U.S.-Turkish Relations

I guess what I'm trying to say is in terms of the process of restrengthening U.S.-Turkish relations at the official level, I think we're doing a good job in making sure we've got the communications working together, making sure we have the same goals, and then calibrating the tactics.

I still feel without any question, despite the complications we see in U.S.-Turkish relations and public opinion, I still feel confident, we all do in fact feel confident that our official relations are really strong and are moving in the right direction.

We have a real challenge ahead of us still on PKK, obviously, we all know that. We know we have to deliver concrete results as I was telling Kasim just the other day. We have to deliver. It's not just the Turkish military leaders or the Turkish political leaders that are demanding concrete results, it's the Turkish people that expect it. The PKK is a serious terrorist threat to one of our most important allies in the world so we're obligated. But we're also obligated to do something against PKK by our own vision for Iraq and our own global policy on terrorism. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist. We have to eliminate havens for terrorists, we are committed to doing so, and as our highest political leaders have told Turkey's highest political leaders, we will do it.

General Ralston is a remarkable military leader. I have been surprised by how effectively he is able to work through our own military bureaucracies, even though he's retired, because he is so respected by the career military. He's one of the highest, most effective and professional military officers I've ever encountered, both internally, working within our system, and then diplomatically.

So all of that is a long way of saying there should be some concrete results soon. There need to be, have to be, and I feel we're actually building some momentum. And again, as I was saying to Kasim just the other day, if we don't produce those results then I'll have no credibility with you. But more importantly, neither will our government, so we've got to do it.

So I would presume that the Secretary and the Foreign Minister will spend some time talking about the PKK, but I hope they'll go well beyond that when it comes to Iraq because we have so much more to talk about on Iraq than just the PKK.

In the last couple of years we worked hard to improve our coordination between our two governments on the ground in Iraq. We've tried to make sure that our Ambassador and the Turkish Ambassador are having regular contact, that we're listening to each other, that the U.S. side is learning from Turkey's extensive experience in Iraq over so many years and decades and even centuries. I think that coordination is working well.

I wasn't here when (Turkish MFA Iraq Special Envoy) Oguz (Celikkol) was here, (Defense Minister Vecdi) Gonul was here last week, but I do try to see him any time I go to Turkey and I have sensed much better coordination between our missions in Iraq than was the case in the past.

Beyond Iraq, when it comes to the Middle East we are always looking for ways, again, to work together with Turkey, to deepen our understanding of the situation on the ground be it in Iran or in Syria or in the Palestinian territories and to make sure we're moving in the same directions, and I think we are. You'll probably have specific questions to ask about that.

In Afghanistan where Turkey, as you know, has twice led ISAF, it's helping to run a PRT in Wardak Province, it's pledged $100 million for Afghan reconstruction. As we saw from the conference last week the Secretary helped organize on Afghanistan, we want to make a new rejuvenated push to provide the security assistance and the economic assistance Afghanistan needs to rebuild and Turkey is a crucial partner in that.

Turning to the economic side, we have a rich agenda right now with Turkey. Just next week I'll be traveling out with (EB) Assistant Secretary Dan Sullivan to have our first EPC, Economic Partnership Commission meeting in I guess two years. That's way too long since we've been able to pull that meeting together. It might be three years even. I won't go into all the items on that agenda, we can talk about it if you wish to.

I just want to highlight one which is energy security. Energy --

Question: What is the date of that meeting?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: We'll be there next Thursday evening, then Friday and Saturday. Friday is the main day. So a week from today, the 9th, 10th and 11th.

Question: In Ankara?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yes, in Ankara. The 8th and 9th.

So on energy security, if you look back to U.S.-Turkish relations in the early ‘90s there wasn't a whole lot to talk about in terms of strategic partnership. I don't think anybody was using that term in 1990. Then in 1999 we were saying U.S.-Turkish relations are a strategic partnership.

There are two major things that happened during that period, maybe three. One was Operation Northern Watch where we worked so well with Turkey to provide security for the Kurdish populations in Northern Iraq. Turkey was essential to that.

The second thing we did together was work with the international financial institutions, especially the IMF, to help Turkey as it implemented its reforms, to make sure that the IMF was there to help Turkey as Turkey was reforming.

The third thing we did that was really substantial was our partnership in Caspian energy which obviously meant Bakhu-Tblisi-Ceyhan which many people thought would never happen, and meant the South Caucasus gas pipeline which is about to open.

