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U.S. Department of State

Diplomacy in Action

II. Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Tajikistan


U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
January 2007
Report
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Country Overview

Country Facts

  • Map of TajikistanArea: 55,251 sq mi (143,100 sq km), slightly smaller than Wisconsin 
  • Population: 7,320,815 (July 2006 est.) 
  • Population Growth Rate: 2.19% (2006 est.) 
  • Life Expectancy: Male 62.03 yrs., Female 68 yrs. (2006 est.) 
  • Infant Mortality: 94.59 deaths/1,000 live births (2006 est.) 
  • Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $8.73 billion (purchasing power parity, 2005 est.)
  • GDP Per Capita Income: $1,200 (purchasing power parity, 2005 est.)
  • Real GDP Growth: 8% (2005 est.)

Overview of U.S. Government Assistance

In FY 2006, the USG provided an estimated $45.01 million in assistance to Tajikistan, including:

  • $8.56 million in democratic reform programs; 
  • $5.40 million in economic reform programs; 
  • $15.37 million in humanitarian programs; 
  • $9.29 million in security, regional stability, and law enforcement programs; 
  • $5.70 million in social reform programs; 
  • $0.70 million in cross-sector and other programs; and 
  • Privately donated and USG excess humanitarian commodities valued at $33.77 million.

FY 2006 Assistance Overview

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS & FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

Tajikistan is a small, poor, Muslim country in a volatile region. It confronts significant challenges, including geographic isolation, the difficult legacy of its civil war, and the lack of employment opportunities for its large, young population. U.S. assistance makes a difference in helping Tajikistan to remain stable, secure, independent, and focused on economic growth and democratic reform. U.S. engagement provides Tajikistan with another international partner to balance its relations. Russia has strong historical ties. Iran and Tajikistan share cultural roots, but Tajikistan dislikes Iran's export of religious fundamentalism. China is a powerful new investment force for Tajikistan's crumbling infrastructure. Many ethnic Tajiks live in neighboring Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, with which Tajikistan also shares trade and historical links.

A solid partner in the War on Terror, Tajikistan has provided logistical support to NATO operations in Afghanistan and has a small police force assisting UN operations in Kosovo. Drug trafficking across the porous 1400-kilometer border with Afghanistan threatens both Tajikistan's and regional stability. The Tajik government (GOT) has demonstrated strong commitment to enforcement and worked closely with the U.S. government (USG) on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism policies.

Tajikistan also has the potential to export electricity to South Asia, providing much needed energy to Afghanistan and Pakistan and supporting the U.S. policy goal of fostering regional economic integration. A U.S.-funded bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan underscores the important trade and transit connections that could be developed in the region.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

USG foreign assistance priorities in Tajikistan in FY 2006 largely mirrored our foreign policy goals. Priority programs addressed the need to: secure Tajikistan's borders and build institutional capabilities to combat terrorism and drug trafficking and enhance regional stability; encourage economic growth through legislative and regulatory reform, small and medium enterprise development, and regional energy and trade networks; and support political reform and democratic institution building.

Border security lies at the heart of USG assistance efforts. Increasing the GOT's capacity to monitor and control Tajikistan's borders will enhance conditions for economic growth, regional trade, and an active civil society, as well as eventually reduce drug trafficking and transnational terrorism. Without economic development, Tajiks will increasingly turn to trafficking narcotics from Afghanistan as a source of income, thus undermining USG counter-narcotics efforts on both sides of the border. USG assistance seeks to help provide more domestic job opportunities to reduce the number of Tajiks seeking work outside of Tajikistan and bring greater economic stability by decreasing Tajikistan's reliance on migrant remittances, which account for up to half of Tajikistan's $3 billion GDP. Economic growth and stability will in turn lessen the societal influence of extremists and terrorists and give citizens more incentive to demand that their government rule justly and democratically. The USG will continue to support democratic reform to give people the tools to participate actively in their governance and advocate for human rights. USG support for the under-funded health and education sectors is essential to developing Tajikistan's human potential and future work force.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Like many post-Soviet states, Tajikistan was not an easy place to work. Its basic indicators on health, education, and corruption rank among the world's worst. President Rahmonov had spoken a great deal about the need for reform in many sectors. But real change was slow to materialize. Government corruption and bureaucratic inertia characterized all but a few ministries and departments. Painful memories of the 1992-1997 civil war remained fresh in most citizens' minds; civil society was reluctant to rock the boat or undertake any activities that would appear to threaten "stability."

The operating environment for counter-narcotics, security and military assistance was favorable. The GOT welcomed USG training programs and equipment and increased its own capabilities in a short period. The GOT also participated in regional multilateral activities and was firmly committed to a full recovery in Afghanistan.

Although President Rahmonov called for greater foreign investment, the GOT took few concrete steps to improve the investment climate. The private sector was very small and most Tajiks did not trust the nascent banking system.

Conditions for implementing democracy-building programs were complicated. In the lead up to the November 2006 presidential election, the GOT tightly monitored media and political activities and squashed any perceived threats to "stability." Different GOT ministries closely scrutinized U.S.-funded NGOs conducting democracy or media activities, putting up bureaucratic barriers intended to restrict their effectiveness.

COUNTRY PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Tajikistan's Democratic Reform

The "radar" or "spider web" graphs below illustrate Tajikistan's democratic performance during FY 2005. Ratings are based on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 representing the greatest advancement. These charts provide a disaggregated look at each of the indices and are reported to Congress on a regular basis. The gray shaded area represents 2005 performance levels, while the two dark lines indicate how each country compares in its progress vis-�-vis two standards: (1) the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's performance in each indicator as of 2002 (2002 was the year that Romania and Bulgaria - the "threshold countries" - were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership); and, (2) where the country stood in each indicator in 1999. Together, these charts provide a broad picture of where remaining gaps are in a country's performance, and to what extent these gaps are being filled. For more information, including a detailed explanation of each indicator shown in the graph, see USAID/E&E/PO, "Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia," No. 10 (August 2006). Found online at: http://inside.usaid.gov/EE/po/mcp.html.

