Exerpts: September 24 Press Briefing

Question: Can you talk a bit about the report on Ukraine providing Iraq with some sensitive equipment? And I believe there might have even been guidance on this yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Boucher: The reports of the sale of an early warning system from Ukraine to Iraq have been around for some time. What is new is that we've recently concluded an analysis of a July 2000 recording that was provided by the former Ukrainian presidential bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko. On one of the tapes, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is heard approving the clandestine sale of "Kolchuga" early warning systems to Iraq, and we believe this recording to be authentic.

This recording's authentication has led us to reexamine our policy towards Ukraine, in particular towards President Kuchma. We've initiated a temporary pause in new obligations of Freedom Support Act assistance that goes to the central government of Ukraine while we carry out this review.

The pause doesn't affect the bulk of our assistance to Ukraine, which goes to the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations and local and regional government bodies. Programs to support activities like small business, land titling and exchanges will continue. Our military-to-military and nonproliferation assistance would likewise be unaffected. But what we're doing is we're having a pause in programs that are with the central government authorities. These programs had a budget of approximately $54 million in fiscal year 2002 and they represent about 35 percent of our total Freedom Support Act assistance to Ukraine. Programs that are funded under this budget have included work with the Ukrainian Government on reforms in fiscal and commercial law, pensions and government regulations.

We remain committed now more than ever to help Ukraine undertake needed political and economic reforms and draw closer to the rest of Europe. Our ongoing policy review reflects our serious concern that illicit transfers to Iraq were approved by President Kuchma, as well as our determination to discourage further transfers by Ukraine or by any other country that violates UN sanctions on Iraq.

Question: -- (inaudible) about these for at least a year, I think, if not even longer than that. I remember last summer it was an issue. Was the US already leaning toward believing these stories or did it really take the tape to convince you that Kuchma had personally done this?

Mr. Boucher: I think there were a variety of stories around. There wasn't necessarily evidence or confirmation of any kind, and it was the examination of these tapes that led to that confirmation and therefore the policy conclusions that we're drawing.

Question: The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has denied this but denied it in a very interesting way, saying that there's no way that there could ever be any sales or delivery of such items to Iraq under their guidelines. Is there any evidence that this radar system was ever delivered, actually delivered to Iraq?

Mr. Boucher: We're not certain that it was, that these systems are in Iraq. On the other hand, there are some indications that suggest it may be there, and we're continuing to assess those.

Question: One other thing. I realize that although you date back to the last administration, I'm not sure you date back as far as July -- were you? I don't remember. Anyway, apparently one of the reasons that you guys are so upset about this is because this tape recording is from just very close to a time that former President Clinton was in Kiev and met with President Kuchma.

And I'm wondering if you remember back then, or if there is any institutional memory of whether this kind of thing -- sales, high-tech sales to Iraq -- was discussed at those meetings or at that meeting, and whether or not President Kuchma assured former President Clinton that he wasn't going to be -- that Ukraine wasn't going to be doing that kind of thing.

Mr. Boucher: Frankly, I don't remember for sure. The issue of sales to Iraq and respect for UN sanctions was indeed a frequent -- has been for a long time -- a frequent subject of discussion with the Ukraine Government at the highest levels because we're all aware that Ukraine has manufacturers and equipment that Iraq has sought to procure in the past because it was compatible with their previous stocks of military equipment. So it's been an ongoing issue that we've discussed frequently with the Ukraine Government to try to ensure that they protected against sales and made sure that no sales were made, despite Iraq's attempts to procure military equipment.

Whether a specific sale like this came up during the visit of President Clinton, I think I'd have to leave to the record that's already out there. I'm sure there were extensive White House briefings during that trip and you can probably find out from there how this issue was addressed.

Question: Can you tell us whether there was any direct, once you've come to this conclusion, direct contacts either with our Ambassador or with Secretary Powell to the Foreign Ministry, and what maybe the message was? ‘How could you?’ Something like that?

Mr. Boucher: There have been direct contacts between our Ambassador and the authorities in Kiev, and we have told them quite bluntly what we have concluded and what we were doing with our programs.

Question: Wait, wait. Is there some reason that you're particularly upset about -- had you received official assurances from Kuchma that this sale had not happened and that -- or that he had not approved it?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know. I'd have to look back at the record on that one, too. I don't particularly remember that.

I would say that any leader approving the sale to Iraq of this sophisticated detection system in violation of UN Security Council resolutions is a very serious matter, and that's a matter that we would take seriously no matter who it is. But it is a very serious matter to have a national leader approving a sale in violation of UN resolutions.

Question: Are you planning to take action against Ukraine at the United Nations for violation of the Security Council resolutions?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know. We'll have to see. I don't know.

