Program Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness

• Disrupt the transportation and export/trans-shipment of illegal coca leaf and precursor chemicals: The GOB will interdict 14 percent of Bolivia’s potential cocaine production.
  
  
• Help GOB develop and maintain programs that reduce coca production and control marketing of licit coca leaf: A new GOB Yungas strategy seeks first to slow the growth of potential cocaine production in 2005 and 2006, then to begin to reduce it in 2007; a fully institutionalized DIGECO (the agency charged with controlling marketing of legal coca) enforces new regulations explicitly limiting new licenses to trade coca leaves.
  
  
• Help develop and maintain strong counternarcotics and anti-crime policies and programs within the GOB; support GOB initiatives to strengthen and secure its own borders against transnational crime; develop the professional capabilities of counternarcotics forces within the GOB's judiciary and police: Successful prosecution of major drug cases increases 15% over 2005; 90% of all CN police/prosecutors/legal assistants are trained in advanced drug case investigative techniques; an elite group of Bolivian National Police is trained in anti-terrorist investigative techniques. Information sharing with international partners is increased, and domestic and international cooperation is improved.
  
  
• Encourage public awareness of the drug trafficking threat and greater domestic support for counternarcotics policies and programs: A National Drug Prevention office designs and implements programs; a national drug prevention network is formed; DARE program begins reaching 25,000-30,000 middle school students throughout the country during FY 2006. Our strategy will also include seed grants to strengthen NGO’s and civil society organizations that play a meaningful role in drug prevention. Public opinion support in favor of overall CN goals increases by 2% over FY 2005.
  
  
• Promote development of a stable, representative government characterized by political and social order, citizen confidence in the political system and strengthened democratic institutions: Public satisfaction in local governance is increased to approximately 49 percent; police structure developed based upon modern policing principles, which is responsive to complaints of corruption and abuse; percentage of complaints made against members of the Bolivia National Police resolved within six months is ten percent higher than in FY 2005. 
  
  
• Provide viable, licit employment and income-generating alternatives to the cultivation of coca in the Chapare and Yungas regions: 30,000 farm families in the Chapare (cumulative 1999-2006) and 15,000 farm families in the Yungas (cumulative 2001-2006) benefit from alternative development; the wholesale value of licit products leaving the Chapare increases to $40 million; average income of Yungas families involved in specialty coffee projects increases by 41% from FY 2005 to FY 2006.

Bolivia’s counternarcotics efforts have reached a critical juncture due to serious challenges to democratic stability that reach far beyond counternarcotics policies. Porous borders, feeble institutions, endemic poverty and a succession of weak governments make fertile territory for throwback Marxist and other radical opposition groups, regional terrorist organizations, narcotics traffickers, diverse criminal interests, and illegal immigration. Because of these factors Bolivia has become a significant transit zone for Peruvian and Colombian cocaine. A year of political turbulence has also threatened Bolivia's hard-won gains in democratization, macroeconomic stability, and the fight against drug trafficking. Counternarcotics successes are also overshadowed by the expanding coca cultivation in the Yungas. The volatile nature of the Yungas region, with its severe topography and a long history of traditional coca cultivation, works against replicating the successful Chapare forced eradication strategy. It is the GOB’s principal CN challenge now and for the foreseeable future, and will require significant assistance to the GOB to increase government presence in the Yungas.

Of equal concern is the adoption of violence as a means of protest and intimidation throughout the country. Alternative Development (AD) farmers, advisors, and NGOs have fallen victim to bombings, beatings, and seizure of their property by local unions and organizations tied to cocaleros -- with the tacit approval of municipal governments controlled by or sympathetic to cocalero interests. While an alarming increase in attacks on eradicators in 2003 resulted in seven deaths and scores of injuries by shootings and remotely activated booby-trap bombs, GOB/cocalero agreements in 2004 helped reduce the level of violence. The increasingly sophisticated violence suggests the possibility of foreign financing and infiltration of Bolivia by foreign terrorist organizations (case in point: Francisco "Pacho" Cortez, an ELN activist cozy with MAS and Chapare cocaleros, was arrested when caught with plans to overthrow the GOB), presenting a growing danger to Bolivian national security. USAID has provided increased security to AD projects.

Due largely to long-term USG support for effective GOB eradication policies, Bolivia has dropped to third after Colombia and Peru in world cocaine production. Our integrated framework of support for interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and drug use prevention has yielded important results in the Chapare: the illegal coca crop of the Chapare region, once the world's largest production area, is less than a tenth of the mid-1990's level, and over 144,000 hectares there previously devoted to illegal coca now produce licit crops. The record-breaking seizures of both drugs and precursor chemicals in 2003 and the GOB’s continuing strong interdiction performance in 2004 demonstrate the value of long-term investments made in developing special counternarcotics police units (FELCN). Total potential cocaine production in Bolivia decreased from an estimated 240 metric tons in 1995 to 65 metric tons in 2004. The FELCN and the Bolivian National Police (BNP) both created Offices of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that have already resolved numerous cases of alleged corruption among the police. The GOB has instituted greater control over coca licensing procedures, reducing the diversion of coca to cocaine production through USG support for the General Directorate for the Legal Trade of Coca (DIGECO). With assistance from USAID and OAS/CICAD (funded by INL), the GOB has focused increasing attention on delivering land titles in the Chapare and the Yungas. New AD activities in the Yungas are beginning to show their value, with demand for support exceeding available funding. In September 2004, President Mesa approved a new National Drug Strategy for 2004-08 that included a Plan of Action for the Yungas; its effective implementation will require considerable donor support.

The FY 2006 request of $80 million is aimed at sustaining prior gains and continuing effective programs in eradication, interdiction, drug prevention/social communication, and integrated alternative development that will enable Bolivia to: further reduce coca cultivation, control the diversion of (licit) Yungas coca to cocaine production, interdict Bolivian and transshipped Peruvian and Colombian cocaine, expand demand reduction programs in schools, increase social awareness of the harm caused by excess coca, drug trafficking, and drug consumption, maintain program-appropriate ready-rates for land, riverine and air assets that support eradication and interdiction operations, provide advanced training to police, improve efforts against money laundering, and extend alternative development to tens of thousands of families in the Chapare and the Yungas.

To continue interdiction activities, NAS will be obliged in FY 2006 to assume costs previously covered by DEA Plan Colombia funding to support economic incentives, travel, fuel, etc. However, with a reduction in overall funding levels for FY 2006, NAS must reduce some elements of the program (principally salary supplements, the number of personnel, U.S.-based training, etc.). We will maximize the capacity of remaining program personnel by replacing aging vehicles (about 100 in FY 2006 alone) and maintaining current levels of various office and communications equipment, building maintenance and in-country training. The number of prosecutors has been reduced and capped by mutual agreement at 110, and FELCN personnel at 1,648; however, more personnel cuts may be necessary if DEA annual project funding falls below that of prior years. The FELCN units that NAS supports include: a command staff; GIAEF (money laundering investigations); GISUQ (chemical control); CANES (canine detection); UMOPAR (rural patrol unit); and, GIOE (intelligence and special operations) and its subunits: SIU (a highly specialized intelligence unit, managed by DEA); GRIRMO (mobile roadblocks unit); and GICC (containers investigation group). The GARRAS Jungle Training School (a regional training center for CN police from Bolivia and other Latin American countries, provides essential training (e.g., jungle survival skills, basic criminal investigation procedures, and human rights) to increase individual effectiveness and institutionalize modern police principles. Approximately 100 Garras candidates will be trained in jungle operations courses, and 200 police agents in 18 advanced or refresher courses in intelligence, information management, defensive driving, paramedic/first aid skills, etc., in remote locations throughout the country. The project will also fund two basic courses for new prosecutors and five advanced training courses for the rest. The CANINE program will support approximately 82 dog/handler teams -- which will fall short of rising demand for its unique capabilities, including the canine explosives detection capacity to assist in force protection. Police, security and judicial infrastructure will have to be stretched to implement the Yungas Plan of Action under the GOB's new National Drug Strategy.

