NATO Defense Ministerial and the Wehrkunde Security Conference

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Welcome. I appreciate you all coming in early in the morning. I had a press event with the press travelling with the Secretary of Defense of the United States in Munich a couple of days ago … so this will be the second one in about five days and I'm sure there will probably be a lot of similarity in terms of focus and emphasis.

We just finished the NATO Defence Ministerial, the Informal Ministerial, in Seville last week. I thought it was productive, a good dialogue. Discussions in terms of NATO's focus and emphasis I think were important. From there, I attended the Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich over the weekend. I won't have to reiterate some of the startling pronouncements that I'm sure you heard if you were there, and read about if you weren't. Very interesting. If you review and look at who attended, it was significant. I think there's an enormous focus here in Europe on security. And if you in any way looked at what was said, again, the discourse is varied, it's wide. I think opposing viewpoints that can be discussed and offered in a public forum are always a positive factor -- even if folks don't agree, that's OK. So I thought that was a very good conference also. I've been to several of those and I think that's probably one of the best I've been to.

I won't discuss much here in my opening comments about Afghanistan, NATO missions -- I'll leave that to your questions and probably just save more time for your breakfast and your questions. With that, let me stop and I'd be happy to take any questions as we start.

QUESTION: General, could you tell us what you really asked for in Seville for Afghanistan? And can you give us an update of how many troops there are now, how many you expect in the next few months, and what the offers were there?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: That's about four questions and probably about 45 minutes! Seville was not a force generation conference. It was the Informal Ministerial, in which a part of the discussion was about NATO operations in Afghanistan and my judgment, and my staff's and subordinate commands' judgments, of the troops, the formations, needed. That revolves around the mission NATO gave us, which is to conduct security and stability operations throughout the entire country. With that, then, military estimates and planning develop a troop list -- a statement of requirements -- and it says to do that mission, this number of forces are needed. The fact of the matter is, that number of forces has never been provided. So it makes accomplishment of the mission more difficult. The key to success in Afghanistan, we believe, is the ability to both secure and stabilize at the same time. And the point I made at the Ministerial was we do not have adequate forces to do that. Commanders are daily, routinely, having to move forces in their area of responsibility to secure and then stabilize, and when problems arise those same forces have to leave an area and go to another area. The key in this situation, this type of an operation -- an insurgency, if you will -- is to be able to have a continuous presence. In doing so, you control an area. And when you control an area you stabilize it; when you stabilize it, then you can build, you can invest. That's when the reconstruction and the development occur consistently over time. Without that, it's a series of starts and stops, and it will take longer. Without the full troop complement, I believe there are greater risks to every NATO soldier, because all the forces aren't there. Those were the points that I made, and I hope that we will see continued offerings of further forces for ISAF in Afghanistan.

With regard to how many, it's not like an auction, because it wasn't a force generation conference. The ministers discussed the issues; they will go back to their capitals and we hope to see in the coming days, weeks if you will, some increased contributions. And it's not just large maneuver units. There are enablers, small units. There are certain capabilities we need. Sometimes it's the capacity to run airport operations, things like that, that are very important. Those are the enablers that allow the other large units to operate throughout the country. So it's important that we get the broad balance and that we fill that statement of requirements up. Now we revised that statement recently. I felt that it was about 14 months old. It was time to look at it; many things had changed since it was last reviewed. We validated some of the shortfalls that were already there. We added some new requirements. And we deleted or reduced other requirements. I thought it was a very good, comprehensive look at what's needed.

