| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) (08/07)For the most current version of this Note, see Background Notes A-Z.
PROFILE OFFICIAL NAME: Geography People Government Economy GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE HISTORY Following a military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, Portugal began a rapid and disorganized decolonization process in most of its overseas territories, including East Timor. Political tensions--exacerbated by Indonesian involvement--heated up, and on August 11, 1975, the Timorese Democratic Union Party (UDT) launched a coup d'état in Dili. The putsch was followed by a brief but bloody civil war in which the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) pushed UDT forces into Indonesian West Timor. Shortly after the FRETILIN victory in late September, Indonesian forces began incursions into East Timor. On October 16, five journalists from Australia, Britain, and New Zealand were murdered in the East Timorese town of Balibo shortly after they had filmed regular Indonesian army troops invading East Timorese territory. On November 28, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state, and Indonesia responded by launching a full-scale military invasion on December 7. On December 22, 1975 the UN Security Council called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor. Declaring a provisional government made up of Timorese allies on January 13, 1976, the Indonesian Government said it was acting to forestall civil strife in East Timor and to prevent the consolidation of power by the FRETILIN party. The Indonesians claimed that FRETILIN was communist in nature, while the party's leadership described itself as social democratic. Coming on the heels of the communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Indonesian claims were accepted by many in the West. Major powers also had little incentive to confront Indonesia over a territory seen as peripheral to their security interests. Nonetheless, the widespread popular support shown for the guerilla resistance launched by the Timorese made clear that the Indonesian occupation was not welcome. The Timorese were not permitted to determine their own political fate via a free vote, and the Indonesian occupation was never recognized by the United Nations. The Indonesian occupation of Timor was initially characterized by a program of brutal military repression. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the occupation was increasingly characterized by programs to win the "hearts-and-minds" of the Timorese through the use of economic development assistance and job creation while maintaining a strict policy of political repression, although serious human rights violations--such as the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre--continued. Estimates of the number of Timorese who lost their lives to violence and hunger during the Indonesian occupation range from 100,000 to 250,000. On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced his government's desire to hold a referendum in which the people of East Timor would chose between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. Under an agreement among the United Nations, Portugal, and Indonesia, the referendum was held on August 30, 1999. When the results were announced on September 4--78% voted for independence with a 98.6% turnout--Timorese militias organized and supported by the Indonesian military (TNI) commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. While pro-independence FALINTIL guerillas remained cantoned in UN-supervised camps, the militia and the TNI killed approximately 1,300 Timorese and forcibly relocated as many as 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly 100% of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On September 20, 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) deployed to the country, bringing the violence to an end. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS Under the constitution ratified in March 2002, "laws and regulations in force continue to be applicable to all matters except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution." Many Indonesian and UNTAET laws and regulations remain in effect, but are being gradually replaced by Timorese laws. During the period from December 2004 to September 2005, the government held local elections in all 13 districts. Timor-Leste witnessed its largest and longest political demonstration in April and May 2005 when several thousand protestors took part in a protest about a broad array of religious and political issues led by the Catholic Church that lasted 20 days. The demonstration ended peacefully with the signing of an agreement between the Catholic Church and Prime Minister Alkatiri that resolved several key issues of disagreement. Despite the winding down of the UN presence in the country, the institutions comprising Timor-Leste's armed forces (F-FDTL) and police (PNTL) remained fragile and the authority of the state much more tenuous than most observers assumed at the time. In February 2006, approximately 400 military personnel (from a total military strength of 1,400) petitioned President Gusmao to address their complaints of discrimination against "westerners" or Loro Monu people by "easterners" or Loro Sae people in the military. Shortly after presenting their petition, they left their posts and approximately one month later were dismissed by the F-FDTL