The Joint Task Force (JTF) and other GOB entities (including DIRECO and the Ecological Police) accomplish forced eradication in the Chapare using roughly 1,500 military, police and civilian personnel. CNC estimates suggest that in recent years the GOB has been able to eradicate roughly as fast as cocaleros replant in that zone. The GOB’s Drug Strategy for 2004-8 calls for a shift in FY 2006 from voluntary reduction in parts of the Yungas to some form of forced eradication. Forced eradication in the Yungas is a significantly different undertaking than in the Chapare, requiring substantial budgetary resources and political will to face a more hostile populace--the lack of either of which would scuttle the endeavor. The USG is the only country providing support to GOB eradication efforts in the Chapare. Unfortunately, nearly half of the Air Wing fleet of helicopters will be retired by FY 2006 due to lack of funding for critical flight safety upgrades, depriving eradication efforts in the Yungas of a key logistical capability necessary for success. FY 2006 funding will be adequate only to sustain eradication activities in the Chapare, with support for food, communications equipment, fuel, field equipment and other materiel. After DIGECO, the GOB agency that regulates the domestic trade in licit coca, has been institutionalized, its infrastructure has been upgraded and its regulations have been amended to curtail additional commercialization licenses, NAS will cease all support to DIGECO.

The Policy Development project will help strengthen the National Drug Control Board (CONALTID). Project support will help this ministerial body to effectively coordinate the GOB's anti-drug strategy; develop the coordination and policy development capacity of the Vice Ministries of Social Defense, Alternative Development, and Health as CONALTID's technical secretariats; and help the GOB develop and implement its social communication policies related to counternarcotics activities. The project will provide technical advice, equipment, training, consultancies, and other support as appropriate. Strengthening the coordinating role of CONALTID is crucial to the implementation of a coherent GOB CN policy. The project will also enhance GOB capability to manage the implementation of the new National Drug Strategy (in the face of likely resistance) and to design and implement a social communication strategy to promote popular support for the GOB’s CN activities. The Demand Reduction Project will develop a demand reduction network among NGOs -- funding drug consumption surveys, focus groups and attitudinal studies, and holding training seminars for teachers, community organizations and NGOs on related issues. The project also funds the BNP’s DARE program, which will expand to reach some 25,000-30,000 middle school students and certify additional members of the FELCN as DARE instructors.

Bolivia covers a huge expanse of territory, and its poverty has left its transportation infrastructure largely underdeveloped, leaving it highly accessible to drug traffickers who utilize a variety of means to move drugs and precursor chemicals. The GOB would be unable to conduct counternarcotics operations in the absence of the logistical support these projects provide. The backbone of the entire counternarcotics program in Bolivia is a logistical infrastructure involving airplanes, boats, various land vehicles, helicopters and a decentralized warehousing and supply system designed to support the extended system of urban and rural bases and offices occupied by project personnel. The Blue Devils Task Force (BDTF) -- with its mobile bases and roving river patrols, ranging across 40 percent of Bolivia’s land mass-- forces traffickers to utilize costlier overland or air routes, increasing the risks associated with drug production and trafficking in the remote north of Bolivia. The BDTF provides logistical support to UMOPAR in the riverine zones, especially in Beni/Pando, which is a major transit area for both drugs (from Bolivia, and Peru and Colombia) and chemicals. The BDTF also provides limited support to the eradication forces operating in the Chapare. In FY 2006 reduced funding will require a reduction in the BDTF project by approximately 50 percent, enabling it to provide riverine support only in the most operationally critical areas, such as the areas surrounding the Yungas and the Chapare. The Green Devils Task Force (GDTF) principally supports the eradication forces operating in the Chapare. Cuts in the use of helicopters in the Chapare due to reduced levels of funding in FY 2006 will require the GDTF to absorb additional logistical and operational requirements. The majority of vehicles in the project were excess defense items, and constant replenishment of motors and spare parts is required to keep them operational. The Field Support Program pays the operating expenses and leases for NAS facilities located outside of La Paz. These facilities -- field offices, vehicle maintenance facilities and warehouses in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Trinidad, Chimoré and Villa Tunari -- provide a common support platform for NAS-supported activities throughout the country.

In FY 2006, the Secure Borders Project will support nascent GOB activities to combat transnational and domestic organized crime, including Trafficking in Persons. The objectives will be training an elite group of approximately 40 Bolivian National Police (BNP) through two courses in investigative techniques that lead to successful terrorism-related prosecutions, and pursuing the drafting and passage of legislation that more effectively addresses the many manifestations of transnational crime. The project will assist the GOB customs authority to fulfill its obligations under the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA).

The Law Enforcement Development Program (LEDP) project supports administrative and organizational development, improvement of criminal investigative capabilities, the development of training resources and capabilities of both police and prosecutorial personnel, as well as anti-corruption and police/prosecutorial reform activities. The LEDP coordinates with MilGroup and DEA regarding training provided to Bolivian security forces and with USAID regarding training for Bolivian prosecutors. The effectiveness of the BNP and the office of the Attorney General are key to the success of justice sector reform within Bolivia. In FY 2006, the program will provide four basic training courses for 200 new police and 30 advanced courses for an additional 2,000 police and 150 prosecutors, and purchase training materials, hire in-country trainers/consultants, and fund participant travel.

The FIU Development project will support GOB initiatives to develop its money laundering intelligence unit within the Banking Superintendent’s Office. An effectively functioning FIU would complement the important work of the GIAEF (the FELCN unit specializing in money laundering investigations). Both units will coordinate to identify and freeze assets held by drug traffickers, terrorists or other criminals involved in transnational crime. Since this is a new project, start-up costs include office and computer equipment for a unit of 20 personnel as well as incentives, travel, and legal consultancies to draft new legislation.

USAID’s Administration of Justice (AOJ) project supports the creation of more effective, accessible and accountable law enforcement and administration of justice systems. The AOJ project will assist the GOB to: enact legislation complementary to Bolivia’s Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP); achieve institutional reforms required by the CCP (including the development of multi-service justice centers to improve access to justice within conflictive regions and the provision of equipment and training to the newly established Forensic Investigations Institute); and, increase understanding of the CCP throughout the legal community and by the public.

Integrity is essential to institutional reform of the BNP. A police structure based on modern policing principles --one that is responsive to complaints of corruption and abuse-- will also help improve public confidence in the democratic system itself, since the public interacts more with the police than with any other public sector entity in their daily lives. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) (593) has a small corps of investigators with a solid grounding in human rights and the new disciplinary code. Tribunals are hearing cases under this system. Ninety OPR personnel and 40 Tribunal personnel spread throughout Bolivia’s nine departments all require furniture, office equipment and vehicles. All new personnel will require training, with personnel changing every two years.

