U.S. Department of State

Overview for 2010

Introduction:

Drug trafficking and transnational organized-crime pose a serious threat to citizens of all countries. For the United States, this has led to broad support for promoting security abroad as a crucial part of protecting the health and safety of American citizens at home. Today, over $2 billion dollars (managed through the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)) is provided annually in U.S. foreign assistance for a range of bilateral and multilateral initiatives with partners abroad. This technical assistance and financial support is used to further drug control, law enforcement and administration of justice where transnational organized crime seeks to gain a foothold.

As President Barack Obama stated in the Administration’s 2010 National Drug Control Security Strategy, “combating international criminal and trafficking networks requires a multidimensional strategy that safeguards citizens, breaks the financial strength of criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts illicit trafficking networks, defeats international criminal organizations, fights government corruption, strengthens the rule of law, bolsters judicial systems and improves transparency.” This view is also the underlying story of the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).

International Frameworks:

In 1909, a handful of countries, including the United States, met in China to negotiate and sign the Shanghai Declaration, the first international convention that recognized that some drugs are dangerous and that the nations of the world must work together to regulate them. Decades international efforts culminated in the world’s blue print for drug control, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which has been signed by nearly every country in the world. To stay ahead of agile criminal elements, the UN Convention’s aim of international cooperation through implementation of comprehensive programs is reflected in numerous national policies, practical initiatives and strategies, and regional and bilateral conventions and agreements. In recent years, the UN Convention against Translational Organized Crime, the UN Convention against Corruption, the OAS’s 2010 Drug Strategy for the Hemisphere and a wide range of other regional accords have been adopted to promote the concept of a unified international front aimed at ensuring rule of law around the world. Countries understand they must continually adapt to stay ahead of criminal elements who attempt to undermine the aspirations of the community of nations.

Drug Demand Reduction:

The international community increasingly accepts that drug use is as much a public health problem as it is a public safety problem. The United States has emphasized prevention and treatment and, like many other nations, is determined to adapt the latest scientific knowledge and effective social services to help these individuals overcome their addiction. At the same time, strategies aimed at supply reduction and law enforcement control measures, at home and abroad, continue to be integral to overall national and foreign policy objectives.

During a recent trip to Mexico, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged that the United States’ “insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade.” While the overall demand for drugs has diminished over the long term in the United States, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health indicates that illicit drug use increased in the United States in 2009 – with 8.7 percent of the population age12 and older using illegal substances as compared to 8 percent in 2009. This development has prompted the Obama Administration to focus on a reinvigorated approach to prevent drug use and addiction and to make treatment available to those in need.

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) called on member states “to integrate drug abuse prevention into public health, health promotion and child and youth prevention programs.” Treating the drug user involves a comprehensive system of health and social services. In the United States, for example, an expanding network of drug courts with the purpose of rehabilitating non-violent drug offenders has helped many drug users to become responsible citizens. The model, which started with just one court in Miami, Florida, in 1989, has expanded to more than 2,500 such institutions that promote judicial and law enforcement collaboration with health treatment facilities and social services to meet community and offender needs. Evaluations of these courts over the years have proven that this humane approach for qualifying individuals is a more effective and cost-saving alternative to traditional incarceration.

Today, the drug-court model in the United States, Europe and elsewhere is being fostered and established all over the world. For example, multilateral assistance combined with national resources has resulted in the on-going establishment of drug court systems as an alternative to penal incarceration throughout the Western Hemisphere. For example, in reaction to an epidemic of marijuana use, Jamaica established the first drug court in the Caribbean over 20 years ago. Today, through bilateral programs fostered by such countries as the United States and Canada, and with the help of multilateral organizations such as the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) and the European Union, the drug court alternative continues to expand.

The Americas:

For more than 10 years, the OAS/CICAD Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) has strengthened regional and sub-regional collaboration on all levels, including drug awareness and treatment approaches, information data collection, sharing and harmonizing counternarcotics and crime legislative models, extradition practices and other control measures. The MEM, unique in the world in that it deploys the expertise of independent peer reviewers from all OAS countries, has sparked hundreds of recommendations that individual countries and the CICAD Commission are taking concrete and effective measures to implement.

Implementing the MEM recommendations is an essential part of the toolkit that allows OAS countries to work as a cohesive force against the dual threats of drugs and crime. The MEM focuses on institution building, demand reduction, supply reduction, control measures and international cooperation. Notably, the MEM evaluation country reports published in 2010 prompted the independent hemispheric experts who draft the reports to make over a third of their recommendations in the area of narcotics control measures. These recommendations for action include establishing and/or refining laws and regulations to control weapons, ammunition and related material to stem the growing violence posed by illegal drugs and crime.