QUESTION: It is very difficult for me to understand, and to explain to our readers, what's going on exactly. The last time I came here to breakfast with your predecessor, he asked in the morning for about 1,000 men. In the afternoon he gave an interview to some U.S. media and all of a sudden it became 2,500. In the meanwhile, you have U.S. forces that were transferred to ISAF plus 1,000 forthcoming, plus British soldiers, plus Canadian reinforcements, Dutch reinforcements, Danish, and so on. So it makes more or less 12,000 troops at least. And we still hear from you and others that we need 2,000 or more troops and that we are still lacking 10 percent. But 10 percent of what? It's very difficult to understand how it is always 90 percent of requirements, with troops growing all the time. So what is exactly necessary? Is it right that you need two or three or four battalions with all the logistic apparatus enabling them to fight….?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The answer is yes, you do. The problem is, it's dynamic. That's why we reviewed the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. The conditions changed. What I don't want to do is provide facts, figures, details, specifics. Because if you have that, the enemy will have that. And then he will know what our order of battle is. We call it order of battle -- that's troop list; it's a military term. And he has one. He knows what forces he has available. We don't know where all his forces are and how many and who's leading them. But if we put this statement of requirements out, then he will know exactly what it is we don't have. And he will leverage that to his advantage. So I'm not going to get into the details. I don't think you will ever see anywhere where I have said we need 2,000 of this or 1,000 of that. I have not said that. And I won't say that, because it's not about 2,000 of this. It's about capabilities. We need some ground maneuver capability in addition to what we have. We need to have some additional medium- and heavy-lift helicopter capability and fixed-wing capability -- it's called intra-theater airlift -- and rotary-wing capability to move tactical mobility around Afghanistan. We need additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance -- ISR. Those are unmanned aerial vehicles; they're the airplanes that take pictures. Beyond that, I'm not going to get into specifics on where we need the type of units to do things. It's an operational issue and I just don't think it serves a purpose to put that out in the open, because it can be used against us. You say that the numbers change, conditions change, we keep [going] up, down. I think there's circular reporting. I think that these numbers are being picked up; someone says 2,000…. That's why I won't get with the numbers. I don't think that's helpful, and it just confuses the issue.

What's changed? We needed to fill what was not filled. That's some maneuver capability and some enablers. We needed some additional requirements. Why? Because of the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is very porous and we now understand better -- we, NATO -- since we took over the south and the east in the summertime/fall. We've now had time on the ground; we understand better that that border is porous and that insurgents, the Taliban, are moving back and forth across it, almost with impunity. So that's part of the revised CJSOR additions. That's about as far as I want to go with specifics. I think beyond that it would not be helpful to the commanders on the ground. They need the flexibility. They don't need their formations announced. This 24/7 news worldwide capability goes out everywhere, and I'll guarantee you there are satellite dishes all throughout the Waziristan and other places that would be monitoring these developments and watching closely to see if an advantage can be gained. That's why I want to stay away from that. The bottom line is the revised CJSOR is very similar in numbers and capability to the previous. What we did was refine it. And as I said, we've asked for some additional but we also said here's some that can be deleted or reduced. So it's balanced out. It's not about numbers; it's about capabilities.

QUESTION: You've set out very clearly the sequence of how you see success in Afghanistan. It's about security, then stabilization, then stability…. Did you feel that that message was understood correctly in Seville? Certainly from some of the comments from ministers, it seems that some of the Europeans consider that there needs to be a different sequence, a sort of meshing of security and reconstruction at the same time….. The French also wanted more of an explanation as to why you considered there was the potential for an upsurge in violence over the next few weeks. Are you going to provide more details, or do you think it is not necessary?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Let me go with the first one. I can't say if the ministers fully understood the points that I was making. There has to be from an ISAF perspective a concurrent, simultaneous effort to secure and stabilize. We can't do it sequentially because you start getting gaps between the stages. It has to be, at the ISAF civil-military level, almost always concurrent. As soon as security is gained, either through Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police or ISAF, immediately then there has to be an assessment done with tribal elders, provincial governors, local municipal leaders -- what are your needs here with regard to infrastructure, social services, things like that, for what we call our quick-impact projects that ISAF is capable of doing. They can repair a bridge, get a road fixed, build a schoolhouse, a medical clinic, provide some doctors to do some treatment if there's a significant disease or endemic medical problem. That has to happen concurrently. That's why we need the full sourcing of the troop units.

