| International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2007 Budget Justification -Report Home Page Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs April 2006 Andean Counterdrug Initiative Bolivia Budget Summary ($000) FY 2005 Actual FY 2006 Estimate FY 2007 Request 90,272 79,200 66,000 Program Objectives and Performance Indicators
Disrupt the trade in illicit coca leaf and the export/trans-shipment of cocaine and precursor chemicals: the Government of Brazil (GOB) will interdict 16 percent of Bolivia’s potential cocaine production. Develop and maintain programs that reduce coca production and control marketing of licit coca leaf: GOB drug strategy will introduce forced eradication in the Yungas in 2007; DIGECO (the Bolivian agency charged with controlling the marketing of legal coca) completes its institutionalization and enforces new regulations that exert greater control over trade and limits the granting of new licenses to trade coca leaves. Develop and maintain strong counternarcotics policies and programs within the GOB and encouraging greater domestic support for counternarcotics policies and programs: the ministerial National Drug Prevention Coordinating Council (CONALTID) designs a coherent and sustainable set of programs advancing its drug strategy; a national demand reduction network is formed within civil society; the DARE program is incorporated into the national school curriculum. Support GOB initiatives to strengthen and secure its own borders against transnational crime: the GOB passes legislation that improves law enforcement capabilities against transnational crime; the GOB undertakes effective regional coordination of intelligence and operations against transnational crime organizations; the GOB extends investigative and prosecutorial capabilities against trafficking across entire country, while also developing effective means to attend to victims. Develop and maintain strong counternarcotics and anti-crime policies and programs within the GOB; develop the professional capabilities of counterterrorism forces within the GOB's judiciary and police: there is a 10 percent increase over prior year in successful prosecution of major drug cases; 95 percent of all CN police/prosecutors/legal assistants are trained in advanced drug case investigative techniques; an elite group of Bolivian National Police are trained in anti-terrorist investigative techniques. Develop a stable, representative government characterized by political and social order, citizen confidence in the political system and strengthened democratic institutions: Public confidence in courts, public prosecutors, and defenders has increased to approximately 44 percent; the GOB passes new police organic law that is based upon modern policing principles and is responsive to complaints of corruption and abuse; percentage of complaints made against members of the Bolivia National Police resolved within six weeks/months is ten percent higher than in FY 2006. Increase the competitiveness of licit rural enterprises; foster more effective, transparent, and responsive democratic institutions, and improve basic public services and social conditions. As part of the stated objectives, an increase in the value of licit crop exports (bananas, coffee, pineapple, cocoa, palm heart, etc.) to an estimated level of $41.7 million will be achieved. Also, strengthening local support for the control of illegal coca will be achieved through provision of basic public services and improved social conditions. Program Justification Bolivia’s porous borders, feeble institutions, history of political exclusion, endemic poverty and a succession of weak governments has created fertile conditions for regional terrorist organizations, narcotics traffickers, diverse criminal interests and trafficking in persons. The election of cocalero leader Evo Morales as president in December of 2005 has thrown into question the continued will of the GOB to provide its counterpart (in the form of land, funding, and personnel) to bilateral projects. This, in turn, might require a significant adjustment in how USG support is channeled, in order to ensure the continued effectiveness of USG efforts to pursue our objectives through effective programs that support democratic stability and the rule of law. Disengagement and the withdrawal of USG resources would result in the rapid collapse of much of what has been achieved over more than two decades of USG financial and policy support. Forced eradication in the Tropico de Cochabamba (Chapare) must continue – presently cocaleros replant coca roughly as fast as the GOB can eradicate it. The Yungas is the GOB's principal counternarcotics challenge and is by far the largest coca growing area in Bolivia, with a severe topography and long history of traditional coca cultivation and resistance to eradication. Alternative development activities in the area will be critical to strengthening local support for the reduction of illegal coca, but even when combined with effective interdiction, cannot counter the long-term trend line in Yungas without the eradication component. Bolivia remains a significant transit zone for Peruvian and Colombian cocaine en route to Brazil, Argentina and eventually Europe and the United States. The nexus between drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime is evident in Bolivia. There is also increasing evidence of international drug trafficking organizations operating in Bolivia, especially Mexicans and Colombians. Bolivia is also susceptible to becoming a staging area for domestic, regional, and international terrorists due to the expanse of its virtually unmonitored borders, thinly populated rural areas, ongoing social conflicts, and its reputation for corruption. USAID's anti-corruption project, Narcotics Affairs Section’s (NAS) Law Enforcement Development and Secure Borders projects and other Mission activities will help the GOB combat corruption, illegal immigration, trafficking in persons and money laundering. Program Accomplishments USG support to Bolivia has resulted in the reduction of potential cocaine production from an estimated 240 metric tons in 1995 to 70 metric tons in 2005. Bolivia eradicated over 6,000 hectares of coca in the Tropico in 2005. Through FY 2005, the annual value of licit products leaving the Tropics of Cochabamba and the Yungas of La Paz was estimated at $81.7 million, exceeding the $61 million target by 34 percent. Average licit gross farm gate family income in the Cochabamba Tropics continued to rise, reaching $2,667 in 2005 (compared with $2,390 in 2004). Estimated net licit family income in the Cochabamba Tropics increased from $1,865 in 2004 to $1,958 in 2005, while in the Yungas of La Paz, it increased from $1,584 to $1,711. In both areas average (licit) incomes are substantially above the national average. In both areas average (licit) incomes are substantially above the national average. In the Chapare, the value of private investment continued to increase, reaching $86.5 million. Chapare and Yungas high value licit crop exports – such as