Partners in the Western Hemisphere also engage in cooperative relationships with the United States in the fight against drug cartels and transnational organized crime. In the face of significant public safety challenges, Mexico has taken a tough stance against powerful drug lords. Bolstered by complementary initiatives in the United States, the U.S.-Mexico Merida Initiative promotes cooperation at all levels to build Mexican institutional capacity to strike back at the cartels. The success of the bilateral partnership is urgent: law enforcement data indicates that Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations are active in more cities in the United States than any other drug trafficking organizations.

Led by President Filipe Calderon, Mexico is engaged in the arduous task of developing and implementing significant police and rule of law reform. Trafficking organizations have reacted violently, killing some 34,000 people in Mexico in the past four years, but Mexico has been firm in its commitment to regain national stability and to prevent criminal elements from weaving themselves tighter into the fabric of Mexican society. Mexican authorities dealt a major blow in January 2011 when they captured Flavio Mendez Santiago, “El Amarillo,” who directed operations for the infamous “Zetas” criminal gang in three southern Mexican states, including Oaxaca.

Support through the Merida Initiative incorporates a U.S.-Mexican prosecutor task force to dismantle Mexican cartels and a bi-national working group to augment law enforcement capacity to prosecute gun smugglers and stand up other key control measures, including the targeting of criminal money laundering. In 2009, Mexico extradited 107 fugitives to the United States.

The decade-old Plan Colombia, the bilateral counternarcotics between Colombia and the United States, has led to impressive results. Colombia’s success in rebuilding its nation is due in no small part to U.S. technical and financial support but also to the will of the Colombian government and its people. Once mortally threatened by illegal insurgents, armed groups, and seemingly invincible drug kingpins, Colombia today has regained the upper hand as a vibrant democracy now able to transfer its “lessons learned” to Afghanistan, Mexico, Haiti and Central America. As the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Gil Kerlikowske said in Bogota in January 2011, Colombia “serves as a beacon of hope for other nations struggling with the threat to democracy posed by drug trafficking and related crime.” Colombia’s leadership intends to sustain progress through a continued firm response to destabilizing influences and expansion of good governance to long-ignored rural areas of the country.

Central America and the Caribbean, transit zones for illegal drugs destined for the United States, are the focus of two important Administration multilateral initiatives to deter the displacement of crime from Mexico and Colombia: these are the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Justice sector capacity building under CARSI and CBSI will expand on bilateral programs aimed at promoting the rule of law, reducing illegal weapons trafficking, countering the insidious influence of gangs, and enhancing law enforcement efforts against money laundering.

In the President’s FY 2011 Majors List report to Congress, both Venezuela and Bolivia were found to have “failed demonstrably” to meet their international narcotics control commitments. Despite the capture and deportation to Colombia of several suspects connected to terrorist groups in 2010, Venezuela appears to tolerate the presence of such organizations and did not take significant steps to limit their ability to operate inside Venezuelan territory. Moreover, since stopping formal cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2005, Venezuela has maintained only limited case-by-case cooperation with the United States. In Bolivia, coca cultivation has expanded significantly during the government of President Evo Morales. The country’s ability to identify, investigate and dismantle drug trafficking organizations remains considerably diminished following its expulsion of DEA personnel from Bolivia in January 2009.

Southwest Asia:

Afghanistan cultivates 90 percent of the world’s supply of opium poppy for heroin. Active insurgencies tied to drug traffickers in the southern and western provinces of Afghanistan overlap with 98 percent of the country’s poppy cultivation. Although plantings of this crop remained static in 2010, opium production decreased due to unfavorable weather conditions and an agricultural blight. The United States and its NATO allies are working with Afghanistan to strengthen basic law enforcement institutions and other civil society infrastructure to further the development of alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation. In order to significantly reduce its poppy crop, the Government of Afghanistan must reinforce its determination to foster results-based programs that promote concrete institution building and root out corruption, a fundamental element contributing to instability.

With the support of international assistance, opium poppy cultivation has declined significantly. Today, only seven provinces in Afghanistan cultivate opium poppy as compared to 21 provinces in 2005. More incentives will be required to compel farmers to move to legal livelihoods, and to break their ties to traffickers and insurgents.

