In addition to having to cope with environmental problems stemming from marine nuclear reactors and associated radioactive waste, Russia is burdened with numerous non-nuclear environmental threats. While it is beyond the scope of this report to examine these threats, mentioning them illustrates that the nuclear waste issue does not exist in isolation and that Russia is further troubled by many additional environmental concerns. Russia is ill-equipped financially and politically to resolve these problems on its own.

The cleanup of waste from naval activities, in particular, will likely continue to be short-changed while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) wrestles with the allocation of its severely limited defense budget. The MOD has indicated that it will be cutting back on the Navy in order to buttress a traditional reliance on the land-forces for defense. A lack of funding for the Navy will inhibit carrying out nuclear submarine decommissioning, de-fueling, and dismantlement in an expeditious manner. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has also played and will increasingly continue to play a major role in the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes.

In 1995, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection of the Russian Federation issued the "State Report on the Status of the Environment of the Russian Federation." This report stated, "The greatest danger in recent years is found in the radioactive waste repositories [located on the Kola Peninsula]. The repositories for spent nuclear fuel are … obsolete, are practically completely full, and could lead the Navy to return to the practice of dumping liquid radioactive wastes into the sea."

Until 1992, the Soviet Union and Russia had been dumping radioactive waste, including some nuclear submarine reactors containing fuel, at sea, according to open sources. This took place even though the Soviet Union had ratified the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (unofficially known as the London Dumping Convention) in 1975. In particular, the Soviet Union dumped thirteen nuclear submarine reactors, six of which contained spent or damaged nuclear fuel, in the Kara Sea. The Soviet Union also dumped untreated solid and liquid low-level radioactive wastes in the Barents and Kara Seas. It is estimated that the Soviet Union dumped at least twice as much radioactive waste at sea as the combined inventories of the other twelve nations that had carried out disposal activities at sea. Much of the Russian dumping was done in shallow waters near the continental shelf north of the 40^th latitude in the Russian Far East in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and north of the 70^th latitude in the Russian Northwest in the Barents and Kara Seas[3].

The Russian Northern and Pacific fleets contain about 250 surface and subsurface nuclear powered vessels, with about two-thirds berthed in the northern region. Today, the Russian Navy’s nuclear powered fleet includes more than 476 marine reactors in service or storage and has generated large quantities of spent nuclear fuel, high and low-level solid and liquid radioactive wastes that have not been processed or safely stored. These marine reactors are mostly from nuclear submarines. The vast majority of the submarines contain two reactors each, and the remaining small fraction of the total submarines has one reactor each. Figures vary, but approximately 160 nuclear submarines have been taken out of service in the Russian Navy; about 90 of these are from the Northern Fleet[4,5]. These decommissioned submarines have overwhelmed the existing dismantlement and de-fueling infrastructure, and as a result, many of the decommissioned vessels are moored for long periods of time awaiting final disposition. Of the 90 Northern Fleet submarines, about 60 remain to be de-fueled[6]. In the Pacific Fleet, about 40 submarines await de-fueling.

The following brief description of the high number of de-commissioned submarines and large amount of radioactive waste at the numerous facilities in the Kola Peninsula illustrates the environmental security challenges facing Russia. The Northern Fleet, operating out of the Kola Peninsula, includes five naval bases: Zapadnaya Litsa, Vidyayevo, Gadzhievo, Severomorsk, and Gremikha. Of these bases, Zapadnaya Litsa is the most important for two reasons. First, it is only forty-five kilometers from the Norwegian border and has, therefore, attracted serious attention from Norway. Second, it is the largest submarine base in Russia with four naval facilities associated with it. These facilities are Andreeva Bay, Bolshaya Lopatka, Malaya Lopatka, and Nerpicha.

Andreeva Bay is the primary spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste storage facility for the Northern Fleet. This facility contains about 21,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and about 12,000 cubic meters of solid and liquid radioactive wastes. There are three wet storage tanks in the Andreeva Bay facility, containing large volumes of spent nuclear fuel. These tanks are deteriorating due to poor maintenance and the harsh Arctic climate. Much of the legacy fuel at this facility has been stored in unlicensed transportation casks out in the open with no protection from the elements. Many of these casks are also deteriorating. Similar storage facilities exist in the Russian Pacific Fleet on the Shukotovo Peninsula near Vladivostok.

