Skip Links
U.S. Department of State
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Keep...  |  Daily Press Briefing | What's NewU.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
SEARCHU.S. Department of State
Subject IndexBookmark and Share
U.S. Department of State
HomeHot Topics, press releases, publications, info for journalists, and morepassports, visas, hotline, business support, trade, and morecountry names, regions, embassies, and morestudy abroad, Fulbright, students, teachers, history, and moreforeign service, civil servants, interns, exammission, contact us, the Secretary, org chart, biographies, and more
Video
 You are in: Under Secretary for Political Affairs > Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs > Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Releases > Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Remarks > Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Remarks (2006) > July 

The U.S.-Cyprus Relationship

Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Remarks at Press Conference
Nicosia, Cyprus
July 18, 2006

Ambassador Ronald Schlicher: (Matthew Bryza) has been to the island before, but this is his first trip in his new capacity. So, I’m sure that all of you are eager to hear from Matt how he has found his visit. But before I introduce him, let me also note that the U.S. Government, and certainly our Embassy here in Nicosia, has been very intensely involved in the last couple of days in making preparations for the evacuation of perhaps thousands of American citizens from Lebanon. These preparations are very intense, and I’d like to take this opportunity to express our very sincere thanks to the Government of Cyprus for the really remarkable cooperation and humanitarian concern that they’ve demonstrated in helping us mount this effort. This effort is likely to continue throughout the coming days, and I’d like to express thanks for what the government has done, and for what they will be doing in the future as we go through this process together. So, without further ado let me turn the floor over to Matt Bryza.

Bryza: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thanks to you for this warm reception here. Thanks to everybody I’ve met since I have been on this trip – friends and colleagues in the Government of Cyprus, friends working in civil society, friends in the north as well. I really feel the warm Mediterranean hospitality. We are quite grateful, as Ambassador Schlicher has just said, for the cooperation that the Republic of Cyprus has offered us regarding this very difficult situation as we work to evacuate people from Lebanon. I am very excited to be here actually; I finally do have a chance to come here in my new capacity to work with Ambassador Schlicher and his absolutely first-rate team to see if we can find a way to advance a comprehensive, just and lasting Cyprus settlement that reunifies the island within a bizonal, bicommunal federation. I will come back to that in a second.

I am also here to look for any way that we can enhance our bilateral cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus, and it is just a strange twist of fate, an unfortunate fate that we are working together with the Government of Cyprus at this moment on the evacuations, but sometimes we have to make a virtue out of necessity. So, there is a great opportunity here before us to deepen our United States Government to Republic of Cyprus Government cooperation.

Why I’m here though, before we knew what would be happening in Lebanon, was to get a chance to acquaint myself more deeply with the views of all the people on the island. This is my sixth straight year working on the Cyprus issue. I spent four years on it working in the White House on President Bush’s staff. To tell you the truth, I worked more closely and more personally with (President Bush) on this matter than I think any other matter. At least, up to the 2003-2004 period.

So, I’ve spent a lot of my waking hours and sleeping hours thinking about your beautiful island. I’m here to meet as many people as I possibly can and hear as many perspectives as I can. As Ambassador Schlicher told you previously, my goal is to deepen my understanding and to listen and to improve our own thinking on how to move the process forward. We fully, absolutely 100%, support the Secretary General of the UN in his effort to advance a just and lasting settlement within a bizonal, bicommunal federation. That’s my function: to do anything I can to support Secretary General Annan’s efforts, and frankly to support him once he is convinced that both sides have demonstrated their good will to resume the discussions in good faith. We just hope that Under Secretary General Gambari’s visit here a little over a week ago created an opening for that very thing to happen.

I wind up my stay here I think not naively optimistic but certainly not coldly pessimistic either. I sense on both sides of the Green Line, and in all aspects of society, in the business community, and among NGOs and government officials that while there is a real desire to move forward, there is also still a real difference on the core issues. You know better than I. Some would argue that there is a rift between the societies. I don’t know if there is because I also sense a real, serious recognition that this opening that Under Secretary General Gambari helped broker with Mr. Talat and President Papadopoulos is real but is also perishable and needs to be worked out immediately. So, thank you. That’s my statement and I welcome your questions.