Opium from Afghanistan is primarily transmitted via Eastern and Central Europe to Western Europe. According to United Nations reports, Russia, Portugal and Spain, suffer from the greatest number of heroin users in Europe. Important transit countries around Afghanistan include Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries.

Pakistan is a top national security priority for the United States. The country’s serious problems with drug trafficking and addiction are strongly associated with instability and lawlessness on its 1,500 mile frontier which includes the rugged and remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. This region is ideally suited to drug trafficking operations. Moreover, these challenges are compounded by Pakistani Taliban and allied militant groups operating in the region. Given the enormous distances and terrain, the reach of Pakistani anti-drug forces has been limited. Despite these challenges, United States bilateral counternarcotics assistance will continue to incorporate programs to extend civilian law enforcement reach throughout the country.

In the absence of official relations with Iran, the United States depends on other sources for data on the country’s significant illegal drug problem, both in terms of heroin use and the production and distribution of methamphetamine-type stimulants. The United Nations estimates that as much as 40 percent of opiates departing Afghanistan go through Iran for local consumption or onward transit to European markets. Estimates show there are some 1.2 million opium users in Iran, nearly 2.5 percent of the population.

Southeast Asia:

After Afghanistan, Burma is the second largest global cultivator of opium poppy for illegal heroin production. Between 1998 and 2006, the land devoted to poppy cultivation declined, but the United Nations reports that in 2010 there was a sharp increase in area cultivated by nearly 50 percent. Burmese production of illegal methamphetamines, marketed as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) also continues to increase. Law enforcement investigations show that ATS pills manufactured in Burma are produced in the millions and trafficked to Thailand, down the Asian peninsula and in smaller quantities, even north into China.

U.S. programs in Asia have traditionally focused on reducing opium production and raising law enforcement capacity. In Laos and Thailand, foreign assistance has historically helped local governments identify alternatives to poppy cultivation for minority hill tribes. Law enforcement capacity building programs in the region are carried out primarily by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. funds are integral to drug awareness and demand reduction initiatives implemented by the United Nations Offices of Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Africa:

United States initiatives in Africa are based on the growing concern about drug smuggling and its potential to destabilize West African countries such as Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Liberia. The principal method of conveyance for cocaine to West Africa is via mother ships from the east coast of Latin America, especially Venezuela and Brazil. Because of natural linguistic links, Brazil has stepped up programs to establish counternarcotics initiatives with Portuguese-speaking African nations to thwart the movement of cocaine on its way to Europe, with Spain and Portugal serving as the main European gateway countries.

United States and European partnerships in Africa are dedicated to promoting the rule of law in countries that are threatened by political, social and economic instability, making them especially vulnerable to criminal enterprise and corruption. The proceeds of drugs trafficked in this part of the world and sold in Europe flow back to the same cartels that traffic illegal drugs to the United States. To further cooperative efforts against this threat, the United States and the European Union will host a Trans-Atlantic Symposium on Illicit Networks in Lisbon in May 2011. The U.S. will also participate in an upcoming G-8 Ministerial on Cocaine Trafficking, also scheduled for May 2011.

Looking to the Future:

International cooperation and coordinated action are needed to address the worldwide challenge posed by drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. This includes monitoring new and emerging criminal activity designed to avoid detection. In the past several years, for example, national leaders and law enforcement have been working to thwart the use of the Internet to facilitate drug smuggling. This includes efforts to stop the increasingly common practice of establishing virtual pharmacies on the Internet for the illicit sale of both legally produced medicines and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.

The use of new precursors and chemicals in the production of illegal substances is a similar problem. For example, the ingredients used to produce the synthetic drug MDMA are different today from those ingredients found in the “club drug” when it first appeared. New harmful synthetic concoctions are regularly reported by intelligence and law enforcement authorities. To meet the goal of controlling chemicals and illegal drug precursors, all countries should become full partners in the United Nations Pre-Export Notification (PEN) online data-base system.

The international community faces an array of emerging challenges that will require active and close cooperation in the years ahead. The use of self-propelled semi-submersible vessels, designed exclusively for smuggling, serves as a prime example. Effectively screening containers for illegal cargo among the thousands of shipments that pass through lawful ports of entry will also remain a significant challenge. The international community will need to continue to focus on innovative ways to counter money laundering and corruption, which are so often linked to insurgencies and terrorism.

Working to stop these illegal activities and protect like-minded nations around the world is directly tied to the security and prosperity of the American people. To that end, the United States is committed to enhancing the capacity of new and maturing democracies to uphold their international drug and crime control commitments.