Question: Richard, is there anything they can do now to, you know, to get out of this, to get their money restored? And since they've already approved it and possibly delivered it, or appear to have done, what can they do to --

Mr. Boucher: I don't really have anything further to say on it at this moment. Certainly providing the full information on the situation and what may or may not have been delivered would be helpful, but I don't have a list of required things that I'd like to see them do at this point.

Question: Just one more extremely briefly. You said that this has caused you to review your policy towards President Kuchma himself. Does this mean that he could possibly join that growing list of world leaders that you're not too thrilled about having in power?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know of any particular list like that, Matt. We call 'em the way we see 'em when we see 'em.

Question: Right, exactly. But, I mean, is there -- but is there something that you could take action against him personally, kind of like the sanctions that you've imposed on President Mugabe and his --

Mr. Boucher: As I said, we're reviewing the situation in terms of our relations with him, and we will decide accordingly and tell you when it's time.

Okay. Same thing?

Question: -- tapes involving President Kuchma? Did you just verify the authenticity of this one, or did you --

Mr. Boucher: That's right. We really looked at this particular tape because of the issues involved. I don't have any broader --

Question: Nothing on like the --

Mr. Boucher: Nothing broader on the tapes.

Question: The Middle East?

Mr. Boucher: The Middle East? We're going to shift to the Middle East. Okay.

Question: -- brought a resolution that got through the Security Council, which the US didn't stop, although it could have with a veto; simply abstained, obviously knowing that means it would be approved by such countries as Syria. Why did the United States allow this to go through? What was your thinking? That it reflected your criticism of Ariel Sharon, or what?

Mr. Boucher: It reflected the direction we wanted to go in, but it didn't go far enough. It didn't provide the clarity and the context that we thought were required. We ourselves tabled a draft resolution late Monday afternoon. Our draft was much more explicit on terrorism, those who perpetuate it, the need to combat it, strong support for the Quartet and the political process that we have underway on the ground. We felt it was important to specify that groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade were killing civilians, obstructing the Quartet's efforts and Palestinian reform process prospects. So we abstained on this resolution because we didn't think it went far enough in identifying and condemning those groups.

Question: Yeah, but that sounds like a pretty strong series of objections, so my question really is why didn't you kill it and try to get a resolution more to your liking?

Mr. Boucher: As I said, we proposed a resolution ourselves when this draft finally came forward at, whenever it was, 2 or 3 a.m. We felt it was flawed but that we could abstain.

Question: So, in other words, you were looking for a resolution that you could support, rather than looking to defeat another resolution?

Mr. Boucher: We had, in fact, proposed a resolution; that we could support our own resolution, yes.

Question: Well, you also didn't -- but, you know, you didn't oppose this one, so --

Mr. Boucher: We abstained on this because the text was modified. It didn't go far enough in the direction we thought it should.

Question: Richard, I'm sure you've seen the Israeli reaction. Essentially, they are saying that they won't comply with the withdrawal requirements in the resolution until the Palestinians do things which may take some time to be sure that they are doing them. What do you think of this Israeli response?

Mr. Boucher: I'm not going to get into a whole back-and-forth. I think you know that we have been proceeding along the lines that the President laid out in his June 24 speech and that we have been working with the Quartet and the Israelis and Palestinians and others to accomplish those goals: real reform and transformation on the Palestinian side and reciprocal steps on the Israeli side so that they will withdraw back to the areas of September 2000.

Those goals remain. Those attempts remain. Those efforts to build clean Palestinian security institutions, to stop terrorism through cooperation, all those things remain as important and we'll continue to pursue them.

Question: Can I just follow up? You're not really answering the question. This is a UN Security Council resolution, even if you abstained on it, and therefore it has the authority of the UN Security Council behind it. Are you not even asking for immediate withdrawal, as the resolution does?

Mr. Boucher: The resolution --

Question: It does say immediate withdrawal. Read it. And it does say -- there's the word "immediate" in there.

Mr. Boucher: No, it says "demands that Israel immediately cease measures in and around Ramallah, demands also the withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces." Those are both things that we're working very intensely on.

Question: So you are calling for that, are you?

Mr. Boucher: We are -- as I said, we've asked the Israelis to refrain from further action and we continue to work with both parties to try to resolve the situation. I will just leave it at that for the moment.

Question: Was this an occasion -- was this conveyed by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, as Saturday night he, you know, made the US request? In other words, did the Secretary get back on the telephone and say, ‘Mr. Sharon, the UN feels this way’?

Mr. Boucher: No, he hasn't telephoned Prime Minister Sharon again, but our Ambassador has been in touch with Prime Minister Sharon and his office. We're in constant touch with them as well as with the Palestinians to see what we can do.