Those are quick-impact. Those fix today's problems now. That's what I call retail; that's down at the consumer level. The second part is wholesale. That's where you need long-term public and private development, both governmental and non-governmental. This is the international organisations, World Bank and those types of things. They come in, they're chartered to do this, they're resourced to do this. They look at the situation, they begin investing -- creation of opportunities, jobs, long-term infrastructure, the building of, say, public utilities, hydroelectric power, distribution, electrical grids, potentially railroads -- those things that invest in the nation over time, that create jobs, that stimulate commerce. That's the long-term. That's what will over time make the difference in terms of providing alternative opportunities that are not there today.

So the retail effort is ongoing. As much as we'd like? No. Can we do better? Yes. Do we have to stay at it? Absolutely. We've also got to get that wholesale effort, which I think funnels from world organisations -- UN, internationals, non-governmentals -- into Kabul and then out to provincial governors then down to municipalities. That's the long-term: private, public sector investment.

QUESTION: That's precisely the thing which some of the comments from ministers lead us to believe they haven't understood. They brush aside when you talk about more requirements … let's not talk about troops all the time, let's talk about reconstruction.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I understand. But the troops are part of the stability. You can't get reconstruction and stability without security. And you can't get long-term stability and reconstruction without security. We don't need the troops for combat kinetic purposes. We need the troops to be able to provide the presence throughout these areas, these municipalities and provinces. Where there is a government or ISAF presence, the Taliban are not going to prevail. That's why we need those. So this isn't more troops in order to conduct strictly security. This is more troops to provide the presence to allow these concurrent actions to occur.

With regard to the French and a spring [upsurge in violence], I don't know that we have talked about tying this requirement for full sourcing to any particular event. I think traditionally, if you look at the last several years, it's pretty much understood, accepted, common knowledge, that when the snows are over and the thaws begin and the trafficability in the country is better, there normally has been an uptick, an increase in attacks. We don't think this year will be any different. But what is different is that ISAF right now is continuing to focus its operations, and in even a greater way they are on the uptick, if you will, in terms of their security operations and their stability operations -- the quick- impact projects. They have not taken a winter pause. So our intent here is to continue an upward climb in terms of engagement presence and the number of these projects that we can put out there. Again, with the intent to provide opportunity and provide services to the people.

QUESTION: Are there some places in Afghanistan where you can already start reconstruction, where the situation is stabilized enough to start?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: My assessment after a couple of trips and talking to people, and seeing -- and I've been out to every area -- I think that in the north and the west right now the main effort is stability, reconstruction and development. The supporting effort is security. There are some pockets of organized crime, but it's generally not the insurgency. There are some drug traffickers up in the north and the west that are always destabilizers, but I think the main effort there is reconstruction and development. I think in the south and the east the main effort is security, in order to allow the stability, reconstruction and development to begin. So I think the short answer would be in the north and west the possibilities exist right now.

QUESTION: I would like to come back to the possibility of a spring insurgent uptick in violence. In that case, would you be willing to consider the use of the NATO Response Force? Also, I would like to ask you about Italy, first of all your general assessment of the presence of the Italian troops in the country, and secondly whether you are satisfied with the offer made in Seville of an additional three planes….? Finally, the Italian minister Parisi has spoken about a date of 2011 which emerged in the course of the debate in Seville as a possible date for reviewing the situation in Afghanistan…. What do you expect to happen in 2011? If there is a revision of the situation, would you say that would be the turning point for troops to start coming home?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I think we will see an upsurge in insurgent activity, Taliban activity. The question is, how dramatic? The Taliban suffered significant setbacks in 2006. Operation Medusa was, I believe, a significant defeat. There were conventional Taliban attacks. They suffered an enormous number of casualties, killed or wounded, among those participating. I would find it unlikely that we'd see that again. Now, do I think that would mandate the NATO Response Force use? If one looks at the NATO Response Force tasks and missions, first of all, it's a NAC decision. But secondly, NATO has a Strategic Reserve force. That's the first place that I would go to ask for authority to be granted by the North Atlantic Council for its use. So at this point, I don't see the NRF. I visited Italian troops in Regional Command Center -- Regional Command Capital, as it's called. I visited the headquarters Regional Command West that the Italians man, and some of the formations there. I'm very impressed with the quality, professionalism and capability of the Italian forces. General Satta out in RC West is a superb commander. He has got incredible multi-national experience. His credentials are as good as I've seen anywhere. I was very impressed with what I saw there. The contribution recently of the additional airlift is welcome and it will be very important, so obviously we're glad to have that. Is it enough? It's never enough. As I said, there are still some open requirements but we greatly appreciate whatever the nations can afford to contribute at this time, and we hope they'll continue to do so.