Graph shows Tajikistan Democratic Reform:  Average of Romania and Bulgaria-2002, corruption, 1.5; electoral process, 1.7; civil society, 2.5; independent media, 1.7; governance/public admin, 1.8; rule of law, 1.8

The graph above shows Tajikistan's democratic reform scores in 2005* (the gray shaded area) as compared to the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's democratic reform scores in 2002 (the bold line) when they were invited to join NATO and receive favorable indications of future EU membership.

*Actual 2006 scores not yet available.

Graph shows Tajikistan Democratic Reform:  1999, corruption, 1.5; electoral process, 1.7; civil society, 2.5; independent media, 1.7; governance/public admin, 1.8; rule of law, 1.8

The graph above shows Tajikistan's democratic reform scores in 2005* (the gray shaded area) as compared to its democratic reform scores in 1999 (the bold line).

*Actual 2006 scores not yet available.

Tajikistan's Economic Reform

The "radar" or "spider web" graphs below illustrate Albania's economic performance during 2005. Ratings are based on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 representing the greatest advancement. These charts provide a disaggregated look at each of the indices and are reported to Congress on a regular basis. The gray shaded area represents 2005 performance levels, while the two dark line indicates how each country compares in its progress vis-�-vis two standards: (1) the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's performance in each indicator as of 2002 (2002 was the year that Romania and Bulgaria - the "threshold countries" - were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership); and (2) where the country stood in each indicator in 1999. Together, these charts provide a broad picture of where remaining gaps are in a country's performance, and to what extent these gaps are being filled. For more information, including a detailed explanation of each indicator shown in the graph, see USAID/E&E/PO, "Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia," No. 10 (August 2006). Found online at: http://inside.usaid.gov/EE/po/mcp.html.

Graph shows Tajikistan Economic Reform: Average of Romania and Bulgaria-2002, external debt percent GDP, 3.5; private sector share, 2.0; share of employment in SMEs, 3.5; export share of GDP, 2.5; FDI pc cumulative, 0.5; GDP as percent 1989 GDP, 2.0; 3yr avg inflation, 3.0
The graph above shows Tajikistan's economic reform scores in 2005* (the gray shaded area) as compared to the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's economic reform scores in 2002 (the bold line) when they were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership.

*Actual 2006 scores not yet available.

Graph shows Tajikistan Economic Reform: 1999, external debt percent GDP, 3.5; private sector share, 2.0;  export share of GDP, 2.5; FDI pc cumulative, 0.5; GDP as percent 1989 GDP, 2.0; 3yr avg inflation, 3.0

The graph above shows Tajikistan's economic reform scores in 2005* (the gray shaded area) as compared to its economic reform scores in 1999 (the bold line).

*Actual 2006 scores not yet available.

FY 2006 Country Program Performance

Governing Justly and Democratically

Tajikistan continued to be a country in transition, led by an autocratic central government with some movement towards more democratic institutions and practices. President Rahmonov and his key advisors publicly and privately spoke about the importance of democracy. But GOT actions showed only limited support for democratic principles. The GOT made some progress when it amended electoral procedures before the November 2006 presidential election to bring them more closely in line with international standards. The GOT, however, maintained tight control over the overall political environment. It prevented a number of political party training activities and actively sought to weaken opposition movements. The GOT used bureaucratic and political means to obstruct access to independent information. It refused to register or license USG-supported independent community radio stations and tried to block access to independent Internet news sites. U.S. and other NGOs faced bureaucratic and political challenges and were pressured by different government ministries on issues unrelated to their activities. On the positive side, local governments and civil society organizations increased their capacity to work in communities and became more effective advocates for their citizens. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were able to engage in voter and civic education, and women's rights.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

In FY 2006, the USG had six priorities for its democracy and governance assistance. USG programs were designed to strengthen civil society, independent media, and political parties as well as to improve the electoral process and capacity of local governments; and finally to advance legal education reforms.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

The USG supported local government and decentralization by helping implement a national decentralization strategy to provide effective and transparent delivery of municipal services and hold local government accountable through meaningful public participation. Programs included technical assistance to develop national decentralization policies, training for selected local governments and community groups, and the co-financing of small-scale infrastructure projects. USG efforts prevented conflict among various disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups through conflict management and mitigation activities, in particular in the areas most affected by the civil war of 1992-1997. To encourage broader social participation among young people, programs also provided vocational training, Internet access, computer literacy training, and business internships.

The USG worked to strengthen civil society and NGOs so that they can create local groups that can organize and advocate on democracy and human rights related issues. Civil society programs focused on improving the legal and regulatory framework for NGO operations, strengthening the institutional capacity of NGOs, and developing practical skills to make NGOs more effective in developing and advocating policy positions and member-driven priorities across a wide range of sectors. In addition, U.S assistance supported a program to develop a civic education textbook for secondary schools.

The USG sought to improve access to information and further media freedom by funding community radio programs, training journalists in international standards of reporting and information sharing, supporting Internet access programs, and training in a county where commercial Internet access is out of reach for most. Activities to strengthen independent media included technical analysis and input on the overall policy framework, legal advice to journalists and media outlets on complying with changing regulations, training in management of mass media organizations, training for print and broadcast journalists, and financial support for the production of informational programming. The GOT would not register a key NGO carrying out media activities. As a result, television production activities faced considerable difficulties. The GOT also pressured the U.S. organization's local affiliate. The community radio component of community development programs also faced delays due to the GOT's refusal to register groups, issue licenses, or allocate frequencies.

Political party training developed constituency outreach techniques and strengthened internal organization. In the run-up to the November 2006 presidential elections, the environment became increasingly difficult for media and political party operations. The GOT would not register a key NGO carrying out political party training which severely limited its ability to operate effectively. Planned political party development activities and training of political party and domestic observers for the presidential elections were suspended in April 2006 when the GOT deported the head of a USG implementing partner.

USG-funded activities improved the electoral process by implementing changes to election laws and procedures to enable them to meet international standards and by supporting voter and poll worker education programs. The USG supported NGO collaboration with the Central Committee on Election and referenda to implement recommended changes to election procedures and regulations and educate poll workers and voters. Voter education projects were targeted at specific groups including youth and women.

