Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Australia is a committed partner in international efforts to combat illicit drugs. Australia is a consumer, rather than a producer, nation. There is no evidence of narcotics destined for the U.S. transiting Australia. U.S. and Australian law enforcement agencies have excellent cooperation on narcotics matters. Drug policy is an issue of increasing importance in domestic affairs in Australia, with the passage of state legislation allowing for safe heroin injecting rooms (clean needles provided, no prosecution for drug offenses) in two Australian cities; implementation of this legislation has been delayed, however. Australia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in Australia. According to a 1998 survey for Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), nearly 40 percent of Australians over the age of 14 have used the drug at least once, with 17 percent having used it in the last 12 months. The survey revealed that 46 percent of all Australians report having used at least one illicit drug in their lives, with 22 percent having done so in the previous year. Australia has also seen a growth in the use of the synthetic drug Ecstasy: a recent survey by the National Drug and Alcohol Research Center (NDARC) found that 20 percent of men surveyed ages 20 to 29 and 10 percent of women in that age group had tried the drug.

Heroin use is on the rise in Australia. 2.2 percent of all Australians reported using heroin in the 1998 AIHW survey, up from 1.4 percent in 1995. Among men aged 20-29, 6.2 percent reported heroin use in 1998, up from 3.6 percent three years earlier. The state of New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have passed legislation allowing for the creation of "safe heroin injecting rooms." Neither state has actually established a safe injecting room, due to numerous procedural and legal hurdles.

Policy Initiatives. The government’s comprehensive drug strategy remains the "Tough on Drugs" program first announced by Prime Minister John Howard in 1997. Since its inception, more than U.S.$250 million has been spent on implementation of the strategy, according to the Prime Minister’s office. Drug policy remains an issue in which both the federal and state governments have a role. This leads to variations in laws and punishments across Australia.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Law enforcement agencies continued aggressive antinarcotics law enforcement activities in 2000. Responsibility for these efforts is divided between the federal and state governments, with the various law enforcement agencies generally working well together.

According to a report from Australian Customs, from July 1999 to December 2000, Customs seized 717 kilograms of cocaine, 269 kilograms of heroin and 144 kilograms of ecstasy. The most significant seizures of the year 2000 were a 317 kilograms shipment of cocaine seized in Sydney and, in late December, 184 kilograms of heroin. Police also seized Australia’s two largest shipments of ecstasy ever: 76 kilograms in January and 105 kilograms in December 2000. In a report issued in March 1999, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) reported that between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998, federal and state/territory enforcement authorities seized 320.9 kilograms of heroin and other opiates, 103.1 kilograms of cocaine, and 182.2 kilograms of methamphetamine and other amphetamines.

The AFP has established a number of overseas liaison posts to assist in narcotics-related investigations. These liaison officers, particularly those in the Pacific Island nations, also assist local law enforcement agencies in training and institution building. The AFP, both in country and overseas, has a close working relationship with U.S. agencies, such as DEA and FBI. In October, the AFP, in conjunction with other international law enforcement agencies, played a central role in the seizure of 357 kilos of Southeast Asian heroin in Fiji. This was Australia’s first direct enforcement activity outside its borders. The Australian government is working through the court system to extradite a prominent Mexican money launderer back to Mexico pursuant to that country’s request. In 2000, Australia transferred to the U.S. three persons wanted for narcotics crimes.

Corruption. The Australian government is vigilant in its efforts to prevent narcotics related corruption. There is no indication of any senior official of the government facilitating the production or distribution of illicit drugs or aiding in the laundering of proceeds from such activities.

Agreements and Treaties. The U.S. and Australia cooperate in law enforcement matters under a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty. Australia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The USG has concluded a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) with Australia. Australia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December, 2000.

Cultivation/Production. The only significant illicit cultivation in Australia is cannabis, which remains at less than 5,000 hectares throughout the country. Australia has a significant licit opium crop, primarily on the island of Tasmania. Controls against diversion of that crop are excellent.

Drug Flow/Transit. Australia has been and continues to be a target for Southeast Asian heroin trafficking organizations and South American cocaine traffickers. The U.S. Embassy continues to monitor the possibility of these drugs transiting Australia to the U.S., but to date there has been no information that this is occurring.

U.S. Policy Initiatives. The primary U.S. counternarcotics activities in Australia remain looking for signs of traffic from Australia to the U.S. and providing mutual assistance and sharing intelligence in an effort to disrupt and dismantle international trafficking organizations. Cooperation between U.S. and Australian authorities in achieving these goals is excellent.

The Road Ahead. Australia shows no sign of lessening its commitment to the international fight against drug trafficking, particularly in Southeast Asia. The U.S. can expect to enjoy excellent bilateral relations with Australia on the counternarcotics front and the two countries should work well together in UNDCP and other multilateral fora.

I. Summary

Brunei Darussalam does not produce or consume narcotic drugs in significant quantities. Drug-related problems are relatively minor although in the past few years there has been a steady increase in drug use and drug-related arrests. There are no indications that Brunei is being used for major transshipment of illegal drugs or for money laundering. The Brunei government has a vital, proactive antidrug program led by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). The Brunei government actively participates in regional activities and multilateral antidrug fora and has made substantial progress in strengthening laws pertaining to narcotics-related crime. Brunei is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Contact and cooperation with regional U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials has been positive.

The quantity of illegal drugs coming to or transiting Brunei is relatively small. Brunei authorities report there is no evidence of drug syndicates operating in the country. Brunei’s borders are coastlines and dense jungles intersected by rivers, making it difficult to patrol. Of primary concern to the GOB are numerous small islands in the Brunei Bay area that are Malaysian territory, and therefore out of Brunei’s jurisdiction. Undocumented and unregulated illegal immigrants inhabit these islands. These illegal immigrants, thought by the NCB to be predominantly Filipino, are cited as a primary source of illegal drugs entering Brunei. Although the NCB cooperates with the GOB military and other agencies, they do not currently have adequate maritime capabilities to interdict or inspect daily inter-island boat traffic. The GOB has informally broached the "island problem" subject in bilateral police meetings with the Government of Malaysia (GOM).

Methamphetamines are the most commonly used illegal drugs, followed by cannabis.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Brunei’s Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), which leads the country’s counternarcotics efforts, believes that it lacks adequate funding. Its trained staff is dedicated, professional and, although small, efficiently performs investigative and enforcement activities. Cooperation between the NCB, police, customs, and other agencies involved in counternarcotics is excellent.

Brunei vigorously prosecutes those arrested for narcotics offenses. According to GOB statistics through 10/30/2000, there has been a 21 percent increase in drug-related arrests in Brunei (from 46.5 arrests per month to 56.4 arrests per month) from 1999 to 2000. These are significant statistics, given the small population of Brunei (approximately 338,000, including 40,000 in the capital Bandar Seri Begawan where most of the arrests occurred), and the distraction of the police by the year-long security preparations for the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings held there in November 2000. APEC was a gigantic undertaking for the GOB and significantly impacted on the attention and resources of the police, including the NCB. Like its neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei has a well-publicized death penalty for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking (more than 30 grams), for marijuana (more than 600 grams), for cocaine (more than 40 grams), and most recently for possession and trafficking in methamphetamine (more than 250 grams). As in Malaysia and Singapore, this tough policy on drugs appears to have a significant deterrent effect.

Policy Initiatives. Money laundering legislation was still undergoing legal review in late 1999, but the Brunei government announced that a law would be put into place soon. Anticipating such a law, in 1999 Brunei authorities initiated a cooperative effort with regional money laundering experts.

Brunei participates in ASEAN and other regional antidrug fora, and regularly cooperates with the Malaysian government in counternarcotics operations along common borders. Brunei drug officials also maintain regular contact with counterparts in Singapore, Thailand, and Australia.

Agreements and Treaties. There are no bilateral law enforcement treaties between the U.S. and Brunei. Brunei is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Drug Flow/Transit. The Brunei government appears concerned about Brunei becoming a transit point for precursor chemicals but has not developed a preventive strategy yet.

Demand Reduction. The Brunei government operates one drug rehabilitation facility, which accommodates approximately 250 (voluntary and involuntary) residents. Recent government focus has been on demand reduction activities, especially targeting the use of crystal methamphetamine, known locally as syabu. In 2000 the Brunei government funded school and village programs with antidrug messages geared to six to 17-year-old students and their parents.

Corruption. There is no indication of drug-related corruption in Brunei.

Bilateral Cooperation. During 2000 the Narcotics Control Bureau and police have attended training courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. NCB personnel recently attended a money-laundering seminar hosted by DEA in Singapore. There is excellent ad hoc cooperation with the regional DEA presence in Singapore. The recent shift by the USG to partial self-funding of Brunei participants at ILEA has had a significant negative impact on GOB participation. In spite of the obvious benefits, it is likely that GOB interest in attending ILEA will further wane when Brunei is asked to fully fund their participation. In Brunei the budget process is cumbersome to begin with, and—after recent financial problems—the GOB is remaining fiscally conservative.