With regard to 2011, I don't know. I don't want to get into dates. I think that there are a couple of things that we have to look at. We have to continually assess the situation -- the security, the stability, the reconstruction, the development. We have to continually assess the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces. Because for ISAF, for the NATO mission: secure and stabilize the country. Once the Afghan National Security Forces are trained, equipped and they can sustain themselves, they will do that job. So that becomes a security and stability force, and then ISAF departs. We'll have to make sure that they have adequate numbers, they have the equipment, they have the leadership -- which I think is there even today -- and they have the ability over time to sustain that. It can't be just a year or two and then without the institutional support it starts to fall apart. We're working on that now, I know the United States is, and NATO is beginning to participate. I think that's the key.

QUESTION: I was under the impression that this date came from NATO itself. Now you don't want to speak about dates. How did this come about?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don't know about any date. I'm not NATO. I'm the Allied Command Operations commander. You may have to go to NATO Headquarters, but I don't recall ever addressing a date. It's based upon conditions. How long does it take to grow a capable Afghan National Security Force? How long will it take to inject and to get these reconstruction projects, this development effort, going? Those will be the determining factors, not a date on the calendar. I don't know of a date. I have not seen that.

QUESTION: The training and the equipment of the Afghan National Army seems to be a new task for NATO … so I suppose that during this year it's going to be one of the priorities. Training is possibly feasible, but equip?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The G8 nations a few years ago assumed responsibility for different functions. Germany assumed responsibility for training the Afghan National Police, other nations for governance, other nations for demobilization, things like that. The United States assumed the responsibility for the Afghan National Army. They are the lead nation. Having said that, they have over several years invested enormous manpower and resources in that effort. There is a recognition, we understand NATO needs to participate in there. The Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations, have provided to the Secretary General's office a paper on how NATO may be able to do that for the future. We already have operational mentoring and liaison teams on the ground that are working with the Afghan battalions. They're called OMLTs. There are more required. NATO has not filled its stated commitment to do that, so we are continuing to work with the nations to do that. I will say that there have been many contributions for equipment lately from NATO countries. That's helpful, it's a good thing. We heard more at Seville and I believe in the future there will be more coming. I believe the United States has legislation pending, a supplemental budget appropriation, and I think there's somewhere around $8 billion for train and equip for the Afghan Security Forces. So there are lots of efforts, and I see an increasing role and a growing role for NATO in training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces.

QUESTION: There was a committee meeting in Ottawa last night in the Canadian Senate in which they said the Canadian government should consider withdrawing its contingent from ISAF if other allies don't come up with more reinforcements to support. I was wondering how concerned you are that that sort of thing is a symptom of a division in the Alliance, if you like, between those seven or eight countries that are engaged in the south and the east, and the others who maybe argue that they signed up to do reconstruction work and stabilization work, and didn't sign up to lead Spring offensives against the Taliban and take on counter insurgency work in the southern regions.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Sounds like a political question to me. I'm here to render military advice. Each nation has to address the situation based upon what they feel is in their interest and how they want to contribute. I hate to use this term, but if I had full authority, what would I want the most? I would want full sourcing of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, 100 percent . If I can't have no caveats and full sourcing, I'll take full sourcing. If we can't get full sourcing, then let's get rid of the caveats so that commanders on the ground have flexibility and they have the ability to provide the best response possible for the security and the stability at the same time. But the worst case is to not source the requirement and to put constraints on commanders for the use of the forces.