Today what we want to do is build on those pipelines, expand the corridor that currently exists for natural gas and make it a major one, a big one, a transit route that will help Europe diversify its gas supply so that it doesn't feel so much monopoly pressure from one direction. Our goal is not to have a confrontation with GazProm, but our goal is to increase competition, healthy commercial competition which in the long run is good for everybody, including for GazProm itself, by the way. The key to making all that work is helping the Azerbaijani Government work with investors to expand gas production in Azerbaijan as quickly as possible to make sure gas is available to fill the pipelines that will go from Turkey to Greece and Italy, as well as an Abuko pipeline from Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.

So that's sort of the full realm, I think, of what will be on the agenda for the Foreign Minister's visit.

Question: What about Cyprus?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: They'll probably touch on it, but as you know things have quieted down quite a bit on Cyprus except for in the last couple of days with the questions of the possible oil prospecting on the Continental Shelf.

Frankly, that issue is not one I would think that merits at this point attention by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Turkey. We're not party to that at all. That's an issue for Turkey to work through with the Republic of Cyprus.

In terms of the Cyprus question, it's time now to implement the agreement brokered by (United Nations) Undersecretary General (Ibrahim) Gambari last July 8th on the island, which means soon Talat and Papadopoulos will meet and then technical committees will begin working through specific, everyday quality of life issues while at the same time the two sides will work through substantive issues that are pertaining directly to a comprehensive settlement. The Annan Plan is something that isn't, well it's not formally on the table now but it still has elements that are important, that reflect a lot of good thinking, a lot of hard work, and that are promising, that will have to be a foundation of a comprehensive settlement whenever we move more rapidly toward a comprehensive settlement.

The port issue now seems quieter since the European Union decision.

Question: [Inaudible]?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: The so-called Armenian genocide, yes. What's happening with that? That will probably come up, yeah.

Our position on that is that our policy remains of course unchanged. We don't believe that political statements or diplomatic statements are the appropriate way to resolve this issue of how to refer to these horrible events of 1915. We all agree, I'm sure we all agree that what happened was a horrible tragedy. It's terrible. It's an issue that has so many sides, so many complicated angles, so many differing points of view that politicians can't do it justice by simply making a determination. What has to happen from our perspective, what we would like to see happen, is that learned people, everyday common people, professors, philosophers, historians have a chance to sit down and have a candid discussion over time for an extended period that gets at the core of what happened and allows the societies of Turkey and Armenia to reconcile themselves with their pasts and with each other. You can't do that through a political decision.

We also would like to see Turkish-Armenian relations normalize. I as the Minsk Group co-chair for the United States totally understand how complicated that is. I'm deeply sensitive to Nagorno Karabakh and how that plays into this whole equation. Notwithstanding that we would love to see movement toward an opening or a normalization of the relations between Turkey and Armenia because that's good for everybody. It will be good for Turkish business people, it's good for regional stability, and it's good for peace in the long run but I understand how complicated it is.

Question: What could possible steps be on the part of Armenians and Turks for that [inaudible]?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Well, Ali, as you well know, the Turkish Government and the Armenian government have talked about historical commissions. They've talked about diplomatic discussions as well to normalize relations. Then there's the question now since the tragic murder of Hrant Dink, about, an even more intensive discussion of Article 301. It's hard for the Turkish Government simply to abolish Article 301 given political realities. We understand that. But I think from our perspective it would be a wonderful step if there no longer was this issue out there of Article 301 that provides a pretext or a reason for people outside of Turkey to criticize Turkey.

We are here as Turkey's friend. I hope Turkey considers us one of its closest friends in the world. In that spirit we want to do everything we can for what we view as Turkey's proud traditions of tolerance and of co-existence, of all sorts of ethnic and religious communities. We want the world, especially Europe, to understand what a strong record Turkey has. Article 301 still makes that difficult. It has a magnetic impact on thinking in Europe and gets everybody to focus just on that issue rather than on all of the complex history of Turkey.

Question: Not on the Armenian genocide but on the PKK, you said that you are, the U.S. is obligated to do something on the PKK, that you're also obligated to do something against it because of your vision in Iraq. So would you please fill in what concrete steps we are talking about and why if this was your vision in Iraq what has changed? Why are you feeling obliged to do it right now when the elections in Turkey are getting closer?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: We've always felt obliged. Always. There is no change in terms of our commitment. If you go back and read the statement that President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, and then Prime Minister Baroso then of Portugal and President Aznar of Spain issued just a couple of days before the Iraq war began you will see in it -- it's called the Azores Declaration -- one of the goals we outlined is that there will be no haven for terrorists of any sort in Iraq. We meant the PKK. I know, having been involved in the drafting of that document, what we meant when we wrote that in there. We meant the PKK. So even before any U.S. troops set foot in Iraq that was our goal.