Q: Mr. Bryza, my first question is about your meeting with AKEL leader Demetris Christofias. Today the Greek Cypriot media says that you delivered the message that the Annan Plan will not be revived and that the Greek Cypriot people should not be punished for their rejection of the plan. What do you have to say about this and why do you think the Turkish Cypriots still suffer from international isolation despite their approval of the Annan Plan? My next question is that it wasn’t on your schedule to meet with the Greek Cypriot FM. Why did you change your schedule?

Bryza: Thank you very much. I don’t think it’s ever appropriate to divulge the specific details of a conversation I had with a leader of a country – He said things to me in confidence, and I’m sure he wouldn’t want to betray things I said to him in confidence. But in general, happily, I will tell you, absolutely, that the position of our government is of course not to punish anyone for any democratically-reached decision taken in any country. It could be Cyprus or any country in the world. Every step we take, everything we do, aims to facilitate the reunification of the island within a bizonal bicommunal federation. That’s our goal as I have said a couple of times.

Perhaps sometimes people think we differ on the tactics, maybe, but on the strategic vision, the strategic direction, I think we all share the same objective that I’ve just articulated: that of reunification.

I’m not here to talk about the Annan Plan. In fact, I haven’t discussed it at all. I think I may have just said it right now for the first time since I’ve been here. There is a whole series of ideas that has been agreed upon. There’ve been years of difficult negotiations that have resulted in partial agreements. It would be silly and really a waste of effort and time to throw all that away. But of course the Greek Cypriot people rejected the plan so it’s time to build on what’s been achieved, what’s been agreed upon, and move forward and take advantage of this opening that Under Secretary General Gambari seems to have helped create.

When it comes to the Turkish Cypriot community, all I can say, as my government has articulated in our so-called shared vision statement that we’ve just issued with Turkey two weeks ago, that our goal – and it’s going to sound like a broken record – is to foster the reunification of Cyprus within a bizonal, bicommunal federation, and within a process that is led by the UN. In the context I have just described of pursuing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement, we also seek to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. The underlying logic of this is that we believe, we’re thoroughly convinced, that it’s easier to reunify a country if the economic disparities are limited. That’s what we believe and so that’s what we’re pursuing, with the goal of reunification always in mind.

Regarding Foreign Minister Lillikas, I was extremely pleased to learn yesterday that he is coming back to Cyprus sooner than I anticipated. I have to go back to Washington because I’ve been on the road for a bit. I came here after having done my homework. I went to Ankara, I went to Athens, had a lot of meetings about this issue and I have a lot of problems back home to deal with. We’re working hard to manage the Lebanon issue. I’m also our US Government mediator on several other conflicts – on Nagorno Karabakh, on South Ossetia, (inaudible). I’m our lead at the State Department for trying to help Europe diversify its energy resources. I’m also responsible for the South Caucuses countries; I do some other work on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, so there’s a lot going on with all these issues. I wanted to stay here as long as possible, but I have to get back to Washington. I have to go back on the road within a week or so, and I’m so pleased that Foreign Minister Lillikas is coming back at just the right time so we can meet tomorrow morning…You’re darn right I’ll be back, and I’d like to meet even more people.

Q: Are you ready to bury the hatchet with Nicosia? The second: have you come here with any kind proposal whatsoever? Because it was implied by GOC officials today that you’ve come with some suggestions that would ease Turkey’s accession course to the EU and I want to know exactly what that means. There was some warning from the GOC that this won’t happen at the expense of Cyprus.

Bryza: Sure, thank you. There’s no hatchet to bury. I’m astounded when people say that we’ve done anything other than seek to reunify the island and support the efforts of the UN Secretary General for a bizonal, bicommunal federation. That’s our objective. There was never any intention to do anything other than that. So, really there is no hatchet at all to bury. In terms of specific plans, that’s not the function of the US Government. We’re here as supporters. We’re supporting the effort of the Secretary General on a comprehensive settlement. We’re not a member of the EU, so it’s not really appropriate for us to have any specific plan regarding Turkey and the EU, but we are doing all that we possibly can to achieve all of our strategic objectives. One objective is a just and lasting Cyprus settlement, another is Turkey’s accession to the EU. This is on separate tracks, through separate organizations and different processes.

Q: I am sure you know after spending so many years on the Cyprus issue, the problems and differences, and so on. And within that role that you described of the US supporting the UNSYG, have you come up with any ideas to suggest to the UNSYG as to how to overcome these difficulties, and can you share these ideas or views with us?