Finally, the USG promoted respect and protection of human rights, particularly trafficking in persons, prevention of forced labor, and protection of rights of migrant laborers. Legal education efforts included a legal internship program and work to improve law school curricula. The GOT formally requested that a USG-funded implementer stop its "Street Law" program, where law students taught school children civics and basic law.

OUTPUTS

Law students conducted 159 legal consultations with NGOs and other interested organizations. More than 68 of these consultations were media-related, involving journalists, media outlets, media NGOs, and international organizations.

Youth apprenticeship and training programs benefited 800 young people. Over 1,000 young people received English language, Internet, and basic computer training. Approximately 245 unemployed youth in target areas got long-term jobs.

Media workshops trained 124 print and electronic media professionals. Five broadcast media and one newspaper benefited from on-site residencies. Eight private media outlets received production grants. Residents in Istaravshan and Isfara got access to the Internet in economic opportunity centers.

Sixty NGOs participated in 52 civic advocacy campaigns. Eleven pilot cities used citizen participation techniques including public hearings and meetings to discuss water supply, solid waste removal, city landfills, composting, and housing /communal service delivery. Forty-five community programs were implemented in eight cities, covering solid waste and sanitation issues. Training was provided for 438 local NGOs on such topics as advocacy, team building and management, professional development, human rights, public relations and fundraising. NGO workers, religious leaders and government officials participated in specialized short-term exchanges in the United States on topics including the role of NGOs, international crime, state and local government, and religion in a secular society.

Through 24 USG small grants, a total of 9,257 participants were trained in elections, women's rights, human rights, AIDS prevention, and media awareness. Small-scale community infrastructure programs built or rehabilitated three schools, three bazaars/trade centers, a sports hall, and a community radio station.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE/IMPACT

USG programs in local government, civil society, community development, and election support made an impact in Tajikistan and furthered democratic development. However, programs in political party development, civic education, and media had only negligible effects as a result of GOT opposition and bureaucratic barriers.

The GOT's approval of an overall public administration reform strategy, which includes a decentralization plan, represented a significant success. This plan laid the groundwork for the gradual strengthening of local government authority, as well as for direct local elections. USG technical assistance was instrumental in the development of the decentralization aspect of this strategy and helped improve the performance of local governments.

In December 2005, the Network of Civil Society Support Centers signed a one-year agreement with the Ministry of Education to co-finance education projects in seven regions. The GOT and the network will also partner in education activities. USG partners also successfully lobbied for a substantial reduction of state registration fees for NGOs; the high fees for NGO registration had been a significant impediment to NGO growth.

USG support for the November 2006 presidential election resulted in implementation of new regulations that at least partially met international standards, and provided wide-ranging poll worker and voter education.

The USG developed and presented to the GOT the second edition of a civics education textbook and teachers' guide. The GOT agreed to use the textbook as supplementary material in grades 9-11 and was considering it for possible inclusion as part of civics study in secondary schools.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers can better understand whether or not assistance programs are having the intended impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Governing Justly and Democratically. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 - September 30 of the following year. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 - December 31.

Performance Indicator: Civil Society Index. Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process. (7-point scale: 1 indicates a very advanced NGO sector, 7 indicates a weak NGO sector) Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit. The data upon which this ranking is based comes from the previous calendar year. Found online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Rank

CY 2006 Target

5.0

5.0

4.75

5.0


Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator declined somewhat in CY 2005 in part because of restrictions imposed by the Tajik Ministry of the Interior, especially regarding contact of international organizations with local NGOs. The GOT tightly controls Tajikistan's political climate. USG-supported civil society programs have helped communities engage and advocate on social issues, but political activism has largely been off limits. Most Tajiks attribute the start of the civil war to political protests. They are unlikely to challenge the GOT or push for a freer society. Certain NGOs face significant bureaucratic and political barriers. The CY 2006 target is slightly higher in hope that the GOT restrictions will ease.

Performance Indicator: Independent Media Rating, from Freedom House Nations in Transit. The Freedom House rating addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, editorial independence, the emergency of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private citizens. Measurement is on a 7-point scale, with 1 being the best, 7 being the worst. The data upon which this ranking is based comes from the previous calendar year. Found online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2005 Rank

CY 2006 Rank

CY 2007 Target

5.75

5.00

6.25

6.25



Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator declined because during CY 2005 the GOT intensified its pressure on journalists and media it deemed critical of GOT policies. Despite USG efforts to promote independent media, the GOT prevented registration and operation of community radio projects and generally maintained a tight control on all media, going as far as to attempt to block access to independent internet sites prior to the presidential election. The Tajik media does not push the government, because the few journalists who have challenged the authorities have found themselves fined or imprisoned.

Economic Growth

Due in large part to remittances entering the mainstream banking system, and a low post-war starting baseline, Tajikistan's GDP grew 8% to 9% over the last six years. However, GOT officials noted that GDP growth will slow to 7% until Tajikistan can produce a consistent energy supply and replace its aging production equipment. Aluminum and cotton remain the two biggest exports. President Rahmonov has actively called for increased foreign investment, but corruption and bureaucracy make Tajikistan a risky place to do business. Russia, Iran and China have invested heavily in transportation and energy infrastructure projects. In June 2006, Tajikistan accepted $639 million in low-interest loans from China for road and energy projects.

The lack of agricultural and land use reform represents one of the biggest hurdles to economic development. Tajik cotton farmers are the poorest in the world, directed by the GOT to grow cotton and saddled with thousands of dollars of debt to middle-men. Despite united donor pressure to address the problem of land use rights, the GOT has been unable to implement the needed reforms.

