits.

Interdiction in the Cocaine Transit Zone: The cocaine transit zone drug flow is of double importance for the United States: it threatens our borders, and it leaves a trail of corruption and addiction in its wake that undermines the social framework of societies in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. Helping our neighbors police transit zones has required a well-coordinated effort between the governments of the transit zone countries and the USG. With high levels of post-seizure intelligence collection, and cooperation with allied nations, we now have more actionable intelligence within the transit zone.

The U.S. Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – South (JIATF-S), working closely with international partners from throughout the Caribbean Basin, has focused its and regional partners’ intelligence gathering efforts to detect and monitor maritime drug movements while maneuvering interdiction assets into position to affect seizures. The USG’s bilateral agreements with Caribbean and Latin American countries have eased the burden on these countries’ law enforcement assets to conduct at sea boardings and search for contraband, while allowing the USG to gain jurisdiction over cases and remove the coercive pressure from large drug trafficking organizations on some foreign governments.

Mexican law enforcement interdicted over 48 MT of cocaine; 2,171 MT of marijuana; 292 kilograms of opium gum; 298 kilograms of heroin; and, 899 kilograms of methamphetamine in 2007. Venezuela reported seizures of 28 metric tons of cocaine in 2007. This is less than claimed seizures in 2006; and these figures include seizures made by other countries in international waters that were subsequently returned to Venezuela, the country of origin.

According to JIATF-S, the number of drug smuggling flights from Venezuela to Hispaniola increased by 38 percent from 2006 to 2007. Approximately two thirds of the flights went to the Dominican Republic, and, in 2007, Dominican authorities seized approximately four metric tons of cocaine, 102.5 kilograms of heroin, 17,902 units of MDMA, and 511.7 kilograms of marijuana. Haiti seized 914 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana. West Africa has become a hub for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe. Some 33 tons of cocaine have been seized in West Africa since 2005, but this is probably only the tip of the iceberg. UNODC estimates that around 40 tons of cocaine were trafficked through West Africa in 2007 alone. A quarter of all cocaine consumed in Europe may transit West Africa.

This onslaught is due to more effective interdiction along traditional trafficking routes, and the convenient location of West Africa between Andean cocaine suppliers and European consumers, but most of all it reflects he vulnerability of West African countries to organized crime.

Synthetic Drugs

Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS): Although abuse and trafficking in amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) remain among the more serious challenges in the drug-control arena, the 2007 edition of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime’s World Drug Report (2007) notes that “the alarming increases in the production of ATS throughout the 1990s seem to have leveled off over the last few years. This is likely a result of recent efforts to monitor and improve precursor control.” Despite this modest stabilization, the use of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and MDMA (“ecstasy”) remains prevalent in many countries, especially in those of Central and Northern Europe and Southeast Asia. Synthetics can be made anywhere and offer enormous profit margins. The relative ease and low cost of manufacturing ATS drugs from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates.

Methamphetamine production and distribution are undergoing significant changes in the United States. Methamphetamine use has stabilized nationally since 2002 after increasing during much of the 1990s, and domestic production of methamphetamine has decreased dramatically since 2004. However, according to the December 2007 National Drug Intelligence Center’s “National Methamphetamine Threat Assessment 2008,” the increasing prevalence of high-purity ice methamphetamine throughout the country and the expansion of methamphetamine networks operated by Mexican and Asian drug trafficking organizations have largely sustained U.S. methamphetamine markets. Despite heightened chemical import restrictions in Mexico, production in that country has increased since 2004, and Mexican organizations and product continue to dominate domestic markets, supplanting many local dealers who had previously produced and distributed the drug independently.

This pattern is at least partially due to increasingly effective domestic controls over the retail sale of licit pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, the primary chemicals necessary for methamphetamine. Regulations for the sale of such products in the U.S. became effective at the national level for the first time in late 2006 under the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA). To capitalize on these gains and prevent production from merely shifting ground, the U.S. Government enhanced the scale and pace of its law enforcement cooperation with the Government of Mexico to target the production and trafficking of methamphetamine. For its part, the Government of Mexico demonstrated unprecedented political commitment towards stemming the illicit diversion of chemicals required for methamphetamine production. The Government of Mexico determined in September of 2007 that it would issue no further licenses for the importation of any amount of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and any product containing these chemicals. Sellers of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine products must deplete their remaining stores of products containing these chemicals by 2009, after which the use of these products will be illegal in Mexico. This new policy has the potential to significantly disrupt the methamphetamine trade in the years ahead.

The United States is keenly aware that drug traffickers are adaptable, well-informed, and flexible. New transshipment routes may be emerging in Southeast Asia and Africa, and there is also ample evidence that organized criminal groups ship currently uncontrolled chemical analogues of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing illicit methamphetamine-type drugs. Large-scale methamphetamine production is increasing in Canada as outlaw motorcycle gangs and Asian drug trafficking organizations expand their methamphetamine operations. Some methamphetamine produced in Canada is distributed in U.S. drug markets, along with some MDMA (also known as ecstasy).

Canada has also emerged as a source country for a significant percentage of the ecstasy consumed in the United States. The Netherlands remains an important producer of ecstasy as well, although the amount of this drug reaching the United States seems to have declined substantially in recent years, abetted by proactive measures from the Dutch Government. The successful five-year strategy (2002-2006) against the production, trade and consumption of synthetic drugs was endorsed by the Dutch Parliament in 2007. Labs in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe are major suppliers of amphetamines to the European market, with the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries among the heaviest European consumers of amphetamine. In the United States, Ecstasy use has flattened among the teenage population most at risk, according to the 2007 Monitoring the Future report.