Bolshaya Lopatka has eight piers and a servicing dock for submarine storage and repair. A small amount of solid and liquid radioactive waste is stored there. Excess waste is transported to Andreeva Bay. The Nerpicha solid and liquid radioactive waste storage facilities are also small, so this waste is transported to Andreeva Bay as well. At Malaya Lopatka, there are five piers and a floating dock for submarine maintenance.

Vidyayevo naval base consists of the Ara Bay and Ura Bay facilities. At Ara Bay, about a dozen nuclear-powered submarines are waiting for de-fueling and dismantlement. This facility also has small storage capacity for solid and liquid radioactive waste.

Gadzhievo has two naval facilities: Sayda Bay and Olenya Bay. Sayda Bay contains numerous nuclear-powered submarines and reactor compartments, awaiting final disposition. About six decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines are awaiting dismantlement at Olenya Bay. This base stores about 200 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and more than 2,000 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste.

The administration center for the Northern Fleet is in Severomorsk, near Murmansk, which bases several naval surface warships, including two nuclear-powered vessels.

Gremikha, the Northern Fleet base furthest east of Murmansk, has more than a dozen nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement. This base also contains three large radioactive waste storage facilities, which suffer from many of the same problems as those at Andreeva Bay.

The Kola Peninsula houses six naval yards: Nerpa, Safonovo, Sevmorput, and Shkval in the Murmansk region, and Sevmash and Zvezdochka in the Arkangelsk region.

Shkval, located on the western side of the Murmansk fjord, has about a half-dozen decommissioned nuclear submarines. One of them, a first-generation Echo II, contains a damaged reactor with high radiation levels in the reactor compartment. The radioactive waste storage facilities at this site are full. Consequently, two hundred containers of radioactive waste and other contaminants reside in open storage, exposed to the elements.

Safonovo, which is between Murmansk and Severomorsk, is a naval yard for nuclear ballistic missile submarines and nuclear surface warship repair. Sevmorput, in the eastern side of the Murmansk fjord, serviced nuclear submarines from the 1960s to 1991, when nuclear fueling was stopped due to radiation safety concerns for the nearby city of Murmansk.

Nerpa, located near Polyarny on the Kola fjord, is one of three naval yards where nuclear submarines are dismantled. It has an open-air solid radioactive waste storage facility about 100 meters away from the sea as well as a storage tank of liquid radioactive waste.

The Arkangelsk region has the two largest naval shipyards in the Northern Fleet. Initially designed for submarine construction and repair, both Sevmash and Zvezdochka now also serve as major facilities for nuclear submarine dismantlement. Several submarines are awaiting dismantlement along with some floating reactor compartments awaiting long-term storage. The city of Severodvinsk on the White Sea supplies the work force for these two naval yards. In and around Severodvinsk, there are four solid waste storage facilities. More than 12,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste is stored in Severodvinsk. Much of this waste is stored haphazardly.

The Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning and dismantlement process involves the following steps[7]:

• Removal of the submarine from active status;
• Removal of missiles (for ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs)) and other weapons, such as torpedoes;
• Cutting out ballistic missile launch tubes (for SSBNs);
• Extraction of the spent nuclear fuel and disconnection of the reactor circuits;
• Transport of spent fuel for reprocessing or long-term storage;
• Storage and disposal of low- and high-level radioactive wastes;
• Removal, recovery, and recycling of reusable equipment and metals;
• Separation of the reactor compartment (usually with a compartment attached on either side of the reactor compartment);
• Sealing of the reactor compartment for long term storage (presently, these compartments are floating at pierside as three-compartment units); and
• Scrapping remaining uncontaminated parts that are not salvageable.

