Overview for 2009
“Security for our citizens must be advanced through our commitment to partner with those who are courageously battling drug cartels, gangs and other criminal networks.” — President Barack Obama
The illegal drug trade directly threatens the security interests of the United States, as well as those of the broader international community and the health and safety of our citizens. No other criminal activity can match the profits generated from illegal narcotics trafficking. This translates into an unrivaled ability for drug criminals to corrupt public officials, undermine democratic governments, and sabotage sustainable economic development. For these reasons, the United States works closely with our international partners to encourage steps to prevent the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.
To implement this objective, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides technical assistance to countries most affected by the illegal drug trade. This assistance helps these countries develop their own law enforcement and criminal justice capacities to uphold their international commitments against illegal drugs. Our long-term goal is to promote the expansion of partner country counternarcotics capabilities to the point where they can sustain future development and where cooperation between countries becomes the norm. As Secretary Clinton has described, a key component of this cooperation is to reduce demand for illegal drugs in the United States.
As is the case every year, progress was far from uniform in 2009. The annual INCSR review is a snapshot of events covering a narrow timeframe, and it is important to distinguish long-term progress from short-term gains and losses. Numerical data—such as interdiction statistics or arrests of traffickers—do not fully measure the success of some countries and regions in reforming and strengthening state institutions or changing ingrained cultural habits. There are no uniform solutions to all national and regional circumstances, and the United States cannot do more to assist countries than those countries believe is in their own self-interest. One of the least tangible but most important gains that we have seen over the past decade is that virtually every government recognizes the serious threats posed by the drug trade. This international consensus is rare in the realm of foreign policy and a great advantage as we move forward into 2010 and beyond. The United States is committed to helping countries help themselves to develop the capacities necessary to enforce their laws and protect their sovereignty.
Key International Successes
Colombia’s decade-long effort to strengthen its democracy and regain control over its national territory from drug-trafficking insurgents has been remarkable. Ten years ago, large areas of Colombia were beyond the writ of the state, controlled by terrorist and criminal organizations that exploited these territorial safe-havens to promote their trafficking activities. Colombia’s people and political leadership reacted with determined resolve to defend the country’s sovereignty and re-establish the rule of law, aided by U.S. assistance programs that were dramatically accelerated during this time. President Alvaro Uribe’s program to establish “democratic security” over the country’s full territory has brought dramatic progress. With support from the United States ranging from material assistance to training, the Uribe Administration marshaled new domestic resources, increased funding for law enforcement and justice reform, and began the difficult process of re-establishing state control over the countryside. The Colombian state is no longer in danger from insurgents fueled by the drug trade, and is able to provide its citizens greater security and access to formal institutions of justice. This has allowed Colombia’s economy to grow at a rate that surpasses most countries in the Western Hemisphere, creating space for civil society and allowing Colombians to take control over their local communities.
This consolidation of the rule of law also led to measurable reductions in illegal drug production. According to the most recent estimate from the U.S. Government, potential cocaine production in Colombia dropped fully 39 percent between 2007 and 2008 from an estimated 490 metric tons in 2007 to 300 metric tons. Further, the area under cultivation dropped 29 percent during the same time frame, from an estimated 167,000 hectares in 2007 to only 120,000 hectares in 2008. Record eradication levels in 2008, along with increased government presence and the deployment of security forces in select growing regions were instrumental in achieving these results. The material support of the United States remains important towards solidifying these institutional reforms achieved to-date, but significant progress in transferring financial and operational responsibility to Colombia for several counternarcotics programs has increased local capacity and allowed the United States to reduce its support.
There is, however, much work to be done. Despite the steady progress of recent years, drug trafficking and terrorist groups continue to constitute a dangerous threat in Colombia. Countering these groups will require a sustained effort over the longer term effort by the Government and people of Colombia, along with continuing political and other support from friends and allies.
Mexico faces extraordinary challenges from international drug trafficking organizations. President Calderon and courageous police officers, judges and citizens are confronting drug trafficking organizations that are the source of high levels of violence and have undermined Mexican institutions. The threat of drug-fueled corruption is powerful, and Mexico’s long border with the United States makes our cooperative relationship there even more essential to our national interests.
In support of Mexico’s effort, Mexico and the United States have agreed on a new level of cooperation under the Merida Initiative. The Merida Initiative provides material support for Mexico to strengthen law enforcement and judicial institutions to prosecute individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade and other forms of organized crime. One of President Calderon’s top priorities in office has been to press forward the difficult but essential process of rooting out corruption from Mexico’s courts and police. In June 2008, the Mexican Congress passed constitutional reforms and legislation to overhaul Mexico’s judiciary and public security apparatus; implementing legislation is currently being considered in Mexico’s Congress. This process will require time to complete, but the systemic reform underway is essential to achieving sustainable results. Short-term law enforcement surges can achieve limited gains, but they achieve no durable progress unless domestic institutions can arrest, prosecute and incarcerate criminals and enforce the state’s authority after the surge ends. This is why the character of U.S. support for the Merida Initiative has continued to evolve, shifting from a focus on major equipment acquisition to improve operational ability in the early phase toward a longer-term emphasis on institutional development and capacity building designed to support the broader Mexican judicial and social reforms needed for confronting organized crime. The United States has also stepped up law enforcement and intelligence operations on the U.S. side of the border, including the creation of an interagency border enforcement task force to identify, disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations engaged in arms trafficking, drugs, human smuggling and trafficking and bulk cash smuggling.