Bryza: Yes and no. This is the job of the Secretary General. What I can say is that I can only share the hope that I hope you all feel regarding what the Under Secretary General Gambari was able to achieve. It seems that we now have a way forward; it seems now, with the formation of technical committees and with the exchange and finalization of a list of substantive issues that we have a way ahead in terms of the leaders Mr. Talat and President Papadopoulos agreeing to get together and keep this process moving forward. So really it is the UN that is in the lead. We’ll support this process as much as we possibly can. It is not our plan; it is the Secretary General and the Under Secretary General’s plan at this point.

Q: But he is prepared to listen to you.

Bryza: Well I haven’t had the chance to talk to Undersecretary General Gambari since he was here. We were traveling on different schedules. I hope very much I will be able to go visit with him when I go home to the States. That’s one reason why I am anxious to get home is to go to New York as well. So I expect that it will inspire me. And we will exchange views.

Q: (Inaudible)

Bryza: Well, every human being has ideas right? Mine probably are not nearly as profound as yours. You have lived here, I presume, all of your life, but I have humble thoughts. I need to be inspired by Under Secretary General Gambari, definitely.

Q: You talked with Mr. Talat about the direct trade regulation. I am just wondering what the position of the U.S. is regarding the direct trade regulation and if there is any proposal regarding that?

Bryza: Well the direct trade regulation has nothing directly to do with the U.S. It is an EU regulation – as you know we are not members of the EU. And the EU does not particularly like the U.S. suggesting what it should do. It is an independent organization. But as I said earlier, our policy is to work to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. Frankly, that’s also the EU’s own policy. I mean that’s what the trade regulation is all about. It is about finding a way to ease the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots. So I would say in this case that the United States and the EU share an objective. But it is up to the EU to work with Turkey to advance this whole process and to work, of course, with the Republic of Cyprus being a key EU member state.

Q: Within this common vision document between the U.S. and Turkey, should we expect some sort of a good will gesture on the part of Turkey, such as withdrawing some of its troops, especially now that we are approaching the anniversary of the invasion? Was it one of your suggestions that you put forward in Ankara?

Bryza: You are a very creative questioner. The shared vision document is about a shared strategic vision. It is about the broad picture of what we would like to accomplish together with Turkey based on shared strategic interests and shared values. So when we talk about shared strategic interests, we talk about resolving the Cyprus issue in a just and lasting way; we also talk about Turkey’s full inclusion within the European family, meaning EU admission. We talk about Iran and the Middle East peace process in Syria, Afghanistan and democracy in the broader Middle East and Central Asia. We talk about economic cooperation as well. So that’s what the shared vision document is all about. It is not about the specific tactical steps that might have to be taken to advance a just and lasting settlement here on the island.

Q: Does the U.S. have any fresh policies on easing the isolation on the Turkish Cypriots? Because the U.S. is supporting the Green Line, but obviously it is not working as it was expected.

Bryza: The Green Line Regulation you mean. We do not support the Green Line. I think it is more accurate to look at the issue as what sort of fresh ideas does the international community have. I mean I spent a lot of my own time in Brussels and in EU member states, capitals, talking about the Cyprus issue, talking about everything I work on: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and energy issues. The goal of our administration is to rebuild our partnership with our European allies. So, we try to consult as much as we possibly can to have a common approach. I hope the U.S. is able to offer fresh ideas, inject fresh ideas into these processes all the time, including on Cyprus, but it really would be unwise for me to specify what they are, not withstanding your question, because once I do then they are no longer fresh, and probably no longer viable.

Q: Does the USG consider Nicosia, the GOC, as an impediment to Turkey’s full EU accession?

Bryza: No. Of course not. Turkey’s accession to the EU depends on Turkey’s fulfillment of EU criteria. Actually, there is not much more to say than that. We want to do all that we can as a non-member of the European Union to help Turkey make these tough decisions. In fact, I should say that others – none of you in this room – have often only quoted me as saying what I’ve just said: that we should work together to help Turkey take these tough decisions. I want to underscore as firmly as I possibly can that Turkey has an obligation to fulfill these criteria, including, by the way, those not only of the acquis communautaire, but also regarding the general accession process. Turkey freely undertook an obligation to extend the additional protocol to the Republic of Cyprus. That means Turkey undertook its own obligation, we didn’t make Turkey do it. It has its own obligation to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships. Period. With that in mind, it’s smart, it’s wise of all of us, if we want this process of Turkey’s accession to proceed, to find ways to make that happen, and also to make it politically achievable if we share the objective of Turkey’s EU accession. What the U.S. then hopes to do is to work together with all of you, as my presence here indicates, to keep both processes that I’ve talked about on track – that of Turkey’s EU accession and that of a comprehensive settlement process under the UN.

