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Georgia Monitoring Project: Review of U.S. Assistance in the Post-Conflict Area of Shida Kartli, Georgia


Report
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
October 17, 2011

   
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

THE GEORGIA MONITORING PROJECT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY

MAIN FINDINGS

Immediate Post-conflict Aid

Housing

Living Conditions

Food Aid

Hygiene

Healthcare

Provision of medicines

Education

Economic Security

Re-establishment of Agricultural Production

Competitiveness

New Business Opportunities

Civil Society

Capacity Building

Human Rights and Civic Engagement

Media

ANNEXES

Annex 1: List of U.S. Government Lead Agencies, Bureaus and Offices Involved in Emergency Relief and Recovery Projects

Annex 2: List of U.S. Government Funded Emergency Relief and Recovery Projects

Annex 3: Methodology


ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
 

DOD

Department of Defense

DOT

Direct Observation Treatment

GMP

Georgia Monitoring Project

GOG

Government of Georgia

EUR/ACE

Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia

FtF

Face-to-Face interview

JNA

Joint Needs Assessment

IBTCI

International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

OFDA

USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PAS

Public Affairs Section

PRM

Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

DOS

United States Department of State

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture

WFP

World Food Programme

1 hectare

2.47 acres



THE GEORGIA MONITORING PROJECT

The Georgia Monitoring Project is a two-year project (June 2010 to May 2012) funded by the United States Department of State, implemented by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., and managed by the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE). The primary purpose of this project is to monitor the results of U.S. Government foreign assistance provided to the Government of Georgia from the $1 billion Brussels pledge to ensure the funds are directed toward the foreign policy and foreign assistance objectives for which they were intended. EUR/ACE defines monitoring as the determination of the progress being made to meet defined objectives.

After the conflict in August 2008 between Georgia and Russia, the “Brussels pledge” was announced by the international community on October 9, 2008, at the donor-coordinated Joint Needs Assessment in Brussels, jointly chaired by the European Commission and the World Bank, to assist Georgia’s financing needs for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. At the Brussels conference, donor pledges for the public sector totaled $3.7 billion. An additional $800 million was pledged to support the private sector. The largest bilateral pledge of $1 billion was made by the Government of the United States of America.

DISCLAIMER

The author’s views expressed in the publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of State or the United States Government.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Two months after the August 2008 Russia/Georgia conflict, the World Bank and the European Commission chaired a donor Joint Needs Assessment Conference in Brussels to enlist support for Georgia’s post-conflict recovery. At this conference, the United States Government pledged $1 billion to the Government of Georgia. The total amount pledged by international agencies and individual governments was approximately $4.5 billion.[1] Out of this $1 billion, the U.S. Government allocated approximately $136 million for immediate post-conflict recovery and reconstruction activities, including immediate food supplies, shelter, energy supplies, and agricultural assistance for conflict-affected households, households that had been forced to flee their homes during the conflict. U.S. assistance supported housing rehabilitation, opportunities for income generation, and community mobilization to facilitate the integration and reintegration of conflict-affected households into society. This report covers Shida Kartli, an area in central Georgia directly affected by the August conflict (Map 1). The focus of this review is on assistance to the conflict-affected households that returned to the Shida Kartli (delineated below as a light grey area bounded by a dashed line). The review also focuses on conflict-affected households that could not return to territory lost after the conflict (the area in orange, adjacent to Tskhinvali Region).

Map 1: August 2008 Conflict Area

Date: 08/2008 Description: Map 1: August 2008 Conflict Area © Source: GMP
Source: GMP

These households were resettled in new settlements in rural areas or collective centers in urban areas in Shida Kartli. The review does not assess displaced Shida Kartli residents resettled in other regions of Georgia.

Purpose of the Review

This review presents an independent view of the results of two years of U.S. Government assistance in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli (from fall 2008 to fall 2010) whose overall goal was to provide of immediate help with food supplies, shelter, energy supplies, and agricultural assistance to the conflict-affected population and the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure. The findings and conclusions of the Georgia Monitoring Project review are based on a desk review of project documents, site visits, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and a comprehensive quantitative survey in April 2011 of 2,000 conflict-affected households in Shida Kartli. The conclusions are based on a comparative analysis of the socio-economic status of conflict-affected households before and after the August 2008 conflict. The report also aggregates the data gathered from the survey to estimate the total magnitude of assistance for the area of Shida Kartli from which Russian troops withdrew after August 2008.

Summary of Findings

The August 2008 conflict, which lasted only five days, inflicted significant economic damage on the country. Approximately 139,000 inhabitants of Shida Kartli were forced to flee their homes. Three months after the conflict, approximately 113,000 people (81% of the displaced population) had returned to their homes in Shida Kartli. Approximately 7,750 people (6% of the displaced population) were resettled in the new settlements and collective centers in Shida Kartli. In addition, approximately 18,250 people (13% of the displaced population) were resettled in new settlements and collective centers in other regions of Georgia and were not surveyed in this report. The U.S. Government addressed vital immediate post-conflict needs such as housing, food, personal hygiene, healthcare, medicines and education, as well as repair of potable water supply systems and energy security. U.S. Government support addressed intermediate-term needs through re-establishing agricultural production significantly damaged by the August 2008 conflict, developed programs for the conflict-affected population in training for new business opportunities and in agricultural skills. Support was directed, in addition, to civil society capacity building, encompassing human rights, as well as in media development.

Immediate Post-Conflict Aid

Conflict-affected households faced many immediate challenges in returning to their homes or relocating to new settlements and collective centers. More than half of the homes in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli were destroyed or damaged. The Georgia Monitoring Project survey suggests that housing assistance reached approximately half of the population with destroyed and damaged homes. Assistance was vital as winter approached. The survey suggests that assistance was provided to all households whose homes were entirely destroyed. U.S. shelter assistance contributed to the housing of more than 8,000 households – 55% of households that returned to their homes to the post-conflict area.

The U.S. Government also targeted assistance to support living conditions for conflict-affected households that returned to their homes, were relocated to new settlements, or moved to collective centers. Assistance contributed to improvements in potable water supply and to meeting urgent needs for firewood for the winter. Assistance also contributed to conversion to natural gas for heating in new settlements, collective centers, and some villages.

Conflict-affected households also needed food aid. The Georgia Monitoring Project survey suggests that food aid was appropriately targeted and comprehensively delivered in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli. According to survey results, food aid was provided to approximately 28,330 households (94% of the 30,110 households in the post-conflict area). Beneficiaries overwhelmingly evaluated food aid as highly important or important for their households. Food aid was evaluated especially highly by the new settlement and collective center residents with limited capacity to grow their own food.

U.S. Government assistance also provided hygiene, healthcare, and medicines to conflict-affected households. Approximately 13,130 households (49,190 people) received hygiene assistance, 44% of all households in the post-conflict area. The provision of healthcare services and medicine was more modest in scope. Survey results show that approximately 2,600 households (10,250 people) received healthcare assistance, 9% of the 30,110 households in the post-conflict area. The Georgia Monitoring Project survey suggests that approximately 2,800 households (10,650 people) received medicines, 9% of all households in the post-conflict area. Beneficiaries expressed high levels of satisfaction with hygiene, healthcare, and medicines.