The Government and people of Mexico have shown tremendous bravery in carrying this program forward, despite substantial reprisals from the cartels. We believe that the Mexican Government’s efforts are having a real impact; for the first time, trafficking organizations are facing an existential threat from the state, which they cannot win by bribery or intimidation.
There were notable signposts of progress against major Mexican drug trafficking organizations in 2009. Arturo Beltran Leyva, head of the Beltran Leyva Cartel, was killed in December in a firefight, when he refused to surrender to Mexican authorities. Top-level leaders from the Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva, Gulf and Arellano-Felix trafficking organizations were arrested. Removing these important cartel leaders has narrowed the operating space of criminal gangs, who are now fighting among themselves for diminishing territory and profits. At the institutional level, Mexico is moving forward to restructure and improve the operational capacity of the federal police, and with U.S. support, is striving to develop the means to do background investigations on the entire force, and to begin to do the same for units drawn from state and municipal police in order to stem corruption. Measured both by short-term law enforcement actions and longer-term institutional reforms, Mexico experienced historic progress in 2009.
The road ahead will not be an easy one. The drug cartels in Mexico are entrenched and powerful. The broader institutional changes needed to modernize and reform the law enforcement and criminal justice sectors can only take place gradually and over time. Carrying through on these changes will require a long-term commitment from both the Mexican Government and the people of Mexico. Mexico is on the right path, however, and the Government has laid out a solid plan for breaking the cartels and protecting public security. The United State will continue to work closely with Mexico to help implement this plan.
Confronting the “Balloon Effect” in Production and Transit Routes
Drug traffickers are adaptive, resilient and ruthless in adjusting to new enforcement pressures. Not bound by any sovereignty or legal concerns of their own, they can and do adjust operations quickly to new territories and smuggling corridors. Faced with pressure on operations in one territory, they switch operations to another. This displacement, known as the “balloon effect,” underscores the need to promote counternarcotics cooperation on a global basis. Here again, the twin challenges are political will and technical capacities. As Mexico achieves further progress against the criminal organizations operating on its territory, the most likely regions to face greater pressure from displaced traffickers are Central America and the Caribbean basin. There is growing evidence that Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations are already establishing a presence in these regions, particularly in some Central American states.
Through the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the United States will continue to assist Central American states to confront the criminal organizations, gangs and violence that plague the region, as well as support programs to strengthen institutional capabilities to investigate, prosecute and prevent corruption within law enforcement agencies. Our assistance will also help to facilitate the transfer of critical law enforcement investigative information within and among regional governments, and fund equipment purchases, training, community policing, and economic and social development programs. To address displacement to the Caribbean, the United States will begin implementing in 2010 a complementary Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), developed in close cooperation with states of the region. The CBSI aims to strengthen Caribbean partner nation capabilities, including maritime security, law enforcement, information sharing, border and migration control, transnational crime, and criminal justice.
President Obama outlined how the United States will seek to build partnerships to improve the safety of our citizens at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago:
Together, we have both the responsibility to act, and the opportunity to leave behind a legacy of greater prosperity and security…Just as we advance our common prosperity, we must advance our common security. Too many in our hemisphere are forced to live in fear. That is why the United States will strongly support respect for the rule of law, better law enforcement, and stronger judicial institutions.
Security for our citizens must be advanced through our commitment to partner with those who are courageously battling drug cartels, gangs and other criminal networks throughout the Americas. Our efforts start at home. By reducing demand for drugs and curtailing the illegal flow of weapons and bulk cash south across our border, we can advance security in the United States and beyond. And going forward, we will sustain a lasting dialogue in the hemisphere to ensure that we are building on best practices, adapting to new threats, and coordinating our efforts.
The diversification of drug transit routes is a phenomenon that extends beyond the Western Hemisphere. The United Nations and governments around the world have reported that the drug trade is becoming more fragmented, with new markets and routes in regions that do not neatly fit into the now obsolete paradigms of ‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ nations. West Africa, for example, ignored by international traffickers only five years ago, now serves as a major corridor route for cocaine consumed in Europe and markets farther east—in total, a market that is approaching the size of that of the United States. Organized crime networks that once avoided trafficking in illegal drugs have established new relationships with suppliers in source countries. Heroin routes from Afghanistan have similarly diversified, as has production of methamphetamine from beyond traditional source countries in Mexico and Burma. This underscores the need for global international cooperation and the universal implementation of law enforcement commitments codified by the UN drug control conventions and other legal instruments, such as the UN Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption. The United States on its own can never hope to arrest every drug trafficker or dismantle every criminal network on its own. What we can realistically achieve is coordination with international partners to facilitate common goals and approaches, and assist to some extent the capacities of states to succeed.
This is also true with drug-source states where cultivation of illicit crops has shifted in response to law enforcement pressure in one area and moved to locations where conditions favor expanded drug production. Potential cocaine production in Bolivia has increased by an estimated 50 percent since 2007. The Government of Bolivia as a matter of policy has permitted increased production of coca, which is “legal” under domestic law, but contrary to international conventions of which Bolivia is a signatory. Bolivia also reduced law enforcement measures against drug production and trafficking. The United States maintains a significant counternarcotics assistance program in Bolivia and remains willing to work with Bolivia to improve its counternarcotics results.