Tajikistan passed a significant law on inspections in 2006 that could smooth the way for small and medium enterprise (SME) growth. Tajikistan also made steps towards developing its hydropower potential, by signing bilateral and multilateral agreements to explore power export to South Asia.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

The USG had four main assistance priorities to promote economic growth. First, the USG supported the growth of SMEs and increasing opportunities for individuals and investors to acquire business information, knowledge and skills. Second, USG projects helped to identify and promote foreign and U.S. investment opportunities to increase economic activity, develop hydropower resources, and encourage Tajikistan's engagement in development of electricity grids and promoting regional trade in Central Asia to improve linkages and export markets. Third, USG assistance worked to increase the economic productivity of the Tajik agricultural sector through targeted development of the agricultural value chain, increasing exposure to marketing practices, and supporting land reform initiatives. Finally, USG programs facilitated legal, regulatory and financial sector reform to promote domestic and foreign trade and investment through targeted technical assistance in the commercial, administrative and banking sectors.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

To facilitate improvements in the macroeconomic foundation for economic growth and policy environment for SMEs, USG projects continued to support the GOT's transition to a market economy and worked closely with GOT counterparts to: improve tax policy and administration, banking supervision, and budget formulation; facilitate reforms in energy, agricultural and land sectors; and strengthen the legislative and institutional framework and promote its proper implementation to help stimulate investments and combat corruption. USG partners reformed and strengthened the business and economics curricula and instruction in colleges and universities to enhance the skills and knowledge of the next generation of business leaders and to create stronger linkages between universities and businesses.

The USG promoted private sector growth by improving the SME environment, increasing SME agricultural productivity, and strengthening water and energy management. To facilitate growth of private sector productivity, the USG assisted with firm-level business consulting, trade promotion, agribusiness and value chain development, certification of accounting practitioners, and business and economics education. By strengthening microfinance institutions, introducing new loan products at commercial banks, and improving supervision capacity of the National Bank, the USG supported increased access of SMEs (including agribusinesses and farmers) to financial services. Tajik entrepreneurs and relevant policymakers learned about U.S. business practices through Special American Business Internship Training (SABIT) and the International Visitor Programs.

In the natural resources area, the USG assisted the GOT to achieve a more sustainable energy sector and worked with Water User Associations to improve their infrastructure and organizational capacity. The USG assisted de-mining efforts to return land currently affected by land mines to productive use.

OUTPUTS

The USG helped 92 businesses develop strategic plans and improve their marketing, operational and financial management. The USG developed and supported on online guide to Tajikistan's international trade policy. This guide improved public access to GOT policies by providing information regarding all requirements related to the import, export and transit of goods.

U.S. efforts to support local microfinance projects resulted in the registration of two new organizations. USG funding helped these local microfinance organizations expand their operations to 30 locations throughout Tajikistan, thereby providing financial services to more than 11,400 clients. USG assistance also helped to improve management and customer service at six local microfinance institutions and helped to strengthen micro-lending departments in four local commercial banks. As a result, the banks that received USG assistance doubled their portfolios to over $15M and trained 150 new loan officers. Ten new micro-lending branches were opened, bringing the total to 33, covering 13 localities throughout Tajikistan.

USG assistance funded five local NGOs to provide land-related legal services to 1,980 individual farmers. The USG also provided private property rights training to 351 businesspeople, 39 judges and court personnel and 356 legal professionals.

USG assistance helped to create and strengthen twenty-six water users associations and trained more than 1,200 farmers on how to implement efficient water management practices. Grants totaling more than one million dollars were provided to improve water irrigation systems.

The U.S. provided business and economics training for 100 high school teachers and established three regional retraining offices. In addition, the USG funded the publishing of 4,500 economics textbooks and workbooks and 200 teachers' editions. USG assistance also established two pilot centers that developed demand-driven partnerships on economic issues between universities and 40 private and public organizations. Seven universities introduced "certified accounting" courses attended by 290 students in 2006. In FY 2006, 27 students passed comprehensive examinations and were certified as Certified Accounting Practitioners and Certified International Professional Accountants.

Eighteen Tajik businesspersons traveled to the U.S. for training. These men and women came from various fields including mining, hotel management, aviation, food processing, road construction and agriculture.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE/IMPACT

Business consulting assistance helped the 92 participating SMEs to increase their average annualized sales by 73% and productivity by 21%. The assistance also facilitated 103 business transactions with a total value of nearly $2 million. The USG also facilitated community discussions with government officials by establishing Customs Consultative Councils in Kurgan-Tube and Khorog and continuing to support previously established Councils in Dushanbe and Khujand.

The USG bolstered public confidence in the banking sector by assisting the National Bank of Tajikistan to comply with international banking supervision standards. These efforts helped to increase overall bank deposits. The National Bank expected deposits to grow to 10.3% of GDP, up from 6.97% in 2005. By strengthening microfinance institutions and introducing new loan products at commercial banks, USG assistance supported increased SME access to financial services. The USG supported eight microfinance institutions which expanded their total clientele to over 32,000 entrepreneurs, and supported four local commercial banks that served over 5600 micro and small businesses.

The USG assisted the GOT to create a legislative framework that to assist SME development. USG-funded advisors worked with the GOT to draft several key pieces of commercial legislation including the Economic Procedure Code, Civil Procedure Code, Enforcement Procedures Code, Law on Legal and Normative Acts, and Administrative Procedures Code. USG assistance further facilitated land policy discussions and helped to create the Government Land Legislation Working Group. The U.S. also provided policy advice on drafting amendments to the Land Code and Civil Code.

In FY 2006, the Barqi Tojik energy company began using the Naryn-Syrdarya Cascade Operation Planning Instrument model. This model, developed with USG assistance, allows the company to manage hydropower production volumes at the Kairakum reservoir.

U.S. training helped Tajik farmers increase their incomes through better management of resources and improved financial planning. The establishment of water user associations and USG-funded improvements to irrigation systems helped to improve water delivery and productivity on 12,000 hectares of land and increased water collection payments by 40 percent.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers can better understand whether or not assistance programs are having the intended impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Economic Growth. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 - September 30 of the following year. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 - December 31.

Performance Indicator: Economic Reform Index (USAID/EE/PO, Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia), drawing from EBRD Transition Report 2005, scores range from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most advanced. EBRD Economic Reform Index includes components on small-scale and large-scale privatization; trade liberalization; price liberalization; corporate governance; competition policy; banking; and non-banking financial reforms. The data upon which this ranking is based comes from the previous calendar year.

