Transatlantic Security

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Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) Volker: Good morning. I thought in starting out I would take a step back and look back at what have we done over the last year or so, and then in that context also a couple of the current things that we’re doing today.

You’ll remember that soon after his re-election, in fact two days after his re-election, President Bush gave a press conference in which he said he wants to work together with Europe to face common challenges. He repeated this message again and again in December and January and February. So did Secretary Rice throughout that time. The President’s first visit, or first foreign travel after his reelection was to Europe. In fact, to Brussels for meetings with the EU, here in the EU buildings as well as to NATO and to Germany and Slovakia. Secretary Rice’s first travel as Secretary of state was also to Europe.

We spent a year basically trying to flesh out that proposition, that in order to deal with the challenges that we face in the world today the U.S. and Europe need to work together. We need to build a stronger strategic consensus, we need to discuss our objectives and we need to build joint actions in what we do. We face a complex set of challenges and it’s critical that the democratic community in the world discuss these issues, build a common view, express that view in the world, and act on it. That’s what we’ve been trying to do.

A year ago I would have said we share common objectives on a number of issues. And I would have talked about Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, but that’s about as far as it would have gotten. We wanted the same thing but we had different strategies for how we were trying to get there.

Over the past year we have done a lot of work with our European allies and partners bilaterally - in the European Union, in NATO, in the OSCE, in other fora like the Quartet or the Contact Group or the EU-3 on Iran. I think we have made an enormous amount of progress in seeing the United States and Europe really put their minds and their efforts together to face some of these challenges together. If I go through that same list of issues that I would have mentioned a year ago – Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Russia, China, Africa, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction – I could now give you four, five, six specific things on what are we saying about them and what are we doing together. I’m sure we’ll get into some of these later today.

But I think when you take that kind of macro view, I think you can see an enormous amount of progress reflected in the will on both sides of the Atlantic to have the transatlantic relationship working together on these common challenges. So that’s sort of the perspective that I’m bringing here.

As was mentioned, I am here in Brussels today for meetings with the EU. We do a so-called task force meeting where we just periodically get together to try to review the full range of issues that we’re dealing with and make sure that we feel like we’re functioning well and that the right people are engaging directly and that we are preparing the way for future ministerials and summit meetings.

I was in Munich over the weekend for the Munich Security Policy Conference where a number of European leaders and ministers were there speaking about security and defense policy. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was there from the United States as was Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick. It was a fascinating conference this year. I can talk a bit about that.

I was also in Paris prior to that for bilateral consultations accompanying Deputy Secretary of State Zoelick. From here I’ll go to Rome for further consultations, to Vilnius, and also to Moscow. In Moscow, I’ll be talking about OSCE and NATO issues. I’d just add that here in Belgium as well I had a meeting yesterday with the OSCE coordinator for Belgium, given Belgium’s OSCE chairmanship.

That’s sort of the range of issues I’m covering in this trip and the discussions. That’s an opening statement to tell you what I’ve been doing, and then maybe you’ll want to go to questions from here.

Question: Perhaps I can start with a question about Hamas and to what extent Europe and the United States are coordinating what their next steps should be as far as that’s concerned, what sort of things you’re looking for now, and what would happen if Hamas doesn’t go as far as clearly renouncing violence or making a clear statement on Israel.

PDAS Volker: As you know, the Quartet issued a statement in London last week following the Palestinian elections in which they called on Hamas to renounce violence, to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and to adhere to all prior agreements of the Palestinian Authority. They called on the future Palestinian Authority to do that. And as you know, the European Union is part of the Quartet, so this represents a European Union view as well as the U.S., United Nations and Russia. That’s an important step so far.

They have not yet formed a government in Palestine, the Palestinian territories, and we’ll have to see exactly how that comes out, but we’ve made very clear that we do not see the ability of the United States to continue funding the Palestinian Authority if it’s a Palestinian Authority that does not renounce violence or that does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. There needs to be a sense that both sides recognize that they need to work towards a two-state solution, dealing with each other as partners, and building security. That is essential that that come from the Palestinian Authority.

The European Union has expressed this view as well. Obviously people are considering how this applies and I think we have a bit of time ahead just to see how this develops in the Middle East. Certainly the best outcome is that Hamas does come forward with some new statements and new positions as it assumes new responsibilities.

Question: If there’s a more nuanced outcome in that Hamas will [inaudible] exactly as you would like it, is there a way then of ring-fencing to make sure it does not go to the Authority or get used by people you don’t like?