QUESTION: It's a political question maybe, but there's a military aspect to it. If the Canadians take out their troops, surely that will leave an enormous gap?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: It does. It's a terrible situation. I find it very unfortunate, and we would not want that to happen. But as I say, the argument may be:
be there with no constraints. That would be what we would like to see. So from a military perspective, I just gave you what I think is the best judgment I can make. I don't want to get into commenting or judging. Again, that's right now a discussion and dialogue, and we'll have to see what the future holds in terms of actions taken based on that type of rhetoric.

QUESTION: But after Seville are you more hopeful that other nations are going to come up with significant contributions to fulfil the requirements?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I am optimistic that we will see increased contributions. "Significant", the term you use, is in the eye of the beholder. Small contributions of an enabling nature can be very significant. There are certain things that enable other military activities to happen. They may appear to be very inconsequential and not sexy, but they are critical because without them we can't do other what I would call big-muscle tasks. They're the connective tissue.

QUESTION: Doesn't it get frustrating for you and your predecessor? You keep making this pitch over and over again to get more help in Afghanistan, and then you hear things like a Canadian Senate Committee saying we really just want to pull them out.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Everybody has a perspective and a viewpoint, and is it frustrating? Well, I've only been here two months and I can't speak for my predecessor, but I've been in coalition operations and I've been on the other end, the commander end In NATO operations. It's alliance operations. Those things happen. But here's what bothers me the most, and I said this. I said it to the North Atlantic Council. If the nations don't source this to 100 percent -- either member nations or participating nations, because we have others there beyond NATO -- but if it's not sourced to 100 percent I think it does three things: One, it limits COMISAF's flexibility. He then has to use constraint, he has to adjust, he has to manage; he has new complicating factors. Two, it severely constrains the regional commanders who have to implement the tactical operations on the ground. Third, and most importantly, it places every NATO soldier there at greater risk. If the third reason doesn't resonate, doesn't get you, if you don't understand that, then you've missed the point. That's the very reason that it ought to be sourced because it provides less risk. It puts fewer soldiers down there in harm's way when you've got the full complement. Somebody didn't just develop a statement of requirements and throw it in the window. This is well thought out, prudent, capable, competent military planning. One could argue that if you don't get the forces you need for the mission you're given, then you need to go back and revise the mission. Well, we'll see what happens. I don't know if the future is going to require us to do that. But I still think we can generate, we can get additional contributions and then we'll continue to assess.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up with a more specific question about the risks that soldiers are facing? Forgive me for not knowing the technical term, but these new bombs that have shown up in Iraq…. Are you getting any sense that they're also showing up in Afghanistan?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don't want to get into specifics. We have a growing problem with improvised explosive devices. They are not to the level of sophistication at this point that you intimate. However, they are becoming more sophisticated.

QUESTION: Can you go any further?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: No.

QUESTION: You say that you need more troops and forces…. In that sense, do you consider that six reconnaissance aircraft … from Germany or the three … fighters and the two helicopters that the French have sent are only token gestures….?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: No. They're significant. Remember I said we had a shortfall in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance? Those aircraft are capable, they will help, and it's significant to me. I think it's important. Whatever we do to eliminate the difference between what we have and the statement of requirements is a positive thing. It's important. It adds, and then I think it reduces the risk, both to mission success and to the individual NATO soldier on the ground. Because those aircraft can be used in a variety of means: tactical airlift, intra-theater airlift, rotary wing lift. They can move quick- impact project materials, they can move the materials to build a schoolhouse or a clinic, as well as troops. So it's important. It's not uni-dimensional. ISAF is working in a lot of different ways.