The Road Ahead. The NCB continues to request further training, including technical training in a wide range of antinarcotics law enforcement techniques. Brunei needs to remain vigilant against the amphetamine-type stimulant epidemic that has beset the rest of Asia.

I. Summary

Burma remains the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium and heroin. Since 1996, however, production of both heroin and opium in Burma has steadily declined due to Burmese government eradication efforts and adverse weather conditions in major poppy growing areas. Cultivation of opium poppy expanded in 2000 to 108,700 hectares, a 21 percent increase over the 89,500 hectares under cultivation in 1999. The increase primarily resulted from better germination in existing fields and only secondarily from increased planting. Because of localized bad weather, Burma produced 1,085 metric tons of opium in 2000, a decrease of 5 metric tons from the 1,090 metric tons produced in 1999. Production of methamphetamines has skyrocketed over the past few years. Burmese counternarcotics officers continued to seize heroin and methamphetamines, but total seizures of both narcotics declined in 2000. Overall, in 2000 the Burmese seized approximately 27 million methamphetamine tablets, compared with nearly 29 million seized in 1999. Heroin seizures declined from approximately 273 kilograms in 1999 to 171 kilograms in 2000. Opium seizures increased slightly to 1,528 kilograms in 2000 from 1,445 kilograms in 1999.

The Government of Burma (GOB) continued to pursue and arrest individual drug traffickers in 2000, including members of some former insurgent groups, but has been unwilling or unable to take on the most powerful groups directly. The cease-fire agreements that the government has signed with these insurgent groups often implicitly condone their continued participation in narcotics production and trafficking, at least over the short term.

Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Second only to Afghanistan, Burma remains one of the world’s largest producers of illicit opium. Burmese opium production doubled in 1989, the year after the current military regime took power, and remained high throughout the early 1990s. Since 1996, however, opium production has declined sharply to levels that are now less than half Burma’s annual production during the early 1990s. Burma has become a major source of methamphetamines trafficked throughout the region.

Burma currently accounts for approximately 80 percent of Southeast Asia’s opium production, and 20 percent of the world’s production. Most of the opium is produced in Burma’s Shan State, particularly in areas under the control of former insurgent groups. Since 1989, the government has negotiated cease-fire agreements with most of the former insurgent groups that control these areas, offering them limited autonomy and development assistance in exchange for peace. In negotiating these agreements, the regime’s highest priority has been to end the ethnic conflicts and achieve some measure of national integration. Narcotics control has been a lesser priority, and many of the cease-fire agreements have permitted former insurgents to continue their involvement in narcotics cultivation and trafficking activities. The cease-fire agreements have also had the practical effect of condoning money laundering. The government has encouraged former insurgent groups to invest in "legitimate" businesses and some have used the opportunity to launder money through investments in banks, hotels and construction companies.

The former insurgent groups with whom the government has negotiated cease-fire agreements, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA—Kokang Chinese), remain armed and heavily involved in the heroin trade and in the manufacturing and distribution of synthetic drugs. They are also largely immune from government action. To cite only one example, under the terms of the cease-fire agreement, Burmese troops cannot even enter Wa territory without permission from the UWSA.

Many of the leaders of these ethnic groups are involved in the heroin and/or amphetamine trade. They include Peng Jiasheng and Liu Goushi of the MNDAA; Pao Yuqiang, Li Zuru, and Wei Xuekang of the UWSA; Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA); and Yawd Serk of the Shan State Army South (SSA South), also known as the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), which was formerly part of drug lord Chang Qifu’s Mong Tai Army. Chang Qifu disbanded his army in January 1996 in return for generous terms of surrender, which allowed him to avoid criminal prosecution. U Sai Lin (Lin Mingxian) of the Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA) has been listed in previous years as a major narco-insurgent leader, but he has successfully rid his area of opium cultivation. There are no current, confirmed reports of U Sai Lin or the ESSA still being involved in narcotics trafficking, although it is likely that ESSA territory is a trafficking route because of its location along the border with China. Mon Sa La, the former head of the Mong Ko Defense Army, is now in custody in Burma, and the Mong Ko Defense Army has been destroyed.

There is reason to believe that money laundering in Burma and the return of narcotics profits laundered elsewhere are significant factors in the overall Burmese economy, although the extent is difficult to measure accurately. Political and economic constraints on legal capital inflows magnify the importance of narcotics-derived funds in the economy. An under-regulated banking system and ineffective money laundering legislation have created a business and investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in legitimate commerce.

Drug abuse—in particular intravenous drug use—is on the rise in Burma and is accompanied by an alarming spread of the HIV/AIDS virus, especially in the ethnic minority areas that are the source of the drugs. HIV/AIDS infection rates in gem and jade mining areas are particularly high. The GOB has not taken decisive action against the spread of HIV/AIDS.

In the past five years, as overt military challenges to Rangoon’s authority from the ethnic groups have eased, the government has increased its counternarcotics enforcement efforts. In 1997 the GOB garrisoned troops on a year-round basis in the Kokang region, and in November 2000 the Burmese military occupied Mong Ko. The GOB has only a token presence in Wa territory, however.

Under pressure from the government, the MNDAA, the KDA, and the MDA in Shan State had declared their intention to establish opium-free zones in territory under their control by the year 2000. Unable to meet that deadline, those groups have now pledged to achieve that goal in 2001. The ESSA has declared its territory an opium-free zone. The Wa have announced their territory will be an opium-free zone by the year 2005.

Ethnic groups have made "opium-free" pledges since 1989, but, with the exception of the Kachin State and ESSA territory, results have been limited. The long tradition of opium cultivation in northern Shan State, the lack of viable alternatives for some farmers, and the sheer profitability of growing opium intensify the extent of the problem. Accordingly, meaningful poppy crop reduction and eventual elimination of opium production in these areas will require considerable eradication, law-enforcement, and alternative-development efforts by the GOB, supplemented, where possible, by the international community. The government will also need to strengthen its commitment to provide resources for the counternarcotics effort and to foster increased cooperation between the government and the ethnic groups involved in production and trafficking.

The GOB has stated that it would bolster eradication efforts by providing development assistance, infrastructure improvements, and advice on crop substitution. The GOB has also requested assistance from the U.S. Government (USG) in verifying whether these groups fulfill their commitments. Exchange of information on opium cultivation throughout Burma now occurs during the joint USG-GOB year-by-year opium poppy survey. The GOB has also asked China for assistance in curbing narcotics trafficking and has established a regular forum with China for discussing counternarcotics cooperation.

Policy Initiatives. During 2000, the Government of Burma pursued a cautious, low-risk counternarcotics program. The GOB introduced no new counternarcotics policies and continued to exert little direct pressure on major drug organizations, particularly the UWSA. Counternarcotics authorities made little attempt to seize drugs or destroy heroin and/or methamphetamine factories in UWSA-controlled territories.

Burmese counternarcotics efforts in 1999 and 2000 produced new legislation designating caffeine a drug precursor, and initial efforts to draft more comprehensive money laundering legislation.

With encouragement from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. Embassies in Rangoon and Bangkok, the Burmese and Thai governments agreed to undertake joint operations against drug trafficking along Thailand’s northern border with Burma. The long-standing agreement has yet to be implemented, however. Operation of a joint antidrug task force in Tachilek, Burma, and Mae Sai, Thailand has been hindered by political tensions between Burma and Thailand.

The Burmese government maintains its refusal to render drug lord Chang Qifu to the U.S. on the grounds that he had not violated his 1996 surrender agreement. The agreement reportedly stipulated that if Chang Qifu ended his insurgency and retired from the drug trade, the GOB would provide him with security in Rangoon and allow him to conduct legitimate business. Burmese authorities assert that he will continue to enjoy immunity from prosecution in Burma and exemption from rendition to another country as long as he does not violate his surrender agreement. This issue remains a source of friction between Burma and the U.S. The 1988 UN Drug Convention obligates parties, including Burma, to prosecute such traffickers. GOB officials have stated they would be willing to prosecute Chang Qifu or his subordinates, if it can be proven that they have engaged in narcotics trafficking after the surrender agreement was signed.

The military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has affirmed its intention to implement the ongoing "Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races." The plan calls for a program of integrated development combined with law enforcement aimed at improving living standards in the ethnic areas and viable economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. Few GOB resources have been devoted to the program, however. As a result, health, education, and infrastructure in border areas remain poor, and the GOB’s opium eradication efforts are likely to be undercut by the lack of viable economic alternatives available to farmers and villagers.