Through this report, the United States seeks to provide a clear assessment of progress and challenges. It is only over the longer term that sustainable success can be measured. This year’s INCSR demonstrates that the policies and programs of individual nations, along with the courage and determination of the international community, are advancing common goals and objectives.

Demand Reduction

Demand reduction has evolved as a key foreign policy tool for addressing the inter-connected threats of drugs, crime, and terrorism in places like Afghanistan. More recently, it has become a critical component in efforts to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, where intravenous drug use is the mechanism of transmission.

Drug abuse and addiction have a devastating impact on individual lives, families, and communities. Drug abuse is also inextricably linked with the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD), tuberculosis, and hepatitis C. Drug abuse is associated with family disintegration, loss of employment or income, school failure, domestic violence, child abuse, and other social problems and criminal acts. Based on the U.S. experience in trying to reduce the demand for drugs at home, many foreign countries request INL-sponsored technical assistance to enhance the development of effective policies and programs to combat narcotics abuse in countries around the world. INL is ready to provide guidance to international partners, which is based on a coordinated approach in the areas of drug prevention and treatment. INL promotes the sharing of critical information and evidence-based studies, in order to promote and preserve the stability of societies that are threatened by the narcotics trade and narcotics abuse.

INL’s demand reduction strategy includes a wide range of initiatives to address the needs and national security threats posed by the illicit drug trade. These efforts cover programs to prevent the onset of drug use, intervention with drug abusers, and improvement of treatment delivery. In achieving these goals, INL supports the following:

Training and technical assistance to educate governments and NGOs on science-based best practices in drug prevention and treatment;

Development and support of regional and international coalitions for drug-free communities, involving private/public social institutions and law enforcement working together to educate communities about the dangers of drug abuse;

Research and evaluation efforts, to measure the effectiveness of intended prevention and treatment programs and the kinds and extent of current drug use in a community; and

Dissemination of science-based information and knowledge transfer through multilateral and regional organizations.

INL supports substance abuse treatment, training and technical assistance that addresses women’s drug treatment issues, and related violence. These programs respond to the unique needs of female drug addicts.

Significant completed and on-going INL-funded demand reduction projects for Fiscal Year 2010 included:

Women Drug Treatment Initiatives: INL supports research-based prevention and treatment programs in key drug producing /using countries that improve services for addicted women and their children, a chronically under-served and stigmatized population. The program supports a model residential drug treatment program for high-risk female youth in Brazil. INL also supports the development of a training curriculum, which will address the unique needs of female addicts worldwide.

Mexico/Merida: In October 2010, the OAS/CICAD signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of Mexico through the National Council against Addiction (CONADIC), establishing a process and a framework for cooperation for carrying-out programs and activities. Under this Memorandum, INL is supporting the OAS/CICAD in the Mexico/Merida initiative to establish a national-level counselor certification system for drug abuse counselors aimed at improving the delivery of drug treatment services in Mexico. Thus far, three Needs Assessments have been conducted; training of 600 counselors will begin in early 2011.

Drug-Free Communities: INL is supporting the drug-free communities program which assists community groups in forming and sustaining effective community anti-drug coalitions that fight illegal drugs. The goal of these coalitions is to bring citizens together to prevent and reduce drug use among youth. Membership includes youth, parents, businesses, the media, schools, youth organizations, law enforcement, religious and fraternal organizations, civic groups and local government. As a result of INL-funded training, active coalitions have been developed in several communities in Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico.

Colombo Plan: The USG and the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program (DAP) established a training arm for treatment experts to prepare the process of professional certification of addiction professionals in Asia.

UNODC: INL is supporting the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) global TREATNET Project that provides comprehensive treatment-provider training and technical assistance to improve treatment delivery systems in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The primary emphasis of the initiative is to share drug treatment best practices with the aim to assist service providers to improve the quality of services and to guide policy makers in programming more effectively.

Afghanistan: INL currently supports 26 residential treatment centers in Afghanistan. This initiative includes training female addiction counselors in counseling techniques for women, family therapy, and support for home-based treatment. Of the 26 centers, six provide residential treatment for women with adjacent facilities for their children and two centers provide residential treatment services for adolescent males. In 2011, INL will also begin support for an adolescent female treatment center.