QUESTION: To go back to my earlier question about the differences between those who are in the south and those who aren't. Are you seeing any signs that that's having an impact on morale amongst the soldiers on the ground….? Is there any danger that they feel they're not being fully supported by other allies?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: It's hard to tell. I'm not on the ground enough and haven't got enough contact. What I hear from commanders is that is not the case. I think a very positive fact is with the generous United States contribution of the additional brigade. That allows COMISAF now to have what he has not had, which is a tactical theatre reserve. That's a very, very positive factor and I think that makes a world of difference to all the regional commanders. And obviously through a chain of command, that impact will be felt with the soldiers on the ground. So I think that's very important.

QUESTION: You referred to the Taliban not being as strong as they were last year, or suggested that because of the damage that was done. You also said that they're using more sophisticated devices. I wonder if you could assess the strength of the Taliban as an army?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: They suffered significant losses, but I don't know that they're not as strong, because they recruit. If you look, for example, at the refugee situation and the Afghani refugees in Pakistan, it's over two million. So there's an enormous potential recruiting base. I think what we've seen in the last few months in parts of the country is an increase in asymmetric attacks. I said last year they came conventionally, massed formations, and they suffered significantly. Now we see a different tactic. What we're seeing is more of a classic insurgent tactic, where it's smaller. That's where this improvised explosive device (IED) increase we think is coming from. So rather than try to stand and slug it out with ISAF, they're not going to do that. I think there'll be different approaches. There will be more of what we would call the classic insurgency, small-unit tactics. So again, it's in every conflict in the history of mankind. You have to continually adjust what you do because you have a smart, cunning, thinking enemy. We have to understand that, and we have to be one step ahead.

QUESTION: Is that what begs the need for more intelligence?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Exactly. It's essential that we've got the linkage between the soldiers on the ground who see, feel, sense, and they're great providers of information; and then we've got technical information means, and it's got to be brought together and synthesized and then products developed to inform so we can stay that step ahead, and we're proactive not reactive. It's very difficult.

QUESTION: When did you notice that change in tactics? Was it after Medusa, or more recent than that?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: It seemed to be after Medusa. If you recall, there was a flurry of IEDs in Kabul for a while. There has been some good work done by the forces there, and that is receding. But now we see it in other parts of the country.

QUESTION: The Secretary General the other day said that he expects the back of the insurgency to be broken by 2009. Was that based on military advice?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: It wasn't my advice. You'll have to talk to him, but I don't know. I have not talked about any dates.

QUESTION: Does NATO have common guidelines for counter insurgency? For example the United States now have this new field manual.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Not to the extent of a new field manual. However, because the nations participate, and nations have much experience, yes. It's a consistent assessment back and forth. We must observe, understand, assess, revise, direct, monitor, assess. This is a tough business when you get into irregular warfare. We're learning, but again we've got enormous competence and experience with the leaders there, and many units have had much of this over the years. So I think that's a positive, and what we've got to do is bring together the information and intelligence gathering mechanisms then to produce these assessments so commanders can continually be more concise.

QUESTION: Do you think it is possible on the ground to crush and defeat forever the insurgency, the Taliban, in Afghanistan? I think it more or less covers what I guess the French minister meant when he asked what exactly are our military and political objectives. That is to say, do you really think that the kind of surge of NATO/ISAF force in Afghanistan would solve the problem and in one or two years be able to crush the Taliban forever? It's a political and military problem at the same time; some countries are maybe reluctant to address the question because they believe that it is not possible to crush the Taliban in one or two years, or to prevent them from always coming back….

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I'm sure that we could debate this. But what is the mission? To establish a safe and secure environment. To establish security and stability. The ISAF mission is to do that and then turn it over to the Afghan security forces. Now, can you crush the Taliban? I don't think you can crush anything that is ideological. That probably doesn't ever happen. What you do is you offer choice. In life, everybody wants a choice. If you get a choice, even if they're not good choices you're probably happier than with no choice. The choice is that the people in Afghanistan don't have to subscribe to an oppressive, extremist view of life. They have a choice to do something else. They have a choice to send their children to a school that teaches things other than hatred. They have a choice for a legal job, not an illegal job growing poppies and then turning it over to drug traffickers. They have a choice in life, and that's what this is about. This is about giving them opportunities. It's a job. It's a roof over their head. It's food on the table for their children. It's an education. It's medical care that they have not had. Those are the things that will crush this movement, this Taliban, this ideology, this extremist view of life, or extremist view of the life they want.