Presently, Russia is attempting to create the necessary infrastructure to carry out this program. Recently, Russia has expressed the view that it must conduct this program in a deliberate, careful manner in order to minimize expenditures and to preclude building unnecessary or unused capacity. Only up to 20 percent of the costs might be recouped from the sale of non-nuclear materials recovered from the de-commissioned submarines. This is representative of the costs that can be recovered from the submarine disposal process in the U.S. Table 1 summarizes the major steps in the lifecycle management of Russian naval spent nuclear fuel from submarine dismantlement activities.

Throughout the facilities noted above and the rest of the Russian nuclear navy, disposing of spent nuclear fuel represents the key disposal and cleanup challenge. While spent nuclear fuel is only about 5% of the radioactive waste volume from Russian submarines, it comprises more than 99% of the radioactivity from these vessels. This inventory resides in more than 100 decommissioned submarines (the majority are in Northwest Russia), shore storage facilities, icebreakers (under civilian control), military and civilian (for example, the Lepse and Lotta) surface vessels, and barges. According to open sources, the total amount of spent fuel assemblies exceeds 112,000, including about 34,000 in the Pacific Fleet and about 79,000 in the Northern Fleet[8].

To meet the challenge of spent fuel disposal, Russia is contemplating new spent fuel handling, movement, and storage initiatives, in addition to increasing spent fuel reprocessing in the immediate future. While some of these initiatives involve cooperative technical development efforts with western countries that address specific radioactive waste management problems, others are unilateral Russian initiatives at the present time. Some of these actions, given current Russian environmental conditions and the status of relevant infrastructure, cause international concern and may pose significant threats to environmental security by either exacerbating the existing problems in the affected regions or by contributing to potential new problems in the future. Problems could arise from:

• Limited Russian capabilities in the proper off-loading of fuel assemblies and low level liquid waste from ballistic (SSBN) and general purpose (attack -- SSN and guided-missile -- SSGN) submarines;

• Lack of capabilities for the proper handling, transport, and storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies;
• Uncertainties over the disposal of nuclear reactor compartments from the decommissioned submarines, including a small number of liquid metal reactors which cannot be de-fueled;
• Unsatisfactory storage of spent and damaged nuclear fuel assemblies onboard ships (such as the Lepse, the Lotta, and other similar storage ships) and barges;
• Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and management of the resulting waste streams;
• Inadequate plans, procedures, technologies, and resources supporting Russian spent fuel and waste management;
• Lack of Russian Federation inter-ministerial cooperation to effectively carry out programs; and
• Lack of a permanent waste repository.

The Northern Fleet operates six service ships for submarine de-fueling operations. Four of these vessels are the 30-year old Project 326 Class ships, and two are the more modern Malina Class vessels. Reportedly, all of these vessels are in poor mechanical condition; several are severely contaminated with radioactivity, and all are close to full storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel. Pacific Fleet support vessels are also poorly maintained.

Another component of the radioactive waste management system is storage and processing of liquid radioactive waste. The Russian Navy suffers from a lack of both storage capacity and facilities for waste processing. The United States, Norway, and Japan have expanded waste processing facilities; for example, a significant effort is the upgrade and expansion of the RTP Atomflot site to treat primary coolant waters and high salinity radioactive liquid waste from dismantled submarines. These facilities will help Russia meet and adhere to all requirements of the London Dumping Convention.

TABLE 1. MAJOR STEPS IN THE LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIAN NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITY	TYPE OF UNIT	ACTIVITY/ SUBMARINE	TOTAL ACTIVITY - NW FLEET[9]	TOTAL ACTIVITY - FE FLEET[10]	TOTAL
Number of fueled submarines	Decommissioned Fueled submarine		65	40	105
Preparation of fueled submarine for decommissioning	Fueled Reactors	2	130	80	210
Off-loading of spent nuclear fuel to floating service vessels	Fuel Assemblies[11]	500	32,500	20,000	52,500
Placement in casks	40 Tonne Metal Concrete Casks[12]	15	975	600	1,575
Interim storage in Kola and Vladivostok Regions	Interim storage sites[13]	0.3	20	12	32
Placement on rail car at reloading facilities	Special Rail Cars[14]	5	325	200	525
Train transport to Mayak[15]	Special Train[16]	1	65	40	105
Transfer to Mayak for storage/reprocessing	Fuel Assemblies	500	7,500[17] + TBD	TBD	TBD