With support from the United States and Japan, the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) continues to implement a community based, alternative development project in the southern portion of the Wa region. The project complements the United Wa State Army’s decision to eradicate opium production in the areas under its control by 2005. Known as the Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP), the project is a five-year, $15 million program intended to introduce economically viable alternative crops to replace reliance on opium poppy cultivation. Already established in ten pilot villages, the project will gradually expand into more than two-thirds of the 334 villages in Mong Pawk Township in the Wa territories. The U.S. also funded smaller UNDCP alternative-development projects in the Nam Tit and Lao Kai areas of Northern Shan State. In addition, the GOB and Japan have developed a crop-substitution program on 14,565 acres in northern Shan State to replace opium poppy cultivation.

Accomplishments. Although the drug threat from Burma continues to be very high, seizures of illicit narcotics remained close to or below 1999 levels. In 2000 Burmese officers seized approximately 27 million methamphetamine tablets, somewhat less than the nearly 29 million tablets seized in 1999. Even though sizeable quantities of methamphetamine tablets have been confiscated, the seizures represent only a small fraction of the methamphetamines produced within Burma.

In 2000 seizures of ephedrine, the precursor used to manufacture methamphetamines, were less than half the quantity seized in 1999. Burmese officers seized only about 2,700 kilograms of ephedrine in 2000 compared to seizures of nearly 6,500 kilograms in 1999.

Seizures of heroin declined for the third straight year, and seizures of opium gum rose only slightly over previous years. Heroin seizures in 2000 totaled only 171 kilograms, only 273 kilograms in 1999, and only 404 kilograms in 1998. Opium seizures in 2000 totaled 1,528 kilograms, slightly more than the 1,445 kilograms seized in 1999, but significantly less than the 5,400 kilograms seized in 1998. The GOB claimed to have eradicated 10,985 acres under poppy cultivation during the 1999/2000 growing season and 9,800 acres during the 1998/1999 growing season.

According to Burmese reports, at least eight heroin refineries and two methamphetamine laboratories were seized in 2000. During 1999 the government destroyed 23 heroin refineries and six methamphetamine refineries.

Law Enforcement Measures. The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law brought the Burmese legal code into basic conformity with the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The law contains some legal tools for addressing money laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of drug conspiracy cases. Burmese policy and judicial officials have been slow to implement the law, however, targeting few, if any, major traffickers and their drug-related assets.

The lack of effective legislation and enforcement encourages the investment of drug proceeds in legitimate business ventures by traffickers or former traffickers. Family members of former or present traffickers have invested heavily in infrastructure projects, such as roads and port facilities, as well as in banks, airlines, hotels and real-estate-development projects during the year. Some of these investments are intended to supplement government expenditures on rural development projects in areas under control of the ethnic insurgent and trafficking groups. There is solid evidence indicating that drug profits formed the seed capital for many otherwise legitimate enterprises in the commercial services and manufacturing sectors.

Formally, the Burmese government’s drug-enforcement efforts are led by the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), which is comprised of personnel from various security services, including the police, customs, military intelligence, and the army. CCDAC now has 21 drug-enforcement task forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key transit routes near Burma’s borders with China, India, and Thailand. The CCDAC, which is under the effective control of the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) and relies, in part, on military personnel to execute law-enforcement duties, continues to suffer from a lack of adequate resources to support its law-enforcement mission.

Corruption. There is no evidence that the government, on an institutional level, is involved in the drug trade. There are persistent and reliable reports, however, that officials, particularly corrupt army personnel posted in outlying areas, are either directly involved in drug production and/or trafficking or are paid to allow others to engage unhindered in drug activities. Army personnel wield considerable political clout locally, and their involvement in trafficking is a significant problem. The GOB has said that it welcomes information on corruption within its ranks, and a few military personnel were arrested for narcotics-related offenses in 1999.

Asset Forfeiture. Burma has made no changes to its asset-forfeiture law. Currently, the 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law gives the GOB authority to seize money, property, or proceeds involved in or derived from narcotics trafficking. As long as the required taxes are paid, however, the GOB does not exercise this authority, particularly in cases where assets are invested in a legitimate business or in real estate.

Agreements and Treaties. Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The U.S. believes that the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition treaty, which was accepted by the post-independence Burmese government in 1948, remains in force and is applicable to U.S. requests for extradition of drug fugitives and other criminals from Burma. The GOB continues to reject the validity of this treaty.

The GOB is one of six nations (Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam) that, along with the UNDCP, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering a sub-regional action plan aimed at controlling precursor chemicals and reducing illicit drug trafficking and use in the highlands of Southeast Asia. In addition to periodic meetings with counterparts from the other signatories to the MOU, Burma has held counternarcotics discussions with Russia and India in 1999. The GOB signed bilateral drug control agreements with India in 1993, with Bangladesh in 1994, with Vietnam in 1995, and with the Russian Federation, Laos, and the Philippines in 1997.

Cultivation and Production. Burma remains a leading producer of opium, despite a sharp decline in production since 1996. Over the past four years, opium cultivation has declined by nearly one-third and opium production has dropped by approximately 58 percent to an estimated maximum production of 1,085 metric tons in 2000. Two factors appear to have contributed to this result. The first is continued eradication efforts by the government. In 2000, the government reported having destroyed approximately 10,985 acres of poppy, but those claims cannot be verified by satellite imagery. The second, and perhaps most important, factor is adverse weather conditions. During the 1999/2000 crop years, unseasonable rains during the planting season in October and a subsequent severe frost in December severely affected the opium poppy crop. As a result, even with an increase of 21 percent in land under cultivation (108,700 hectares in 2000 versus 89,500 hectares in 1999), actual opium yield marginally declined to 1,085 metric tons in 2000 compared to 1,090 metric tons produced in 1999.

The GOB conducted a baseline survey of opium cultivation in 1999 aimed at determining actual opium production (as opposed to potential production that the USG measures) throughout the country. According to Burmese figures, there were 102,066 acres used for opium poppy cultivation in 1999, producing a total of 449 tons of opium. However, the government has never explained the methodology used to arrive at these totals, and the U.S. has continued to rely on the figures resulting from the joint U.S.-Burma opium yield survey.

Drug Flow/Transit. Most heroin in Burma is produced in small, mobile labs located near the borders with Thailand and China in Shan State areas controlled by former insurgent groups. An increasing amount of methamphetamine is reportedly produced in laboratories co-located with heroin refineries in the Wa region and in the territory of the former Shan United Revolutionary Army in southern Shan State. Heroin and methamphetamine produced by Burma’s former insurgent groups are trafficked largely through transit routes crossing the porous Chinese and Thai borders; to a lesser extent over the Indian, Bangladeshi, and Lao borders; and through Rangoon onward by ship to other countries in the region. Although Thailand remains an important route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia, trafficking through China has increased significantly over the past several years. Traffickers continued moving heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio through Mandalay to Rangoon or other seaports. Trafficking routes leading through Kachin and Chin States and Sagaing Division in northern Burma to India continued to operate as secondary routes.

China and India are the principal sources for acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, and ephedrine, the primary chemical ingredient of methamphetamine.

Demand Reduction. Drug abuse continues to escalate in Burma. Official estimates in 1999 put the number of drug addicts at approximately 86,537, up from the estimate in 1998 of 66,463. According to UNDCP and non-governmental organizations working in the health sector, the actual number is significantly higher, totaling about 400-500,000 addicts. Heroin, relatively cheap in Burma, is more widely used, and intravenous use of heroin contributed to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the Kachin and Shan States. According to the GOB’s "Rapid Assessment Study of Drug Abuse in Myanmar," sponsored by the Ministry of Health and UNDCP in 1995, drug treatment services are not reaching most drug users because of a lack of facilities, lack of properly trained personnel, and inadequate treatment methods. The non-governmental organization (NGO) "World Concern" conducts a demand-reduction project in Kachin State.

Policy and Programs. Direct material USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally repressed the pro-democracy movement. In 1998, the GOB refused to renew a crop-substitution project, Project Old Soldier, that was being conducted by the U.S. NGO, 101 Veterans, Inc., in 25 villages in the Kutkai area of northern Shan State. The project had been in operation for two years, with USG support.

Currently, the USG engages the Burmese government on narcotics control on a very limited level. DEA, through the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-related intelligence with the GOB and conducts joint drug-enforcement investigations with Burmese counternarcotics authorities. U.S. agencies have conducted opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan State in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, with essential assistance provided by Burmese counterparts. These surveys give both governments a much more accurate understanding of the scope, magnitude, and changing geographic distribution of Burma’s opium crop.

The U.S. government regularly urges the Burmese government to take serious steps to curb Burma’s large-scale opium production and heroin trafficking and, more recently production of and trafficking in methamphetamines. Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to:

• undertake counternarcotics efforts commensurate with Burma’s central role in opium, heroin, and methamphetamine production and trafficking;

• prosecute drug-trafficking organizations and their leaders, and deprive them of assets derived from the drug trade;

• take action against drug-related corruption, including prosecution and appropriate punishment of corrupt officials and money launderers;

• take action against fugitive drug traffickers and turn them over to third countries;

• undertake opium poppy eradication on a wide scale in areas under its direct control or immediate influence;

• press ethnic groups, such as the Wa, the Kokang, and the Kachin, who have pledged to create opium-free zones in their regions, to make good on their commitments;

• develop and enforce effective antidrug, anticonspiracy, and anti-money laundering legislation; provide strong support to multilateral drug-control projects in Shan State.

