2006 German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends Survey

Assistant Secretary Fried: Happy to. First of all, as I said earlier in the remarks you can’t cite, but I will repeat. That is not in fact what I found interesting in the survey. I suspected that journalists might find that interesting, but I think that those numbers are interesting only in a short term and, if you pardon me, partisan political context. They don’t really surprise me. That’s not news.

What is interesting is the difference between the short-term political judgment and the longer term communality of perception of the world and similarity of strategic agenda. That is, Europeans and Americans see the world in similar ways, and they believe that the United States and Europe should have a common agenda.

Now, that is what you can conclude from the numbers about democracy and the numbers about threat. It means that the thesis of the European-American drift, which is not simply part of this cyclical partisan political dynamic but is more deeply rooted in a diversion of values, has been disproved by this study. This study upends that thesis and, in fact, demonstrates that whatever political differences exist, which may be a byproduct of the debate about Iraq – and maybe you are correct here, maybe a product of the American political season because we’re in one. Despite that, the United States and Europe have a very firm basis on which to act and work together in the world. That to me is the most significant finding of this study.

Nico Fried, Süddeutsche Zeitung: I have a question concerning the slide that was showing the feelings of Germans towards other nations, and there was one particular fear that it was Israel – only 46 or 44% – or pretty close to Palestinians and (inaudible) and the survey was made before the war there. What does that tell you about public mood in Germany towards Israel?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I think it tells you just what your questions suggest, that the public mood is skeptical. I find that unfortunate. I think that Israel has found itself in an obviously difficult circumstance where it is damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t. Six months ago, we were talking about the possibilities that existed should Olmert continue Sharon’s policies of territorial withdrawal and what that might mean for the peace process. Now we have a very different discussion in the intervening period. What has caused this difficulty has been precipitated by attacks on Israel and that’s very unfortunate.

I think that if we’re going to get where we all want to be, which is to two states, Palestine and Israel living side by side in peace and security, we need to be realistic about the problems and the forces that are keeping us from those goals; and I think that Hezbollah’s actions and Hamas’s actions have been very unfortunate for groups which claim to have the welfare of the Palestinians and Lebanese people at heart, respectively. They have nothing to advance those interests but have brought conflict and war. That is too bad, but we can’t be deterred from keeping in mind our ultimate objectives, as I said, a peace of two nations living side-by-side in democracy and security. But we must fight against the terrorist acts, which are, at the moment, the chief obstacle between us and that objective.

Richard Herzinger, Welt am Sonntag: My question is not on the survey. My question is on Iran. Are you worried about the reactions by the EU on the rejection of the UN Security Council "ultimatum" and do you see any chances (inaudible) … against Iran, especially about Russia and China? Second, there also was a change in orientation of the EU towards Hamas, saying that if they join the (inaudible) government with Fatah this would change the situation, and we go on to direct talks. Is there thinking on the American side of a new initiative of how things should go on?

Assistant Secretary Fried: With respect to Iran, you have given me an opportunity to agree by default with the characterization you made of the European reaction of being weak. I think that was your word, but that is not my word. We have worked closely with our EU 3 colleagues for some time. We have advanced our common objective of a strong diplomatic response against Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. We have begun to put significant political pressure on Iran through the efforts of the EU 3+ 3, working with our Russian and Chinese colleagues. We need to increase that pressure.

We made at the beginning of this summer – the EU 3 made a very credible offer to Iran. We supported that offer. Iran has rejected it. The EU 3 and the United States working with Russia and China have shown leadership in seeing adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1696. We are now going to consult with our European friends about next steps. I have every reason to believe that the European response will be steady and firm.

If Iran continues its defiance of the international community -- and I have every confidence that our consultations with our European friends will demonstrate to the Iranian leadership that it cannot get away with defiance at no cost and will demonstrate to the Iranian people that their leadership is taking them down a road of isolation not a road of international legitimacy.

And our view of Hamas has been and that is not just the U.S. view – the view of the Quartet, the U.S., Europe, UN, Russia – has been that Hamas has to fulfill certain conditions. They have not only not fulfilled those conditions, their actions have undermined their own claim to represent the best interests of the Palestinian people, so we are skeptical about what they’ve done, and we think that the burden is on them to demonstrate they are going to meet the demands of the international community.

Emily Harris, NPR: I was interested in the questions in the survey about Iran and support for diplomatic actions. If you could share the definition of what it would be if diplomatic efforts failed. That was one of the key questions, if they failed would you support (inaudible).

Assistant Secretary Fried: I’m a great fan of NPR. Let me say this, even on-the-record.