The Red Devils Task Force (RDTF) is a Bolivian Air Force rotary wing aviation unit that provides general aviation support for the JTF. In FY 2006, reduced funding levels will support only three to four remaining UH-1H helicopters and four Huey II helicopters with fuel, in-country per diem, incentives, uniforms for 169 personnel, and maintenance of forward operating locations. NAS funding will also provide funding for one additional Huey II helicopter upgrade. A small staff of AMCIT contractors will continue to assist the RDTF with maintenance, quality control, logistics, and training. Interdiction and eradication operations are highly dependent upon reliable helicopter support due to the near impassability of many roads at any time, but especially during the lengthy rainy season. However, by FY 2006, the much-reduced RDTF will only be able to support eradication logistical requirements.

The Black Devils Task Force (BlkDTF) project supports three C-130 aircraft. The BlkDTF transports CN forces and project supplies throughout Bolivia and moves rotary aircraft parts, program supplies and equipment to and from CONUS, which saves shipping costs and time. The BlkDTF is the only heavy-lift, in-country support available for transporting helicopter fuel blivets to forward operating locations. With the severe reductions in the RDTF program in FY 2006, the C-130 aircraft will be key to moving resources to forward operating locations, particularly those difficult to reach over land. The project funds provide maintenance, repairs, parts and required inspections as well as operating costs, including in-country per diem, fuel, uniforms, equipment and incentives for 81 personnel. FY 2006 funding will maintain a 1,000-hour flight-hour capability.

Assisting farm families to exit coca cultivation will depend upon continued economic and social development support in coca-growing regions. In FY 2006 the AD project (administered by USAID) will: promote the sustainable production of licit crops; provide infrastructure, institutional support for producers’ associations and legal land tenure; encourage the development of more democratic and effective municipal governments; improve services for education, health and vocational training; increase opportunities for off-farm employment and market access for products; and ensure improvement of the administration of justice, conflict resolution and citizen security in coca-growing areas. Continued funding is required to increase assistance to reach a total of 45,000 farm families in FY-2006, as they move out of coca and into licit activity, creating approximately 4,000 jobs, and to strengthen nascent AD efforts in the Yungas in the face of increasing coca cultivation.

Bolivia INL Budget ($000) FY 2004 FY 2004 Supp FY 2005 FY 2005 Supp FY 2006 Interdiction FELCN, UMOPAR, GIOE, GISUQ, GIAEF, K9, Garras School, Prosecutors 12,532 - 12,532 - 12,992 Eradication JTF, Eco Police, DIRECO, DIGECO 11,760 - 11,383 - 10,194 Policy Development/Demand Reduction 993 - 993 - 847 VM/SD, Demand Reduction Operational/Logistical Support 7,989 - 8,603 - 7,156 BDTF, GDTF, Field Support Border and Transportation Control 34 - 34 - 34 Secure Borders Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering 1,664 - 1,664 - 767 LEDP, FIU Development Anti Corruption 193 - 620 - 593 OPR Aviation 10,633 - 9,493 - 6,667 RDTF, BlkDTF, Helo Upgrade Sub Total 45,798 - 45,322 - 39,250 Administration of Justice * 3,480 - 4,500 - 3,000 Alternative Development * 38,272 - 37,164 - 34,000 Program Development and Support U.S. Personnel 656 - 676 - 795 Non-U.S. Personnel 1,040 - 1,012 - 1,293 ICASS Costs 695 - 750 - 788 Program Support 1,059 - 848 - 874 Sub-Total 3,450 - 3,286 - 3,750 Total 91,000 - 90,272 - 80,000 * This is an INL-funded and USAID-administrated program.

Brazil

Program Objectives and Performance Indicators

Support to the Government of Brazil (GOB) will: disrupt major trafficking organizations, increase interdiction activities, improve control of precursor chemicals, reduce money laundering, improve the capabilities of and enhance cooperation among Brazilian law enforcement agencies, and raise awareness of the dangers of drug-related crimes.

Training and equipment funds to Brazilian federal police will enhance operational effectiveness as well as the physical and procedural security at borders, ports, and airports.

An extended GOB presence in the Amazon region will result in more riverine patrols and increases in interdiction.

Improved federal/state cooperation and information sharing on anti-drug issues will enhance the GOB’s ability to conduct sustained interdiction operations.

Greater regional cooperation will build alliances between law enforcement agencies in Brazil and neighboring countries to disrupt major trafficking organizations operating in Brazil and to prevent any spillover cultivation of illicit crops from the major producing nations.

The Brazilian criminal justice system will investigate and prosecute drug traffickers and money launderers, reduce money laundering and dismantle international criminal organizations.

Training to improve investigative techniques will lead to more arrests and prosecutions for drug-related and money-laundering crimes.

Improvements in the GOB’s anti-money laundering regulatory apparatus will continue. The GOB’s new national strategy for combating money laundering will be implemented.

Increased public awareness of the dangers of drug trafficking and drug abuse will deter the rising domestic consumption of illicit drugs.

Public support for law enforcement efforts increases as drug awareness programs deliver their message.

Support to local treatment and demand reduction facilities will decrease drug abuse in Brazil.

Although Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, it is the only country that borders all three coca-producing countries in the Andes -- Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. The sparsely populated Amazon region comprises more than one half of the country, which has long, porous borders. The GOB has been particularly concerned about the security of the Amazon since the implementation of Plan Colombia. Brazil has relatively well-developed communications, infrastructure and banking services that, together with major international airports and seaports, makes it a desirable transit route for illicit narcotics bound for the U.S. and European markets. Money laundering in Brazil is primarily related to drugs, corruption, and trade in contraband.

These factors, coupled with increasingly successful enforcement efforts in neighboring countries, contribute to a growing drug transit problem in Brazil. Brazil is a transit country for cocaine base moving from other Andean cultivation areas to processing laboratories in Colombia. It is also a conduit for cocaine from the source countries to North America, Europe and Brazilian cities. By assisting Brazil to improve its law enforcement capabilities, the U.S. will diminish the flow of illicit drugs passing through Brazil to the U.S., as well as have an impact on illegal arms shipments and money laundering in Brazil.

Recent USG efforts in Brazil have improved the performance of GOB counterdrug law enforcement agencies and have assisted in the implementation of regional initiatives to reduce both the supply of, and the demand for, illicit drugs. In 2004, the Federal Police seized 7.7 metric tons of cocaine, 120 kilograms of crack, and 149 metric tons of marijuana. Continued USG support for Project COBRA, a project on Brazil’s border with Colombia, was decisive in the GOB's determination to establish additional border control projects on the borders of other neighboring countries such as Peru (PEBRA), Venezuela (VEBRA), and Bolivia (BRABO). Finally, programs along Brazil's border with Suriname and Guyana (operation GUISU) are conducted to destroy illegal landing strips. In 2004, the GOB further exercised a regional counternarcotics leadership role when it implemented "Operation Six Borders" to disrupt the illegal flow of precursor chemicals.