Bilateral Cooperation. USG counternarcotics cooperation with the Burmese regime is restricted to basic law-enforcement operations. The U.S. provides no bilateral material or training assistance due to U.S. concerns over Burma’s commitment to effective counternarcotics measures, human rights, and political reform. DEA’s liaison with Burmese policymakers and military officials—conducted mainly through DEA’s office in Rangoon—will continue to focus on providing intelligence on enforcement targets and coordinating investigations of international drug-trafficking groups.

The Road Ahead. Based on experience in dealing with significant narcotics-trafficking problems elsewhere around the world, the USG recognizes that ultimately large-scale and long-term international aid, including development assistance and law- enforcement aid, will be needed to curb fundamentally and irreversibly drug production and trafficking in Burma. The USG strongly urges the GOB to commit itself fully and unambiguously to implementing effective counternarcotics measures, respecting the rule of law, punishing drug traffickers and major trafficking organizations (including asset forfeiture and seizure), combating corruption, enforcing anti-money-laundering legislation, continuing eradication of opium cultivation, destroying drug-processing laboratories, and respecting human rights.

I. Summary

Despite some progress in improving law enforcement and limiting corruption in 2000, Cambodia remained a weak link in the region’s efforts to combat the narcotics trade. Through 1998, chronic political instability hindered Cambodia’s ability to mount a sustained effort against the narcotics trade. The Cambodian government recognizes that its counternarcotics performance to date has been spotty and often ineffective, and there is widespread recognition that the country must be more aggressive in tackling drug-related issues. However, because of poor institutional capacity, Cambodia needs substantial support in virtually every key area. Cambodia’s lead antinarcotics agency, the National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD), cooperates closely with DEA, regional counterparts, and the UNDCP. Cambodia is a party to the 1993 Regional Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Drug Control, and is also a party to the six MOU countries’ Subregional Action Plan for Drug Control. In mid-2000, the U.S. Government permitted mid-level Cambodian officials to participate in courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, an initial step toward fulfilling critical training shortcomings. Cambodia is not a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, or the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but the NACD has urged the adoption and ratification of the latter convention.

Cambodia is not a major producer of opiates or coca-based drugs. It is the only country in Southeast Asia that does not have a significant domestic drug abuse problem. Recently, however, Cambodian authorities have becoming increasingly concerned at the growth in amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) use, particularly among youths who frequent the nightclub scene in Phnom Penh and other urban areas, commercial sex workers, and Cambodian migrant laborers. There is also a growing incidence of glue-sniffing and other inhalant abuse by street children and some disadvantaged youths.

Marijuana is cultivated for export as well as for some domestic consumption. Reliable figures about acreage are difficult to come by. Marijuana production tends to be concentrated in the provinces of Koh Kong, Banteay Meanchey, Kandal, Kampong Cham, Kratie, Stung Treng, Preah Vihear, and Kampot. Much of the production is reported to be "contract cultivation" under the control of foreign criminal syndicates. Analysis of seizures in recent years indicates that Europe is the major destination for Cambodian cannabis.

In addition to marijuana, Cambodia’s principal involvement in the international narcotics trade is as a transit route for Southeast Asian heroin to overseas markets, including China, Europe, Australia, and the United States. There is little hard information available on the scale of heroin trafficked through Cambodia, but the amount of heroin seized in the United States in recent years traceable to or through Cambodia is small.

In the past year or two, Cambodian authorities have become increasingly concerned over what appears to be a substantial increase in the amount of chemically based synthetic drugs coming into the country from Thailand and elsewhere in the region. Cambodian authorities believe that foreign crime syndicates, working in concert with Cambodian nationals, have set up some highly mobile clandestine laboratories in Koh Kong, Banteay Meanchey and Battambang provinces (all along the Thai-Cambodia border) that are producing ATS, both for distribution locally and for export. Although ATS use in Cambodian society has not reached crisis levels, Cambodian officials are very concerned about the potential for a rapid increase in metamphetamine abuse and are anxious to avoid an epidemic of the proportions experienced in neighboring countries.

There is some concern that precursor chemicals imported for industrial use in Cambodia, including methanol, sulfuric acid, toulene and ephedrine, are being diverted for drug production, although the magnitude of this diversion is not known.

Policy Initiatives. Cambodian law enforcement agencies have very few resources and generally lack even the most basic training in law enforcement techniques and drug enforcement measures. Three decades of warfare and factional fighting have severely hampered a sustained effort against illegal drugs. In late 1998, the cessation of factional fighting and final demise of the Khmer Rouge along with the formation of a new coalition government provided a measure of stability that allowed the government to begin the process of devoting more attention to combating crime and illegal narcotics. But better coordination is needed among various government agencies and ministries, with the NACD playing a central role, to provide more effective measures against drug production, abuse, and trafficking.

The NACD, which was reorganized two years ago, has the potential to become an effective policy and coordination unit for the government. With the enthusiastic backing of the Cambodian government, UNDCP is trying to implement a four-year, USD 2.3 million "NACD Support Project" that would strengthen the NACD Secretariat. This project seeks to establish the NACD as an independent functional government body able to undertake drug control planning, coordination and operations. Over two, two-year phases, the project seeks to provide procedures for planning, operations and administration and to provide staff training, technical advice, basic transportation, communications and office equipment.

Accomplishments. NACD hosted a national seminar April 27-28, and also a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of the six greater Mekong sub-region countries and UNDCP May 18-19 to discuss joint actions to fight drug production, trafficking and abuse. The six governments and UNDCP hold annual meetings at the Senior Officials level and every other year at the Ministerial level to discuss drug control developments in the region, assess the measures being taken to deal with illicit drug problems, and to adopt recommendations on joint remedial actions. The meeting in Phnom Penh addressed progress made under thirteen Action Plan projects in the fields of drug abuse, reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking, and law enforcement cooperation. The six countries also discussed and endorsed the UNDCP support project to strengthen Cambodia’s drug control capability.

A Phnom Penh Mini-Dublin Group was formed in 1999 under the leadership of Australia and Japan, a development that was warmly welcomed by the Cambodian authorities. This group, in which the United States participates actively, provides a forum for multilateral discussion of narcotics issues and aims to improve coordination of donor effort to Cambodia’s drug control and antidrug trafficking efforts. The Mini-Dublin Group met twice in 2000.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Continuing a pattern that began in 1999, government authorities recorded a number of seizures of cannabis and torched a number of marijuana fields and plants in 2000. In May, a truck carrying 262 kilograms of marijuana was stopped on National Route 5 just outside the capital; police arrested the driver and truck owners. In May, antinarcotics police in Phnom Penh seized several boxes of compressed marijuana weighing 115 kilograms plus a number of weapons. According to preliminary figures from the Anti-Drug Department of the National Police, authorities seized 1,108 kilograms of cannabis in 2000. One hundred twenty-four people were arrested for various drug-related offenses in 2000, up from seventy-eight in 1999. Of the one hundred twenty-four arrests in 2000, eighty-one were foreigners and forty-three were Cambodians.

Corruption. As a consequence of chronic political turmoil spanning three decades, corruption remains widespread and pervasive. This makes Cambodia highly vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers and foreign crime syndicates and effective law enforcement a daunting challenge. Senior Cambodian government officials proclaim their intention to fight illegal narcotics trafficking and production, and officials at all levels regularly call for U.S. assistance in training antinarcotics police. However, several factors constrain sustained advances in effective law enforcement of illegal drugs by the government, not the least of which is an acute shortage of trained personnel and high levels of official corruption, aggravated by abysmally low salaries for Cambodian civil servants. The judicial system is weak, and there have been numerous cases of defendants in important narcotics and other criminal cases having charges dropped inexplicably or being set free after paying very small fines.

Perhaps the biggest reported controversy in 2000 occurred in February in connection with the destruction by police of a 60-acre marijuana plantation in the province of Kampot. Subsequent to the torching of the plantation, which was highlighted by authorities and reported widely in the press, villagers in the area told reporters they had seen "foreigners" on the plantation, a helicopter landing on the grounds on a half dozen occasions, and men in military uniform controlling access to the site. Prime Minister Hun Sen castigated local authorities for permitting these "irregularities" to take place under their watch, and the deputy provincial police commissioner and one other police officer were placed under arrest for suspected involvement. Several weeks later, the deputy police commissioner alleged that four senior Cambodian government officials—including the former and current heads of the NACD and a deputy commander-in-chief of the Cambodian military—had accepted bribes totaling USD 80,000 to protect the plantation owners. The four officials vehemently denied the accusations.