PDAS Volker: We’ll have to see exactly what happens, but I think the fundamental point stays the same. Unless the two sides and the people representing those sides work toward a two-state solution, work on the road map, which means that on the Palestinian side there needs to be a renunciation of violence, a recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and adherence to all prior commitments, if you don’t have those things then there won’t be a basis for moving forward and that’s what we all want to see, so we’ll be very much pressing those points from the Quartet statement. And the Quartet’s words are more than a statement, it reflects the collective thinking of people in the Quartet and we’ll be pressing that as they form a government.

Question: Wouldn’t the worst scenario be the collapse of the Palestinian Authority – chaos. You don’t have too strong a hand, the U.S. and the EU….

PDAS Volker: It’s been, I don’t know exactly how long, a week or more since the Palestinian election. I wouldn’t treat this as an issue that’s about to explode. I think we have some time to work on this. There has been a standoff between the Israelis and Palestinians for a very long time. Hamas has had this position for a very long time. There are Palestinian Security Forces that have thus far done a reasonably good job of trying to ensure security. Hamas has what it calls a ceasefire in place. I don’t think this is about ready to explode as an issue, but I do think it’s a serious issue if we want to see the process move forward.

Question: Why do we keep asking Hamas all the time to do the right moves when for at least five years Israel has done whatever it pleases, and of course the Palestinians are saying now…It is because Israel did what it did that Hamas came up with came up with such a strong message. The Palestinians don’t like what Israel is doing and because of that, perhaps in self-defense, they are thinking that Hamas is the right solution. We keep asking Hamas to behave themselves where no one is asking Israel to do anything.

PDAS Volker: I think you have to take a look at the situation. We had a Palestinian Authority that was acting responsibly, that was trying to work toward a two-state solution, that was willing to negotiate toward that with Israel, treated Israel as a partner. You have an Israeli government that is working toward the outcome of a Palestinian state as their neighbor, that is working to build security, that was working together with the Palestinians as a partner. Everyone has at heart the interest of the Palestinian people, to see that they have better opportunities economically, politically, and in security.

What’s changed is now the Fatah party was rejected as a governing body and in its place was elected a party that does not share that basis, those objectives for establishing peace. As I said, Israel is working toward a solution of a Palestinian state, has withdrawn from Gaza, has cooperated to try to build security in the context of its withdrawal from Gaza, so I think there are a lot of positive things there.

The other thing I would say is, in thinking about your question, is it’s important always to look from the Israeli perspective too. If you’re faced with terrorist attacks, if you’re faced with what would now be your negotiating partner who says that they do not recognize your right to exist, you cannot be there, and then over the horizon you have an Iran that is saying Israel should be wiped off the map and is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, it’s a very dangerous and volatile environment. I think any Israeli voter or government would be very concerned about this. Not to say they don’t have responsibilities and opportunities in the process as well, and they were exercising them, but I think we also have to recognize how it appears from their point of view.

Question: I’d like to slightly change the subject. Could you comment on the recent incident between Denmark and Europe where there have been some comments that this is the start of a war of the cultures?

PDAS Volker: Recent incidents between Denmark and Europe? [Laughter].

Question: Did I say Europe? I need a cup of coffee. [Referring to events following the publication of cartoons in Denmark]

PDAS Volker: I would refer you also to a statement issued by the White House over the weekend and to a statement issued by the State Department last week. A couple of basic things here. One of them is that I think it’s very important that we all are politically sensitive and we recognize what are objectionable language or practices, and we do this in many ways in our societies under normal circumstances any way. We’re very sensitive about racism and racist epithets, racial denigration. We’re very sensitive about ethnic conflict. And particularly in states where there have been conflicts in the past, we’ve learned to be very sensitive to that.

I think we should be equally sensitive on matters of religion. I think it’s just a matter of responsibility. I think that’s what a number of European commentators have said as well. Certainly what was part of our statement.

In addition to that there is, of course, free media and we strongly support the right of free expression, and this should be exercised with responsibility but it should not be a right that is curtailed.

Finally, I think also that reactions to freedom of expression, things that are said, also need to be in appropriate measure. I think that the violence that we’ve seen over the past weekend, the burning of embassies, the demonstrations, is beyond what could be justified based on what’s taken place in terms of the cartoons and the freedom of expression, as objectionable as those are.