U.S. Government assistance also rehabilitated schools that were damaged by the conflict, and supported training for teachers and for educational activities. Seventy-four percent of the children who go to school in the post-conflict area attend fully or partially renovated schools.

Economic Security

U.S. Government assistance helped conflict-affected households to resume their agricultural activities after the conflict. The August conflict destroyed almost the entire 2008 harvest, the main annual income for households. After the conflict, households did not have the financial capability to resume farming without assistance. Assistance helped restore production almost immediately through support for winter wheat cultivation in the post-conflict area. Conflict-affected households were assisted throughout the 2009 agricultural cycle. In 2009, more than 24,000 conflict–affected households received assistance, 80% of all conflict–affected households. As these households recovered with the help of assistance, they were able to finance their own agricultural production in the following year.

Assistance was also provided to support fruit production; orchards had been the main source of income for agricultural households in Shida Kartli. Assistance with pesticides helped yields increase in 2009 in the post-conflict area.

Animal husbandry was central to the livelihoods of many households prior to the conflict. A significant number of livestock either died, were slaughtered or appropriated by the Russian military forces as a direct result of the conflict. Assistance focused on feed to keep cattle alive over the winter in the post-conflict area, where households had not been able to harvest forage due to the conflict. While assistance was widely provided and aided households over the winter, the number of livestock owned by households in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli continued to decrease after the conflict due to changes in the availability of pasture and hay lands in the wake of the conflict.

U.S. Government assistance provided training in agricultural technology, post-harvest handling, and marketing for people in the post-conflict area. According to the survey, approximately 8,200 households had heard about these trainings, and 11% of households had at least one family member who took part in these trainings (approximately 1,000 people).

Training and skills development in areas outside of agriculture was also supported by the U.S. Government. The development of new skills was especially important to people in collective centers and new settlements, who no longer had enough land to return to agriculture as the economic base for their household. The survey found that approximately 1,000 people had been trained in business skills. U.S. Government assistance also made credits and grants available for people to start small businesses. Training how to apply for credits and grants led to high success rates for households in the post-conflict area that applied for these funds. In total, more than 5,000 people in the post-conflict area reported receiving a grant or credit.

Civil Society

U.S. Government assistance was provided to strengthen civil society in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli. The conflict damaged the social fabric of the post-conflict area. Assistance trained local government staff in social work and psycho-social rehabilitation. Training in human rights and civic engagement targeted households in new settlements and collective centers, but also reached returnees in the post-conflict area. U.S. Government assistance allowed the local television station to replace its damaged transmitter and resume broadcasts of local news to the population. Assistance helped keep civic engagement alive after the conflict; the survey found that 8% of conflict-affected households had at least one family member who was active as a member of a social or public organization.

INTRODUCTION

This review of U.S. assistance in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli, Georgia presents the findings of the Georgia Monitoring Project (GMP) on the three major assistance components: Immediate Post-Conflict Aid, Medium-Term Economic Security and Further Development of Civil Society. Under each of these major rubrics, we present more detailed information on aid directed to particular sectors within the broader assistance category. In the three annexes at the report’s conclusion, we indicate the U.S. Government agencies, bureaus and offices involved in emergency relief and recovery projects, U.S. Government funded emergency relief and recovery projects, and a detailed statement of the methodology we have employed.

The August 2008 conflict inflicted significant economic and social damage to Georgia. The damage was most extensive in the conflict-affected area of Shida Kartli where 139,000 people—approximately 44% of the population of the province—fled their homes. Shida Kartli, a region in central Georgia, contains the Tskhinvali Region that has been de-facto independent since the early 1990s. As Russian forces advanced from the Tskhinvali Region, the population left the part of central Shida Kartli in Map 2 below (marked in light grey) as well as the Akhalgori District (marked in orange). These people will be referred to as conflict-affected households throughout the report. Russian troops withdrew from only the first area of Shida Kartli, not from the Akhalgori District. About 4/5 of the population returned some three months later to only the first area of Shida Kartli; the population that fled Akhalgori District and some other villages from the Tskhinvali Region were not able to return and were resettled in either new settlements or collective centers.

Map 2: Post-conflict populations in Shida Kartli

Description: Map 2: Post-conflict populations in Shida Kartli © Source: GMP
Source: GMP

The Government of Georgia (GOG), the international community, and Georgian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reacted extremely quickly to provide temporary shelter for conflict-affected households and to meet their basic livelihood needs. Most conflict-affected households were sheltered temporarily in public schools and kindergartens in Shida Kartli or the Georgian capital of Tbilisi that were vacant over the summer of 2008.

After the withdrawal of Russian military forces from areas outside of the Tskhinvali Region, approximately 113,000 people (81% of the displaced population) returned to their homes in Shida Kartli, where many found their premises ruined, burned, or ransacked; infrastructure damaged and non-functional; and agricultural land mined or littered with explosive remnants of war. To house conflict-affected households that could not return to areas now controlled by the de-facto authorities in Tskhinvali, the GOG built new settlements and renovated unused buildings in Shida Kartli or other regions of Georgia to serve as collective centers. Construction was done quickly to allow the resumption of schooling in public institutions and kindergartens in mid-September 2008. Approximately 7,750 people (6% of the displaced population) were resettled in the new settlements and collective centers in Shida Kartli. Approximately 18,250 people (13% of the displaced population) were resettled in new settlements and collective centers in other regions of Georgia (Table 1).

Table 1: The displacement of the population of Shida Kartli as a result of the conflict

Unit of Measure

Total in Shida Kartli (before the conflict)

Left homes due to conflict

Returned to their homes (Returnees)

Resettled in new settlements in Shida Kartli

Resettled in collective centers in Shida Kartli

Resettled in other regions of Georgia

Population

313,600[2]

139,000

113,000

6,250

1,500

18,250

Household

84,757[3]

35,326

28,200

1,550

380

4,932

Source: GMP Survey

Three types of conflict-affected households and people are analyzed in this report:

  • Returnees who were temporarily displaced but returned to their villages;
  • Displaced people who were resettled in new settlements within the Shida Kartli Region distant from their old villages; and
  • Displaced people who were resettled in collective centers in urban areas within the Shida Kartli Region.

The category of people and households from Shida Kartli who were resettled in other regions of Georgia was not investigated since this review targeted only the territory of Shida Kartli after the conflict.

Returnees and those resettled in the new settlements and collective centers required different types of assistance for rehabilitation, reintegration, and development. Returnees were expected to resume pre-conflict economic activities, which were largely agricultural; although they were able to return to their homes, they faced new conditions. People resettled in new settlements or collective centers in Shida Kartli or other regions of Georgia faced larger changes to their lives and livelihoods.

While the August conflict lasted only five days, the damage done was severe for all three groups.

Nearly 90% of returnees depended on agriculture and returned to their own land. Fruit from their orchards was their main source of income. Constraints imposed by post-conflict conditions affecting irrigation, stocks of mineral fertilizers, availability of agricultural equipment, limited access to forest resources, community hay lands and pastures posed economic difficulties, as did destruction to their homes.

The population resettled in the new settlements in Shida Kartli faced a very different situation from that of the displaced population who returned to their own land. The new settlements were constructed for them on agricultural land that had not been cultivated for a long period of time. In addition to a new cottage, they were given small plots of agricultural land. These small plots provided only limited opportunities for them to pursue agricultural production as their main source of income. Their problems were aggravated by the lack of agricultural machinery, tools, and animals, which they had been forced to abandon as they fled. On the other hand, a positive dimension of the resettlement was that the new settlements were located near or alongside the main highway connecting west and east Georgia; this helped create alternative possibilities for employment outside agriculture in such areas as trade and services.