Venezuela is a transit country for cocaine moving from Latin America to the United States and Western Europe. While Venezuela has deported some fugitives to the United States and Colombia and has participated with the U.S. Coast Guard in some maritime interdiction, Venezuela does not cooperate consistently with the United States and other countries to reduce the flow of cocaine through Venezuela. Illegal armed groups in Colombia, including two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, are linked to drug trafficking organizations that move narcotics through Venezuela. There is strong evidence that some elements of Venezuela’s security forces directly assist these FTOs. As with Bolivia, the United States is prepared to deepen its joint work with Venezuela to help counter the increasing flow of illegal drugs through its country.
Afghanistan
In 2009, Afghanistan still produced more than 90 percent of the opium gum used to manufacture heroin worldwide—worth some 2.8 billion dollars in 2009, according to United Nations figures. Over a million and a half Afghans were involved in producing 6,900 tons of opium in 2009, according to the UN. Most poppy cultivation occurs in areas where insecurity is greatest, and moving farmers away from a crop that provides a reliable income in these areas is a challenge. The United States seeks to integrate its counternarcotics support for Afghanistan with the larger mission of defeating the insurgency and reducing corruption and crime in Afghanistan. To reduce the support the insurgency receives from narcotics, and to help connect the people of Afghanistan to effective government institutions, this approach has two main areas of emphasis: agricultural development and targeting Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Recognizing the need for job creation in the licit agricultural sector in order to deny recruits to the insurgency, the goal is to provide farmers with profitable, viable alternatives to poppy by undertaking both short-term efforts (i.e., distribution of wheat seed in poppy-growing areas) and longer-term projects (such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID’s efforts to help farmers start growing pomegranates and grape vines that will bear fruit for years to come).
In addition, the United States will expand support for the Government of Afghanistan’s interdiction and law enforcement efforts targeted on drug traffickers and refiners. This will help break the ties between the narcotics trade and the insurgency, as well as reduce the narcotics-fueled corruption that undermines good governance and slows capacity building at district, provincial, and national government levels. By targeting drug trafficking organizations, we will go after the criminals and corrupt officials who do so much to undermine both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the Afghan government. At the same time, the effort against illicit cultivation will continue through regaining control of areas heavily influenced by the insurgency. Most of the opium cultivated in Afghanistan is cultivated in areas of the south heavily influenced by insurgency. As the coalition and Afghan forces succeed in bringing these areas back under government control, comprehensive counternarcotics programs designed to discourage poppy cultivation can be implemented and given a chance to succeed.
In Afghanistan, political will and security are prerequisites for success. The best-trained and equipped police and military counternarcotics forces and the most comprehensive agricultural development programs are useless if drug control does not have the full confidence and support of the country’s political leadership. In some Afghan provinces, we have seen that where political leaders have had the courage and foresight to weather short-term criticism in favor of long-term results, there has been progress. Where they have vacillated or where insecurity has made counternarcotics efforts impossible, the drug trade has remained strong.
Drugs, Crime, Corruption and Instability
The drug trade both exploits and fosters corruption. Like a disease attacking a weakened immune system, the drug trade exploits conditions of economic, social or institutional shortcomings that corruption fosters. Once imbedded within the political institutions of a society, these criminal networks invariably weaken the bonds of trust between citizens and their state. This puts democratic government, sustainable economic growth, and the rule of law at risk. It also opens new opportunities for related forms of transnational crime. Some drug trafficking organizations limit themselves to illegal drugs, but most are engaged in a wider variety of crimes, and will do business with whomever offers potential for a quick profit. Criminal entrepreneurs use corruption to launder embezzled public funds and smuggle billions of dollars of illegal goods—drugs, arms, humans, natural resources, counterfeit medicines, and pirated software. This can overwhelm and corrupt law enforcement institutions and can fuel insecurity and endanger the welfare and safety of citizens. The convergence of crime, corruption, and weak governments often can devolve into the failed states and ungoverned spaces that can provide a workspace for terrorists.
The United States and many other countries are particularly concerned by evidence of links between international terrorist groups and the drug trade. Some of these linkages—such as the longstanding ties between drug trafficking, terrorist and insurgent groups in Colombia and Afghanistan—are well-documented and directly endanger the stability of these governments and, in the case of Afghanistan, the lives of U.S. service members. In Peru, remnants of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso are increasingly reliant on drug trafficking for funding and were active in 2009, as in previous years, in ambushing and killing police and military personnel. More globally, there is evidence that individuals belonging to or sympathetic to international terrorist groups have turned to the drug trade as a revenue source. The United States is committed to working with international partners to identify and dismantle these linkages wherever they exist, and to promote the comprehensive reforms to criminal justice and law enforcement institutions necessary for long-term prevention.