We’ve certainly said, I know the Danish government has said, others have said, we find the cartoons themselves objectionable. We would certainly, as a government not support or publish those. And also I recognize that the newspaper editors themselves have apologized and I think their apology should count for something. I hope that we could be in a more serious dialogue with partners in Europe and also in the Middle East about all of these things. About respect for religion, about tolerance, about freedom of expression, about responsible journalism.

Question: May I follow up on that please? Do you see what happened in the last week as part of a broader picture because issue of the cartoons in Denmark started over three months ago? It was not so sensitive as it is now. So if there has been something else in Europe, for instance.

PDAS Volker: What do you mean?

Question: Well, the reaction wasn’t instant, so was there something more?

PDAS Volker: You said the reaction was not instant, so was there something else?

Question: Yes.

PDAS Volker: These things have a cycle. Sometimes things get more attention at a certain time than they did when they first happened and then they take off. I’m not sure that there’s something else at work there.

I’ve seen a couple of European leaders comment that while there is a spontaneous emotion being expressed about these cartoons being objectionable, there’s also the possibility that this is then being used or manipulated by extremists who are seeking to create exactly this kind of cultural conflict that we don’t believe in or want to see. I think we do have to watch out for that.

Question: What are your thoughts on the way that it developed last weekend in the Middle East from Saudi Arabia. Do you think its was used by extreme elements? Can you give us some insight?

PDAS Volker: I was thinking, for example, if you think about Syria, what kind of state Syria is, how much freedom of expression there is in Syria and the ability to mobilize vast movements, that doesn’t just happen by accident so there has to be some kind of acceptance or support on the part of the state to allow such a demonstration to go forward and to attack embassies of two European countries. As the White House statement said, it is a serious responsibility under the Vienna Convention to ensure the protection of diplomatic missions, diplomatic facilities, and Syria did not exercise that responsibility, so we place Syria as responsible for that.

When you look at the demonstrations in Lebanon, it just struck me how many people mobilized so quickly and with what level of force. I think there is a possibility that there are extremist elements at work in this.

Question: On another subject. Since you are dealing with Europe and Europe is buddy-buddy with Belarus, that just a few days ago or weeks ago decided not to give a visa to the representatives of the EU and the United States. The Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice said just a few months ago in Latvia, no, in Lithuania, in Vilnius that these regimes have to go and we are going to change things. How do you see things evolving in Belarus?

PDAS Volker: They’re heading toward an election in Belarus where already the conditions that you would need to have a free and fair election are not in place so it is very, very difficult for alternative political parties or movements to organize or to act…severe limitations on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly. President Lukashenko is seeking a third term of office which is inconsistent with the constitution. So we don’t believe that they’re moving in the right direction in terms of this being a free and fair election. What we would insist is that this must be a free and fair election.

Despite these difficulties the opposition has united around a single candidate, Milinkevich, who was here in Brussels last week, met with European Union officials – Javier Solana. We also met him - Assistant Secretary Fried met him in Warsaw and then again here. And as you say, we and the European Union sought to deliver a clear message to the authorities of Belarus that they have an obligation to have a free and fair election and that there are consequences if they don’t in terms of our view of the legitimacy of the government that emerges from that, and that we may then take further steps based on that.

The Belarusian government chose not to receive this message, did not allow U.S. and EU envoys to come and do that, which is unfortunate, and as a result we then took the same common message and produced a joint U.S./EU statement which we released February 3rd. I’d refer you to that as well. I know your follow-up question will be, "Well, what will you do if there is a bad election, what is your policy there?" That statement, which I would read if I had it in front of me, has a few specifics on this.

It’s interesting, it’s very difficult in an environment like that to know what people really think, what is the popular will, how do political movements take shape. And we’ve seen some polling data that just in the several weeks since the opposition united around Milinkevich as a single candidate, his popularity rating went from somewhere around zero because he was unknown in that environment, to something around 24-25 percent - in just a matter of a few weeks, which is quite something.

I think the point that this raises is that given the opportunity to have a political debate, and to choose their leaders, the people could bring about change in Belarus. What we would like to see the Belarusian authorities do is to create the conditions where that kind of free, fair political election can take place.

Question: There have been some little disputes about this joint statement concerning the wording. Is it true that sometimes the Americans just are more outspoken concerning these issues and the Europeans are too laid back?