Methodology for USG Estimates of Illegal Drug Production

Introduction

Illegal narcotics are grown, refined, trafficked, and sold on the street by criminal enterprises that attempt to conceal every step of the process. Accurate estimates of such criminal activity are difficult to produce. The estimates on illicit drug production presented in the INCSR represent the United States Government’s best effort to sketch the current dimensions of the international drug problem. They are based on agricultural surveys conducted with satellite imagery and scientific studies of crop yields and the likely efficiency of typical illicit refining labs. As we do every year, we publish these estimates with an important caveat: they are estimates. While we must express our estimates as numbers, these numbers should not be seen as precise figures. Rather, they represent the midpoint of a band of statistical probability that gets wider as additional variables are introduced and as we move from cultivation to harvest to final refined drug. Although these estimates can be useful for determining trends, even the best USG estimates are ultimately only approximations.

As needed, we revise our estimate process-and occasionally the estimates themselves-in the light of field research. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes such field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain. Weather also impacts our ability to gather data, particularly in the Andes, where cloud-cover can be a major problem.

Improved technologies and analysis techniques may also produce revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether the subject of analysis is the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the reports of the unemployment rate. When possible, we apply these new techniques to previous years’ data and adjust appropriately, but often, especially in the case of new technologies, we can only apply them prospectively. For the present, these illicit drug statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art and science improve, so will the accuracy of the estimates.

Cultivation Estimates

With limited personnel and technical resources, we cannot look at an entire country for any hint of illicit cultivation. Analysts must, therefore concentrate their efforts on those areas that are most likely to have cultivation. Each year they review eradication data, seizure data, law enforcement investigations information, the previous year’s imagery, and other information to determine the areas likely to have cultivation, and revise and update the search area if possible. They then estimate cultivation in the new survey area using proven statistical techniques.

The resultant estimates meet the USG need for an annual estimate of cultivation for each country. They also help with eradication, interdiction and other law enforcement operations. As part of the effort to provide a better and more comprehensive assessment, the areas surveyed are often expanded and changed, so direct comparison with previous year estimates may not be possible.

Production Estimates

Illicit crop productivity depends upon a number of factors. Changes in weather, farming techniques, soil fertility, and disease prevalence can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. Although most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain, we continually strive to improve our production estimates. The relative productivity of poppy crops can be estimated using imagery, and our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates has improved in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. Such studies led to a reduction in our estimates of average productivity for fields that had been sprayed with herbicide, but not completely destroyed. In such fields, some, but not all of the coca bushes survive. The farmers of the illicit crop either plant new bushes among the surviving plants or let what is left grow until harvest. In either case, the average yield of such plots is considerably less than if it had not been sprayed. Multiple studies in the same growing area over several years have helped us understand the effects of eradication and have helped us to measure the changes in average yield over time.

Coca fields which are less than a year old (“new fields”) produce much less leaf than mature fields. In Colombia, for example, fields might get their first small harvest at six months of age; in Bolivia fields are usually not harvested in their first year. The USG estimates include estimates for the proportion of new fields each year and adjust the estimated leaf production accordingly.

Processing Estimates

The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures all affect production.

The USG estimates for coca leaf, cocaine, marijuana, opium, and heroin production are potential estimates; that is, it is assumed that all of the coca, marijuana, and poppy grown is harvested and processed into illicit drugs. This is a reasonable assumption for coca leaf in Colombia. In Bolivia and Peru, however, the USG potential cocaine production estimates are overestimated to some unknown extent since significant amounts of coca leaf are locally chewed and used in products such as coca tea. In Southwest and Southeast Asia, it is not unrealistic to assume that virtually all poppy is harvested for opium gum, but substantial amounts of the opium are consumed as opium rather than being processed into heroin. (The proportion of opium ultimately processed into heroin is unknown.)

Other International Estimates

The USG helps fund estimates done by the United Nations in some countries. These estimates use slightly different methodologies, but also use a mix of imagery and ground-based observations. The UN estimates are often used to help determine the response of the international donor community to specific countries or regions.

There have been some efforts, for Colombia in particular, for the USG and the UN to understand each other’s methodologies in the hope of improving both sets of estimates. These efforts are ongoing.