Question: You may say that, it sounds wonderful. It comes with such a fantastic statement to the ears, but in reality it is something that the U.S. has not delivered.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: You're right.

Question: That has created this enormous reaction toward the U.S. policies in the region, evoking the sense of [Sykes-Picot agreement]. So I'm just curious what has changed? What's the new environment now that you feel like you're going to bring this into action now?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Again, I'm trying to make the point that nothing has changed in terms of what our commitment has been. What is changing, is that we over time we have been able to get the Iraqi Government to a point where it now understands this is imperative, it has to happen.

Previously we had not been able to bring U.S. forces to bear to resolve or to eliminate the PKK problem in Iraq. Why? Number one, because the solution is not only military. The Turkish military has been present in Iraq for a decade. Long before the war there were Turkish troops on the ground in Iraq. There were clashes. The problem wasn't fixed.

Turkey has the most capable military in Europe. It wasn't able to fix the problem militarily. That's not an excuse for no security steps to be taken against the PKK; don't get me wrong. But what I'm getting at is it's a very complicated issue, number one.

Number two, obviously U.S. military forces and security forces have been occupied with burning fires elsewhere in Iraq. One way to look at it in a folksy way is that if your house is on fire and your neighbor's house is on fire you need to put out the fire in your house before you can go take care of your neighbor's house fire. Or in an airplane they tell you before putting an oxygen mask on your child sitting next to you, put it on your face first so you can function.

So for these last couple of years we've been working so hard to try to get the situation under control in the rest of Iraq first.

Question: It's even worse now.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yeah.

Question: The fire in Iraq in general is much worse now. So the fire at home, your home, is even bigger now.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It is even bigger, yeah. So what I'm saying is -- That's a separate point. It's true but a different point, Umit. Now we've gotten to a point I think where we've gotten the Iraqi Government to a point where it realizes uh huh, we've got to do something.

We don't want to be responsible. We can't be responsible for fixing this problem on our own because if we were to do so, if we were the ones that were responsible, we would be undercutting the sovereignty of the Government of Iraq. If we do that, then how do we maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, if it's the U.S. that's in charge of fixing these problems on Iraq territory? So that's a political reason, so we've had to get the Iraqi Government to do it.

Question: Are you saying that if you allow the Kirkuk Referendum to go ahead, you're going to put your signature to divide the country into three, at least, different countries or nations, whatever you name it. So do you agree with the Turkish vision in that?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: When the referendum in Kirkuk would take place is not determined, right?

Question: It is determined in the Constitution. It will happen before the end of this year.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Or will it? Who knows if it will. Will it actually? I don't know if it will.

Question: What does the U.S. think about Turkey's position on it? Do you agree with the Turkish assessment on Kirkuk? If the referendum goes ahead it is going to be leveraged to divide the country or the Kurds.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: The way I would answer that is to say that our goal, as President Bush just said, is to maintain a unified Iraq. Anything you hear to the contrary, any pundits or political speculation, whether they be people in power or out of power, to the contrary, is false. Our policy is to support a unified Iraq. We understand how sensitive, how dangerous the situation in Kirkuk is.

The Governments of the United States and Turkey and Iraq, and Baghdad, I mean, share a common vision when it comes to Kirkuk in terms of not wanting that situation to lead to the breakup of Iraq, right? And wanting there to be a way to resolve the difficult property questions and demographic issues that are what's really fueling the political fire in Kirkuk.

So on timing, et cetera, I don't have anything else to say. And if you really want to get down into the details of that, please talk to our Iraq policy people. But in general I can say we do share the Turkish society and government's vision that if Kirkuk is not managed properly it can become a terrible problem that works against our shared goal of maintaining a unified Iraq. That's our goal. We've got to do that.

Question: On the PKK you said it is not only a military solution. Keeping that in mind, when I talk to people in Ankara and Washington lately I am getting the sense that indeed a military operation might take place in the spring and with the consent of the U.S. Government. Am I naive to believe that? Is it still out of the question for the U.S. Government or is it perhaps the sign they're coming to an agreement that may be a limited operation --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: You mean a Turkish military operation?

Question: Turkish, yes.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: You were never naïve. But that's not something that we're really talking about at this point.