Pharmaceutical Abuse, and the Internet: The number of Internet pharmacies established since 2002, and particularly since 2005, has increased sharply. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center’s October 2007 “National Drug Threat Assessment,” a study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University states that the number of Internet pharmacy sites offering Schedules II through V controlled prescription drugs increased 70 percent—from 342 in 2006 to 581 in 2007. The study determined that 32 percent of the sites were “anchor sites” (sites at which the customer could place an order and pay for the drugs), and the remaining 68 percent were simply portal sites that directed customers to the anchor sites. Of the anchor sites, 84 percent did not require a prescription at all to purchase the drugs, and another approximately 10 percent accepted faxed prescriptions, increasing the risk of multiple use of one prescription or use of fraudulent prescriptions.

An area of continuing concern is the abuse of pharmaceutical drugs, especially among teenagers. According to the December 2007 “Monitoring the Future” survey, while most of the illicit drugs have shown considerable declines in use over the past decade or so, most prescription psychotherapeutic drugs did not; in fact, a number of them showed steady increases in use outside of their legitimate medical use (amphetamines being the single exception). These include sedatives such as Vicodan, tranquilizers, and narcotic drugs other than heroin (most of which are analgesics). As a result, they have become a relatively more important part of the nation’s drug abuse problem. Fortunately, most of them have shown signs of leveling or even of beginning a gradual decline in use over the past couple of years. Many of these drugs are available over the Internet, through doctors prescribing drugs without seeing patients or “pharmacies” that accept unverified or even substandard prescriptions. It is not known what percentage of this abuse involves international sources.

Cannabis (Marijuana)

Cannabis production and marijuana consumption continue to appear in nearly every world region, including in the United States. Marijuana still remains the most widely used of all of the illicit drugs. According to the December 2007 “Monitoring the Future” study, the decline in 2007 in the annual prevalence of marijuana use among U.S. 8th graders was statistically significant, falling from 11.7 percent in 2006 to 10.3 percent in 2007. Since the recent peak years of use reached in the mid-1990s, annual prevalence has fallen by over 40 percent among 8th graders, 30 percent among 10th graders, and nearly 20 percent among 12th graders. The prevalence rates for marijuana use in the prior year now stand at 10 percent, 25 percent, and 32 percent for grades, 8, 10, and 12, respectively.

Drug organizations in Mexico and Canada produce more than 4,000 metric tons of marijuana, which is then marketed to the more than 20 million users in the United States. Canada produces approximately 800 metric tons of high potency marijuana, which is marketed, increasingly, nationwide in the United States, along with marijuana from Colombia, Jamaica, and possibly Nigeria. Domestic production of marijuana may rival that of foreign sources.

According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), marijuana potency has increased sharply. Of great concern is the high potency, indoor-grown cannabis produced on a large scale in Canada and grown in laboratory conditions using specialized timers, ventilation, moveable lights on tracks, nutrients sprayed on exposed roots and special fertilizer that maximize THC levels. A portion of U.S. domestic production is also grown under these “hydroponic” conditions. The result is a particularly powerful, dangerous, and addictive drug. Despite suggestions that marijuana use has no long-term consequences, the latest scientific information indicates that marijuana use is a common first step to the abuse of more serious drugs, and that the drug itself is associated with learning difficulties, memory disturbances, and schizophrenia.

Opium and Heroin

Opium poppy, the source of heroin, is cultivated mainly in Afghanistan, Southwest Asia, and on a small scale in Colombia and Mexico. In contrast to coca, a perennial which takes at least a year to mature into usable leaf, opium poppy is an easily planted annual crop that can yield as many as three harvests per year with the correct care and climate. Opium gum can take less than 6 months to harvest.

According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the world’s opium poppy in 2007, which was a record high for the second year in a row. Total poppy cultivation increased by 28,000 hectares over 2006 levels, which accounts for a 17 percent increase in land under cultivation. While the total export value of this opium harvest was $4.0 billion, which made up more than a third of Afghanistan’s combined licit and illicit GDP of $11.5 billion, only $1 billion was paid to Afghan poppy farmers, with the rest going to the narcotics traffickers. Containing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is intimately tied to the considerable security challenges faced there by counterinsurgent Coalition forces. A growing body of evidence indicates the presence of a symbiotic relationship between the narcotics trade and the anti-government insurgency, most commonly associated with the Taliban. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to the insurgency, while insurgents provide protection to growers and traffickers to prevent the government from interfering with their activities.

Afghanistan supplies all but a small amount of the heroin going to Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and much of Asia. Although only a small portion of heroin produced from Afghan opium finds its way to the United States, the negative implications of the drug trade for Afghan security, reconstruction, governance, and economic development make countering narcotics key to achieving all other U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. In the south of the country, where poppy cultivation is most pronounced, the Afghan Government has faced challenges controlling narcotics due to insecurity, corruption, a lack of political will, the limited reach of Afghan law enforcement, and a weak judicial system. Poppy production has soared in recent years in provinces where insurgents are most active: five relatively higher-income, agriculturally rich provinces along the Pakistan border account for 70 percent of Afghanistan’s 2007 poppy production with over 50 percent occurring in Helmand province alone. In the more secure north and central areas of the country, however, poppy production has been significantly reduced or even completely eliminated, in the case of 13 provinces, due to successful counternarcotics efforts combined with security, political will, and the provision of development assistance.