Russian nuclear materials management is seriously hampered by the lack of resources, infrastructure, and the necessary technology to safeguard, handle, transport and store naval nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel. Russia appears willing to address these problems. However, it lacks the resources to effectively address the range of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel management issues, as well as to safely dismantle its ballistic (SSBN) and general-purpose (SSN and SSGN) nuclear submarine fleet. This combination of factors poses several potential risks, including that of possible proliferation of certain highly enriched nuclear materials and a definite threat to the local and regional environment and marine food chain.

A major concern within Russia and with neighboring countries is that the spent nuclear fuel and associated radioactive wastes could leak and contaminate the environment, presenting a health hazard to the populace. Although contamination from leaking spent nuclear fuel storage facilities may pose a serious problem, especially considering the hazardous state of much of this storage, a greater environmental contamination risk could emanate from a criticality or other accident while de-commissioned Russian nuclear submarines are laid-up or during de-fueling.

The Russian Navy has applied many temporary safety measures to prevent decommissioned nuclear submarines from sinking. However, managing these submarines moored at piers presents difficulties not normally associated with operational submarines. These impediments to safe maintenance could be contributing factors leading to possible accidents. For instance, the main control panel of the reactor plant is usually removed during de-commissioning. Moreover, the partial crew that monitors de-commissioned nuclear submarines is generally not well trained. Tending de-commissioned submarines is not a glamorous, career-enhancing duty assignment, and crewmembers often come from the least competent segment of the submarine force[18].

Several studies have assessed the potential for radioactive material release from these submarines and their associated consequences. The events studied include criticality accidents, primary heat transport system failure (including loss-of-coolant events, loss-of-coolant flow events, and fuel channel blockage), secondary heat transport system failure, cooling water system failure, electric system failure, instrument system failures, hydraulic oil system failure, flooding, fires, explosions, and sinking. Research results, summarized below in Tables 2 and 3, are taken from a Canadian study that was verified by a NATO Study Group[19] in a report published in March 1998. These studies note that the two most serious accidents resulting in the substantial spread of radioactive contamination from a moored decommissioned nuclear submarine are (1) a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and (2) a nuclear criticality accident during de-fueling.

A LOCA means that the reactor core, which contains the nuclear fuel along with highly radioactive fission products, would be deprived of coolant -- necessary to carry away heat and prevent the core from melting down. A meltdown might result in a massive release of radioactivity to the environment if the pressure vessel of the submarine were ruptured. A LOCA could result from either loss of electricity to the feed water pumps or a small loss of coolant. Ship collision, a potential external cause of a LOCA, is possible, but is considered to have a low probability of resulting in significant reactor damage because most Russian submarines have double hulls to resist the effects of collision. The possibility of these causal events occurring is extremely small, but if such an event happened, a core melt would likely occur. While such an accident would contaminate the pressure vessel and make de-fueling and dismantlement extremely difficult, it would not necessarily represent a major immediate threat to humans or the environment and would not represent a trans-boundary contaminant unless the pressure vessel would rupture.

The second serious accident scenario is a criticality accident, a spontaneous chain reaction during reactor de-fueling of a de-commissioned submarine. Even though the chance of such an accident occurring on a particular submarine is extremely small, it is important to recall that more than 100 Russian nuclear submarines with most containing two reactors currently wait for de-fueling. A severe de-fueling accident could cause a steam explosion. This explosion would cause a radioactive plume to rise. The severity of the resulting contamination would depend upon the height of the plume, wind patterns, and other weather conditions. This type of accident would spread radioactive elements similar to those released by the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Because of the operating conditions of a typical Russian submarine reactor compared to the Chernobyl reactor, the accumulation of radioactive products from the submarine fuel would be many times less than the buildup of these materials in a Chernobyl-type reactor. Therefore, the severity of a submarine criticality accident would be much less than the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

According to open source reports, five Russian Navy criticality accidents have occurred, twice during refueling operations. The three remaining accidents occurred during maintenance and reportedly did not result in a radioactive release to the environment. The most significant accident occurred in 1985 during refueling of an Echo II submarine in Chazhma Bay near Vladivostok. The control rods were not properly detached and were removed with the lid of the reactor vessel. This action led to an uncontrolled chain reaction and fire, killing ten people with many others receiving high doses of radiation. The accident contaminated the marine environment and dispersed radioactive contamination to the local area via atmospheric transport.