PDAS Volker: Actually there was not much dispute over this joint statement from our perspective. I guess in any kind of diplomacy you have a draft, you say oh, let’s change this word or let’s change that word, but this was one of the areas where I think the U.S. and the EU had the quickest, fastest, most common understanding in terms of reaching agreement on what we were trying to do compared to a lot of other issues. There’s a genuine commonality of view on what the situation is in Belarus and what the steps are that we should be thinking.

Question: [Inaudible] attitude towards issues…?

PDAS Volker: I think on Belarus in particular, which is what we’re talking about, I think this was really a very smooth process and in fact just as we sought to arrange this joint demarche, the EU and the U.S. in Minsk, we were coordinating with the EU once or twice a day on how to present the request, how to respond to Belarusian responses to our request which were not yes and not no, but trying to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the European Union. We both approached it with the determination that we would not allow such a wedge to be driven.

Question: In more general terms, is there a different attitude?

PDAS Volker: I think what we have is an American way of speaking starting with the President, that is very forthright and very strong, saying we believe in freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, market economy, and that the advance of freedom in the world is essential. The basis of our societies, which are based on these values, and the security of our societies depend upon the continuing advance of freedom in the world. That’s the kind of language that Europeans don’t often say. I’m not sure there’s a lot of difference of view in terms of the basic values and what that means. I think there’s actually a lot of commonality. I think it’s more a manner of speaking, of how people present that.

Question: One of the big issues in Munich was Iran and we had several U.S. Senators talk about a coalition of the economic willing that would be ready to impose various sanctions on Iran outside the UN Security Council if need be. I was wondering, do you not see the potential for the same questions of legitimacy about action on Iran arising if that happens as we saw over in Iraq?

PDAS Volker: I don’t. In the first instance, we have to go step by step. We had a very important meeting with the Board of Governors in the IAEA in which they assumed the responsibility of reporting Iran to the UN Security Council. That’s an important step. In accordance with the agreement that we reached in London last week, we will take up the issue in the UN Security Council in March and we’ll see where we go with that. We have to go step by step.

We continue to be in close consultation with the EU-3 who have the lead in any negotiations, if they’re to resume. Those are now stopped for the time being, given Iranian decisions. And also with Russia and with China as members of the Security Council.

We may get to the stage where we would agree in the UN on sanctions to apply to Iran, if they continue to reject cooperation with the national community and continue to pursue uranium enrichment within Iran which can really only be justified as necessary for a nuclear weapons program.

If the UN doesn’t do that I think we will face questions about well, what do we do? It is a very serious threat. And I don’t believe that there’s a question of legitimacy for the European Union or the United States or others to apply sanctions to a country such as Iran. That’s a matter of choice that the U.S. has made a long time ago and that the European Union is perfectly within its rights to make.

Question: If the UN was such a flawed route for dealing with Iraq and if sanctions were such a flawed way for dealing with Iraq, why bother with those two approaches with Iran?

PDAS Volker: We went through the United Nations on Iraq. We had multiple Security Council resolutions over a number of years about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction and so forth. President Bush went to the United Nations before the war in Iraq, made a major speech, made the case for the UN to take action. We then passed a further Security Council resolution on Iraq giving Iraq one last chance. So we used the UN process extensively in Iraq.

In the end, there was an expectation that there needed to be yet one more Security Council resolution on Iraq and that did not happen until after the conflict, and then there was a UN Security Council resolution at the end of the hostilities phase and we’ve had several since then in which we had sought to establish a firm basis for security, stability, democracy, in Iraq and we continue to operate on that basis.

Question: Is that different from the reason why the U.S. went down the UN route which was essentially that and the UN [inaudible]. On this one the United States seems to be very serious about going down the UN route, much more serious than it was over Iraq. Isn’t that because you don’t really have the options in Iran that you had in Iraq, that is, military force?

Secretary Volker: I think we were serious on both occasions. Your question was why didn’t we use the UN in the case of Iraq, so what I was doing was refuting --

Question: That wasn’t the question. The question was why was the UN flawed with Iraq, but [inaudible].

PDAS Volker: We thought the UN had to exercise its responsibilities. We still think the UN should do that, including in the case on Iran.

The purpose here, and this gets back to what I was saying in the beginning, that we do believe it’s very important for the international community, particularly the democratic community in the world, to work together to deal with these very serious challenges and to do so on the basis of our shared values. That includes building as strong and as international consensus as possible.

