America's Heroin Crisis: The Impact of Colombian Heroin and How We Can Improve Plan Colombia

Just as important, we now have sufficient helicopters for reconnaissance and security to support spray missions as well as for use in interdiction and air support. Until this year, there were insufficient assets (especially those capable of operating in the mountainous areas where poppy is grown) in the country to cover an expanded spray program.

We currently have nine pilots who have been trained for the Air Tractors. This training includes intensive mountain flying which means the versatile pilots can spray coca or poppy. Six more pilots are in training in New Mexico and are due to graduate during the February-March time-frame. An additional pilot will be trained by April 30. This means that our complete contingent of sixteen mountain qualified AT-802 pilots will be trained and ready in time to match the incremental delivery of the additional AT-802 aircraft to Colombia.

With these improvements, we plan to achieve the 2002 spray goal of 5,000 hectares of opium poppy -– an increase of 170 percent over 2001. For 2003, the goal is to spray all remaining Colombian poppy -- up to 10,000 hectares -- along with the remaining Colombian coca -- up to 200,000 hectares. Full funding of our FY 2003 request for Colombia will be essential to achieving these goals.

As ONDCP correctly points out in their testimony, targeting the opium poppy crop is a complex and costly proposition, and it is important to highlight the difficulties we confront in opium poppy eradication. Poppy is grown in well-hidden, widely dispersed fields in rugged cloud-covered mountains, often defended by FARC or paramilitary groups. Reconnaissance and spraying of the poppy crop is significantly dangerous, as tragically illustrated by the October 23 crash (due to bad weather) of a Colombian National Police helicopter. Four people died on board this routine reconnaissance mission. Also, spray planes have been hit by ground fire, including three at the end of November on the same day. For the same factors -– hidden small fields, wide dispersion, mountain terrain, bad weather, and growing areas far from coca zones -- supporting poppy spraying requires spending approximately three times the resources per hectare as spraying coca.

To ensure that these eradication gains remain permanent, USAID continues to implement Plan Colombia alternative development programs in poppy growing areas. These programs focus on four main activities: strengthening private, public, national and local institutions; expanding rural infrastructure; increasing licit economic opportunities; and improving management of natural resources. Since initiating its $10 million program in 1999, USAID has signed agreements with small farmer associations in poppy growing areas resulting in the cultivation of 2,124 hectares of licit crops benefiting 3,357 families. USAID supports alternative income-generating programs such as cultivation of specialty coffees, cold climate fruits and vegetables, raising dual-purpose (meat/milk) livestock, as well as development of infrastructure in poppy-growing departments. USAID will continue its robust alternative development programs in poppy areas, and plans to establish an additional 765 hectares of licit crops and assist an additional 2,320 families in the coming year.

INCREASED COLOMBIAN SUPPORT

In closing, I would like to touch on what is perhaps the most positive element in our drug policy and programs in Colombia. As you know, in August, President Alvaro Uribe took office, bringing with him a bold vision of how to resolve the problems confronting Colombia coupled with the political will and public support to do it. Within the first four months of his administration, he has already begun to act decisively and concretely:

• Even before assuming office, Uribe recognized the need for a comprehensive and viable plan to achieve his ambitious goals, and undertook the creation of the Colombian National Security Strategy (NSS). Although not yet released, and as we have reported to the Congress, the draft NSS includes pledges to enhance resources for security, undertake a comprehensive counternarcotics campaign, improve human rights protection, continue funding social/humanitarian programs, and make a determined effort to completely sever military-paramilitary ties. President Uribe wrote President Bush that Colombia is undertaking the commitments in the NSS to ensure the effectiveness of joint efforts with the United States to achieve our common goals in combating narcotics trafficking and terrorism.
  
  
• President Uribe has publicly and repeatedly emphasized his personal commitment to a total war against the Colombian drug industry on all fronts. He is working closely with the United States Mission in Bogota to broaden the spray program, enhance the capabilities of all counter-drug forces, increase the effectiveness and coverage of interdiction, and enhance alternative development programs. His administration has already directly assisted in concrete areas, including speeding up the acquisition and employment of new spray aircraft and helicopters. This enabled the spray program to undertake one of its most aggressive and effective spray campaigns in the second half of 2002 –- a vigorous initiative that is the first sustained, large-scale aerial eradication effort in Colombia. This campaign is currently attacking coca in the Putumayo/Caqueta areas (spraying over 60,500 hectares as of December 1 for this campaign) and (beginning in November) poppy in the Cauca and Narino areas (spraying over 1,500 hectares as of December 1 for this campaign).
  
  
• President Uribe also recognized that fundamental to resolving Colombia’s problems is the need to establish security throughout rural Colombia where the central government’s traditional lack of presence has allowed the FARC, paramilitary groups, and drug organizations to run rampant. The new administration has already begun implementing plans to systematically re-establish government presence and public security throughout the country. This effort has a direct and important long-term impact on our broad counter-drug strategy. This is the first step towards developing a more developed culture of law in remote areas where drug crops are grown – a culture designed to discourage involvement in illegal activities. Also, general public safety and stability are required to create a self-sustaining and developed economy that provides viable licit alternatives to drug crops from which people can make a living.

We believe that the commitment already shown by the Uribe Administration represents a unique opportunity for both of our countries to make serious, significant, and permanent progress in combating drugs, and in turn, the terrorism that drug profits support. In the four months since President Uribe has been in office, we have seen unprecedented cooperation and the highest level of support for our drug policies and programs. We also recognize that President Uribe, in his unflinching commitment, is taking a major political and personal risk.