bananas, coffee, pineapple, cocoa, and palm heart – increased from $25.3 million in FY 2004 to $35 million in FY 2005. Over 800 kilometers of improved roads helped farmers reach markets while providing collateral social benefits to thousands of families. The GOB continued a strong interdiction performance in 2005, seizing 11.38 metric tons of cocaine (base and HcL), destroying 2,583 cocaine base labs and making some 4,300 arrests in 6,713 operations. FY 2007 Program Interdiction The Special Counter Narcotics Police Force (FELCN) is a Bolivian National Police (BNP) entity (comprising 1,023 NAS-supported personnel) which includes a command staff and UMOPAR (rural patrol units), plus various specialized police groups: K-9 (drug detection dogs), and the FOE (Special Operations Force). The FOE comprises some 460 personnel, incorporated from the former intelligence and special operations group, the chemical control group and the money laundering investigations group under one streamlined command; it also includes SIU (a highly specialized intelligence unit, managed by DEA), GRIRMO (mobile roadblocks unit) and GICC (containers investigation group). The FOE in all its forms provides coordination for counternarcotics operations and motivates action on time-sensitive intelligence. The Garras del Valor School is an academy for training new counternarcotics personnel in such courses as basic criminal investigation procedures, the basics of the Bolivian legal system, human rights, and jungle survival skills. The Garras School also serves as a regional training center for counternarcotics police from other Latin American countries, in order to promote regional integration. The interdiction project also includes support for 71 counternarcotics prosecutors and legal assistants who lead the investigations undertaken by the FELCN elements. In FY 2007, support will boost the presence and effectiveness of the police in the Yungas; replace obsolete equipment throughout Bolivia and assume interdiction operational costs once funded by DEA Andean Ridge Initiative (ARI) resources. FELCNwill establish three new small posts (about $60,000-80,000 each) along the border with Chile and Peru; increase the numbers of operational units of mobile trained police agents and prosecutors in the Yungas; and replace over 100 obsolete vehicles and various office and communications equipment. K-9 will hold its number of guide-dog teams at 94, but continue to deepen the training provided to each team, including a subset of teams that are trained in explosives detection, to assist in force protection for eradicators as well as continue to develop its breeding program. The Garras del Valor School will trainover 250 Garras candidates in three courses; in addition, police agents and prosecutors will be trained in advanced or refresher courses involving intelligence, information management, defensive driving, paramedic/first aid skills, etc. in settings across the country. Training, equipment and technical support will also be provided to counternarcotics prosecutors and legal assistants. Eradication Resources in FY 2007 will sustain limited independent forced eradication operations in the Chapare and the Yungas. New operations in the Yungas will require improvements to existing forward-operating bases, additional infrastructure, and vehicles. The Joint Eradication Task Force (JTF) will consist of approximately 2,000 military, police, and civilian personnel with separate units conducting eradication (including the provision of force protection) in the two zones. The Office of Agricultural Reconversion and Coca Crop Substitution (DIRECO) supervises the destruction of coca crops and verifies the eradication. The Ecological Police will provide perimeter security for the JTF and conduct primary reconnaissance for locating coca fields. Policy Development/Demand Reduction The ministerial-level National Drug Control Council (CONALTID) is the GOB’s central policy making body for counternarcotics. The Vice Ministries of Social Defense and Alternative Development are the most significant implementers of these polices. This project supports the operations of these entities, by providing technical advice, equipment, training, consultancies and other support as appropriate. This project also supports demand reduction activities, focusing principally on enabling civil society – through training and other interventions – to provide basic rehabilitation and other services the public sector remains incapable of delivering. The project also supports DARE program, which will seek to reach 35,000 middle school students in a broader base of cities. This project also has a public affairs component that promotes USG interests in drug issues, provides accurate information on counternarcotics questions and policies to the media, enhances the professionalism of the media (especially on drug-related themes) and helps generate information useful to the USG. Operational/Logistical Support The entire range of USG counternarcotics projects rely upon a logistical infrastructure involving airplanes, boats, various land vehicles, helicopters, and a decentralized warehousing and supply system. This extensive support enables eradication and interdiction to operate effectively in the often primitive conditions that characterize Bolivia. The Blue Devils Task Force (BDTF) is a special unit within the Bolivian Navy that supports interdiction across the country’s extensive river system and collects actionable intelligence. In FY 2007, the project will continue the replacement of aged equipment, including 25 boat motors and 30 Zodiacs, along with 30,000 spare parts and support for 170 members, six land bases, five mobile bases (each with a large supply ship and various patrol craft) to control natural river chokepoints. The Green Devils Task Force (GDTF), a unit of 154 Bolivian Army personnel with a fleet of approximately 110 light, medium, and heavy-lift utility and other types of vehicles provided by the USG, provides ground transportation in support to interdiction and eradication operations. In FY 2007, support will provide for the continued repair of the aging fleet of vehicles, including the provision of motors and spares, as well support for its personnel. The Field Support Program (INFRA) supports the operating expenses for NAS facilities located outside of La Paz (including field offices, vehicle maintenance facilities and warehouses in located Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Trinidad, Chimore, and Villa Tunari). This infrastructure provides a common support platform for NAS and DEA-supported activities throughout the country. In FY 2007 we will also continue to support administrative and operating expenses not attributable to individual projects, such as personal services contract (PSC) and foreign service national (FSN) personnel salaries/benefits, travel, transportation expenses, real property rentals, office supplies, phones/utilities, and other contracted services needed in support of NAS-supported projects within their jurisdictions. Secure Borders This project provides for institutional strengthening across GOB law enforcement agencies that enhances their ability to better secure Bolivia’s borders against transnational crime. FY 2007 support will provide consultancy services and training (either directly from USG agencies or from private consultants), as well as material support strengthening border controls through increased information-sharing with international partners and improved domestic and international cooperation. This project will also support work to mitigate the impact trafficking in persons has on its victims and will also support the prosecutions of related cases. Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering Law Enforcement Development Project (LEDP): In FY 2007, this project will provide training to BNP and counternarcotics police and others in modern investigative techniques that lead to successful prosecutions. Other courses will be tailored to the needs of the specific police or prosecutorial activity. Overall, the project will provide 30 courses to the law enforcement community, including courses in human rights and a new component on trafficking in persons. To accomplish this, the project will purchase training materials, hire trainers/consultants and provide for travel of course participants. FIU Development: In FY 2007, this project will support efforts and initiatives crafted by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance that are aimed at improving the legal basis for anti-money laundering investigations and prosecutions. Once a new anti-money laundering law is passed, the project will train an elite group of police and prosecutors in application of the law, identification and freezing of assets held by drug traffickers, terrorists, and other criminals involved in transnational crime, as well as perpetrators of corruption. Anti-Corruption Administration of Justice (AOJ): Managed by USAID, the AOJ project provides contractual technical assistance and other services/goods to support the passage of further enabling legislation, the strengthening of key justice system institutions, and the training of justice system actors to consolidate the criminal system reforms and address new problems associated with the changing character of social conflicts (nationwide, but particularly in the coca growing regions). It will also provide urgently needed reforms in the body of commercial and administrative law. Office Of Professional Responsibility (OPR): In FY 2007, this project (managed by NAS), will provide training and material support to a small corps of internal affairs investigators with a solid grounding in human rights and the new police disciplinary code, as well as the staff of the associated tribunals that hear cases under this model system. Aviation Red Devils Task Force (RDTF): The RDTF provides general aviation support for the eradication and interdiction programs. In FY 2007, the project will provide support to GOB expansion of forced eradication into the Yungas, while supporting similar operations in the Chapare. Support operations and maintenance for eight UH-II upgraded helicopters and increased operation and maintenance costs for the remaining seven UH-1H helicopters (which are scheduled to be upgraded to Huey II models in the FY 2007 Air Wing Critical Flight Safety budget); support fixed and rotary-wing aviation operations headquarters at Santa Cruz and forward operating bases in Trinidad, Chimore and a new one in Suapi, at the edges of the Yungas. American citizen contractors assist the RDTF with maintenance, quality control, logistics and training, with day-to-day contract oversight provided by American PSCs. The project will also support maintenance for three light fixed-wing aircraft; a qualified force of helicopter pilots, fixed-wing pilots, crew chiefs and support technicians, and support qualification of maintenance technicians as flying crew chiefs. Black Devils Task Force (BlkDTF): FY 2007 funds will allow the project to continue to support the GOB's interdiction and eradication activities even more effectively, with the incorporation of a refurbished King Air aircraft into the project’s assets. The project’s other assets are three C130B aircraft, which transport project personnel and supplies throughout Bolivia and move RDTF and BlkDTF spare aircraft parts, supplies and other project equipment to and from continental U.S. Support also covers all maintenance, repairs, spare parts, and required major inspections at U.S. facilities, as well as in-country costs for fuel and per diem, uniforms, equipment and economic incentives for 81 personnel (19 pilots, co-pilots and navigators, and 62 enlisted personnel who provide maintenance support). The goal for FY 2007 is to maintain a trained, reliable medium-lift-capable aviation unit that provides aviation support to NAS projects, while maintaining an operational rate of 95 percent of requested missions; support an American PSC who oversees BlkDTF activities, as well as four technicians who supervise maintenance; and an FSN warehouseman to maintain control of the multi-million dollar spare parts inventory. Alternative/Integrated Development Continued funding for the USAID-managed integrated alternative development program is required to complement the GOB’s eradication and interdiction efforts. Program efforts focus on increasing the competitiveness of licit rural enterprises, fostering more effective, transparent and responsive democratic institutions, and improving basic public services and social conditions. Integrated alternative development efforts must continue to be sequenced appropriately and complemented by effective eradication and interdiction activities. Program Development and Support (PD&S) Funds will be used for the salaries, benefits, allowances and travel of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential leasing, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs and other administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
Bolivia INL BUDGET ($000) FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2005 Supp FY 2006 Supp FY 2007 Interdiction FELCN, UMOPAR, GIOE, 12,532 - 12,992 - 11,000 GISUQ, GIAEF, K9, Garras School, Prosecutors Eradication JTF, Eco Police, DIRECO, DIGECO 11,383 - 10,194 - 8,000 Policy Development/Demand Reduction 993 - 847 - 600 VM/SD, Demand Reduction Operational/Logistical Support 8,439 - 7,156 - 5,400 BDTF, GDTF, Field Support Border and Transportation Control 34 - 34 - 34 Secure Borders Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering 1,664 - 767 - 600 LEDP, FIU Development Anti Corruption 620 - 593 - 400 OPR Aviation 9,493 - 6,237 - 5,156 RDTF, BlkDTF, Helo Upgrade Sub Total 45,158 - 38,820 - 31,190 Administration of Justice * 4,500 - 2,970 - 1,000 Alternative Development * 37,164 - 33,660 - 30,000 Program Development and Support U.S. Personnel 676 - 795 - 808 Non-U.S. Personnel 1,176 - 1,293 - 1,314 ICASS Costs 750 - 788 - 800 Program Support 848 - 874 - 888 Sub-Total 3,450 - 3,750 - 3,810 Total 90,272 - 79,200 - 66,000 * Funds are transferred to USAID who manages these programs. Brazil Budget Summary ($000)