Our goal is to produce concrete results and preferably to have the Iraqi Government produce them, right? Because of what I said before. We support Iraq's territorial integrity. To do so the Iraqi Government has to be sovereign, it has to carry out its own functions on its own territory. And frankly, if you're a leader in Baghdad you have no interest in PKK terrorists roaming through the country. That's a negative. Even if you're (KRG President Masoud) Barzani or (Iraqi President Jalal) Talibani, if you were still up in the north, you know better than I do about the military clashes that ensued between PKK and Kurdish groupings previously.

So there's no desire in Baghdad to let this problem go on forever. Our challenge is to focus and arrange, physically, mechanically get the Government of Iraq to a point where it can undertake these efforts. Of course with our support. And all of this, obviously I'm not going to give you a detailed answer to your question, but whatever happens has to be done in a way that's coordinated among all of us. The Turkish Government, the Iraqi Government and the U.S. Government, let me put it that way. But please don't misinterpret that as either a green light or a red light or a warning or an admonition or a statement of approval of what you suggested, a Turkish unilateral action.

Question: My second question is about Makhmour (refugee camp). When General Ralston was there he talked to the people in the camp and asked them under what conditions they would go back to Turkey. They said if there is an amnesty. There is a decision to close the camp. There have been these discussions I think now two years ago between the U.S. and Turkey --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Even longer.

Question: I'm wondering first of all if that working group or a similar process of negotiations or talks will begin on the closing of the Makhmour Camp, and what is your position of what Turkey can do to persuade those in the camp to go back.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Thank you.

We hope there will be trilateral discussions. Actually in a way, quadrilateral, right? The Government of Iraq, the Government of Turkey, the United States and the UNHCR. There is a pending agreement out there that needs to be finalized. Turkey needs to provide its comments on this document that's co-drafted with the UNHCR. But so does Iraq. So the next step ought to be that the parties come together, either they sit down at a table together or if they just exchange information and suggest edits to this agreement, then we can go forward even further in closing Makhmour, but Makhmour is in the process of being closed out, as General Ralston described. There were just actions taken by the Iraqi Government to confiscate weapons that were in the camp. There's a census that's been conducted in the camp now as well. These are all mechanical steps that need to transpire for the camp to be closed down. Not because we say you have to go through these steps, but this is what the UNHCR which has jurisdiction over the camp has wanted to see happen, so that's happening.

When it comes to the return of camp residents or other members of the Kurdish population to Turkey yes, you're right, as General Ralston said, he was there, he did encounter a significant number of Turkish, I guess former citizens, Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity who would like to return to Turkey. I don't know exactly what it takes to provide them the confidence that it's "safe" to go back. I don't know what that is. I know how controversial an amnesty law would be. This government would not suggest to any ally that they should turn the other cheek and forget about terrorist crimes. Of course we would never suggest that. If somebody has committed a terrorist crime they should go through the normal judicial process, be prosecuted. Investigated, prosecuted and the rule of law should proceed.

There's a much more complicated question for people who are suspected of or perhaps are or were members of the PKK who are not and were never terrorist operatives. How do you deal with them? I don't have an answer to that. That's up to the Turkish Government to come up with a way to resolve that problem.

What I can say is if the Turkish Government does come up with a mechanism like that, that will I think have a significant, maybe even a dramatic impact in draining away the political or even physical support for the PKK in Iraq. That's very helpful. But that doesn't get away from our obligation or our need to produce other concrete results on the ground in Iraq.

Question: Do I understand you right, you said you would like to see the quadrilateral process begin again --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yes.

Question: -- but there's no decision?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It's sort of going along. The way this works is people exchange papers, drafts, e-mails, it has to come to closure somehow. And whether we force the coming to closure through an actual physical meeting or whether working through embassies we just make it happen, it just has to happen.

Question: I understand the U.S. position is that Turkey should work [inaudible] Iraqi Government. Iraqis take care of problems, be they PKK or other issues. Do you think, obviously Turkey does not invite Mr. Talabani to Ankara and Turkey does not have a good relationship with Mr. Barzani. Do you think this is helpful? Do you think it could be a good thing for Turkey to engage more? Especially Turkish [inaudible], have better outcome?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yeah. We do think it would be useful for the Turkish Government to engage even more with Kurdish regional leaders, but with Kurdish regional leaders in the context of they being part of the Government of Iraq. The whole point is that we don't want to do anything that undermines the sovereignty of the central government in Baghdad. So as far as we're concerned, Barzani, sure he's a leader of the KDP, sure he's the leader of the Kurdish region but he's also a member of the Government of Iraq and we need always to consider him in that regard. Or he's an Iraqi official, let's put it that way. Just as the Governor of California is an American official. That's slightly different.