This report also includes data on drug production, trafficking, seizures, and consumption that come from host governments or NGOs. Such data is attributed to the source organization, especially when we cannot independently verify it.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

2005-2010 (all figures in hectares)
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Poppy
Afghanistan	107400	172600	202000	157000	131000	119000
Burma	40000	21000	21700	22500	17000	in process
Colombia		2300	1000		1100	in process
Guatemala	100
Laos	5600	1700	1100	1900	1000	in process
Mexico	3300	5000	6900	15000	19500	in process
Pakistan	SEE NOTE BELOW
Total Poppy	156400	202600	232700	196400	169600
Coca
Bolivia	26500	25800	29500	32000	35000	in process
Colombia	144000	157000	167000	119000	116000	in process
Peru	34000	42000	36000	41000	40000	in process
Total Coca	204500	224800	232500	192000	191000
Cannabis
Mexico	5600	8600	8900	12000	17500	in process
Total Cannabis	5600	8600	8900	12000	17500

Notes on Colombia poppy cultivation: The 2008 and 2005 surveys could not be conducted due to cloud cover. Partial survey in 2007 due to cloud cover.

Note on Laos poppy cultivation: A partial survey of only the Phongsali growing area was conducted in 2009.

Notes on Pakistan poppy cultivation: There are no USG countrywide numbers for Pakistan. Please see the Pakistan Country Chapter for government of Pakistan estimates.

Notes on Colombia coca cultivation: Survey areas were expanded greatly in 2005 and to a lesser extent in 2006 and 2007.

Notes on Peru cultivation: In the 2006 survey, the Cusco growing area could not be completed; the value for that area is an average of the 2005 and 2007 estimates The 2005 cultivation estimate was revised in 2007.

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production

2005-2010 (all figures in metric tons)
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Opium
Afghanistan	4475	5644	8000	5500	5300	3200
Burma	380	230	270	340	250	in process
Colombia		37	15		17	in process
Guatemala	4
Laos	28	8.5	5.5	17	10.6	in process
Mexico	71	108	149	325	425	in process
Pakistan	SEE NOTE BELOW
Total Opium	4958	6027.5	8439.5	6182	6002.6
Coca Leaf
Bolivia	36000	37000	38500	43500	43000	in process
Colombia	146000	148000	139000	85000	79000	in process
Peru	53500	54500	43500	43500	46000	in process
Total Coca Leaf*	235500	239500	221000	172000	168000
Potential Pure Cocaine
Bolivia	115	115	130	195	195	in process
Colombia	500	510	475	285	280	in process
Peru	260	265	210	215	225	in process
Total Potential Pure Cocaine	875	890	815	695	700
Potential Export Quality Cocaine
Bolivia	155	150	160	245	240	in process
Colombia	590	600	570	355	365	in process
Peru	295	305	235	235	245	in process
Total Potential Pure Cocaine	1040	1055	965	835	850
Cannabis
Mexico (marijuana)	10100	15500	15800	21500	unknown	in process
Total Cannabis	10100	15500	15800	21500	unknown

 Notes on Colombia opium production: The 2008 and 2005 surveys could not be conducted due to cloud cover. Partial survey in 2007 due to cloud cover.

Note on Pakistan opium production: There are no USG countrywide numbers for Pakistan. Please see the Pakistan Country Chapter for government of Pakistan estimates.

Note on Laos poppy production: A partial survey of only the Phongsali growing area was conducted in 2009.

Note on Bolivia coca leaf production: In 2006, CNC revised the 2002-05 values due to new yield information.

Note on Colombia coca leaf production: New research in 2007-2009 led to revised leaf and cocaine production figures for 2003 -208. Survey areas were expanded greatly in 2005 and to a lesser extent in 2006 and 2007.

Notes on Peru coca leaf production: In the 2006 survey, the Cusco growing area could not be completed; the value for that area is an average of the 2005 and 2007 estimates. Survey areas were expanded in 2005. The 2001- 2005 values were revised in 2007 to reflect new yield figures for immature fields.

Notes on Mexico marijuana production: Reliable Mexican marijuana yield data was not available to estimate potential marijuana production in 2009.

