Roundtable on Enhancing Transatlantic Environmental Cooperation: Meeting Notes

U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
December 8, 2005

Event Notes

On December 8, 2005, the U.S. Department of State sponsored a listening session aimed at gathering stakeholder feedback on ways the U.S. and EU can foster better cooperation on environmental issues. The event was part of a larger effort to solicit stakeholders' ideas on concrete ways to strengthen and deepen transatlantic trade and investment. The event’s moderator, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Glyn Davies, provided opening remarks. Other panelists included Claudia McMurray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs, State Department, Joan Fidler, Director Office of Western Hemisphere & Bilateral Relations, Environmental Protection Agency, Jennifer Prescott, Environmental Affairs, U.S. Trade Representative, and Penelope Naas, Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of Commerce.

The Department of State appreciates the participation of all of the attendees and encourages them to email written comments to FR0439@ustr.eop.gov.

Following are synopses of comments made by various stakeholders; comments have not been attributed to specific individuals or organizations:

Comments

1. EU regulations are not enforced with the same rigor as U.S. regulations. Where U.S. regulations are enforced to the letter of the law, the EU often promulgates regulations that aspire to a goal without the means of enforcement. Thus they may appear much tougher on paper than they actually are in practice.

2. The EU’s relative lack of transparency allows flexibility to EU firms that would be impossible in the U.S., where there is an explicit, transparent process and threat litigation. In this way, EU regulations become trade barriers, with importers forced to comply with rules that local firms ignore. Instead, all firms should comply with the law as written.

3. International standards and laws are interpreted differently, and there is not a consensus-based standard. The U.S. and EU should commit to work on consensus of standards interpretation. It will be necessary to address different enforcement cultures.

4. EU firms that must comply with EU regulatory programs may seek compensatory relief against U.S. firms that do not. Compliance burdens associated with meeting EU-mandated greenhouse gas emissions reductions required under the Kyoto Protocol or the proposed EU chemical control initiative known as REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization of Chemicals) might prompt calls to tax imports from U.S. firms not covered by EU regulations.

5. The U.S. should work together with the EU to track mercury flows in the world and to reduce mercury production in the clor-alkalide sector. Mercury use in small-scale mining is especially dangerous, affecting millions of people who are not aware alternatives to mercury exist. Enforcing the law will eliminate the problem and will encourage use of alternative technologies.

6. The U.S. and EU should seek to cooperate rather than compete on clean technology. Clean technology lists drawn up by both sides can have the effect of giving approval to certain technologies. Sometimes they are honest, and sometimes they are clearly promoting their own companies. U.S. technologies must be on the EU’s approved list for them to be effectively marketed in Europe. This is especially important in competing for markets in the 10 new EU member states.

7. The U.S. and EU should cooperate on urban issues. Seventy to 80 percent of people in the developing world live in urban areas.

8. The U.S. defines sustainable development in economic growth terms, while the EU emphasizes poverty reduction. It is to the advantage of the U.S. to promote its definition and incorporate it into trade capacity building and standards development.

9. The guarantee of enforcement, transparency and possibility of civil suits should be present in both U.S. and EU regulations. Otherwise, the rules can be applied discriminatorily.

10. The EU’s plan for a globally harmonized system of chemical classification is based on the hazardous toxicity of ingredients that go into an end product, but not on the final hazard presented by the product itself. (Example: Ethanol is toxic, but is used in safe amounts in wine and cleaning products). Intervention by the U.S. government is needed to promote a classification system using a risk-based approach.

11. Labeling initiatives must be right-sized. Too much information on a consumer product label may obscure the danger for personal use of products.

12. The EU actively promotes its standards internationally, thus proliferating their scientifically questionable views on Precaution and creating future problems for U.S. firms. The EU is active in international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Standards organization (ISO), the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), the Codex Alimentarius food code of the FAO and the World Health Organization (CODEX), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The U.S. Government should work with the private sector to determine the proper role in responding to the EU’s efforts.

13. Standards should assist trade. Standards that inhibit trade and innovation are not helpful. For example, the EU REACH initiative provides ineffective protection for intellectual property rights.

14. It is important that any transatlantic environmental dialogue undertaken by the U.S. and EU be more than a token effort.