CY 2002 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Rank

CY 2006 Target

2.23

2.30

2.45

2.5


Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator is slowly improving. Even though corruption was still rife and the economic climate problematic, USG programs in banking supervision, SME legal and regulatory reform, and commercial law have led to significant improvements in Tajikistan's business and investment climate. Privatization, however, lagged behind and corporate governance remained largely theoretical in Tajikistan's small private sector.

Performance Indicator: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) - Measures the net output of the cultivation of crops and livestock production, as well as the forestry, hunting, and fishing sectors, as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2006. Found online at http://www.worldbank.org.

CY 2002 Baseline

CY 2004 Percentage

CY 2005 Percentage

CY 2006 Target

29%

24%

22%

25%



Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: USG programs supporting water users associations and the improvement of farmer-to-market connections for high value crops resulted in a growth in the agricultural value added. However, cotton continues to dominate the agricultural sector, and land use reform is needed to allow farmers more choice in what they grow and sell. So improvement in this indicator is slow.

Investing in People

Tajikistan's social sector faced the double challenge of overcoming the lingering effects of the 1992-1997 civil war as well as the need to overhaul the unsustainable health system left behind by the Soviet Union. The pressures of a rapidly growing, poverty-stricken population, a deteriorating infrastructure, and insufficient GOT funding contributed to the ongoing need for USG assistance.

Tajikistan continued to welcome USG assistance in both health and education. This was evident in its National Development Strategy for 2006-2015, which was in line with the Millennium Development Goals for Tajikistan. GOT progress in health reform continued to be hampered by its low implementation capacity and a fluid political and operational environment. There was, however, progress made. For example, Tajikistan proposed, with U.S. assistance, a $27 million program for tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS control which was approved by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

In the education arena, approval of Fast Track Initiative funds for the GOT to use in education presented new opportunities to leverage resources. The GOT's most significant education policy challenge remained high teacher turnover due to low salaries.

USG-funded exchange programs offered Tajik businesspersons and students, who have only limited access to outside information, an effective way to learn English and be exposed to new ways of thinking. Tajikistan's low level of English proficiency has proven to be a serious disadvantage for further educational, diplomatic, and economic development in both the region and internationally.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

USG health activities focused on improving the health of Tajikistan's citizens by supporting health system reform, funding efforts to control infectious diseases, and facilitating the improvement of maternal, child, and reproductive health services. USG education activities sought to improve primary and secondary education by upgrading teacher skills, improving curriculum, increasing community involvement, and providing small infrastructural renovations. Program components included: teacher training, provision of methodological journals, training in creation of low cost teaching materials, efforts to increase community participation in education including small scale infrastructure projects with community contributions, training for school administrators in best management practices, and pilot education finance activities. Finally, UGS support for student and professional exchanges remained a top assistance priority to give Tajiks greater access to the outside world and English language education.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

To help Tajikistan control the spread of HIV/AIDS, the USG provided assistance in disease surveillance, blood safety, quality of services for those with HIV, outreach to vulnerable populations, and guidance on policy reform. For TB control, the USG assisted with Directly Observed Therapy Strategy (DOTS) implementation, strengthened political support for TB control, and sought to maintain drug supplies, improve supervision, and increase public awareness of TB. The USG also worked to strengthen TB laboratory diagnosis and surveillance.

To help Tajikistan better address public health threats, the USG worked at the policy level to promote health reform, such as finance reform and the promotion of evidence-based medicine. The USG also provided epidemiology training to increase the GOT's capacity to investigate and manage public health threats.

In maternal and child health,the USG assisted the GOT to apply the international live birth definition to improve infant mortality assessment. The accuracy of the resulting information will allow the GOT to focus on problem areas to decrease overall infant mortality. USG assistance also strengthened maternal and child health services through system-wide training of providers. Maternal and child health activities focused on pilot institutions in Khatlon Oblast. This was complemented by USG activities to improve the quality of family planning/reproductive health services in Khatlon Oblast.

USG-sponsored education programsfocused on improving the quality of primary and secondary education through teacher training and support for GOT education policy reform. Programs also sought to strengthen schools management capacity, and increase community involvement in decision-making. The program also aimed to improve the quality of education in the remote areas of Gorno-Badakhshan, Rasht, and Khatlon regions.

OUTPUTS

USG assistance helped the Ministry of Health (MOH) complete its first round of HIV sentinel surveillance, and present results to 50 key government counterparts. In addition, USG programs provided education and alternative activities for more than 17,000 young people identified as being at increased risk of HIV infection. Four hundred and fifty educational sessions for at risk populations reached nearly 2,000 prostitutes and their clients. The USG developed six new, evidence-based HIV/AIDS curriculum modules, which the Tajikistan Medical University in Dushanbe integrated into its curricula. USG assistance helped Tajikistan's armed forces continue and extend its HIV/AIDS programs which provided education, testing and treatment for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. New military recruits began to receive standard instruction on HIV/AIDS, including printed material to take away. Military Academy recruits also receive instruction on the ABCs of abstinence, faithfulness and prophylactics.

The USG supported implementation of the World Health Organization (WHO)-endorsed Directly Observed Therapy strategy (DOTS) for TB in eight additional regions, and contributed to development of a new Tajik Law on TB. USG programs developed training materials for basic microscopy and held train-the-trainers sessions in Dushanbe for oblast specialists. Logistic Management Information System pilot testing was conducted in two sites. To help increase treatment adherence, the USG provided food supplements from the World Food Program to TB patients in two new regions, Khatlon and Sugd. At three pilot sites, 2,000 TB cases were entered into the USG-developed Electronic Surveillance and Case Management ESCM. In collaboration with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the USG conducted training on TB laboratory quality assurance/control activities. The USG also supported a study to estimate TB prevalence in Vose district.

To combat malaria,the USG provided technical assistance to develop handbooks based on WHO guidelines for indoor residual spraying and biological control. The USG also provided technical assistance to the GOT to plan and implement the Global Fund's malaria project. When a USG project completed its malaria training activities, it transferred equipment to the Ministry of Health and other partners.