In 2004, the GOB, in partnership with UNODC, hosted a money-laundering seminar with Brazilian President Lula. In addition, the GOB adopted and began implementing a new national strategy document for combating money laundering. The first major coordination action taken under the new plan was the creation of a new high-level coordination council (the GGI-LD), led by the Ministry of Justice's Office for Asset Seizure and International Judicial Cooperation. The GGI-LD determines overall strategy and priorities, which are then implemented by Brazil's financial intelligence unit, the Council for the Control of Financial Activities (COAF). Among the more ambitious efforts, the COAF is drafting legislative changes to facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering - and terrorism finance - cases by refining the legal definition of money laundering.

The recent inclusion of the majority of Brazil's 26 states and one federal district into the Unified Public Safety System led to the creation in 2004 of a National Guard by the National Public Safety Secretariat, SENASP, a federal entity responsible for the integration of diverse state civil and militarized police forces. With INL support, SENASP coordinated and delivered several national training activities. The GOB’s effort to implement a unified reporting system for law enforcement and statistical crime and narcotics seizures is also underway. By the end of 2004, the GOB revised its central reporting database and encouraged state law enforcement agencies to adhere to this centralized system.

The DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance and Education) program is now active in all 26 states of Brazil and the Federal District. INL support to the National Antidrug Secretariat (SENAD) and the Ministry of Education in 2004 trained over 5,0000 school teachers on an anti-drug curriculum. During the same year, INL support assisted SENAD’s implementation of a nation-wide drug use survey and established a toll-free counseling hotline, which provides callers with facts about the consequences of illicit drug use.

INL resources will support projects designed to secure Brazil’s borders in order to combat the transit of illegal narcotics in Brazilian territory. Also, INL programs will prevent precursor chemicals and arms produced in Brazil from being shipped to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. INL resources will also assist state law enforcement agencies and the Federal Police through training and acquisition of basic law enforcement equipment. Finally, INL support will reinforce Brazil’s efforts to combat money laundering, promote public awareness, and support demand reduction programs.

Narcotics Law Enforcement: Funding will provide operational support and equipment to the Brazilian Federal Police to conduct more effective investigations and interdiction operations against international narcotics cartel leaders. In addition, the project will continue to build on training already provided by INL and other USG agencies to enhance port and airport security, and to other illegal activities such as arms trafficking, chemical diversion and money laundering. Progress will be measured by improved investigative techniques, increases in seizures, and number of arrests and convictions.

Northern Brazil Law Enforcement: This project will continue to provide operational support to Brazil’s Projects COBRA, PEBRA, VEBRA and BRABO, which are aimed at fortifying the northern border through riverine control, linked to a tactical command center in Tabatinga. Continued funding will support those initiatives that are still in their initial start-up phase such as: VEBRA (Venezuela), PEBRA (Peru), and BRABO (Bolivia). Progress will be measured in terms of the deployment of material and personnel resources to operating locations in the Amazon as well as the performance of the command center.

State Security Law Enforcement: This project will assist the Brazilian National Public Safety Secretariat and promote improved coordination of counternarcotics activities within Brazil’s law enforcement community. Funds will provide equipment and training to Brazilian state, civil and military police forces and may also include training for community-oriented police forces. Progress will be measured in terms of increased effectiveness of state police investigations and number of officials trained.

Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction: The recognition of the seriousness of the increase in illegal drug use in Brazil, particularly among young people, has led to the passage of drug legislation that emphasizes demand reduction. In FY 2006 the Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction project will continue support for SENAD programs that focus on drug education to increase public awareness of Brazil’s drug problem and demand for illegal drugs. INL will seek to build public support for counternarcotics efforts by providing grants to individual state drug councils, federal and state government agencies, university educational research groups, private organizations and youth programs. Progress will be measured in terms of the capacity of Brazilian organizations to produce effective demand reduction programs and changes in drug consumption patterns.

Program Development and Support (PD&S): PD&S funds will provide necessary resources for salaries, benefits, and allowances of U.S. and foreign national direct hire and contract personnel, field travel, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs, and other general administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Brazil INL Budget ($000) FY 2004 FY 2004 Supp FY 2005 FY 2005 Supp FY 2006 Narcotics Law Enforcement Narcotics Law Enforcement 3,780 - 3,500 - 2,300 Northern Brazil Law Enforcement 4,500 - 3,000 - 2,000 State Security Law Enforcement 1,000 - 1,528 - 700 Sub Total 9,280 8,028 5,000 Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 500 - 500 - 500 Program Development and Support U.S. Personnel 166 - 178 - 178 Non-U.S. Personnel 44 - 77 - 77 ICASS Costs 90 - 106 - 106 Program Support 120 - 39 - 139 Sub-Total 420 - 400 - 500 Total 10,200 - 8,928 - 6,000

Colombia

Program Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness

Reduce the cultivation of coca and opium poppy to a non-commercial level.

• All coca and opium poppy will be sprayed to disrupt the market and deter replanting.
  
  
• Forced eradication and alternative development will continue to reduce and discourage cultivation in traditional growing areas, as well as potential new areas for cultivation.
  
  
• Manual Eradication will increase in areas where aerial spraying is not feasible

Dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and prevent their resurgence.

• Interdiction of cocaine and heroin will continue at current high levels in the near term until production capacity has been more severely reduced.
  
  
• Technical assistance and training will be employed to allow the Government of Colombia to investigate arrest, prosecute, and convict more key narcoterrorists, particularly those who are Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT).
  
  
• Extradition of major narcotraffickers to the U.S. will continue as Colombia persists in dismantling narcotrafficking organizations at a rapid pace.
  
  
• Police and military aircraft, including Air Bridge Denial (ABD) assets, will achieve and maintain optimal mission capable rates, despite an increased operational tempo in support of expanded mission requirements.

Halt the diversion of precursor chemicals as well as the laundering of money.

• Money laundering units trained and equipped in recent years will increase the amount of money seizures and the number of prosecutions.
  
  
• Robust Chemical Control efforts will continue and seizures of precursor chemicals and prosecutions will increase

Develop greater respect for rule of law throughout Colombia and increase access to justice.

• Permanent police presence in conflictive areas will be strengthened to cement recently established government presence and additional stations will be constructed as needed. 
  
  
• Additional legal assistance offices and oral trial courtrooms will be set up to complete the transition to the oral system of justice and more judges, prosecutors, and police will be trained.
  
  
• Human rights early warning system and training will be expanded to ensure that affected communities are alerted and violations are investigated and prosecuted in a timely fashion.
  
  
• Internally displaced persons and demobilized combatants have either returned to their homes or have established a suitable permanent residence elsewhere

Provide legal economic opportunities via alternative development and social infrastructure projects to former small field coca growers and other vulnerable groups.

• Number of families assisted and hectares of licit crops replacing illicit crops with licit crops through alternative development projects will increase.
  
  
• Number of employment opportunities for residents in or near to areas of aerial spraying and illegal cultivation will increase.
  
  
• Avenues to deliver products produced by alternative development will be increased.

