Good afternoon and thank you, Steve, for that warm introduction. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in Somalia.
The last several months have been busy in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. While these have been difficult times, we should not lose sight of the future and the opportunities in front of the Somali people today. Through the framework outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter, there remains an opportunity to rebuild Somalia and restore effective governance representative of all aspects of Somali society. There will be additional challenges before we get there, but this is our common goal, and we must work purposefully to achieve it.
A LOOK BACK AT THE LAST YEAR
Before we discuss the current situation and the way forward in Somalia, I’d like to take a few moments to take a look back over developments of the past few months.
When Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, last spoke at CSIS in January, the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) had just collapsed as an organization. The CIC had refused to join the governance process and the Transitional Federal Institutions through peaceful dialogue, demonstrating to the international community that they were not interested in being part of a long-term political solution for Somalia. Instead, the Courts chose to provoke Ethiopia into launching a counter-offensive against continued CIC military expansion – which ultimately cost the CIC the support of the Somali people and sealed its own fate and rapid demise as a political entity.
The months following the collapse of the CIC have been difficult and frequently frustrating. While the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has made its share of mistakes, the United States government is most concerned by the rise in violent extremism – largely perpetrated by the violent and radical al Shabaab militia that previously hijacked the CIC towards an agenda of military expansion, terrorism, and aggression. Recently, these attacks have deliberately targeted moderate and respected political figures and journalists who are essential to lasting political accommodation.
This violent extremism is designed to undermine an inclusive political process and prevent the establishment of lasting peace and stability - and must not be tolerated. While there are genuine opposition voices that should be brought into the political process, we must emphasize that violence is not acceptable as a means of achieving political objectives and encourage all Somalis to participate in a genuine, non-violent political process. At the same time, we must work towards an effective ceasefire arrangement that will help achieve these objectives, reduce the level of violence in Mogadishu, and prevent further deaths of innocent civilians.
The key to long-term stability in Somalia lies in a continued process of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.
THE WAY FORWARD
As outlined by Assistant Secretary Frazer in January, there are three primary U.S. policy priorities for Somalia:
First, to encourage inclusive political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and other key Somali stakeholders;
Second, to move forward with the deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia; and
Third, to work with our international donor partners on program of assistance to support the constitutional process outlined by the Charter, help build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions to provide much-needed social services for the Somali people, and respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
We have made some headway over the past few months, particularly in mobilizing donor resources and supporting initial deployments of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The United States actively supported the deployment of approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops as the lead element of AMISOM. Deployment of AMISOM is a critical element in helping to stabilize Somalia and create conditions for lasting political reconciliation. AMISOM will help to create conditions for the reduction of Ethiopian forces and their eventual departure from Somalia. Americans, Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to insecurity in Somalia.
Earlier this year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million of that aid was used to furnish equipment and provide airlift assistance for the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support AMISOM. On 27 August, the U.S. began training two battalions of Burundian troops under the African Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program as well as preparing to provide equipment in support of the Burundian contingent for AMISOM. The United States is providing $5.6 million in equipment in addition to the ACOTA training to support Burundi’s deployment to Somalia. Our donor partners have also worked to make resources available to support this important mission.
In addition, we have worked closely with our international partners, such as the United Kingdom, to maintain focus and momentum within the UN Security Council on moving towards a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation as a successor to AMISOM.
The donor community has reacted quickly to make funds available in support of the National Reconciliation Congress, including a contribution of $1.25 million from the United States. Overall, in fiscal year 2007, the United States has provided more than $64 million in humanitarian assistance, $10 million in development assistance, and we have continued to make additional resources available to respond to emerging needs.
Most important to restoring stability and governance to Somalia is the path to establishment of permanent governing institutions at the end of the transition period in 2009. To a great extent, this process will be driven by the transitional government’s willingness to create an enabling environment for inclusive political dialogue. But it also requires that all Somali stakeholders seize this opportunity and choose to engage in a genuine political process and work within a transitional process based on the Transitional Federal Charter.
These objectives reflect an international consensus on Somalia, formed through discussions within the International Contact Group on Somalia and the International Advisory Committee (IAC) for the National Reconciliation Congress. As a founding member of both groups, the United States has worked closely with its regional and international partners in seeking a way forward in Somalia. Through the Contact Group and the IAC, the international community has repeatedly reaffirmed its strong commitment to supporting a sustainable political solution in Somalia through broad-based national dialogue and providing appropriate development, security, and humanitarian assistance.
During recent months, the United States has been actively working with our international donor and regional partners to ensure that the National Reconciliation Congress provided the mechanism for genuine political dialogue among all key Somali stakeholders. Our goals for the Congress were clear: achieve equitable representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and agreement on a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional process. Unfortunately, due to the lack of participation from key opposition figures – despite repeated invitations from the Congress managers and encouragement from the international community – the Congress has not yet fully achieved these objectives.
Following an initial period of social reconciliation, the second, political phase of the Congress concluded on August 30. Yet the process of political dialogue and accommodation is by no means complete. As long as important segments of Somali society remain outside of the political process, the Congress stands ready to reconvene and provide the framework for inclusive dialogue when other opposition figures are ready to join a non-violent political process. At the same time, the TFG leadership must implement the recommendations of the Congress in good faith and in keeping with the spirit of national dialogue and reconciliation. In moving forward with the transitional process, all transitional committees appointed by the TFG must be fully inclusive of all key stakeholders, including those who may not have participated in the Congress.
None of these efforts will succeed alone: In order to achieve lasting security, there must be:
- political dialogue and accommodation among Somalis,
- improvements in the Somali government’s capacity,
- training of a representative, competent and respected Somali security force,
- and forward movement on the transitional tasks outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter leading to national elections and the establishment of permanent governance institutions in 2009.
CONCLUSION
It is important for the Somali people to look to the future, moving forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather than focusing on the current composition of the TFG and its Institutions. As in Liberia or the Democratic Republic of Congo during their transitions, the Transitional Federal Institutions are not permanent institutions. Rather, they offer a transitional mechanism that provides a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following the transitional process.
We understand that this is an ongoing process, and that we have not reached the end. Along with our regional and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialogue, however long it may last, while also responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
Thank you, and now I would be happy to take any questions that you may have.
