Securing Our Facilities Before Disaster Strikes

Richard J. Griffin
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign Missions
Remarks before the International Physical Security Forum
Albuquerque, New Mexico
(as prepared for delivery)

June 19, 2007 

It is a pleasure to be here this evening.

I would like to congratulate this group—and especially the Israelis—on having the foresight to organize this forum back in 1999 to exchange information on how to protect facilities—and the people who live and work in them— before disaster strikes.

All too often in the security business, our work is subject to the rule of ATF—I’m not referring to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms—but rather to “After the Fact.”  The After the Fact rule says that disaster has to strike before you have the resources to strengthen security.

In too many cases, the After the Fact rule has held sway, and it has taken a major catastrophe before security upgrades are made to protect people and property. For instance, it took two major incidents at the White House compound before the U.S. Secret Service was given authority to close off Pennsylvania Avenue in 1995. And, of course, the security measures taken in the wake of September 11, 2001, serve as textbook examples of the After the Fact rule.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the law enforcement and security arm of the U.S. Department of State. DS is responsible for protecting people, property, and information at more than 285 State Department diplomatic missions worldwide. And like the members of this Forum, we are in the business of replacing the After the Fact rule with pro-active measures to protect our people and facilities before disaster strikes.

Today, the threat of violence against U.S. Department of State employees and facilities is real and growing. Since 1998, 40 State Department employees—and 10 employees of other civilian U.S. government agencies serving at our diplomatic missions—have lost their lives to terrorism.

I’d also like to point out that, when U.S. diplomatic facilities are attacked, it is not only Americans who suffer. In the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa, 15 State Department employees lost their lives—along with 225 Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens who lived or worked nearby.

The East Africa bombings were a wake-up call for the United States concerning the need to strengthen security at our diplomatic facilities around the world. In 1999, Congress passed the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act, which established statutory security requirements for the co-location and setback of all overseas State Department buildings in which significant numbers of employees work. For example, the law mandates that:

• in selecting sites for new diplomatic facilities, all non-military personnel at the post must be located at a single site;
• all newly acquired or constructed buildings must be set back at least 100 feet from the perimeter of the site; and
• new chancery and consulate offices that occupy substantial portions of rented buildings or other spaces must meet the setback standards, as well as security standards for chanceries and consulates.

The new security requirements apply to all facilities acquired, rented, or built by the State Department after November 29, 1999.

These security standards have saved lives—and they have allowed U.S. diplomats and other employees to continue to do their jobs, even in the aftermath of an attack on an embassy compound. For example, in September 2006, enhanced physical security and security procedures at our embassy in Damascus prevented four armed attackers using hand grenades and gunfire from exploding two car bombs on the embassy compound. No lives were lost, and the fact that attackers did not even succeed in breaching the embassy’s security perimeter meant that embassy staff were able to resume their jobs following the attack.

Enhanced security at our overseas facilities allows State Department employees to meet with representatives of other governments, sponsor informational and cultural programs about the United States, and negotiate trade and diplomatic agreements without fear of violence or other retaliation. Enhanced security, in short, allows our employees to go about their jobs and conduct the business of diplomacy freely and effectively—even in the face of attacks on our facilities .

We recognize the balance that must be achieved between making our overseas facilities accessible to those who would befriend us and secure against those who would do us harm.

Indeed, preserving the American values of openness and transparency is a prime consideration whether we are designing a new embassy, retrofitting security for an older one, or designing security systems for the new American Presence Posts in remote locations.

Working with the State Department’s Office of Overseas Buildings Operations, DS is now engaged in a long-term capital security construction program to replace 180 of our most vulnerable facilities worldwide. In implementing this program, we are trying to provide security for people, property, and information without compromising the openness and transparency for which the United States is known worldwide.

Fortunately, thanks to the work and information sharing efforts of people in this room and your colleagues at the State Department and other organizations around the world, we are now able to make our facilities more secure without making them look like fortresses or prisons.

As in so many other aspects of law enforcement and security, the exchange of information and ideas among people and organizations that are grappling with similar challenges is essential to our success. That is why the International Physical Security Forum (IPSF) has such an important role to play as we try to balance security and accessibility in designing and retrofitting our diplomatic facilities.

Over the past eight years, this forum has become a vehicle for the sharing of information and research among member countries. Interacting with representatives from other nations allows members to compare their approaches to handling specific threats and incidents. This interaction and comparison facilitates more objective self-analysis and formulation of best practices. As a result, the members of IPSF have amassed an impressive record for tackling critical security issues through cooperation and collaboration. In fact, the cooperative relationships built up and enforced through this annual forum are leading to breakthroughs—no pun intended—in our understanding of many physical security issues.

For instance:

• The United Kingdom cooperative is testing and evaluating anti-ram vehicle barriers, protective window glazing, suicide bomber detection, homemade explosives, and blast effects.
• The Canadian cooperative is testing and evaluating blast effects and homemade explosives and performing modeling of human injuries.
• The Israeli cooperative is working on blast effects, structural retrofits for protecting buildings, protective window glazing, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, homemade explosives, suicide bomber detection, and techniques on rendering bombs safe.
• And the Australian and Singapore cooperatives are working to improve data sharing concerning homemade explosives and blast effects.

Thanks to the work performed by each of you and your organizations, and the information sharing that goes on at this meeting and throughout the year, we can realistically look forward to designing and building facilities that are even more secure—and more aesthetically pleasing and welcoming in the future.

For instance, in 2002, a blast-resistant interior partition system was developed and used at the U.S. Agency for International Development building in Sarajevo. This partition system allowed us to adapt a commercially glazed office building to meet the Department of State’s requirements for blast resistance. The overall result is a more aesthetically pleasing building that is also more secure.

Another example is the use of new anti-ram barrier designs as part of our Embassy Design program. These new anti-ram walls and fences have been designed to provide the same level of protection as their predecessors, yet their appearance is more pleasing and less obtrusive, making buildings look more inviting and open.

In making our facilities secure, we face many challenges from ever-more sophisticated weaponry and the people who use them. But we also have more sophisticated technologies at our disposal to counter these forces. In fact, the challenges that we face today may be no more daunting that those faced by engineers and builders throughout history.

I think that architect Stuart Knoop put it very well in the book Security: Planning and Design when he stated that:

“Throughout the course of human history, architects, designers, and builders have addressed security of all kinds. Often, the most visible security components of a building, such as doors, gates, fenestration, and window grilles, have been raised to levels of high art through architectural design. The inclusion of physical security in the design of a building or other structure is not antithetical to design that inspires.”

In closing, I am looking forward to joining you tomorrow for the ultimate experience in tearing down in order to build up a stronger structure in the future.

Thank you for your time and your attention this evening.