Given the history of criticality accidents, this scenario was rigorously investigated in the NATO Study group. They modeled a criticality accident during de-fueling of a decommissioned submarine occurring in Ara Bay in Northwest Russia. (Ara Bay is located approximated 100 km east of Kirkenes, Norway.) This modeling included source term size and composition, reactor characteristics, and atmospheric transport. A complicating factor for any regional transport analysis for the Arctic area is the potential for relatively high concentrations of contaminants being rafted long distances by floating ice. This effect depends on the time of year that an accidental air release at a coastal location occurs. Two main categories of results came out of this modeling.

First, the most probable events would result in most of the radioactive contaminants staying within Russian territory. In particular, about 80% of the released radioactivity, on average, would contaminate the Barents Sea and/or Russian territory. The other 20% of the contamination landed primarily on the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The near term doses to a population in Kirkenes, Norway or rural northern Finland would be less than 1 milliSieverts (mSv), with long term doses to the same regions due to ingestion of contaminated foods and other external sources still totaling less than 1 mSv per year. Both doses would be well below the recommended levels for the protective actions of sheltering (5-50 mSv) and evacuation (50-500 mSv). This study did not calculate dose to the Russian population or shipyard workers, which would obviously be much higher. Therefore, for most accidents, trans-boundary contamination would be small in comparison to Russian Federation contamination. In particular, such contamination could harm the food chain, especially fisheries, which are major food and livelihood sources in this region. Addressing the consequences of this type of accident could impose a large-scale health and financial burden on Russia. Under these cases, stability of the Northern European allies would not be the main concern. However, instability of Northwest Russia would be of paramount concern.

Second, the study examined a plausible worst-case accident. In this hypothetical accident, the majority of the released radioactivity landed in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The amount of rainfall was a key factor in determining the severity of the contamination. In particular, "rainfall during [radioactive] cloud passage may lead to contamination rates comparable to the situation in the middle of Sweden following the Chernobyl accident, but the affected area will be much smaller," according to the NATO study. Up to 30 percent of the local food products could be contaminated. This could lead to a major disruption in fishing and other food industries in the Nordic countries. Under a plausible worst-case de-fueling accident, trans-boundary effects would be the primary concern, resulting in possible regional instability. In addition, there would be considerable contamination within Russian territory.

In sum, these potential nuclear accidents could threaten public health and the environment throughout the region by:

• Direct irradiation from and inhalation of contaminated air;
• Absorption of radioactive materials through contamination of water supplies;
• Radiation doses through the consumption of contaminated food from both land (e.g., animal grazing and growing of vegetable matter) and water sources (fisheries), i.e., damage to the food chain; and
• Direct irradiation from fallout.

In addition, all the above effects could harm the financial health of the regional economies in Northern Europe and Northeast Asia for accidents occurring in Northwest Russia or the Russian Far East, respectively.