Program Objectives and Performance Indicators Assistance to the Government of Brazil (GOB) will continue to build and strengthen Brazil’s interagency law enforcement and drug interdiction border control operations. Support will also enhance federal, state, civil, and military law enforcement capabilities by providing operational support and equipment to conduct more effective investigations and interdiction operations against specific international narcotics cartel leaders and their associates. Specifically assistance will:
Program Justification Brazil is a transit country for cocaine base moving from other Andean cultivation areas to processing laboratories in Colombia. Although Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, it is the only country that borders all three coca-producing countries in the Andes – Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. The sparsely populated Amazon region comprises more than one half of the country, which has long and porous borders. This makes Brazil a conduit for cocaine from the source countries to North America, Europe and Brazilian cities. Brazil has relatively well-developed communications, infrastructure, and banking services that, together with major international airports and seaports, makes it a desirable transit route for illicit narcotics bound for the United States and European markets. These factors, coupled with increasingly successful enforcement efforts in neighboring Andean countries, contribute to a growing drug transit problem in Brazil. By assisting Brazil to improve its law enforcement capabilities, the United States will diminish the flow of illicit drugs passing through Brazil to the United States, as well as have an impact on illegal arms shipments and money laundering in Brazil. Program Accomplishments Recent USG counternarcotics efforts in Brazil have resulted in improved performance and operations of GOB counter-drug law enforcement agencies and the implementation of cooperative initiatives to reduce both the supply of, and the demand for, illicit drugs. In 2005, Operation COBRA (Colombia/Brazil) operated more effectively with representatives from Peru and Colombia working in the Joint Intelligence Center in Tabatinga. Cocaine interdiction was up in the North and North East of Brazil as result of this collaboration. Additionally, the DEA/Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS)-supported Special Investigative Units (SIUs) of the Federal Police in Rio and Sao Paulo have been successful. Most large operations carried out by the Federal Police have been the result of information developed by the SIUs. The Federal Police, in conjunction with NAS Brazil, are developing plans to open additional SIUs in Brazil. The SIUs will be linked and offer real time intelligence to units throughout the country. In 2005, the Brazilian version of the DARE program, PROERD, spread to all 26 Brazilian states and the Federal District. Today PROERD is the second largest DARE program in the world outside of the United States. The USG participation in this success has been substantial. As new curricula are developed periodically in the United States, the 27 state Military Police, responsible for the program in the country, continue to reach out to spread the concepts. Nearly 5 million Brazilian children have been trained in the fifth grade DARE curriculum in Brazil since 1992. In the same year, INL support assisted the National Antidrug Secretariat’s (SENAD). At the request of SENAD, INL is issuing a grant in the amount of $350,000 to a university in the state of Rio Grande do Sul to implement and operate, for a period of 13 months, the National Toll Free Service named LIFE LINE - ("LINHA DA VIDA - INFORMAÇÕES E ORIENTAÇÕES SOBRE DROGAS"). Its main objective is to provide counseling on primary and secondary drug abuse prevention, drug effects, and information on community resources for drug users, addicted people, their families, and society in general. NAS Brasilia sponsored "in-service" refresher training for 30 trainers and their dogs. Participants came from a number of Brazilian states and will also be used for regional operations. Similar training will also be offered in early 2006 for 30 "explosive" dogs and their handlers. These teams will also be used to provide security support for the 2007 Pan American games in Rio de Janeiro. FY 2007 Program Narcotics Law Enforcement The Brazilian Federal Police (BFP), operating in a country larger than the United States, has only 7,000 agents, of whom only 1,000 are working in the drug enforcement area. This project will contribute the additional resources and training needed to enhance BFP effectiveness in its counternarcotics efforts. Funding will support training against arms trafficking by various USG agencies as well as training to combat money laundering and other financial crimes. Additionally, INL funds will provide bullet-proof vests, communications equipments and GPS devices that will improve Brazilian law enforcement capabilities in remote areas. Northern Brazil Law Enforcement To guarantee the continued success of Plan Colombia, it is essential that Colombia and the United States obtain support for the plan from Colombia’s neighbors. Funding will contribute to the GOB’s expanding Operation COBRA to reinforce its northern borders with Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, and Suriname via night vision equipment, small riverine boats and port control training. These operations are aimed at fortifying the northern border through riverine control, which is linked to a tactical center in Tabatinga. State Security Law Enforcement Working with the Brazilian National Public Safety Secretariat (SENASP), funds from this project will assist in purchasing communications equipment and GPS devices used in conducting effective investigations and interdiction operations against narcotics cartel leaders and their associates. Through this conduit, the USG hopes to work with the various branches of the Brazilian police, who are on the front lines of interdiction and law enforcement, in combating the threat of cross-border narcotics trafficking. Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction This project aims to reduce the demand for drugs in Brazil, a significant market for illegal narcotics. INL funding, in conjunction with the SENAD, will support a national survey of narcotics abuse patterns and drug education programs. These pilot projects are designed to influence Brazilian public opinion on counter-drug policies and programs in order to build political will in support of narcotic control initiatives. Program Development and Support (PD&S) Funds will be used for the salaries, benefits, allowances and travel of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential leasing, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs and other administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
Colombia Budget Summary ($000)
Program Objectives and Performance Indicators Disrupt Illicit Drugs
Dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and prevent their resurgence.