It's useful in an operational way or in a practical way, for example, for General Ralston and General Bashir to have interaction with political leaders in the Kurdish area because there are so many practical problems that need to be worked out to produce those concrete results against the PKK I've been talking about. It's a lot harder to do if we don't have that multilateral cooperation happening.

Question: The Cyprus Government obviously angered Turkey with its decision to have an agreement, a contract, having a contract with Lebanese and Egyptians. It's an internationally disputed area, obviously. The United States is trying to find a resolution of the problem there. Do you think was it timely on the part of Greeks to pursue with that agreement? Is it helpful?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: You mean the Continental Shelf thing?

Question: Yes, the agreement with oil exploration. Was it timely? Was it a wise move or a good move on the part of Greeks? Or it should have been better if they delayed such actions after a resolution was found for the dispute?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It's not really for me to assess whether the Greek Government's decision was wise or unwise, but what I can say sitting in the chair I sit in, also being our mediator on Cyprus, is that any action that takes place that increases the level of emotionality and political tension doesn't help us get to the point where we reduce tension and reduce emotion to the point that we can really reinvigorate the Cyprus settlement process under UN auspices. So I would hope that this issue will pass, will calm down, and that we together will turn back to the UN process and implementation of the Gambari Agreement from July 8th. That's what I hope.

Question: I understand your [inaudible] about the [inaudible] on the issue of PKK, but we know that President Bush gave instruction to American Army [inaudible] without asking the Iraqi authorities. And when your troops [inaudible] people all parts of the Iraqi Government. Maybe not [inaudible], but the Shiite and the Kurdish ones [inaudible]. Is that a double standard? [Inaudible] with the Iranians, you can arrest them, you can kill them, but without asking Iraqi authorities; but on the other hand the terrorist PKK, you called them terrorists, you know that they are, and you cannot provide any instruction because you refer [inaudible] of Iraq.

Is that something, I think there is something wrong.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: That's a very perceptive question, but my answer would be no, there's not a difference here.

Number one, when it comes to -- I don't know when the orders were issued in terms of dealing with Iranians on the ground. There are press reports --

Question: We know that they arrested them and that Iraqi authorities protested.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yes. But what we don't know is what other sorts of arrangements may have been in place between us or the coalition and various Iraqi authorities. I just don't know the answer to that. I don't know. So what I'm saying is I don't know the case that what we did was totally against the wishes of the Iraqi Government, but that's not that important. The difference here is that the Iranians are in the midst of U.S. forces, so we encounter them. If we encounter PKK operatives we better arrest them as well, but we don't encounter them. We don't have forces in the north. We don't have them up there.

Question: With all due respect, sir, are you punishing the country that's behaving and loving its citizens to be killed by PKK terrorists crossing the border from northern Iraq?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I don't understand your question.

Question: Because they do not intervene in the Iraqi theater? Because they sit on their side, don't cross the border. But the Iranians are crossing the border, creating your, making your life much more difficult in Iraq, so that you are taking an action against Iran. But on the other side you are claiming to be an ally to Turkey and just okay, they have to handle it.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I don't understand that point. Where is there a double standard? Can you try it again?

Question: Can I [inaudible]? Does the United States need any PKK attack to American troops for arresting them?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: No. Not at all.

Question: You need some encounterment with the PKK people in Iraq for arresting them?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: No. It's a question of the physical presence of where U.S. forces are. We do not have these concentrations of U.S. troops in the north. We're not there. So we don't come across PKK operatives the way we come across these Iranians elsewhere in Iraq.

Question: But American troops arrested the Iranian in Irbil.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It was in Irbil.

Question: It shows us that American troops may operate in north, and just the first days of the occupation American forces attacked and eliminated [inaudible] in north.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Yes.

Question: Because [inaudible] terrorists. Yeah, he is terrorist. But PKK also. So that American troops operated and are still operating if necessary in northern Iraq, and they are operating against, they are arresting Iranian people in northern Iraq, in Irbil. We know it is [inaudible] PKK people [inaudible] or other places.

The question is the lack of encounter with the PKK in Iraq territory, is the question? If PKK attacks, are you waiting for some kind of literally attacks from PKK in order to --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: We're not. No. That's a good question. No, we're not. We are waiting to get the information that allows us to go after them and there have been cases in the past where we've gotten information and we've followed up on it, gone after them, and they weren't there. The operatives of the PKK weren't there.