I think Russia’s role and China’s role in the UN in dealing with Iran are key. If you look at Iran in terms of its nuclear programs, Russia plays an important part in addressing that question. China could also play a very important part in addressing that question. So there are reasons why it’s important that we have the international community as engaged as possible from a democratic perspective and also from a very practical perspective.

Question: Is there a danger of this becoming an issue of the efficiency of the UN or of the focus being on Russia and China rather than on Iraq?

Secretary Volker: Could you repeat the question?

Question: Is there danger of this becoming an issue of Russia and China and getting them on board, and of the efficiency of the UN, rather than Iraq? That is, a matter of process rather than substance?

PDAS Volker: I don’t think so. I think that thus far, if you look at this issue of Iran over a year, year and a half, and its nuclear programs, it has been one of having a divided approach within the international community, and a lot of debate about what’s the appropriate response. Why is the U.S. saying this? Why doesn’t the U.S. offer more carrots? Why doesn’t the EU offer more sticks? A lot of acrimony in the debate over what to do about Iran a year and a half ago. And the trend line since then has been one of a strengthening consensus, both between the U.S. and the EU-3, but also much more broadly as you see in the vote in the IAEA Board of Governors where only three nations voted against the resolution – Venezuela, Cuba and Syria. So a broadening consensus, both substantively and numerically, in terms of what the issue is with Iran.

I think the clarity of the issue has gotten greater over time. I think Iran has been responsible for some of this itself, of course, through its actions and its statements, both about its nuclear program, about Israel, about the Holocaust, and its rejection of the negotiating process that the EU had offered, the EU-3 had offered. So I think the issue has actually become more focused on Iran’s actions and behavior as a result of this effort than less so.

Question: Can I come back to the question on sanctions for Iran? I find it strange that there is now talk about sanctions towards Iran because, according to the U.S., sanctions in Iraq didn’t stop weapons of mass destruction programs. So how can sanctions stop Iran getting nuclear weapons?

PDAS Volker: The whole effort here is to try to get Iran to make a different decision: instead of pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enrichment within Iran, to get them to make a different decision. And if they will insist on a civilian nuclear program that they find a way to do that that is consistent with IAEA norms and without having an enrichment cycle inside of Iran.

That was also, if you compare it with the case of Iraq, we were hoping to get Saddam Hussein to make a different decision about a weapons of mass destruction program. On the one hand, our intelligence was flawed and we know that now. On the other hand, he was deliberately deceiving his own people as well as the outside world about his nuclear weapons program and made no effort to change that level of deceit.

Whether sanctions would work remains to be seen. Iran is a country that does care about its engagement with the international community and I think putting that engagement in question as part of an effort to get them to make a different decision about a nuclear weapons program would be a right and sensible step.

Question: Talking about Israel and Hamas, you mentioned, you linked Hamas to Iran and Iran’s [inaudible] a dangerous political environment. In terms of looking at global threats, are Iran and its nuclear program the biggest clear and present danger to world security?

PDAS Volker: I think the biggest, most serious, immediate threat we face is terrorism. I think the prospect of Iran having nuclear weapons is a very serious but slightly longer-term challenge. We have a little time to work on this and we want to continue to pursue diplomatic approaches to deal with this and we have some opportunity. So I think they’re both crucial and it’s a very serious threat for both Europe and the region and the United States.

Question: I’d ask you, it’s a little bit related to this on NATO. We heard discussion of NATO forming wider links, with Australia, Japan, others. From that two questions flow. One is what more could NATO do, and secondly, aren’t you a little bit disappointed given that we’ve been hearing for a few years this argument that NATO could be very important in the global war on terrorism, and as yet there is very little sign that it has actually managed to move in that direction, even though there is consensus within NATO for such a role.

PDAS Volker: Thanks for a question about NATO, and thanks for a long enough question to allow me to get a cup of coffee. [Laughter].

Question: It could have been shorter.

PDAS Volker: No, no. That’s perfect.