commander. In late April the petitioners group staged protests in Dili. On April 28, the protests turned violent. Citing ineffective police response, the government called in the armed forces (F-FDTL) to respond. The rioting and the police and military response resulted in six confirmed deaths. In response to the events of April 28, large numbers of people began to flee their homes for internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or the outlying districts and several members of the F-FDTL, including the commander of the Military Police, left their posts in protest of the military intervention. During a FRETILIN Party Congress in mid-May 2006, Prime Minister Alkatiri was re-elected as Secretary General after his supporters successfully amended the party constitution to substitute secret ballots with an open vote. Against this political backdrop, a series of deadly clashes between the F-FDTL and forces comprising dissident military, civilians and some police took place on May 23-24, followed by deadly conflict between the F-FDTL and the PNTL on May 25. In the aftermath of these clashes, which effectively caused the dissolution of law and order, mob and gang violence took over the capital, resulting in additional deaths, widespread destruction of property, and the continued displacement of thousands of Dili residents. At the peak of the crisis, approximately 80,000 IDPs were in the districts and approximately 70,000 were residing in camps within Dili. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and international relief organizations provided vital services to the camps that included water and sanitation facilities, camp management support, hygiene kits, and mosquito nets. USAID also supported Timor-Leste's independent public radio and television broadcast services in order to ensure that reliable and timely information about current political events reached Timorese citizens. On May 28, the Government of Timor-Leste requested the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal to send security forces to stabilize the country. By July 2006 there were approximately 2,200 international military and police officers in Timor-Leste. During June 2006, there was increasing pressure on Prime Minister Alkatiri to resign as criticisms of his handling of the crisis mounted. Moreover, serious allegations emerged that he had been involved in illegal arms distribution. In June, former Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato was arrested on the charge of distributing the above-mentioned weapons and placed under house arrest. Following President Gusmao's public request that the prime minister step down, accompanied by a threat to resign himself if Alkatiri remained in office, Alkatiri resigned on June 27. Anti-Alkatiri demonstrations, which kicked off on June 28, with most participants coming from the western districts, turned into partial celebrations following the prime minister's resignation and lasted for several days. Similar numbers of demonstrators entered Dili from the eastern districts the following week to voice support for Alkatiri and the ruling FRETILIN party. After President Gusmao held consultations with the leadership of the FRETILIN Party, Jose Ramos-Horta--the Foreign and Defense Minister in the Alkatiri government--became Prime Minister on July 10. Prime Minister Ramos-Horta's new cabinet was sworn in on July 14, 2006. Ramos-Horta said the "immediate task of his Government is to consolidate security in Dili and in all of Timor-Leste and to put in place the necessary conditions to enable displaced Timorese to return home and rebuild their lives." As requested by the Government of Timor-Leste, the UN Security Council passed resolutions to roll over the small UN political mission, UNOTIL, until August 25, 2006 while its members considered the mandate of a larger follow-on UN mission to help Timor-Leste overcome its crisis. The United States coordinated closely with members of the Core Group on Timor-Leste (Australia, Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) and the EU to obtain approval of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which provides for a UN-led policing component of up to 1,608 personnel. UNMIT's mandate, set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1704 approved on August 25, 2006, calls for the UN mission to assist in restoring stability, rebuilding the institutions comprising the security sector, supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, and achieving accountability for the crimes against humanity and other atrocities committed in 1999, among other aims. UNMIT's mandate is currently in force through February 2008. (UNMIT's own website provides additional information: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/ ) Although security in Dili has been significantly improved in comparison to the violence and anarchy that reigned in May and June, neither the establishment of a new government nor the expansion of the UN mission has reduced the levels of violence and criminality to their pre-April 2006 levels. Indeed, in October, shortly after the UN Special Commission of Inquiry issued its report on responsibility for the security crisis of April-June, Dili experienced a surge of violence that led to several deaths and the closure of the international airport for a day. While the overwhelming majority of the current violence is Timorese-on-Timorese perpetrated by gangs or martial arts groups, foreign