The population resettled in collective centers would no longer be able to pursue their traditional agricultural activities. Collective centers were situated in urban areas which made agriculture impossible while presenting potential opportunities in new or traditional trades and services.

Table 2 below indicates the major damage in the conflict-affected area of Shida Kartli.

Table 2: Impact of the August conflict

Damage or loss

Unit of Measure

Number

Percentage of all conflict –affected area

 
 

DWELLINGS[4]

 

Destroyed

Home

610

2%

 

Damaged

Home

14,810

53%

 

CROP LOSS

 

Grain

Metric ton

8,200

48%

 

All types of vegetables

Metric ton

20,200

64%

 

All types of fruit

Metric ton

28,000

39%

 

LIVESTOCK LOSS

 

 

 

Cattle

Unit

12,200

28%

 

Sheep, Goats and Pigs

Unit

5,400

77%

 

Rabbits

Unit

24,000

89%

 

Poultry

Unit

265,300

56%

 

MACHINERY LOSS

 

 

 

Tractor, mini tractor and cultivator

Unit

2,600

29%

 

Truck and mini bus

Unit

600

20%

 

Vehicle and motorcycle

Unit

1,500

21%

 

LANDS MINED

 

Agricultural land

Ha[5]

3,402[6]

5%[7]

 

Source: GMP Survey

METHODOLOGY

This report presents findings on the results of U.S. assistance in the immediate post-conflict period in Shida Kartli. In examining U.S. assistance, the GMP with the support of the well-regarded Tbilisi-based social science research firm ACT Research, conducted a survey that asked people living in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli about the results of the conflict on their lives. The survey asked about the kinds of post-conflict assistance that has been provided to their households and enquired about overall conditions in their households in April 2011. Although GMP focused the survey on the area where U.S. assistance had been delivered in Shida Kartli, beneficiaries in the post-conflict area did not distinguish among various donors that provided assistance. The survey presents the views of Georgian beneficiaries on the results of assistance to provide relief, further reconstruction, and support recovery for these households.

GMP developed a detailed household questionnaire for the report. The questionnaire makes it possible to characterize the situation of households prior to the August 2008 conflict, immediately after the conflict, and at the time of the survey in April 2011. Using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, GMP analyzed the basic socio-economic parameters of the returnees and those who were resettled in the new settlements and collective centers. The GMP analysis then compares their status before the conflict to that after the conflict.

A stratified random sample from areas targeted by U.S. assistance in Shida Kartli was used to select survey locations and respondents. Three target groups of conflict-affected households were identified in Shida Kartli: (1) households that returned home (returnees); (2) households resettled in new settlements; and (3) households resettled in collective centers. For the sampling frame, GMP used a list of settlements in the post-conflict area provided by the World Food Program, which included new settlements, collective centers and 82 villages of returnees in the post-conflict area. GMP conducted a survey of randomly selected 2,000 households from these three target groups (Table 3).

Table 3: Major data collection methods

Type of interview

Type of respondent

Total # of interviews

# of interviews among returnees

# of interviews in the new settlements

# of interviews in the collective centers

Face to Face

Household

2,000

100%

1,200

60%

600

30%

200

10%

Face to Face

Group

40

100%

20

50%

10[8]

25%

10

25%

Source: GMP Survey

In addition to household interviews, GMP conducted group interviews with representatives from each of the three target groups who were aware of assistance projects in their area. The interviews were conducted in each collective center and new settlement, and returnee interviews were conducted in 20 Temi (cluster of villages) that comprises 82 villages of returnees.[9] Finally, to ensure that there were no gaps, GMP conducted eight in-depth interviews with key informants. To guarantee confidentiality to all the respondents, GMP followed Article 4 of the Basic Principle of Official Statistics as stipulated in the Law of Georgia on Official Statistics.[10]

The data was collected in April 2011. All data collected through group and face-to-face interviews were aggregated and analyzed to create a comprehensive assessment. The findings were analyzed in the three target groups separately to identify similarities and differences in the data. Then, the data from all target groups were aggregated and analyzed as a whole in order to assess the results of assistance for all populations affected by the August 2008 conflict.

MAIN FINDINGS

U.S. assistance supported projects in emergency response and recovery and restoration; these efforts aimed to overcome the effects of the conflict, create the conditions to restore household livelihoods, and rehabilitate destroyed infrastructure. The undertaking was a complex and wide-ranging one. Nine U.S. Government lead agencies, bureaus and offices supervised the expenditure of approximately $136 million through 47 projects with 45 implementing partners.[11] These projects had a significant effect on the population in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli.[12] Findings will be examined by distinct areas of assistance below.

Immediate Post-conflict Aid
 

Housing

The GMP survey suggests that multinational housing assistance reached approximately half of the population with destroyed and damaged homes. At the beginning of the August conflict, approximately 44% of all households in the conflict area left their homes.[13] Within three months after military hostilities ceased, approximately 81% of the displaced population had returned to their homes. Approximately 53% of returnee homes in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli were destroyed or damaged (Table 4).

Table 4: The impact of the conflict on returnees’ homes

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of returnees in post-conflict area

# and % of returnees whose homes were destroyed

# and % of returnees whose homes were significantly damaged

# and % of returnees whose homes were slightly damaged

# and % of returnees whose homes were not damaged

Returnees household

28,200

100%

610

2%

7,600

23%

6,600

27%

13,390

48%

Source: GMP Survey

With winter approaching, returnees needed assistance to repair their damaged homes for the season. The U.S. Government, among other donors, launched assistance programs to provide shelter or rebuild homes for households whose homes were fully destroyed and to rehabilitate damaged homes.

According to the survey, all 610 households whose homes were entirely destroyed had their homes rebuilt or received temporary shelter. Shelter assistance was comprehensive in targeting all of the most needy returnees – those whose homes were completely destroyed (Table 5).

Table 5: Rebuilding and shelter provision for returnees with destroyed homes

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of returnees whose homes were destroyed

# and % of returnees whose homes were rebuilt

# and % of returnees provided with shelter

# and % of returnees whose homes were rehabilitated

# and % of returnees whose homes were not rehabilitated

Returnee household

610

100%

120

20%

470

77%

20

3%

0

n/a

Source: GMP Survey

Among damaged homes, priority was given to the rehabilitation of significantly damaged homes. Approximately 55% of significantly damaged homes (see Table 6 below) and 50% of slightly damaged homes (see Table 7 below) were rehabilitated.

Table 6: Rehabilitation of significantly damaged homes

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of returnees whose homes were significantly damaged

# and % of returnees whose homes were rebuilt

# and % of returnees provided with shelter

# and % of returnees whose homes were rehabilitated

# and % of returnees whose homes were not rehabilitated

Returnee household

7,600

100%

60

1%

30

> 1%

4,200

55%

3,340

44%

Source: GMP Survey

Table 7: Rehabilitation of slightly damaged homes

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of returnees whose homes were slightly damaged

# and % of returnees whose homes were rebuilt

# and % of returnees provided with shelter

# and % of returnees whose homes were rehabilitated

# and % of returnees whose homes were not rehabilitated

Returnee household

6,600

100%

0

n/a

0

n/a

3,300

50%

3,300

50%

Source: GMP Survey

Together, U.S. shelter assistance contributed to housing of a significant number of households (55%) that returned to the post-conflict area. The GMP survey did not ask respondents their evaluation of the importance of shelter assistance for their household.