Intensive USG engagement with GOT led to the GOT's approval of the national 2005-2015 health financing strategy. This new strategy supported new provider payment systems and called for the calculation of standard co-payments under the new basic benefit package.

USG clinical training helped maternal and child healthcare providers improve the level of obstetric care from pre-natal through newborn feeding. USG programs provided training in both rural and urban centers at hospital and smaller clinics. The USG advised the GOT on how to develop forms for unified data collection on infant mortality according to WHO criteria, and disseminated information about the national decree on live birth definition. Pilot sites in Dushanbe and Sogd Oblast implemented the new definition. A second center of excellence in family medicine was launched at the City Health Center #1 in Konibodom, Sugd Oblast.

In the area of basic education, USG-funded school-based teacher training centers began to provide surrounding schools with methodological instruction and funding to stimulate faculty professional development. The program has trained a total of 1,943 teachers. Participating teachers and school directors noted that USG-supported teaching methods were effective. Anecdotal evidence suggests a sharp decrease over the past two years in grade repetition in rural schools. The GOT decided to use USG-funded teacher training modules nationwide in teacher training institutions. The GOT used Fast Track Initiative (FTI) resources to implement this training plan. The USG advanced educational finance reform by helping the GOT introduce a per capita funding formula, thanks in large measure to the success of the proposed funding model in a pilot district. The GOT decided to roll out "per capita financing" to seven new districts (out of 62) starting in 2007.

More than 50 high school students, eight undergraduate students, and 16 graduate students/scholars studied in the U.S. through USG-funded exchange programs. Exchange alumni from FY 2006 and previous years comprise a small cadre of U.S.-educated professionals working in Tajikistan's government, private sector, donor and development organizations. These individuals are examples for their peers and can help foster understanding and support for democracy and economic reform as well as U.S. policies and priorities.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE/IMPACT

Afterthe Ministry of Health successfully completing of the first round of HIVsentinel surveillance with USG assistance, the GOT requested funding from the World Bank to expand HIV sentinel surveillance to other parts of Tajikistan. The GOT used documents that the USG helped to write as its basis for the national program for AIDS control. The GOT requested assistance from other donors to scale-up the USG-developed TB/HIV integration model. National TB/HIV monitoring team's assessment of the TB/HIV integration pilot in Dushanbe revealed that the GOT had put in place and effective referral system to combine AIDS and TB services. One epidemiologist enrolled in the USG-supported Central Asia applied epidemiology training program. Students in Tajikistan from this program participated in an epidemiological analysis of TB hospitalization and an investigation of a leptospirosis outbreak

On maternal and child health, 38 new villages established emergency transportation plans, bringing the total to 119. In addition, 41 new villages adopted birth plans, for a total of 118 villages working with 3,019 pregnant women. One hundred and ninety-four community volunteers received refresher courses on Safe Motherhood, Sexually Transmitted Infections, Breastfeeding, and Family Planning. These volunteers in turn organized 2,327 health education sessions for 24,471 participants. Over 100 health care providers were trained in Life Saving Skills, including sessions in "Safe Motherhood" protocols, the "Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses," and infection prevention.

The USG-supported "Second Center of Excellence" serves as a model for effective institution of family medicine in rural areas of Tajikistan. A household survey found that almost 50% of the population who live near the site had received care from a family doctor during the past year, and almost an equal number (48%) said they had received health information or counseling from a PHC worker during that period. In previous years, there were no family doctors in Tajikistan and health promotion via health facilities was rare.

In Basic Education, the USG expanded teacher training activities to include teachers of secondary grades in target areas, and implemented more in-depth collaboration and capacity building at state in-service training institutions. Teacher training targets were greatly exceeded (482 against the target of 107) due to the introduction of a USG-developed "methodology training course" and the conversion of an existing USG program to include subject-specific training for secondary teachers. The 72-hour course was integrated into the state in-service teacher training curriculum and will become part of the GOT's plan to provide high-quality professional development to all teachers.

In education finance, intensive training was provided to officials of the Kulyab education and finance departments. Early analysis of the pilot in Kulyab shows that adjustments to improve efficiency are beginning to occur, with modest improvements in class sizes and the salary share of non-teaching staff. In addition, to address the demand for lower-level government capacity building, the USG developed a special training course for district education authorities. The USG addresses teacher turnover by providing training to a team of teachers in each school.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers better understand whether specific assistance programs are making their intended impact and, if necessary, how to adjust these programs to improve the impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Investing in People. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 - September 30 of the following year. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 - December 31.

Performance Indicator: Infant Morality. Number of deaths of children under one year of age per 1,000 live births. Source: United Nations Statistics Division Millennium Development Indicators. Found online: www.millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd.

CY 1995 Baseline

CY 2000 Number

CY 2003 Number

CY 2004 Number

95

93

92

92


Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator has been improving slowly. Tajikistan currently has one of the highest infant mortality rates in Central Asia, reported by UNICEF at 92 per 1,000 live births in 2003. In response to technical assistance and policy support from the USG, the Ministry of Health agreed to implement the internationally-accepted World Health Organization international live birth definition in 2007. This is a critical first step in improving the chances for an infants' survival. The USG and UNICEF will continue to support the MOH following the recent adoption of ILBD and provide additional training courses. Analysis of recently collected data may provide another rate for this indicator.

Performance Indicator: Tuberculosis (TB) Incidence per 100,000. Number of newly diagnosed tuberculosis cases, all forms during the given calendar year. Source: World Health Organization, European Health For All Database. Found online: www.data.euro.who.int/hfadb/.

CY 2002 Baseline

FY 2003 Number

CY 2004 Number

CY 2005 Target

62.91

64.81

70.44

71.0



Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: Although the increase in this indicator is negative, indicating increases in tuberculosis (TB) incidence and morbidity, it also reflects improvements in reporting and recording. The USG supports Tajikistan's national TB control program, working through partners to improve implementation of the DOTS strategy in the civilian system. The USG builds political support for TB control, improves human and system capacity, and enhances program management, supervision, and surveillance. Tajikistan is only beginning to address TB in the penitentiary sector, a major source of disease burden, and increased resources available through the GFATM may lead to further system improvements. Therefore, the target is higher for CY 2006.