Strengthen Institutions
Develop Alternatives
Program Justification Colombia’s position as the supplier of over 90 percent of the cocaine and almost 50 percent of the heroin entering the United States makes the aggressive disruption of the illicit drug trade a top USG priority. Colombia is home to three Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). These groups finance a large part of their operations with proceeds from the drug trade and are a threat to the security of the hemisphere. The funding requested in FY 2007 will continue to consolidate the successes of the Plan Colombia Supplemental of 2000 and subsequent Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) programs. Even though the original Plan Colombia has formally ended, the most important elements of its programs continue. It is important to further develop and strengthen the GOC’s institutions so it can assume ownership and responsibility for these programs. Without sustained support in the near term for the hard-won gains of the joint effort between Colombia and the United States, regional progress against the narcotics trafficking industry and its terrorist allies could be jeopardized. Program Accomplishments Colombia had a record year in eradication, interdiction, and extradition in 2005. In November 2005, preliminary results of the latest price surveys of heroin and cocaine in U.S. communities indicated that the price of heroin was up 30 percent and the price of cocaine was up 19 percent. U.S.-Colombian efforts played a decisive role in reducing the supply of these drugs, preventing hundreds of tons of illicit drugs from reaching the world market through interdiction, aerial spraying of coca and poppy crops, and manual eradication. The U.S.-supported Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate (DIRAN) sprayed 138,775 hectares of coca in 2005 and 1,624 hectares of opium poppy. The illicit coca cultivation eradicated would have yielded over 150 metric tons of cocaine with a street value of over $15 billion. Manual eradication reportedly accounted for the destruction of an additional 31,285 hectares of coca and 497 hectares of poppy. Coca cultivation, which stood at 170,000 hectares in 2001, shrank to 145,000 hectares in 2002 and 114,000 hectares in 2003. Although the Colombian coca crop estimate remained statistically unchanged between 2003 and 2004, eradication of mature crops resulted in an estimated six percent reduction in cocaine production capacity during that timeframe. Figures for 2005 were not available at time of publication. Based on average purities of bulk seizures in the United States, net supply was approximately 515 metric tons of export quality cocaine. Effectively, Colombian counternarcotics efforts have reduced Colombia’s capacity to produce cocaine by 43 percent since 2001. Opium poppy eradication has reduced Colombian heroin cultivation by 68 percent since 2001 from 6,540 hectares to 2,100 hectares. This marked reduction in opium poppy crop size in Colombia is reflected in the most recent statistics on the price and purity of heroin in the United States; South American heroin samples declined in purity by 22 percent and increased in cost per pure gram by 30 percent between 2003 and 2004. During 2005, DIRAN and the Colombian military captured a record 228 metric tons of cocaine and coca base, along with 718 kilos of heroin. The estimated street value of the 228 metric tons of cocaine is $23 billion. Interdiction and eradication efforts have kept an estimated 378 metric tons of cocaine, worth over $38 billion, off the streets of the United States. The DIRAN alone destroyed 104 HCl laboratories and 773 base labs in 2005, while the number of HCL laboratories destroyed by all police and military units was 200. The DIRAN regularly conducts cooperative, or joint, operations with the Colombian Air Force, Army, and Navy. The Colombian Army Counterdrug Brigade conducts drug interdiction and provides essential ground security for aerial eradication, a crucial element in reducing ground fire aimed at our spray aircraft. Continued intelligence coordination and more intensive utilization of the Counterdrug Brigade has kept the number of hostile fire impacts on spray aircraft below historic levels, even though the program sprayed more hectares. Maintaining hostile fire impacts below historic levels has helped to sustain the operational tempo of aerial eradication operations by reducing time lost to repair damaged aircraft. Colombia’s justice system continues its transition to an accusatorial system similar to that of the United States, leading to positive changes in the roles and responsibilities of the judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators. The accusatory system is now functioning in Bogotá and six other municipal areas and is proving to be efficient and effective. It was extended on January 1, 2006, to an additional seven judicial districts, including Medellin. Over 20,000 prosecutors, judges, and criminal investigators had received intensive training in the new accusatory system by early 2006. The USG, through the Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP) and rule of law assistance, has helped Colombia in reforming and strengthening its criminal justice system. USG programs have supported the cultivation of over 73,000 hectares of legal crops and completed more than 1,000 social and productive infrastructure projects in the last five years. More than 73,000 families in 17 departments have benefited. The USG has improved the delivery of public services in 156 municipalities, including the delivery of potable water and sewage treatment. To date, the USG has provided non-emergency support for over two million Colombians internally displaced by narcotics terrorism, including aid for over 2,800 former child ex-combatants. Nine peaceful-coexistence centers in small municipalities provide onsite administrative and legal assistance, educational opportunities, and a neutral space for community meetings, discussions, and events. Additionally, the GOC’s presence in rural areas was expanded by the creation of 45 Justice Houses (Casas de Justicia), which offer access to justice and peaceful conflict resolution. The Early Warning System, created in 2001 to prevent massacres and forced displacement, helps ensure prompt GOC responses to possible human rights violations. Homicides were down by 13 percent in 2005, declining to their lowest point since 1987. Kidnappings were down by 