QUESTION: Do you have any intelligence of Iranian involvement in Afghanistan in supporting the insurgents?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: If I did, I couldn't tell you. There's a lot of activity out in the west because of the border -- commercial activity, a lot of movement of goods and services across the border. Beyond that, I don't know. The west, Herat, that area out there is almost an economic engine right now. There are very positive developments out there.

QUESTION: What was your first sentiment when you heard President Putin?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I was disappointed. You look back, and ten years ago we started a bit of a NATO-Russia initiative. Five years ago I think it was enhanced through some further initiative and momentum. And in many ways we've got representation here. I was disappointed.

QUESTION: Is it still possible to go further with Russia in this context, from a military to military point of view?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I certainly would hope so. We've had what I judge to be superb, good, improving military to military [contacts]. One of the stumbling blocks has been the inability to get a Status of Forces agreement. We've got to get through that, and we'll work on that. I hope we can do that. When I was here in 1998 as a Brigadier General, I visited an installation and we were planning on exercises with the Russians…. I was impressed, and we were glad to do that. So I would certainly hope we can sustain this. But it was maybe a setback, and I think unfortunate.

QUESTION: General, I know you are here in your capacity as SACEUR … but on this missile defense thing. That is bilateral, but the U.S. is a member of NATO, Poland and the Czech Republic also, and NATO is thinking of maybe one day having that kind of ballistic missile defense…. Do you think it is technically possible, or necessary, to have those bases so close to the Russian border, even when we know that historically Russia was always slightly paranoid for many reasons? Don't you think that it is a kind of, not provocation, but at least something that was not absolutely necessary, knowing that you already have … equipment [elsewhere] that was largely sufficient?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don't want to get into the political aspect of it. But from the geometry and physics and things like that, it's my understanding that those are more optimum locations. Beyond that, it becomes a political issue. But I think that those locations were based on best military advice, and physics and other things, as opposed to any political considerations. That's my understanding, but beyond that I wouldn't want to engage because I would do so without knowing any of the facts.

QUESTION: In Kosovo there was some violence over the weekend. Are you now confident that KFOR has the riot control capability to deal with such problems if they were to intensify, and has overcome the problems of a couple of years ago?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes, I am. I've been down there. I've looked at the formations and talked to the commanders. Given the numbers of capable units on the ground -- over 60 percent I believe are trained and equipped for riot control capability -- I think that what they have there is adequate to the task.

QUESTION: Is the NATO command structure flexible enough to conduct operations in Afghanistan and in Kosovo at the same time, or do you plan some adaptations to this command structure?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I think it is capable at this time. As you know, we just rotated over from ISAF-9 to ISAF-10 so we're now putting the final touches because of inbound personnel standing fully up in Kabul. We've been in Kosovo since 1999. It is very mature. It has gone through several reviews. The change from multinational brigades in the past, with these invisible barriers, to multinational task forces with no boundaries and no caveats on how they can be used, is a significant level of flexibility that's very helpful. No, I'm comfortable with that, as are their intervening headquarters both in Brunssum and Naples.

QUESTION: Going back to Kosovo, the political blockage between NATO and the EU is well known…. In what way is that restricting you in some of the conversations you need to have and some of the decisions you need to have made…..?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: At this point, it's not. I don't feel that; I don't see that. My concern is the drawdown of the UN mission, UNMIK -- the timing of that, and the velocity if you will, with the stand-up then of the EU capability, particularly in the policing function, which provides security. My concern is that we've got to synchronize that so that as one comes down the other comes up commensurately, or it will create gaps and a lack of police monitors and police assistance. So we're watching that closely. The European Union personnel, the advance parties, integrated closely with UNMIK and KFOR -- KFOR as a kind of forcing function to make sure that that is harmonized. And I think they realise that there has to be closer attention paid to that so that we don't get unbalanced and leave something uncovered.