In August 2007, the U.S unveiled its Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan to guide its efforts to achieve short-term and long-term success in the fight against narcotics. The strategy maintains the basic framework of the comprehensive five pillar approach to counternarcotics – public information, alternative development, eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement and justice sector reform – but calls for several key refinements to better address changing trends in cultivation, the security context, the political climate, and economic development requirements. The strategy enhances incentives for participation in licit livelihoods through the provision of additional development assistance, while simultaneously strengthening the disincentives to participation in all aspects and levels of the narcotics industry through increased interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement. The complexity of the drug problem in Afghanistan demands a balanced counternarcotics approach that melds deterrence, prevention, and economic development assistance. The U.S. approach meets these requirements and supports the Afghan Government’s own strategy to combat narcotics.

Much of the heroin used in the United States comes from poppies grown in Colombia and Mexico, though opium gum production in these countries accounts for less than four percent of the world’s total production and Colombian production has been cut by 60 percent since 2001. Mexico supplies most of the heroin found in the western United States while Colombia supplies most of the heroin east of the Mississippi. Long-standing joint eradication programs in both countries continue with our support. Colombian law enforcement eradicated 375 hectares of opium poppy in 2007, while the Government of Mexico (GOM) reported eradicating 7,784 hectares of opium poppy, a decrease from 2006 levels. The decline in the rates of eradication is at least in part due to the realignment of responsibilities for aerial eradication, as well as higher than normal precipitation during the key growing season.

Controlling Drug-Processing Chemicals

Cocaine and heroin are manufactured with certain critical chemicals, some of which also have licit uses but are diverted by criminals. The most commonly used chemicals in the manufacture of these illegal drugs are potassium permanganate (for cocaine) and acetic anhydride (for heroin). Government controls strive to differentiate between licit commercial use for these chemicals and illicit diversion to criminals. Governments must have efficient legal and regulatory regimes to control such chemicals, without placing undue burdens on legitimate commerce. Extensive international law enforcement cooperation is also required to prevent their diversion from licit commercial channels, and to investigate, arrest and dismantle the illegal networks engaged in their procurement.

This topic is addressed in greater detail in the Chemical Control Chapter of the INCSR.

Drugs and the Environment

Impact of Drug Cultivation and Processing: Illegal drug production usually takes place in remote areas far removed from the authority of central governments. Not surprisingly, drug criminals practice none of the environmental safeguards that are required for licit industry, and the toxic chemicals used to process raw organic materials into finished drugs are invariably dumped back into sensitive ecosystems with no regard for human health or the costs to the environment. The devastating environmental impact of coca cultivation in the Andean region has been well-documented. Illegal cultivation there has led to the destruction of approximately six million acres of rainforest over the past 20 years. Coca growers routinely slash and burn remote, virgin forestland in the Amazon to make way for their illegal crops; coca growers typically cut down up to 4 hectares of forest for every hectare of coca planted. Tropical rains quickly erode the thin topsoil of the fields, increasing soil runoff, depleting soil nutrients. By destroying timber and other resources that would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, including medicinal research, illicit coca cultivation decreases biological diversity in one of the most sensitive ecological areas in the world. In Colombia and elsewhere, traffickers also destroy jungle forests to build clandestine landing strips and laboratories for processing raw coca and poppy into cocaine and heroin.

Illicit coca growers use large quantities of highly toxic herbicides and fertilizers on their crops. These chemicals qualify under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States. Production of the drugs requires large quantities of dangerous solvents and chemicals. One kilogram of cocaine base requires the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilograms of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the soil and contaminate waterways and poison water systems upon which local human and animal populations rely. In the United States, marijuana-processing operations take place in national parks, especially in California and Texas near the border with Mexico.

Methamphetamine is particularly alarming in its environmental impact. For each pound of methamphetamine produced in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, five to six pounds of toxic, hazardous waste are generated, posing immediate and long-term environmental health risks, not only to individual homes but to neighborhoods. Poisonous vapors produced during synthesis permeate the walls and carpets of houses and buildings, often making them uninhabitable. Cleaning up these sites in the United States and Mexico requires specialized training and costs thousands of dollars per site.

Impact of Spray Eradication: Colombia is currently the only country that conducts regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy, although countries throughout the world regularly spray other crops with herbicides. The only active ingredient in the herbicide used in the aerial eradication program is glyphosate, which has been thoroughly tested in the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in September 1993. EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and around aquatic areas. It is one of the most widely used herbicides in the world, including in Colombian and Ecuadoran commercial farms. Colombia’s spray program represents a small fraction of total glyphosate use in the country. Biannual verification missions continue to show that aerial eradication causes no significant damage to the environment or human health. The eradication program follows strict environmental safeguards, monitored permanently by several Colombian government agencies, and adheres to all laws and regulations, including the Colombian Environmental Management Plan. In addition to the biannual verification missions, soil and water samples are taken before and after spray for analysis. The residues in these samples have never reached a level outside the established norms. The OAS, which published a study in 2005 positively assessing the chemicals and methodologies used in the aerial spray program, is currently conducting further investigations to be completed in early 2008 regarding spray drift and other relevant issues.