Question: Richard, how are you going answer for the double standard on this? I mean --

Mr. Boucher: I think the evidence that the United States working with the parties, working with the Quartet to implement UN resolutions on Israeli-Palestinian issues, is quite clear. We've been very active. We remain very active.

Question: Well, I'm a little confused by your answer to Jonathan's earlier question. You do want the Israelis to comply with this resolution, don't you?

Mr. Boucher: We do want the Israelis to comply with this resolution. We continue to work on issues such as withdrawal, and we've urged them to refrain from further action in and around Ramallah. Those are things that we had, in fact, in our draft resolution of things that we want people to do.

We also want for the Palestinians to take their responsibilities and to stop the violence, to stop the terrorist groups and their ability to conduct actions that only kill innocent civilians and undermine the peace process.

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Question: I don't know if the Jordanian Foreign Minister's meeting concluded by the time you were coming down here. So is there a point in asking about that meeting?

Mr. Boucher: Sure.

Question: All right. Well, he had a lot to say last night. It took him about a half an hour to go through a checklist, but I wonder if he said the same critical things to the Secretary that he said at the Council on Foreign Relations last night; for instance, move ahead with the Arab peace plan, it isn't your business if Arafat is in charge, you're trying to fit the Middle East to your concept, you're trying to inject democracy, which can't be injected with a syringe.

Mr. Boucher: All very interesting, Barry, but I'm not going to try to --

Question: What was the meeting about?

Mr. Boucher: I will tell you what the meeting was about, but I'm not in the position of speaking for the Jordanian Foreign Minister. He does quite well on his own. The meeting was about two major issues: one was the Middle East peace process; the other was Iraq.

On the Middle East peace process, the Secretary and Jordanian Foreign Minister discussed the situation right now in Ramallah, the UN resolution that was passed, looking for steps and ways that we can try to help resolve this situation; and second of all, they talked about the overall progress that we hope to make down the road that the President outlined on June 24th and the need to stick to that. The Quartet statement and the work the Quartet was doing and how the Quartet would pursue that work, I guess, was the main topic on the more general things.

Second of all, on the issue of Iraq, the Jordanians were pleased that the President had taken the issue to the United Nations. And the Secretary discussed the need for the United Nations to deal effectively with the issue and to really take the issue on, the need for the United Nations to tell Iraq how to comply with the disarmament provisions of its resolutions and how to comply with the other resolutions.

Question: Did he at least say, ‘Don't attack Iraq?’ He said that would be his first order of business.

Mr. Boucher: As I said, we discussed Iraq and we discussed the need for the UN to deal with the issue. I will leave it at that.

Question: And did he question --

Mr. Boucher: I'm not speaking for the Jordanian Foreign Minister. I'm not going to pass out a bunch of quotes that he may or may not have said. It's not my job to talk for him. If you want to ask the Jordanian Foreign Minister what he said to the Secretary, feel free to ask the Jordanian Foreign Minister.

Question: Does the Secretary agree with the Jordanian Foreign Minister that the pace of Mideast peacemaking should be picked up, that the Arab peace plan should proceed irrespective of whether Yasser Arafat is in charge or not?

Mr. Boucher: The Secretary and the Jordanian Foreign Minister, as I just said, discussed how to continue to pursue our efforts, how to keep working on the issues that are outlined in the President's speech, how to continue working along the lines of the Quartet statement, and those remain important both to Secretary and to the Jordanians. In terms of the Arab League peace plan, that was also addressed just last week in the -- last week? -- in the Quartet statement and that remains an important part of our -- how can I say -- of the framework of pursing these goals.

Question: Richard, one of your complaints last week was that the Iraqis had not offered unfettered access to any site in Iraq, but only unconditional return. They've now made that step. Do you -- would you -- do you welcome that step?

Mr. Boucher: I haven't seen every word that the -- I guess it was the Lieutenant General or somebody that gone on today. Just the other day, they were rejecting any possibility, any new UN resolution. So you kind of have the Iraqis, you know, one day here and one day there. And I think it just reiterates, makes the point once again, how important it is for the Council, for the Security Council to define what it is that Iraq has to do, to define what "without conditions," what "unrestricted," and "unfettered" will mean, and then for Iraq to comply.

If Iraq were really interested in complying, really interested in disarmament, they would have started to admit their program, started to admit to the information that that British have put out in their dossier or even the information that the inspectors reported two years ago in public.

Question: Richard, in the meeting with the Jordanian Foreign Minister, did you discuss at all the possibility of using Jordan as a base of operations for any attacks on Iraq?

Mr. Boucher: As I said, they discussed UN action on Iraq and the need for the UN to deal with the issue. I will leave it at that.

Question: But you can't say yes or no to that question?

Mr. Boucher: I will leave it at that.

Question: Okay.