Living Conditions

Potable Water

According to the survey, prior to the conflict, approximately 16,900 households (56%) had potable water. As a result of the conflict, the water supplies for many villages were cut and so remained for a period subsequent to the conflict since the headwaters were now in territory controlled by Russian military forces. The U.S. Government recognized that potable water was important to returnees. As a result of restoration of the water supply lines through U.S. and other assistance, as of April 2011 approximately 17,600 households (58% of all the conflict-affected households) had potable water in the post-conflict area. Prior to the conflict, potable water was often supplied on a schedule rather than available constantly. After the conflict, the frequency of potable water supply had not changed. Households without potable water must haul water from sources in the neighborhood or village. With the structural changes to water systems caused by the conflict, maintaining the potable water supply and increasing the number of households with potable water by 700 is a substantial achievement.

Electricity

Electrification was comprehensive in Shida Kartli. All 30,110 households living in the post-conflict area reported having electricity before the conflict; electricity provision remained at 100% after the conflict.

Firewood

The overwhelming majority of Shida Kartli inhabitants depend on wood stoves to heat their homes. Households had three major sources of firewood: forests, their orchards, and purchases through retailers. Before the conflict, firewood was purchased by 70% of households, while 18% supplied themselves with wood from forests, and 27% burned wood from their orchards.[14] The conflict cut the population’s access to forest resources now under Russian control. Now only 4% of returnee households obtain firewood from the forests, while 46% depend on their own orchards. Relying on orchard wood for heat may lead to over-cutting and weaken fruit yields. U.S. Government assistance recognized that heat would be important to the post-conflict effected households. The survey showed that approximately 7,000 households were assisted through the delivery of free firewood: 500 households in new settlements and 6,500 returnee households. This U.S. assistance targeted a critical problem for returnees – heat for the winter.

Natural Gas

Natural gas is the preferred way to heat homes in Georgia. Approximately 4,100 (14%) households in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli had natural gas before the August conflict. At the time of the survey, the number of households with natural gas was almost 5,900 (20%), an increase of 6%. An additional 1,800 households now have access to natural gas: 900 in new settlements, 350 in collective centers, and 550 returnees in villages. Households resettled in the collective centers and majority of households resettled in the new settlements now use natural gas for heating.

Food Aid

GMP survey methodology suggests that food aid was appropriately targeted and comprehensively delivered to conflict-affected households. The August 2008 conflict placed the population of Shida Kartli in an extremely grave situation. The conflict destroyed or damaged agricultural production prior to harvest and limited access to the region afterwards inhibiting harvesting what remained. According to survey results, food aid was provided to approximately 28,330 households (approximately 94% of all households in the post-conflict area). Approximately 1,780 households that did not leave their homes, had undamaged homes, or had few agricultural losses did not receive food aid (Table 8, following page).

Table 8: Food aid beneficiaries

Type of Beneficiary

Households in the post-conflict area

Population in the post-conflict area

Households that received food aid

Population that received food aid

% that received food aid

Total

30,110

120,750

28,330

115,100

94%

Returnees

28,200

113,000

26,400

107,350

94%

Residents of new settlements

1,550

6,250

1,550

6,250

100%

Residents of collective centers

380

1,500

380

1,500

100%

Source: GMP Survey

Food needs of conflict-affected households were targeted effectively. Households in the collective centers had limited space and lacked storage for food; therefore, food aid to the collective centers was delivered more frequently than to households living in new settlements. The strategy was to end food aid gradually based on implementers’ understanding of the food needs of households and their ability to meet them without emergency aid. Food aid ceased in 2009 for returnees, in 2010 for new settlements, and in 2011 for collective centers. Beneficiaries overwhelmingly evaluated food aid as highly important or important for their households (Table 9). Food aid was evaluated especially highly by new settlement and collective center residents with limited capacity to grow their own food. Food aid saved more than 100,000 people from hunger.

Table 9: The importance of food aid for beneficiaries

Scale

Returnees

New settlements

Collective centers

All groups

Highly important

47%

68%

66%

48%

Important

43%

29%

34%

42%

Not important

10%

3%

0%

10%

Sum

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: GMP Survey

Hygiene

The GMP survey methodology suggests that the provision of hygiene supplies to conflict-affected households was appropriately targeted and comprehensively delivered to the neediest households. Hygiene is critical in relief situations because inadequate sanitation can lead to the spread of disease in conflict-affected households and these epidemics can spread to the rest of the population. U.S. assistance thus sought to deliver personal hygiene supplies to the households that were not able to return to their homes, returned to destroyed homes, or had significant damage to their homes.

The GMP survey methodology suggests that approximately 13,130 households (49,190 people) received hygiene assistance, 44% of the 30,110 households in the post-conflict area. Personal hygiene supplies were provided to approximately 11,200 returnee households in villages in the post-conflict area, 1,550 households resettled in the new settlements, and 380 households resettled in the collective centers. This assistance was provided to all households resettled in new settlements and collective centers, which demonstrates the comprehensive targeting of the neediest households (Table 10, following page).

Table 10: Hygiene aid beneficiaries

Type of Beneficiary

Households in the post-conflict area

Population in the post-conflict area

Households that received hygiene supplies

Population that received hygiene supplies

% that received hygiene supplies

Total

30,110

120,750

13,130

49,190

44%

Returnees

28,200

113,000

11,200

41,440

40%

Residents of new settlements

1,550

6,250

1,550

6,250

100%

Residents of collective centers

380

1,500

380

1,500

100%

Source: GMP Survey

Approximately 92% of beneficiaries of hygiene supplies aid considered this aid highly important or important (Table 11). Similarly, there was praise for the process by which aid was terminated gradually, ending spring 2009 for returnees and in spring 2010 households resettled in the new settlements and in collective centers.

Table 11: Opinions of hygiene aid beneficiaries

Scale

Returnees

New settlements

Collective centers

All groups

Highly important

44%

62%

50%

46%

Important

48%

33%

49%

46%

Not important

8%

5%

1%

8%

Sum

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: GMP Survey

The comprehensive targeting and high satisfaction rates expressed by beneficiaries of hygiene aid suggests that the assistance was highly effective. There were no outbreaks of infectious diseases in the conflict-affected area in the period.

Healthcare

The GMP survey suggests that the provision of healthcare to conflict-affected households was relatively modest in scope as health services were provided only to those households in need of such services. Healthcare assistance is the provision of medical services such as consultations with a physician. As with hygiene, healthcare aid is critical in relief because disease can spread among conflict-affected households and to the rest of the population. U.S. assistance sought to deliver healthcare because the healthcare facilities that the Shida Kartli population had used before the conflict were damaged.

The GMP survey suggests that approximately 2,600 households (10,250 people) received healthcare assistance, 9% of the 30,110 households in the post-conflict area. The survey found that healthcare had been provided to approximately 2,200 returnee households in villages in the post-conflict area (8% of all returnee households), 350 households resettled in the new settlements (23% of all new settlement households), and 50 households resettled in collective centers (13% of all collective center households). Table 12 on the following page graphically summarizes these findings.