Table 2. Nuclear Submarine Accident Scenarios Resulting in Potential Radioactive Material Release: Internal Events
Event	Cause	Problem for moored/ decommissioned submarines?	Comments regarding moored submarines
Criticality Accidents	Control Rod Ejection	No	Submarine in guaranteed shutdown. Control rods electrically disconnected and mechanically stopped.
	Idle Loop Restart	No	Coolant pumps shutdown and disconnected electrically.
	Cold Water Injection	No	Emergency core cooling system would be drained; control rods fully inserted.
	Steam Line Break	No	Sub is shut down and does not produce steam.
	Excessive Steam Demand	No	Sub is shut down and does not produce steam.
	Reactor De-fueling	Yes	Reactor vessel and submarine hull open to environment.
Primary Heat Transport System Failures	Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)	Yes	Could lead to core melt
	Loss-of-coolant-flow Event	No	Reactor(s) and pumps shut down and only natural circulation required.
	Fuel Channel Blockage	No	Power level is much less than one percent of full power, and low core temperature would not lead to fuel damage.
Secondary Heat Transport System Failures	Steam Line Breaks	No	Sub is shut down and does not produce steam; feed water inventory is large relative to decay heat generated.
	Feed water Line Breaks	Yes	Similar to small LOCA
	Loss of Feed water Flow	Yes	Similar to small LOCA
Cooling Water System Failure	Sea Water System Failure	No	Decay heat small and could be dissipated through conduction in the condenser; active seawater cooling is not necessary.
	Component Cooling System Failure	No	Even with the secondary side of the shutdown cooling heat exchangers empty, it is possible to dissipate decay heat through conduction and convection
Electric System Failure		Yes	Temperature and pressure would rise and ultimately pressure relief valves would lift; results similar to small LOCA
Instrument Air System Failure		Yes	Mechanical valves would open; natural circulation would fail; similar to LOCA
Hydraulic Oil System Failure		No	Unlikely to be used in areas essential to reactor safety
Flooding		Yes	Could affect decay heat removal
Fires/Explosions		Yes	Could affect decay heat removal with results similar to flooding.
Sinking		No	Leakage would be slow and contained; the hull could be easily raised.

Table 3. Nuclear Submarine Accident Scenarios Resulting in Potential Radioactive Material Release: External Events
Event	Cause	Problem for moored/ decommissioned submarines?	Comments
Ship Collisions		Yes	Possible, but low probability of significant damage due to strength of submarine double hull. Small LOCA accident possible, but this might be offset by cooling effects of flooding.
Falling Objects	e.g., from overhead cranes	No	Unlikely to cause significant damage, particularly to the reactor area.
Grounding/ Beaching		No	Vessels are already grounded or moored.

____________

[3] See for example, Don J. Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the former Soviet Union, edited by David R. Payson, Battelle Press, 1997.

[4] "Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement Plans and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program Assistance," Fact Sheet, 23 September 1998.

[5] Povl Ølgaard, "Worldwide Decommissioning of Nuclear Submarines," In Decommissioned Submarines in the Russian Northwest, ed. Elizabeth Kirk, NATO ASI Series Vol. 32, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 17.

[6] Thomas Nilsen, "Naval Nuclear Waste Management in Northwest Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Conference: The Toxic Legacy of the Cold War in the Former Soviet Union, 1998.

[7] Adapted from Jill Tako and Tamara Robinson, "Decommissioning and Dismantlement Overview," Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1998.

[8] See for example, Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Aleksandr Nikitin, The Russian Northern Fleet, Bellona Report, August 1996.

[9] 91 submarines await dismantling; 26 of these have been de-fueled; and 65 await de-fueling.

[10] 56 submarines await dismantling; 16 of these have been de-fueled; and 40 await de-fueling.

[11] 250 fuel assemblies/reactor.

[12] One 40 tonne metal concrete cask/35 fuel assemblies.

[13] Cask "farm" will store 50 casks each.

[14] Rail cars/3 40-tonne metal concrete casks.

[15] Current capacity = 10 train trips per year to Mayak. Thus, complete transfer of all fuel from Northwestern or Far Eastern sites to Mayak will require about 10 years assuming there is no change in capacity or scheduling. In fact, new wagons will be constructed with support from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and U.S. DOD/CTR. This will increase the infrastructure capacity and reduce the number of years required to transfer this fuel.

[16] 1 special train/5 rail cars.

[17] DOD CTR Program includes provisions for reprocessing of spent fuel from 15 SSBNs.

[18] Benjamin A. Snell, "Dismantling Russia’s Northern Fleet Nuclear Submarines: Environmental and Proliferation Risks," Master’s Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2000.

[19] "Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence Related Problems," NATO CCMS Study, Cross Border Environmental Problems emanating from Defence Related Installations and Activities, Phase II: 1995-1998, NATO Report No. 227, March 1998, pages 1-9