So we've been unsuccessful so far. I probably shouldn't go beyond that as to why we're unsuccessful. I can't really talk about why we were, but we were unsuccessful. So we've got to be successful. We've got to improve the flow of information for one thing. That means we've got to get the right sources, to get the right sources, that gets back to what I talked about before. We have to get the Government of Iraq more focused to make sure we get that information and we have to do all of that information sharing and planning in close cooperation with the Government of Turkey as well, because the Government of Turkey can have information as well.

I can't go beyond that because then I have to be talking about intelligence operations.

Question: But you know that Turkish public opinion is very [inaudible] about that every day, the relation of the action. Fortunately [inaudible] PKK, fortunately. If one day they will decide that we cannot trust them enough, [inaudible] decide to cut ceasefire, break the ceasefire.

Although the ceasefire, the tension in the public opinion about this PKK issue is very high. The tension in the circle of the state operators also the same thing. So that the question is very big and when you said that, the last time, [inaudible]. How can you realize that they help people who might be [inaudible] and especially [inaudible] to the electoral task, the campaign. So can you give some specific means of [inaudible]?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I wasn't saying to Kasim just be patient. That's not what I was saying. What I was saying was if you're patient a little while longer you will see some concrete results. And General Ralston said something similar today. He said something like, I didn't read it but I heard what he said, he said previously as a military man, right, the use of force as a last resort. He didn't say that today. He talked about arrests today.

So when I said be patient I meant beyond our interview that we're having yesterday, or beyond this gathering here. We know something has to happen quickly. Yes, the ceasefire may be lifted this spring. Yes, you're going through elections. Yes, there's all this controversy over the resolution in the U.S. Congress. There is a lot of tension, all coming together at the same moment in Turkey about this very issue. So we know, you've got our attention and we've got to do something or else you'll have zero patience and we won't have to deal just with journalists but with the TGS --

Question: -- about this question. I had an interview with General Ralston two weeks ago. He was complaining about, he complained about the comments of some people in Washington about PKK. Who are they? Because they are saying, we agree with Turkish Government and [inaudible]? Who are they? What's the problem?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Obviously I don't know exactly to whom General Ralston was referring to in your conversation. But to try to put it in a different way without naming names, of course, I can't name names.

But the challenge of dealing with Iraq is bigger than obviously anything this government is dealing with right now. And there are endless tasks and in bureaucracies, and the U.S. Government is the biggest bureaucracy in the world, it's the most powerful organization in the world, it's got so many directions, so many moving parts, people moving in all different directions and accomplishing what they see as their discreet tasks.

If you are let's say in charge of economic reconstruction in our embassy in Baghdad, that's what you focus on. If you're in charge of security at our embassy in Baghdad you worry about the quieting the overall security situation with that burning house that I was talking about before. If you're in Washington dealing with Turkey, the top priority is U.S.-Turkish relations and worrying about what the impact would be if there were what Yasamin was talking about, if there were a Turkish incursion into Northern Iraq and how destabilizing that could be for the whole region potentially. Somebody's got to pull all these pieces together and somebody has got to make sure there's a proper balance and a proper focus in our government, and then in the Iraqi Government as well which has all of its priorities. But Ralston was talking about the U.S. Government.

So to integrate all that we have the Deputies Committee, the Principals Committee, and on top of that all the President just to pull it all together. The challenge is to make sure that when we're working on this problem over here, whatever it may be on the economics of Iraq, we're also spending enough time and devoting enough resources and focusing enough effort on in this case the PKK problem. Getting the huge, enormous, monstrous machine of the U.S. Government to stay focused on the right problems at the right time requires a huge amount of work and that's what General Ralston is talking about.

What I was getting at before is that he is very effective at doing that. He has such credibility, is so well regarded in the military that he can get our folks on the ground in Iraq to say this is urgent. You've got to go push the Iraqi Government to drop what they're doing over here and focus on the PKK. That's what he's doing.

Question: You are encouraging Turkey to get into some cooperation with Iraqi Kurds as well as Americans and the [inaudible] too.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: With the Iraqi Government.

Question: Yeah. The thing is, I have heard many military or Turkish military officials say that the PKK and Barzani are one and the same. You say in some cases you pursue PKK terrorists, but you got some leads but when your troops were there they were not there. And the weapons surge in [inaudible]. Apparently the PKK people there had been warned in advance and they kind of fled or whatever and the weapons were cached or whatever. Who is doing that? Iraqi Kurds apparently. Are they cooperating in the first place? Why don't you urge the Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with Turkey in the first place? It's their job as Iraqis to do that. Why don't you push them in [inaudible] this way.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: What makes you think we don't?