I’m going to give a long answer, if you don’t mind, because I think there are a few things that are worth saying about NATO. One of them is that in 1994 NATO had never conducted a military operation and by 2005 NATO was conducting six or seven simultaneously. The first military operation that NATO conducted was in Bosnia. There was a great deal of debate at the time about NATO acting out of area - what does this mean, should it do so? - even in the face of serious issues of ethnic cleansing and warfare in the European continent. Gross human rights abuses. There was debate over whether NATO should really intervene or not. When you fast forward ahead to 2005, I think people’s thinking has shifted dramatically from that time, where NATO is acting as the principal peacekeeping and stability force in Afghanistan, is patrolling the Mediterranean through Operation Active Endeavor for counterterrorism purposes, is training Iraqi security forces, delivering humanitarian assistance to Pakistan and to Louisiana, providing logistical support, airlift, to African Union forces to help them in Darfur, continuing the mission in Kosovo, and continuing with a small presence in Bosnia with the EU now taking the lead in Bosnia but NATO maintaining a small presence.

This is a striking variety of operations, both in terms of the nature of the operations, responding to a multiplicity of challenges, and also in terms of geographic scope.

The first point is that I think there has already been a significant change in thinking about what NATO is and does, at least as a matter of practice if not as a matter of theory. That when challenges arise, our leaders look around and say what can we do about it, who can do something about it, and we often ask the question – well, can NATO do this, can NATO do that? The UN is in that situation. It gets confronted with a challenge, oftentimes it will issue a mandate, it will say yes, there ought to be a security assistance force, such as in Afghanistan, and then look for an organization like NATO to try to help execute that decision.

In Africa, of course, the African Union has the lead, not NATO and not others. But in response to a request NATO was able to provide some support and we’d be prepared to do more if that’s what the African Union wants.

So I think that change of thinking has already gone a long way.

The next thing I would say is that this level of activity and diversity of operations and carrying them out at great distance is very challenging. We would like to see NATO strengthen its capabilities, particularly in terms of acting at some distance – deployability - and in particular areas that may be useful for future operations. As a matter of priority, we think that the NATO Response Force has been a very good innovation in terms of getting a certain number of forces available on short notice and able to deploy, but that this should be strengthened and reinforced. We ought to look at other capabilities that NATO does not have in sufficient number as well and we should encourage nations to develop these further and make them available on shorter notice. We should think about long range planning, given the number of operations that we’ve got. Instead of just a couple of years out maybe looking at a few more cycles out and generating the forces to carry them out.

We ought to think about how we pay for these things, because we’ve had a pretty simple system at NATO where whoever participates pays the cost of their own participation. But when you multiply this over several operations it ends up being the same countries doing a lot of the same work and it becomes an impediment to doing more. Maybe we should spread these burdens more equitably among the allies.

So there’s a whole range of things that we would see on the capability side to reinforce and make NATO stronger and effective.

Another consequence of this development in terms of how we view and use NATO over time is that NATO is now acting in parts of the world that it never acted in before and with partners that it had not typically acted with before. If you’ll look at Afghanistan, for example, you’ll find NATO working together or in some relationship with Australia and New Zealand and, I believe, Japan. It raises the question not of membership for these countries in NATO, but it raises the question that if our expectation is that the trajectory that NATO has been on is one that will continue, then we would expect that we would be working with these countries in the future. And, therefore, maybe we should create some kind of relationship, whatever you would call it - partnership, liaison, communication, something, with countries with which we are likely to be operating in various spots in the world in the future as we deal with crises or peacekeeping or humanitarian support.

So creating those kinds of liaisons or partnerships is something that we’re thinking about.

We don’t have a fixed view that is a blueprint saying here’s what the new NATO looks like. These are the kind of topics that were discussed a little bit in Munich over the weekend, that are the subject of consultations now within NATO and among the allies in bilateral channels. The aim is to reach more of a common view by the time of the summit meeting this fall. In November of this year there’s a summit meeting in Riga. That’s sort of the target for really coming to closure on some of these further steps. But these are the topics that we’re talking about and some of the reasoning why.

Question: How will you see the relationship with the ESDP – cooperation, competition?

PDAS Volker: We strongly support the strengthening of European capabilities to carry out security and defense tasks, and don’t see any reason why this should be in competition or conflict with NATO. This can be done in a very transparent and interoperable way. The way we would look at it is NATO is the place where the U.S. and Europe come together on security and defense issues. When we act together we should act through NATO. That’s what it’s there for. This has, in fact, been the case many times.

In addition to that, if there were cases where we will not be acting together for whatever reason, say the U.S. won’t participate and the European nations say, "We’ll take this on as the EU," we would support that, too. It’s really a question of what is the best instrument for dealing with common security and defense goals?