Table 12: Healthcare aid beneficiaries

Type of Beneficiary

Households in the post-conflict area

Population in the post-conflict area

Households that received healthcare services

Population that received healthcare services

% that received healthcare services

Total

30,110

120,750

2,600

10,250

9%

Returnees

28,200

113,000

2,200

8,900

8%

Residents of new settlements

1,550

6,250

350

1,200

23%

Residents of collective centers

380

1,500

50

150

13%

Source: GMP Survey

Approximately 92% of beneficiaries of healthcare aid considered the aid highly important or important. These levels varied slightly among beneficiary groups: 91% of returnee households, 95% of households resettled in the new settlements, and 99% households resettled in collective centers that received healthcare aid assessed the assistance as highly important or important (Table 13).

Table 13: Opinions of healthcare aid beneficiaries

Scale

Returnees

New settlements

Collective centers

All groups

Highly important

43%

60%

40%

46%

Important

48%

33%

57%

46%

Not important

9%

7%

3%

8%

Sum

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: GMP Survey

The high satisfaction rates expressed by the beneficiaries of healthcare aid suggest that the assistance was effective for the households that received healthcare aid.

Provision of medicines

The GMP survey suggests that the provision of medicines to displaced households was relatively modest in scope as the medicines were provided only to those households in need of medicines. As with healthcare assistance, provision of medicines is critical in relief because disease can spread among conflict-affected households and to the rest of the population. U.S. Government assistance sought to deliver medicines because the households that had fled their homes lacked the medicines they needed for prior conditions and to address new maladies.

The GMP survey suggests that approximately 2,800 households (10,650 people) received medicines, approximately 9% of the 30,110 households in the post-conflict area. Medicines were provided to approximately 2,600 returnee households in villages in the post-conflict area (9% of all returnee households), 100 households resettled in the new settlements (7% of all new settlement households), and 100 households resettled in the collective centers (26% of all collective center households). (Table 14, following page).

Table 14: Medication beneficiaries

Type of Beneficiary

Households in the post-conflict area

Population in the post-conflict area

Households that received medical aid

Population that received medical aid

% that received medical aid

Total

30,110

120,750

2,800

10,650

9%

Returnees

28,200

113,000

2,600

9,900

9%

Residents of new settlements

1,550

6,250

100

400

7%

Residents of collective centers

380

1,500

100

350

26%

Source: GMP Survey

Approximately 87% of medication beneficiaries considered the aid highly important or important. These levels varied slightly among beneficiary groups: 85% of returnees, 93% of households resettled in the new settlements, and 91% of households resettled in the collective centers that received medicines assessed the assistance as highly important or important (Table 15).

Table 15: Opinions of medication beneficiaries

Scale

Returnees

New settlements

Collective centers

All groups

Highly important

43%

60%

45%

46%

Important

42%

33%

46%

41%

Not important

15%

7%

9%

13%

Sum

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: GMP Survey

The high satisfaction rates expressed by medication beneficiaries suggest that this assistance for recipient households was effective.

Consistent with concerns about the spread of epidemic diseases, the U.S. Government supported the expansion of the Direct Observation Treatment (DOT) facilities for tuberculosis to Shida Kartli. In 2008, due to dislocation as a result of the conflict, the percentage of successful treatment cases fell significantly, from 71% in 2007 to 58%. DOT program success is clear in the rebound of treatment success in 2009 to 75%, exceeding the rate prior to the conflict.[15]

Education

The conflict took place in early August during the summer holidays in Georgia. According to the survey, children of approximately 11,700 households (39% of all conflict-affected households) had at least one member attending a public school in the post-conflict area. Other households did not have children, had children too young or too old for school, or did not have children at home. Of these 11,700 households, children of approximately 4,400 (38%) households attended schools partially or fully damaged by the conflict, while children of approximately 7,300 (62%) households attended undamaged schools. Rehabilitation work – which also encompassed repairs to other schools, undamaged by the conflict, but in serious need of renovation – commenced rapidly following the ending of hostilities. School rehabilitation was partly completed in 2008 and partly in 2009. According to the GMP survey, children of approximately 8,650 conflict-affected households (74% of the 11,700 households noted above) now attend fully or partially renovated schools.

Education assistance went beyond the rehabilitation of schools. Training programs, educational courses, professional education, and distance learning projects were implemented through the Gori Teaching University. U.S. assistance reconstructed and refurnished the training auditorium with space for more than 30 students. Assistance also supported the development of higher vocational education. Community centers were opened in all new settlements which were used for trainings. Rooms in administrative buildings were also reconstructed as facilities needed to train returnees in villages.

Economic Security
 

Re-establishment of Agricultural Production

Agriculture is the main economic activity in Shida Kartli. The favorable climate, highly fertile land, irrigation systems, and road infrastructure enable residents to farm a broad spectrum of crops for consumption and income generation. Animal husbandry was also well developed. Agricultural production varied significantly across villages in the region due to different endowments of water, arable land, and pastures. According to the survey, on average prior to the conflict, each household had 1.5 cattle and 0.76 hectares of agricultural land, of which 0.41 hectares were arable, 0.30 hectares of orchard, and 0.05 hectares of hay land.[16] The August conflict destroyed almost the entire 2008 harvest, the main annual income for households. To understand the magnitude of agricultural assistance on households, GMP compared the agricultural situation prior to the conflict in 2007 with that achieved after the conflict in 2009 and 2010. Data on 2008 is only valuable for an assessment of damage.

There are dramatic differences between people whose land is now in Russian-controlled territory and who, therefore, were resettled in the new settlements or in collective centers and people who could return to their own homes and land. This difference shaped the distribution of U.S. assistance for the restoration of agricultural production.

The U.S. Government launched a number of assistance initiatives to respond to needs of conflict-affected households involved in agriculture. To restore agricultural production quickly, U.S. assistance supported grain production, provided feed for livestock, and encouraged the restoration of fruit orchards which were significantly damaged due to destroyed irrigation systems.

Support for grain production targeted the conflict-affected population who returned to their homes or who resettled in the new settlements. This program was one of the best examples of transitioning from humanitarian aid to development aid because it provided the population with the means to produce bread. Emergency support to restart grain production started rapidly in the fall of 2008 in time to plant winter wheat. The restoration of agriculture was slowed by the clearance of explosive remnants of war and the presence of Russian troops in some areas. Winter wheat assistance allowed households to grow crops immediately in 2008 and keep some of the harvest for seed to plant without assistance in fall 2009. With the destruction of irrigation systems, winter wheat became important to agricultural livelihoods as a drought-tolerant crop that they were able to harvest even after a late 2008 sowing due to the conflict. According to the survey, approximately 3,620 conflict-affected households received winter wheat assistance, 12% of the entire conflict–affected population.

Animal husbandry was central to the livelihoods of many households prior to the conflict. A significant number of livestock were lost as a direct result of the conflict; assistance focused on maintaining the number of cattle for households, since as a result of the conflict the number of hectares of hay lands and pastures available to the population had significantly decreased due to the occupation.