Question: The results are clear.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: No. The fact that they don't produce results doesn't mean we're not pushing them, right?

Question: Okay, so that means you have no leverage on them.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It doesn't mean no leverage, it means we've got to keep on pushing them and so far we haven't been able to convince them to do what they have to do. I agree with you, they need to do that and we've been pushing them and we need to keep pushing them and push them harder and get them to do it. I agree with you.

Question: The other thing is that unfortunately many people we talked to including some officials don't share your enthusiasm about General Ralston's performance. There are even some rumors that Turkey might cancel its part of the mechanism. Many people have lost their faith in trilateral. Do you think that can happen?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Who cares what I think about that? You know Turkey. You tell me.

Question: Well what happens if that happens? Is it hypothetical?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It's pretty hypothetical, yeah. I don't think we're going to get to that. We better not, right? Look, if we don't produce concrete results, loss of faith in us overall is a natural consequence so we have to produce the results. I don't know what else to tell you. But I don't want to predict, I don't want anyone to write about the U.S. official predicts that General Ralston is going to lose confidence of Turkish officials. I don't think that's going to happen because he's so capable, but I take your point.

Question: You have been asked several times about this 50/50 issue, [inaudible] and you [inaudible]. But I want to ask a question that [inaudible] problem that Turkish society might become totally anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Iraqi, anti-everything. The last issue when we [inaudible] of the [inaudible] this reaction, all of this discussion, et cetera. Do you think that this American and European [inaudible] a position about [inaudible] of the issue like PKK or [inaudible], et cetera, are not helping this kind of anti-Westernism or anti-democracy approach [inaudible]? Is that [inaudible] for Turkey? Is that [inaudible] for Turkey? The kind of civil coups defeat in Turkey, against democracy, against Europe, against United States, against everything? Is there some kind of fear or --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: No fear that there will be some kind of overturning of Turkish democracy. No. No fear of that. Turkish democracy is strong. It's really strong, and it's complicated and difficult as a democracy is supposed to be, but no, there's no fear that the fundamental secular democracy that is a cornerstone of the Turkish republic, that that's going to go away? No. Absolutely no concern about that.

Question: But I'm not asking for your [inaudible], I'm asking a societal issue. If people are becoming really anti-Western, anti-democratic, you cannot protect the democracy without people. And we have so many examples like this in Europe --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: You mean a revolution? You're talking about a revolution?

Question: I'm talking about [inaudible] crisis, or a kind of crisis. I am not talking a coup de'tat or some [inaudible]. I'm talking about society preference, society's choice, that there is the target of [inaudible]. Hitler came to power through elections.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: He sure did. But no, I don't see that historical analogy having any currency in today's Turkey. But of course we remember what happened earlier with Gray Wolves and right wing parties and the violence previously. Yeah, we're aware of that. But maybe we're naïve, maybe we're not seeing the full picture, but I don't see that level of social tension being present yet in Turkey. We still see the most popular political party being the [AKP] party. You can argue over how much popularity it has. Is it 25, 35, 40 percent? Probably not 40 percent, but has it lost some of its support since the last election? People debate that. And [MHP] which is not a violent party but it's on the far right, yes, it's increasing in strength. But nowhere near where the [AKP] party is at this point. So in terms of society, I don't see that happening. Maybe I'm wrong. Tell me. You are much more astute observers of Turkish society than I am. You know infinitely more than I do. I don't see it.

But do we see a sharpening of the mood and the attitudes and a hardening of approaches toward the U.S. or toward Europe? Yeah, we sure do and that's worrisome. The one common political concept across the political spectrum in Turkey is nationalism. Nationalism can be a good thing if it rallies a country to achieve greatness; and nationalism can become a bad thing if it leads to chauvinism.

In Turkey I don't think it's a worrisome trend at all, nationalism. I think it's positive. I think the [AKP] party's election was a reflection of a positive form of Turkish nationalism which is embracing Turkey's traditions. Islam and democracy are core traditions of Turkish political society. Great. That's what we would like to interpret the [AKP] party's election having been about. But the [AKP] party isn't going to govern alone, either. This next election will have other parties coming into the parliament most likely.

Question: Don't you think that you contribute a little bit the anti-Western [inaudible], your position, --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Sure.

Question: -- that only the PKK [inaudible]. The PKK, I am against this [inaudible] solution. I don't think there is a need for [inaudible] personally, but as a journalist I know that people are really, really [inaudible] and really are becoming more and more anti-American, anti-Western because PKK is surviving in northern Iraq occupied by United States.