We would like to start from the perspective that Chancellor Merkel laid out in Germany over the weekend, which is: let’s start from the assumption that we ought to talk together, we ought to talk as the U.S. and European countries about what the issues are and what we intend to do, and NATO should be a primary forum for that dialogue. If we decide to act together because we care, we share the same interests and goals and values and we want to act together to deal with an issue, then we should act through NATO.

Question: Following upon that principle then, therefore has the European Union already talked to the United States about its plans possibly to send a battle group to Congo? Troops which potentially therefore would not be able to be used in NATO nations during the time of their deployment there?

PDAS Volker: We have been in discussions with the EU already about Congo, and nothing has come to closure. We’re looking for a little bit more information about what the mission is and what’s required to conduct the mission. We haven’t reached any firm views ourselves about what U.S. role there may or may not be, or if there needs to be a larger mission, if there’s any reliance on NATO assets of capabilities. We’re just not that far along in terms of the operation itself. But in terms of talking about the issue, indeed, we’re already in that kind of dialogue.

Question: And the principal is clear that, this primacy principle, namely that you would want to see a consultation on whether NATO should be used on any given mission before it’s then handed out to another organization such as the EU.

PDAS Volker: I don’t want to be limiting and say that the EU can’t talk about something until NATO does. I don’t think that’s right. And I think the difference is that when it’s the U.S. and European allies talking about what we may do together or how we view a particular problem, we ought to have a robust political and strategic dialogue within NATO about a whole range of issues. We’ve been making a conscious effort over the past year to ensure that we put our officials out, that we bring over our Assistant Secretary dealing with African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, or Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Tom Shannon, or Assistant Secretary Dan Fried on Europe and Eurasia, and that we engage in a robust dialogue and that we do that.

That doesn’t mean that NATO will have an operational role on every single issue in the world. It probably won’t. But we ought to have a serious transatlantic dialogue about these issues. And it shouldn’t be exclusively NATO. For instance, I’m in Brussels today for meetings with the EU and we’ll talk a lot about some of these same issues. We’ll talk about Afghanistan, we’ll talk about Iraq, we’ll talk about Africa, and I think that is also an important element.

Question: When you were talking about having a great partnership with the countries that NATO is working with, are you talking about formalizing that relationship with the existing organization, i.e. NATO. I don’t know what their relations are currently, maybe they have ambassadors to NATO, but don’t actually have missions. Would it be sort of formalizing that relationship, or would it be saying the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a product of the Cold War, but now perhaps it’s bigger than the North Atlantic, perhaps it is countries against terrorism or something like that, and actually expanding NATO.

PDAS Volker: Right. They actually don’t have ambassadors to NATO and missions and so forth. They have embassies in Belgium and they certainly have some officers assigned as liaison with NATO. There isn’t that kind of actual relationship; so creating such a relationship in some way is what we’re thinking about. But we haven’t made any conclusions about what that really means in practice and that’s something we would only do in consultation with the other allies, as to how to do this.

One thing I would say is that our view of NATO is not that NATO, the NATO of the past, is irrelevant and we just start over with a new concept. It’s that NATO was always the expression of the collective will on security and defense of the U.S. and the European allies and that remains the case. It’s a collective defense organization, but in a very different world than we lived in during the Cold War. The types of challenges that we face, the geographic location of these challenges and the tools that are necessary to deal with these challenges are all very, very different. And that is why we are getting into the geographic areas that I talked about, the nature of operations that I talked about, the capability requirements that are different than they were during the cold war, and the coming into contact with new partners that we would not have come into contact with in the same way in the Cold War.

Question: Sorry, you meant partnership rather than full membership…

PDAS Volker: Yes.

Question: Going back to your first statement, when you were saying how Europe and the U.S. are closer on many issues than they were a few years ago. Which field do you see where there is still more room for improvement? Is there a certain situation where you would like to see Europe more involved?

PDAS Volker: Well, first of all, I made a strong case why I believe that the U.S. and Europe are working well together in a large number of areas, more so than before and in a greater amount of specificity and common action, but I think, on both sides there is a lot more that we need to do… How much work do we have to get done? I would say there is an awful lot out of there. We cannot sit back and say, O.K., now we fixed everything. Just the opposite. We had a good start and there is a lot more to do. One of the areas that I would continue to point to is Iraq where we are in a very different situation that we were in 2003. We have an elected Iraqi government. We have that on the basis of an Iraqi constitution which was passed by referendum. We are looking at both the political process, economic reconstruction, development process, and a security process that need to come together so that the Iraqi people can succeed in building a secure democracy that maintains the unity of the country and is a source of stability in the region.