Colombia’s position as the supplier of over 90% of the cocaine and 50% of the heroin entering the United States makes the aggressive disruption of the illicit drug trade a top priority among the numerous important USG interests in Colombia. It is much easier and more cost effective to eradicate and interdict this cocaine and heroin in or close to the source before it is shipped to international markets and before narcoterrorista can reap a profit from them. Interdiction and eradication programs in Colombia, in effect, extend our borders out to the Andean region. Without them, narcotraffickers would have open lanes to the U.S. borders and no significant impediment to their production capacity. Colombia is home to three Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). These groups finance a large part of their operations with proceeds from the drug trade and are a threat to the security of the entire hemisphere. As Colombia continues to have success in battling these FTOs, they could become more desperate and prone to use their resources and networks to earn money by servicing potentially new allies who could be other terrorist organizations. The USG cannot afford to allow terrorists organizations with tens of thousands of well-armed and trained members to operate unimpeded in this hemisphere.

The funding requested in FY 2006 will set the stage to lock-in the successes of the Plan Colombia Supplemental of 2000 and subsequent Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) programs. Earlier programs have put increasing pressure on every aspect of the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia, but it is important to follow through and further develop and strengthen GOC institutions, so we can hand off these programs to Colombia. Without our sustained support for the near-term, the hard-won gains of the joint effort between Colombia and the U.S. may well be reversed. We are clearly at a tipping point and we must continue to keep the pressure on the narcoterrorists.

The Government of Colombia (GOC) announced its Plan Colombia in 1999, as a six-year program with a balanced and wide-ranging strategy designed to end the country’s 40-year armed conflict, eliminate narcotrafficking, promote economic and social development, strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, and promote respect for human rights and humanitarian programs. The Uribe Administration, which took office in 2002, continues to be fully committed to the goals and objectives of Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia, by any measurement, has had exceptional success in attaining the objectives it established, but the job is not finished and we must continue to consolidate the progress so far made.

2004 was the fourth consecutive record-breaking year of aerial eradication. Aircraft sprayed over 136,500 hectares of coca through the year and 3061 hectares of opium poppy. Despite narcotraffickers’ aggressive efforts to defend their illicit cultivations, the number of ground fire impacts decreased by nearly 50 percent compared to 2003 because of improved intelligence, security, and coordination. Coca cultivation was at 170,000 hectares in 2001, shrank to 145,000 hectares in 2002, and 114,000 hectares in 2003. Although U.S. Government’s illicit crop estimates for 2004 will not be available until March 2005, the UN estimated a 30 percent reduction in Colombian coca during the first six months of 2004. Our efforts with Colombia in eradicating and interdicting illicit drugs and dismantling terrorist networks are paying off in other areas as well. Homicides were down by over 15% in 2004. Kidnappings were down by over 30% during the same period. Arrests of narcotraffickers increased in 2004 by 33%. Field losses of the AUC were up by 80% and 10% for the FARC in 2004. Terrorist attacks were down by over 47% and attacks against small municipalities decreased by 75% in 2004. Since 1998, the GOC has extradited over 260 fugitives to the United States. People in Colombia are now talking about peace as something that could really happen sooner rather than later and this will bring greater prosperity and security to Colombia and the hemisphere.

The results of the Colombian National Police Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN) and the Colombian Army’s (COLAR) Counterdrug Brigade are outstanding. During 2004, they seized more cocaine and coca base than ever, building on record increases since 2001. In 2001, seizures were 80 metric tons. In 2002 seizures were 124 metric tons, and in 2004 seizures were at least 178 metric tons. The DIRAN alone destroyed over 150 cocaine laboratories in 2004; while the number destroyed by all Police and Military units were 200. The DIRAN also regularly conducts cooperative, or joint, operations with the Colombian Air Force, Army, and Navy. The COLAR Counterdrug Brigade conducts drug interdiction and provides essential ground security for aerial eradication, a crucial element in reducing ground fire aimed at our spray aircraft.

Since 2001, over two million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been assisted in Colombia, along with over two thousand child soldiers. The Early Warning System, created in 2001 by Plan Colombia to prevent massacres and forced displacement is functioning and ensuring prompt GOC responses to possible violations. This program has also created 11 new mobile satellite units of the national human rights units, bringing the total to 21. The Promotion of the Rule of Law program has established 37 Justice Centers (Casas de Justicia) since inception and over 2.6 million cases have been processed. Thirty-five oral trial courtrooms were constructed with U.S. financing. These will be crucial to Colombia’s recently begun transition to an oral justice system.

USAID supported medium- and long-term alternative development programs have historically concentrated in the southern departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, the areas of Colombia’s densest coca cultivation. By the end of 2004, programs had aided almost 40,000 families and established over 55,000 hectares of licit crops since their inception. In addition, USAID constructed over 200 social infrastructure projects in 2004, bringing the total to 874, since the project began. Nevertheless, the formidable security threat and lack of viable economic infrastructure in many parts of the Putumayo pose formidable obstacles and have caused the USG to refocus alternative development to expand activities beyond southern Colombia to other areas with illicit cultivation but where a greater number of legal economic activities already exist and have shown a potential for success. This will boost income-generating opportunities through private sector partnerships that emphasize infrastructure development, along with direct crop substitution when feasible.

Following on the successes of the last two years, INL’s plan is to continue to effect a total, lasting, systematic dismantling of narcoterrorism in Colombia. The Colombian forces trained by INL and other USG agencies will be supported by INL air assets, as they seek out and destroy narcoterrorist organizations. Infrastructure development now taking place in the climate of increased security in Colombia will continue to be protected by programs funded by INL and victims of kidnappings and assaults carried out by guerrilla groups will continue to be rescued by USG-trained and supported units. All of this will be in addition to the continued high levels of eradication and interdiction operations. These programs form the core of what we must do to succeed in wiping out the narcotics trade in Colombia and stop the terrorism that threatens the elected democracy in one of our key Latin American allies and the stability of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Anticipating the conclusion of Plan Colombia in late 2005, the Colombian Government has begun planning a follow-on strategy that would build on and consolidate the progress made to date. INL, in conjunction with others in the USG, will work to support three areas described by the Colombian Government that in general represent a continuation of programs we are already undertaking:

(a) Fighting terrorism, narcotics trafficking and international organized crime

(b) Economic and social reactivation

(c) Institutional and justice system strengthening

A fourth area proposed by the GOC, that of "peace negotiations, demobilization and reintegration of illegal armed groups," is the result of progress made by Plan Colombia. Because of the pace at which peace negotiations with the paramilitaries have developed, specific significant assistance has not yet been programmed and is to be the subject of additional consultations with the Congress.

Colombian Army Aviation Support: COLAR Aviation support directly enhances the ability to conduct both interdiction and eradication operations. This funding provides fuel, spare parts, repair and maintenance costs for the 82 helicopters (26 UH-1N’s, 16 UH-60’s, 35 Huey II’s and 5 K-Max) that provide essential airlift capacity for operations against high value narcoterrorist targets and provide vital security to eradication missions. The fleet has grown significantly in recent years, as has the number of operations. FY 2006 funds will also support helicopters and facilities dedicated to protecting the critical petroleum infrastructure in Arauca Department. COLAR support includes training crews and technicians and providing aviation infrastructure support. In FY 2006, there is a projected increase in the number of missions, areas of operations, and number of vetted units receiving U.S. support. The strategic focus will be to capitalize on the COLAR’s ability to use aggressive, small, mobile units to go after long-standing and newly developing narcotrafficking organizations. This will require sustained high levels of helicopter airlift support. Three battalions of the CD Brigade have been retrained and retooled and in conjunction with COLAR Aviation, will continue to expand their area of operations from the conflict regions of Colombia.