51 percent and terrorist attacks were down by 21 percent in 2005. The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) declined by 15 percent. During 2005, the Colombian government continued consolidating control in all parts of the country, maintaining a police presence in all of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities (county seats.) Under President Uribe’s administration, extraditions have increased with 304 Colombian nationals and 11 non-nationals extradited by the end of 2005. In the short term, funding will support Colombia’s follow-on efforts to Plan Colombia at levels similar to previous years, while continuing to work toward the goal of nationalizing the programs so that USG funding levels will decline in the long term. Increasing Colombian participation in funding has not been easy. President Uribe has moved faster in battling narcoterrorism than foreseen and this success has caused an increase in the operational pace of all programs. GOC support for funding, personnel, and programs has increased markedly. Colombia has doubled the percentage of GDP devoted to public security to over five percent in the last four years. The Government of Colombia has added more than 111,000 National Police and Army soldiers since 2000, with training and equipment support from the USG. The GOC also increased the number of Manual Eradication Groups (GMEs) to 60 in 2005. Thanks to increased Colombian participation in aviation activities, in Fiscal Year 2006 we will have reduced the number of U.S. contractor pilots and mechanics by over 100. Funds will be applied to expanding operational and maintenance support for military and police aviation missions, including support requirements for the helicopters protecting the Arauca pipeline. Fiscal Year 2006 will also have been the first year since 2000 without a significant increase in the helicopter or fixed-wing USG-supported fleet in Colombia. FY 2007 Program The Colombian law enforcement and military forces will use FY 2007 funding to maximize drug interdiction and eradication efforts. We are encouraged by recent preliminary reports of declining purity and increasing prices of both cocaine and heroin on U.S. streets. The reports reflect the success of the substantial investment made by USG programs. 2005 was another record year for eradication and we anticipate spraying over 130,000 hectares of coca crops and 2,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2006 and 2007. This sustained level of aerial eradication is necessary to ensure that there is no resurgence in coca or poppy cultivation. Manual eradication will continue to be a complement to aerial spraying in areas with adequate security. In FY 2007, we will continue to see an increase in the number of Colombian National Police (CNP) and Colombian army (COLAR) missions, areas of operations, and vetted units receiving U.S. support due to the increased operational pace and successes in the field. CNP funding will be used for the operation and maintenance of aircraft in support of eradication and interdiction, and to support infrastructure improvements, CNP training, and secure and interoperable communications and intelligence systems. We will work to sustain and improve interdiction units, including the highly successful 150-man mobile squadrons of Carabineros or rural police, and the three airmobile Junglas interdiction companies. As we transfer job responsibilities to the Colombian government, we are eliminating U.S. contractor positions. Simultaneously, we are enhancing our operational and maintenance capabilities in the face of added responsibilities. We are providing operational and maintenance support for the two Blackhawk helicopters and eight Huey II helicopters that arrived in May 2005 to protect the Arauca pipeline, as well as managing and maintaining the new base at Saravena in Arauca, which opened in 2005. We are also working to replace lost and aging aircraft with newer, commercially available models. We plan to acquire aircraft that can be more easily maintained and operated by the Government of Colombia in future years, when nationalization plans currently in development have been implemented. Alternative development programs work to create permanent alternative income-generation opportunities for local populations. Democracy programs seek to modernize the criminal justice system, promote access to justice for disenfranchised Colombians, protect human rights, increase government transparency and accountability, and support peace initiatives. IDP programs provide economic and social assistance to persons displaced by civil strife and violence, youth at risk of recruitment by illegal armed groups, and the communities in which they reside. ACI funding administered by the DOJ contributes to training for judges, prosecutors, and police, and the promotion of timely and effective investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations. Culture of Lawfulness programs promote awareness and appreciation for the rule of law. Funds will also be used to support the demobilization of paramilitary groups that is underway. Support to the Colombian Military Airbridge Denial Program: These funds will provide continued operational and maintenance support for the Colombian Airbridge Denial Program (ABD) consisting of five Cessna Citation 560 aircraft and two C-26 aircraft. It will also provide continued training for Colombian aircrews, USG contract ground and air safety monitors. We will also explore the possibility of using ABD assets to conduct limited maritime air patrols needed to extend Colombian Government control over trafficking by sea. This would allow the Colombian Air Force to conduct maritime patrol missions in conjunction with the Colombian Navy and Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) providing better coverage of the trafficking routes in, through and departing Colombian territory. As Colombian air operations have become more successful, the drug trafficking flight patterns and means of conveyance have changed to remote border areas close to Venezuela and Brazil and more maritime departures from the Colombian coastal areas. The ABD program was requested as a separate line item in FY 2005 and FY 2006, but has been incorporated into the regular Colombia budget in FY 2007. Other in-country costs associated with the ABD program will continue to be funded through other headings within the Colombian Military budget. Air Force Interdiction and