Reducing Consumption: a U.S. Priority
The United States also recognizes that we cannot reasonably expect to limit the flow of illicit drugs to the United States on a sustainable basis without further reducing our own domestic demand for those drugs. Our international supply reduction efforts can and are achieving important progress, but without additional progress in reducing demand at home, our gains will be under severe pressure. As Secretary Clinton has noted, the United States has a “shared responsibility” for curbing the international narcotics trade: “We know very well that the drug traffickers are motivated by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States, that they are armed by the transport of weapons from the United States.”
The United States has made some important gains in reducing illegal drug consumption. The most recent National Survey on Drug Use and Health data showed that between 2006 and 2008, regular cocaine use dropped by a third for people in the age bracket most prone to using it, and fewer young people are trying cocaine for the first time. But we have much room to improve. Reducing demand in the United States serves a multitude of interests domestically. It also promotes important foreign policy goals. Less demand will lead to fewer illegal profits, and this can help cut some of the economic taproots of international organized crime and corruption that threaten the economies, security and stability of vulnerable states. As much as it is in our own interests, we also need to reduce drug consumption to reinforce our strategic foreign policy objectives.
Next Steps
The most powerful defenses against the global drug trade are intangible—international cooperation and political will. Promoting effective, flexible law enforcement and diplomatic cooperation between governments is a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. The governments and citizens of many countries demonstrated great courage in directly confronting the threat of drug trafficking in 2009, often at great expense and short-term political cost. In the long-term, however, these sacrifices are investments towards securing a more prosperous and peaceful future. The United States is dedicated to supporting their efforts, both through cooperative engagement abroad and through reducing domestic drug consumption, principally by expanding prevention efforts and access to treatment. This is a shared responsibility, and one that we and our international partners must meet together in order to achieve lasting results.
International drug syndicates remain a formidable threat. They are resilient, have access to resources available to few governments, and can adapt quickly to changing trafficking and consumption patterns. The drug trade also exploits situations where political will is uneven, particularly between countries in the same region. In 2009, not all countries demonstrated the level of commitment that is necessary for combating such a relentless adversary. The United States seeks to cooperate with all governments in this multi-faceted challenge. Sustainable progress will require further action along a full spectrum of interventions, including: additional progress in promoting alternative livelihoods in regions where illegal drugs are cultivated; enhanced law enforcement relationships between affected governments; and strengthening and expanding the reach of effective law enforcement and judicial institutions. The United States is committed to playing a constructive role in cooperation with our international partners towards achieving these results.
Demand Reduction
Demand reduction has evolved as a key foreign policy tool for addressing the inter-connected threats of drugs, crime, and terrorism. More recently, it has become a critical component in efforts to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in countries with high numbers of intravenous drug users.
Drug abuse and addiction have a devastating impact on individual lives, families, and communities; drug abuse is inextricably linked with the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD), tuberculosis, and hepatitis C. Drug abuse is also associated with family disintegration, loss of employment or income, school failure, domestic violence, child abuse, and other social problems and criminal acts. Based on the U.S. experience in trying to reduce the demand for drugs, many foreign countries request INL-sponsored technical assistance to enhance the development of effective policies and programs to combat international narcotics abuse. INL continues to provide guidance to international partners that is based on a coordinated approach in the areas of drug prevention and treatment. INL promotes the sharing of critical information and evidence-based studies, in order to promote and preserve the stability of societies that are threatened by the narcotics trade.
Our demand reduction strategy includes a wide range of initiatives to address the needs and national security threats posed by the illicit drug trade. These efforts cover strategies to prevent the onset of drug use, intervention with drug abusers, and improvement of treatment delivery. In achieving these goals, INL supports the following:
Taking into account the unique needs of female drug addicts, INL supports substance abuse treatment, training and technical assistance that addresses women’s drug treatment issues, and related violence.
As a cornerstone of a strong demand reduction strategy, and with the understanding that local problems require local solutions, INL assists foreign partners in generating funding for training to reduce substance abuse among youth and to strengthen the collaboration among organizations and agencies in the public and private sectors. Training activities have been conducted in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador Mexico, Guyana, Peru, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania. Other completed and on-going INL-funded demand reduction projects for Fiscal Year 2009 included:
Methodology for USG Estimates of Illegal Drug Production
Illegal narcotics are grown, refined, trafficked, and sold on the street by criminal enterprises that attempt to conceal every step of the process. Accurate estimates of such criminal activity are difficult to produce. The estimates on illicit drug production presented in the INCSR represent the United States Government’s best effort to sketch the current dimensions of the international drug problem. They are based on agricultural surveys conducted with satellite imagery and scientific studies of crop yields and the likely efficiency of typical illicit refining labs. As we do every year, we publish these estimates with an important caveat: they are estimates. While we must express our estimates as numbers, these numbers should not be seen as precise figures. Rather, they represent the midpoint of a band of statistical probability that gets wider as additional variables are introduced and as we move from cultivation to harvest to final refined drug. Although these estimates can be useful for determining trends, even the best USG estimates are ultimately only approximations.
Each year, we revise our estimates in the light of field research. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes such field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain. Weather also impacts our ability to gather data, particularly in the Andes, where cloud-cover can be a major problem.
Improved technologies and analysis techniques also produce revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether the subject of analysis is the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. When possible, we apply these new techniques to previous years’ data and adjust appropriately, but often, especially in the case of new technologies, we can only apply them prospectively. For the present, these illicit drug statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art and science improve so will the precision of the estimates.