Colombian Army (COLAR) Counterdrug (CD) Mobile Brigade: Continued Support and development of the CD Brigade enhances the host nation’s ability to conduct sustained eradication operations. The CD Brigade will continue to utilize its specialized training to focus on the fragmented heroin trade as well as the coca industry. Funding for this project in FY2006 will provide ongoing logistical and operations support to the COLAR CD Brigade’s interdiction operations, including high value targets, as well as to the CNP’s aerial eradication missions. This requires the purchase of additional military equipment and ammunition, as well as funding to establish new simple forward operating locations and general sustainment for this vital unit, whose operational pace has increased every year since its establishment, although our support has decreased in recent years.

Air Force Interdiction and Surveillance: Narcoterrorists have traditionally exploited Colombia’s vast and relatively unsecured borders to move illicit narcotics, weapons, money and other contraband via air. Logistical and technical assistance support will be provided to assist the Colombian Air Force in interdiction and surveillance programs in support of endgame operations against unauthorized aircraft flights and in coordinating with Colar and CNP Aviation units. These funds will cover in-country local expenses in support of the Air Bridge Denial program. Uses include assistance in the maintenance and operation of forward operating locations, minor infrastructure improvements, fuel, training, and specialized equipment.

Navy/Maritime Interdiction: Colombia’s extensive riverine network connects the interior with the coastal regions and is a key link between narcotics cultivation and processing facilities and embarkation points. These funds will be used to train and equip specialized units to analyze operational intelligence and interdict contraband traffic, particularly along Colombia’s Pacific littoral, with a particular focus on fast boat operations.

Colombian National Police (CNP) Aviation Support: CNP Aviation directly supports Colombia’s ability to conduct both interdiction and eradication operations. Funding for the CNP Air Service (ARAVI) aircraft supports transport aircraft, eradication escorts, and intelligence platforms. Ongoing expenses have increased due to an increased operational pace brought about by the success in Colombia. Other increases include: rising cost of fuel; additional aircraft for support, transport, spraying, and intelligence gathering; operation and maintenance costs; training for CNP personnel; and upgrading of existing aircraft. Funds are used to support the growing fleet of 62 rotary-wing and 24 fixed-wing ARAVI aircraft. Funding will also be used to purchase spare parts, tools, maintenance, armaments and ammunition, training, communications support, and aviation-related infrastructure costs. Spraying in 2005 and 2006 should be the last peak years before Colombia begins to enter a "maintenance spraying" phase. The 2006 spray plan will reflect a further pursuit of smaller, more dispersed fields, as well as more frequent repeat spraying of key cultivation areas. Aircraft range limitations and severe topography will diminish efficiency and keep eradication flight hours high in order to meet our goals.

CNP Support for Eradication: This program enhances the host nation’s ability to conduct sustained eradication operations to ensure the downward trend in illicit cultivation in Colombia. Funding will provide for operations and maintenance for the eradication aircraft fleet that includes spray aircraft, escort helicopters, imagery gathering aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft. These funds will also be used to purchase the glyphosate and surfactant used for eradication. More dispersed cultivations, as well as the projection of our spray operations to areas more distant from fixed operating bases and more frequent repeat spraying of key cultivation areas, will increase transport costs and other logistical expenses. These programs are an ongoing cost of making illicit drug cultivation non-sustainable in Colombia. These funds will also support upgrades and maintenance of reconnaissance aircraft equipped with advanced imagery and mapping devices to improve the CNP’s ability to locate illicit crops. Manual eradication efforts will be increased in areas where aerial spraying is not feasible, although we will proceed with caution since manual eradication is more dangerous than aerial eradication. We will provide equipment, training, and technical assistance to protect these units from mines, explosive devices, and narcotraffickers.

CNP Support for Interdiction: Continued support for this program enhances Colombia’s ability to conduct interdiction operations by funding non-aviation CNP anti-narcotics directorate (DIRAN) activities, including training and equipping DIRAN's 20 operational companies and three airmobile interdiction companies (Junglas). The Junglas are among the finest Special Forces units in Colombia, if not Latin America. Funding will cover DIRAN and Junglas training costs in Colombia and in U.S. military and commercial training institutions. It will also upgrade existing DIRAN interdiction facilities and construct new facilities, especially along Colombia's eastern, southern and western zones so that DIRAN can project force into these remote, but critical areas. Funding will also provide equipment, and training to sustain a DIRAN Polygraph Unit to ensure the integrity of personnel conducting interdiction and security duties in Colombia’s ports and other locations. The Airport Security program will continue to develop with funding for small equipment purchases, operational expenses, machine maintenance, training of new anti-narcotics police assigned to the airports, and recertification of canines and handlers. As with eradication efforts, these programs are an ongoing cost of making the illicit drug trade unsustainable in Colombia.

CNP Administrative Support: The focus here will be on continuing base improvements, purchase of munitions and arms, upgrading security, maintenance and upgrading of equipment necessitated by the increase operation tempo of the last two years. The program of establishing an interoperable communications and information system to bring the bulk of the CNP to a modern and professional level will continue as the CNP grows and existing equipment becomes obsolete.

The programs under this heading are programs carried out by USAID. The USAID program has three principal objectives: stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging small producers to join the legal economy through licit economic activities and infrastructure projects; promoting more responsive, participatory and accountable democracy; and relieving the plight of Colombian internally displaced persons.

Alternative Development: USAID's alternative development (AD) program provides income and employment opportunities to rural residents and small farmers who have eradicated and agree not to grow illicit crops and supports small and medium private enterprises that generate licit income and employment opportunities. Assistance is also provided for social and productive infrastructure projects as a means for improving access to markets and services. The strengthening of licit economic opportunities in zones in and near illicit cultivation will contribute to permanent abandonment of illicit crop production. The AD program will strengthen national and local institutions that carry out alternative development planning and trade capacity building. The AD program will also support the strengthening of democratic local governance and decentralization efforts. Technical assistance will also be provided to improve the management and conservation of natural resources in buffer zones around national parks and to support indigenous communities by improving their livelihoods through the implementation of sustainable, productive activities.

Support for Democracy: USAID's democracy program provides technical assistance and training to modernize the criminal justice system; protect and promote human rights; increase government transparency and accountability; support peace initiatives; strengthen political parties and potentially support the reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants. Activities will promote a strong democratic government presence to counter the negative effects that illicit activities have on transparency, accountability and the ability of local officials to practice good governance.

Support to Vulnerable Groups/IDPs: The IDP program helps to improve community infrastructure and provide economic alternatives to deter people from participating in illegal narcotics activities. USAID's Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) humanitarian assistance program provides economic and social assistance to vulnerable groups, including ex-child soldiers, youth at risk of recruitment by illegal armed groups, host communities, and persons displaced by civil strife and violence. USAID-funded activities are primarily focused on medium and longer-term solutions leading to the sustainable re-integration of IDPs and former child soldiers into mainstream Colombian society through programs at the national and local levels. Adult ex-combatants may also be assisted on a limited basis after consultations with Congress in support of demobilization and reintegration of the AUC.