Agreements and Treaties. Cambodia is not a party to the 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, or the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, the comprehensive antidrug legislation passed by the National Assembly in December 1996 would enable Cambodia to become a party to the above Conventions and to implement the provisions of the Conventions. Some believe that Cambodia will make a concerted effort to ratify the international drug control treaties once the NACD gains the increased drug control capacity within the bureaucracy that would make such action meaningful. Although it is not yet a party to the UN drug conventions, Cambodia voluntarily submits the UNDCP annual report questionnaire required of parties to the conventions.

Cambodia has no extradition or mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States, but the Cambodian government has cooperated with U.S. law enforcement agencies regularly in the past by rendering or deporting persons wanted in the United States for crimes, including narcotics, upon request and presentation of an appropriate warrant. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh has been assured that such cooperation will continue. The Cambodian government concluded an extradition treaty with Thailand in 1998 and is in the process of negotiating an agreement with Laos. The Cambodian government views bilateral and regional cooperation with neighboring states to be essential in its efforts to combat narcotics trafficking.

Cultivation/Production. Accurate estimates of the level of drug cultivation and production are difficult to come by. Cambodian authorities had some success in combating illicit cultivation during 2000. A number of cannabis plantations and fields of varying sizes were destroyed. As in the previous year, provincial governors were instructed to make sure that farmers understood that cannabis cultivation would not be tolerated and that they would be held accountable.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cambodia shares porous borders with Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam and lies near the major trafficking routes for Southeast Asian heroin. Some heroin and marijuana are believed to enter and exit Cambodia via the deep water port of Sihanoukville (also known as Kampong Saom), locations along the coastline of Koh Kong (near the Thai border) and Kampot (near the Vietnamese border) provinces, and the river port of Phnom Penh. The country’s main international airport, Pochentong International Airport in Phnom Penh, suffers from lax customs and immigration controls, and some heroin and ATS destined for United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and Europe is believed to transit there. Under the Cambodian government’s "Open Skies" policy, direct flights from major Asian gateways, including Bangkok and Singapore, began serving the regional airport in Siem Reap (location of Angkor Wat) in 2000. Customs and immigration controls in Siem Reap are rudimentary.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The NACD is attempting to boost awareness about drug abuse among the populace, especially Cambodian youth, primarily through the use of pamphlets and posters. Cambodia does not have separate rehabilitation centers for recovering drug addicts, but the government has sought outside assistance for programs on drug treatment and rehabilitation centers for drug addicts and vocational training centers for severe addicts. Several national and international NGOs operate in Cambodia with mandates that are directly or indirectly related to drug control issues. Some of these NGOs work in the area of demand reduction, and an NGO Substance Abuse Task Force was established in early 1999 in collaboration with UNDCP.

Policy Initiatives. Cambodia is a fragile, flawed democracy. There has been relative political stability since the formation of a democratically elected coalition government in 1998, but Cambodia is still plagued by the institutional weaknesses common to the world’s poorest developing countries. The challenge for the United States is to: nurture the growth of democratic institutions in Cambodia, including greater respect for human rights; provide humanitarian assistance and promote sound economic growth policies to alleviate the debilitating poverty that engenders corruption; and build capacity in law enforcement to enable Cambodia to deal more effectively with narcotics traffickers.

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S.-Cambodia bilateral counternarcotics cooperation is hampered by restrictions on official U.S. assistance to the central government that have remained in place since the political disturbances of 1997. No bilateral treaties for law enforcement exist between the U.S. and Cambodia. Some counternarcotics assistance is provided by the U.S. indirectly to Cambodia via multilateral contributions, such as through the UNDCP.

Despite the fact that direct U.S. Government non-humanitarian assistance to the Cambodian government, including antinarcotics assistance, remained suspended in 2000, the Cambodian government continued to openly welcome bilateral cooperation with DEA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies. Cambodian law enforcement authorities often make drug suspects under arrest available for interview by DEA. DEA personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok visited Cambodia regularly in 2000 and received excellent cooperation from their Cambodian counterparts. In 1999, the Cambodian government accepted a U.S. proposal to conduct quarterly high-level consultations on counternarcotics cooperation. One such consultation was held in February 2000, but scheduling difficulties precluded additional meetings during the year. The next consultation is scheduled for February 2001.

U.S. officials routinely raise narcotics-related issues with Cambodian counterparts at all levels, up to and including the Prime Minister. Cambodian officials freely admit their shortcomings in the area of enforcement due to corruption and the lack of resources, and regularly appeal for U.S. Government assistance, especially training.

The Road Ahead. Funding is needed to encourage greater bilateral and multilateral counternarcotics cooperation involving Cambodia. At every meeting and at every level, Cambodian law enforcement authorities uniformly describe the need for outside training and assistance as their top priority. The decision by the U.S. Government in mid-2000 to permit mid-level Cambodian law enforcement officers to attend training courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok (ILEA) was a highly positive step. Cambodian officials will especially benefit from advanced police courses covering issues such as drug identification, investigations, coordination of operations and intelligence gathering techniques.

Funding assistance is needed to allow working level Cambodian officials to participate in regional counterdrug conferences, such as the yearly meetings of the six greater Mekong subregion countries that are signatories to the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding on Drug Control with the UNDCP.

In mid-1999, the DEA Country Attache from Bangkok and the U.S. Ambassador presented the NACD with an INL-funded drug-testing laboratory, but there has been no follow-up U.S. assistance to the laboratory since that time. The laboratory is currently operating at minimal capacity and is functioning off the original chemicals, standards, and supplies during its setup eighteen months ago. Many of these items are running out, and there is no money available from the Cambodian government to continue laboratory operations, a concern that has been echoed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the NACD. A DEA chemist visited the laboratory in late September and early October 2000 and prepared a thorough report in which he documented safety concerns and equipment needs and suggested sources of funding and training for laboratory personnel. The DEA Country Office in Bangkok has initiated discussions with UNDCP regarding possible funding of a portion of this initiative. Assistance is needed to make the INL-funded drug laboratory operational.

DEA currently has a presence in Bangkok, Rangoon and Vientiane. The Cambodian government would welcome a DEA presence in Phnom Penh, and the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh strongly supports this as well.

In sum, Cambodia is making progress toward more effective institutional law enforcement against illegal narcotics trafficking, and is intent on doing more. However, Cambodia’s institutional capacity to transform this attitude into efficient drug control operations is low.

I. Summary

The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) continues to be a major transit country for illegal narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle. During 2000 the PRC worked strongly and effectively to combat narcotics trafficking and domestic drug use. Preliminary figures suggest that heroin seizures by Chinese law-enforcement personnel remained steady from the previous year, while seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) skyrocketed. A government "White Paper" issued in June set forth a comprehensive strategy to fight narcotics use and trafficking. For the first time, Chinese authorities provided U.S. counternarcotics officials with samples of drugs seized en route to the United States. The United States and the PRC signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in mid-2000. China is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Most seizures of Southeast Asian heroin now take place within Chinese borders. Preliminary figures suggest that heroin seizures in 2000 were roughly the same as those in 1999, representing a significant drop from 1998’s record levels. Record quantities of ATS were seized in 2000, illustrating the growing threat of this type of drug in China. The Chinese government reported that there were 681,000 registered drug addicts in 1999, but officials privately admit that the actual number of users is far higher.

China is a major producer of precursor chemicals, including acetic anhydride, potassium permanganate, and ephedrine. China monitors all 22 of the chemicals on the 1988 UN Drug Convention watch list. China has been a strong partner with the United States and other concerned countries in implementing a system of pre-export notification of dual-use precursor chemicals.

In 1997 the PRC criminalized the laundering of proceeds from narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling. In April 2000 the government enacted "true name" banking legislation. China does not participate in the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering or other regional or international groups, such as the Financial Action Task Force. A detailed discussion of money laundering is in the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes section of this report.

Policy Initiatives. In June, the government issued a "White Paper" on drugs. This comprehensive strategy for fighting narcotics trafficking and drug use covers all of the major goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention and emphasizes drug eradication, interdiction, education, and rehabilitation as well as precursor chemical control.

Illicit Cultivation/Production. China’s effective eradication program has essentially eliminated commercial cultivation of illicit narcotics within its borders. The government continues to target small-scale cultivation in remote northeastern and northwestern areas of the country. Ephedra grows wild in northern parts of China and is used to make ephedrine, the precursor for methamphetamine. The government tightly controls exports of this key precursor.

In part because of the success of these efforts, Chinese officials suggest, narcotics traffickers have increased the production of methamphetamines ("ice") and other synthetic drugs within China. Faced with a growing threat from methamphetamines and synthetic drugs such as ecstasy, the government has made locating and destroying illicit drug laboratories a top priority. A single investigation resulted in the seizure of 17 tons of methamphetamines and precursor chemicals with an estimated street value of up to U.S. $700 million. The results of that case highlight not only the extent of the ATS problem in China, but also the depth of the government’s commitment to combating synthetic drugs produced and distributed in China.