And that is something Europe has an enormous interest in, we have an enormous interest in, and the people in the region have an enormous interest in. And when we look at the contributions, the scale of contributions is very uneven among European countries and between the United States and Europe. And we believe that there is a lot that Europe has a lot to offer in terms of technical expertise, in terms of reconstruction and development, in terms of training. So there is a lot there and I think the Iraqi people need all the help that we can give them.

Question: One area where Europe and the U.S. don’t seem to agree is this extraordinary rendition and there are various investigations ongoing at the moment. Will the U.S., would you or colleagues go and see the European Parliament or would they be allowed to see you in Washington on these questions? If it happens, there are already some cases that are looked at but some of these renditions, particularly of European citizens have breached European law, rather than U.S. law. How would you deal with that?

PDAS Volker: Secretary Rice gave a comprehensive answer to this question when she came to Europe in December. I just want to repeat a couple of the things that she said then. First of all, the U.S. abides by its own laws and these are considerable. This is not a lawless environment; there are laws. Second, that we adhere to our international obligations and that includes the International Convention Against Torture. Thirdly, we respect the sovereignty of our partners and allies. And fourthly, we are not going to comment on specifics of any individual cases. This is a matter for cooperation among governments, as we have done, but we are not going to comment publicly on any specifics. I won’t go into the rest of her statement but the only other point I would bring out is that this is a very complex challenge. What do you do when you are in a battle, such as in Afghanistan, and you are fighting against combatants that are not in uniform, who are seeking to kill U.S. or European forces that are there, and instead of being killed, they are captured and detained. And what do you do with them? In any other armed conflict, that is including World War II in Europe, people have detained combatants until the end of the conflict.

We are in a war on terrorism, which is different than a traditional war and so we have to look at what are the best legal means and mechanisms for dealing with that. The U.S. has chosen to use a framework based on the laws of war in terms of what we do with terrorist combatants. European countries have chosen to look at this principally as a matter for civilian courts of justice, which we, of course, have as well, but don’t think it applies. I think we ought to have a serious discussion among democratic countries that share values of human rights and the rule of law, and security for our citizens, which is the paramount point about how we do deal with these things. I am pleased that the debate in Europe seems to have cooled a bit. There was a very hot, frenzied environment in November and December and, I think, some not well-thought-out commentary. Because the issue is not so much, "did this flight go from here to there," the issue is "how do democratic countries, like the U.S., like our European allies and partners deal with this challenge?" And there aren’t easy answers. We ought to have that kind of serious discussion rather than a heated discussion that gets down to individual cases. I think that is what the European discussion is starting to move to it, and I think this is a very good sign.

Question: Just a question back on NATO. You were talking about going into new areas and so on. Sudan, is it time that NATO gets involved? Is there a transition toward the UN?

PDAS Volker: The starting point here, again, should be what are we trying to do on the issue, on the ground. We would certainly like to see more help and support in Sudan, and we also see the African Union having the lead on this. One way for this to develop further is to transition to a UN force of "Blue Helmets" and we would be interested in supporting that in whatever way we can. If the African Union or the UN were to seek support from NATO, we would certainly support NATO giving a positive answer to that. But I think we need to focus first on what is necessary on the ground and how do we provide that. We are very much in favor of doing whatever we can.

Question: Can I just follow up on this question on renditions because you didn’t say whether you intend to cooperate with the European Parliament. No doubt, some MEPs want to have some discussions with U.S. officials…

PDAS Volker: What I did say is that we are not going to comment on specific cases. And if we are getting down to the European Parliament saying "what about this, what about that"… I don’t think that is where we are going to go. The European Parliament, both the committee lead as well as the president have written to various U.S. officials. We have responded to those officials with letters of our own. The responses are very much in line with the statements that the Secretary gave on December 5th. That is basically how we intend to respond, how we intend to deal with these issues looking forward as well.

Question: It depends on the basis of which they want to talk… if it is a discussion on policy, that is one thing…

PDAS Volker: We want to work together with Europe as a whole and including all its institutions. We want to work together. And the substance of what we are saying on this is, as I already put it, based on what Secretary Rice said in December. It is not a question of cooperating or not cooperating with the European Parliament, it is a matter of saying: we do want to work together with Europe. These are serious issues and we have given a serious response.