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
1. Afghanistan	20 December 1988	14 February 1992
2. Albania	Accession	27 June 2001
3. Algeria	20 December 1988	9 May 1995
4. Andorra	Accession	23 July 1999
5. Angola	Accession	26 October 2005
6. Antigua and Barbuda	Accession	5 April 1993
7. Argentina	20 December 1988	28 June 1993
8. Armenia	Accession	13 September 1993
9. Australia	14 February 1989	16 November 1992
10. Austria	25 September 1989	11 July 1997
11. Azerbaijan	Accession	22 September 1993
12. Bahamas	20 December 1988	30 January 1989
13. Bahrain	28 September 1989	7 February 1990
14. Bangladesh	14 April 1989	11 October 1990
15. Barbados	Accession	15 October 1992
16. Belarus	27 February 1989	15 October 1990
17. Belgium	22 May 1989	25 October 1995
18. Belize	Accession	24 July 1996
19. Benin	Accession	23 May 1997
20. Bhutan	Accession	27 August 1990
21. Bolivia	20 December 1988	20 August 1990
22. Bosnia and Herzegovina	Succession	01 September 1993
23. Botswana	Accession	13 August 1996
24. Brazil	20 December 1988	17 July 1991
25. Brunei Darussalam	26 October 1989	12 November 1993
26. Bulgaria	19 May 1989	24 September 1992
27. Burkina Faso	Accession	02 June 1992
28. Burundi	Accession	18 February 1993
29. Cambodia	Accession	7 July 2005
30. Cameroon	27 February 1989	28 October 1991
31. Canada	20 December 1988	05 July 1990
32. Cape Verde	Accession	08 May 1995
33. Central African Republic	Accession	15 October 2001
34. Chad	Accession	09 June 1995
35. Chile	20 December 1988	13 March 1990
36. China	20 December 1988	25 October 1989
37. Colombia	20 December 1988	10 June 1994
38. Comoros	Accession	1 March 2000
39. Congo, Democratic Republic of		28 October 2005
40. Cook Islands	Accession	22 February 2005
41. Costa Rica	25 April 1989	8 February 1991
42. Cote d’Ivoire	20 December 1988	25 November 1991
43. Croatia	Succession	26 July 1993
44. Cuba	7 April 1989	12 June 1996
45. Cyprus	20 December 1988	25 May 1990
46. Czech Republic	Succession	30 December 1993
47. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	Accession	19 March 2007
48. Democratic Republic of the Congo	20 December 1988	28 October 2005
49. Denmark	20 December 1988	19 December 1991
50. Djibouti	Accession	22 February 2001
51. Dominica	Accession	30 June 1993
52. Dominican Republic	Accession	21 September 1993
53. Ecuador	21 June 1989	23 March 1990
54. Egypt	20 December 1988	15 March 1991
55. El Salvador	Accession	21 May 1993
56. Eritrea	Accession	30 January 2002
57. Estonia	Accession	12 July 2000
58. Ethiopia	Accession	11 October 1994
59. European Economic Community	8 June 1989	31 December 1990
60. Fiji	Accession	25 March 1993
61. Finland	8 February 1989	15 February 1994
62. France	13 February 1989	31 December 1990
63. Gabon	20 December 1989	10 July 2006
64. Gambia	Accession	23 April 1996
65. Georgia	Accession	8 January 1998
66. Germany	19 January 1989	30 November 1993
67. Ghana	20 December 1988	10 April 1990
68. Greece	23 February 1989	28 January 1992
69. Grenada	Accession	10 December 1990
70. Guatemala	20 December 1988	28 February 1991
71. Guinea	Accession	27 December 1990
72. Guinea-Bissau	Accession	27 October 1995
73. Guyana	Accession	19 March 1993
74. Haiti	Accession	18 September 1995
75. Honduras	20 December 1988	11 December 1991
76. Hungary	22 August 1989	15 November 1996
77. Iceland	Accession	2 September 1997
78. India	Accession	27 March 1990
79. Indonesia	27 March 1989	23 February 1999
80. Iran	20 December 1988	7 December 1992
81. Iraq	Accession	22 July 1998
82. Ireland	14 December 1989	3 September 1996
83. Israel	20 December 1988	20 May 2002
84. Italy	20 December 1988	31 December 1990
85. Jamaica	2 October 1989	29 December 1995
86. Japan	19 December 1989	12 June 1992
87. Jordan	20 December 1988	16 April 1990
88. Kazakhstan	Accession	29 April 1997
89. Kenya	Accession	19 October 1992
90. Korea	Accession	28 December 1998
91. Kuwait	2 October 1989	3 November 2000
92. Kyrgyz Republic	Accession	7 October 1994
93. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic	Accession	1 October 2004
94. Latvia	Accession	24 February 1994
95. Lebanon	Accession	11 March 1996