Attacking Trafficking Organizations

Law enforcement tactics have grown more sophisticated over the past two decades to counter the sophisticated trafficking networks that transport large volumes of drugs internationally. Rather than measuring progress purely by seizures and numbers of arrests, international law enforcement authorities have increasingly targeted resources against the highest levels of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Increasingly, international law enforcement authorities are learning the art of conspiracy investigations, using mutual legal assistance mechanisms and other advanced investigative techniques to follow the evidence to higher and higher levels of leadership within the syndicates, and cooperating on extradition so that the kingpins have no place to hide. These sophisticated law enforcement and legal tools are endorsed as recommended practices within both the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. This increasingly mainstream approach towards targeting the organizational leadership of drug syndicates and disrupting their lines of control and command is paying great dividends.

The drug trade depends upon reliable and efficient distribution systems to get its product to market. While most illicit distribution systems have short-term back-up channels to compensate for temporary law enforcement disruptions, a network under intense enforcement pressure cannot function for long. In cooperation with law enforcement officials in other nations, our goal is to disrupt and dismantle these organizations, to remove the leadership and the facilitators who launder money and provide the chemicals needed for the production of illicit drugs, and to destroy their networks. By capturing the leaders of trafficking organizations, we demonstrate both to the criminals and to the governments fighting them that even the most powerful drug syndicates are vulnerable to concerted action by international law enforcement authorities.

Mexican drug syndicates continue to oversee much of the drug trafficking in the United States, with a strong presence in most of the primary U.S. distribution centers. The Calderon Administration’s courage, initiative and success have exceeded all expectations of cooperation in facing this threat. President Calderon has addressed some of the most basic institutional issues that have traditionally confounded Mexico’s success against the cartels, using the military to reestablish sovereign authority and counter the cartels’ firepower, moving to establish integrity within the ranks of the police, and pursuing concrete actions that promise to give law enforcement officials and judicial authorities the resources and the legal underpinning they need to succeed. Presidents Bush and the leaders of Central America and Mexico agree that transnational crime is a regional problem, which will require regional solutions. To that end, the Merida Initiative would combine each nation’s domestic efforts with broader regional cooperation to multiply the effects of our actions. This partnership would support coordinated strategies to:

  • Break the power and impunity of criminal organizations;

  • Assist the governments of Mexico and Central America in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls;

  • Improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and

  • Curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region

To achieve these goals, President Bush has requested $1.1 billion to date for Mexico and Central America to provide:

  • Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, and canine units for Mexican customs, for the new federal police and for the military to interdict trafficked drugs, arms, cash and persons;

  • Technologies to improve and secure communications systems to support collecting information as well as ensuring that vital information is accessible for criminal law enforcement;

  • Technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice – vetting for the new police force, case management software to track investigations through the system to trial, new offices of citizen complaints and professional responsibility, and establishing witness protection programs;

  • Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities and rapid operational response of law enforcement agencies in Mexico;

  • Support to the countries of Central America to continue implementation of the USG’s anti-gang strategy; to support specialized vetted units; to strengthen juvenile justice systems and post-prison rehabilitation; to expand community policing; and to support land and maritime drug interdiction.

The Merida Initiative is a foreign assistance program that would complement existing and planned initiatives of U.S. domestic law enforcement agencies engaged with counterparts in each participating country. Strengthening institutions and capacity in partner countries will enable us to act jointly, responding with greater agility, confidence, and speed to the changing tactics of organized crime.

Extradition

There are few legal sanctions that international criminals fear as much as extradition to the United States, where they can no longer use bribes and intimidation to manipulate the local judicial process. Governments willing to risk domestic political repercussions to extradite drug kingpins to the United States are finding that public acceptance of this measure has steadily increased.

Mexican authorities extradited a record 83 fugitives to the United States in 2007, including prominent members of the Gulf Cartel, the sixth consecutive year this number has increased. Colombia has an outstanding record of extradition of drug criminals to the United States, and the numbers have increased even more in recent years. The Government of Colombia extradited a record 135-defendants in 2007, including priority targets Degaberto Florez, Aldemar Rendon Ramirez, the Bernal-Palacios brothers, and Luis Gomez-Bustamante; and AUC paramilitary associate Hector Rodriguez. Overall, 618 individuals have been extradited to the U.S. since December 1997.

Also in 2007, two Afghan drug traffickers with links to the insurgency volunteered to be transported from Afghanistan to stand trial in the United States. The first, Mohammad Essa, was a key heroin distributor for the Haji Baz Mohammad network in the Untied States. He fled the United States when Baz Mohammad was sent to stand trial in New York. In December 2006, he was apprehended in Kandahar Province by the United States military during a battle with insurgents, and he was voluntarily transferred back to the United States in April 2007. The second was Khan Mohammad, who was a supporter of the insurgency and arrested in Nangarhar Province in October 2006. He was indicted for selling opium and heroin to Afghan law enforcement informants with the understanding that the drugs were destined for the United States. He was voluntarily transferred to the United States in November 2007 and will stand trial in Washington, D.C. Afghanistan and the United States do not yet have a formal bilateral agreement on extradition, but U.S. justice mentors are working with the Afghan Government to draft a broad extradition law.

Institutional Reform

Fighting Corruption: Among all criminal enterprises, the drug trade is best positioned to spread corruption and undermine the integrity and effectiveness of legitimate governments. Drugs generate illegal revenues on a scale without historical precedent. No commodity is so widely available, so cheap to produce, and as easily renewable as illegal drugs. A kilogram of cocaine can be sold in the United States for more than 15 times its value in Colombia, a return which dwarfs regular commodities and distorts the licit economy.