According to the survey, before the conflict, 30,110 households had approximately 44,000 cattle; 7,000 sheep, goats and pigs; 27,000 rabbits; and 476,000 poultry. As a result of the conflict, they lost approximately 28% of their cattle, 77% of their sheep, goats and pigs, 89% of their rabbits, and 56% of their poultry. After the conflict, significant assistance was provided to support animal husbandry through the provision of animal feed and preventive de-worming treatment for cattle. According to the survey, approximately 3,750 conflict-affected households received maize assistance (13% of all the conflict–affected population). Support for grain production transitioned to assistance with maize to re-establish animal feed production in spring 2009.

Despite assistance, households were unable to maintain the number of livestock that remained after the conflict. Reduced access to pastures and hay lands after the conflict has reduced the potential for households in animal husbandry. According to the survey, as of January 2011, the households in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli had approximately 27,000 cattle, 1,300 sheep, goats and pigs, 4,400 rabbits and 192,000 poultry – significantly less than in January 2008 (Table 16).

Table 16: Average number of livestock owned by Returnees (by years)

Type of Livestock

Before the Conflict - Jan. 2008

After the conflict - Jan. 2009

As of Jan. 2011

Cattle

1.29

1.11

0.95

Sheep, Goats and Pigs

0.62

0.54

0.36

Rabbits

0.69

0.10

0.13

Poultry

14.05

7.41

6.46

Source: GMP Survey

Irrigation systems and orchards are more difficult to restore and develop compared to the rehabilitation of annual crop production, which does not require long-term capital investment. The region affected by the conflict was the major apple producer in the country. As a result of the conflict and damaged irrigation systems, Shida Kartli lost 29% of its irrigated land and fruit orchards were significantly damaged. Returnee households were aided throughout the 2009 agricultural cycle since they did not have the financial or technical capacity to resume farming without assistance.

According to the survey, in 2009 approximately 16,700 households received pesticide assistance, 56% of the population in the conflict-affected area of Shida Kartli. Assistance was both short-term, to support production now, and longer-term, to encourage the development of orchards. Short-term assistance with pesticides was especially comprehensive in coverage.

After the 2008 August, conflict approximately 66% of returnee households cut wood from their own gardens and orchards for winter heat. Assistance provided fruit tree seedlings to restore production in the long-term.

As a result of short-term assistance, the yield of fruit in 2009 in the post-conflict area increased significantly compared to 2008. Drought significantly impacted the yield of fruit in 2010; the rehabilitation of irrigation systems to reduce the impact of drought remains one of the most pressing issues for agriculture in Shida Kartli (Table 17).

Table 17: Average yield of fruit produced by returnees (by year)

All type of Fruits

Unit

Yield of 2007 (before the conflict)

Yield of 2008 (conflict year)

Yield of 2009 (after the conflict)

Yield of 2010

Metric ton /Household

2.95

0.69

1.61

0.48

Source: GMP Survey

Conflict-affected households were assisted throughout the 2009 agricultural cycle. After the conflict, these households did not have the financial capability to resume farming without assistance. The survey showed that in 2009 more than 24,000 conflict–affected households received U.S. assistance, which constituted 81% of all the conflict–affected households. As these households recovered with the help of assistance, they were able to finance their own agricultural production in the following year.

Approximately 75% of beneficiaries of agricultural aid evaluated this support as highly important or important. These levels varied slightly among beneficiary groups: 75% of returnees, 85% of households resettled in the new settlements, and 54% of households resettled in the collective centers that received agricultural aid assessed the assistance as highly important or important (Table 18).

Table 18: Opinions expressed by agriculture aid beneficiaries

Scale

Returnees

New settlements

Collective centers

All groups

Highly important

29%

50%

12%

30%

Important

46%

35%

42%

45%

Not important

25%

15%

46%

25%

Sum

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: GMP Survey

Competitiveness

An integral part of supporting the re-establishment of agricultural production was training in agricultural technology, post-harvest handling, and marketing for people in the post-conflict area. According to the survey, approximately 8,200 households had heard about these trainings, 11% of households had at least one family member who took part in training, and 18% of these participants expressed a desire to take part in further trainings. New settlements were appropriately targeted for training; under changed circumstances after the conflict, residents had to adapt to new agricultural conditions and smaller plots. Training appropriately focused on cash crops for income generation and skills that could be applied in a short period of time after training.

New Business Opportunities

U.S. Government assistance supported training and skills development in areas outside of agriculture. The development of new skills was especially important to people in collective centers and new settlements who could not return to agriculture as the economic base for their household. Training was offered in a variety of skills and occupations. Training in business skills generated the highest interest among people in the post-conflict area. The survey found that approximately 1,000 people had been trained in business skills. Of the 1,000 people who reported being trained, 135 stated that they had found a job or started a new business, while another 150 people reported they were still looking for employment or attempting to start a new business based on the training (see Table 19 below). Despite this relatively low ratio, we have to consider expected positive long-term outcomes as a result of the training, i.e. networking among already employed trainees and job seeker trainees, experience in job interviews and changes of job search behavior and knowledge of desirable workplace behavior.

Table 19: Training in business skills

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of trainees

# and % of trainees who found a job or started new business

# and % of trainees who are still looking for employment or attempting start a new business

Total

1,000

100%

135

14%

152

15%

Returnees

670

67%

110

16%

120

18%

Residents of new settlements

300

30%

20

7%

30

10%

Residents of collective centers

30

3%

5

17%

2

7%

Source: GMP Survey

U.S. Government assistance also made credits and grants available for people to start small businesses in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli, and provided training on how to apply for and use these resources. The GMP survey found that 23% of people in the conflict-affected area (approximately 6,900 people) were interested in starting a new business with the assistance of credit. Survey data showed that 15% of the conflict-affected population, approximately 4,500 households, managed to receive a credit and start a new business after the conflict. The provision of credit was more prevalent than training. The survey found 250 people that had been trained in how to apply for credit. Of the 250 people trained in applying for credit, 54% of trainees (135 people) approached banking institutions for credit and 79% of applicants for credit (107 people) were successful (see Table 20 below). Credits were available to a wider range of people than grants and were important in starting new businesses in the post-conflict area. To draw conclusions on the results of the training for starting new businesses, more in-depth investigation is desirable. Because of the limitation in size of the questionnaire, GMP did not ask such questions as: how many hours were dedicated to the full training curriculum, the ratio of attended hours to total hours, results of post-training exams, pre-conditions (collateral, match requirement in-kind or in cash) for receiving credit in the post-conflict area, number of applications submitted by an individual, etc.

Table 20: Credits

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of trainees

# and % of trainees that applied for credit

# and % of applicants that received credit

Total

250

100%

135

54%

107

79%

Returnees

200

80%

110

55%

95

86%

Residents of new settlements

40

4%

20

50%

10

50%

Residents of collective centers

10

16%

5

50%

2

40%

Source: GMP Survey

Grants were less known as sources of finance than credits by conflict-affected households. According to the survey, approximately 7% of the conflict-affected population (2,100 people) expressed a desire to receive a grant. The survey found that as of April 2011 approximately 600 households managed to receive a grant and start a new business after the conflict. At the time of the survey, approximately 600 other applicants were still expecting a response. Grant funds were more widely available than training in grants as a source of funds. The survey found 500 people had been trained in how to apply for grant. Of these 500 people, 80% (400 people) requested a grant and 55% (220 people) of these requests were successful (Table 21).