Drug Flow/Transit. The PRC shares a 2,000-kilometer border with Burma. The majority of heroin produced in Burma now travels through China en route to the international market. Reflecting China’s importance as a transshipment route, most seizures of Burmese heroin now take place in China. Smaller quantities of heroin enter China from Laos, Vietnam, and Southwest Asia.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Preliminary figures suggest that seizures of heroin by Chinese law-enforcement personnel in 2000 will be roughly equal to those from the previous year. The amount represents a steep decline from 1998, when heroin seizures reached an all-time high. Nonetheless, China still accounts for more heroin seizures than all other East Asian countries combined. Methamphetamine seizures continued to soar, with this year’s total seizures eclipsing last year’s record haul.

In the fall of 2000, Chinese police uncovered a syndicate that specialized in smuggling MDMA (ecstasy) to the United States. In the course of the investigation, Chinese authorities arrested several suspects and seized 100,000 tablets bound for the United States. The Ministry of Public Security has worked actively with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to identify U.S. residents involved in the operation, which had already successfully smuggled 50,000 tablets into the United States. Although this case demonstrates effective bilateral cooperation on narcotics, Chinese responses to U.S. requests for information and assistance in narcotics investigations often come too late to be of operational value.

Corruption. Chinese officials admit that corruption is one of the most serious problems the country faces. An ongoing anticorruption campaign has led to the arrest of hundreds of government officials. The execution of a former provincial Vice Governor and a Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee attest to the extent of the campaign, as well as to the degree to which corruption has permeated Chinese society. One smuggling and corruption scandal in the southern port city of Xiamen involved official complicity in avoiding duties on approximately USD 10 billion worth of consumer goods. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will greatly reduce tariff barriers to imports, should significantly reduce smuggling and its attendant corruption. Most other official graft in China involves misappropriation of funds, abuse of power, and embezzlement. There have been instances of PRC officials embezzling funds and then emigrating to the United States. Efforts to deport them have not been successful. There were no reports in the state-controlled media of narcotics-related corruption.

Asset Forfeiture. The PRC’s criminal law provides for asset forfeiture. Article 347 of the criminal law, which states that "smuggling, trafficking, and manufacturing of drugs will subject an offender to a term of imprisonment or death and the confiscation of property," has been used to seize drug-related proceeds and assets, particularly in Yunnan province.

Precursor Chemical Control. China is a major producer of precursor chemicals. The PRC monitors all 22 of the chemicals on the 1988 UN Drug Convention watch list. Several provinces, including Yunnan (which shares a border with Burma), have even more stringent controls than called for by the Convention. Yunnan, for example, monitors exports of 28 chemicals. In June 1999 and May 2000, the government issued regulations further tightening controls on transportation licenses for ephedrine. The PRC cooperates closely with the United States on chemical control issues. The two sides have in place a strong pre-export notification program for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. China is a participant in Operation Purple, the worldwide initiative to stem the diversion of potassium permanganate to cocaine syndicates.

Demand Reduction. China’s counternarcotics strategy emphasizes both education and rehabilitation. According to official statistics, there were 680,000 "registered" addicts in 1999, but officials admit that the real figure may be many times higher. Individuals identified as addicts are subject to compulsory rehabilitation. The 746 rehabilitation centers throughout the country treated 224,000 addicts in 1999. An additional 120,000 were treated at specially designated reeducation-through-labor treatment centers.

China provides antidrug education to all school children and has also taken steps to warn citizens about the link between intravenous drug use and HIV/AIDS. The country also has experimented with "drug free communities," an effort to mobilize entire communities to work together to combat narcotics trafficking and encourage former addicts to remain drug free. In the coming years, China plans to expand this program beyond a few initial test communities.

Agreements and Treaties. The PRC is party to more than 30 mutual legal assistance treaties with 24 countries covering civil or criminal matters. In June 2000 the PRC and the United States signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. When this treaty enters into force, it will provide a powerful tool for obtaining evidence needed to prosecute transnational criminals, including narcotics traffickers, in both countries. The PRC signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000. China has yet to take action to activate a bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement signed in 1999. This agreement, if brought into force, would facilitate cooperation by customs officials and enhance the flow of narcotics intelligence.

A May 1997 U.S.-PRC Memorandum of Understanding on Law Enforcement Cooperation allows the two sides to provide assistance on narcotics investigations and prosecutions on a case-by-case basis.

The PRC also cooperates actively with countries in the region in the fight against narcotics. Along with the UNDCP and five Southeast Asian nations, China is a member of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) States. In the MOU, the members agreed to collaborate on drug-control projects and programs. China supports crop-substitution initiatives for farmers in Burma and Laos, as well as demand reduction efforts in areas bordering Yunnan province.

In August 2000 senior Thai and Chinese officials met in Yunnan province and agreed to strengthen bilateral efforts to fight drug trafficking and the transshipment of precursor chemicals. They formalized the agreement in October by signing a MOU detailing areas of cooperation. Also in October the PRC and the Republic of Korea signed a bilateral extradition treaty. In November, the PRC and Laos signed a bilateral cooperation accord, which included provisions for expanding efforts to combat transnational crimes, including narcotics trafficking.

Policy Initiatives. Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation at both the working and policy levels improved in 2000. The June visit to the PRC by then U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director McCaffrey symbolized the high-level bilateral commitment to work together to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and use. At the working level, PRC and U.S. officials cooperated closely in conducting transnational investigations, exchanging information on existing and emerging threats, and developing Chinese law-enforcement capabilities.

There were several notable examples of successful cooperation in the field of law enforcement in 2000, including the dismantling of an ecstasy-smuggling ring operating in both the PRC and the United States.

PRC and U.S. counternarcotics personnel meet regularly to discuss active investigations and related narcotics matters. In response to a U.S. request, China for the very first time provided the United States with samples of drugs seized in an investigation for inclusion in the DEA special drug-signature program. The United States continued to emphasize the importance of receiving quick responses to requests for information in time-sensitive investigations.

Throughout the year, Chinese police attended counternarcotics and general law-enforcement training courses at the joint U.S.-Thai International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. This important regional forum brought together police and other law-enforcement officials from throughout the region to improve technical capabilities and establish ties among regional counternarcotics and law-enforcement bodies.

The Road Ahead. During his June visit to China, then ONDCP Director McCaffrey identified several areas in which the United States hoped to expand and strengthen bilateral cooperation, including the exchange of narcotics-related information and strategic intelligence. To this end, the United States has proposed holding regular meetings of working-level counternarcotics officials to discuss specific topics and targets of mutual interest. The United States will also encourage the PRC to continue to provide samples of narcotics seized by Chinese officers. The United States will continue to monitor both the transshipment of Burmese heroin through China and the threat posed by the explosive growth of methamphetamine trafficking in China.

I. Summary

Hong Kong’s law-enforcement efforts and the extensive development of port facilities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have diminished Hong Kong’s role as a narcotics transshipment/transit point. Hong Kong adopts a multi-pronged strategy to combat drug trafficking and abuse, covering legislation and law enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation, preventive education, research, and international cooperation. In November 2000 Hong Kong was removed from the U.S. Majors List of drug-transit points and downgraded to a country/economy of concern. The 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which the PRC is a party, applies to Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s position as a key port city in close proximity to the Golden Triangle and the PRC historically made it a natural transit point for drugs moving from Southeast Asia to international markets, including the United States. In recent years, however, Hong Kong’s law-enforcement efforts coupled with rapid development of modern port facilities in southern China have reduced Hong Kong’s role as a major narcotics transit center. Because no seizures of heroin transiting Hong Kong and destined for the United States had occurred since 1996 and because drug-transit patterns have shifted to ports in southern China, the U.S. removed Hong Kong from the Majors List of drug-transit points in 2000. Hong Kong law-enforcement officials continue to maintain a cooperative liaison relationship with U.S. counterparts on narcotics and related criminal activities.

The number of drug addicts in Hong Kong increased by 3.1 percent in the first half of 2000 to 10,607 from 10,291 in the second half of 1999. The slight increase was mainly due to the upward trend in abuse of psychotropic substances, such as ecstasy and ketamine. The number of registered abusers of these two substances rose sharply in the first half of 2000 to 1,518 compared to 296 in the second half of 1999. Heroin, used by 78.9 percent of all drug abusers, remains the most commonly reported drug of abuse in Hong Kong.

Policy Initiatives. In response to a decision by the United Nations Commission on Narcotics and Drugs to tighten control on remifentanil and dihydroetorphin in March of 2000, Hong Kong in May 2000 upgraded the two substances to Schedule 1 of the "Dangerous Drugs Ordinance." In light of the rapid increase in the number of reported ketamine abusers, ketamine was upgraded to Schedule 1 in December 2000.