No government is completely safe from the threat of drug-related corruption, but young democracies are especially vulnerable—particularly fragile democracies in post-conflict situations. The weakening of government institutions through bribery and intimidation ultimately poses just as great a danger to democratic governments as the challenge of armed insurgents. Drug syndicates seek to subvert governments in order to guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. Unchecked, the drug cartels have the wherewithal to buy their way into power. By keeping a focus on eliminating corruption, we can prevent the nightmare of a government entirely manipulated by drug lords from becoming a reality.

Improving Criminal Justice Systems: A pivotal element of USG international drug control policy is to help strengthen enforcement, judicial, and financial institutions worldwide to narrow the opportunities for infiltration and corruption by the drug trade. Corruption within a criminal justice system has enormously detrimental impact; law enforcement agencies in drug source and transit countries may arrest influential drug criminals only to see them released following a questionable or inexplicable decision by a single judge, or a prosecutor may obtain an arrest warrant but be unable to find police who will execute it. As governments work for basic reforms involving transparency, efficiency, and better pay for police and judges, we see systemic improvements.

The USG is continuing its support to Afghanistan to counter the drug trade that threatens stability and economic development as the country emerges from decades of war. Efforts to improve the capability of Afghanistan to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate those guilty of narcotics violations are integrated into the overall justice sector strategy that the United States pursues jointly with the Afghan Government and international partners. Together with our international partners, we are training and mentoring Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Criminal Justice Task Force and Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. These efforts are tied into other USG justice assistance programs to build and reform the criminal, commercial, and civil justice systems to establish the rule of law.

Next Steps

The drug trade is fundamentally an illicit business. It enters the legitimate commercial world through its dependence on raw materials, processing chemicals, transportation networks, and its need to launder its profits through legitimate commercial and financial channels. We must intensify our efforts to block the drug business in all these areas, in particular focusing on the financial end because this black market can easily be diverted to fund insurgencies and terrorism, and to undermine the institutions of government. Since governments individually control domestic access to the global financial system, they have the potential, by working together, to make it difficult for drug profits to enter the legitimate international financial system.

However, the international narcotics trade has long demonstrated its ability to adapt to law enforcement constraints, and the drug trade itself also evolves, with the increasing use of synthetic drugs, Internet sales and distribution, state-of-the-art communications and technical and financial expertise. Even the best alternative livelihoods cannot compete with the financial pressures on, and armed threats to, those who grow illicit crops.

In partnership with key partners and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, we have made many inroads into the core of key drug trafficking networks, and scored victories in the battle for public understanding of the social and public costs of drug use. Looking back on the 25 years since we first published this report, and on the 20th anniversary of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, we can see tangible improvements in our ability to work with our international partners to increase pressures on the drug trade at every stage of its operations, from cultivation and production to transport and marketing. For the future, we must intensify our efforts to ensure that the 1988 Convention and the follow-up commitments of member states are successfully implemented, and that the potential of this framework for international cooperation is fully realized. Over the long term, such steady progress offers the best hope for transforming a potential threat to the stability of nations into a challenge that governments can manage and defeat.

Demand Reduction

The need for demand reduction is reflected in escalating drug use that takes a devastating toll on health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability of all nations. Therefore, drug demand reduction is a critical factor in a balanced approach that integrates the principles of supply and demand to drive down drug use and its consequences. Recognizing these challenges, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD#25) on International Drug Control Policy, orders the Secretary of State “to expand U.S. international demand reduction assistance and information sharing programs in key source and transit countries”. The NSPD also makes clear that international drug trafficking organizations and their linkage to international terrorist groups constitute a serious threat to U.S. national security by generating illicit funds that increasingly threaten global peace and stability. Therefore, demand reduction assistance has evolved as a key foreign policy tool to address the inter-connected threats of drugs, crime, and terrorism, and more recently it is recognized as a key complimentary component in efforts to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in countries with high rates of intravenous drug use.

Strong drug-demand reduction policies and programs should address all sectors of society. Nations are no longer the sole masters of their destinies, nations are dependent on one another; global rules and cooperative global behavior are needed, given the “globalization” aspects of a modern economy. Consequently, recognizing the extensive U.S. experience in reducing drug demand, through successful evidence-based programs, foreign countries are requesting INL-sponsored technical assistance on demand reduction programming, since drug consumption also has debilitating effects on their society and children. Our response has been a comprehensive and coordinated approach in which supply control and demand reduction reinforce each other. Such assistance plays an important role in helping to preserve the stability of societies threatened by the narcotics trade.

Our demand reduction strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives to address the societal and national security threats posed by the illicit drug trade. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at “critical decision points” in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and community coalition development efforts to increase public awareness and mobilize society to counter the deleterious consequences of drug use/abuse. This latter effort involves the development of coalitions of private/public social institutions, the faith community, and law enforcement entities to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for “best practice” research studies to use these findings to improve similar efforts in the U.S. and around the world.

During 2007, INL continued to provide training and technical assistance at various locations throughout the world on topics such as, combating violence against women through substance abuse treatment. This training takes into account the unique needs of female drug addicts, and provides substance abuse treatment training and technical assistance, which addresses women’s treatment issues and related violence.

  • Afghanistan – creation of five substance abuse treatment programs to address women’s needs. This initiative included training of women counselors in counseling techniques, family therapy, and formation of support group networks.

  • El Salvador – enhancements to corrections- and community-based treatment programs to address the overlapping challenges of male and female drug abuse, gang membership and related violence.

  • Philippines – creation of substance abuse units in female correctional facilities and help with the formation of community-based institutions.

  • Peru – creation of model substance abuse treatment programs for female adolescents and street kids at high risk for drug abuse and sexual/physical violence.