So this is the question. So --

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I agree with you.

Question: Previously when the Turkish Government had talks with Damascus you had some concern. Now at the ISG [inaudible] advice to the President to have dialogue with Damascus, also Tehran, but the President doesn't seem to be liking the idea. Turkey still goes on dialogue with Syria and [inaudible].

What is your feel of it now? Do you feel that Turkey has a leverage to bring some communication via Damascus or Tehran? What does that mean to you? Are you as irritated as you were or you have a different take on it now?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I wouldn't say we're irritated. We know Turkey has an important role to play in its neighborhood. For God's sake, Turkey is a NATO ally that borders Syria, Iraq and Iran. Wow. That's astounding. So it's important for us to stay very closely coordinated with Turkey as Turkey conducts diplomacy in its neighborhood.

You're right there was some dissonance or a difference of approach to Syria back a couple of, well, a year ago when the international community had decided it was going to push very hard to isolate Assad, right? As the whole Hariri murder was unfolding and the report was coming due. Things have changed a bit. We don't need to go into the history of what all that is. We still of course are not in favor of embracing the Assad regime.

That said, we did see a positive contribution that Secretary Rice recognized during Foreign Minister Gul's last visit here when Ahmet Davutoglu paid his visit to Damascus and had consultations in this case with Hamas. It was a useful intervention. I don't know how much of that intervention of Ahmet Bey (Davutoglu) had to do with the government in Damascus, but our approach is more complicated than saying never talk to Syria. It's more complicated than that. And as long as we're coordinating with the Turkish Government and doing whatever we need to do or what Turkey needs to do with Syria as a neighbor in a way that we all are comfortable with, then there's no problem.

When it comes to Iran, again the situation has moved a little bit. I think the U.S. and Turkey are on the same page in terms of the goals in Iran. We're not talking about regime change in the U.S. Government, we're talking about a change in the behavior of the Iranian Government. Turkey agrees with that.

We're talking about Iran --

Question: Regime change is the U.S. policy.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Not in Iran. No, it's not. It's not the administration's policy. The administration's policy is behavioral change. It's not regime change. It's changed behavior. Maybe some people in Congress may have different views, but the U.S. Constitution says the President makes foreign policy. So our view is it's behavioral change that we seek.

On weapons of mass destruction or on the nuclear program I think Turkey and the United States are on the same page completely. And I guess just in the last couple of days Iran has suggested that maybe some of the neighbors of Iraq get together to discuss security, and we're not against that actually. We're not against that. If something positive can come out of it, okay. It's important that Turkey play a role in that.

Question: The Syrian Prime Minister was in Ankara. He talked to Foreign Minister Gul and Gul is visiting to Washington. So each time prior to the Washington visit we have these regional cooperation or whatever, and then there is always the talk that oh, are they going to carry a message from Damascus to Washington.

I don't know about the message, but in the broader term do you see Turkey is playing a role or Turkey has been asked to play a role by Washington to have a dialogue with those two countries?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Turkey doesn't need to be asked by Washington do anything. Turkey is a NATO ally, a sovereign country with a proud history of being an important actor in this region and in regions beyond its immediate neighborhood, so we're not asking Turkey to do anything but we welcome Turkey when it does the sorts of things I talked about already, be it the visit of Davutoglu or Foreign Minister Gul's speech a couple of years ago in Tehran, right? When he talked about reform. He said if we don't advance reform, reform will overtake us. Those sorts of interactions are great. That's very helpful. That's valuable.

Question: To follow up on [inaudible]'s question, would it in your view be a good step if the Turkish President invited his Iraqi counterpart to Turkey for a visit?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: Sure, it would be wonderful. It would be great.

Question: Which [inaudible]?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: [Laughter]. You provocateur. Sezer and President Talibani? Of course that would be a wonderful step. We want Turkey and Iraq to have the closest possible relationship and we've got a lot to learn from Turkey with regard to Iraq and vice versa.

Question: Maybe he will visit as [inaudible].

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I hope not.

Question: [Inaudible] is going to next Prime Minister of Turkey.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: What do you think?

Question: I don't know.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: It all depends on who the next President of Turkey is, huh? I don't know what's going to happen. It seems just reading what you guys write and talking to people in your society, it seems like maybe Turkish politics are moving in that direction, but who knows?

Question: Do you have the time for the meeting?

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza: I honestly don't know what time it is, but it will be a meeting and a lunch, so probably they'll meet just before lunch time. I would guess around 11:00 or 12:00, depending on if they eat lunch at noon or at one. Unfortunately, I don't get to go.