The Hong Kong government, through the Control of Chemicals Ordinance, tightly controls the licensing of 24 chemicals that can be used as precursor chemicals in drug production. This ordinance allows the government to suspend the license of any applicants suspected of false representation and to seize any chemicals in the suspect’s possession. In response to the UN’s resolution on tightening control of norephedrine, norephedrine was placed on Schedule 2 of the Control of Chemicals Ordinance.

A new bill centralizing and standardizing the licensing of drug treatment and rehabilitation centers was introduced in the Hong Kong legislature in November 2000. The purpose of the new bill is to improve the quality of service and to protect patients’ rights. Once the bill is passed, the Social Welfare Department of the Hong Kong government will be the sole authority for licensing drug treatment and rehabilitation centers throughout Hong Kong.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Hong Kong law-enforcement agencies have continued to use a multifaceted strategy to inhibit the distribution of illicit drugs. With respect to traditional heroin distribution, the Hong Kong police have adopted a three-tier approach. At the headquarters level, the Narcotics Bureau targets domestic and international drug trafficking and high-level traffickers. The regional police force focuses on trafficking across police district boundaries. At the district level, the police aim to eradicate street-level distribution. Hong Kong works closely and cooperatively with U.S. law-enforcement agencies.

The evidence suggests that the passage of illicit drugs through Hong Kong destined for foreign markets has diminished. The vast majority of drugs reaching Hong Kong supply the domestic market. The Narcotics Bureau of the Hong Kong police concentrates on both aspects of the problem, international trafficking and domestic trafficking. The Narcotics Bureau cooperates with the PRC, Canada, Australia, the U.S., and countries throughout Southeast Asia. However, its resources are primarily focused on syndicates involved in the supply and distribution of drugs in the Hong Kong domestic market.

In 2000 the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department continued to take a proactive approach toward drug trafficking at all levels through intelligence-based operations and international cooperation. The department’s counternarcotics budget was increased by 10.5 percent in 2000 over 1999. Also, two additional patrol boats were commissioned in 2000 to strengthen maritime capabilities. Plans for future improvements include an enhanced drug-detecting canine unit, installation of two state-of-the-art vehicle x-ray scanning systems at container ports, acquisition of ion scanners, and narcotics and explosive detectors. A team of 280 investigators from the Customs Drug Investigation Bureau work around-the-clock on covert investigations of narcotics importation, manufacturing, and distribution.

According to the government’s Narcotics Division, Hong Kong authorities seized 376.4 kilograms of heroin between January and October 2000, an increase from the 287.5 kilograms of heroin seized in 1999 and the 209.4 kilograms of heroin seized in 1998. From January through October, counternarcotics authorities seized 219.52 kilograms of cannabis, a significant increase over the 35.8 kilograms seized in 1999, but notably less than the 585.1 kilograms seized in 1998. Seizures of cocaine totaled 10.67 kilograms through October 2000, on par with the seizure of 16.7 kilograms in 1999, and well below the total of 167.7 kilograms seized in 1998. Authorities seized 89.97 kilograms of methamphetamines between January and October 2000, compared to 102.1 kilograms seized in 1999 and 232.7 kilograms seized in 1998.

Hong Kong law-enforcement agents made a total of 7,254 drug-related arrests between January and September 2000, compared to 8,733 arrests in 1999 and 10,773 arrests in 1998. They arrested 3,681 persons on heroin-related charges, compared to 5,641 arrests in 1999 and 7,086 arrests in 1998. They also arrested 2,334 persons on charges relating to psychotropic drugs, compared to 2,660 such arrests in 1999 and 3,151 arrests in 1998.

Corruption. There is no known narcotics-related corruption among senior government or law-enforcement officials. Hong Kong has a comprehensive anticorruption ordinance that is effectively enforced by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which reports directly to the chief executive.

Asset Forfeiture. Under the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance (DTROP) and the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance (OSCO) a court may issue a restraint order against a defendant’s property at or near the time criminal proceedings are instituted. The property includes money, goods, real property, and instruments of crime. A court may issue production orders and search warrants for investigations of drug trafficking and money laundering and confiscate the value of a defendant’s proceeds of illicit activities. Cash connected to drug trafficking that is imported into or exported from Hong Kong may be seized, and a court may order its forfeiture. The government has proposed to the legislature amendments to the restraint and confiscation provisions of the DTROP and OSCO. The proposed amendments would streamline the confiscation procedures and add a penal provision for those who contravene court-ordered restraint orders. Hong Kong does not have a civil forfeiture system. There is no express provision in Hong Kong law that provides for sharing confiscated assets with foreign jurisdictions. The law does allow for the assets confiscated from an external confiscation order to be put in a special account that enables sharing of assets. There is an administrative measure in place for the consideration on a case-by-case basis of asset sharing requests from foreign jurisdictions.

Agreements and Treaties. Hong Kong has Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements with the U.S., Australia, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. In addition, agreements are currently under discussion with Portugal, Canada, the Philippines, Israel, and India. Hong Kong has also signed Surrender of Fugitive Offenders Agreements with 12 countries, including the U.S., and Transfer of Sentenced Persons Agreements with three countries, including the U.S.

Hong Kong actively cooperates with international organizations, such as the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on drug-related issues. The Hong Kong government continues to seek cooperation with other countries, even in the absence of bilateral agreements. For example, in 2000 Hong Kong law-enforcement agencies provided operational intelligence on drug trafficking, money laundering, and control of precursor chemicals to their overseas counterparts through law-enforcement liaison channels. Hong Kong also provided assistance to over 140 countries on restraint and confiscation of proceeds from drug trafficking.

Cultivation and Production. Hong Kong is not a producer of illicit narcotics.

Drug Flow/Transit. Although illicit narcotics continue to transit Hong Kong, the known volume of traffic has decreased significantly in the past few years. In 2000 there were no seizures in Hong Kong of drugs destined for the U.S. market. Nevertheless, Hong Kong traffickers, using Hong Kong as a base, continue to control large portions of Southeast Asian narcotics traffic, using various routes and means throughout the region.

In an effort to eradicate Hong Kong’s role as a transport/transshipment point for illicit drugs, the Hong Kong government has developed a database of information on all cargoes, cross-border vehicles, and shipping. The Air Cargo Clearance System (ACCS), the Land Border System (LBS) and the Customs Control System (CSS) are all capable—at the click of a button—of processing information on all import and export cargoes, cross-border vehicles, and vessels.

Domestic Programs. In 2000 the Hong Kong government’s preventive education policy continued to focus on youth and parents. In response to the sharp increase in psychotropic substance abuse in 2000, the government has initiated aggressive public awareness programs, including:

• The opening of Phase One of the Drug Infocenter in June. Phase One includes a library, a multipurpose room, and a volunteer room to provide support for antidrug efforts by teachers, social workers, and the public. The center serves as a focal point for Hong Kong’s antidrug education campaign. Phase Two, construction of an exhibition hall, is scheduled for completion in 2003.

• The revamping of youth volunteer groups to improve recruitment and strengthen volunteer participation in antinarcotics efforts. The Hong Kong government’s Narcotics Division, together with the Action Committee Against Narcotics (ACAN), has revamped the youth volunteer groups. Since the reorganization, more than 150 volunteers and 80 corporations have joined the fight against drugs.

The government utilizes the existing education system to spread the antinarcotics message to Hong Kong’s youth. In the first ten months of 2000, the Narcotics Division, in partnership with three non-governmental organizations, made antidrug educational presentations to 85,000 students in over 450 schools. In addition, over 60 lectures on the dangers of drug abuse were organized for parents, employees, and members of youth organizations. The Narcotics Division also provided funds to community organizations to spur antinarcotics awareness.

Policy Initiatives. U.S. law-enforcement officials continue to emphasize joint investigations with their counterparts in Hong Kong law enforcement to develop prosecutable cases—either in Hong Kong or in the U.S.—against major traffickers based in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong continues to be an active participant in U.S.-sponsored programs on narcotics and money laundering. In 2000, 35 Hong Kong officers participated in training courses at the U.S.-Thai International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand. In 2000 the ILEA curriculum included specialized courses covering "International Controlled Deliveries and Investigations" and "Integrity and Corruption," among other topics, as well as three Supervisory Criminal Investigator Courses covering a wide range of narcotics and crime issues. Also in 2000 five Customs and Excise Department officials attended a training course on airport interdiction, "Operation Jetway," sponsored by the Drug Enforcement Administration. In September the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division supported the participation of two Hong Kong law-enforcement officials in training in the U.S. covering suspicious transactions and financial-crimes investigations.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. government will encourage Hong Kong to continue playing an active role in combating narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities consistent with its international stature. Although Hong Kong has been removed from this year’s Majors List, the U.S. continues to emphasize the importance of close cooperation based on an open, mutual exchange of information between the Hong Kong and U.S. law-enforcement agencies to strengthen, enforce, and implement existing laws and guidelines.