Reestablish Public Security in Conflict Zones: The reestablishment of public security and general government presence in conflict zones program will require an expansion of the CNP’s presence in these zones so that the GOC can provide the social and economic benefits of democracy to all Colombians. Funds will be used to organize, train and equip additional members of municipal police units to be stationed in new areas or areas that are currently severely understaffed in very dangerous locations. Funding will also be used to organize, train and equip additional 150-man, mobile "Carabineros" (rural police) squadrons that have proven to be quite successful. Equipment purchases will include field equipment, light weapons and munitions, communications/command and control systems, medical supplies, force protection upgrades, vehicles, and operational logistics support. U.S. funds will also be used to continue to construct and upgrade hardened police stations in the larger municipalities to provide cover for reinserted CNP units in particularly conflicted areas.

Judicial Reforms Program: Colombia’s transition to an accusatorial judicial system similar to our own has required a significant amount of training and technical assistance over the last few years. The first oral case was recently argued a few months ago and Colombia is on its way, but much remains to be done. Significant training and technical assistance will be provided in the area of money laundering, asset forfeiture, and organized crime investigations that are complex and time consuming and require special skills not normally needed in more routine cases. As in our police and military programs, there will be significant emphasis on respect for human rights and anticorruption measures. Specialized units will receive training in investigating and prosecuting these types of cases. Technical assistance and training will also be provided to support areas crucial to the new judicial system like forensics and professionalization with small purchases of specialized equipment that supports these activities.

Other Promote the Rule of Law Programs: This portion of the budget includes drug awareness and demand reduction efforts and the important Culture of Lawfulness program that promotes a respect and appreciation for rule of law in the youth who comprise the future of Colombia. We will also provide limited technical assistance and equipment to the GOC for its individual deserter program that began in 2002 and has seen an increase in deserters in the last three years. There is also a small program for promoting institutional reform within the Ministry of Defense. This program will expand reforms within MOD related to institution building, to include strengthening civilian management and direction. We will also continue expanding the expertise and equipment base of the bomb squad and explosive database center and provide limited support to the Prison Security project.

PD&S funds are used for the general administrative and operating expenses for the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of INL programs in Colombia. Expenses include the salaries, benefits, and allowances of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, leases, field travel, and International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs.

Colombia INL Budget ($000) FY 2004 FY 2004 Supp FY 2005 FY 2005 Supp FY 2006 Support to the Colombia Military Army Counterdrug Mobile Brigade 5,000 - 3,080 - 1,850 Army Aviation Support 147,304 - 125,236 - 124,700 Air Bridge Denial Program 7,121 - - - - Air Force Interdiction and Surveillance - - 4,620 - 4,620 Navy Maritime Interdiction Support - - 460 - 460 Sub-Total 159,425 - 133,396 - 131,630 Support to Colombian National Police Aviation Support 71,238 - 70,000 - 71,230 Support for Eradication 44,185 - 82,500 - 82,520 Support for Interdiction 40,973 - 16,931 - 16,680 Administrative Support 2,000 - 1,390 - 1,390 Sub-Total 158,396 - 170,821 - 171,820 Support to PRM Support to Population, Refugees and Migrations Groups/IDPs 5,000 - - - - Sub-Total 5,000 - - - - Promote Social & Economic Progress Support for Democracy * 24,000 - 22,000 - 19,000 Alternative Development * 59,845 - 70,694 - 83,257 Support for Vulnerable Groups/IDP * 37,634 - 32,000 - 22,500 Sub Total 121,479 - 124,694 - 124,757 Promote the Rule of Law Bomb Squad/Explosive Database Center  500 - 700 - 230 Prison Security/Drug Rehabilitation Training  500 - - - 90 Judicial Reforms Program 7,500 - 6,000 - 6,000 Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 250 - 200 - 230 Culture of Lawfulness Program 250 - 400 - 600 Reinsertion Program for Armed Groups  - - - - 363 Institutional Reform for Ministry of  Defense  - - - - 180 Reestablish Public Security in Conflict Zones  13,800 - 20,079 - 19,700 Sub-Total 22,800 - 27,379 27,393 Program Development and Support U.S. Personnel 2,000 - 2,000 - 2,400 Non-U.S. Personnel 1,500 - 1,400 - 1,700 ICASS Costs 1,000 - 1,000 - 1,000 Program Support 2,300 - 2,077 - 2,300 Sub-Total 6,800 - 6,477 - 7,400 Total 473,900 - 462,767 - 463,000 *  Funds are transferred to USAID who manages these programs.

Ecuador

Program Objectives and Performance Indicators

Improved performance by the Ecuadorian National Police, the criminal justice system and military forces, and improved cooperation among the three, disrupt the transit of drugs through Ecuador from neighboring countries.

A ten percent increase in counternarcotics police stationed along frequently used or newly emergent trafficking routes create choke points and improve interdiction results.

A ten percent increase in patrolling in remote areas by units of special mobile anti-narcotics police, including special operations such as regional sweeps, targeted intelligence gathering and random roadblocks to keep pace with quickly-changing trafficking patterns.

Provision of additional small boats, land vehicles, communications gear, field equipment, operational support and training improve interdiction operations by the Ecuadorian Army and Navy in the country’s coastal waters and along land borders.

Improvements in intelligence, mobility, communications and technical inspections increase disruption of drug trafficking organizations and lead to a twenty percent increase in drug seizures by the counternarcotics police.

Government presence along Ecuador’s northern border inhibits incursions of criminals and narcoterrorists from Colombia.

USAID will provide technical expertise and training to leaders and viable public sector and civil society institutions within the Ecuadorian Anticorruption System (SAE) to develop policy dialogue activities among the parties to collaborate with other USAID implementers and donors to advance SAE initiatives. This training will promote the access of SAE institutions and civil society to the best practices and expertise in the world. The program will improve SAE institutional capacity for transparency and accountability in GOE planning, budgeting, procurement and sensitive operations.

Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) works on improving law enforcement and judicial capabilities enables government institutions to better combat drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. USAID has an on-going criminal justice program to train justice sector officials and criminal lawyers to implement the Oral Accusatory Justice System.

NAS trains police units and new counternarcotics personnel in advanced interdiction methods, conduct of joint operations and maximization of intelligence increase interdictions and arrests.

Additional police personnel are hired and trained.

Greater specialized expertise maximizes the implementation of money laundering and precursor chemical controls, resulting in increased prosecutions for violations.

Improvement in economic/social infrastructure decreases the vulnerability of Ecuador to the production and domestic use of illicit drugs.

Popular support of national and local governmental institutions improves as measured by public opinion surveys.

Public education activities increase awareness of the dangers of drug use, strengthening popular resistance to drug trafficking as measured by public opinion surveys.

Public infrastructure improvements increase access to markets for licit crops and improve competitiveness of indigenous industries as measured by increasing sales and family income.

Sharing porous borders and a contiguous seacoast with Colombia and Peru, Ecuador is a major transit country for illicit drugs and chemicals. The armed conflict in Colombia complicates drug interdiction on Ecuador's northern border. Weak public institutions, widespread corruption and a poorly regulated financial system make Ecuador vulnerable to organized crime. Uneven implementation of the new criminal procedures code, a faulty judicial system and conflicting laws hamper prosecutions. Border controls of persons and goods are undependable. Much of the population lives in poverty. Scanty government presence in a large portion of the country contributes to lawlessness. The National Police (ENP) and military forces are inadequately equipped and trained.