Peace and Security

Tajikistan was a regional leader in fighting terrorism and narcotics trafficking and contributed to greater border security and political stability in Central Asia. Securing the 1,400-km border with Afghanistan was a formidable challenge for Tajikistan's under-trained, under-paid, under-supplied border and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, existing legislation did not contain conspiracy or aiding and abetting provisions, critical elements for successfully prosecuting complex drug trafficking cases. Because of this legislative gap, only the lowest level traffickers were prosecuted; top criminals with links to organized crime remained free. The GOT began implementing a national action plan against trafficking in persons.

Although there were no domestic terrorist groups, Tajikistan's porous borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan allowed members of international terror groups to enter the country undetected. The GOT took a strong stance against terrorism and kept a close watch on suspected extremists and militants. The Tajik security apparatus remained close to its historical ally Russia; however, relations were strained when the Russian border troops withdrew from the country in June 2005.

Tajikistan seized more drugs than all other Central Asian countries combined. After assuming responsibility for its borders following the withdrawal of Russian border troops, Tajikistan made considerable progress in creating a sustainable border patrol and infrastructure. In 2006, the Tajikistan border forces worked with the U.S. and other donor countries to increase troop capacity and maintain security. Tajik officials believed that the expanding drug crop in Afghanistan triggered the extension of Afghan drug processing labs into Tajikistan. While there was no definitive evidence that this had occurred, the possibility of spillover remained a high threat.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

The USG focused FY 2006 peace and security assistance on: developing the operational capacity of Tajik authorities to protect its borders and disrupt narcotics trafficking, terrorism and other criminal activity extending governance of the central authorities into remote areas; developing organizational capacity, professionalism, and institutions of GOT law enforcement authorities and military through specialized trainings and exchanges; assisting with transition of Tajik armed forces into a modern force following the Western model of civilian leadership of military structures, a corps of responsible non-commissioned officers, and adoption of western military ethics and attitudes; developing the Tajik military's ability to conduct counter-terror and other operations, to include peace support operations by developing Tajik military interoperability with U.S., NATO and coalition forces, and by means of information exchanges, training and provision of equipment; strengthening regional ties between military and disaster relief forces in support of regional stability and inter-operability; developing Tajikistan's ability to investigate, arrest, and prosecute major narcotics traffickers in collaboration with the Drug Control Agency, Prosecutor General's office, Ministry of Interior and other Government agencies; and supporting anti-Trafficking-in-Persons efforts through operational assistance, organization development and increased awareness.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

The USG completed key capacity building projects at the main Ministry of Interior police academy training center and conducted several training courses. The projects including establishing a language center, computer training center, an analytical center, a trafficking-in-persons investigative unit, and developing a counter-narcotics mobile team.

USG-funded border control projects for Tajikistan's Border Guards included outpost renovation, construction projects on the Afghanistan border, and various technical assistance projects. USG assistance supplied trucks, fuel, spare parts, summer and winter uniforms, police and law enforcement equipment for conscripts and officers, and technical communication and computer equipment for main and regional operations centers. The USG began installing and conducting training on a new national communications network for both voice and data transmission capability for Afghan border and command centers.

The USG supported the Tajik Drug Control Agency through a salary supplemental program, as well as through infrastructure improvements for headquarters and the regional offices. The agency's new mobile team division became fully operational and began functioning in FY 2006. A new analytical center was established at headquarters that became fully-integrated into agency operations and began to function. The USG also established a laboratory capable of producing evidence to submit in court for drug cases. Finally, the USG provided a new communication network that improved regional and national capabilities for voice and data transmissions.

The USG improved classrooms and the library at the Ministry of Security training center. The USG also worked with and trained the Ministry of Security to form a new analytical center to integrate the Ministry of Security more effectively with other law enforcement entities.

The USG facilitated Tajik military and defense official participation in classes and conferences at the George C. Marshall Center. The USG also fostered Tajik participation at other multilateral and information exchange programs.

OUTPUTS

The USG trained over 300 specialized border, law enforcement, and drug control officers in several specialties related to undercover and operational capabilities for both counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism activities. The USG also provided technical equipment training.

Joint USG-GOT operations on drug interdiction, the sharing of actionable intelligence, and improved communications and data transfers capability resulted in 10 operational initiatives in FY 2006.

USG support for the Ministry of Interior, Drug Control Agency and Border Guards resulted in increased drug interdictions. During the first nine months of 2006, law enforcement agencies in Tajikistan seized a total of 3,747,705 kilograms of drugs, compared to 3,416,355 kilograms during the same period in 2005.

One military officer successfully completed the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Career Course and began working under the Tajik National Guard Chief of Staff in Dushanbe.

In May, representatives of more than 20 countries attended a three-day International Conference on Drug Trafficking in Dushanbe. This conference, co-sponsored by the GOT and the USG, discuss how to strengthen controls along the Tajik-Afghan border.

With USG support, the International Organization for Migration was able to establish and maintain two shelters for repatriated trafficking victims. The two shelters, which opened in 2006, provided a place of refuge for over 100 trafficking victims. The U.S.-funded Intelligence and Analytical Center for Counter-narcotics and Trafficking-In-Persons played a critical role in gathering data and analyzing trafficking trends in Tajikistan.

The Central Asian multilateral disaster response exercise was one of the most fruitful examples of GOT participation in the numerous exchanges, classes and conferences that made up the series of regional cooperation exercises. During this disaster response exercise, Tajik officers developed regional contacts with counterparts in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, creating networks to facilitate a coordinated response in the event of an actual natural or man-made disaster.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE/IMPACT

U.S. assistance has increased the ability of the multiple GOT agencies to coordinate and cooperate on sensitive drug and organized crime investigations. This was demonstrated by multiple successful prosecutions of Customs, Border Guards and Ministry of Interior officers involved in drug smuggling operations. Over 200 kilos of heroin was seized during these agencies' operations supported by USG-funded equipment and training techniques.