  • Brazil – creation of an outreach center for 245 high-risk youth whose parents are drug abusing prostitutes, including plans for the creation of a model drug treatment center for women and their children (first such facility in Latin America).

  • Thailand – creation of substance abuse treatment programs for female addicts. A science-based, outcome evaluation of these programs revealed that overall drug use was reduced from 92 percent of targeted patients to 10 percent and methamphetamine abuse was reduced from 90 percent to 10 percent (pre- and post treatment).

As a cornerstone of a strong demand reduction strategy, and with the understanding that local problems need local solutions, INL also provided the necessary funding for training assistance targeting counternarcotics community coalitions working toward reducing substance abuse among youth, and strengthening the collaboration among organizations and agencies in the public and private sectors. Consequently, training programs were conducted in El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia, covering the promotion of sound drug policy and science-based drug prevention programming.

In addition, INL funded staff training at the juvenile correction system in Sao Paulo, Brazil for drug abusing and other criminal populations on the fundamental principles of the therapeutic community (TC). The TC has especially been adapted globally as a successful treatment intervention for juvenile populations with substance abuse, behavioral, and personality disorders that are commonly found in prison settings. Prison programs, which adhere to many elements of the therapeutic community treatment program have been scientifically shown to be successful in significantly reducing criminal recidivism and facilitating better reintegration into society by inmates.

INL is also funding the Creation of Muslim-based Anti-Drug Outreach Centers with the intent to develop a series of community-based outreach centers in volatile regions where the U.S. has little or no direct access to civil society such as Afghanistan, southern Philippines, Indonesia, and remote sections of Pakistan. This initiative is designed to significantly enhance America’s image in Muslim countries, reduce drug consumption that fuels the coffers of terrorist organizations, reduce drug-related violence, cut into the recruitment base of terrorist organizations, and provide youth in at-risk areas with alternatives to radical or terrorist indoctrination. It addresses a key priority in the President’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism through support of Muslim organizations “ensuring them that American values are not at odds with Islam.” This initiative includes collaboration with the INL-supported network of 400 Muslim-based Anti-Drug programs.

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

How Much Do We Know? The INCSR contains a variety of illicit drug-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government’s best effort to sketch the current dimensions of the international drug problem. Some numbers are more certain than others. Drug cultivation figures are relatively hard data derived by proven means, such as imagery with ground truth confirmation. Other numbers, such as crop production and drug yield estimates, become softer as more variables come into play. As we do every year, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, even the best are ultimately approximations.

Each year, we revise our estimates in the light of field research. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes such field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know With Reasonable Certainty. The number of hectares under cultivation during any given year is our most solid statistic. For nearly twenty years, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the extent of cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What We Know With Less Certainty. How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. To add to our uncertainty, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. Therefore, we are estimating the potential crop available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

Harvest Estimates. We have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. In all cases, however, multiplying average yields times available hectares indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest. The size of the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old) is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates. The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures obviously affect production.

Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve. Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, these illicit drug statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves so will the precision of the estimates.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
2002-2007 (all figures in hectares)

 

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

Poppy

           

Afghanistan

202000

172600

107400

206700

61000

30750

Burma

21700

21000

40000

36000

47130

77700

China

           

Colombia[1]

in process

2300

 

2100

4400

4900

Guatemala

   

100

330

   

India

           

Iran

           

Laos

1100

1700

5600

10000

18900

23200

Lebanon

            

Mexico

in process

5000

3300

3500

4800

2700

Pakistan[2]

 

984

769

 

1714

213

Thailand

         

750

Vietnam

         

1000

Total Poppy

224800

203584

157169

258630

137944

141213

Coca

            

Bolivia

in process

25800

26500

24600

23200

21600

Colombia[3]

in process

157200

144000

114100

113850

144450

Peru[4]

in process

37000

34000

27500

29250

34700

Total Coca

0

220000

204500

166200

166300

200750

Cannabis

           

Lebanon

           

Mexico

in process

8600

5600

5800

7500

4400

Total Cannabis

0

8600

5600

5800

7500

4400

 

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
2002-2007 (all figures in Metric Tons)

   

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

Opium

                 

Afghanistan

8000

5644

4475

4950

2865

1278

Burma

270

230

380

330

484

630

China

               

Colombia[5]

in process

37

30

63

68

Guatemala

    

4

12

   

India

               

Iran

                 

Laos

5.5

8.5

28

50

200

180

Lebanon

                  

Mexico

in process

108

71

73

101

58

Pakistan[6]

  

36

32

44

4.3

Thailand

              

9

Vietnam

              

10

Total Opium

8275.5

6063.5

4990

5445

3757

2237.3

Coca Leaf

               

Bolivia

in process

37000

36000

37000

33000

35000

Colombia

in process

152000

136800

108000

115500

147900

Peru

in process

50000

52000

47900

51200

58300

Total Coca Leaf

0

239000

224800

192900

199700

241200

Potential Pure Cocaine

             

Bolivia[7]

in process

115

115

115

100

110

Colombia[8]

in process

610

545

430

460

585

Peru[9]

in process

245

250

230

245

280

Total Potential Pure Cocaine

0

970

910

775

805

975

Cannabis

           

Lebanon (hashish)

            

Mexico (marijuana)

in process

15500

10100

10400

13500

7900

Total Cannabis

0

15500

10100

10400

13500

7900


 