I wouldn’t want to over-interpret or start to speculate about what it means that diplomacy has failed and what then. I take those responses as very interesting and illustrative of something more simple, which is that there is a European and American consensus that Iran is a real problem, that Iran must not be allowed to get nuclear weapons, and that we’ve got to be serious about preventing it.

I think we were all a little surprised by the relatively high numbers of Europeans that would support military action. If you ask most Germans, they would say Europeans were sensible and civilized people. No European – maybe only 5 percent – would support military action. I’m making this up, but it illustrates the expectation as pretty high numbers. I do not regard those as indicative of the European desire to support military attacks on Iran. I regard them much more simply as an expression of determination to Iran not to get away with it. To me that simply means European publics are serious about dealing with the problem of Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, and therefore, they will support vigorous, vigorous diplomatic efforts, which are now underway. In other words, those numbers relatively high for military support I don’t regard as actual support for a military option. It’s support for seriousness and determination, which is actually very welcome.

Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune: As a diplomat how do you know when diplomacy has failed?

Assistant Secretary Fried: It’s like something else – you know it when you see it. You don’t like to define it, and it’s dangerous to define it because then you’ve boxed yourself in for no particular reason. We often speak of the Iran problem and pressure on Iran, and I wonder if this isn’t a mistake, because it is the Iranian regime which may or may not be representative but certainly doesn’t have any democratic mandate in a sense that I understand it; in any sense we all understand it is leading the country on the path of confrontation, truculence, and defiance.

What Iranian society really thinks, I don’t know. Intensely patriotic? To be sure. Proud of being Iranian? Absolutely. But ready to see their country in an international pariah? I doubt it. For the sake of nuclear weapons, which the regime denies it’s seeking, I doubt it, too.

It may be that the Iranian regime really doesn’t want to be internationally isolated, that our diplomacy will work if we stick through it. If we are strong enough, if we develop a strong consensus that Iranian’s current defiance will not stand, diplomatic efforts can well bear fruit and sometimes in ways you don’t expect.

Friederike von Tiessenhausen, Financial Times Deutschland: I have a question on Lebanon. (inaudible) And the worries that the UN mandate continuing the (inaudible) won’t work. I wonder whether you share (inaudible) the perceptions?

Assistant Secretary Fried: It is true that the UN Security Council has assigned considerable responsibilities to the government of Lebanon, and it needs to meet those responsibilities. The past week has seen and continues to see intense diplomacy, seeking to get these forces into place with the concurrence of the Lebanese government for the purpose of securing Lebanon; keeping new weapons out of Lebanon in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

We understand that Germany is considering taking part in the maritime and perhaps other aspects of the mission. This is a very good thing, a welcome development. There is an elaborate diplomatic set of steps underway to take us from where we are to that. It is obviously -- it is the job of the international community to remind Lebanon and insist Lebanon fulfill what it must do. And these discussions are now going on, and they’re making progress, and so I’m not going to comment further. We are making progress.

Louis Charbonneau, Reuters: Back to Iran. Tomorrow there are supposed to be talks here of the EU 3 + 3 -- the P5 plus Germany. There was supposed to be a meeting between Germany and Solana today that has been either cancelled or postponed. Maybe it will happen Friday. What does this mean for tomorrow’s meeting? Will there be a substantive meeting discussing possible sanctions and do you think that the Europeans are ready to go for sanctions? It seems that the EU 25 have some disagreements within the block on whether sanctions are desirable.

Assistant Secretary Fried: I can’t characterize discussions that haven’t taken place except to say that I don’t doubt that they will be very substantive and very serious. We’ve been in the habit of having productive, substantive discussions, and I think these will occur as certain as one can be that these will occur tomorrow. We’ve been working well with our European friends on the basis of our common efforts; we’ve made a lot of progress. I don’t doubt that that progress will continue, and that whatever Iran is doing, we will act in accordance with our common understanding that Iran must not be allowed to defy the international community and must give up its nuclear weapons program in accordance with the very constructive offer that has been made to Iran.

Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune: What is Turkey’s decision to actually participate in this peacekeeping force in Lebanon?

Assistant Secretary Fried: It is certainly welcome, the vote of the Turkish parliament and the efforts of the Turkish government. Turkey does have a role to play. It has the capabilities. I’m glad that they’ve stepped up to this. It’s perfectly understandable that Turkey had a national debate. Any country would. This is a tough, dangerous responsibility. I’m glad Turkey is stepping up, and they’ve shown that they are a member in the international community that takes responsibility seriously.

Thank you all for coming!