Cultivation Estimates
With limited personnel and technical resources, we cannot look at an entire country for any hint of illicit cultivation. Analysts must, therefore concentrate their efforts on those areas that are most likely to have cultivation. Each year they review eradication data, seizure data, law enforcement investigations information, the previous year’s imagery, and other information to determine the areas likely to have cultivation. They try to improve upon the previous year’s search area if possible. They then make their best effort to estimate cultivation in the new survey area using proven statistical techniques.
The resultant estimates meet the USG need for an annual gross estimate of cultivation for each country. They also help with eradication, interdiction and other law enforcement operations. As part of the effort to provide a better and more comprehensive assessment, the areas surveyed are often expanded and changed, so direct comparison with previous year estimates are often impossible. The Table below shows how expanded geographic search areas have added to the estimates for one country, Colombia.
Year-to-Year Cultivation Comparison
|
-- Reconstitution and new planting in existing survey areas -- 4,700 ha (3%) in newly surveyed areas -- Survey Areas increased 6% over 2006
|
| Numbers do not appear to add due to rounding. |
Harvest Estimates
The size of the harvest depends upon a number of other factors. Small changes in soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. To add to the uncertainty, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. We continually strive to improve our harvest estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates has improved in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. Such studies led to a reduction in our estimates of average productivity for fields that had been sprayed with herbicide, but not completely destroyed. In such fields, some, but not all of the coca bushes survive. The farmers of the illicit crop either plant younger bushes among the surviving plants or let what is left grow until harvest. In either case, the average yield of such plots is considerably less than if it had not been sprayed. Multiple studies in the same growing area over several years have helped us understand the effects of eradication and have helped us to measure the changes in average yield over time.
Coca fields which are less than a year old (“new fields”) produce much less leaf than mature fields. In Colombia, for example, fields might get their first small harvest at six months of age; in Bolivia fields are usually not harvested in their first year. The USG estimates include estimates for the proportion of new fields each year and adjust the estimated leaf production accordingly.
Processing Estimates
The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures all affect production.
The USG estimates for cocaine and heroin production are potential estimates; that is, it is assumed that all of the coca and opium poppy grown is processed into illicit drugs. This is not a bad assumption for coca leaf in Colombia or for opium gum in any country. In Bolivia and Peru, however, the USG potential cocaine production estimates are overestimated to some unknown extent since significant amounts of coca leaf are locally chewed and used in products such as coca tea. In Southwest and Southeast Asia, it is not unrealistic to assume that virtually all poppy is harvested for opium gum, but substantial amounts of the opium are consumed as opium rather than being processed into heroin. (The proportion of opium ultimately processed into heroin is unknown.)
Other International Estimates
The USG helps fund estimates done by the United Nations in some countries. These estimates use slightly different methodologies, but also use a mix of imagery and ground-based observations. The UN estimates are often used to help determine the response of the international donor community to specific countries or regions.
There have been some efforts, for Colombia in particular, for the USG and the UN to understand each other’s methodologies in the hope of improving both sets of estimates. These efforts are ongoing.
This report also includes data on drug production, trafficking, seizures, and consumption that come from host governments or NGOs. Such data is attributed to the source organization, especially when we cannot independently verify it.
Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
2005–2009
(All Figures in Hectares)
|
|
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
|
Poppy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Afghanistan |
107,400 |
172,600 |
202,000 |
157,000 |
131,000 |
|
Burma |
40,000 |
21,000 |
21,700 |
22,500 |
17,000 |
|
Colombia |
|
2,300 |
1,000 |
|
in process |
|
Guatemala |
100 |
|
|
|
|
|
Laos |
5,600 |
1,700 |
1,100 |
1,900 |
1,000 |
|
Mexico |
3,300 |
5,000 |
6,900 |
15,000 |
in process |
|
Pakistan |
SEE NOTE BELOW |
|
|
|
|
|
Total Poppy |
156,400 |
202,600 |
232,700 |
196,400 |
149000 |
|
Coca |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bolivia |
26,500 |
25,800 |
29,500 |
32,000 |
in process |
|
Colombia |
144,000 |
157,200 |
167,000 |
119,000 |
in process |
|
Peru |
34,000 |
42,000 |
36,000 |
41,000 |
in process |
|
Total Coca |
204,500 |
225,000 |
232,500 |
192,000 |
0 |
|
Cannabis |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico |
5,600 |
8,600 |
8,900 |
12,000 |
in process |
|
Total Cannabis |
5,600 |
8,600 |
8,900 |
12,000 |
0 |
Notes on Colombia poppy cultivation: Partial survey in 2009 due to cloud cover. No survey was conducted in 2008. Partial survey in 2007 due to cloud cover. The 2005 survey could not be conducted due to cloud cover.
Note on Laos poppy cultivation: A partial survey of only the Phongsali growing area was conducted in 2009.
Notes on Pakistan poppy cultivation: There are no valid USG countrywide numbers for Pakistan. Please see the Pakistan Country Chapter for government of Pakistan estimates.
Notes on Peru cultivation: In the 2006 survey, the Cusco growing area could not be completed; the value for that area is an average of the 2005 and 2007 estimates. Survey areas were expanded in 2005.
Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
2005-2009
(All Figures in Metric Tons)
|
|
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
|
Opium |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Afghanistan |
4,475 |
5,644 |
8,000 |
5,500 |
5,300 |
|
Burma |
380 |
230 |
270 |
340 |
250 |
|
Colombia |
|
37 |
15 |
|
in process |
|
Guatemala |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
Laos |
28 |
8.5 |
5.5 |
17 |
10.6 |
|
Mexico |
71 |
108 |
149 |
325 |
in process |
|
Pakistan |
SEE NOTE BELOW |
|
|
|
|
|
Total Opium |
4,958 |
6,027.5 |
8,439.5 |
6,182 |
5,560.6 |
|
Coca Leaf |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bolivia |
36,000 |
37,000 |
38,500 |
43,500 |
in process |
|
Colombia |
151,000 |
158,000 |
150,000 |
87,500 |
in process |
|
Peru |
52,000 |
54,500 |
43,500 |
43,500 |
in process |
|
Total Coca Leaf* |
239,000 |
249,500 |
232,000 |
174,500 |
0 |
|
Potential Pure Cocaine |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bolivia |
115 |
115 |
120 |
195 |
in process |
|
Colombia |
525 |
550 |
535 |
295 |
in process |
|
Peru |
250 |
265 |
210 |
215 |
in process |
|
Total Potential Pure Cocaine |
890 |
930 |
865 |
705 |
0 |
|
Cannabis |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (marijuana) |
10,100 |
15,500 |
15,800 |
21,500 |
in process |
|
Total Cannabis |
10,100 |
15,500 |
15,800 |
21,500 |
0 |
Notes on Colombia opium production: Partial survey in 2009 due to cloud cover. No survey was conducted in 2008. Partial survey in 2007 due to cloud cover. The 2005 survey could not be conducted due to cloud cover.
Note on Pakistan opium production: There are no valid USG countrywide numbers for Pakistan. Please see the Pakistan Country Chapter for government of Pakistan estimates.
Note on Laos poppy production: A partial survey of only the Phongsali growing area was conducted in 2009.
Note on Bolivia coca leaf production: In 2006, CNC revised the 2002-05 values due to new yield information.
Note on Colombia coca leaf production: New research in 2007 led to revised leaf and cocaine production figures for 2003—2006. Survey areas were expanded greatly in 2005, and to a lesser extent in 2006 and 2007.
Notes on Peru coca leaf production: In the 2006 survey, the Cusco growing area could not be completed; the value for that area is an average of the 2005 and 2007 estimates. Survey areas were expanded in 2005. The 2001- 2005 values were revised in 2007 to reflect new yield numbers for immature fields.
Parties to the 1988 UN Convention
|
Country |
Date Signed |
Date Became a Party |
|
1. Afghanistan |
20 December 1988 |
14 February 1992 |
|
2. Albania |
Accession |
27 June 2001 |
|
3. Algeria |
20 December 1988 |
9 May 1995 |
|
4. Andorra |
Accession |
23 July 1999 |
|
5. Angola |
Accession |
26 October 2005 |
|
6. Antigua and Barbuda |
Accession |
5 April 1993 |
|
7. Argentina |
20 December 1988 |
28 June 1993 |
|
8. Armenia |
Accession |
13 September 1993 |
|
9. Australia |
14 February 1989 |
16 November 1992 |
|
10. Austria |
25 September 1989 |
11 July 1997 |
|
11. Azerbaijan |
Accession |
22 September 1993 |
|
12. Bahamas |
20 December 1988 |
30 January 1989 |
|
13. Bahrain |
28 September 1989 |
7 February 1990 |
|
14. Bangladesh |
14 April 1989 |
11 October 1990 |
|
15. Barbados |
Accession |
15 October 1992 |
|
16. Belarus |
27 February 1989 |
15 October 1990 |
|
17. Belgium |
22 May 1989 |
25 October 1995 |
|
18. Belize |
Accession |
24 July 1996 |
|
19. Benin |
Accession |
23 May 1997 |
|
20. Bhutan |
Accession |
27 August 1990 |
|
21. Bolivia |
20 December 1988 |
20 August 1990 |
|
22. Bosnia and Herzegovina |
Succession |
01 September 1993 |
|
23. Botswana |
Accession |
13 August 1996 |
|
24. Brazil |
20 December 1988 |
17 July 1991 |
|
25. Brunei Darussalam |
26 October 1989 |
12 November 1993 |
|
26. Bulgaria |
19 May 1989 |
24 September 1992 |
|
27. Burkina Faso |
Accession |
02 June 1992 |
|
28. Burundi |
Accession |
18 February 1993 |
|
29. Cambodia |
Accession |
7 July 2005 |
|
30. Cameroon |
27 February 1989 |
28 October 1991 |
|
31. Canada |
20 December 1988 |
05 July 1990 |