Table 21: Grants

Type of Beneficiary

Total # and % of trainees

# and % of trainees that applied for a grant

# and % of applicants that received a grant

Total

500

100%

400

80%

220

55%

Returnees

380

76%

290

76%

170

57%

Residents of new settlements

100

20%

90

90%

40

44%

Residents of collective centers

20

4%

20

100%

10

50%

Source: GMP Survey

Credit and grant funds appear to have targeted different groups of conflict-affected households. Grants were mainly focused on new settlements and collective centers where households did not have assets that could be used as collateral for credit. Credit resources were available mainly in resettled villages where returnees had assets that could be used as collateral. Credits were primarily given to returnees. Approximately 15% of the households in conflict-affected villages received credit (4,500 people), while in the new settlements and collective centers, approximately 4% of households received credit (75 people). In contrast, approximately 2% of returnee households in conflict-affected villages received grants (500 people), while 4% of households in new settlements and collective centers received grants (80 people). This suggests that credits were appropriately targeted to conflict-affected households with assets.

Civil Society
 

Capacity Building

U.S. assistance also served to strengthen local governance and civil society in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli. To increase quality and encourage sustainability in GOG social assistance programs, training targeted potential social workers from Gori municipality staff, the administrative city of Shida Kartli. These staff members were trained in social work. A system was devised for managing individual cases to increase the effectiveness of social assistance in the post-conflict area.

Other training provided through post-conflict assistance focused on psycho-social rehabilitation. The conflict and dislocation was psychologically traumatic for many people in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli. A training course was created for government and NGO staff working in the post-conflict area to raise awareness of psychological trauma and train people in Shida Kartli how to work with traumatized populations. Up to 200 teachers, doctors, and local or regional NGO workers were trained.

Human Rights and Civic Engagement

Members of conflict-affected households were also trained in human rights with U.S. assistance. The conflict and displacement violated the human rights of people across Shida Kartli. Assistance anticipated that people in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli would face difficulties in adjusting to changed circumstances and might need support to protect their rights. This understanding led to support for human rights training. Many people participated in human rights training. The survey found approximately 13% of all households in new settlements (200 people) and 12% of all households in collective centers (50 people) had been trained in human rights.

Assistance thus sought to address the lack of civic engagement following the conflict and strengthen civic engagement of people in the post-conflict area, especially those in new settlements and collective centers. Residents of new settlements and collective centers had a high rate of involvement in civic engagement training and projects. In the new settlements, 23% of households reported being trained in civic engagement, as did 21% of households in collective centers. Prior to the conflict, 10% of conflict-affected households had at least one family member who was a member of a social or public organization. After the conflict, despite this training, 8% of conflict-affected households had at least one family member who was a member of a social or public organization. This decline can be attributed to the difficulties conflict-affected households face adjusting to new environments and their need to focus on solving new personal and family issues from the conflict. Without training, it is likely that this rate would have declined more sharply.

Media

Information is critical to conflict-affected households, who need information about their local area to make informed decisions about their lives in times of change and uncertainty. U.S. Government assistance supported Trialeti, a regional television and radio station, whose signal covers all Shida Kartli. Trialeti’s transmitter was damaged by the conflict and the company went off the air. U.S. Government assistance was used to replace the transmitter. Broadcasting resumed with the same comprehensive coverage of Shida Kartli. Without assistance, the company could not have resumed broadcasting. The assistance was of important to conflict-affected households in the region who needed locally relevant information to help them resume their lives in Shida Kartli.

ANNEXES
 

Annex 1: List of U.S. Government Lead Agencies, Bureaus and Offices Involved in Emergency Relief and Recovery Projects (Implemented in the Post-conflict Area of Shida Kartli)
 

#

U.S. AGENCIES/BUREAUS/OFFICES

FUNDING

NUMBER OF PROJECTS

1

DOS/EUR/ACE

$ 3,487,583

1

2

DOS

$ 92,523

1

3

DOS/PM

$ 7,450,000

1

4

PAS

$ 316,866

14

5

PRM

$ 19,000,000

1

6

DOD

$ 13,510,000

1

7

USAID

$ 71,155,350

14

8

USAID/OFDA

$ 18,811,099

6

9

USDA

$ 3,154,882

1

10

Not specified

$ 88,100

7

 

TOTAL

$ 135,878,529

47


Annex 2: List of U.S. Government Funded Emergency Relief and Recovery Projects Implemented in the Post-Conflict Area of Shida Kartli [17]
 

#

SECTOR

U.S. AGENCIES/ BUREAUS/OFFICES

PROJECT TITLE

FUNDING

DURATION

1

IIP/HA

DOS /EUR/ACE

Humanitarian Assistance

$3,487,583

Jan. 2009-ongoing

2

IIP/HA

DOS

Hellenicare Medical Mobile Unit I and II

$92,523

Jan. 2009 - Jan. 2011

3

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

1,550 MT of P.L. 480 Title II Emergency Food Assistance

$1,846,400

2009

4

IIP/HA

USAID

Emergency Relief Food Assistance to IDPs

$2,499,402

Dec. 2008 - July 2009

5

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

Agriculture and Food Security

$2,899,999

Oct. 2008 - Mar. 2009

6

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

Logistics/Relief Commodities; Shelter and Settlements

$1,015,056

Oct. 2008 - July 2009

7

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

Protection; WASH

$1,632,229

2008-2009

8

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

Economy and Market Systems; Logistics and Relief

$1,144,330

Sept. 2008 - Mar. 2009

9

IIP/HA

USAID/OFDA

Humanitarian Assistance

$10,273,085

Fall 2008

10

IIP/HA

DOD

Airlift of USG Emergency Relief Supplies

$13,510,000

Oct. 2008 - Mar. 2009

11

IIP/HA

USAID

Rebuilding Lives Project

$5,245,250

Sept. 2004 - Sept. 2010

12

IIP/HA

USDA

PL 480 Food Aid Monetization

$3,154,882

June 2006 - Sept. 2010

13

IIP/HA

USAID

Tuberculosis Treatment and Control

$7,169,581

Mar. 2003 -Mar. 2011

14

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

Psycho-social Rehabilitation of IDPs

$7,040

Sept. 2008 - Oct. 2008

15

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

Psycho-social Rehabilitation of IDPs

$33,212

July 2010

16

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

Psycho-social Rehabilitation of IDPs

$14,670

2010

17

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

Psycho-social Rehabilitation of IDPs

$20,078

2009 - 2010

18

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2008 (special post-conflict assistance)

$23,866

2008 - 2009

19

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2008 (special post-conflict assistance)

$4,978

2008 - 2009

20

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2008 (special post-conflict assistance)

$24,564

Fall 2008

21

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$24,000

2009 - 2010

22

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$22,151

2009 - 2010

23

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$23,913

2009 - 2010

24

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$22,150

2009 - 2010

25

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$20,745

2009 - 2010

26

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2010

$23,944

2010

27

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2010

$13,014

2010

28

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY OUTREACH – ALUMNI GRANTS FY2010

$5,000

2010

29

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY OUTREACH – ALUMNI GRANTS FY2010