I. Summary

Indonesia is not a major drug producing or drug-transit country. However, Indonesia has a long way to go in mounting an effective and long-term strategy against drug traffickers and crime in general. Although there have been positive steps, the Indonesian National Police (INP) lack appropriate resources, training and expertise to mount complex narcotic investigations. The INP and its narcotic investigative drug unit, NARKOBA, continue to rely heavily on the U.S. Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) expertise and training to address both domestic and U.S. drug investigations. Indonesia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has passed new antinarcotics laws that conform to international norms established by the UN convention. However, implementing these laws often proved to be difficult and police at times have been arbitrary in enforcing them.

Ecstasy is a major problem, especially in urban areas. Methamphetamine was introduced in Jakarta in 1998 and many of the pills now sold as ecstasy in Jakarta nightclubs are actually methamphetamine. Marijuana is produced in remote areas of Northern Sumatra, primarily for domestic consumption. Local media has, on occasion, reported that the GAM rebel group in Aceh province is involved in marijuana production and trafficking. DEA has not received any solid evidence independently or from the INP to support these assertions. There has been an increase in clandestine methamphetamine and ecstasy laboratories. Narcotics, particularly methamphetamines, have gained popularity, especially among the younger generation of Indonesians.

Drug trafficking organizations exploit Indonesia’s large and diverse geographical makeup, porous borders and lack of stringent customs control. These organizations often take advantage of Indonesia’s lack of sophisticated law enforcement techniques by shipping narcotics through Jakarta to markets in the U.S., Europe, South America, Africa, and Australia.

In addition to the existence of domestic networks, Southeast and Southwest Asian drug organizations remain active in Indonesia. In the year 2000, DEA has observed an increase of Southwest Asian heroin being smuggled via commercial airlines from Pakistan (Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi) to Jakarta. Routes from Pakistan that transit Bangkok or Singapore to Jakarta have become increasingly popular. Most of these groups are West African (Nigerian) organizations utilizing Indonesian and Thai female couriers. These groups obtain their heroin in Bangkok and engage couriers to carry it via commercial air into Soekarno-Hatta Airport in Jakarta. From Jakarta, the heroin is distributed to the United States, Australia and Western Europe, with a smaller amount sold on the local market. Drug traffickers also use Indonesia as a transit point for shipping cocaine to Europe, Asia and the U.S., although there is no evidence that this has a significant effect on the U.S. Structured drug organizations, such as the West African heroin Number 4 trafficking group, are operating in Indonesia. The DEA is working closely with INP Narkoba officials on enforcement efforts to counter this threat. At times Narkoba’s efforts have been unintentionally undermined by competing elements of the INP’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID). Both offices conduct narcotic investigations, however CID does not concentrate exclusively on this issue.

The INP is attempting to reduce the spread of narcotics into the country through various investigative elements. These investigations increasingly result in fatal shootings of narcotic suspects. West Africans, particularly Nigerians, are often at the center of these investigations and are victims in the shootings. In March 2000, the DEA Singapore Office, INP, and the DEA offices in Kuala Lumpur and New York arrested a Nigerian drug trafficker who was shipping heroin to New York City. This Jakarta-based trafficker was arrested in Kuala Lumpur, by DEA and Malaysian authorities with one (1) kilogram of heroin.

Policy Initiatives. In 1997, the Indonesian Parliament approved legislation outlawing psychotropic drugs including ecstasy, and provided for penalties of up to seven years imprisonment for marijuana possession and a maximum of 20 years in jail for marijuana trafficking. It also ratified Indonesia’s participation in the 1988 UN drug convention, and passed new antidrug legislation which replaced the previous 1976 law. The 1997 legislation conforms to the criteria set forth in the 1988 UN convention. Since 1997, no new laws concerning narcotics enforcement have been passed.

Accomplishments/Law Enforcement Efforts. The DEA Singapore Office continues its close relationship with the INP Narkoba unit through training, equipment and operational expertise. The INP Narkoba unit is working to develop DEA methods, and DEA continues to work very closely with the INP Narkoba unit to identify potential production and cultivation areas. Eradication of the sale, transport and financing of narcotics remains a primary objective of antinarcotics activities by the authorities, particularly within the domestic markets. Arrests of narcotics traffickers are reported frequently in Jakarta and the Kuta beach area of Bali. Arrests of foreigners, particularly Nigerians, in connection with narcotics use, possession and trafficking are frequently noted in the Indonesian media.

In 2000 Indonesia has made great progress in precursor chemical control as compared to past years. For example, DEA has been able to assist INP/Narkoba in establishing a Precursor Chemical Control Unit. This has resulted in the first ever precursor chemical seizure in a joint investigation between DEA, INP, Indonesian Customs, and the Ministry of Health. In June 2000, approximately 4,400 kilograms of Acetic Anhydride (AA) were seized at the Port of Jakarta. The Indonesian company that was importing the AA from the U.S. did not have the necessary permits and licenses to import AA, which is a precursor chemical used to make heroin. The AA was seized and the company was not allowed to import any more precursor chemicals into Indonesia.

Corruption. Corruption among police and customs personnel persists in Indonesia, with continuing reports from street sources that police personnel often assist drug traffickers or are themselves involved in selling narcotics, and that persons arrested for narcotics trafficking can easily bribe police to free them. Given the low salaries of these officers (USD 40 to 60 per month), they face great temptation to accept bribes from drug traffickers. It should be noted, however, that none of DEA’s investigations have ever been compromised by Indonesian narcotics officers.

Agreements and treaties. Indonesia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. While there is no formal extradition relationship between the United States and Indonesia, in practice U.S. and Indonesian authorities have cooperated effectively in resolving extraditions for criminal cases. Indonesia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols in December, 2000.

Cultivation and production. As their limited resources permit, the INP, in particular, the narcotics unit, and Indonesian customs continue their efforts to combat narcotics smuggling. As in previous years, the illicit cultivation of marijuana in Aceh province was the target of periodic eradication campaigns. The INP is strong in its enforcement efforts aimed at eradicating drug trafficking in Jakarta and other urban areas. However, they face more difficulties in outlying rural areas. At this point there is no measurable evidence that their counternarcotics efforts have had any significant impact on drug usage.

Drug Flow/Transit. Indonesia continues to be used as a transit point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin and other drugs, including transshipment to the United States in small quantities, Australia and Europe. Because of Indonesia’s porous borders, drug traffickers find this an attractive area. Customs and immigration officials working outside of the capitol are easier to bribe and less motivated in their work. Drug traffickers can thus move their products into and out of Indonesia relatively easily.

U.S. Policy Initiatives. The United States supports adoption of new legislation for money laundering and asset forfeiture. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and the DEA Attaché in Singapore coordinate cooperation with the GOI on narcotics matters. Indonesian authorities fully support the DEA in all narcotic matters. The DEA will continue to assist the INP to increase its ability to handle bilateral investigations against major trafficking groups. GOI resources will have a direct impact in this area. DEA will provide training to the INP Narkoba unit in how to better utilize their drug laws. This will enhance their counter drug efforts and provide a more viable platform to work cases with DEA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies. Over the last year, 10 INP Narkoba officers have attended training at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. DEA will request and continue to provide training for the INP Narkoba unit. This will include two special training sessions from DEA’s Office of International Training for a two-week basic drug investigation course in Jakarta and a second two-week course in Denpasar, Bali.

Bilateral Cooperation. Cooperation has been excellent between the RSO’s office and the INP, but especially so between the INP’s Narkoba unit and the DEA. Training programs mentioned above were provided to the INP during 2000.

DEA plans to recommend candidates for the ILEA course in 2001 and continue training of INP Narkoba officers in Indonesia. U.S. Customs continues to work with Indonesian customs to enhance and upgrade the narcotics detection/canine interdiction program at Soekarno-Hatta international airport as a result of DEA training. Police narcotics officers and customs officials greatly improved their operating procedures, i.e., surveillance and contraband search techniques, intelligence gathering, interview techniques, report writing, arrest procedures, and execution of controlled deliveries. DEA has helped the INP narcotics unit to establish a drug intelligence database to track all drug arrests throughout Indonesia. During 2000, the Government of Indonesia continued to cooperate with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration on narcotics cases. The DEA encourages regional cooperation against West African heroin organizations. INL and the U.S. Treasury Department have identified funding for continued financial crime investigation training and assistance in drafting money-laundering legislation.

The Road Ahead. The United States will continue to work closely with the INP and Indonesian Customs to enhance their abilities to combat narcotics trafficking and abuse through training opportunities in Indonesia and at ILEA Bangkok. Close cooperation on investigations between the Indonesian Government and DEA will continue.

I. Summary

Although Japan is not a major pro