The Ecuadorian Government is making an earnest effort to curtail drug trafficking and other international organized crime. Military and police presence in the northern border area is growing in size, extent and effectiveness. Ecuadorian authorities are seeking to improve port cargo inspections; three of Ecuador's public ports met ISPS standards on time. The use of advanced inspection technology increased in 2004. Cocaine seizures through November 2004 were at levels below those of 2003, but seizures of heroin and precursor chemicals continued at a high level.

Ecuadorian national resources are insufficient to meet all of the challenges presented by narco-guerrilla and other transnational criminal organizations. USG assistance is vital to Ecuador's struggle to maintain its territorial integrity and promote the rule of law.

USG-funded counternarcotics "preventive alternative development" programs are working to contain the spread of the Andean coca/cocaine economy into Ecuador. To implement the 2003-2006 strategy along Ecuador’s Northern Border, ACI-funded initiatives contributing directly to this objective are executed under two broad approaches: 1) Those aimed at increasing citizen satisfaction with performance of local democratic institutions; and 2) Those designed to increase licit income and employment for small and medium farmers in Ecuador’s northern border provinces.

In 2004, Ecuadorian army units along the northern border were provided with computers, field supplies and ground vehicles, including 50 Humvees and heavy trucks. Resources were provided to the Ecuadorian Navy for expanded patrol and interdiction operations on Ecuador’s northwestern estuaries, rivers and coast. Support to Ecuador’s army and navy is strengthening Ecuador’s northern border and its ability to control the movement of goods and persons through ports. Military-police cooperation in joint missions on the northern border continued to improve. Army and police forces in Sucumbios province continue to interdict large volumes of illicit precursor chemical, petroleum ether, en route to Colombia. Drug seizures have not increased, but the presence and increasing mobility of Government of Ecuador (GOE) military and police has presented a strong deterrent to further criminal expansion.

A port inspection station for the counternarcotics police in Ecuador’s second-largest port, Manta, was completed in March 2004, and a major addition to the police base in the northern border town of San Lorenzo will be completed in January 2005. A police checkpoint is under construction in San Jeronimo, also in the northern border area, with an estimated July 2005 completion date. Expanded and improved living quarters and kennels for drug detecting dogs are being built in the USG-constructed police base in Lago Agrio, also near the Colombian border. Designs for two additional inspection stations in southwestern Ecuador, one inside Puerto Bolivar, and another at the highway intersection Y de Jobo, are completed, and construction should begin in February 2005. Site preparation has begun for a provincial counternarcotics police headquarters in Tulcan, the Colombia-Ecuador crossing point of the Pan American Highway, with construction planned for 2005. These new facilities will expand police presence and counternarcotics operations in areas especially vulnerable to drug trafficking.

The Police and Judicial Training project is training trainers to improve police, prosecutorial and judicial professionalism and capabilities while reinforcing principles of rule of law and human rights. The Port Security project’s U.S. Customs (DHS/ICE) advisor in Guayaquil plays a key role in mobilizing the area’s private sector through the Business Anti-smuggling Coalition (BASC). The advisor continues to improve the police’s investigative and search techniques, and monitors their performance at seaports and airports.

To increase citizen satisfaction and legitimacy of democratic institutions in the northern border area, a social and productive infrastructure program totaling over $24 million has built dozens of water and sanitation systems, bridges and small irrigation projects --, infrastructure which is crucial to economic development. Complementing the infrastructure program, a new northern border local government development program was initiated in July 2004, to strengthen local governments and citizen participation in ten priority municipalities.

Licit income and employment opportunities are being developed by strengthening the competitiveness of rural enterprises through improved farm-to-market linkages in selected sectors, utilizing state of the art technical assistance, training and financial incentives. At the core is a focus on competitive rural industries within "clusters" (including distributors, wholesalers, processors, post-harvest agents, producers, raw material suppliers, etc), working in unison to identify and overcome constraints to greater productivity, stronger competitiveness and sustainability. The initial priority sub-sectors being supported are cacao, coffee and vegetables.

Police Operations: Funds will support the Counternarcotics Police Directorate (DNA) port and canine operations; a mobile interdiction strike force; acquisition of law enforcement and communications equipment; vehicle acquisition, fuel, maintenance, repair and operational costs; and the cost of providing a port advisor from the U.S. Customs Service (DHS/ICE). Jointly with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the NAS will support a small, mobile technical intelligence unit.

Military Border and Coastal Control: The project will sustain and reinforce military surveillance and interdiction capabilities along the northern seacoast and the land border with Colombia. Funds will be used to maintain and, if needed, to replace or augment land vehicles, boats and field equipment provided to Army and Navy forces in 2002-2005. This project will also support some field operations of the new Quick Reaction Forces being established by the Ecuadorian Army on the northern border.

Police Facilities Construction: Funding will support expansion of police presence and counternarcotics operations in sensitive locations inadequately protected against narcotics trafficking. The FY 2006 project will provide construction of counternarcotics police bases in Huaquillas and Loja, both key points on trafficking routes from Peru into Ecuador. The project is intended to increase the numbers of counternarcotics police stationed in the target areas, to continually maintain 30- to 40-member units at key interdiction points, including remote outlying sites.

Police and Judicial Training: With 150 new DNA personnel annually being added through 2006, basic and advanced training will emphasize ground and airborne field operations, intelligence methods, and cargo and personnel inspection techniques, with military co-trained with police where appropriate. The project will extend and refine police, prosecutorial and judicial training in implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedures.

Money Laundering and Chemical Control: Ecuador has a dollar economy and weak banking controls; the country also produces chemical precursors and is a transit corridor for diverted chemicals. In FY 2006, the project will provide training and equipment to assist the GOE as it establishes new financial intelligence and chemical control units and associated enforcement units.

Drug Awareness/Public Diplomacy: The project will give direct support to drug awareness projects operated by the GOE. It will counter misunderstandings and disinformation in the Ecuadorian public regarding USG counternarcotics policies and activities and the true nature of the drug, terrorism and other transnational challenges by providing informational materials, sponsoring travel to view USG counternarcotics projects and activities, and funding guest speakers.

Program Development and Support: PD&S funds are used for the salaries, benefits, allowances and travel of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential leasing, ICASS costs and other general administrative and operating expenses for counternarcotics and anti-crime program planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Northern Border Development: FY 2006 activities will increase the project's geographic reach in expanding infrastructure, local government institutional support and strengthening communities into more municipalities in the Northern Border area. The final phase of the project,due to end in FY 2006, will continue to increase jobs and incomes in the North by supporting the competitiveness of existing rural enterprises. Activities will include capital investment and complementary technical assistance to help local governments build and sustain social and productive infrastructure; technical assistance and training to municipal governments and local communities to identify and resolve local development problems democratically; support for small farmers to legalize land holdings; and support to strengthen the competitiveness of existing agricultural and related enterprises in the North.

Ecuador INL Budget ($000) FY 2004 FY 2004 Supp FY 2005 FY 2005 Supp FY 2006 Narcotics Law Enforcement Police Operations 8,188 - 3,962 - 2,735 Police Facilities Construction 3,565 - 1,960 - 1,500 Police and Judicial Training 1,000 - 945 - 900 <