Q: Any specific ideas on that?

Bryza: Well, fulfilling all the criteria, right? The Copenhagen criteria – they’ve done a pretty good job on political reform, but economic reform needs to be stepped up (inaudible)… and there are (inaudible)…Oh, you mean specifically on the port issue? There are (inaudible)… It’s no secret there have been ideas that have been circulating for a while in the diplomatic community about the specific ports here; Foreign Minister Gul issued his proposal in January of this year. Our response was that in principle we support the idea of lifting all restrictions on all forms of commerce between the island and Turkey. Of course we support that. That’s a wonderful idea, but we didn’t endorse the specifics of that proposal. We endorsed the concept of that proposal, the idea of Turkey inviting the parties, the sides, the communities, everybody, to sit down and negotiate the lifting of all restrictions on all forms of commerce between the island of Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey.

Q: Going back to the Protocol, didn’t Turkey say that it did not include Cyprus?

Bryza: I guess that’s the whole point. Since last October 3rd , Turkey has undertaken an obligation to extend the additional protocol to the ROC.

Q: Yes, but it hasn’t done that. What’s your position on that?

Bryza: That’s correct. My position – that’s what I was talking about a bit earlier. Turkey has an obligation. It committed itself last October 3rd to extend the protocol to the Republic of Cyprus. Period. That’s its obligation. At the risk of repeating myself, I’ll say at the same time, we want to do all that we can, working with the Republic of Cyprus, with all the EU member-states, with the Commission, with the Council, with the government of Turkey, to ensure that that happens as smoothly and quickly as possible.

Q: So, there is an interconnection between Turkey’s obligations to open its ports with the Cyprus question?

Bryza: I don’t know. It seems that you’re making a statement. Would you like to explain that?

Q: You said before that Turkey needs to meet its obligations. Period. But on the other hand, you say the U.S. will do what it can to facilitate Turkey to make this decision.

Bryza: No. That’s not what I said. I said that the United States is working with the Republic of Cyprus, with all the EU member-states, with the European Council, with the Commission and with the government of Turkey to make sure Turkey does, in fact, fulfill this obligation. So, it’s not that the United States is launching an effort, that we have a plan, or that we are leaning on anyone to take particular steps. We’re working with everybody to come up with a set of steps that are mutually agreeable so that Turkey does fulfill its obligation. But it’s an obligation. It’s Turkey’s choice at the end of the day. Does it fulfill the obligation or does it choose not to? It’s Turkey’s obligation.

Q: Regarding the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Lebanon. What’s the latest? I know that a ferry has already left to pick up U.S. nationals from Lebanon. Do we know when it’s due to be back to Cyprus?

Bryza: I’d like to defer to his Excellency Ambassador Schlicher who, while I’ve working on this issue today, he’s been really working on the Lebanon issue today.

Ambassador Schlicher: In fact, according to my information, the vessel has left. We do expect it to have no problem getting to Beirut and taking aboard a load of American citizens and perhaps others. I don’t have an estimated arrival time yet, but let’s hope it’s as soon as safely possible, and I’m sure we’ll be seeing a lot of such activities in the coming days. And I would like again to express the thanks for the remarkable cooperation that we’ve received from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Thank you.

Q: You’re talking about the Orient Queen?

Ambassador Schlicher: Yes.

Q: Do we know how many U.S. nationals are coming back?

Ambassador Schlicher: I believe the capacity of the ship is around 800. I think the larger question is what is the total number of Americans who will be coming out? Frankly, that’s a developing issue. There’s quite a large pool of American citizens in Lebanon – over 20,000.

Q: Do you have a rough idea how many have registered to leave?

Ambassador Schlicher: I don’t know. I don’t have these numbers for you. Thanks.



Released on July 20, 2006

  Back to top

U.S. Department of State
USA.govU.S. Department of StateUpdates  |  Frequent Questions  |  Contact Us  |  Email this Page  |  Subject Index  |  Search
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov  |  Privacy Notice  |  FOIA  |  Copyright Information  |  Other U.S. Government Information

Published by the U.S. Department of State Website at http://www.state.gov maintained by the Bureau of Public Affairs.