QUESTION: Have you received assurances from the EU that this mission will do the tougher functions like riot control or guarding religious monuments? Because if they don't, there's a risk that KFOR will be left holding the baby.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: That's work in progress. We're working through that now. That's why it's so important that the advance parties, the early arrivals, got the good assessment to understand that one size doesn't fit all. This is different from Bosnia when we did the transition there. You've got to make the assessment and then adapt to the different conditions.

QUESTION: Do you foresee a very different KFOR within one year?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don't know. I think what we'll have to do is obviously let the political developments occur here with regard to presentation of the Ahtisaari proposal to the United Nations. Then the process of resolution, and then beyond that, I don't know when that is, but that's when we must watch the transition and make these assessments to see, again, what's the security level, how competent is the Kosovo police service, this notion of a Kosovo Security Force will have to be described and constructed, and NATO will have a responsibility there. So again, I don't want to put a timeline on it. What we have to do is look at the tasks, and then as those tasks unfold early on, we'll get a better feel for how they fall out on a calendar, if you will, for the future.

QUESTION: On The Kosovo Security Force, do you have any ideas at this stage as to how large the force should be….?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I think we'll probably get some guidance on that from the future status proposal or from political means. But at this point, no, I wouldn't want to presume that.

QUESTION: Regarding Afghanistan, you don't want to talk about numbers, which is understandable, but in the past with your predecessor and also at the NATO political level, percentages have been given out, sometimes different percentages at the same time…. What would you say is now the percentage which is filled at the moment?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: At FOC I heard about 85 or 90, or something like that -- about last fall. The United States contribution was significant. Everybody had their own formula. It's above 90 for sure, with that additional 3,200 from the U.S. So my best military estimate is probably 93 or 94. There may be an enabling unit out there of 15 people without which you cannot effectively conduct operations with 2,000. That's why it's not about numbers; it's about capabilities. There are some very, very small functional niche-type units that are essential. And they oftentimes are high-demand, low-density. There's not enough of them to go around. ISR is one of those. There's never enough.
(EDITORIAL CLARIFICATION: the percentages expressed above are based on pledges made by nations that have not necessarily all arrived in Afghanistan.)

QUESTION: But when you came, you did a new assessment and you asked for more than your predecessor….

GENERAL CRADDOCK: You didn't listen. I said three things happened. We validated what had yet to be filled. We determined there were new requirements based on new conditions -- stage 3/stage 4, the border. Three, we deleted or reduced requirements based on the fact that conditions had changed and we didn't need it. I can't tell you if the number is more or less. That's not important. What's important is the capabilities needed.

QUESTION: You can also translate capabilities into manpower, more or less.

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don't know that that's a true statement. I did not count up what we deleted and what we recommended. I don't know that that's a true statement.

QUESTION: The number you're asking for is higher because we have problems with the Taliban…….. (inaudible)

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The mission was for security and stability, and a troop list was built against that. It was never sourced. So we could do one or the other or one and a little bit of the other. My point is that we have got to do both. What's changed? What is the addition here? This is what I said earlier. It is the fact that when we took over in the south and the east, we realised that there's a border here and it's porous. NATO hadn't had that before. They got in, operated … so we have to do something to control this border. And we hope the neighbor, Pakistan, makes more effort to control the border. So based upon the ISAF requirement to control the border, that was the change. That was the addition. But beyond that, the rest of it was already there. It was security and stability, both at the same time. But without that, you can't do that. You have to trade off one and increase the risk.

QUESTION: To control the border, do you need troops on the ground or intelligence….?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: All of the above.

QUESTION: Can you confirm that the 10th Mountain Division is going to be replaced….?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I think the intent is to do that. I don't know that they've decided how they're going to do that.