nationals have also been targeted. Differences between Loro Sae and Loro Monu have subsided and been overtaken by long-standing conflicts between members of competing groups, including martial arts groups and semi-religious sects. While much of the current fighting reflects a continuing lack of law and order underscored by the absence of judicial accountability, many observers note that communal and gang violence has been employed in many cases toward political ends. As of June 2007, over 28,000 displaced persons remained in 29 camps in and around Dili, representing over 4,000 families, 45% of whom have houses that have been destroyed. Over 2,000 houses have been destroyed, and many more damaged. Another 70,000 or so IDPs remain in the outlying districts. Numbers of displaced persons remain essentially unchanged from late 2006. November and December 2006 featured public efforts by the Timorese leadership to foster a spirit of reconciliation--particularly among members of the armed forces and the police--but key issues remain outstanding, including the lack of resolution of the petitioners' case and the continued presence of armed military dissidents. Police functions in Dili are currently under UN control, while members of the PNTL are being gradually reintegrated into city policing following vetting for criminal or ethical violations. UN officials and other observers expect the reform of the country's security sector to be a long-term challenge. Timor-Leste held presidential elections in the spring of 2007. On April 9, voters chose from a slate of eight candidates. With a voter turnout of almost 82%, the top two finishers were the FRETILIN candidate Francisco "Lu-olo" Guterrres, who received 28% of the vote, and Jose Ramos-Horta, who stepped down as Prime Minister to run as an independent candidate with the endorsement of former President Xanana Gusmao. Ramos-Horta received 22% of the vote. Because the electoral law requires that a candidate win a majority, a second round was held on May 9. Ramos-Horta, who received the backing of all but one of the parties fielding candidates in the first round, won by a landslide, receiving 69% of the vote. The presidential elections experienced some procedural glitches, but were largely free of violence and significant irregularity. The presidency is a mostly ceremonial position, and executive power is concentrated in the prime minister. The majority party in parliament normally determines the next prime minister. Parliamentary elections were held June 30, 2007. FRETILIN won the most seats in parliament, but no single party won a majority, and the various parties did not agree to form a national unity government. On August 6, 2007, President Ramos-Horta asked Xanana Gusmao, the leader of a coalition with a majority of the seats in the parliament (the Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority), to form a government. Gusmao was sworn in as Prime Minister along with most of the other ministers in the new government on August 8, 2007. Principal Government Officials Timor-Leste maintains an embassy at 4201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (telephone: 202-966-3202). Timor-Leste Government website: http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/ ECONOMY Timor-Leste has made significant progress in a number of areas since independence. It has become a full-fledged member of the international community, joining the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The Government of Timor-Leste has drafted a National Development Plan, and its Constituent Assembly has transitioned into a national parliament that has commenced reviewing and passing legislation. In July 2005, parliament unanimously passed a law creating a petroleum fund to effectively manage and invest oil revenues to ensure these funds are invested in the country's development after exploitation of these resources ends. While a nascent legal system has been put into place, the justice system remains among the weakest performing sector of government, still unable to perform its most basic functions without substantial assistance by outside professionals. Efforts are underway to put in place the institutions required to protect human rights, rebuild the economy, create employment opportunities, and reestablish essential public services. FOREIGN RELATIONS Relations Between Indonesia and Timor-Leste In 2005, both nations created a bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) in order "to establish the conclusive truth in regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, with a view to promoting reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the non-recurrence of similar events." The United States has encouraged both Indonesia and Timor-Leste to ensure that the TFC achieves a credible outcome and that the TFC process is transparent, holds public hearings, has international participation, and names the names of those individuals who perpetrated the serious crimes. Respected international human rights groups, however, have criticized the TFC because its limited terms of reference for achieving these ends do not provide for prosecutions or similar measures to achieve accountability, and because the TFC has made no clear progress to date. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TIMOR-LESTE Principal U.S. Officials The U.S. Embassy in Timor-Leste is located at Praia de Coquieros, Dili; tel: 670-332-4684, fax: 670-331-3206. |
 | |||
|