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

1. Afghanistan

20 December 1988

14 February 1992

2. Albania

Accession

27 June 2001

3. Algeria

20 December 1988

9 May 1995

4. Andorra

Accession

23 July 1999

5. Angola

Accession

26 October 2005

6. Antigua and Barbuda

Accession

5 April 1993

7. Argentina

20 December 1988

28 June 1993

8. Armenia

Accession

13 September 1993

9. Australia

14 February 1989

16 November 1992

10. Austria

25 September 1989

11 July 1997

11. Azerbaijan

Accession

22 September 1993

12. Bahamas

20 December 1988

30 January 1989

13. Bahrain

28 September 1989

7 February 1990

14. Bangladesh

14 April 1989

11 October 1990

15. Barbados

Accession

15 October 1992

16. Belarus

27 February 1989

15 October 1990

17. Belgium

22 May 1989

25 October 1995

18. Belize

Accession

24 July 1996

19. Benin

Accession

23 May 1997

20. Bhutan

Accession

27 August 1990

21. Bolivia

20 December 1988

20 August 1990

22. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Succession

01 September 1993

23. Botswana

Accession

13 August 1996

24. Brazil

20 December 1988

17 July 1991

25. Brunei Darussalam

26 October 1989

12 November 1993

26. Bulgaria

19 May 1989

24 September 1992

27. Burkina Faso

Accession

02 June 1992

28. Burundi

Accession

18 February 1993

29. Cambodia

Accession

7 July 2005

30. Cameroon

27 February 1989

28 October 1991

31. Canada

20 December 1988

05 July 1990

32. Cape Verde

Accession

08 May 1995

33. Central African Republic

Accession

15 October 2001

34. Chad

Accession

09 June 1995

35. Chile

20 December 1988

13 March 1990

36. China

20 December 1988

25 October 1989

37. Colombia

20 December 1988

10 June 1994

38. Comoros

Accession

1 March 2000

39. Congo, Democratic Republic of

20 December 1988

28 October 2005

40. Costa Rica

25 April 1989

8 February 1991

41. Cote d’Ivoire

20 December 1988

25 November 1991

42. Croatia

Succession

26 July 1993

43. Cuba

7 April 1989

12 June 1996

44. Cyprus

20 December 1988

25 May 1990

45. Czech Republic

Succession

30 December 1993

46. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Accession

19 March 2007

47. Denmark

20 December 1988

19 December 1991

48. Djibouti

Accession

22 February 2001

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

49. Dominica

Accession

30 June 1993

50. Dominican Republic

Accession

21 September 1993

51. Ecuador

21 June 1989

23 March 1990

52. Egypt

20 December 1988

15 March 1991

53. El Salvador

Accession

21 May 1993

54. Eritrea

Accession

30 January 2002

55. Estonia

Accession

12 July 2000

56. Ethiopia

Accession

11 October 1994

57. European Economic Community

8 June 1989

31 December 1990

58. Fiji

Accession

25 March 1993

59. Finland

8 February 1989

15 February 1994

60. France

13 February 1989

31 December 1990

61. Gambia

Accession

23 April 1996

62. Georgia

Accession

8 January 1998

63. Germany

19 January 1989

30 November 1993

64. Ghana

20 December 1988

10 April 1990

65. Greece

23 February 1989

28 January 1992

66. Grenada

Accession

10 December 1990

67. Guatemala

20 December 1988

28 February 1991

68. Guinea

Accession

27 December 1990

69. Guinea-Bissau

Accession

27 October 1995

70. Guyana

Accession

19 March 1993

71. Haiti

Accession

18 September 1995

72. Honduras

20 December 1988

11 December 1991

73. Hungary

22 August 1989

15 November 1996

74. Iceland

Accession

2 September 1997

75. India

Accession

27 March 1990

76. Indonesia

27 March 1989

23 February 1999

77. Iran

20 December 1988

7 December 1992

78. Iraq

Accession

22 July 1998

79. Ireland

14 December 1989

3 September 1996

80. Israel

20 December 1988

20 May 2002

81. Italy

20 December 1988

31 December 1990

82. Jamaica

2 October 1989

29 December 1995

83. Japan

19 December 1989

12 June 1992

84. Jordan

20 December 1988

16 April 1990

85. Kazakhstan

Accession

29 April 1997

86. Kenya

Accession

19 October 1992

87. Korea

Accession

28 December 1998

88. Kuwait

2 October 1989

3 November 2000

89. Kyrgyz Republic

Accession

7 October 1994

90. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic

Accession

1 October 2004

91. Latvia

Accession

24 February 1994

92. Lebanon

Accession

11 March 1996

93. Lesotho

Accession

28 March 1995

94. Liberia

Accession

16 September 2005

95. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Accession

22 July 1996

96. Liechtenstein

Accession

9 March 2007

97. Lithuania

Accession

8 June 1998

98. Luxembourg

26 September 1989

29 April 1992

99. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.