|
32. Cape Verde |
Accession |
08 May 1995 |
|
33. Central African Republic |
Accession |
15 October 2001 |
|
34. Chad |
Accession |
09 June 1995 |
|
35. Chile |
20 December 1988 |
13 March 1990 |
|
36. China |
20 December 1988 |
25 October 1989 |
|
37. Colombia |
20 December 1988 |
10 June 1994 |
|
38. Comoros |
Accession |
1 March 2000 |
|
39. Congo, Democratic Republic of |
|
28 October 2005 |
|
40. Cook Islands |
Accession |
22 February 2005 |
|
41. Costa Rica |
25 April 1989 |
8 February 1991 |
|
42. Cote d’Ivoire |
20 December 1988 |
25 November 1991 |
|
43. Croatia |
Succession |
26 July 1993 |
|
44. Cuba |
7 April 1989 |
12 June 1996 |
|
45. Cyprus |
20 December 1988 |
25 May 1990 |
|
46. Czech Republic |
Succession |
30 December 1993 |
|
47. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea |
Accession |
19 March 2007 |
|
48. Democratic Republic of the Congo |
20 December 1988 |
28 October 2005 |
|
49. Denmark |
20 December 1988 |
19 December 1991 |
|
50. Djibouti |
Accession |
22 February 2001 |
|
51. Dominica |
Accession |
30 June 1993 |
|
52. Dominican Republic |
Accession |
21 September 1993 |
|
53. Ecuador |
21 June 1989 |
23 March 1990 |
|
54. Egypt |
20 December 1988 |
15 March 1991 |
|
55. El Salvador |
Accession |
21 May 1993 |
|
56. Eritrea |
Accession |
30 January 2002 |
|
57. Estonia |
Accession |
12 July 2000 |
|
58. Ethiopia |
Accession |
11 October 1994 |
|
59. European Economic Community |
8 June 1989 |
31 December 1990 |
|
60. Fiji |
Accession |
25 March 1993 |
|
61. Finland |
8 February 1989 |
15 February 1994 |
|
62. France |
13 February 1989 |
31 December 1990 |
|
63. Gabon |
20 December 1989 |
10 July 2006 |
|
64. Gambia |
Accession |
23 April 1996 |
|
65. Georgia |
Accession |
8 January 1998 |
|
66. Germany |
19 January 1989 |
30 November 1993 |
|
67. Ghana |
20 December 1988 |
10 April 1990 |
|
68. Greece |
23 February 1989 |
28 January 1992 |
|
69. Grenada |
Accession |
10 December 1990 |
|
70. Guatemala |
20 December 1988 |
28 February 1991 |
|
71. Guinea |
Accession |
27 December 1990 |
|
72. Guinea-Bissau |
Accession |
27 October 1995 |
|
73. Guyana |
Accession |
19 March 1993 |
|
74. Haiti |
Accession |
18 September 1995 |
|
75. Honduras |
20 December 1988 |
11 December 1991 |
|
76. Hungary |
22 August 1989 |
15 November 1996 |
|
77. Iceland |
Accession |
2 September 1997 |
|
78. India |
Accession |
27 March 1990 |
|
79. Indonesia |
27 March 1989 |
23 February 1999 |
|
80. Iran |
20 December 1988 |
7 December 1992 |
|
81. Iraq |
Accession |
22 July 1998 |
|
82. Ireland |
14 December 1989 |
3 September 1996 |
|
83. Israel |
20 December 1988 |
20 May 2002 |
|
84. Italy |
20 December 1988 |
31 December 1990 |
|
85. Jamaica |
2 October 1989 |
29 December 1995 |
|
86. Japan |
19 December 1989 |
12 June 1992 |
|
87. Jordan |
20 December 1988 |
16 April 1990 |
|
88. Kazakhstan |
Accession |
29 April 1997 |
|
89. Kenya |
Accession |
19 October 1992 |
|
90. Korea |
Accession |
28 December 1998 |
|
91. Kuwait |
2 October 1989 |
3 November 2000 |
|
92. Kyrgyz Republic |
Accession |
7 October 1994 |
|
93. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic |
Accession |
1 October 2004 |
|
94. Latvia |
Accession |
24 February 1994 |
|
95. Lebanon |
Accession |
11 March 1996 |
|
96. Lesotho |
Accession |
28 March 1995 |
|
97. Liberia |
Accession |
16 September 2005 |
|
98. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya |
Accession |
22 July 1996 |
|
99. Liechtenstein |
Accession |
9 March 2007 |
|
100. Lithuania |
Accession |
8 June 1998 |
|
101. Luxembourg |
26 September 1989 |
29 April 1992 |
|
102. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep. |
Accession |
13 October 1993 |
|
103. Madagascar |
Accession |
12 March 1991 |
|
104. Malawi |
Accession |
12 October 1995 |
|
105. Malaysia |
20 December 1988 |
11 May 1993 |
|
106. Maldives |
5 December 1989 |
7 September 2000 |
|
107. Mali |
Accession |
31 October 1995 |
|
108. Malta |
Accession |
28 February 1996 |
|
109. Mauritania |
20 December 1988 |
1 July 1993 |
|
110. Mauritius |
20 December 1988 |
6 March 2001 |
|
111. Mexico |
