An Update on the Conflict in Northern Uganda

Mr. Chairman and honored members of the Caucus, we are all too familiar with the grim and tragic facts on the ground in Northern Uganda. Since 1987, Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army have abducted more than 20,000 children; brutally murdered over 12,000 civilians, many of them children; and displaced over 1.4 of the 1.8 million people in northern Uganda, most of them from the Acholi nation, for no apparent reason other than for Kony's personal demonic self-aggrandizement.

Ending this insanity, restoring peace, rebuilding lives torn by conflict and bringing reconciliation between the Ugandan Government and the Acholi people require diplomatic and political will, military pressure, and humanitarian efforts. No one element of this approach can be successful by itself. There must be a comprehensive endeavor. On the diplomatic and political front, President Museveni has offered ceasefires, negotiations and amnesty, even to Kony himself. Thus far, thousands of LRA fighters and around 50 LRA commanders have taken the offer, but the threat of death prevents many others from seeking an escape from their nightmare. We urge the Ugandans to continue these efforts with those willing to accept the amnesty offered by the GOU.

Sudan has given safe haven to Kony and the LRA for many years.. The Sudanese government has agreed to end its support to the LRA. We hope that the recent peace agreement between the SPLM and the Sudanese government will encourage that government to actively deny Kony refuge in Sudan.

The peace initiative by former Ugandan minister, Betty Bigombe, has yielded some results, including persuading an unprecedented number of LRA members to leave the insurgency for amnesty offered by the Ugandan government. In addition, Bigombe has been able to make direct contact with the elusive Kony. President Museveni supports this effort and the U.S. has provided financial assistance to Minister Bigombe. While she continues to pursue peace, we remain skeptical as to whether Kony really has any desire to end the conflict. Time and again, Kony has scuttled peace initiatives and used the ceasefires as an opportunity to resupply and build up his forces.

We have encouraged President Museveni and the Ugandan Government to make reconciliation with the Acholi people a top priority. While the Acholi fear Kony, they equally distrust the Ugandan Government. Only through greater confidence in, and support from, the Ugandan Government will there be better cooperation in the ongoing peace efforts by the Acholi population. The failure thus far of reconciliation efforts between the Government of Uganda and the Acholi people raises the grim possibility that, should the LRA conflict end, the underlying political problems in northern Uganda would continue to fester and lead to another exhibition of frustration and perhaps violence. In order to bring about sustainable peace, the Ugandan government must make a profound effort to reach out to the Acholi people.

The second element in this approach is military pressure and the United States has helped boost Ugandan military capabilities.

In 2002, we released $1.7 million in FMF to procure vehicles, spare parts and radios. Due to operational priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan, delivery of these items was made only recently. In 2004, the U.S. released $4.9 million for non-lethal assistance such as radios and vehicles and to provide training to the UPDF. We do not recommend allotments for lethal weapons.

We believe that the government of Uganda can do more with the military manpower and resources they already have to destroy the LRA. During the first years of this decade, the Ugandans sent troops into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This diverted precious resources and military units away from their operations against the LRA.

Let me emphasize again, that a military solution in and of itself should not be the only tool used to end the crisis in the north. The UPDF needs training and equipment, but military operations increase the likelihood of collateral damage. The LRA is brutal, but its forces include a substantial number of Acholi children that has abducted and used them as soldiers, sex slaves, human shields, and hostages. The Acholi people are not supportive of any actions that increase the prospect of death to loved ones kidnapped by Kony.

A third part of the effort is humanitarian relief. The Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) is a U.S. contribution to the effort. NUPI's goal is to increase cooperation between the GOU and the Acholi in order to deprive the LRA of support. Further, we seek to ensure there are secure corridors for humanitarian relief. The U.S. provides over 50% of the food assistance to Uganda, including a contribution of $75 million in 2004. We also provided $20 million in non-food humanitarian assistance in 2004. The U.S. provided over $13 million to support reintegration of former child soldiers and abductees. Total aid to Uganda in FY 2004,including $50 million for AIDS prevention, was over $172,000,000.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, it is through diplomatic and political initiatives, military pressure and humanitarian efforts that the Ugandans can find a solution to this crisis. Our role is to support their efforts to bring an end to this horrific insurgency, and to try to meet the assistance needs of the people of Uganda to get the job done.