96. Lesotho	Accession	28 March 1995
97. Liberia	Accession	16 September 2005
98. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Accession	22 July 1996
99. Liechtenstein	Accession	9 March 2007
100. Lithuania	Accession	8 June 1998
101. Luxembourg	26 September 1989	29 April 1992
102. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	Accession	13 October 1993
103. Madagascar	Accession	12 March 1991
104. Malawi	Accession	12 October 1995
105. Malaysia	20 December 1988	11 May 1993
106. Maldives	5 December 1989	7 September 2000
107. Mali	Accession	31 October 1995
108. Malta	Accession	28 February 1996
109. Mauritania	20 December 1988	1 July 1993
110. Mauritius	20 December 1988	6 March 2001
111. Mexico	16 February 1989	11 April 1990
112. Micronesia, Federal States of	Accession	6 July 2004
113. Moldova	Accession	15 February 1995
114. Monaco	24 February 1989	23 April 1991
115. Mongolia	Accession	25 June 2003
116. Morocco	28 December 1988	28 October 1992
117. Mozambique	Accession	8 June 1998
118. Myanmar (Burma)	Accession	11 June 1991
119. Namibia	Accession	6 March 2009
120. Nepal	Accession	24 July 1991
121. Netherlands	18 January 1989	8 September 1993
122. New Zealand	18 December 1989	16 December 1998
123. Nicaragua	20 December 1988	4 May 1990
124. Niger	Accession	10 November 1992
125. Nigeria	1 March 1989	1 November 1989
126. Norway	20 December 1988	14 November 1994
127. Oman	Accession	15 March 1991
128. Pakistan	20 December 1988	25 October 1991
129. Panama	20 December 1988	13 January 1994
130. Paraguay	20 December 1988	23 August 1990
131. Peru	20 December 1988	16 January 1992
132. Philippines	20 December 1988	7 June 1996
133. Poland	6 March 1989	26 May 1994
134. Portugal	13 December 1989	3 December 1991
135. Qatar	Accession	4 May 1990
136. Romania	Accession	21 January 1993
137. Russia	19 January 1989	17 December 1990
138. Rwanda	Accession	13 May 2002
139. St. Kitts and Nevis	Accession	19 April 1995
140. St. Lucia	Accession	21 August 1995
141. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Accession	17 May 1994
142. Samoa	Accession	19 August 2005
143. San Marino	Accession	10 October 2000
144. Sao Tome and Principe	Accession	20 June 1996
145. Saudi Arabia	Accession	9 January 1992
146. Senegal	20 December 1988	27 November 1989
147. Seychelles	Accession	27 February 1992
148. Sierra Leone	9 June 1989	6 June 1994
149. Singapore	Accession	23 October 1997
150. Slovakia	Succession	28 May 1993
151. Slovenia	Succession	6 July 1992
152. South Africa	Accession	14 December 1998
153. Spain	20 December 1988	13 August 1990
154. Sri Lanka	Accession	6 June 1991
155. Sudan	30 January 1989	19 November 1993
156. Suriname	20 December 1988	28 October 1992
157. Swaziland	Accession	3 October 1995
158. Sweden	20 December 1988	22 July 1991
159. Switzerland	16 November 1989	14 September 2005
160. Syria	Accession	3 September 1991
161. Tajikistan	Accession	6 May 1996
162. Thailand	Accession	3 May 2002
163. Tanzania	20 December 1988	17 April 1996
164. Togo	3 August 1989	1 August 1990
165. Tonga	Accession	29 April 1996
166. Trinidad and Tobago	7 December 1989	17 February 1995
167. Tunisia	19 December 1989	20 September 1990
168. Turkey	20 December 1988	2 April 1996
169. Turkmenistan	Accession	21 February 1996
170. UAE	Accession	12 April 1990
171. Uganda	Accession	20 August 1990
172. Ukraine	16 March 1989	28 August 1991
173. United Kingdom	20 December 1988	28 June 1991
174. United States	20 December 1988	20 February 1990
175. Uruguay	19 December 1989	10 March 1995
176. Uzbekistan	Accession	24 August 1995
177. Vanuatu		26 January 2006
178. Venezuela	20 December 1988	16 July 1991
179. Vietnam	Accession	4 November 1997
180. Yemen	20 December 1988	25 March 1996
181. Yugoslavia	20 December 1988	3 January 1991
182. Zambia	9 February 1989	28 May 1993
183. Zimbabwe	Accession	30 July 1993
Signed but Pending Ratification
1. Holy See	20 December 1988
Other
1. Anguilla		Not UN member
2. Aruba		Not UN member
3. Bermuda
4. BVI		Not UN member
5. Hong Kong		Not UN member
6. Kosovo
7. Marshall Islands
8. Papua New Guinea
9. Somalia
10. Taiwan		Not UN member
11. Turks & Caicos		Not UN member