Surveillance: Narcoterrorists have traditionally exploited Colombia’s vast and relatively unsecured borders to move illicit narcotics, weapons, money and other contraband via air. Logistical and technical assistance support will be provided to assist the Colombian Air Force in interdiction and surveillance programs in support of endgame operations against unauthorized aircraft flights (the Air Bridge Denial program) and in coordinating with COLAR and CNP Aviation units. These funds will cover in-country expenses and INL contractor costs in support of the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program. Uses include assistance in the maintenance and operation of forward operating locations, minor infrastructure improvements, fuel, training, U.S. safety monitors and specialized equipment. Funding pays for the contract maintenance and operation of Cessna Citation C-560, Cessna 182, and FAC C-26 aircraft. Navy/Maritime Interdiction: Colombia’s extensive river network connects the interior with the coastal regions and is a key link between narcotics cultivation and processing facilities and embarkation points. These funds will be used to train and equip specialized units to analyze operational intelligence and interdict contraband traffic, particularly along Colombia’s Pacific coast. The primary beneficiaries of this program are the Colombian Navy units. Support to the Colombian Police Colombian National Police (CNP) Support for Interdiction: Continued support for this program enhances Colombia’s ability to conduct interdiction operations by funding non-aviation CNP DIRAN activities, including training and equipping DIRAN's 20 operational companies and three airmobile interdiction companies (Junglas). Funding will cover DIRAN and Junglas training costs in Colombia and at U.S. military and commercial training institutions. It will also upgrade existing DIRAN interdiction facilities and construct new facilities, especially along Colombia's eastern, southern and western zones so that DIRAN can project force into these remote, but critical areas. Funding will also provide equipment and training to sustain a DIRAN Polygraph Unit to ensure the integrity of personnel performing interdiction and security duties in Colombia’s ports and other locations. The Airport Security program will continue to develop with funding for small equipment purchases, operational expenses, equipment maintenance, training of new anti-narcotics police assigned to the airports, and recertification of canines and handlers. As with eradication efforts, these programs are an ongoing cost of making the illicit drug trade unsustainable in Colombia. Colombian National Police (CNP) Administrative Support: The focus here will be on continuing base improvements, purchase of munitions and arms, maintenance, and upgrading security and equipment. The program of establishing an interoperable communications and information system to bring the bulk of the CNP to a modern and professional level will continue, as the CNP grows and their existing equipment becomes obsolete. Promote Social and Economic Progress Support for Democracy: USAID's democracy program will promote a strong democratic presence to counter the negative effects that illicit activities have on transparency, accountability, and the ability of local officials to practice good governance. The USAID democracy program provides technical assistance and training to: 1) modernize the criminal justice system and promote access to justice for all Colombians; 2) promote and protect human rights through an integrated Prevention, Protection and Response program; 3) increase government transparency and accountability with a two-pronged approach to strengthen government internal control systems and promote civil society oversight of public investment and processes; 4) strengthen political parties; and 5) support peace initiatives of civil society, while strengthening the GOC's ability to implement policies and activities in support of peace throughout Colombia. Alternative Development: USAID alternative development (AD) seeks to establish the social, institutional, and economic preconditions required to: 1) promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in regions vulnerable to drug production and conflict; and 2) place local communities in the strongest possible socio-political position to turn away permanently from involvement in illicit activities. Programs provide income and employment opportunities to rural residents and small farmers who have agreed not to grow illicit crops. AD projects also support small and medium private enterprises that generate licit income and employment opportunities and provide infrastructure to increase community cohesion and improve access to markets and services. They provide technical assistance to improve resource management in ecological buffer zones and to improve livelihoods in indigenous communities. They strengthen local and national institutions that plan rural economic development and build trade capacity. Finally, they interact with Support for Democracy programs to strengthen local governance and decentralization efforts. Support to Vulnerable Groups/IDPs: This USAID program targets IDPs and other vulnerable groups. It provides economic and social assistance to persons displaced by civil strife and violence, to youth at risk of recruitment by illegal armed groups, and to the communities in which they reside. USAID-funded activities are focused on medium- and long-term solutions leading to the sustainable re-integration of IDPs into mainstream Colombian society through programs at the national and local levels. Improved Environment for Demobilization and Reintegration: Subject to relevant legal conditions (including a certification by the Secretary of State) being fulfilled, USAID and the Department of State will provide support for the Government of Colombia’s efforts to demobilize and reintegrate (DR) illegal armed groups back into civil society and to facilitate reconciliation and the delivery of reparations to victims of the country’s armed conflict. This program provides technical assistance, institutional strengthening and implementation support for: 1) monitoring and verification of the DR process, including assurance that those responsible for serious crimes are identified, prosecuted, and punished; 2) reintegration, counseling, and job training of ex-combatants, including children; and 3) reconciliation and victims’ reparations. Administrative Support: USAID receives ACI funds to cover the administrative costs of running the alternative development program in Colombia. These funds are used to pay for salaries, benefits, and allowances of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential and warehouse leasing, field travel, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs, and other general administrative and operating expenses for the alternative development program. These funds also support the DOJ’s judicial reform programs. Significant assistance will also be provided in the areas of money laundering, asset forfeiture, organized crime, and human rights investigations and prosecutions. The DOJ projects will continue to provide training and technical assistance to complete the transition to an accusatory judicial system similar to our own. This practical training will complement the judicial projects done by USAID in its Support for Democracy program. Other Programs to Promote the Rule of Law: This portion of the budget includes drug awareness and demand reduction efforts and the important Culture of Lawfulness program that promotes a respect and appreciation for rule of law in the youth who comprise the future of Colombia. We will also provide limited technical assistance and equipment to the GOC for its individual deserter program. There is also a program for promoting institutional reform within the Ministry of Defense (MOD). This program will expand reforms within MOD related to institution building, to include strengthening civilian management and direction, and promoting nationalization. We will also continue expanding the expertise and equipment base of the bomb squad and explosive database center and provide limited support to the Prison Security project. We will also continue to support respect for rule of law and civic responsibility. The Culture of Lawfulness program is being integrated into CNP basic training programs. Already in ten cities, the program will train additional teacher trainers to move the program closer to self-sufficiency. PD&S funds are used for the general administrative and operating expenses for the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of INL programs in Colombia. Funds cover salaries, benefits, and allowances of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel; residential and warehouse leasing; field travel; International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs; and other general administrative and operating expenses for counternarcotics and as anticrime program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The NAS will also be moving into a new office building. Some funds will be used to adapt, equip, and furnish the building. In addition to salary, benefits, and allowances for personnel, these funds cover temporary duty (TDY) assistance and general administrative and indirect operating expenses that cannot be identified with a specific project. ICASS costs are the overhead costs paid to the Embassy for occupying space in the Embassy and for using basic Embassy services.
Ecuador Budget Summary ($000)
Program Objectives and Performance Indicators Interdiction
Enhanced Ecuadorian National Police, criminal justice system and military forces efforts coupled with improved cooperation disrupt the transit of drugs through Ecuador from neighboring countries.
Stabilization Criminal Justice Development Government institutions are able to better combat drug and other organized crime groups.
Economic and Social Sector Development Improvement in economic/social infrastructure decreases the vulnerability of Ecuador to the production and domestic use of illicit drugs.
Program Justification Sharing borders and a contiguous seacoast with Colombia and Peru, Ecuador is a major transit country for illicit drugs and chemicals. The armed conflict in Colombia also complicates drug interdiction on Ecuador’s northern border. Most drugs leave Ecuador by sea. Ecuadorian authorities continue to strive for improved port cargo inspections. Cocaine seizures for 2005 were at levels substantially above any recorded previous year, while seizures of heroin and precursor chemicals continued at high levels. Uneven implementation of the new criminal procedures code, a faulty judicial system, and conflicting laws hamper prosecutions. The USG provides equipment, infrastructure, and training to help improve counternarcotics performance. Weak public institutions, widespread corruption and a poorly regulated financial system make Ecuador vulnerable to organized crime. Border controls of persons and goods are undependable. Much of the population lives in poverty. Scanty government presence in a large portion of the country contributes to lawlessness. The Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) and military forces are inadequately equipped and trained to deal with international criminal or insurgent pressures. There is no evidence that significant illicit crops or drugs are produced in Ecuador. However, coca base, cocaine hydrochloride and heroin from Colombia and Peru are transshipped internationally through Ecuador's sea and airports in volumes ranging from a few hundred grams to multi-ton loads. Maritime cocaine shipments aboard Ecuadorian flag vessels and through Ecuadorian waters increased dramatically in 2005. Although Ecuador has no bilateral maritime agreement with the U.S., law enforcement operators are improving their ability to work cooperatively to facilitate boarding and search of suspect vessels by United States law enforcement personnel. Detected shipments of drugs via international mail and messenger services continued at a high level in 2005. Ecuadorian alternative development efforts are focused on economic and social development programs along the northern border that are "preventive" rather than "alternative" development, since illicit crop cultivation is not currently significant; however it still remains a major problem in the adjacent Putumayo region of Colombia. Attention to alternative development will take advantage of the current relative stability in the north to further consolidate successes to date in containing narcotrafficking spillover threats. Program Accomplishments Overall, seizures were at a record-setting pace with nearly 45 metric tons of cocaine seized in 2005. The USG continued to receive excellent cooperation from the ENP and from the Armed Forces, who do the bulk of b | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