$4,685

2010

30

EG

USAID

Georgia Agriculture Risk Reduction Program

$16,578,163

Oct. 2008 -Dec. 2009

31

EG

USAID

Emergency Supply of Animal Feed

$5,500,000

Dec. 2008 -Jan. 2010

32

EG

USAID

Georgia Nation-wide Employment and Infrastructure Initiative

$16,449,780

Sept. 2004 –June 2010

33

EG

USAID

Georgia Vocational Education Project

$5,550,634

May 2009 - July 2011

34

EG

USAID

Sustainable Integration of the IDPs into the Value Creation Chains of the New Settlement Areas

$500,000

Sept. 2009 -Nov. 2012

35

EG

USAID

Women's Economic Independence in the Post-Conflict Zone and Remote Regions of Georgia

$500,000

Sept. 2010 -Dec. 2012

36

EG

USAID

Rural Energy Program

$300,000

Dec. 2008-Mar. 2009

37

EG

USAID

Internally Displaced Persons Energy Utility Subsidy program

$1,500,000

Dec. 2008-May 2009

38

EG

USAID

Small and Medium Enterprise Support Project

$9,307,745

Sept. 2005 - Sept. 2009

39

EG

PRM/UNHCR

IDP Livelihood Activities, Human Rights Protection and Monitoring

$19,000,000

2010 - 2011

40

GJD

USAID

Informing People of Gori and Kaspi Municipalities about Election Procedures

$24,905

Apr. 2010 -June 2010

41

GJD

USAID

Pre-Election Television Debates in the Regions of Georgia

$29,890

Apr. 2010 -June 2010

42

GJD

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2008 (special post-conflict assistance)

$48,000

Fall 2008

43

IIP/HA

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$23,990

2009 - 2010

44

GJD

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2009 (post-conflict assistance)

$18,561

2009 - 2010

45

GJD

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY COMMISSION SMALL GRANTS FY2010

$22,990

2010

46

GJD

Embassy/PAS

DEMOCRACY OUTREACH – ALUMNI GRANTS FY2010

$3,415

2010

47

P&S

DOS/M/WRA

Conventional Weapons Destruction and Humanitarian Mine Action

$7,450,000

Jan. 2009 –Ongoing

TOTAL

$135,878,529

 


Annex 3: Methodology

GMP used both qualitative and quantitative research methods to gather data on the result of U.S. Government assistance in the post-conflict area. GMP sampled from three different populations that had been displaced by the conflict and had returned to Shida Kartli. The three target groups were: (1) conflict-affected households that had returned to villages in the post-conflict area (returnees); (2) conflict-affected households in new settlements; and (3) conflict-affected households in collective centers.

A separate sampling of households was conducted for each target group. Stratified Random Sampling methods were used in each target group. The strata for the three target groups were villages of returnees, new settlements, and collective centers. The survey was conducted separately in each target group. Conflict-affected households were selected using the Random Walk Principle (RWP) for each target group. Within each target group, the sample size was distributed among strata proportionally to the population size.

Sampling methodology for Returnees:

The World Food Programme (WFP) provided information for sampling. There were 82 villages in the conflict-affected area of Shida Kartli, with 82,231 returnees in total. In each village (i.e. stratum), households were selected using RWP.

Sampling methodology for New Settlements:

The WFP identified twelve new settlements, with approximately 5,622 people living in post-conflict area. Ten of these twelve were identified as recipients of U.S. assistance. Only these ten new settlements were covered by the GMP survey. Within each new settlement, households were selected through RWP.

Sampling methodology for Collective Centers:

There are four settlements in Shida Kartli that comprise ten collective centers. According to WFP, there were approximately 1,137 people in conflict-affected households living in collective centers in Shida Kartli. Within each collective center, households were selected using the RWP.

The sample size was calculated based on a margin of error for quantitative data of 5% and a 95% confidence level for each target group, for a 50% parameter. The sample size was 2,000. Face-to Face (FtF) interviews were conducted with 1,200 returnees, 600 people in new settlements, and 200 people in collective centers.

The report extrapolates from the information gathered from these three different samples to the larger populations from which they are drawn, and adds the three together to examine the overall effect of U.S. assistance. This is how GMP estimates the overall effects of the conflict and the aggregate effects of assistance on Shida Kartli.

The survey also conducted group interviews in each of the three target groups. Group interviews were conducted at the Temi level (in 20 Temi that unite 82 villages of returnees), in each of the ten new settlements, and in each collective center.[18] Group interviews were conducted with representatives of these groups who were aware of donor activities and aid projects implemented in their settlements.

Qualitative data collection combined Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and In-depth Interviews with key informants. FGDs were conducted to identify the main issues for developing the quantitative questionnaire. A separate FGD was conducted through a guide for each of the three target groups. In addition, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants to fill in gaps in data from the quantitative survey.

The sampling unit for FtF interviews was the household. The survey instrument for both FtF and Group Interviews was a structured questionnaire. To guarantee the required level of confidentiality for respondents, GMP followed Article 4 Basic Principle of Official Statistics stipulated in the Law of Georgia on Official Statistics.[19]

All data collected through FGDs, in-depth interviews, group interviews and FtF interviews were aggregated and analyzed to create a comprehensive assessment of the results of U.S. and collective donor assistance to the Shida Kartli region. The findings were analyzed first within each target group to identify similarities and differences. Then the data from all three target groups were aggregated and analyzed as a whole in order to assess the results of post-conflict assistance at the level of its entire target population.

GMP used the Geographic Information System toolkit for planning purposes in an early stage of the survey.



[1] Ministry of Finance of Georgia, Donor mapping - Georgia (Reflects October 2008 Brussels Donors Conference Pledge), http://www.mof.ge/en/3212. For actual donor funding through March 31, 2010 and some associated sectors, please see United Nations and World Bank, Georgia Joint Needs Assessment: A Second Progress Report, June 15, 2010. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GEORGIAEXTN/Resources/jna2.pdf.

[2] www.geostat.ge

[3] 1 Household = 3.7 people

[4] Applies only to people who returned to their own homes after the conflict.

[5] 1 hectare = 2.47 acres

[6] http://www.halotrust.org/operational_areas/caucaus_balkans/georgia/solution.aspx

[7] The amount of agricultural land in Shida Kartli was 69,425 Ha www.geostat.ge.

[8] There were twelve new settlements identified, of which ten new settlements were identified as recipients of U.S. assistance. Only these ten were covered by the survey.

[9] A Temi is an administrative unit comprising a number of villages.

[10] www.geostat.ge

[11] Our understanding is that Shida Kartli received a large percentage of the $136 million funding, but at this point, we do not know the exact amount of US Government funds that actually was expended in Shida Kartli. Other donors also contributed to support the reconstruction of Shida Kartli, but details of their contributions are also not available.

[12] Annex 1: List of U.S. government agencies involved in immediate aid and recovery/rehabilitation projects and Annex 2: List of U.S. government funded projects being implemented in the post-conflict area of Shida Kartli.

[13] The total population in Shida Kartli region before the conflict was 313,600; see www.geostat.ge.

[14] Totals add up to more than 100% because households had multiple sources.

[15] www.tbgeo.ge

[16] 1 hectare = 2.47 acres

[17] Some of the projects listed below have also been implemented outside of Shida Kartli, so the figures may reflect Georgia-wide expenditures

[18] A Temi is an administrative unit which unites several villages and has a leader, the “Temi Representative”. During the site visit to Shida Kartli, GMP found that Temi representatives were the most informed persons about the projects implemented in their area.

[19] www.geostat.ge.



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