Accession

18 October 1993

100.Madagascar

Accession

12 March 1991

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

101.Malawi

Accession

12 October 1995

102.Malaysia

20 December 1988

11 May 1993

103.Maldives

5 December 1989

7 September 2000

104.Mali

Accession

31 October 1995

105.Malta

Accession

28 February 1996

106.Mauritania

20 December 1988

1 July 1993

107.Mauritius

20 December 1988

6 March 2001

108. Mexico

16 February 1989

11 April 1990

109.Micronesia, Federal States of

Accession

6 July 2004

110. Moldova

Accession

15 February 1995

111. Monaco

24 February 1989

23 April 1991

112.Mongolia

Accession

25 June 2003

113. Morocco

28 December 1988

28 October 1992

114. Mozambique

Accession

8 June 1998

115.Myanmar (Burma)

Accession

11 June 1991

116. Nepal

Accession

24 July 1991

117. Netherlands

18 January 1989

8 September 1993

118. New Zealand

18 December 1989

16 December 1998

119. Nicaragua

20 December 1988

4 May 1990

120. Niger

Accession

10 November 1992

121. Nigeria

1 March 1989

1 November 1989

122. Norway

20 December 1988

14 November 1994

123. Oman

Accession

15 March 1991

124. Pakistan

20 December 1988

25 October 1991

125. Panama

20 December 1988

13 January 1994

126. Paraguay

20 December 1988

23 August 1990

127. Peru

20 December 1988

16 January 1992

128. Philippines

20 December 1988

7 June 1996

129. Poland

6 March 1989

26 May 1994

130. Portugal

13 December 1989

3 December 1991

131. Qatar

Accession

4 May 1990

132. Romania

Accession

21 January 1993

133. Russia

19 January 1989

17 December 1990

134. Rwanda

Accession

13 May 2002

135. St. Kitts and Nevis

Accession

19 April 1995

136. St. Lucia

Accession

21 August 1995

137. St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Accession

17 May 1994

138.Samoa

Accession

19 August 2005

139. San Marino

Accession

10 October 2000

140. Sao Tome and Principe

Accession

20 June 1996

141. Saudi Arabia

Accession

9 January 1992

142. Senegal

20 December 1988

27 November 1989

143. Seychelles

Accession

27 February 1992

144. Sierra Leone

9 June 1989

6 June 1994

145. Singapore

Accession

23 October 1997

146. Slovakia

Succession

28 May 1993

147. Slovenia

Succession

6 July 1992

148. South Africa

Accession

14 December 1998

149. Spain

20 December 1988

13 August 1990

150. Sri Lanka

Accession

6 June 1991

151. Sudan

30 January 1989

19 November 1993

152. Suriname

20 December 1988

28 October 1992

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

153. Swaziland

Accession

3 October 95

154. Sweden

20 December 1988

22 July 1991

155.Switzerland

16 November 1989

14 September 2005

156. Syria

Accession

3 September 1991

157. Tajikistan

Accession

6 May 1996

158. Thailand

Accession

3 May 2002

159. Tanzania

20 December 1988

17 April 1996

160. Togo

3 August 1989

1 August 1990

161. Tonga

Accession

29 April 1996

162. Trinidad and Tobago

7 December 1989

17 February 1995

163. Tunisia

19 December 1989

20 September 1990

164. Turkey

20 December 1988

2 April 1996

165. Turkmenistan

Accession

21 February 1996

166. UAE

Accession

12 April 1990

167. Uganda

Accession

20 August 1990

168. Ukraine

16 March 1989

28 August 1991

169. United Kingdom

20 December 1988

28 June 1991

170. United States

20 December 1988

20 February 1990

171. Uruguay

19 December 1989

10 March 1995

172. Uzbekistan

Accession

24 August 1995

173. Venezuela

20 December 1988

16 July 1991

174. Vietnam

Accession

4 November 1997

175. Yemen

20 December 1988

25 March 1996

176. Yugoslavia

20 December 1988

3 January 1991

177. Zambia

9 February 1989

28 May 1993

178. Zimbabwe

Accession

30 July 1993

     

Signed but Pending Ratification

   

1. Gabon

20 December 1989

 

2. Holy See

20 December 1988

Not UN member

3. Zaire

20 December 1988

  
     

Other

   

1. Anguilla

  

Not UN member

2. Aruba

 

Not UN member

3. Bermuda

 

4. BVI

 

Not UN member

5. Congo

   

6. Djibouti

    

7. Hong Kong

  

Not UN member

8. Marshall Islands

     

9. Namibia

     

10. Papua New Guinea

     

11. Taiwan

  

Not UN member

12. Turks & Caicos

  

Not UN member

13. Vanuatu

     

 



[1] In 2007, the survey areas were reduced. The 2005 survey could not be conducted due to cloud-cover. The 2000 survey could not be conducted due to cloud-cover; the reported number is a weighted average of previous years’ cultivation.

[2] The 2005 and 2006 surveys included only the Bara River Valley growing area. No estimate was produced in 2002, but cultivation was observed.

[3] Survey areas were expanded greatly between 2004 and 2005, and to a lesser extent between 2005 and 2006.

[4] In the 2006 survey, one growing area could not be completed due to insufficient imagery collection and the value is not comparable to others. In 2007, CNC revised the 2005 value due to discovery of an error in the cultivation data. Survey areas were expanded between 2004 and 2005.

[5] In 2007, the survey areas were reduced. The 2005 survey could not be conducted due to cloud-cover. The 2000 survey could not be conducted due to cloud-cover. The reported number is a weighted average of previous years’ cultivation.

[6] The 2005 and 2006 surveys included only the Bara River Valley growing area.

[7] In 2006, CNC revised the 2001-05 values due to new yield information.

[8] Survey areas were expanded greatly between 2004 and 2005, and to a lesser extent between 2005 and 2006.

[9] In the 2006 survey, one growing area could not be completed due to insufficient imagery collection and the value is not comparable to others. In 2007, CNC revised the 2005 value due to discovery of an error in the cultivation data. Survey areas were expanded between 2004 and 2005. In 2007, CNC revised the 2001-05 values to reflect new yield numbers for immature fields.



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