16 February 1989 |
11 April 1990 |
|
112. Micronesia, Federal States of |
Accession |
6 July 2004 |
|
113. Moldova |
Accession |
15 February 1995 |
|
114. Monaco |
24 February 1989 |
23 April 1991 |
|
115. Mongolia |
Accession |
25 June 2003 |
|
116. Morocco |
28 December 1988 |
28 October 1992 |
|
117. Mozambique |
Accession |
8 June 1998 |
|
118. Myanmar (Burma) |
Accession |
11 June 1991 |
|
119. Namibia |
Accession |
6 March 2009 |
|
120. Nepal |
Accession |
24 July 1991 |
|
121. Netherlands |
18 January 1989 |
8 September 1993 |
|
122. New Zealand |
18 December 1989 |
16 December 1998 |
|
123. Nicaragua |
20 December 1988 |
4 May 1990 |
|
124. Niger |
Accession |
10 November 1992 |
|
125. Nigeria |
1 March 1989 |
1 November 1989 |
|
126. Norway |
20 December 1988 |
14 November 1994 |
|
127. Oman |
Accession |
15 March 1991 |
|
128. Pakistan |
20 December 1988 |
25 October 1991 |
|
129. Panama |
20 December 1988 |
13 January 1994 |
|
130. Paraguay |
20 December 1988 |
23 August 1990 |
|
131. Peru |
20 December 1988 |
16 January 1992 |
|
132. Philippines |
20 December 1988 |
7 June 1996 |
|
133. Poland |
6 March 1989 |
26 May 1994 |
|
134. Portugal |
13 December 1989 |
3 December 1991 |
|
135. Qatar |
Accession |
4 May 1990 |
|
136. Romania |
Accession |
21 January 1993 |
|
137. Russia |
19 January 1989 |
17 December 1990 |
|
138. Rwanda |
Accession |
13 May 2002 |
|
139. St. Kitts and Nevis |
Accession |
19 April 1995 |
|
140. St. Lucia |
Accession |
21 August 1995 |
|
141. St. Vincent and the Grenadines |
Accession |
17 May 1994 |
|
142. Samoa |
Accession |
19 August 2005 |
|
143. San Marino |
Accession |
10 October 2000 |
|
144. Sao Tome and Principe |
Accession |
20 June 1996 |
|
145. Saudi Arabia |
Accession |
9 January 1992 |
|
146. Senegal |
20 December 1988 |
27 November 1989 |
|
147. Seychelles |
Accession |
27 February 1992 |
|
148. Sierra Leone |
9 June 1989 |
6 June 1994 |
|
149. Singapore |
Accession |
23 October 1997 |
|
150. Slovakia |
Succession |
28 May 1993 |
|
151. Slovenia |
Succession |
6 July 1992 |
|
152. South Africa |
Accession |
14 December 1998 |
|
153. Spain |
20 December 1988 |
13 August 1990 |
|
154. Sri Lanka |
Accession |
6 June 1991 |
|
155. Sudan |
30 January 1989 |
19 November 1993 |
|
156. Suriname |
20 December 1988 |
28 October 1992 |
|
157. Swaziland |
Accession |
3 October 1995 |
|
158. Sweden |
20 December 1988 |
22 July 1991 |
|
159. Switzerland |
16 November 1989 |
14 September 2005 |
|
160. Syria |
Accession |
3 September 1991 |
|
161. Tajikistan |
Accession |
6 May 1996 |
|
162. Thailand |
Accession |
3 May 2002 |
|
163. Tanzania |
20 December 1988 |
17 April 1996 |
|
164. Togo |
3 August 1989 |
1 August 1990 |
|
165. Tonga |
Accession |
29 April 1996 |
|
166. Trinidad and Tobago |
7 December 1989 |
17 February 1995 |
|
167. Tunisia |
19 December 1989 |
20 September 1990 |
|
168. Turkey |
20 December 1988 |
2 April 1996 |
|
169. Turkmenistan |
Accession |
21 February 1996 |
|
170. UAE |
Accession |
12 April 1990 |
|
171. Uganda |
Accession |
20 August 1990 |
|
172. Ukraine |
16 March 1989 |
28 August 1991 |
|
173. United Kingdom |
20 December 1988 |
28 June 1991 |
|
174. United States |
20 December 1988 |
20 February 1990 |
|
175. Uruguay |
19 December 1989 |
10 March 1995 |
|
176. Uzbekistan |
Accession |
24 August 1995 |
|
177. Vanuatu |
|
26 January 2006 |
|
178. Venezuela |
20 December 1988 |
16 July 1991 |
|
179. Vietnam |
Accession |
4 November 1997 |
|
180. Yemen |
20 December 1988 |
25 March 1996 |
|
Country |
Date Signed |
Date Became a Party |
|
181. Yugoslavia |
20 December 1988 |
3 January 1991 |
|
182. Zambia |
9 February 1989 |
28 May 1993 |
|
183. Zimbabwe |
Accession |
30 July 1993 |
|
Signed but Pending Ratification |
|
|
|
1. Holy See |
20 December 1988 |
|
|
Other |
|
|
|
1. Anguilla |
|
Not UN member |
|
2. Aruba |
|
Not UN member |
|
3. Bermuda |
|
|
|
4. BVI |
|
Not UN member |
|
5. Republic of the Congo |
|
|
|
6. Hong Kong |
|
Not UN member |
|
7. Marshall Islands |
|
|
|
8. Papua New Guinea |
|
|
|
9. Taiwan |
|
Not UN member |
|
10. Turks & Caicos |
|
Not UN member |