USG-funded infrastructure efforts along the Afghan-Tajik border prompted the State Committee for Border Control to foster better control of remote locations by repositioning troops to key drug and terrorist trafficking areas along the Afghan border and revising training requirements.

USG support allowed Tajik Drug Control Agency officers to increase collaboration with Afghan drug control units. Tajik counter-drug liaison officers began rotating through Afghan law enforcement units in key northern Afghan areas. Continued USG support to the Drug Control Agency also supported the investigation and arrest of several low- to mid-level corrupt border, law enforcement and customs officials in 2006. These investigations were not completed by the end of the year and could lead to higher-level arrests.

The GOT drafted a national canine strategy, a direct result of USG assistance in providing canines and improving Tajik facilities for drug sniffing and other law enforcement work.

Tajik armed forces were better able to operate in remote, mountainous areas of the nation.

As a result of USG efforts in trafficking in persons, the GOT developed a detailed national action plan for implementing prevention, rehabilitation, and enforcement efforts to combat trafficking in persons.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers can better understand whether or not assistance programs are having the intended impact.

Please find below an important indicator in the area of Peace and Security. In the chart, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The Embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 - September 30 of the following year. "CY" stands for "calendar year," covering events from January 1 - December 31 of the subject year or last calendar year.

Performance Indicator: Judicial Framework and Independence Rating (formerly Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework Rating). Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. (7-point scale: 1 is the highest, 7 is the lowest). Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit. The data upon which this ranking is based comes from the previous calendar year. Found online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2005 Rank

CY 2006 Rank

CY 2007 Target

5.75

5.75

5.75

5.75


Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator was stable in CY 2005. Tajikistan's courts continued to be vulnerable to corruption and influence. Laws were inadequate to fully prosecute some crimes. The judicial system allowed for lengthy pretrial detentions and prisoners were not always treated according to international human rights standards. The CY 2007 target is not higher, although the USG hopes that the Resident Legal Advisor will be able to work with the Prosecutor General's office to strengthen legislation and judicial regulations.

Performance Indicator: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The score relates to the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Source: Transparency International. The data upon which this ranking is based comes from the previous calendar year. Found online at: http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/index.html.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Rank

CY 2006 Target

1.8

2.0

2.1

2.0



Impact of U.S. Assistance on the Above Indicator: This indicator improved slightly in CY 2005. Tajikistan remained one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Graft and corruption was pervasive in business, government, health and education. USG and international donor activities encouraged good governance and transparency. The CY 2006 target is slightly lower because the GOT National Strategy to Combat Corruption was politicized and not effectively implemented.

Humanitarian Assistance

Significant increases in GOT social welfare spending and systemic reforms improved the lives of many people. However, challenges in Tajikistan were great and the needs of many, often institutionalized Tajiks, remained unmet. Tajikistan's severe climate and geographic isolation contributed to problems in the humanitarian sector and the need for the USG to continue a strong program for its disadvantaged citizens.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

Humanitarian programs in Tajikistan continued to focus on improving the daily lives of the most vulnerable, often institutionalized, persons living in remote areas without even the most basic of necessities. The provision of medicines, clothing and adequate shelter remains the top priority for humanitarian efforts. In addition, the USG placed emphasis on bolstering local and USG disaster and crisis response capability.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

The primary focus of the USG humanitarian assistance was distributing humanitarian commodities, for which need was verified, to vulnerable persons beyond the reach of other USG assistance programs and Government of Tajikistan social welfare spending. In FY 2006, the USG continued to fund a commodity distribution project as well as a healthcare services project. In addition, the USG provided a medical exchange, a training and distribution airlift, a small reconstruction project, disaster response assistance, and food assistance. Finally, the USG funded a program that provided free shipping to any registered U.S. charitable organization that wished to send humanitarian commodities to local partners in Tajikistan.

OUTPUTS

Overall in FY 2006, the USG delivered a total of 68 surface containers and four airlifts of various humanitarian commodities valued at $33.77 million. The cost to transport, distribute and monitor these commodities was just over $1.6 million. Commodities delivered included, medicines, medical supplies, shelter items, clothing, shoes, food, blankets, linens, hygiene kits and school supplies. Within this total, the USG enabled five U.S. charities to deliver and distribute eight containers of humanitarian relief items to persons in need in Tajikistan.

The USG conducted a multi-faceted medical exchange, training and distribution project using a U.S. military aircraft to transport donated pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and a volunteer team of approximately 40 American doctors to Dushanbe. The medicines and medical supplies in the airlift were worth $7,869,145 and included urgently needed insulin and antibiotic burn cream requested by the Tajik Ministry of Health. The doctors spent ten to twelve days in Tajikistan assisting with the distribution of donated medicines and providing medical services and training in family practice and emergency obstetrics.

A USG-funded reconstruction project provided potable water for approximately 3000 people living in the villages of Kushkaki Murgon and Karahoni. A USG food assistance project implemented in partnership with the World Food Program provided supplemental nutrition for thousands of Tajik school children and other vulnerable populations throughout Tajikistan.

The USG provided seven containers of disaster response items (tents, sleeping bags, clothing) for U.S. Embassy Dushanbe to use when needed. At the request of the GOT, the USG used a portion of these pre-positioned supplies to respond to two small scale disasters: an orphanage fire in Dushanbe Republican Boarding House for Mentally Disabled Children and an earthquake in Baljuvan, a village southeast of Dushanbe. The USG provided victims with burn medications, bandages, warm clothing, bedding and hygiene items.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE/IMPACT

Humanitarian programs, while significantly impacting the day-to-day lives of recipients, are not designed to have long lasting impacts on recipient countries; however, some aspects of these programs assist in sustainable development. The provision of relief supplies and the renovation of facilities alleviate some of the burden placed on the GOT and allow for resources to be focused on reforms that will enable the country to care for its own. Lastly, humanitarian programs can help the local government identify areas in need of improvement and act as a blueprint for how to begin solving social welfare problems.

FY 2006 Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Tajikistan [PDF format]



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